which Relation is founded partly upon its Original Designation and partly upon its Natural Aptitude to be an Ingredient in the Constitution of a Compound And this Relation to the Compound I affirm the Soul to retain even while it is separated from it as is evident from what both Philosophers and Divines hold concerning the Soul viz. That even in its Separation and Disjunction from the Body it yet retains a strong Appetite and Inclination as well as an Essential Aptitude to return and be re-united to it Which Re-union also we know will be effected at the great and last Day But you will say Does not the Scripture in Heb. 12. 23. speaking of Blessed Souls in a state of Separation from the Body call them The Spirits of Just Men made perfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And if those Just Men were made Perfect must it not have been in respect of the Perfection of their Souls since their Bodies were then rotting or rather rotten under Ground And if they derived this Perfection from their Souls must not their Souls have been eminently perfect themselves which rendred them so And if perfect can we deny them the Perfection of Personality which as we have shewn in Rational Beings carries in it the greatest Natural Perfection To all which I Answer That the Perfection here spoken of is not Natural but Supernatural and relates only to the Consummation of their Graces and not to the manner of their Subsistence Which being the only Thing now in dispute this Scripture which speaks only of the former can make nothing at all to the present Purpose Having thus evinced that the Soul notwithstanding its Self-Consciousness is neither during its Conjunction with the Body nor its Separation from it properly a Person and having withal shewn the grounds and Reasons upon which I conclude it impossible to be so I shall however think it worth while something more particularly to examine as I promised this Author's extraordinary and peculiar Notions of Person and Personality as he applies them to the Soul even while it is joined with the Body also And first in the 268th Page he discourses of it in this manner All the Sufferings says he and Actions of the Body are attributed to the Man though the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour and Governing Power and Constitutes the Person These are his words and they contain a very pleasant way of arguing though wholly contrary to the common known Rules of Philosophy For according to these one would and must have concluded That for this very Reason That all the Actions and Sufferings of the Body and he ought to have added of the Soul too are ascribed to the Man therefore the Man himself to whom these Personal Acts are ascribed must indeed be the Person and that for the same reason also the Soul cannot be so But our Author has a way of Reasoning by himself For says he The Soul is the Person because it Constitutes the Person But for that very Cause say I The Soul is not the Person For whatsoever Constitutes a Person must do it either efficiently or formally That is either as a Principle producing it or a Principle compounding it As for the first way whatsoever Constitutes a person efficiently must do it either by Creation or Generation but this the Soul as much a Superiour Power as it is is not able to do For will any one say That the Soul can either Create or Generate the Person or to speak more plainly the Man who is the Person And then for the other way by which it may be said to Constitute a Person to wit formally This it can do no otherwise than as it is a Constituent Part and therefore only as a Partial and not a Total Adequate Cause of the Constitution That is in other words the Soul as the Form must concur with the Body as the Matter to the Constitution of the whole Person of the Man But then for that very Reason again the Soul cannot possibly be a Person since it contributes to the Constitution of the Person only as a Part which by reason of its Incomplete Being can upon no Principle of Philosophy be a Person And I would fain have this profound Philosopher give me but one allowed Instance where one Person is the constituent Principle of another But to examine the forementioned Assertion yet more particularly since this Man so peremptorily says That the Soul is the Person because it is the Superiour Power and Constitutes the Person I must tell him That the Superiour Power is not therefore the sole Power and consequently cannot solely Constitute the Person which yet this Author pretends it does If indeed he had said That the Soul as the Superiour Power bears the chief and principal part in the Constitution of a Person this had been sence but by no means sufficient for his purpose for still this would not prove the Soul to be a Person which he contends for but on the contrary by proving it to concur thereto only as a Part demonstrate it upon the same Account not to be a Person But this is not all for in Page 169. he calls the Mind of Man a Person and thus Discourses about it Faculties says he Vertues and Powers have Personal Acts and Offices ascribed to them only upon the Account of their Unity and Sameness with the mind in which they are which is a Person and Acts by them Now this also is very odd and strange could any thing in this Author which is odd be strange too For the thing Asserted by him amounts to neither more nor less than this That Powers Faculties and Vertues have personal Acts ascribed to them upon the account of their Unity and Sameness with that which it self neither is nor can be a Person as we have abundantly proved That the Mind of Man taking it in his sense for the Soul cannot be And for his further Conviction I could tell him of something which has personal Acts very remarkably ascribed to it and yet neither for being it self a Person nor for its Unity and Sameness with the Mind in which it is and which sometimes acts by it And that if he pleases to turn to 1 Corinth 13. he will find to be that notable Grace and Virtue called Charity which being but an Accident I believe that even this Author himself will not affirm to be a Person and I am sure as little can be said for any Unity or Sameness that it has with the Mind which it is lodged in Since though it should be utterly lost the Mind would nevertheless retain all the Essentials of a Mind and continue as truly a Mind as it was before Which I think is but an ill Argument of any Unity or Sameness between the Mind and that and this being indubitably true all that this Author here discourses about personal Acts being ascribed to the Mind and about their Identity with the Mind as the
as Subsisting under Three This is manifestly false and contrary to common Experience and without any further arguing the case I appeal to the Reason of all Mankind whether it be not so PARADOX What is Intellectual Love says this Author but the true Knowledge or Estimation of Things What is Iustice and Goodness but an equal Distribution of or a true and wise Proportion of Rewards and Punishments What is perfect Power but perfect Truth and Wisdom which can do whatsoever it knows Page 71 72. Answer We have here a whole Knot or Cluster of Paradoxes but I shall take them a sunder and consider them severally And because they run all in the way of Interrogations I shall take them out of their Interrogative Form and cast them into so many Categorical Assertions The first of which is That Intellectual Love is nothing else but the true Knowledge and Estimation of Things This is False and Absurd For Love is one thing and Knowledge another each of them distinguished by essentially different Acts and Objects Knowledge importing no more than a bare Speculation or Apprehension of the Object whereas Love is properly an Adhesion to it Love essentially presupposes the Knowledge of the Thing Loved but Knowledge cannot presuppose it self Knowledge is the first Act of an Intelligent Mind Love the second And I would fain know Whether this Man of Paradox will affirm That God Loves every Thing which he has a true Knowledge and Estimation of But to give him one Argument for all Are not the Eternal distinguishing Characters of Two Persons of the Blessed Trinity founded in the distinction of Love and Knowledge in God the Son issuing from the Father by way of Knowledge and the Spirit issuing from both by way of Love In the next place he affirms Iustice and Goodness to be the same thing and to consist both of them in a true and wise Proportion of Rewards and Punishments But this also is false These Two being as properly and formally distinguished by their Acts and Objects as the Two former And I do here tell this Author That God's Goodness is the proper Qualification of his own Actions without referring necessarily to any other besides but that his Justice bears an Essential Relation to the Actions of others viz. as Rewardable or Punishable And consequently God might have exerted innumerable Acts of his Goodness though there had never been any Object for him to have exerted so much as one Act of his Iustice upon And to give him one Instance that may Convince any Man of Sense of the vast difference of these two Attributes was that Act of Creation by which God first Created the World an Act of his Justice Or did that Act consist in a Wise proportion of Rewards and Punishments before there was any Act of the Creature to be Rewarded or Punished But I am sure it was an Act of the Divine Goodness whereby God communicated much of the Perfection of Being to something without himself Again is Pardon of Sin an Essential Act of God's Iustice But I am sure it is an Act of his Goodness Certainly this Man neither knows nor cares what he says His Third Assertion is That perfect Power is nothing else but perfect Truth and Wisdom But this also is a gross Paradox and as false as that Omnipotence and Omniscience are not Two distinct Attributes of God God's Power acts by and under the direction of God's Wisdom and therefore neither is nor can be formally the same with it And besides this all Acts of Wisdom and Truth proceed from God by a Necessity of Nature but the Acts and Exercise of his Power by a free determination of his Will For in speaking of God no Man says That God is Wise Knowing or True or Acts according to these Perfections because he will do so for he can neither be nor Act otherwise but we truly and properly say That God does this or that because he will do it for if he had pleased he might have chose whether he would do it or no. From all which I conclude That nothing could be more improperly and absurdly affirmed than That the Divine Power is nothing else but the Divine Truth and Wisdom PARADOX In Men says he it is only Knowledge that is Power Humane Power and Humane Knowledge as that signifies a Knowledge how to do any Thing are Commensurate so that every Man can do what he knows how to do Nay Knowledge is not only the Director of Power but it is that very Power which we call force Page 72. Answ. This is so gross a Paradox that I think it can need no other Confutation than to oppose the sense of all Mankind to it nevertheless I shall offer this one Consideration towards the disproving the Identity of Knowledge and Power viz. That a Man's Knowledge and Skill about the doing any Work of Art may increase as his power of Execution for the Actual doing the said Works may decrease nay wholly cease and therefore they cannot be the same For suppose a Carpenter disabled by Age or Accident that he cannot strike a stroke towards the building an House does he therefore cease to know how to build it while another shall build it wholly by the direction of his Skill and Knowledge This Man may as well prove his Head and his Hands to be one and the same Thing as Knowledge and Power to be so But I shall go no farther than this very Author to confute this Author's Assertion who has told us in p. 9. l. 3 4. That we understand nothing of the Secrets and Mysteries of Nature nor are concerned to understand them any more than it is our Business to understand how to make either a Body or a Spirit which we have no power to do mark that if we did understand it and therefore it would be an useless piece of Knowledge Now I beseech the Reader to set these Two Assertions together viz. that in pag. 72. That to know how to do a Thing is to be able to do it and that other in the pag. 9. viz. That though we understood how to make a Body or a Spirit yet we have no power to do it I say let these Two Propositions be compar'd and then I hope that for the future Knowledge how to do a thing and Power to do it ought not even according to this very Author to pass for the same thing In the mean time we see how one of his Assertions contains a gross Absurdity and the other compleats it with as gross a Contradiction PARADOX This Word Infinite says he confounds our Notions of God p. 77. Answer This is false The Thing indeed signified by the Word Infinite exceeds and transcends our Notions but the word Infinite does not confound them And I would have this Man take notice that for an Object to surpass and be above our Thoughts and to disorder and confound them are very different Things And moreover that it is the
is an act of Intellection and so must issue from an Intellective Faculty which the Body is not endued with and therefore cannot act by and withal every act of the Will is only an Intelligible and not a sensible Object and consequently cannot be otherwise apprehended and perceived than intellectually And as for the Commands of it a Command operates and moves only by way of moral Causation viz. by being first known by the Thing or Agent which it is directed to which thereupon by such a Knowledge of it is induced to move or Act accordingly But now the Will does not thus Act upon the Body the Body having no Principle whereby to know or understand what it Commands And therefore when we say That the Will Commands the Body in strictness of Truth it is only a Metaphorical Expression For the Will or Soul exerting an Act of Volition moves the Body not by Command but by Physical Impulse That is to say It does by its native Force Energy and Activity first move and impell the Spirits and by the instrumental Mediation of them so moved and impelled it moves and impells the Body and this by as real an Impulse as when I push or thrust a thing with my hand For though indeed a material Thing cannot actively or efficiently move or work upon an Immaterial yet Philosophers grant that an Immaterial as being of the nobler and more active Nature can move impell or work upon a Material and if we cannot form in our Minds an Idea of the Mechanism of this Motion it is because neither can we form in our Minds an Idea of a Spirit But nevertheless Reason and Discourse will Evince That the Thing must be so PARADOX He tells us That the Human Nature of Christ may be Ignorant of some things notwithstanding its personal Union to the Divine Word because it is an Inferiour and Subject Nature Page 270. Line 12 13 14. Answer These Words also are both absurd and false And First They are Absurd because no Rules of Speaking or Arguing permit us to say of any Thing or Person That it may be so or so when necessarily it is and must be so For the Term may imports an Indifference or at least a possibility to both sides of the Contradiction So that when a Man says That a Thing may be thus or thus he does by consequence say also That it may not be thus or thus And therefore to say That the Human Nature of Christ notwithstanding its personal Union to the Word may be ignorant of some Things when it cannot but be ignorant of some nay of very many Things is Absurd And in the next place also To make the Subjection of the Human Nature to the Divine the proper Cause of this Ignorance is false and the Assignation of a non causa pro causâ It being all one as if I should say That such an one cannot be a good Disputant because he has a blemish in his Eye For it is not this Subjection of it to the Divine Nature that makes it ignorant of many Things known by that Nature but the vast disparity that is between these Two Natures viz. That one of them is Infinite the other Finite which makes it impossible for the Infinite to communicate its whole Knowledge to the Finite Forasmuch as such a Knowledge exceeds its Capacity and cannot be received into it so as to exist or abide in it any more than Omnipotence or Omnipresence or any other Infinite Divine Perfection can be lodged in a Finite Being And besides this this very Author in the immediately foregoing Page had not only allowed but affirmed That the Body which certainly is both united to the Soul and of a Nature Subject and Inferiour to it was yet conscious to the Dictates and Commands of the Soul Wherefore where Two Natures are united the bare Subjection of one to the other is not the proper Cause that the Nature which is Subject is ignorant of what is known by the Nature which it is subject to For if Subjection were the sole and proper Cause of this Ignorance the Inferiour Nature would be equally ignorant of every Thing known by the Superiour which yet according to this Man 's own Doctrine of the Consciousness of the Body to the Soul is not so This Consideration I alledge only as an Argument ad hominem having already by the former Argument sufficiently proved the falseness of his Assertion But I shall detain my Reader no longer upon this Subject though I must assure him that I have given him but a Modicum and as it were an handful or two out of that full heap which I had before me and from which I had actually collected several more Particulars which I have not here presented him with being unwilling to swell my Work to too great a Bulk Nevertheless I look upon this Head of Discourse as so very useful to place this Author in a true Light that if I might be so bold with my Reader I could wish that he would vouchsafe this Chapter of all the rest a second Perusal upon which I dare undertake that it will leave in him such Impressions concerning this Man's fitness to Write about the Trinity as will not wear out of his Mind in haste And yet after all this I will not presume to derogate from this Author's Abilities how insolently soever he has trampled upon other Mens but content my self that I have fairly laid that before the Reader by which he may take a just and true measure of them And so I shall conclude this Chapter with an Observation which I have upon several occasions had cause to make viz. That Divinity and Philosophy are certainly the worst Things in the World for any One to be Magisterial in who does not understand them CHAP. X. In which the Author 's Grammatical and such like Mistakes as they are found here and there in his Writings are set down and remarked upon COuld this Author have carried himself with any or dinary degree of Candor and Civility towards those whom he wrote against he had never had the least Trouble given him by me upon this Head of Discourse But when I find him treating Learned Men with so much Disdain and Insolence and much liker a rough ill-bred School-Master domineering over his Boys than a fair Opponent entring the Lists with an Ingenuous Antagonist I must confess I cannot think my self obliged to treat him upon such Terms as I would an Adversary of a contrary Temper and Behaviour One Man and a very Learned one too he flirts at as if he could not distinguish between Conjunctive and Disjunctive Particles Vindication of his Case of Allegiance pag. 76. the Two last Lines Another he Scoffs or rather Spits at as neither understanding Greek nor Latine Vindic. Trin. Pag. 95. Line 25. and thereby I suppose would bear himself to the World as no small Critick in both As for the Socinians of which number this latter is
uttered by this Author Whereas he declares himself concerning the said Expressions thus viz. That he cannot mention them without begging Pardon for repeating such horrid and desperate Blasphemies Owen 's Vindication against Sherlock p. 46. That they were fitter for a Iew or a Mahometan for Servetus or Socinus than a Son of this Church p. 47. That he abhorred the Rehearsal of such horrid Profaneness p. 49. That they were odious Satanical Exprobrations of the Truth of Christ's Satisfaction ibid. And now can this Man pretend to speak these Things in the Person of one who thus Abhors Abominates and Detests them The Truth is his whole Book is such a lewd Misrepresentation both of the Words and Sence of his Adversary that if he has any Bloud in his Body it must needs fly in his Face and bid him Blush for such Unconscionable Falsifications But Secondly If he charges these Assertions as Consequences of the Doctrine maintained by his Adversary I must put him in mind of these two Things 1. That to the just charging of any Man with the Consequences of his Doctrine or Opinion the Things so charged ought to be not only the Real but also the Plain Direct and Immediate Consequences of that Opinion Forasmuch as no Man ought in reason to be charged with the Remote far-fetched Consequences of any Proposition held by him since he may in all Equity if he disclaims them be supposed ignorant of them and that inculpably too 2. This Author is to know That to the just charging of even any Doctrine or Opinion with such and such Consequences though they follow never so really and truly from it yet if they lie any thing remote and at some distance from the same they ought first by clear undeniable Arguments to be proved to follow from thence before they can justly and fairly be charged to do so Which two Observations thus premised that I may lay the whole Matter before the Reader more particularly he is to take Notice That the Doctrine which this Author loads with these Blasphemous Consequences is That of the Necessity of a Satisfaction to be paid to God's Justice in order to the Pardon of Sin and the Justification of Sinners And this I affirm to have been the received Doctrine of the Church and the General Opinion of Divines in the Case all asserting the Necessity of such a Satisfaction though not All I confess upon the same ground For First Some found this Necessity upon the Necessary Egress of God's Vindictive Justice naturally acting and exerting it self where it meets with a Proper Object But Secondly Others state this Necessity upon the Decree or Purpose of God resolving to take this course for the Pardon of Sin and no other Which Decree and Purpose though made freely yet being actually passed and declared it was not free for God to baulk the execution of it His Veracity Wisdom and Honour as Supreme Governour of the World not suffering him to let the Violation of his Laws pass without a due satisfaction made to his Iustice. And this has been the Opinion of most Divines in this matter Nevertheless whether upon either of these grounds or some other it is certain that the Necessity of a Satisfaction was still held and owned by the Church And yet upon supposal of this Necessity alone it is whatsoever ground it be stated upon that this Author sets God forth in a most Profane manner as an Impotent Man venting his Rage and Passion without any sufficient Ground or Reason for it For I am sure no other Consideration can Answer or come up to the Impiety of the forecited Expressions And I freely appeal to the Learned and Unbyassed Reader Whether the said Passages can be placed to any other Account whatsoever And if they cannot I ask with what Conscience could this Man of his own Head invent such Hideous Abominable Words and then thrust them into his Adversary's Mouth whether he would or no Or charge them as the necessary Consequences of his Doctrine without proving or by any formed Argument so much as offering to prove them so For surely he ought to have done this in the first place and since he knew that the Learned Assertors of this Doctrine did and would deny these to be the Consequences of it to the very Death he should by clear and solid Ratiocination have proved against them in spight of their Denial that these were indeed the True and Natural Consequences of the said Doctrine before he reproached them as such But it seems he was for doing execution first and for proceeding to Tryal afterwards though as hasty as he was in the former he has not yet done the latter nor I believe ever will Upon the whole Matter it is manifest That it was not so much any thing Personal in Dr. Owen how bitter soever he was against him as the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction asserted by the said Doctor in common with the whole Christian Church which this Author so vilely reflected upon and discharged all those Blasphemous Scoffs at in that Book of his and consequently so far as he was the Author both of the Book and the Scoffs in it he was as fit a Person to have joyned in the Address to the Morocco Ambassadour as any Man in England besides I do I confess charge this Author with Asserting Three Gods though he does not in Terminis express it because of his Asserting Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits But then the case here on my part is quite different from what it was on his For in this the Consequence of Three Gods from Three distinct Infinite Spirits is direct manifest and immediate or rather in Truth is not so properly a Consequence or one Assertion following from another as one and the very same thing expressed in other words which is the True account of this Matter For the Words Infinite Mind or Spirit are but a Periphrasis of the Thing signified by the Term God And their perfect equivalence shall be fully demonstrated in my Fifth Chapter From all which I conclude That since there are beyond all pretence of Denial several Horrid Blasphemous Expressions in this Author 's forementioned Book which must and ought to be charged somewhere and since his Adversary utterly disowns them all both as to Words and Sence and since the Doctrine it self maintained by him infers no such Thing nor has this Author proved that it does so but that the said Representations of it are peculiarly his own and occur no where but in his Book except possibly in the Writings of some of His Old Friends the Socinians and those such as the Transylvanian Ministers it follows that according to the strictest Laws of fair and just Quotation all the black Dirt of those Impious and foul Passages which I have cited from him and charged upon him ought to lie wholly at his Door and let him and his Porter shovel it away thence as they are able As to
viz. That there is nothing in the World that we perfectly understand And in order to this Let us bring and lay together what he Asserts in several places And here first in Page 7. line 20. c. It is agreed by all Men That the Essences of things cannot be known but only their Properties and Qualities and that the World is divided into Matter and Spirit and that we know no more what the substance of Matter than what the sâ—bstance of Spirit is And then he enumerates some of the Essential Properties of each and owns that we know them in Confirmation I suppose of his fore-going Assertion that we know nothing After which in Pag. 8. line 15. he adds As for the Essential Properties Operations and Powers of Matter Sence Experience and Observation will tell us what they are And then I hope we may know also what they are when Sence and Experience has told us So that we see here what our Author asserts But may we rely upon it and hold him to his Word Alas That I fear may prove something hard and unkind For a Man to whom a whole Convocation has given a large scope and liberty of thinking and who has given himself as large an one for speaking loves not of all things in the World to be held too strictly to what he says For in Page 4. line 25. reckoning up some of the Absurdities and Contradictions attending the Doctrine of Transubstantiation he tells us That we know them to be so because we know the Nature of a Body and this also we must suppose said in further Confirmation of his other Assertion that we know not the Nature of any thing and moreover That we know that such things as he there mentions are a Contradiction to the Essential Properties of a Body line 26. All this he says here and that in very plain terms But in Page 7. in which it is high time for a Man to forget what he said in the 4th He tells us That the Essences of things cannot be known and consequently one would think That the Essence of a Body could not be known And yet for one to know the nature of a Body which in Page 4. he says we do without knowing the Essence of it which in Page 7. he says we cannot know is I conceive a way of knowledge peculiar to this Author In the next place as for the property of things he tells us very positively in Page 8. line 33 34. That the Properties and Operations both of Bodies and Spirits are great Secrets and Mysteries in Nature which we understand nothing of c. And yet in Page 7. line 32. he tells us That we know the Essential Properties of a Spirit that it is a thinking substance with the Faculties of Understanding and Will c. Now to know the Essential Properties of a Spirit And yet for these Properties to be such Secrets and Mysteries in Nature that we understand nothing of them both which this Author expresly affirms in the compass of two Pages is another sort of knowledge which ought in all reason to be reckon'd peculiar to himself And thus having consider'd some of his Assertions in Contradiction to one another if there be any such thing as a Contradiction I will consider some of them severally by themselves And here as I have already shewn That he says positively Page 4. line 28. That we have no clear and comprehensive Notion of a Spirit So he adds in the next words That it is impossible to know what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit if we know not what the Nature of a Spirit is i. e. Comprehensively as he must still mean But this by his favour I very much question and desire him to tell me Whether we may not know That it is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit to be Material to be extended and to be compounded of the Elements c. These things I take to be such as are contrary to the Nature of a Spirit and such as may be certainly known to be so and consequently such as may safely rationally and consonantly to all Principles of Philosophy be pronounced to be so And therefore this Author's Assertion viz. That it is impossible to know what is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit if we have not a clear comprehensive Notion of the Nature of a Spirit is apparently False Absurd and Ridiculous But to proceed This Author having said That he knows nothing in the World that we do perfectly understand And for the proof of it alledged That the Essences of Things cannot be known and for the farther proof of that affirm'd That the whole World is adequately divided into Matter and Spirit the Natures of which as he says are wholly unknown to us Suppose now I should as I do deny this whole Argument and affirm That there is a third sort of Beings which are neither Matter nor Spirit which yet as to some of them at least may be perfectly understood and known by us and these are Accidents which according to the ablest Philosophers hitherto do together with substance make a much better and more comprehensive Division of the whole World than Matter and Spirit For certain it is That Accidents as contradistinct to Substance are real Beings and have their respective Essences and Properties belonging to them and such as may be matter of Demonstration which kind of Argument is known to be the proving of any Property or proper Attribute of its Subject by a third thing or Principle bearing an Essential Connexion with both And amongst Accidents I do particularly affirm this of Numbers Figures and Proportions that they are such things as may be perfectly understood by us in the strength of Natural Reason For I think it may be perfectly and comprehensively known That two and two make four and that a Circle is a Figure every part of the Circumference whereof is equidistant from the Centre and a thousand more such things all which are capable of being Scientifically made out to us by Demonstration And this indeed to such an height that as some will admit of no Demonstrations but in the Mathematicks viz. in Numbers Figures and Proportions So there are few or none but readily grant That the Demonstrations about these Matters are the Clearest the most Scientifick and Convincing of all other Demonstrations whatsoever From all which I conclude That what this Author has affirm'd viz. That there is nothing in the World but Matter and Spirit and withal That there is nothing which we do perfectly understand is not only a crude loose unwary but really and in strictness of truth a very false Assertion And therefore though this Author pleaseth himself with a fanciful Harangue about our Ignorance of the Philosophy How the Fire burns and the Waters are condens'd as he calls it into Ice How Stones fall to the Ground and Vapours ascend and thicken in Clouds and fall down again to the
〈◊〉 The Soul of the World Plato in Phoedone says of God That he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Mind that is the Cause and orderer of all Things And Plato the Son of Ariston says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is the Mind of the World And Lactantius gives this Testimony of Aristotle That Quamvis secum ipse dissideat ac repugnantia sibi dicat sentiat by which one would think our Author better acquainted with him than he is in summum tamen unam mentem mundo praeesse testatur Lact. de falsa Relig. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Agreeably to all which Seneca in the Preface to his Natural Questions putting the Question Quid est Deus What is God Answers Mens Universi The Mind of the Universe As the Learned Emperour Antoninus after him expresses God the same way and by the same word in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 5. p. 148. Oxon. Edit And that Passage in Virgil's 6. Aeneid is famous where speaking of God as the Great Soul of the World running through all the Parts of that vast Body he expresses it in those known Verses Coelum ac Terras Camposque liquentes Lucentemque Globum Lunae Titaniaque Astra Spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem magno se corpore miscet And the same was the Opinion of Cato before him a great Man though but a small Author who tells us from the Ancient Poets who were accounted the Philosophers of the first Ages That Deus est Animus God is a Mind or Spirit And the Truth is I reckon that these Learned Men all along by an Infinite Mind or Spirit understood as truly and certainly One Infinite Mind or Spirit as if the Term of Unity had been added by them For besides that the Particles a or the which we use in translating any single word into our own Language import so much the very condition also of the Subject spoken of as being Infinite must needs infer the same So that we see here how the Judgment of Natural Reason in these Eminent Philosophers amongst the Heathens falls in with what God himself revealed by the Mouth of our Saviour concerning his own Nature in John 4. 24. viz. That God is a Spirit For we have them expressing him by these words Aninius Mens Spiritus So that had they all lived after St. Iohn as one of them did their Sentences might have passed for so many Paraphrases upon the Text all declaring God to be One Infinite Soul Mind or Spirit But perhaps our Author will here say What is all this to the purpose since we found our knowledge of the Three Divine Persons wholly upon Revelation And I grant we do so Yet nevertheless I shall by his good favour shew That what I have alledged is very much to the purpose And to this end premising here what we have already proved viz. That to be One Infinite Mind and to be Three distinct Infinite Minds involve in them a Mutual Negation of and Contradiction to one another Forasmuch as to be Unum is to be Indivisum in se that is to say Indivisible into more things such as it self This I say premised First I desire this Author to produce that Revelation which declares the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits For I deny that there is any such Secondly I affirm That whatsoever is a Truth in Natural Reason cannot be contradicted by any other Truth declared by Revelation since it is impossible for any one Truth to contradict another Upon which grounds I here ask our Author Is it a Contradiction for One God to be One Infinite Mind or Spirit and to be also Three Infinite Minds or Spirits If he grant this as I have proved it whether he does or no then I ask him in the next place Whether it be a Proposition true in Natural Reason That God is one Infinite Mind or Spirit If he grants this also then I infer That it cannot be proved true from Revelation That God is Three Infinite Minds or Spirits since the certain Truth of the first Proposition supposed and admitted must needs disprove the Truth of that Revelation which pretends to establish the second But some again may perhaps ask Suppose it were revealed in express Terms That God is Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits would you in this case throw aside this Revelation in submission to the former Proposition declared by Natural Reason I Answer No But if the Revelation were express and undeniable I would adhere to it but at the same time while I did so I would quit the former Proposition and conclude That Natural Reason had not discoursed right when it concluded That God was one Infinite Mind or Spirit But to hold both Propositions to be True and to assent to them both as such This the Mind of Man can never do So that in a word I conclude That if it be certainly true from Reason That God is one Infinite Mind or Spirit No Revelation can or ought to be pleaded That he is Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits And if Revelation cannot or ought not to be pleaded for it I am sure we have no ground to believe it And yet at the same time I own and assert a Revelation of the truth of this Proposition That God is Three Persons or which is all one That God is Father Son and Holy Ghost since it does not at all contradict the forementioned Propositions founded upon Natural Reason viz. That God is One Infinite Mind or Spirit nor could it yet ever be proved to do so either by Arians or Socinians But on the contrary these two Propositions viz. God is One Infinite Mind or Spirit and that other God is Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits which he must be if the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits are Gross Palpable and Irreconcileable Contradictions And because they are so it is demonstratively certain That the said Three Persons are not Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits As this Author against all Principles of Philosophy and Divinity has most erroneously affirmed them to be I have said enough I hope upon this Subject But before I quit it it will not be amiss to observe what work this Man makes with the Persons of the Blessed Trinity as indeed he seldom almost turns his Pen but he gives some scurvy stroke at it or other particularly in Page 89. he affirms That the Expression of the One true God and the only true God cannot properly be attributed to the Son nor to the Holy Ghost From whence I infer That then neither can the Expression of God or the True God be properly attributed to the Son or to the Holy Ghost Forasmuch as the Terms one God and One True God or one only True God are equivalent The Term One God including in it every whit as much as the
expressing himself in this sacred and arduous Subject to give it no worse word whatsoever it may deserve affords the Arians and Socinians no small Advantages against this Doctrine should it stand upon the strength of His Defence as thanks be to God it does not But I must not here omit that Passage which in the former part of this Chapter I promised more particularly to consider a Passage which indeed looks something strangely It is that in P. 258. line 27. where he tells us that he allows That in the Blessed Trinity there are Three Holy Spirits but denys That there are Three Holy Ghosts so natural is it for false Opinions to force Men to absurd Expressions But my Answer to him is short and positive That neither are there Three Holy Spirits nor Three Holy Ghosts in the Blessed Trinity in any sense properly belonging to these words However the Thing meant by him so far as it is reducible to Truth and Reason is and must be this viz. That when the Third Person of the Trinity is called the Holy Ghost there the word Holy Ghost which otherwise signifies the same with Holy Spirit must be taken Personally and consequently Incommunicably but when the Father or Son is said to be a Spirit or Holy Spirit there Spirit must be understood Essentially for that Immaterial Spiritual and Divine Nature which is common to and Predicable of all the Divine Persons All which is most true But then for this very Reason I must tell our Author withal That as Holy Ghost taken Personally is but Numerically one so Spirit or Holy Spirit as it is understood Essentially is but Numerically one too And therefore though the Father may be called a Spirit or Holy Spirit and the two other Persons may each of them be called so likewise yet they are not therefore Three distinct Spirits or Holy Spirits nor can be truly so called as this Author pretends they ought to be and we have sufficiently disproved but they are all one and the same Holy Spirit Essentially taken and which so taken is as much as one and the same God And moreover though Spirit understood Personally distinguishes the Third Person from the other two yet taken Essentially it speaks him one and the same Spirit as well as one and the same God with them and can by no means distinguish him from them any more than the Divine Essence or Nature which Spirit in this sence is only another word for can discriminate the Three Persons from one another So that upon the whole Matter it is equally false and impossible That in the Blessed Trinity there should be Three Holy Spirits or Holy Ghosts Terms perfectly Synonymous either upon a Personal or an Essential account and consequently that there should be so at all For as the word Spirit imports a peculiar Mode of Subsistence by way of Spiration from the Father and the Son so it is Personal and Incommunicable but as it imports the Immaterial Substance of the Deity so indeed as being the same with the Deity it self it is equally Common to all the Three Persons but still for all that remains Numerically one and no more as all must acknowledge the Deity to be And this is the true state of the Case But to state the difference between the Holy Ghost and the other Two Persons upon something signified by Holy Ghost which is not signified by Holy Spirit as the words of this Author manifestly do while he affirms Three Holy Spirits but denies Three Holy Ghosts this is not only a playing with words which he pretends to scorn but a taking of words for things which I am sure is very ridiculous And now before I conclude this Chapter having a Debt upon me declared at the beginning of it I leave it to the Impartial and Discreet Reader to judge what is to be thought or said of that Man who in such an Insolent Decretorious manner shall in such a point as this before us charge Nonsense and Heresie two very vile words upon all that Subscribe not to this his New and before unheard of Opinion I must profess I never met with the like in any Sober Author and hardly in the most Licentious Libeller The Nature of the Subject I have according to my poor Abilities discussed and finding my self thereupon extremely to dissent from this Author am yet by no means willing to pass for a Nonsensical Heretick for my pains For must it be Nonsence not to own Contradictions viz. That One infinite Spirit is Three distinct Infinite Spirits Or must it be Heresie not to Subscribe to Tritheisme as the best and most Orthodox Explication of the Article of the Trinity As for Non-sence it must certainly imply the asserting of something for true concerning the Subject discoursed of which yet in truth is contradictory to it since there can be no Non-sence but what contradicts some Truth And whereas this Author has elsewhere viz. P. 4. declared it unreasonable to charge a contradiction in any Thing where the Nature of the Thing discoursed of is not throughly comprehended and understood I desire to know of him whether he throughly understands and comprehends the Article and Mystery of the Trinity If he says he does I need no other Demonstration of his unfitness to write about it But if he owns that he does not let him only stick to his own Rule and then he may keep the Charge of Non-sense to himself But what shall we say to the Charge of Heresie in which St. Austin would have no Person who is so charged to be silent Why in the first place we must search and enquire whether it be so or no And here if my Life lay upon it I cannot find either in Irenaeus adversùs Haereses or in Tertullian's Prescriptions contra Haereticos Cap. 49. Nor in Philastrius's Catalogue nor in Epiphanius nor in St. Austin nor in Theodoret nor in Iohannes Damascenus's Book de Haeresibus nor in the latter Haeresiologists such as Alphonsus à Castro Prateolus with several others I cannot I say find in all or in any one of these the Heresie of not asserting the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity to be Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits no nor yet the Heresie of denying them to be so But where then may we find it Why in this Author's Book And therefore look no further it is enough that so great a Master has said it whose Authority in saying a Thing is as good as another Man 's in proving it at any time And he says it as we see positively and perhaps if need be will be ready to take his Corporal Oath upon it That such as deny his Hypothesis are Hereticks Now in this case our Condition is in good earnest very sad and I know nothing to comfort us but that the Statute de Haeretico comburendo is Repealed And well is it for the Poor Clergy and Church of England that it is so for otherwise this Man
nothing is so but a Mind or Spirit it may as I have said imply a Mind but it does not directly signifie it But admitting that it does both does this expression prove That the Son is a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distinct from the Father By no means For not only the Son but the Father may be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Holy Ghost 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet they are not Three 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the Reason of this is because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is an Essential Attribute following the Divine Nature and therefore common to all the Three Persons and not a Personal Attribute peculiar to any one of them So that granting the Son to be as truly and properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as this Author would have him yet we absolutely deny That he is a distinct 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the Father And this Expression I am sure is far enough from proving him to be so From Nyssen he passes to St. Athanasius who he tells us observes out of these words of our Saviour John 10. 30. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that our Saviour does not say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that by so speaking he gave us a perfect Duality of Persons in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and an Unity of Nature in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All which is very true and that this distinction of Persons overthrows the Heresie of Sabellius and the Unity of their Nature the Heresie of Arius But then this is also as true that all this is nothing at all to our Author's Purpose For how does this prove either that the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits Or that Self-Consciousness is the proper ground or Reason of their distinction Why yes says He If the Father be an Eternal Mind and Wisdom then the Son is also an Eternal but begotten Mind and Wisdom Very true but still I deny that it follows hence That the Eternal Mind or Wisdom Begetting and the Eternal Mind or Wisdom Begotten are Two distinct Minds or Wisdoms but only one and the same Mind or Wisdom under these Two distinct Modifications of Begetting and being Begot But he pretends to explain and confirm his Notion of a distinct Mind or Wisdom out of those words of the Nicene Creed in which the Son is said to be God of God Light of Light very God of very God By which words I cannot imagine how this Author thinks to serve his turn unless that by Light must be meant Infinite Wisdom or Infinitely Wise Mind and that this must also infer the Father and Son to be Two distinct Infinitely Wise Minds or Wisdoms one issuing from the other But if so then the same words will and must infer them also to be two distinct Gods and very Gods For all these words stand upon the same level in the same Sentence and then if we do but joyn the Term Distinct equally with every one of them we shall see what Monstrous Blasphemous Stuff will be drawn out of this Creed In the mean time let this Author know once for all That Light of Light imports not here Two distinct Lights but one Infinite Light under Two different ways of Subsisting viz. either by and from it self as it does in the Father or of and from another as it does in the Son All which is plainly and fully imported in and by the Particle of signifying properly as here applyed Derivation or Communication in the thing which it is applyed to And this is the clear undoubted sense of the Word as it is used here In the mean time I hope the Arians and Socinians will joyn in a Letter of Thanks to this Author for making such an Inference from the Nicene Creed In the next place he comes to St. Austin where though I am equally at a loss to find how he proves his Point by him any more than by those whom he has already produced yet I will transcribe the whole Quotation into the Margin that so both the Reader may have it under his Eye and the Author have no cause to complain that he is not fairly dealt with Now that which he would infer from thence seems to be this That God the Father is Infinitely Wise by a Wisdom of his own distinct from that Wisdom by which the Son is called The Wisdom of the Father and consequently that they are Two distinct Infinite Wisdoms or Infinitely Wise Minds This I say is that which he would inferr and argue from St. Austin or I know not what else it can be But this is by no means deducible from his words for the Father is wise by one and the same Infinite Wisdom equally belonging both to the Father and the Son but not by it under that peculiar Formality as it belongs to the Son For it belongs to the Son as Communicated to Him whereas it belongs to the Father as Originally in and from Himself And whereas it is objected That if the Father should be Wise by the Wisdom which he Begot then he could not be said to be Wise by a Wisdom of his own but only by a Begotten Wisdom proper to the Son I Answer That neither does this follow since it is but one and the same Essential Wisdom in both viz. in him who Begets and in him who is Begotten Though as it is in him who is Begotten it is not after the same way in Him who Begets So that it is this determining Particle as or Quatenus which by importing a distinction of the manner causes a quite different application of the Term while the Thing is still the same For the Father himself is not denominated Wise even by that very Wisdom that is Essential to Him considered as Personally determined to the Son for so it must be considered as Derived and Communicated and no Divine Perfection can agree to the Father under the Formal Consideration of Derived and Communicated albeit the Thing it self which is Derived and Communicated absolutely considered may and does In a word the Father is Wise by one and the same Wisdom which is both in himself and in his Son but not by it as it is in the Son But by the way it is worth observing That this Man who here in the 102 and 103 Pages denies the Father to be Wise by this Begotten Wisdom which the Son is here called and which in the Sense we have now given of it is very true and alledges St. Austin and Lombard to abett him in it This very Man I say Page 131. Line 24. affirms That the Son is that Wisdom and Knowledge wherewith his Father knows himself Where If for the Father to be Wise and to know himself be formally the same Act and as much the same as his Wisdom and Knowledge can be as it is manifest they are then I leave it to this
For though the Three Divine Persons differ as really yet it is certain that they do not differ as much But what the Fathers alledged only as an Illustration of the Case this Man is pleased to make a direct proof of his Point which by his Favour is to stretch it a little too far For if he would make the foregoing Example a Parallel Instance to the Thing which he applies it to it would prove a great deal too much as has been shewn and therefore as to the Thing which it is brought for does indeed prove nothing at all Now the Thing it is brought to prove is That the Three Divine Persons are Three distinct Infinite Minds or Spirits but since we have shewn That a Real Difference or Distinction may be much short of such an one as is between two or more Minds or Spirits which we own to be as great as between two or more Men it follows That the Real Difference which is between the Three Divine Persons cannot prove them to be so many distinct Minds or Spirits In short our Author 's whole Argument amounts to no more but this which though it may sound something jocularly is really and strictly true viz. That because Peter Iames and Iohn are so many Men therefore Father Son and Holy Ghost are so many Minds A pleasant way of Arguing certainly I have now examined all that this Author has alledged about the distinction of the Three Divine Persons and I have done it particularly and exactly not omitting any one of his Quotations But how comes it to pass all this while that we have not so much as one Syllable out of the Fathers or School-men in behalf of Self-Consciousness Which being according to this Author the Constituent Reason of the Personality and Personal Distinction of the Three Divine Persons will he pretend to prove the Distinction it self from the Fathers and at the same time not speak one Tittle of the Principle or Reason of this Distinction Or will he profess to prove his whole Hypothesis by the Authority of the Fathers and yet be silent of Self-Consciousness which he himself makes one grand and principal part of the said Hypothesis Certainly one would think that the very shame of the World and that Common Awe and regard of Truth which Nature has imprinted upon the Minds of Men should keep any one from offering to impose upon Men in so gross and shameless a manner as to venture to call a Notion or Opinion the Constant Doctrine both of the Fathers and the Schools nay and to profess to make it out and shew it to be so and while he is so doing not to to produce one Father or Schoolman I say again not so much as one of either in behalf of that which he so confidently and expresly avows to be the joynt Sentiment of Both. This surely is a way of proving or rather of imposing peculiar to Himself But we have seen how extremely fond he is of this new Invented Term and Notion And therefore since he will needs have the Reputation of being the sole Father and Begetter of the Hopefull Issue there is no Reason in the World that Antiquity should find other Fathers to maintain it CHAP. VII In which is shewn That the Passages alledged by this Author out of the Fathers do not prove Mutual-Consciousness to be that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity does Consist But that the Fathers place it in something else OUR Author having undertook to make good his Doctrine about the Blessed Trinity from the Fathers and that both as to the Distinction of the Divine Persons and also as to their Unity in the same Nature And having said what he could from those Ancient Writers for that new sort of Distinction which he ascribes to the said Persons in the former part of his 4th Section which I have confuted in the preceding Chapter he proceeds now in the following and much longer part of the same Section to prove the Unity of the Three Persons in one and the same Nature according to his own Hypothesis And the Proofs of this we shall reduce under these Two following Heads as containing all that is alledged by him upon this point of his Discourse viz. First That it is one and the same Numerical Divine Nature which belongs to all the Three Divine Persons And Secondly That the Thing wherein this Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature does consist is that Mutual-Consciousness by which all the Three Persons are intimately Conscious to one another of all that is known by or belongs to each of them in particular And here the Authority of the Fathers is pleaded by him for both of these and I readily grant it for the first but however shall examine what this Author produces for the one as well as for the other But before I do this I must observe to him That if that Distinction Asserted by him between the Divine Persons whereby they stand distinguished as Three Infinite Minds or Spirits holds good all his proofs of the Unity of their Nature will come much too late For he has thereby already destroyed the very Subject of his Discourse and it is in vain to seek wherein the Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature as it belongs to the Three Persons does Consist after he has affirmed that which makes such an Unity utterly impossible And it has been sufficiently proved against him in our 5th Chapter That Three Infinite Minds or Spirits can never be one Numerical Infinite Mind or Spirit nor consequently one God Three distinct Spirits can never be otherwise One than by being United into one Compound or Collective Being which could such a Thing be admitted here might be called indeed an Union but an Unity properly it could not And hereupon I cannot but observe also That this Author very often uses these Terms promiscuously as if Union and Unity being United into One and being One signified the very same Thing whereas in strictness and propriety of Speech whatsoever Things are United into One cannot be Originally One and è Converso whatsoever is Originally One cannot be so by being United into One for as Suidas explains the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say Union is so called from the pressing or thrusting together several Things into one But our Author who with great profoundness tells us of the same Nature in Three distinct Persons being United into One Numerical Essence or God-head Page 118. Lines 9 10. has certainly a different Notion of Union from all the World besides For how one and the same Nature though in never so many distinct Persons since it is still supposed the same in all can be said to be United into any one Thing I believe surpasses all Humane Apprehension to conceive Union in the very Nature of it being of several Things not of one and the same I desire the Reader to consult the place and