Affection of the Soul which is spiritual and known only by Reflexion should have a Different Appearance The two Manners of Existing with which the same Nature is vested differing toto genere that is as far as Body and Spirit their subjects can distance them To explicate this more fully and to shew the difference between Corporeal and Spiritual Idea's I offer to their thoughts this Reflexion concerning the distinct nature of a Phantasm which is a Corporeal Resemblance and the nature of the thing in the Mind that is its Nâ—tion express'd by a Dâ—finition which is Intellectual and Spiritual The Phantasm or Corporeal Resemblance of a Man is a kind of Picture of a thing with two Legs two Arms such a Face with a Head placed uprightly that grows moves itself c. Let us regard next the Definition of a Man or rather which is abating the Expression the same the Notion of him which is that he is a Rational Creature and we shall easily discern of how different a shape it is from the other how it abstracts from many Corporeal Qualities Figures of the Parts and other Considerations which were Essential Ingredients to the Picture or Phantasm and not at all Essential to It nor found in the Definition and how some Considerations too are added in the Definition or imply'd in it as to Apprehend Iudge Discourse c. which no more belong to the Phantasm than it did to Zeuxis's Grapes to have the Definition of the Fruit of such a Vegetable predicated of them In a word one of them is a kind of Portraicture outwardly resembling the other speaks the most Intrinsecal Essence of the thing Defin'd The one signifies Bodily Parts belonging to such an Animal and therefore is Corporeal the other does not signifie but is the Nature signified and this too by Words which denote to us the Mind or Meaning that is the Notion of the speaker which is therefore Spiritual at least in part Whence the Compleat Essence of Man could not be understood nor a Definition of it fram'd without making use of some of these Notions or Idea's which are made by our Understanding reflecting upon its own Spiritual Operations LESSON III. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided 1. THE Differences that divide each Common Head must be Intrinsecal to it For since we cannot discourse of two Disparate Notions at once and since were those Heads divided by Differences that are Extrinsecal to the Common Genus or taken from another Head each Species of it would consist of two Disparate Notions hence it is absolutely necessary to Science that the Differences which divide these Common Heads be such as belong to no other Common Head but be within the Limits of that Head or Intrinsecal to it Again since the Difference is most Formal in constituting the Species and the Genus only Material were the Differences Extrinsecal or Borrow'd from another Head it would follow that all the Species of the Head divided by such Differences would belong to another Head viz. to that Head whence those Differences are taken Which would put all our Notions into Confusion and involve a direct Contradiction as making Substances to be Quantities Qualities c. 2. Intrinsecal Differences can be no other but more and less of the Common Notion For since being Intrinsecal they cannot be taken from any other Head it follows that they must partake of the Common Notion of their own respective Heads Again since if they did partake of the Common Notion Equally they would not differ in that Notion and so would not be Differences of it it follows that they must partake of it Vnequally that is they must be more and less of the Common Notion 3. Hence the Common Notion of Ens Thing or Substence being that which is capable of Existence is Immediately Intrinsecally or Essentially divided into what 's more and less capable of Existence Wherefore 4. Divisible and Indivisible which constitute Body and Spirit are the proper and intrinsecal Differences of the Common Head of Substance For since Actual Division of the Entity makes the thing to be no longer indivisum in se that is to be unum that is to be Ens that is to be capable of Existence it follows that that Ens which is Divisible or Body is less capable of Existence that is has less of the nature of Ens or Substance and the Ens that is Indivisible or Spirit has more Again since Things Divisible or Bodies can only have their own Being or Existence whereas Things indivisible or Spirits are capable of being Other things also or of having in them the Natures and Existences of all the things they know hence they have a greater Capacity of Existence than Bodies have since they have enough for themselves and can impart it to Millions of Other things besides and consequently Body and Spirit are constituted by Divisible and Indivisible as by the proper immediate and Intrinsecal Differences that divide Substance or Ens. 5. The Divisibility and Indivisibility that are the Intrinsecal Differences of Ens are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative For were it so it would follow that some Intrinsecal Differences of Ens in Common would be taken from some other Head viz. that of Quantity and so the Differences being what 's most Formal in the Species hence those Species of Ens would rather be under that Head than its own Again that Divisibility which is of Quantity may oftentimes be put into Act and yet the same Ens remain v. g. a Man may lose the Quantity of an Arm a Tree of a Branch c. and yet remain still the same Things whereas if Quantitative Divisibility were the Intrinsecal Difference which constituted it such an Ens Quantitative Division must by consequence make it cease to be that Ens. Moreover since Quantity as will be shortly seen is Divisibility and Divisibility in Vnity in case Quantity did Intrinsecally divide Ens and constitute Body where-ever there were Quantity there would be Vnity under that notion and so all Quantitative things would be but one Ens or one Body which is the highest absurdity Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which are the intrinsecal Differences of Ens are not those of being Quantitative and not Quantitative 6. Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecally must be the Divisibility and Indivisibility of the Constituents of Ens as such that is the Divisibility of it into Matter and Form and Indivisibility of it into such Constituent parts Which differences do Essentially divide the Genus of Ens and constitute the species of Body and Spirit For since we see Bodies chang'd into one another and therefore the former Body had really somewhat in it determining it to be actually what it was which we call the Form and somewhat by which it could be Another which we call the Power to be another or Matter Again since we see that the
some Body viz. to Animal as one of the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of that Genus as is shewn above 3. Notwithstanding Man cannot be both Body and Spirit formally For then he must necessarily be Two Entities in distinct Lines of Substance the one under the Genus of Body the other of Spirit Whence he would be Vnum and non-Vnum in the same regard or according to the same Formal Notion that is he would be Ens and non Ens and consist formally of two Things as perfectly distinct as an Angel and an Ape and even be more monstrous than a Hircocervus or Chimaera because he would be formally that is essentially made up of two more-generically-opposit Things than these are conceiv'd to be Wherefore the Notion of Man being deduced by Intrinsecal Differences from the Genus of Body he is formally a Body tho' his Soul be of a spiritual Nature which makes him virtually a Spirit Whence also the manner of Existence following from what 's Formal in the Thing he has in this State a Corporeal Manner of Existence as appears by his gleaning Knowledge by the Senses his being Measurable by Quantity Alterable by Corporeal Qualities nay even his peculiar and proper Action of Discourse attends the slow pace of Fancy and Bodily Motion none of which could be competent to a Pure Spirit that exists after a Spiritual and Indivisible manner Nor does this more prejudice the Spiritual Nature of a Soul that it exists and works in some regards after the manner of a Body than it does prejudice the Nature of a Body a Stone for example that it exists in us spiritually as it does when we know it or have the Notion or Nature of it in our Understanding 4. Hence is seen what Notions do formally belong to the Line of Substance or to Ens as Ens viz. the several species of it descending downwards from the Common Head till we come to the Iâ—dividuum which therefore is a compleat Ens as including all those Superiour or partial Notions and * therefore it only is in proper speech an Ens or Thing in regard It onely being ultimately determin'd to be This or That only It is by consequence capable of existing which is the Definition of Ens. Whence all Potential or Indeterminate Notions of Ens such as are Ens Corpus Vivens or Animal in Common are for the same reason incapable of Existing otherwise than as they are Parts of the compleat Ens or Individuum and therefore they are phras'd by the Schools Substantiae Secundae and the Individuum Substantia Prima Lower than the Individuum in the Line of Ens we cannot go nor can any Notion be superadded to it that belong Properly to Ens but that of Existence of which Ens is a Capacity Whence we do not call Existence a Form or Act for This joyn'd with the Matter or Power does constitute that compound Ens call'd Body and therefore are both presuppos'd to Existence but we call it the last Formality of every created Ens because it has no Potentiality at all in that Line but is Pure Actuality and therefore most resembles GOD our Creator and the sole Giver of It whose very Essence is Self-Existence 5. All those Notions before said taking them precisely as determining the common Notion of Ens and belonging to it even to the last Actuality of it Existence inclusively are Metaphysical Notions The proper Object of which Science is Ens not taken as it abstracts from Existence but as it abstracts from all the other Predicaments or common Heads of Notions that is from all Matter and Motion and all Modes or Manners of them For which Reason Existence which more perfectly abstracts from both does more formally belong to the Object of Metaphysicks LESSON IV. Some Considerations belonging to those Ten Heads of Notions or to the Ten Predicaments in Common 1. THE last Nine Predicaments call'd Accidents are not truly Things nor of themselves capable of Existence and therefore they are onely Capable of Being by their Identity with Substance For since we cannot clearly know any thing but by framing diverse Notions or Considerations of it and all the Notions we have are divided into Ten common Heads and it hinders the way to Science if we keep not the Distinction of those Heads unmingled Wherefore it being manifest and undeniable that among those Heads there is one which is truly the Notion of Ens or Thing that is of apable of Existing viz. that of Substance Hence in case we should conceive or put all the rest to be also Entities or Things or of themselves capable of Existence we should confound and jumble all the Common Heads of our Notions together which would fundamentally destroy all possibility of Science even while we are laying it 2. Notwithstanding this the Notions or Natures of those Nine Heads are not Fictitious or fram'd gratis by our Understanding but real Affections or Modifications of the Thing For since we cannot comprehend all that is in the thing at once but are forced to make diverse Considerations of it nor could we do this unless the thing were diversly Considerable it follows that these Nine Heads as well as the First are diverse Considerabilities of the same Thing that is the real Thing it self as diversly consider'd or conceiv'd by us and therefore since they are not Things by virtue of their distinct Notions and yet are really the Thing diversly consider'd which takes nothing from their Reâ—lity it is left that they must be Real Affections Modifications Respects or Determinations of it and not meer Nothings or Fictitious but as we may say somewhat of the Thing or belonging to it which Logicians phrase to be a Thing in an Analogical or Secondary sense 3. The Distinction of these Considerabilities is partly taken from the Vnderstanding partly from Nature it self For since the diverse Considerabilities of the Thing are not so many little Entities found in it but the same thinâ— diversly conceiv'd the distinction of them cannot be taken from the Thing it self singly consiâ—â—red On the other side since our Understanding is naturally apt to make diverse Abstract Notions of the Thing nay is forced to do it because it cannot discourse clearly of more of them toâ—ether much less of the whole suppositum and that the Impressions on the Senses which cause those Notions are naturally diverse and that the Causes in Nature do often work upon the suppositum or thing according to some one Notion or Considerability of it and not according to another for example on its Figure and not on its Colour on its Locality or Situation and not on its Substance hence ample occasion is ministred to the Understanding to consider it diversly that is to make diverse Conceptions or Notions of it Wherefore the distinction of these Considerabilities is partly taken from the Vnderstanding partly from Nature it self Nature affording Ground and Occasion for the Understanding
who are subject to those Laws For since those Laws are the Causes of the Common Practice and the Common Practice is the Effect of those Laws hence the sence of the Laws is demonstrated by the Common Practice a posteriori 20. But the very best and most assured way to detect and avoid Equivocation in all words whatever is to observe and examin whether the same Definition agrees to the word as found in diverse places For since the Definition consists of a Determinate Genus and its Intrinsecal or Proper Differences it must needs give us the precise Notion or Meaning of the Word since if it be either under any Other Genus or constituted by any Other Differences the Essence which they constitute must needs be a different Essence and therefore the Word which signifies it must necessarily have another Meaning or Notion Corol. V. Words being invented to express Sense or Meaning it follows that those Words that have many Senses and all of them True and coherent to one another have the highest perfection that Words can possibly have Wherefore those passages in Holy Scripture that bear both a Literal Tropological or Moral Analogical and Anagogical sence or several of them are of a more sublime nature than other Words are and argue that they were endited by a Divine Author BOOK II. OF THE SECOND Operation OF OUR Understanding or Judgments LESSON I. Of the Nature of Judgments or Propositions in Common of their Parts of the Ground of their Verification and of the several Manners of Predicating 1. HAving treated of Notions and of their Clear Distinction and Expression to that degree as may be sufficient for Science it follows of course that we treat next of Cognition or the putting together of Notions and this not joyning them together on any fashion by rote as it were in our Memory as a School-boy gets a Latin Sentence without book the meaning of whose words he understands and revolves in his Mind but regards not whether it be True or no nor yet the putting them together according to Grammatical Congruity as is this Sentence Virtue and Vice are both equally Laudable in which the Words do Cohere indeed according to Grammar Rules but the Sence is False and Incoherent But as the word Cognition imports it must be the Connecting or Joyning them together in order to Knowledge that is with an Application of our Knowing Power to see whether they ought to be thus put together or no or which is the same whether the Proposition be True 2. Wherefore since we cannot know any thing to be so but what is truly so it follows that all Knowledge must be of some Verity or Truth and this not of a Truth which is materially such or repeated in our Mind for this amounts to no more but a Complex Notion or Apprehension but to make up the Notion of Knowledge we must see the Notions of which that Truth does Formally consist to be truly and indeed Connected As when we say A Stone is Hard we must see that what 's meant by Stone and by Hard are some way or other Connected in the Thing or otherwise all Truths being taken from the things we cannot be said to Know it to be True 3. Judging in proper speech is not meerly and precisely the Seeing or Knowing that the Notions are Connected but the Saying Interiourly or Assenting heartily that they are so Otherwise since nothing can be Known to be so but what is so it would follow that there would be no False Iudgments Wherefore Judging adds to the meer notion of Knowledge that it is the subduing of all Hesitation or the Fixure of our Intellective Faculty about the Verity or Falsity of any thing Whence Judging is the Effect immediately and necessarily resulting from our Knowledge that the Notions are really Connected when 't is a True Iudgment or else from our only Conceiting them to be Connected when the Judgment is False Whence this is a right consequence I see or know the Notions cohere therefore I judge the Saying or Sentence that signifies they are connected to be True which is the Method that all Rational or Judicious men take Whereas Passionate or Ignorant men who are blindly addicted to their own Sentiment take the Contrary way and will have the Notions to cohere and the Proposition to be True because they had prejudg'd it so upon some other Motive than the seeing that the Terms themselves were indeed connected It will be objected that Knowledge also fixes our Understanding and therefore Knowing is Judging I answer That to fix the Understanding so as to acquiesce to what it sees is to make it Judge but the Notion of Knowing is compleated in the bare Seeing the Terms Connected and is terminated in regarding the Object or the Proposition that is Known But Judging superadds to it that it is moreover the yielding to reject all farther disquisition and adhering firmly to that Knowledge which tho' the distinction between them be nice and delicate is another Consideration superadded to meer Knowing and sinks and rivets the Object more deeply and unremovably in the Soul Lastly the Intuitive Knowledge of Pure Spirits is True Knowledge but it is not made by our way of Judging in regard they neither Abstract nor Compound or Divide Notions 4. Hence is seen that to make Judgments of things out of True Knowledge is the Greatest Natural Perfection our Soul is capable of For since nothing can be Known to be so but what is so or True all Judgments resulting from True Knowledge not onely fill our Mind with Truths but are moreoever a Firm Adhesion to Truths and the Secure Possession of those incomparable Endowments which are the Best Perfections of our Understanding and make us like the God of Truth Nor ends the Advantage we gain by Truth in meer Speculation but Truth excluding from its notion all Possible Errour it makes it Impossible we should ever embrace any Errour while we thus Judge Which since Omnis peccans ignorat and that every Sinner as the Proverb is has his blind side must therefore if Truth be Express in our Understanding and kept awake there Preserve such a mind from Sin and by making right and Lively Judgments of our Present and Future State and of our several Duties here most certainly bring us to Eternal Happiness hereafter 5. That Speech that Connects Notions in order to Knowledge or Expresses a Judgment is call'd a Proposition that is such a Speech as proposes the Notions and puts them into such a Frame or Posture of Connexion as best serves for us to Judge whether they are really Connected or no. Whence it must consist of three parts viz. that which is Affirm'd or Deny'd of another which in an Artificial term we call Predicated and that notion the Predicate That of which 't is Affirm'd or Deny'd call'd the Subject and that Notion which signifies their Connexion call'd the Copula The two first are also call'd the Terms
Exact Distinction and remain Unconfounded and that whoever holds otherwise and makes them two Suppositums does in the Christian Phrase Solvere Christum 1 Io. 4.3 I have not time to reckon up even hintingly the many Absurdities that spring from this ill-coherent Position of theirs But I will keep to this very Maxim of his and demonstrate that even according to that Man which must be meant by the Pronoun Ego is truly one thing consisting of Soul and Body and not a mere Mens To show this I deny that he has a Câ—â—ar and Distinct Idea of himself unless he conceives himself to be a Rational thing or as he calls himself Ratio nor can he clearly conceive himself to be a Rational Thing but he must conceive himself to be a Thing that infers new Knowledges out of foregoing ones leasurely or with succession of Time which belongs properly to Bodies and Bodily Motion Wherefore something of Corporeal Extended or Divisible is found in the Clear and Distinct Idea of Ego or Himself if he be a Ratio or Rational Thing for were he meerly a Mens or Spirit his Operations would be Indivisible Simultaneous and Unsuccessive as is abundantly demonstrated in divers places of the following Treatise particularly in my Seventh Demonstration Book 3. Lesson 7. Among the other points he brings as possible to be yet doubted of he puts this for one that a Four-squar'd thing has in it four sides and no more of which he pretends he may yet doubt because some most Powerful Agent may possibly make that appear to him to be so tho' it be not true in reality Now 't is the very Notion or Essence of a Quadratum to have but four sides and therefore the Proposition affirming that it has just four sides is perfectly Identical and the same as to say What has but four sides has but four sides It being then impossible any thing can be more Certain or more Evident than an Identical Proposition I would ask why he might not as well be Deceivable in his First Principle Cogito ergo sum as in that Self-evident Proposition Or if he pretends that Proposition Ego sum cogitans is more Evident than the other then since all Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition consists in the Close and Clear Connexion of its Terms I would demand of him or his Scholars whether there be any Connexion of Terms more Close and more Clear than there is of those found in an Identical Proposition which affirms the Same is the Same with it self Or if they say there is then to know of them in what that Evidence consists or how it comes to be more Evident To make way towards the settling his beloved and self-pleasing Ideas he falls to Doubt of the Certainty of all our Senses in order to Knowledge and that not onely as a Supposition for Discourse sake as he pretended to doubt of other things but really and seriously and his Scholar Malbranche assures us the Eyes and the same he says of the other senses are not given us to judge of the Truth of Things but onely to discern those things which may either Profit or injure us and all over he makes them improper Means to attain Knowledge by Which Tenet of theirs lies open to many Exceptions For First The Reason Cartesius assigns viz. Prudentiae est nunquam illis planè confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt 'T is a part of Prudence not to trust them at all who have so much as once deceiv'd us is utterly unworthy so Great a Man For it discredits all Nature for some few Men's Morality which is a strange Argument for a Philosopher He that has but once deceiv'd us designedly is presum'd to have done it out of Knavery and consequently may not deserve to be trusted the second time because 't is to be fear'd he is still dispos'd to do the same again But what is this to Corporeal Nature in which taking in all circumstances things are carry'd on from Proper Causes to Proper Effects Weak men are sometimes deceiv'd by their Senses but Speculative or Learned men who penetrate the Reasons how the Senses came to misinform them are aware of those undue circumstances and by that means easily prevent the being led by them into Errour 2dly No wise man builds his Judgments barely on the Impressions made on his Senses being taught by their Reason as well as by the Senses themselves better circumstanced that is by Experience that they do sometime deceive us Whence they reserve in their Minds certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in what circumstances we may truly give Credit to their Testimony in what not Now since Exceptio firmat Regulam to say their Information is to be Excepted against in such Circumstances is to acknowledge that in all others they are to be trusted 3dly As Art does preserve the Learned from being Deceiv'd by the Shortness of the Senses in some Cases so as was said lately the Senses themselves do generally correct the False Iudgments they may have occasion'd in Weak People For example to use some of the Instances they object a Brand whirled round represents a Circle of Fire a Stick in the Water looks Crooked a Square Tower seen a far off appears Round and Great Bodies Little But when the Seer comes near the Brand the Tower and those Great Bodies or beholds the Stick out of the Water he having now a more exact View of them in better Circumstances is inform'd certainly by the same Sense and if need be by others conspiring with it that the former representations were not sincere whence he easily corrects his former Mistakes Why then must the Senses be quite discarded as Useless Servants for Knowledge and be branded for constant Lyers and Deceivers since if we apply them as we ought they are the Proper Means to make us correct these too forward Iudgments which in improper Circumstances they may have occasion'd Nay they advance our Knowledge accidentally even when they happen to misinform us by stirring us up to enquire whence it came that the right Impressions on them from the Objects which were Customary was thus perverted which doubtless has been the Cause of very many New Knowledges in Nature 4thly What is all this to Science or to our purpose For in the Method to Science we neither need nor do build our JUDGMENTS on the Senses alone All we require is that they convey into our Knowing Power right Aâ—PREHENSIONS or NOTIONS of the things in Nature And this 't is Evident they must do for tho' as they object a Large Square Steeple seen a far off seems Round and Little and therefore who Judges it such is Deceiv'd yet it imprints truly in my Mind the Notion of Little and Round and 't is on these unmistakable NOTIONS all our Science is built and our Judging right in our Speculations is chiefly grounded on other Principles as will be seen hereafter Lastly Themselves must either
Form which made the former Thing be what it was is gone when 't is made Another Thing and a New Form succeeds into the same Matter hence we can frame diverse Conceptions of Body which belong to it as such an Ens viz. Matter and Form and have a Ground in Nature to say there is a Real divisibility between them Wherefore since that Ens call'd Body by being divisible into Matter and Form becomes liable to have the Form that constituted it such an Ens separated from the Matter and so to lose its being the same Ens it was and incapable of existing any longer and for the same reason a Spirit by it s not being divisible into Matter and Form has not in its Essence any Principle giving it a Capacity not to Exist as had the other but has in its self or rather is of its self a more simple and more perfect kind of Vnity and consequently a more Noble kind of Entity or Capacity of existing than is the other Therefore the Divisibility and Indivisibility which divide Ens Intrinsecally must be the Divisibility and Indivisibility of it into Matter and Form which we call Metaphysical Divisibility because it is the divisibility of the parts of Ens as such that is of Ens under the Notion of Ens. 7. For the same Reason given above Sect. 1 2. Mixt and Simple are the Intrinsecal Differences of Body For since Simple Bodies which we call Elements have in them but the Nature or Essence of One kind of Body only and Mixt Bodies have both the nature of That Kind and of other Elements besides it is manifest that they divide the Common Notion of Body by more and less which are Intrinsecal Differences 8. For the same reason Mixt Body is divided into Living Bodies and not Living by Intrinsecal Differences because Those are more mixt These less 9 For the same Reason a Living Body being that which has a Principle of Motion in it self is divided as by Intrinsecal Differences into Animal which is more Living or more moving it self viz. by every slight Impression on the Senses and Plant or Vegetable which is less-moving it self 10. For the same Reason Animal which is a Body moving it self by Impression on the Senses is intrinsecally divided into Brutes which do thus move themselves onely to a set Determinate number of Actions which is to be less moving it self by impressions on the Senses and Man who by his Reason and Knowledge is apt to move himself to a kind of Vniversality of Action which is to be more moving himself by means of such impressions 11. For the same Reason Man or Rational Animal is divided intrinsecally and essentially into those who have more and less the Faculty or Power of Reasoning who are therefore properly and essentially more and less Men. Note That Common Logicians because we cannot descend or reach to those particular intrinsecal Differences which constitute Individuals do therefore make Man the lowest species But 't is one thing what may serve for Logical Speculation another what the nature of the thing bears and the right division of the Commoner Notion by Intrinsecal differences requires Wherefore tho' not able to discern the intermediate Species and as far as I have observ'd not reflecting that more and less of the common Notion do make the Intrinsecal and Essential Differences that constitute its Species Common Logicians do content themselves to put Individuums immediately under Man and thence mistake Man to have no Essential Differences at all but Accidental ones only yet 't is manifest that since all Individuums are diverse Entia or Things and Essence does formally Constitute an Ens the Differences that constitute diverse Entia must necessarily be Essential So that amongst Men there may be many Degrees of more or less Rational constituting diverse under Species of Man could we have light to distinguish them as well as there are diverse species of Dogs Horses Trees and Flowers 12. Particular or Singular Things are properly call'd Individuums because they cannot be divided into more of the same Notion as all others in the same Line could For Socrates cannot be divided into more that have the particular Nature of Socrates in them as Man could into more that have the Common Nature of Man 13. Individuals only are properly and compleatly Entia or Things and capable of existing For since the Notion of Thing is Capable of Existing and all Notions that are superiour to the Individuum are Inadequate or Partial Notions of it as is manifest and the Individuum is the Whole as comprizing all those Parts and no Part can exist by its own Virtue or out of the whole in regard it would then be of it self a whole Ens and not a Part onely it follows that onely Individuals are properly and compleatly Entia or capable of Existing 14. Individuals are the proper Subject or Suppositum of all other Notions or Natures both of its own Line and of all the rest For since Individuals onely are properly Things or capable of Existing it follows that both all in its own Line and much more in all the other Lines which have not at all in their peculiar Notions any Order or Title to Existence must exist and subsist in Individuals as in their suppositum or subject which lends them to be and sustains them in Being COROLARIES 1. Hence 't is Logically demonstrated that every individual Man is but One Ens or Thing since he descends Lineally from that Common Head by intrinsecal Differences of more and less which constitute him truly One in that Line that is one Ens or one Thing Whence the contrary Position ravels all the Well-Order'd Frame of Human Notions and the Division of them by intrinsecal Differences which as has been shewn must needs put all our thoughts into Confusion and wholly obstruct the Way to Science Nor matters it that there are two contrary Natures in him Corporeal and Spiritual since the Notion of Ens is not the Notion of the Nature but of the suppositum which has the nature in it Add that the notion of Ens is indifferent to both Natures and therefore if they may be co-ordinate to one End and that it wrong no other Principle they may both club into one Thing and compound one Ens As appears in the Incarnation in which the Second Person of the Trinity assum'd Human Nature and joyn'd it to it self in the same suppositum 2. The Notion of Rational which is in some sort truly Spiritual may be Co-ordinate to the Notion of some kind of Body For since Animal is directly subsum'd under the Notion of Body and the Notion of Animal or of a Thing moving it self by Impressions on the Senses is Intrinsecally divided by less-moving it self thus which constitutes Brutes and more-moving it self thus which is manifestly done by its being Rational that is in part spiritual It follows that the Notion of Rational or Spiritual may be Co-ordinate to
Sence of their own Words But let them wriggle what way they will their putting it to be without the World and yet not to exist in re but in our Imagination only which is within the World is so full fraught with variety of Contradictions that they cannot even name it or talk of it without speaking palpable Nonsence at every step of their Discourse Moreover they deny it to be a Thing and yet they attribute to it the Properties of a Real Thing by making it have assignable Parts in it as also to be Extended Measurable c. which is the highest strain of Contradiction imaginable For since Ens and Non-Ens do differ more than toto genere and as far as Contradiction can distance them whatever is affirm'd of an Ens must necessarily be deny'd of Non-Ens so that if a Thing a Body for example can be extended measur'd pass'd through or mov'd in it must necessarily be affirm'd that a Non-Ens cannot be mov'd in extended measur'd or have Parts Lastly Imaginary Space or Vacuum never affected our Senses and therefore since we can have no distinct Notion of it from outward Objects neither can it consequently belong to any of those Common Heads of Notions whence follows that one of these Heads which gives Being to all the other being Ens Imaginary Space and Vacuum are meer Nothings Note 1. That this Discourse equally concludes against Vacuum within the World For that Imagin'd Space would neither be Body nor Spirit Subject nor Accident and therefore it must be meerly Nothing Nor consequently could it be Measur'd Extended Mov'd in c. Note 2. That these two Tenets being overthrown the whole Epicurean Hypothesis built on them falls to the Ground and needs no farther Confutation 11. Hence 't is Logically demonstrated that there can be no Protuberancy in the outmost Superficies of the World for were this so there would be some Distance between the Extream Surface and that Protuberancy and that distance could be Measurable Divisible c. which would make Non-Ens to be Ens. 12. This Humour of Fancy or of ill-govern'd Reason making Entities of Non-Entities and conceiting every Negative purely as such to be a Thing because we cannot conceive Nothings but as Thinâ—s destroys all Science and makes it Chimerical For every Species in Nature includes a Negation of all other Species and every Individuum in the World of all other Individuums at which rate we should have far more Nothings in the World than Things if we come to put all those Negations to bee It were very proper but withal very pleasant if such Men of Fancy would in pursuance of their Tenet frame us a new No-Logick of their own and put Non-Ens in Common to be the First Head of their Negative Notions and then divide it by more of Non-ens that is No-Body and Less of it or no Spirit and then descend to its proper Individuums as Non-Petrus Non-Ioannes Non-Bucephalus c. This would be consequent to their Fantastick Tenet But even then they must be forc'd to contradict themselves and confess that as Non-ens means not capable of existing so by the same reason they ought to make Non-Corpus to be Non-quantum Non-quale Non-passivum Non-locabile c. which would spoil all their Positions of Vacuum and Imaginary Space So certain it is that all Errors pursu'd home to their bad Principles will still confute themselves Hence the distinction some make of Ens into Ens-Positivum Privativum and Negativum is no wiser than was the saying of the Fanatick Preacher in Ben's Play viz. That he had three Lights in him a Great Light a Little Light and No Light at all 13. We have no Natural Notion nor Ground from Nature of an Union as they call it For the Asserters of it neither make it the Action that unites two things or parts nor the Effect of that Action wrought upon the Subject that is their being united which hinders it from belonging to the Common Heads of Action or Passion but an Intervening Little Entity whose nature it is to tye them together And since such a Notion was never imprinted by our Senses 't is plain it can be no Natural Notion as those in the Predicaments are nor belong to any of those Common Heads Nor can it be collected by Reason for since the Matter before the Union be made is Ultimately dispos'd by Nature to receive the Form and the Form is Proper and by the course of Causes Necessary to be received into the Matter thus disposed there can need nothing to Unite them as they call it but the Efficient making the Form result from such Matter as was fitted for it and requir'd it which is to be in it any more than if Fire be apt to burn what 's Combustible and what 's Combustible be perfectly fit to be burnt by Fire there can need any thing but Application to burn it or which in their Phrase is the same to unite the Form of Fire to the Matter of the Wood. This Conceit therefore of those little Entities call'd 〈◊〉 to tack things together at every turn is a meer Chimera coin'd by Fancy and seems to be borrow'd from those mens observing that two Things unapt otherwise to cohere diverse pieces of Wood for example do need Glew or Pitch or some such tenacious stuff to fix them together whence by an Unsuitable and Ill-grounded Metaphor they translate it to the Uniting the parts of Natural Entities which by the wise Conduct of the Author of Nature are always ready for an Union e're they come to be made One and can need nothing at all to unite them or make them One Entitatively Vnion therefore is the Effect of the Action of Uniting or the same with their being united or their Vnity and not an Intermediating Entity since whatever Things or Parts are naturally Vnited do cling together into one Entity by a kind of spontaneous Inclination and by means of the antecedent Dispositions requiring the Form are such good Friends of themselves beforehand that there can need nothing to Reconcile them Besides this Conceit is ill-grounded in another respect for the Inventers of it make account that those Vnible Parts were before they were united Two Things whereas in reality there was but One Thing dispos'd to be chang'd into another by sitting the Matter to receive a new Form Which Discourse may be apply'd to those who ask How or by what means the Soul and Body were United or made One Thing To which the proper Answer is They were never Two Things 14. We can have no One Notion of a Transcendent for since Transcendents are those that run through all or many of the Predicaments and the Predicaments are so many Heads of Notions Generically distinct it is impossible to have any one Notion of Transcendents Again there is no more common Genus which can be divided into those Ten Heads as its Species by Intrinsecal Differences but those several Summa Genera are distinguish'd
and the surest way to do this is to gather their Sense by reflecting on their Sayings and known Intentions 2. Since then the Vulgar agree naturally to say a thing is in a Place the Notion of Place is to be a Container of the thing that is in it and withal such a Container as is not Intrinsecal to the Thing of which 't is enquir'd where it is but Extrinsecal to it for it would be very odd and dissatisfactory and look like a Jest if when we are ask'd Where such a man is we should Answer He is in his Skin Whence pursuing these Natural Apprehensions of theirs exactly we shall find that the Proper Place of any Body must be Another Body that is Immediate and Equal to it for were it Distant from it and so Vnequal to it or too wide for it then since there is no Vacuum that too-large Container would be a Common Place to other Bodies as well as it and so would not be its Proper Place which was the Question that was ask'd since it would be no more Its Place than that others but a Common Place to both which therefore would be no competent Answer to the Question where It was Whence by Reflexion we shall discover that Place in proper and exact speech is the Ambient Superficies of the next Body for this is Immediate and therefore Equal to it because an Indivisible such as the Superficies is in respect to Body can add no Quantity to it or make the Container Vnequal to the thing Contained But 't is to be observed that the Vulgar whose only aym it is to find a thing by asking for its Place do not reflect oftentimes upon their own Notion or as it were refine it to an Exactness but content themselves to know near what Visible thing that which they look for is placed as on the Cup-board behind the door under the Beds-feet c. which is a Slubberd or Imperfect Notion of Place even according to their own Sayings for these do put the thing sought for to be in that Place whereas perhaps many other things are on the Cup-board or near the Bed's feet as well as the thing sought for 3. Again since the Intention of Mankind in asking Where a Thing is can be no other but to know how to find it it follows that Place must be certainly Knowable that is such as does not it self need seeking for Nor could it be such if it were still Subject to be Remov'd for then we should be at a loss both to find It and other things by it and our selves would be at the same plunge as are those that practise the Art of Memory who being to range the things they would remember in â—et Places their Fancy had design'd do affix them to Stools Chairs Brooms and such like which being taken away and Remov'd they have lost the Memory of the thing their Fancy had placed there wherefore Place must have as much Immobility as may Serve for our finding a thing so that our Enquiry where or in what Place the thing is be not defeated and no more is requisit All farther Immobility being nothing to the purpose mankind intended and therefore was no part of their Notion of Place 4. Wherefore there is no Necessity of having recourse to Imaginary Space or Subsistent Dimensions to find something which is Immoveable Absolutely which some do upon this account because all things in Nature are subject to motion For we experience that we can find any thing that we can have necessity to use or know well enough without recurring thither Besides Place must be more Knowable then the thing we look for whereas these Imaginary Vbies are not Distinguishable or Knowable at all So that such wild Conceits as these are Extravagant even to madness We have prov'd Vacuum to be purely Nothing and consequently Vnknowable and therefore to be in a Vacuum is to be in no place or no where And as for Subsistent Dimensions 't is a plain Contradiction upon another score because it puts Quantity to be Substance and capable of subsisting alone or without a Subject 5. 'T is not much less ridiculous to invent little Entities call'd Vbies for Bodies or for Spirits which are incapable of being in place of which we can give no account For since the surface of the containing Body in a Determinate distance from some Parts of the House the Town the Country or the World which to our apprehension are fixt answers all Questions that can be proposed about the Place of a thing and we can be furnisht with this by our Natural Notions it follows that all other far-fetcht Conceits invented to explicate Place are Needless and Sensless Such strange extravagancies capering wits are apt to fall into when they relinquish Nature and the Solid Notions she imprints in them to follow meer Fancy the mint of a thousand ungrounded Capricio's and Chimera's 6. Examples of Vbi may be such as this Quest. Where or in what Place lives Dr. H. Answ. In Kings-street Q. Where is that Kings-street A. In high Holborn Q. Where is Holborn A. At the West end of London Q. Where is London A. About the middle of England Q. Where is England A. In such a part of Europe Q. Where is Europe A. In the Northwest part of the Earth And farther than this or rather not so far none of the Generality of Mankind can have occasion to enquire tho' perhaps Artists or Geographers and Astronomers may nor needs there any more Immobility to be ascertain'd to find out where that Skilful Doctor lives since this may serve our purpose of finding him And we may do this easily let the whole Earth move round never so swiftly by getting an Answer to some of these Questions without the help of Imaginary Space Subsistent Dimensions or those little Entities call'd Vbies which no mortal Man's Eyes ever saw or any man of Sense could ever understand Corol. I. Hence it is a Contradiction to say the World is in Place since it Contains all Space and consequently all Place in its self and therefore is Contain'd by none which as was shewn is requisit to the Notion of being in Place nor is there any necessity or sense it should unless we should Fancy that some ultra-mundane Traveller bewilder'd in Imaginary Space should be put to it to ask some of the Chimera's there which is the way to the World Corol. II. Hence is seen that the Concave Superficies of a Body consider'd as affecting its own Subject is in the Head of Quantity but as Containing another Body and connotating a respect to some other things so fixt and known that by knowing them and It we may know where the thing contain'd is it constitutes the Common Head of Vbi and consequently of Place Corol. III. 'T is seen also that Angels are not properly in Place nor consequently have properly any Vbi since they have nothing in them which can have any Commensuration to a
Certain Sense of Words For Criticks do very frequently ground the Sense of Words upon Etymologies or the Derivation of them from other words Or else on the Sense in which some few learned Writers do take them both which are Fallacious Rules to know their Sense certainly The former because the Reason why the word was Impos'd and the Sense it self of those words are many times Different Notions For example a Stone as some of them tell us is in Latin nam'd Lapis a laedendâ— pedes but the Notion or signification of that word is the very Substance it self of such a Body Nor is the latter Rule competent to give us the true Meanings of those words that express Natural Notions first because those Learned Men use to speak Learnedly or Rhetorically with Tropes and Figures and affect to deliver their thoughts neatly and finely with quaint Phrases Allusions Metaphors and other knacks of Language all which are so many Deviations from the Natural manner of Expression Common to all Mankind and consequently Unsuitable to our Natural Conceptions Besides that a Few Authors suffice the Criticks to build their Observations upon All which falls infinitely short of that Certainty and Plainness which the Common and Constant Vse of the Generality of Mankind or the Vulgar affords us 8. Equivocal Words are either Simply and Absolutely such which we call Equivocal by chance or Relatively which we call Equivocal by design Absolutely when there is no kind of Reason or Ground why the same word should have two different senses as when Far in English signifies a great way in Latin Bread-Corn or any word in one Language happens meerly casually to have a different Signification in another In which sort of Equivocation there can be no danger to Science those two Senses of the Word being so vastly disparate Relatively when there is some kind of Ground why the same word should be transferr'd from one Notion to another And this may be done for two different reasons One when it is referr'd to another for some Connexion with them as Cause and Effect as when the word Healthful which properly belongs to an Animal is transferr'd to Meat because it is the Cause of Health in the Animal and to Vrine because it is an Effect of its Health and therefore a Natural Sign of it Or as when we say there is much Art in such a Picture or Poem it means the Effect of Art for Art in proper speech is to be found only in the Understanding of the Artificer The other Reason of the words being Transferr'd from one to another and consequently Referr'd back to it again is when this is done for some Proportion or Resemblance between them As when we say of a good Governour that he is the Pilot of the Common-wealth to steer it into a safe Harbour and preserve it from splitting upon the Rocks of Division Where the word Pilot which in the First and Proper Meaning signifies a Director of a Ship is transferr'd to a Governor because he does the same in Proportion in a Common-wealth which the other does in a Ship Thus Tranquility which is properly said of the Sea in a Calm is Transferr'd to a State or Kingdom because its Peaceable Condition resembles or bears a kind of Proportion to the Undisturb'd Quiet found in a Calm Sea 9. Words Transferr'd to another for some Proportion or Resemblance between them are call'd Metaphors or Metaphorical and the best Metaphors are when the thing from which 't is Transferr'd is Eminent under that Notion we intend to express As when we call a Valiant Man a Lyon and a Meek man a Lamb because Courage and Mildness are Eminent in those Animals A Continu'd Metaphor is call'd an Allegory As in the Example lately given the word Pilot steer harbour splitting and Rocks are all Metaphors and therefore the whole speech is Allegorical 10. There is no Danger nor Detriment to Science that such words are us'd in Common Speech or Loose Rhetorical Discourses but they are exceedingly pernicious to it when we are treating of Dogmatical Tenets and searching for Truth out of the Words of Written Authors For since those Metaphors however they be True while understood to be meant in Proportion and Resemblance onely yet are Literally Tals and in delivering Doctrines or Dogmatical Tenets only Litteral Truth is aim'd at and if the Reader happen to take a Metaphorical Expression for a Literal one he will most certainly embrace an Errour for a Truth or if he takes a word Literally meant for a Metaphor he will take a Truth for an Errour hence it must Needs be most pernicious to Science not to distinguish between the Metaphorical and Literal sense of the words but mistake one for the other And therefore unless some Certain Rule be Establisht by which we may be ascertain'd when Written Words are to be taken Literally when Metaphorically 't is impossible to be Certain of any Truth meerly by those Written Words 11. Those Words which are Transferr'd from Corporeal to Spiritual Natures are by far more highly Metaphorical than can be any Transferr'd from one Body to another and therefore the Misunderstanding them must needs be very destructive to Science For since Corporeal and Spiritual are the First Species of Ens and the Division of that Genus into those Species is made by the Contradictory Differences of Divisible and Indivisible it follows demonstratively that whatever except the precise Notion of Ens is properly Affirm'd of Body must be properly Deny'd of Spirit and therefore the words Transferr'd from Bodies to Spirits which are in Different Lines are far more Improper than those which are Tranferr'd from one Body to another they being in the same Line and so less Disparate Corol. II. Hence is confirm'd the former docâ—rine that Spirits are not in place nor are Themâ—elves or their Spiritual Actions Subject to Time â—r Commensurable to it c. Since all these may â—roperly be said of Bodies and therefore must â—roperly be deny'd of Spirits Corol. III. From the two last Sections it folâ—ows evidently that no Dogmatical Tenet can be â—rov'd from Books that treat of Spiritual Natures â—r of such considerations as belong to them unless â—ome Certain Rule be first Establisht by which the Reader may know when the words are to be taken â—iterally when Metaphorically in this or that place â—nce a Mistake in this may make the Reader emâ—race a Falshood for a Truth or a Truth for a Falsâ—ood in matters of greatest Importance For exâ—mple this Proportion God is mov'd by our prayâ—rs is Literally False for to be Moved is to be Chang'd and God is Esseâ—tially unchangeable Wherefore it is only True in a Metaphorical â—ence and the Word moved is a metaphor of the last sort viz. of Words transferr'd to anoâ—her for some Proportion or Resemblance between them and so the true sense is this God tho' Unmov'd in himself yet acts in the same manner towards him that prays to him as
too who make Brutes Rational in many things and they make Men to be Rational but in some and so quite destroy the said Definition by Enlarging and Ampliating it and making it Common and Indifferent to Man and Beast and not apply'd to either of them adequately but only in some Degree onely And yet the same men even tho' perfect Scepticks would not dispute the Truth of this Proposition A Man is a Man Wherefore since 't is directly against the nature of First Principles to be Disputable Definitions cannot be First Principles and consequently only Propositions most perfectly Identical can be such 17. There is another kind of Self-evidence call'd Practical which is Inferiour to this we have hitherto spoken of and Proper to the Vulgar This is call'd Self-evidence not because its Evidence is seen in the very Notion of the Terms as was the other but because it is bred or instill'd from the Things themselves without Speculation or Study by a Practical converse with those things Thus the Vulgar know evidently what is Moist Dry Hard c. as well as the best Philosophers tho' they cannot define them as the others can Nay the best Philosophers as will be seen hereafter must learn from their Sayings how to make their Definitions of all such Natural Notions Thus they know Evidently tho' Naturally the force of Witnessing Authority when 't is Vniversal and of Sensible Matters of Fact For example They know there was such a one as Queen Elizabeth or the Long Civil War in England for they know Men could not be deceiv'd themselves in knowing such things and that they could not All universally conspire to deceive their Children in attesting such a Falshood or if they had had a mind to it they know that the Cheat must needs have been discover'd by some among so many thousands Note That this is call'd Evidence because tho' it be a Rude Knowledge yet it is a True one and 't is the Work of Learned men to Polish by Art those rough Draughts of Evidence which the Vulgar have by a Natural way as will be farther seen hereafter 18. Those Speculations only being well grounded which are according to Nature it will add a great confirmation to this new piece of Doctrine that First Principles are Identical Propositions and help withal to satisfie some superficial Readers who perhaps may think such Speculations Aâ—ery to shew that the Nature-instructed Vulgar do abet this Doctrine and make use of Propositions exactly Identical when they would express themselves to stand finally to some Truth which they judge to be most Evident For example if you would force a Clown to deny a thing which he is sure of or knows to be True he will tell you soberly and if you press him much angrily that Truth is Truth or that he is sure A Spade is a Spade or that he knows what he knows or if it be in a point belonging to Justice that Right is Right and he brings these as Evidences from whence he can never be driven Which signifies clearly that such Truths as these are Judg'd by him Self-evident and to be the Principles which naturally determin and fix him in an Immovable Adherence to the point as the Vltimate Ressort and Reason of his Perswasion that is Nature teaches him to have recourse to these as to his First Principles 19. The other Test by which to examin the Truth of this Discourse of ours about First Principles is to desire the Objecter to settle some First Principles of his own after his Fashion which done it will manifestly appear that if he takes any other way either his First Principles will not be Self-evident at all which yet First Principles must be or in case he pretends them such he will not be able to tell you or explicate in what that Self-evidence of theirs consists or else he will produce such as he will tell you he will undertake to prove to be Evident which since what 's Prov'd is concluded will be the same as to offer to obtrude upon us Conclusions instead of First Principles Or lastly they will be meer Fancies of his own put together prettily and exprest wittily and plausibly which when they are divested of their gay Dress and their naked sence is laid open will be either meer voluntary Talk or plain Nonsence in cuerpo Into which Fault of Groundless and boldly and Magisterially pronounced tho' wittily exprest Assertions and the Imposing them upon us for Principles the Author of the Leviathan does fall very frequently and I could wish all his Followers would please to examin all his Principles by this Test and they would quickly discover how strangely they fall short of Self-Evidence that is of the Nature of First Principles Or in case they judge I have stated 〈◊〉 the Nature of First Principles I should take it for a Favour if they would vouchsafe me an Answer to my several Reasons for my Doctrin as to this point in this Lesson and the next and in a full Discourse settle their own First Principles and shew me my Error which I am very confident they will never think fit to Attempt LESSON III. That First Principles are Identical Propositions prov'd by Instances The Use that is to be made of them Also of some other Propositions either in whole or in part Formally Identical and of the Reducing of Inferiour Truths to Self-evident Propositions 1. THAT the First Principles in Metaphysicks are Identical Propositions has already been clear'd It remains to shew they are such in other Sciences also We will begin with Physicks The First Principle that grounds that whole Science according to some Modern Philosophers is Corpus est Quantum in which tho' the Subject and Predicate do indeed differ Grammatically the one of them being Substantively the other Adjectively express'd yet if we rifle the Words to get out the Inward Sense as Philosophers ought we shall find that since all the Essential Differences they allow between a Body and a Spirit is this only that That is Divisible This Indivisible as also that Quantity and Divisibility into Integral parts are with them the same Notion it will appear Eyidently that according to them this Proposition Body is Quantitative is perfectly equivalent to this What 's Divisible is Divisible which is every way Identical I say with them for they deny all Metaphysical Divisibility of Body into Matter and Form by denying all Formal Mutation The same Discourse holds if they put for their First Principle Corpus est Extensum for in that Supposition they hold that Extension is the Notion that Intrinsecally constitutes Body or Matter and differences it Essentially from Spirit Whence the Proposition Corpus est Extensum is the same as Ens Extensum est Ens Extensum or Corpus est Corpus which are most Formally Identical 2. That the First Principle which grounds all Ratiocination in Logick is an Identical Proposition will be shewn hereafter Sect. 10. when we
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity but la All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of or is One Indivisible added to Another Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity 10. The Minor is Evident for all Number tho' Infinit consists of Ones that is of One added to another Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct All the parts must be Actually distinct also Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two must be equally found wherever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity 11. The Minor is proved for all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar that is in our case out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity Again this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance for this has no Distinction of parts but that of Matter and Form Nor out of any other Line for all those do presuppose Quantity and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body therefore if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self 12. Now that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct destroys the Nature of Quantity and is Contradictory is thus proved Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity actually Distinct contradicts the nature of Quantity 13. The Minor is Evident For those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively or rather are already so as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line Wherefore since the Nature of such a Subject as they put Quantity to be does bear it let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into that is into All they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles They must be Indivisible because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into and they must be Infinit for Divisibility that is but Finite would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration Besides it would follow hence that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity Wherefore they being also Infinit in Number for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension for the least Determinate Quantity Infinit times repeated makes an Infinit Extension 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration that since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles nor of Actual parts it is made up of Potential parts that is there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity and this Whole is Divisible without end Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity or which is the same the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole Divisible still into its Potential parts or parts still farther Divisible Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion and consequently the Course of Nature could not have been ab Aeterno but must have had a Beginning Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible The Minor is Self-evident The Major is thus prov'd Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time v. g. Infinit Hours but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible 16. The Major is clearly Evident for were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite then all the Parts which are equivalent to the Whole being Finite the Whole must likewise be Finite The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis that Time Motion or the Course of Nature had a beginning Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists Note that 't is the same as to our Argument whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd or no 't is sufficient the Subject Infinit Motion or Infinit Time bears the having such a Determination made by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings which we call Angels Demonstration V. Axiom 1. What acts is 2. Every thing acts as it is and à fortiori cannot act directly contrary to what it is especially as an Immediate Agent 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings but either Divisible or Indivisible ones that is Body or Spirit 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts and consequently is but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect viz. of the First Motion in Nature therefore i-An Angel acts and consequently is The Minor is thus prov'd Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediatâ—ly by the First Cause noâ— by a Body must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel and consequently an Angel acts is The former part of thâ— Minor viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause is thus demonstrated 19. Fe-No being that is Essentially Vnchangeable and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change can be the Immediate Cause o Change or Motion nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature but ri-The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable and his Nature is directly
as to the nature of Agent and Patient there needs no more to begin the Effect actually but Application 2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient and the Effect be Indivisible there needs no more to begin and end that is to Compleat the Effect at once but Application 3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts 4. Every thing operates as it is 5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause 6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative a Body is Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion For since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is what is Quantitative operates Quantitatively but nothing can operate Quantitatively or exercise 't is Quantity when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity that is moves not according to it's Quantity It follows then that to Operate Quantitatively is to move according to Quantity Wherefore since nothing can move according to it's Quantity but either Intrinsically by having it's Quantity made greater or less or Extrinsically that is by having it's Quantity unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self mov'd towards Another and both these do evidently require some kind of Local Motion 't is Evident likewise that No Câ—â—poreal Operation is without Local Motion Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Local Motion For since Motion is Mutation and consequently Local Motion Mutation or Change according to Place and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space and Space is Quantity it follows that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity But Angels they being Pure Spirits are not Quantitative therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion or capable of having Local Motion made in them Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel For since no Operation of Body is without Local Motion and an Angel it being a Pure Spirit is not susceptible of Local Motion it follows that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body But No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant For since a Cause the self same in all respects if the Patient be likewise the self same and the Application also the self same produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect and an Angel put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant is put to be the self-same as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal it follows that in any time sufficient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect that is act upon it self or change it self Wherefore since an Effect in an Indivisible subject is Indivisible that is Impossible not to be all at once or in one Instant and an Angel being a Pure Spirit is an Indivisible Subject t is Evident that this Effect or the Action of that Spirit upon it self would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made that is can only be made in the First Instant Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant Proposition V. 17. If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being Let there be only Two Angels the one whereof can work upon the other and let the Agent be A the Patient B and because they are suppos'd not to act in the First Instant but after some Duration let the Duration assign'd be C the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant and as is suppos'd one works not upon the other till the Instant D they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D that is for the whole Intermediat Duration C Therefore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each nay in the very First Instant of the Duration C as they are in the Instant D But in the Instant D in which they acted they were in all points fitted to act therefore they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C Wherefore the Effect Begun and the Subject being Indivisible Ended in the very First Instant in case their wanted not Application of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant For since Quantitative Application or Propinquity is not competent to Pure Spirits all the Application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole Duration And tho' they had not had it formerly the Argument returns with the same force that they could not have had this new Knowledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration nor from a Body and therefore they must have had it from anâ—ther Spirit and this in the First Instant because that Other was then perfectly apt to give it This perfectly apt to receive it And consequently If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels how great soever all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being For since where there are only Two one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all because all the imaginable Concurrents to that Action were then adequately put the rest also where there are more will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self or by what it has from another wherefore since it can never want what it has of it self or by it's self it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third unless it be to be wrought upon by the First and so be fitted to work upon the Third but this is done in the very first Instant wherefore also the Third will for the same reason be wrought upon in the self-same Instant Again since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work
upon the Fourth but to be chang'd by the Second and this was done as was now shown in the First Instant the Causes of changing the Fourth were adequately put in the same Instant too and consequently the Effect And since how far soever we proceed the same reason holds viz. that the Effects are still Indivisible and all the Causes of each immediately succeeding Effect still adequately put in the first Instant it will follow that the Effects will still be put in the same Instant by the same necessity that the Effect of the First up on the Second was put in the First Instant of their Being Therefore all whatever any Multitude of Angels how great soever can work upon one another is perform'd in the First Instant of their Being Proposition VII 19. That 't is Infinitly more Impossible an Angel should be chang'd by God after the first Instant than by any other Spirit For since the Angel is in the same manner capable of Change as far as concerns it's self or it 's own power to be changed whether God or any other Spirit be to change it on that side precisely there is a perfect Equality Wherefore seeing on the other side 't is infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not have Power to change her in the First Instant than that any other Spirit should not have such a Power and Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not of himself be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it his Nature being Pure Actuality Also since 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should after some Duration receive any Change in himself fitting him to produce that Effect than that any other Spirit should And lastly since 't is Infinitly more Impossible his Active Power should not be Apply'd to the Patient both in regard he most necessarily and comprehensively knows it and most intimately by himself conserves it in Being Wherefore since from these Considerations or Reasons however Infinitly short in Creatures it is concluded to be Impossible that even any Other Spirit if it should change an Angel at all should not change it in the First Instant and these Considerations or Reasons are found to be in GOD with Infinitly greater Advantage it is Evident that 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD if he change an Angel at all should not change it in the first Instant that is should change it in the Intermediate Duration than that any other Spirit should Proposition IX 20. That 't is absolutely Impossible an Angel should be Changed after the First Instant of it's Being For since no Change can be made without â—he working of Some Cause and no Body can work upon an Angel and all that it self or any other Created Spirit can work upon it must necessarily be in the very First Instant of it's Being and 't is much more Impossible GOD should work upon it unless in the First Instant than that any Created Spirit should and there can be no Cause possible or Imaginable besides GOD Created Spirits or Bodies it follows that there can be no Cause at all to work upon an Angel or to Change it after the First Instant of it's Being and therefore it can undergo no Change after that First Instant ADVERTISEMENT 1. THIS last Conclusion may seem a strange Paradox to some Readers whose Reason and Principles have not rais'd them above Fancy But not to insist farther on the Evidence of our Consequences from Undeniable Principles which have forced the Necessity of our Conclusion such men are desirâ—d to reflect that Ens being divided as by it's Proper Differences by Divisible and Indivisible and these Differences being Contradictory to one another it follows that Body and Spirit which are the Species constituted by those Differences do agree in nothing at all but in the Common and Generical notion of Ens or in this that they are both of them Capable of Being Whence 't is Logically demonstrated that they must Differ nay contradictorily disagree in every thing else so that whatever else is Affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other Wherefore since we can truly and literally Affirm that Body is Quantitative Corruptible in Place mov'd Locally Chang'd by Time or Subject to it Capable of Succession or of Before and After which are the Differences of time c. we must be forced with equal Truth Literally to Deny all these of Pure Spirits or Angels because none of these do belong to the Common Generical Notion of Ens but to that Difference which constitutes that Species call'd Body and therefore the Contradictory to all these and amongst them to be Vnsuccessive in it's Operations must be predicated of the other Species call'd Spirit It will I doubt not be much wonder'd at too that the Devils should be Damn'd in the First Instant of their being which looks as if they were Created in the state of Damnation A thing certainly most Unworthy GOD who is Essentially and Infinitly Good But their wonder will cease if they reflect that those Bad Angels had far more Knowledg and consequently more perfect Deliberation such as they can have in that one Single Instant than We could have had tho' we have been a thousand years Considering and Deliberating e'er we had made our Choice of our last End and fix our Resolution to adhere to it Finally So that it never lay in the power of any Man to have so Clear a Knowledg of his Duty and so perfect and full sight of all the Motives to continue in that Duty as the Devil and his Angels had in that one Instant Whence the Crime of Lucifer and his Adherents was a Sin of pure Malice and not mere Frailty or mixt with Frailty much less of Inadvertence Speculative Ignorance or suggested by the Soul 's deprav'd Companion the Body as are the Sins of the Generality of Mankind some Inconsiderable number of them excepted whose Souls are thorowly poison'd with Spiritual Sin 's peculiar to the Devil such as are Spiritual Pride Malice Envy or such like which wicked Sinners are therefore even while here so many Limbs as it were of the Devil and very difficult to be brought to any Repentance And this is the reason why GOD's Wisdom Goodness and Justice laid so many Miracles of Mercy to save poor weak Mankind and left the Faln Angels in the sad condition in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves Wisely and Justly placing it in the Order of Causes that that Sin which was so perfectly and in despite of all Motives to the contrary so Wilfully Resolute should be Irretractable whereas on the other side Sins of mere Frailty are not hard to be repented of when the alluring circumstance is past and gone The same Faculty which permitted them to fall leaving them likewise in a Pliableness to reform and retract what their Reason abus'd by Passion had perhaps either by surprize or after much
struggling that is half unwillingly yielded to Corol. I. Hence abstracting from Faith and Theology 't is Demonstrated against the Originists by Reason reflecting on the nature of Things that the Devils are to be Eternally Damn'd and how and why 't is Impossible their Hell should have an End For they cannot be saved without Repentance nor repent without having some new Motive which they either knew not of before or did not well consider of it Neither of which can have place here for since they acquire no New Knowledg either by the Senses or by Discourse it follows that they have all in the first Instant that is due to their Natures that is they know all they could possibly know and out of that Knowledg made their Full and Final Choice Nor can there be Consideration in a Knower that sees all things by Simple Intuition For Consideration is the Comparing one Motive with another and therefore 't is an Operation Proper to that Knower that works by Abstracted Notions or Considerations of the Thing Whence it is most Improper and Incompetent to such an Intelligent Being as knows all as once by way of Simple Intuition Corol. II. Tho' all that can concern the Internal Operations of Angels was finished in an Instant yet we may for all that conceive certain Priorities of Nature in the Course or Process as it were of what belongs to them in that First Instant v. g. We can conceive them to be and to be Good according to thâ—ir Essence and Existence as coming Immediately out of God's hand ere we conceive their own Depraved Will made them Bad. We can conceive them to know Themselves ere they knew in and by Themselves the whole Angelical Order and the whole Course of Nature We can conceive them to know Themselves as most fit under God to preside over Humane Nature ere they knew that a Man by the Incarnation of the Word was to be their Head and as it were take their office out of their hands and be Lord of themselves too We can conceive them to know This which was the cause of their Aversion from GOD ere we can conceive them to have had that Aversion from him for his thus Ordering things We can conceive Lucifer their Ring-leader to have had that Aversion ere he propos'd his Seditious thoughts to other Angels to debauch them from their Allegiance We can conceive him to have Debaucht them ere we conceive the Contrast and Battle was between Michael and his Loyal Angels and Lucifer with his Rebellious Troops Lastly we can conceive this Battel fought ere the latter black Squadrons were cast down from their Sublime Height into Hell All these I say may be Conceiv'd to have had certain Priorities of Nature to one another such as those Causes and Effects use to have which are in the same Instant So that this Single Instant of theirs is tho not Formally yet virtually and in order to the many Indivisible Effects producible in it Equivalent or as we use to say as good as a Long Series of our Time Not by way of Quantitative Commensuration of one to the other but by the Eminency of the Angelical Duration or Aeviternity which is of a Superiour Nature to Body and consequently Bodily Motion or Time and Comprehending it all Indivisibly and Instantaneously Corol. III. Hence it follows that the Several Instants which Divines put in Angelical Actions and particularly in Lucifer and his Fiends before their Fall can be no way Solidly explicated and conformably to the nature of Pure Spirits but by those Priorities of Nature For since Comparisons can only be made of those Natures which are ejusdem generis we cannot Compare or Commensurate those Actions which are Spiritual to the Succession found in the Actions of Bodies which are Measurable by Time any more than we can their Essence to the Nature of a Body and it would be an odd Comparison to say an Angel is as Knowing as a Horse is Strong or as a Wall is Hard Wherefore Before and After which are Differences of Time or Successive Motion can never be with good Sense apply'd to the Operations of Pure Spirits Again should we allow such Instants Succeeding one another it would avail nothing For since one Indivisible added to another cannot make a thing Greater nor consequently a Duration Longer the putting many of them advances no farther than the First Indivisible or the First Instant Add that even those Divines who put diverse Instants do all owe our Principles that Angels are Indivisible Substances for did they hold them Corporeal as some of the Fathers did I should not wonder at their Inconsistency but they are frightned from the Conclusions that Naturally and Necessarily follow thence either because they vainly fear Scripture-Texts expressing things humano more or in Accomodation to our low Conceptions cannot otherwise be verified or else because those Conclusions too much shock their Fancy by their seeming Extravagancy or lastly because they are willing to gratifie and please the Fancy of the Vulgar which is startled at such uncouth propositions And this is one mane Hindrance to the Advancement of Science when men are afraid of their own Conclusions because the herd of vulgar Philosophers will dislike and decry them A Fault which I hope I have not been Guilty of in this former Treatise but have both avoided it my self and have Indeavour'd to prevent it in others by holding firmly and directing others to hold to the right Notions or Natures of the things and to pursue steadily the Consequences that do naturally Issue from them how Aukward soever the Conclusions may seem to those who take their Measures from Fancy how to frame their Rules of Logick which are to direct their Reason LESSON VIII Of Opinion and Faith 1. SCience being grounded on Intrinsical Mediums and on such as are Proper or Immediately Connected with the Extrems whence it has to be Evident it follows that those Mediums which are either Extrinsical to the thing or Common ones cannot beget Science but some Inevident or Obscure kinds of Light call'd Faith and Opinion The former of which is grounded on an Extrinsical Medium call'd Witnessing Authority or Testimony the Later on Remote or Common Mediums which seem to bend or lean towards the Conclusion but do not by any Maxim of true Logick reach it or inferr it Examples of both may be these 2. That which is Attested unanimously by such a Multitude of Witnesses and so Circumstanc'd that they can neither be Mistaken in it Themselves nor Conspire to deceive others is true But That there is such a City as Rome is attested by such a multitude of Witnesses and so Circumstanc'd that they can neither be Mistaken in it Themselves nor Conspire to deceive others therefore That there is such a City as Rome is True What 's Promis'd will be but That my Debtor will pay me money to morrow is what 's promis'd therefore That my Debtor will pay me
Reason that can breed in us the least degree of Suspense as to the Verity of these and such like Matters of Fact or unfix us from our most stedfast Adherence to them as most Certain Truths Which shows Evidently that the former were only Morally Certain that is had some Contingency in them and so might possibly be otherwise than we till we came to reflect deem'd them whereas those Latter were more than Morally that is Absolutely Certain because after the most accurate Reflexion we could not invent and heartily embrace any Ground or Reason to admit the least Suspence as to their Truth nor how or why they might possibly be False or which is the same that the Testimony or Tradition for them could be Fallacious Corol. IV. Hence we may make a farther Discovery of the force of Practical Self-evidence instill'd by Nature without Study and that it is a solid Knowledge of the An est of the thing Attested and consequently of the Conclusive Force of Tradition as also of many other Truths the Quid est of which or the Grounds on which our Rational Nature Unreflectingly and as it were at unawares proceeded is to be Demonstrated by Learned Men looking exactly into Intrinsecal Mediums and thence discovering how this Effect viz. such a Firm Adhesion was wrought in us Connaturally or why such an Authority could not deceive us in Attesting such Particulars Note That some of these Matters of Fact now mention'd do fall short as to some of the best Qualifications found in diverse other Traditions viz. as to that of their being Practical Which gives us farther light to discern the Incomparable Strength of Tradition and how every way Impossible it is it should deceive us were it furnisht with all the Advantages it might have 13. Hence is seen that Opinionative Faith is as much Irrational as Opinion was shown to be taking it as Oppos'd to Science for example What an Old Wife said is True That she saw a Spright is what an Old Wife said therefore That she saw a Spright is True LESSON IX Of Assent Suspence Certainty and Uncertainty 1. THE Notion of Potentiality Indifferency Indetermination and Uncertainty as conceiv'd to be in the Thing are one and the same For if the Thing be consider'd meerly as a Power to be This or That or to be thus or thus 't is evident from the Terms that it is not as thus conceiv'd Actually Particularly Determinately or Certainly this or thus since all Difference Determination and consequently Certainty in the thing which if well reflected on are no more but it's being what it is do spring from the Act or Form as all Potentiality Indifferency Indetermination and Uncertainty of being this or being thus does from the Matter 2. Existence as being the Last Actuality takes away all Potentiality Indifferency and Uncertainty of being this or thus that can possibly be in the Thing This is as Evident as 't is that Perfect Light takes away Darkness or that any Opposit is Inconsistent with the other Opposit in the same kind or to come nearer our point that what is has while it is lost all Potentiality or Power of not being while it is 3. Wherefore considering the Thing as it is in our Vnderstanding it remains Indeterminate and Vncertain to us that is our Understanding which is Inform'd by it is Potential or Indeterminate it self and consequently we are Vncertain Intellectually till we see it is The reason is because all our Knowledg is Intirely and Adequately taken from the Thing which makes the Understanding Conformable to it according to the degree of Clearness or Obscurity whereby it is represented to us or affects us Whence follows that when we see the Existence of the Thing or that it is our Understanding is ultimately Determinate that is we are Absolutely Certain 4. Wherefore on the contrary while we see the Thing may not be for ought we know our Understanding is Indeterminate as to it 's Being that is we must remain Vncertain that it is For 't is against a First Principle of our Understanding that the Thing may not be and be at once 5. Wherefore Assent being the Judging that a thing is all that passes in us if we act Rationally is Suspence till we come to a Proof that Concludes it is This is manifest from the Terms For the Words Suspending of Assent do show that take away all Suspence Assent succeeds and consequently that unless it so happens that we see a thing to be clearly False all is Suspence till we come at Assent 6. Wherefore all Common and Remote Mediums which are only apt to ground Opinion being unable to conclude the Thing is they are consequently unable to Determin the Understanding that the Thing is and therefore they must leave it if it works rationally in some degree of Suspence Indetermination or which is 〈◊〉 same in Vncertainty This is Evident because such Proofs do reach only to show the thing Likely to be which falls short of it's Being really and Indeed for Likelihood to be is not the Notion of Being since what is most Certainly is which goes beyond all Likelihoods how great soever they may be imagin'd to be 7. Suspence may be consider'd as Indifferently hovering between the Things being or not being or without Inclining to either of them For sometimes we have no kind of Reason inclining us to the Likelihood of the one more than of the other As we experience it happens to us as to our Determining whether the Number of the Stars be Even or Odd. 8. Hence Assent consists in an Indivisible as does also Dissent or a Judgment that the thing is not but all Suspense is Divisible or Capable of Different Degrees The former part is Evident because it 's proper Object is or being is Indivisible as is also the Object of Dissent is not whereas the Objects of Suspence are seeming Distances from the things being so Actually or Approaches towards it or in Dissent Approaches towards it's seeming not to be so that is Removes from it's being so 9. The Differences of this perfectly Indifferent Suspense are more and Less seemingly Distant from or Approaching to the Actual Being of the Thing For this Indifferent Suspense by it's being Indifferent is a kind of Genus to the others and abstracts from them both and therefore the Differences of it must be more and less in that kind Corol. I. The Disinclining towards Assent or Inclining towards Dissent that the thing is is call'd Doubt and if the Being of that Thing is our Good it grounds that Passion call'd Fear of loosing it And the Inclining towards Assent in such a Case or Disinclining to Dissent causes a disposition in the Understanding opposit to Doubt which tho we want a name for it is a certain chearing Glimpse in the Understanding which was in perfect Darkness before and grounds that Passion which we call Hope Both which Passions are Rational or Irrational according as the
that here is most manifestly a Divisibility between the Natures of Essences of those Things and these Intrinsecal Accidents or Accidental Forms and the Subjects are evidently Chang'd by Natural Causes according to These and not according to its Essence or Nature that is the Subject undergoes so many Formal Mutations that are Accidental And let them explicate these Terms as they please after their own odd manner they shall never avoid the Conclusion if they do put the Subject or Body to be truly an Ens and that it may be otherwise than it was and yet not Immediately cease to be that Ens either of which to deny were to bid defiance to Mankind and to Common Sense 28. I know it will be repli'd that all Natural Bodies are Compound Entities or made up of many little Particles which put together Mov'd and Plac'd Commodiously do enable them to perform those several Operations peculiar to each and that these do occasion our saying in our common Speech it is such an Ens. And that therefore all our Discourse concerning Formal Mutation falls to the Ground since all may be Explicated by the Taking away Adding Ordering and Moving those Particles after such or such a manner But this comes not up to the Point nor can serve them to escape our Argument but rather plunges them into a more manifest and Direct Contradiction For admit that each Compound Ens as they are pleas'd to call those Many Entities or at least a great part of it be made up of those little Particles I am still to ask them whether those Particles do really conspire to make it One Thing or no after the Composition that is whether after the Composition there remains only One Actual Thing or Many Actual Things or Entities If the First then our Discourse proceeds with the same Force for then since this One Ens or Body is Dissolvable or Corruptible it must as was prov'd above have somewhat in it that remains in the Compound w ch is to be made out of it which we call Matter and Somewhat which Formally Constituted the Former Body to be what it was and consequently which does not remain in the New One which is what we call the Form And because it did not cease to be or was Corrupted in an Instant the Former Subject or Body admitted of Alterations first and consequently there was Mutation in it both according to those Substantial and those Accidental Forms But if they say as I fear they will because they must that after Composition there is no Ens which is truly One but Many or if they say that after Composition there is One and Many which are properly and Formally Entities then they must say that the same Thing is both One according to the Notion of Ens and yet not One according to the Notion of Ens which is a plain Contradiction for it Affirms and Denies Contradictories of the Thing acording to the same respect Whereas in the Aristotelian Doctrin there is but One Ens Actually tho' made up of Potential Parts which have a Formal Divisibility between them or which is the same One Thing apt to verify different Conceptions and Notions which as was said above partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once partly because Natural Causes do change it according to One Respect and not according to Another we are naturally forced to make of it Now to make the Subject consist of Potential parts Destroys not the Vnity of the Compounded Ens but Establishes it for to say it is Potentially Many is the same as to say it is Actually One and to Compound an Ens of Potential Parts proper to the Notion of Ens neither of which were One Actual Part before is to make that Ens truly One tho' it had no other Titlâ— to be One of its own nature For to compound an Ens of Entitatine parts neither of which is of its Self an Ens is as plainly to make One Ens as words can express 29. But to put them past this Evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our Discourse by alledging that Natural Bodies are Compounds I have purposely drawn my Chief Arguments from the Atomes or Molicellae as Gassendus calls them of Epicurus and from that Original Mass of Matter of which the Cartesians affirm their Elements were made which the Antiperipateticks must be forced to confess are perfectly Vncompounded And I farther alledge that as Many Quantums cannot compound One Quantum unless they be Vnited Quantitatively so neither can Many Entities such those Distinct Atomes and Particles must be compound One Ens unless they be United Entitavely Wherefore those parts can be only Potentially in the Compound as our Matter and its Essential and Accidental Forms are for were they Actually there they would be Entitatively Many Whence the Ens made up of those Many Actual Entities could not be Entitatively Vnum or one Ens but it would be an Vnum which is Divisum in se and which is worst to compleat the Nonsence and make it a perfect Contradiction it would be in the same respect Divisum in se in which it is Vnum or Indivisum in se viz. in ratione Entis which is to be perfectly Chimerical 30. Thus they come off and so must every one who guides himself by the sound of Words without looking attentively into their Sense For the Word Compounded is in reality a kind of Transcendent and therefore in the highest manner Equivocal whence while out of slightness of Reasoning and not heeding where the Question pinches they take the word in an Vnivocal signification they come to apprehend that the compounding many Entities together according to some Extrinsecal respects such as are Situation Motion joynt-Action and such like is the same as to compound them according to that most Intrinsecal respect call'd Substance and is sufficient to make them One Entitatively or One Ens. 31. And let it be noted that this Discourse equally confutes their Position of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body which leads them into Innumerable Errours And the absurdity in making These Two to be One Compound Thing is far greater than to make One Body compounded of those Particles in regard the Ranging of Particles may at least make One Artificial Compound v. g. a House tho' not a Natural one whereas a Spirit and a Body are forbid by their natures to have any such Artificial or Mechanical Contexture but must unavoidably when the Asserters of this Tenet have shifted and explicated all they can remain Two Actual Things and moreover such Two as are toto genere Distinct nor consequently can they either by the Natural or Artificial Names us'd by Mankind be signify'd by One Word or be called A Man as the former Compounds could be called a House or a Clock And I defy all the wit of Man to invent any way how Two such Actual Things can have any Coalition into One Natural thing or
Physicks to give us a piece of meer Mathematicks for bare Extension fits it for no other Science Nor are we mistaken in thinking so for he tells us expresly that Natural Philosophy is one part of the Mathematicks Tho' the Abstraction which in the place now mention'd he assigns to Quantity as a Genus is very odd and Illogical For the Abstraction of Quantity from the Thing or from Motion is an Abstraction of the Accident from the Subject or from Another Accident and therefore is quite another kind of Abstraction than that of the Genus from the species and it looks as if they hanker'd after Plato's exploded conceit of a Subsistent Vniversal and that they would have their First Matter contrary to all Logick and good sense to be a Body in Common and therefore the Genus to all particular Bodies Nor can any thing sound more awkwardly then to make a Mathematical Treatise of Physicks But Cartesius was a Greater Master of Mathematicks than he was of Physicks and therefore had a vast Design to reduce all Nature and all Philosophy within the Purlew of his own Art in which it must be confest he was very Excellent 39. But to lay yet a Greater Force upon their backwardness to admit a Formal Change in Bodies we come now to more Palpable and Plain Instances not fetch'd from Metaphysicks but from obvious Effects in Nature which every man sees and themselves cannot but acknowledg Let us then take into our consideration a young lately-planted Oak growing in a Nursery which in the space of a hundred years spreads it self into a vast Tree dilating it's large and massy Branches on all sides and over-shadowing a spacious Extent of Ground Can any man deny but that this is the same Thing or the same Tree it was at first And yet 't is most evidently not the same in Quantity it being now a thousand times Greater than it was formerly 'T is manifest then that here is a Real Divisibility between it's Quantity and it's Entity or Substance and a Real Mutation according to the Form of the Quantity and not according to the Notions of Ens or Thing The same may be said of an Infant grown up to be a Man which when 't is now Bigger in Quantity should they deny to be the same Thing or the same Man it would make mad work in the World by taking away Titles of Inheritances and altering the Right of Succession The Infant might perhaps retain his Title for some very small time but the Identity of it being lost by the accruing of new Matter and new Quantity he has forfeited his Estate e'er he comes at age to understand or manage it by losing his Essenee 41. I know that our late Philosophers will hope to evade this last Instance by alledging that the Numerical Identity of a Man springs from his having the same Soul Which Tenet were it proper to confute it here would prove as Unreasonable and ill-grounded as any of the rest I only note on the by that as it becomes God's Wisdom as he is Author of Nature to carry on the Course of Causes by fitting Dispositions to the Production of farther and more Noble Effects and consequently to sute and proportion what Supervenes to what Prae-exists and the Embryo in our case Praeexists and by having such Dispositions in it as made it fit to concur on it's part to work Rationally to such a Degree made it require to have for it's Form such a Rational Soul joyn'd with it and thence determin'd the Author of Nature to infuse it it follows that the thing is quite contrary to what they imagin viz. that the Soul was to be adjusted and proportion'd to the Exigency of the Bodily part and that therefore the Soul is Determinately such or of such a Determinate Degree of Rationality which Essentially and Numerically distinguishes Souls and Men from one another as was fit to be infus'd into and work with such a Body And were not this so it would be impossible to explicate how Original Sin is connaturally transfus'd from Adam or how the Soul becomes tainted by being united to a Body made ex immundo semine But this is not the only ill Consequence that springs from this Extravagant Tenet of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body or that Man is in reality compounded of Two Actual Things and therefore not to be placed in any one Line of the Predicament of Ens or Substance For that odd Opinion does besides very much favour at least very well consist with the Praeexistence of Souls Because if the Soul be not proportion'd to the Disposition of the Corporeal part of Man and so be truly the Form of it but a kind of Assistant Spirit only apt to joyn with it and promote it in it's Operations it might as well Exist before the Body as after it Whence it will be very hard for them to assign any solid Reason from the Nature of such a Spirit since it might indifferently fit other Bodies or assist more of them why there might not be also a Transmigration of Souls from one Man to another for it would be in that case no more but shifting their Office and assisting now one of them then Another Not to mention how this Doctrin as is discourst in the Preface tends to introduce a kind of Fanaticism into the Philosophy Schools by making all their thoughts run upon nothing but Spiritual Conceits and Innate Ideas and having a Spiritual communication with God when they know any Natural Truth after an unintelligible manner Not considering that Man in this Mortal State here is truly one part or piece of Nature and subject to the Impressions of Natural Causes affecting him both as to his Corporeal and Spiritual Capacity according to the Different Natures of those Different Recipients 41. But to return whence we diverted Letting Man and his Individuality alone what can they say to the former Instance of a young Oak or of any other Vegetable or Animal increast to it's Full Growth which all Mankind agrees to be still the same Thing and yet not the same in Quantity It is not hence unanswerably Evident that there is a Formal Mutation according to it's Quantity and not according to it's Entity and therefore a Formal Composition and Divisibility in it according to those two Respects They cannot say they are the same Physically or the same Physical Compound For since all Natural Bodies according to their Doctrin are made solely of their First Matter or of the Particles made of it where there is incomparably more Matter there must be a New-Compound or a New Body in regard more and less must be the Differences of every Notion in the same Line as has been demonstrated Wherefore more or less of the Matter it being inform'd and so truly an Ens or a Body ought to outweigh in constituting Particular Bodies or Entities all consideration of Accidental Notions or Modifications of
Sublunary Motions must bear a proportion to it and be measur'd by it being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was Flowing and Mankind is forced to need and make use of such a Measure to Adjust Proportion and Design all their Motions or Actions by and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious Periods hence there must be a Common Head of the time When those Motions were perform'd which we call Quando If the Extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the Subject or thing in Rest then either that Extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole that is to be Immediate to it or meerly to Contain it which grounds the Notion and answers to the Question Where or Ubi Or it denotes some certain determinate Manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it and then either the whole or at least some Parts of the Subject or thing must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the Extrinsecal thing and 't is call'd its Site or Situation or else the Extrinsecal thing or its parts are conceiv'd to be Fitted Ply'd or Accommodated to the Subject or Thing and then 't is call'd Habit. 20. These ten Common Heads are call'd Predicaments that is Common Receptacles which Contain and whence we may draw all our Predicates for the Common Subject Thing which we may briefly exemplifie thus Peter 1 tho' but a yard2 and half high yet a Ualiant3 Subject4 fought5 and was wounded6 yesterday7 in8 the Field standing9 upon his guard armed10 21. All these Notions under whatever Head if they be Corporeal ones are Natural and Common to all Mankind For since they are made by Impressions on the Senses which are Common to all Mankind it follows that the Notions which are the Effects of those Impressions must be such also since the same Causes upon the same-natur'd Subjects must work the same Effects 22. Our Soul has in it a Power of Compounding those several Notions together of Considering them diverse ways of Reflecting on its own Thoughts and Affections and lastly of joyning a Negative to its Natural Notions if there be occasion such as are the Notions of Indivisible Immaterial Incorruptible Unactive Insignificant c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame Notions of spiritual Things All which is manifest by plain Experience if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own Interiour 23. No Notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these Heads For Corporeal Notions are imprinted directâ—y Spiritual Notions by Reflexion on our Mind and on its Operations or Affections or else by joyning a Negative to our Positive natural Notions And Mix'd or Compound Notions are framed by joyning our former simple Notions Wherefore since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either Corporeal Spiritual or Mix'd or Compounded of Former Notions 't is manifest that all the Notions we have or can have do arise from one of those Heads 24. Wherefore 't is hence farther shewn that there is no necessity at all of making some Notions to be Innate and consequently that Conceit of the Cartesians is Groundless who affirm That by a Motion made on the Senses the Soul by an unknown Vertue peculiar to its self Excites or awakens such and such an Innate Idea which till then lay dormant in it because they find that that Notion is nothing like to the Idea it excites For first how do they prove that only Motion is communicated to the Brain from the Object or that that Motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd Particles or Effluviums of these several Bodies which are as it were little Models of their Nature It is certain this passes thus in the grosser Senses and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler but that the Particles emitted be more subtil which cannot shock the Fancy or Reason of a Natural Philosopher who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness Body is Divisible And of all Men in the World the Cartesians should not be startled at it whose Principles do allow lesser Particles than those Effluviums and to pass thro' far lesser Pores than those within the Nerves or even than such as are in the substance of the Nerves themselves Now this being granted the whole contexture of this Doctrine of ours has a clear Coherence For such Particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them are apt when they are carried to the Seat of Knowledge to breed in the Mind or convey into it the Nature or an Intellectual Notion of the Thing it self To do which there can need no more than that every thing according to the Maxim be receiv'd according to the Nature or Manner of the Receiver viz. that those Effluviums by affecting the Body Corporeally do affect the Soul Intellectually Secondly How is it conceivable or any way Explicable that a Motion which they confess is utterly Unlike the Idea in the Mind should be the Proper Exciter of such an Idea Indeed were those Motions of the Nature of our Signs that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the Users of them they might have a Power to make such a peculiar Excitation of those Ideas as our Words do now or as any odd and disagreeing Things are made use of by us when we practise the Art of Memory But here things are quite otherwise for we have no Fore-knowledge either by Agreement nor by our voluntary Designation that such Motions shall excite such Idea's or Notions nor as is confess'd are they Naturally alike wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular Idea's Add That this hidden Virtue in the Soul to make such a particular Idea start up as soon as that Motion is made in the Nerve is both said gratis and is as Obscure as an Occult Quality and so far from Explicable that even themselves as far as I can learn have not so much as attempted to explain it but it seems to be in part taken up gratis to make good their Doctrine of innate Idea's as the Tenet of such Idea's is to prove the Soul is a distinct Thing from the Body Lastly Their Argument drawn from Experience that the Idea in the Mind is quite different from that Impression in the Senses or any Bodily Faculty is shewn to be Inconclusive by alledging as was said lately that the Nature of the Object found in those emitted Particles and the Nature of it found in the Soul Intellectually or as standing under Notion are the self-same and not so Vnlike as they imagin Add That their Argument faulters in this too that the makers of it did not duly reflect when they advanced it on that ' foresaid Axiom Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis For had they done this they could not have wonder'd that an Affection of the Body which is imprinted directly and an