was are they who change our temperatures by their art of Physick Therefore the soule which is the essence of a living-creature cannot be the temperature Neither is the Soule a quality of the body For the qualities of every body are subject to sense But the soule is not subject to sense but to understanding onely and therefore it is not a Quality Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits accompanied with flesh and sinewes and such other things is strength And that the good temperature of hot and cold dry and moist things is health And that the measurable proportion of the members with a fresh colour is cause of the beauty which is in the Body Now if the soul be a certaine harmony of health and strength and beauty It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him can neither be sick nor weake nor deformed But wee see by often experience that even while the living-soule continueth in them many men are deprived not only of one but of all these good temperatures insomuch that the very same man is deformed and weak and sick all at once Therefore the soule is not the good temperature of the Bodie Some will aske perhaps how it comes to passe if the soule be not the temperature of the body that men are vitious or vertuous according to their naturall constitutions and complexions and they may demand also whether these things proceed not frō the tēperature We answer that they doe indeed proceed from the bodily temperature For as there bee some naturally healthfull or sickly by reason of their constitution So othersome naturally abounding in bitter choller are froward and some other cowardly or leacherous more or lesse according to their complexions But there bee some who overcome these naturall inclinations and by getting the victory over them doe evidently manifest that these temperatures may bee suppressed Now that which overcommeth is one thing and that which is overcome is another thing Therefore the temperature is also one thing and the soule which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature is another thing and not the same The body being an instrument which the soule useth if it bee well fitted for the same is a helper unto the soule and she the better useth it to her own contentment But if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule 's use it becommeth her hinderance and much adoe hath she to strive against the unfitnesse of her instrument Yea so much that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument even as a musitian misseth of true musick when his harp is out of tune The soule therefore must be carefull of the body and make it a fit instrument for her selfe which may be done by ordering it according to Reason and by accustoming the same to good manners as in Harmony otherwhile slackning and sometime winding up according as necessity requires By the neglect whereof shee her selfe may else as it often happeneth become as faultie and as perverse as her Instrument SECT 4. I. The SOVL is not a perpetuall motion as Aristotle affirmes Hee shewes what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is and the defects of Aristoles judgement concerning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live before the SOVL commeth unto it as Aristole hath also affirmed III. The SOVL is neither unmovable of it selfe nor accidentally moved nor bred in the Body as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered ARistotle affirming that the Soule is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perpetuall motion is neverthelesse to bee accounted among them who say that the SOUL is a quality But first let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is to say a perpetuall motion He divideth a substance into three parts The first is matter which is as it were the subject and this matter is in it selfe nothing but a generating power out of which another thing may bee formed The second part of the Essence is forme or speciall kinde by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme The third part consisteth both of matter and forme united together and endued with life The matter being a thing in possibility only and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes That is to say either as you consider of a science or of a contemplation according to the science as a habit or as working by that habit It is considerable as a science because in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde as wee may call it both of sleepe and of waking This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation and sleepe represents the having of this habit without any working thereby The Science is before working according to that science and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is the first continued motion The working according to this forme he names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second continued motion As for example The eye consisteth of a materiall subject and of a certaine forme This materiall subject is in the eye it selfe even that which containeth the sight I meane the matter of the eye and this matter is equivocally called the eye But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the operation wherby it seeth A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned hath yet an aptnesse to receive such a motion Even in such maner we must conceive of it in the SOUL When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body it perfects the living-creature So then in a perfect living-creature neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie neither the Body without the Soul For the SOUL is not the Body it selfe but it is the SOUL of the BODY and therefore it is in the Body yea and in such a kinde of body for it hath not an existence by it self Aristotle first calls the possible inferiour part of the soul by the Name of the soul severing the Reasonable-part from it wheras hee should have taken the whole soul of Man together and not have given his judgement of the whole by a part much lesse by the weakest part there of Aristotle hath affirmed also that the body hath an aptnesse to live even before the soul commeth unto it For he saith that the body hath in it selfe a possibility to live Now the body which hath in it self a possibility to live must first be actually a body before it receives that form For such a body is a matter void of all qualities Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually it self should have in it an aptnesse whereby another thing may be made of it If it be a bodie and hath in it self no other being but in possibility only how can that which
altered and the sense discernes this alteration Now many times the name of the sense and of the seats of the sense are confounded But sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe but of the workings of the sense And therefore some define it thus Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde unto the bodily instruments It is thus also defined Sense is a power of the soule which taketh hold of sensible things and the seat of the sense is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible Plato sayes thus Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things For the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule but the instrument pertaines to the body and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded othersome to rule and bear sway The part which hath in it understanding and knowledge was ordained to rule Those which appertaine to sense and to the motions by appetite as also our ability of speaking are made to serve and bee at command For our voice and our motion by appetite are obedient to reaon most speedily and almost in a momēt of time For wee Will and are moved together and at once so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion as we may see in the moving of our fingers Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason as those which wee call perturbations CAP. 7. SECT 1. I. Of the sense of sight and the opinions of Hipparchus of the Geometricians of Epicurus and Aristotle concerning the same II. The opinions of Plato and of Galen touching the same sense and of the cause of seeing III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification for sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight and some time the power of the sense it selfe Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes take hold as it were of outward things with the farthest ends of them even as if a man should lay his hand on them and presents or yeelds those things whereof they have so taken hold to our sight But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures which are called Cones broad at the first and growing to a narrow top made by the meeting of the eye-beames in one point And they hold opinion that the beames of the right-eye being darted forth to the left-side and the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together at one view and then more exactly perceives them when the beames are met closely one with another And this is the cause that oftentimes when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence For untill it so fall out that the beames meet in that very place where the money lyeth wee still overlooke the same but then wee presently attaine the sight of it as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us are brought to our eyes Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares but a certaine quality rather conveyed from things visible unto the sight by an alteration of the aire which is round about Plato sayes that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the severall brightnesses together that is to say partly by the light of the eyes which flowing out some part of the way into the aire which is of like nature with it selfe partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bodies which are seene and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye affecting the aire which comes betweene them and easily spreading every way or turning to any side Galen agreeing with Plato speaketh of the sight here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts much to this purpose If saith hee any part or power or quality of bodies that are visible should come unto the eye wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen For if a very great mountaine were the object it were quite contrary to reason to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes yea and the spirit belonging to the sight being darted forth could not bee able to collect together so much vigour as would bee requisite to comprehend the whole visible object It remaines therefore that the aire wherewith we are encompassed is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire which encloseth us round For the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire distributes his power into the whole aire And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which belong unto the sight hath his essence of the nature of the spirits This falling into the aire which is dilated round about us makes an alteration even at the very first injection and shootes forth very farre yet so that it containes it self undispersed untill it happen upon a reflecting body For the aire is such an instrument unto the eye to discerne visible objects as the sinew is unto the braine and look in what case the braine is in respect of his sinew in like case is the eye in respect of the aire after it is quickned by the bright shining of the Sun Now that it is the nature of the aire to become like unto those things which enter into it appeares manifest by this that whensoever any bright thing be it red or blew or of the colour of silver shall bee conveyed through the aire when it is light the colour of the aire will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same But Porphyrie in his book which hee wrote of the senses affirms that neither the making of the Figure Conos neither any shape nor any other thing is cause of our seeing but only this that the soul her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible doth perceive and know that all those things which are seene be contained in her selfe because it is she only which holds them together to their preservation For as he saith whatsoever is in the world is nothing else but the soul holding together divers bodies And it were not untruly said that the soul commeth to the knowledge of it selfe by
hath taught us that there is not one thing only but many things to cure every disease and therefore Man cannot be one onely intire thing It may be further proved that there are foure Elements by the reason wherewith every one of them endeavoureth to confirme his owne opinion who affirme that there is but one onely Element For when Thales affirmed that water onely was to bee accounted an Element hee endeavoured to shew that all the other three were made of it saying that the faeces of it become earth the thin parts become aire and that the thinnest parts of that aire are turned into fire Anaximenes holding opinion that aire onely is an Element goes about to prove likewise that all the rest of the Elements are made of aire Heraclitus and Hipparchus Metapontinus affirming that there is no Element but fire use likewise the very same demonstration to make their argument seeme reasonable Now it will become evident by the reasons which these men give to justifie their assertion that every one of them is an Element For by some it is demonstrated that all other Elements are made of the fire by another that all the rest are made of water and by a third that they are all of aire which make it plaine that all the Elements are changed one into another by their generall consent who otherwise disagree And if they can all bee changed one into another it will necessarily follow that they must all be Elements because which of the foure soever shall bee taken it will appeare that even that is made of some other The Body which is composed of these Elements being an instrument for the SOUL is divided together with the powers of the same For it was framed to be convenient and fit for them in such maner that no power of the SOUL should be hindered through the Bodies defect And therefore to every power of the SOUL there are proper parts of the Body assigned for his operation as I will more particularly declare in the following Chapters The SOUL exercises the part of an Artificer the BODIE is as it were his instrument It is also the matter wherein the actions are conversant and the effect which is wroght thereby is the action it selfe The matter is as the woman the act is that which is conversant about her either whoredome incest or lawfull copulation The powers of the Soul are divided into these three phantasie judgement and memory CAP. 6. I. Of the phantasie or imagination what it is by what Names expressed and by what instruments it worketh II. Of the seats and nature of the senses and why being but foure Elements there are five senses III. The definitions of sense according to Plato and others and distinctions betweene such faculties in the Soul as are appointed to beare rule and to obey EXpresse we will in the next place such things as concerne the phantasie or imagination The faculty of imagining is a power of that part of the soule which is void of Reason and worketh by those instruments wherein the senses are placed The thing subject to imagination is that whereabout our imagination is conversant and may bee called imaginable as that which is felt is termed sensible Imagination it selfe called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a passion of that part of the soul which is irrationall procured by something which is subject to our imagination A vaine imagination called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a void passion in the parts of the soule which are destitute of reason being procured of no certaine thing whereof an imagination should arise But the Stoick Philosophers doe set downe those foure in this maner The imagination it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The thing wherby the imagination is moved 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A voide drawing away of our imagination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And that which moveth our imagination to bee vainely drawne away 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Imagination is a passion representing unto us both it selfe and the thing moving our Imagination For when we see some white thing there is ingendred some passion in the Soule by the reception thereof Even as there is some passion begotten in the seats of the Sense when it feeleth any thing So there is then something engendred in the Soule when it conceiveth any thing it receiveth an Image or impression of the thing understood The fancie or the thing wherby Imaginatiō is moved is any sensible-thing which hath caused the Imagination as it may bee some white thing or any other object which may move the SOVL. The Fantastick or void drawing away of our Imagination is a needles or causuall seducing or distracting of the Imagination without any certaine thing which may move the same The Fantasme or thing it selfe whereby wee are idely drawne away is the very attraction whereby wee are attracted according to our vain Imagination which falleth out in those that are Mad or Melancholy Betweene these Opinions there is no difference but only in the alteration of some Names The Instruments of the Imagination are the former Panns of the braine The Vitall spirits which are in them The sinewes proceeding from the braine The nerves moistned by the Vitall spirits and the very frame of the places wherein the Senses are seated There are five seats for the senses but all are properly but one sense which is the SOUL it self who by the seats of the senses discernes all such things as fall out in them It discernes or taketh knowledge of an Earthy nature by that sense which is most Earthie and Bodily namely the Touching It perceiveth perspicuous or bright shining things by that sense which is most perspicuous that is to say the sight It judgeth such things as are pertinent to aire by that seat which is ordained for the aire for the very substance of the voice is aire or the smiting of the aire and it receiveth every tast by a certaine quality of the instrument of the sense of tasting which attracts by its waterish and spongy nature For it is the nature of every sensible thing to be discerned by some thing which hath a nature like unto it and by this reason it should seeme that there being onely foure Elements there should bee no more but foure senses But because there is a kinde of vapour and certaine smells which have a middle-nature betweene aire and water the parts whereof are somewhat thicker then aire thinner then water which appeares by them who are sick of a heavinesse in the head by rhumes and stoppings for they drawing the aire by respiration have no feeling of the vapour by reason the fatnesse of the odour is hindered by obstructions from approaching the sense therefore a fifth-seat of the sense namely smelling was provided by nature that no such thing as may bee brought unto our knowledge should be hidden from the sense Yet the sense is not an alteration but the discerning of alterations Indeed the seats of the sense are
ability we have spoken of the imagining faculty of the soule of the instruments thereof and of those things wherein they agree or differ To the cogitation these particulars are generally pertinent the judgement of things a consent unto them a refusall of them and a desire unto them But those which are specially pertinent are consideration vertues knowledges the reason of arts deliberation and choice This is that part wherby wee attaine the foresight of things to come in visions or dreames and therein onely the Pythagorean Philosophers following the Iewish opinions thinke true prophecying consisteth The instruments of cogitation are the middle-pan of the braine and the vitall spirits which are in it CAP. 13. I. Of the memorative part of the Soul and the definition of memory according to Origen and Plato II. The difference betwixt remembring of things contained in sense and of things contained in understanding as also what recordation is III. Of the instruments of the memory and demonstrations evidently shewing where the fountaines of the senses of the cogitation and memory are to be found THe seat of memory which the Greekes cal Mnemoneuticon is the cause and storehouse both of memorie and recordation or remembrance Memory as Origen saith is a certaine appearance left in the minde by some sense which had wrought actually before Plato taketh it to be a preservation of things both felt and considered For the minde takes hold of things which are subject unto sense by the seats of the sense and therof is opinion begotten But it layeth hold on things intelligible by understanding and thence ariseth consideration And when the minde retaines the Prints both of things in opinion and of those also which are in consideration we then say that it remembers them It is likely that Plato doth herein meane by the name of consideration not the principall consideration but a certaine cogitation For things contained in sense are remembred by themselves but things contained in understanding are accidentally remembred The remembrance of things thought upon by us doth remaine in us upon the heed of some appearance which was before in our imagination And we remember those things which are properly contained in our understanding in respect that wee have learned them and heard them but as for their substance wee have no memory thereof For indeed the apprehending of things contained in understanding proceeds not from any preceding imagination but commeth to us by learning and by a naturall notion If we be said to remember such things as we saw or heard or knew heretofore by some occasion or meanes This word heretofore having relation to the time past makes it plaine that such things as are made and destroyed againe and such as have their being in time are comprehended in memory and that our memory consisteth of things absent but is not procured or moved by those absent things Recordation or remembrance called by the Greekes Anamnesis is when forgetfulnesse hath interrupted our memory for it is a recovering of memory which was lost when it failed by forgetfulnesse Memory is lost either altogether and for ever or else for a space onely and when it faileth but for a space we call the recovery thereof remembrance But there is another kind of recordation which is not occasioned by the forgetfulness of such things as proceed from sense or understanding but from the forgetfulnesse of those things which wee have even by naturall notions By naturall notions or things naturally conceived I meane such as every man hath in him without any teacher as that there is a God This Plato calleth a recordation of Idea's and what is meant by Idea's I will hereafter shew Such things as appeare unto the imagining part are from thence conveyed unto the cogitation and the cogitation or discoursing part when it hath once apprehended such things judged of them sends them to bee stored up in that part of the soule wherein memory is resident The instruments used by the memory are the hinder braine-pan called by the Greekes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the vitall spirit there placed But seeing we have affirmed that the beginnings and roots of the senses are the former pans of the braine The seat of the cogitation the middle pan And of the memory the hinder-pan it will be necessary for us to prove evidently that these things are so Lest we seeme to give credit to that which hath been spoken without any reason to be rendred for the same A plaine demonstration thereof may bee taken from the parts themselves for if by any meanes the former braine-pan be hurt the senses are much hindred but the cogitation remaineth sound If only the middle-pan be harmed the cogitation is maymed but the seat of sense keepes the senses whole If any hurt befall both to the former and middle-pan both sense and cogitation decay If the hinder-pan be onely disordered the memory alone perisheth and neither sense nor cogitation receive harme But if the former the middle and the hinder braine-pans be all together out of order the party so disturbed is maimed in sense in cogitation and memory all at once and the whole living-creature is in danger of destruction This is made evident also by many diseases and accidents which are symptomes of diseases and especially in frantick men For in some of them their cogitation onely is hurt and their senses are preserved whole Such a frantick man is mentioned by Galen who being in a place wherein a wool-winder was at work by him rose up and taking certaine glasse vessels which hee found in the roome ran to the window and asked such as passed by whether they would have such or such glasses cast downe unto them calling every vessell by the right name And when they who stood below said they would have it so hee threw them all downe one after another Then hee asked them whether they would have the wool-winder throwne downe also they thinking he had but jested replyed yea whereupon he tooke up the wool-winder and hurled him headlong from a high place This man had his senses whole enough for hee knew which were the glasse-vessels and which was the wool-winder but his cogitation was diseased Others there be who deluded by a vaine imagination suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seene whereas in other things they are not without the direction of reason In such as these the former braine-pans are only diseased and the middle-pan uncrased For by those diseases which follow every part the course of their operation is accordingly hindred and the living-creature is hurt in respect of that operation to the working wherof the part diseased is naturally serviceable As for example if the feet bee hurt our walking is hindered for that is the work whereunto the foot serveth CAP. 14. I. Of the Reason from whence we have the denomination of reasonable-creatures II. Of our speech and of the severall instruments