the presence of a thing in a fit subject but privation is the absence thereof as sight is a habit blindness privation The Canons or Rules are three 1. Habit and privation are abâ—ut the same subject And hence privation cannot properly be but in that subject which is capable of the Habit a man therefore may be said to be blind but a stone cannot 2. Privative opposition requires determination of a certain time neither can privation be spoken of a subject but after the time that by its nature and fitness it might receive the habit as none can be said to be bald until the time that according to nature they should have hair 3. From privation to habit there is no regress naturally the privation being perfect that is such as doth take away the act and next beginnings of habit and leaveth nothing in the subject but the remote beginnings thereof thus he that is once quite blind cannot ordinarily and by natural means ever see again 13. Contradictory opposition is between contradictory terms And those things are said to be contradictory which are expresly contrary as affirmation and negation as a thing and not a thing a man and not a man The Canons or Rules are two 1. Contradiction is the first of all oppositions and so the measure of all the rest for in every opposition there is virtually included a contradiction and the opposition is to be thought so much the greater by how much it cometh nearer to a contradiction 2. Between contradictory things there is no medium neither of abnegation or of the subject and therefore one of the contradictory things is affirmed of a thing and not a thing nor of participation or of the form CHAP. XV. Of Order and of that which is said to be together before or after ORder is that according to which some thing is said to be before or after another thing or together with it 2. A thing may be said to be before or after another five several waies 1. In time 2. In nature 3. In disposition or order 4. In honour 5. In Causality 3. That is said to be first in time that is the most ancient thus Romulus was before Cato and the City Pergamus before that of Rome 4. That is said to be first in nature which cannot be reciprocally affirmed in consecution of existence as there is a man therefore there is a living creature but it doth not follow there is a living creature therefore there is a man a living creature therefore is in nature before a man and every Genus before its species 5. That is said to be first in order or disposition which is nearest the beginning Thus the Exordium in an oration is said to be before the proposition the proposition before the narration the narration before the confirmation the confirmation before the refutation the refutation before the conclusion and in every science or discipline that is first which is put in the first place and thus letters are before syllables 6. That is said to be first in honour or dignity that is the most worthy thus a King is before his Subjects a Father before his Son a Master before his Servant Gold before Silver and Vertue before Gold 7. That is said to be first in Causality which is any way the cause of another's existence thus the Sun is before Light 8. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another it may also be said to be after 9. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another it may be also said to be together with another but two of the waies are more usual than the rest together in time and together in nature 10. They are said to be together in time that are existent at the same time 11. Things may be said to be together two waies primarily and secundarily 12. They are said to be primarily together in time which begin to be at the same time and they are said to be secundarily together in time when the one begins to be before the other doth cease to be thus Aristotle and Plato are said to be cotemporaneous or together in time though Plato was born before Aristotle and did also die before him 13. Things may be said to be together in nature two ways first simply and absolutely and then in respect of some third 14. Things are said to be together simply and absolutely which are reciprocally together according to the consecution of existence but so that the one is not the cause of the others existence Thus the relate and correlate are together in nature and two effects depending upon the same next cause as risibility and docibility in man 15. Things are said to be together in respect of some third thing which under the same Genus are in division opposed to one another thus a man and a beast are said to be together in nature not simply and absolutely in respect of themselves but in respect of a living creature for a living creature is predicated of them both together and not of one first and another after In this a Synonymous Genus is distinguished from a homonymous or aequivocal Genus because this is not predicated of its several species together but of one first and another after CHAP. XVI Of Motion COncerning Motion four things are to be considered 1. The Praecognita 2. The Definition 3. The several kinds 4. The Rules belonging to it 2. The Praecognita are either such as concern the definition or such as concern the division thereof 3. The Praecognita concerning the definition of motion are three 1. The subject in which it is 2. The two terms from which and to what 3. The measure or instant time and from these three every motion must be defined 4. The Praecognita concerning the division of motion or the several kinds of it are also three 1. Motion is taken two waies viz. either generally for any mutation whether it be in time or in an instant and thus it comprehendeth Generation and Corruption or specially for some mutation which is made and measured by time thus it comprehendeth these four species augmentation diminution alteration and location and not Generation Corruption 2. Motion as it is divided here is motion generally taken and as it comprehendeth all these mutations 3. Motion although it be put as a post-predicament yet it is also in a predicament but in a diverse manner it is in the predicament of position as it is in its own nature but here as it is taken in reference to its terms from which and to what 5. Motion in the general is thus defined Motion is a mutation made in the subject viz. either in the first matter or in the body from one term to another either in time or in an instant 6. Motion is twofold instantaneous or successive 7. Instantaneous motion is that which is made in an instant and this is Generation or Corruption 8. Generation is an
species and this is either hardly removed from the subject and is called a habit as vertue or easily removed from the subject and is called disposition as a disposition unto vertue 5. An innate or inbred quality is such a quality as is natural and this Aristotle maketh the second species this maketh the subject apt and fit for action and is some natural faculty or power as risibility is a faculty naturally belonging unto man 6. A Patible quality is such a quality as doth affect the senses and causeth passion in them and that either by it self or by accident 7. A Patible quality affecting the sense by it self Aristotle maketh the third species and is that which either affecteth the body or the mind 8. A Patible quality which doth by it self affect the body is either such a quality as cannot be easily moved as whiteness or such a quality as may be easily removed and is some passion of the body as blushing 9. A Patible quality which doth of it self affect the mind is also either hardly removed as inveterate anger or easily removed as some sudden passion of love or hatred 10. A Patible quality which doth affect the senses or causeth passion by accident Aristotle maketh the fourth species and this is external proportion either in things natural and then it is the form of the thing or in things artificial and then it is the Figure 11. To the first species of quality do all the habits of the body belong as health sickness and all kind of diseases and all infused habits as faith charity and the gift of tongues with all disciplines whether of arts or sciences both speculative and practical as Logick Geometry Physicks Metaphysicks and Divinity and all both vertues and vices 12. To the second species of Quality belong all faculties proceeding from the essential forms of all substances as the faculty of willing speaking laughing in man of neighing and running in a horse and the vertue of herbs mettals and stones all occult qualities as sympathy and Antipathy and all influences of celestial bodies the temperament of the body and disposition of the mind and such like 13. To the third species of quality belong all objects of sense as of seeing tasting smelling hearing and feeling 14. To the fourth species of quality belong all Mathematical figures with all natural and artificial forms of bodies The Canons or rules of qualitie are three 1. Qualities only admit of contrarieties as heat and cold the contrariety of qualites is most discernable in the third species sometimes in the first but not so frequently in the second and fourth 2. Qualities do admit of degrees asf more and less but this doth not belong to all qualities 3. Things in reference unto their qualities may be said to be like or unlike CHAP. XI Of Action Action is an accident by which a subject is said to be doing and that by one of these three waies 1. By some intrinsick quality as fire by its beat acts in the water 2. Instrumentally as he that effects some thing with a sword or gun or such like 3. By the very formality of action and so it is to be taken in this predicament 2. Action as it is taken in this predicament is twofold immanent or transient 3. An immanent action is that which doth not cause any real change in the thing that suffers as understanding sâ—ght 4. A transient action is that which doth occasion a real change in the thing that suffers as heat cold c. The Canons or Rules of Action are three 1. Action doth admit of contrariety 2. Actions are capable of more and less These two rules are not proper unto actions in respect of themselves but by and for their qualities by means of which the Agent acteth nor are they agreeable to every action and this is most proper unto action 3. Every action doth of it self infer passion 5. Passion is an accident by which the subject is called patient or it is the effect and a certain reception of action for every passion is received not so much by the condition of the agent as by the disposition of the patient 6. Passion is either transmutative or intentional 7. A transmutative passion is that which maketh some real alteration in the patient and answereth unto a transient action 8. An intentional passion is that which terminateth the action without any real alteration in the patient and this answereth to an imminent action The Canons or Rules of Passion are three 1. Passion doth admit of Contrariety 2. Passion admitteth of more and less both these are to be understood as in the predicament of action hath been declared 3. Passion is of it self and immediate inferred from action and this is is most proper unto passion CHAP. XII Of Relation HItherto we have spoken of such predicaments as are absolute accidents come we now to that which is respective namely relation 2. Relation is a respective accident by which one thing is predicated of another or by some way may be referred unto another 3. Relation is twofold intentional or real 4. Intentional Relation is that by which some second intention is referred to another thus Genus and species the cause and the caused the subject and the accident are things that are related 5. Real relation is that by which the thing it self is referred unto another and this two-fold 1. Accidental when one thing is referred not in respect of its essence or nature but only by Accident as possessor and possession 2. Essential when one thing is referred unto another according to its nature and essence as Father and Son Master and servant 6. In every Relation two things are required the subject and the term 7. That is called the subject which is referred unto another and that the term to which the subject is referred The subject is called the Relate and the term is called the Correlate 9. The relate and correlate are mutually referred to one another and that by a double relation in which reciprocation that which is the subject of one relation is the term of the other and the contrary 10. In like manner that which is the relate in one relation is the correlate in the other and the contrary 11. Every relate or respective is founded in some absolute predicament as aequality in quantity likeness in quality Paternity in action 12. Relates and Correlates as they are such are both together in nature and knowledge and so do mutually put or take away one another as well in being as in knowing 13. Relates are taken two ways 1. Materially for those things with which the Relations do agree as a father is taken for the man begetting the Son for him that is begotten and so they are not together in nature for the father as a man must needs be before the son 2. Formally for that very relation which is in the subjects by which the terms are mutually referred to one another as the father
to his son and so they are in nature together 14. Knowledge and knowable are taken three ways 1. Both Actually thus that is called knowledge by which we actually know a thing that knowable which is actually known and so they are in nature together 2. Both potentially as that is called knowable which may be known and that knowledge which we may know and so also they are in nature together 3. One Actually and the other potentially and so knowledge is taken for that which we actually know and knowable for that which may be known and so they are not both together in nature The Canons or Rules of Relates are three 1. Relates admit of contrariety A Relate is not contrary to its Correlate but one Relate is contrary to another yet not in respect of themselves but in respect of their subjects This rule therefore doth not hold in all but in such relates only which have contrary foundations or subjects thus a friend and an enemy are contrary because the foundations of friendship and enmity to wit wishing well and wishing ill are contrary 2. Relates are capable of more and less this rule also holds in respect of the subject or foundation and therefore in those relates only which have a changable subject or foundation For when the subject or foundation is varied the Relation is intended or remitted For example unequal things are made more or less unequal when Quantity which is the subject of inequality is in one of the two more or less 3. Relates are convertible that is every Relate is referred to its reciprocal Correlate as a master is the master of a servant and a servant is the servant of some master CHAP. XIII Of the four last Predicaments HItherto I have spoken of the principal predicaments the less principal now follow and they are four When Where Situation Habit. 2. The Predicament When is an Accident by which finite things are said to be in time past present or to come The words belonging to this predicament make answer to such questions as are made by this word When as to day to morrow yesterday and the like The properties thereof is to accommodate time to persons things or Actions 3. The Predicament where is an Accident by which things finite are said to be in some place where is not the place it self but notes the manner or circumstance of place and maketh answer to such questions as are made by this word where as at home within without in this or that Countrey c. The property thereof is to accommodate place to persons things and actions 4. The Predicament of Situation is a certain Ordination of parts and generation or a placing of parts in Generation to make up situation a threefold habitude is required 1. Of the parts of some whole among themselves 2. Of the parts of some whole unto that whole 3. Of the parts and the whole in reference to place Yet every ordination of parts is not site or situation but that only which they have in the whole by Generation The propertie thereof is to be the nearest assistant unto substance of all the extrinsecal respective accidents All gestures and positions of body belong to this as standing sitting walking c. Not as they signifie these actions but as they signifie the position and order of the parts in the whole or in some place 5. The predicament of Habit is an accident by which some garment or something like a garment is put about hanged upon or any other way joyned to a body The body having it is a substance the thing habiting is always some artificial form belonging to the fourth Species of Qualitie The Application of this to it is that which maketh this predicament The propertie thereof is always to be inherent in many in the habit and in him that hath it but in divers respects for it is in the body that hath it as in a subject in the habit or thing framed as in a cause To this belong all kind of garments whether they be such as are used for necessity as shoes for the feet and cloaths for the rest of the body or for distinction as a Mitre a Gown whether for Divines Lawyers or Citizens or for ornament as rings Jewells Deckings and the like CHAP. XIV Of Opposition HAving done with the Antepredicaments and the Predicaments themselves the Postpredicaments now follow and they are four Opposition Order Motion and Manner of having 2. Opposition is such a repugnancy of two simple terms as neither the one can agree with the other nor both of them with a third after one and the same manner 3. One of the opposites is either opposed to one or to many those oppositions where one is opposed to many are called Disparates as a man and a horse of which Aristotle in his Logick makes no mention nor are they to be reckoned amongst the kinds of opposition 4. Those oppositions where one is opposed to one are either of a thing and a thing or of a â—hing and not a thing 5. Opposition of a thing and a thing is either Relative or Contrary 6. Relative opposition is between the relaâ—ive terms as the relate and his correlate for though the relates do mutually depend upon one another in reference to their simple being yet are they opposed to one another in reference to their being in a subject as father and son but this is the least kind of opposition The conditions belonging to these are set down in the Predicament of Relation 7. Contrary opposition is between contrary â—erms And these are called contraries that being contained under the same Genus are at the greatest distance between themselves and mutually expell one another from the same subject that is capable of them as heat and cold 8. Contraries are of two sorts mediate and immediate 9. Immediate contraries are such as admit of no medium between them but the one of them is always in the subject that is capable of them as like and unlike health and sickness 10. Mediate contraries are such as do admit of some medium so that though one be expelled it is not necessary that the other should be in that subject from which the first is expelled as white and black The Canons or Rules of Contraries are these following 1. True contrarietie by it self is not to be found but in qualities by themselves and absolutely taken 2. Contraries in the highest degrees cannoâ— be in the same subject so what is hot in the highest degree cannot be cold at all but in remiss degrees they may both be in the same subject 3. One of the contraries being remitted the other is intended or heightened and the contrary for every subject capable of two contrary qualities must needs be filled up with the whole possible latitude of one of them 11. Opposition of a thing and not a thing is either privative or contradictory 12. Privative opposition is between Habit and privation And Habit is
the earth doth not alwaies find gold 4. In a cause not sufficient of it self as he is not alwaies learned that is industrious nor that ground alwaies fertil that is well tilled because to both these more is required The latter part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In a cause by accident as he that doth not dig into the earth may find a treasure 2. In a cause that may but is not as a building may stand though the Architect be dead 3. As oft as the effect may be produced by diverse causes as Socrateâ— may die though he doth not drink poyson 2. The effect being granted the cause is also granted and the effect being taken away the cause is taken away also The first part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a treasure may be found though the earth be not digged 2. In an effect that doth remain after the cause as the house may remain though the builder be dead 3. In an effect that may be produced by diverse causes as a man may die though not by poyson The latter part hath also three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a man may dig in the earth and not find a treasure 2. In an effect which was but is not as a building may be destroyed though the builder be living 3. In an effect produced by a free agent as there may be a Physician although he doth not cure any disease 3. Such as the cause is such is the effect and the contrary as if the tree be good the fruit will be good and the contrary both parts of this Canon have two limitations 1. In aequivocal causes and effects as the draught may be beautiful though the painter be deformed 2. In a material cause for some thing that is extrinsecal as ice is not fluid because water is so 4. That for which any thing is such is much more such it self as the air being hot by reason of fire doth argue that fire is much hotter than air This rule faileth 1. Where both are not such as wine which maketh a man drunk is not it self more drunk because drunkenness cannot be said to be in wine 2. Where it doth not receive more and less as a father is not more a man than a son although he be the cause why the son is a man for humanity doth not receive more and less 3. In a cause not sufficient of it self as a Master which maketh his schollar learned is not alwaies more learned than his schollar for by his ingenuity and industry it sometimes so comes to pass that the schollar is more learned than the master 5. The cause is in nature before the effect as reason before risibility and this never faileth for a final cause in which it only seems to fail although it be in act and execution after the effect yet it is before it in the intention of the agent for which only reason it is the cause CHAP. XII Of the Topicks from the Subject and the Accident WE do not here take the subject for substance in which the accident is inherent or accident for that which doth precisely and adequately adhere to the substance but subject is here taken for all that to which any thing not belonging to its essence is attributed An accident is here taken for every such attribute as number is the subject of equality that is it is an accident of an accident An accident may be divided many ways and so may a subject for an accident is 1. either proper or common 2. Separable or inseparable 3. Inherent or internal and adherent or external 4. And chiefly it is either accidental as weariness doth accompany a feaver a pale Moon rain and all prognosticating signs Concomitant as an Eclipse of the Full-Moon and consequent as a day to the twilight signs and circumstances do also belong to this Topick The Canons or Rules are five 1. The subject being granted the proper accident is also granted and being taken away the proper accident is taken away also and the contrary as if he be a man he is risible and the contrary and if he be not a man he is not risible nor the contrary This rule never faileth by reason of the reciprocation of the subject and the proper accident 2. The subject being granted the common accident is also granted but not the contrary as if it be snow it is white but if it be white it is not therefore snow The first part of â—his rule faileth in separable accidents as if â—t be water it is not therefore cold And the â—atter part faileth 1. In a proper accident â—he first way as if there be knowledge there â—s a man 2. In an individual accident as â—f there be this whiteness there is snow because an accident doth not change its subâ—ect 3. A common accident being taken away â—he subject is taken away but not the contraâ—y as if it be not white it is not snow but yet there may be white though there be no snow The first part faileth in a separable accident the latter in a proper accident the first way and in an individual accident and subject as in the former rule 4. The thing being granted the circumstance of time and place is granted and the circumstance being taken away the thing is taken away as if Milo did kill Clodius then Milo was living and present if he was neither living nor present he did not kill him This rule never faileth in any requisite circumstance necessarily 5. The antecedent concomitant consequent being granted the consequent concomitant and antecedent for every exigence is also granted to wit a concomitant in being an antecedent in being or that hath been a consequent in being or that will be and being taken away the other is taken away also as if there be an Eclipse there is a full Moon if there be a birth there was a conception if there be a twilight the Sun will rise This rule faileth 1. In a thing not cohering necessarily as he which is a Philosopher must not of necessity be therefore poor and if there be a Comet it doth not follow there must be war 2. In things cohering necessarily if there be not a mutual necessity for though it be true that if there be an Eclipse there is a Full Moon yet it doth not follow that if there be a Full Moon there must always be an Eclipse yet these things not necessary are of great force to beget belief especially if many of them shall be joined together in one Hence Astrologers Physiognomers and Orators do highly value this Topick in questions of fact especially CHAP. XIII Of the Topicks from Dissentany and Comparison DIssentanies are either Opposites or Disparates as a Horse and a Bull. There are four kinds of Opposites of which Book I. Chap. 13. Comparisons are either in respect of quality as like and unlike or in respect of quantity or also of