Selected quad for the lemma: spirit_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
spirit_n	body_n	soul_n	true_a	7,689	5	4.8842	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A33161	The five days debate at Cicero's house in Tusculum between master and sophister.; Tusculanae disputationes. English	Cicero, Marcus Tullius.; Wase, Christopher, 1625?-1690.	1683 (1683)	Wing C4307; ESTC R11236	182,432	382

in the Body For my part when I look closely into the nature of the Soul it seems a far more difficult and obscure Speculation what the Soul should be when confin'd to this Body as in a strange House then what it should be when it is escap'd and arriv'd at the open Heaven as its own home For unless we can conceive the nature of a thing which we never saw neither can we apprehend the Being of God who is an incorporeal Spirit Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus because the Nature and likeness of a So●● were hard to be understood plainly deny'd the ●●ry being of it Indeed it is one of the hardest Operations for the Soul by a reflex act to behold the Soul And this was the true meaning of Apollo in that Precept wherein he enjoyns man to know himself For I do not take that he means we should know our Limbs how tall we are or of what shape nor indeed are our Bodies our selves and what I now speak to you I do not address to your Body When therefore he saith know your self he means know your Soul for the Body is but the Case and Cabinet of the Soul Whatever Actions are perform'd by your Soul are your Actions Therefore to know thee unless it had been of some Divine Import it would not so far have pass'd for the Invention of some profound Wit so as to have been father'd upon a God requiring no greater Ability than to know ones self But though the Soul should not attain to know what is the Nature of the Soul pray satisfie me can it not know its Being can it not be sensible of its Motion from whence arose that Argument of Plato press'd by Socrates in the Dialogue stil'd Phaedrus and quoted by me in my sixth Book of Politicks SECT XXIII Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul from its inward Motion WHat always moveth is eternal but what imparts motion to another and what is acted by another when it comes to an end of motion must also come to an end of life That only therefore which moves it self because it is never deserted of it self neither doth it ever cease moving nay this is the Spring this the Principle of Motion to other things which are mov'd Now a Principle hath no precedent source of being for all things arise from their Principle but it can spring from no other thing for so it would cease to be a Principle if it were begotten of any thing else but if it be never generated neither will it ever corrupt for a Principle abolish'd can neither arise again from another nor can it produce any other thing from it self for all things must necessarily arise from their Principle so cometh it about that the Principle of Motion must be at that which moveth it self now that can neither be born nor dye or else all Heaven would tumble down and the whole frame of Nature stop its course nor have any Mover by whose first impression it should be set on Motion It being therefore plain that what moves it self is eternal who can deny the Nature of Souls to be such for whatsoever is stir'd by a foreign Impression is inanimate but every Animal is quickened by an inward Motion and of its own for that is the proper Nature and Power of the Soul which if it be the only of all Substances that alwayes moves it self neither was it in truth ever born and is eternal Let all the petty Philosophers for so should they be call'd in my opinion who differ from Plato and Socrates and that Family let them come in to assist one another they will not only never express any thing so neatly but also never be able to discern where the stress of the Argument lyes e The Soul therefore is sensible that it moves and is withall sensible that it moves by its own and no foreign Impulse and that it can never be that it should fail it self from whence its Eternity is concluded unless you have any reply to offer S. I indeed am well contented to admit into my thought no matter of questioning it I have such a favour for that Opinion e The Soul therefore is sensible that it moves The former Argument of Self-motion being common to all living Creatures might seem to conclude for the like Privilege to the Souls of brute Beasts which go downward and return into the Power of that Matter from whence they were educed But Cicero restrains it to a reflex Act of the understanding which properly flows from the rational Soul SECT XXIV From the capaciousness of its memory WHat do you think of these other Instances Take you them to be of less moment which manifest that there is somewhat Divine in the Souls of men which could I perceive how they could have been born I might also comprehend how they should dye For as to the Blood Choler Phlegm Bones Sinews Veins in a word all the mould of the Limbs and of the whole Body methinks I could account for them whereof they are compounded and how they were form'd from the Soul it self if there accru'd no other advantage but that we liv'd by it I should think the Life of man as much supported by Nature as that of a Vine or other Plant for we say that they also live Again if the Soul of man had no other Faculties than those of desiring and avoiding that too it would have in common with the Beasts For the first instance it hath memory and that infinite of innumerable things f so that Plato would have it to be the recalling to mind what was known in a former Life For in that Book which is entitled Menon Socrates asks a certain Youngster some Geometrical questions about the content of a Square He answers them as a Child and yet the Interrogatories are so easie that the answer proceeding step by step cometh at length to that pass as if he had learn'd Mathematicks from which Socrates would conclude that to learn is nothing else but to refresh the Memory Which Topick he explains much more accurately yet in that Dialogue which he held the very day wherein he submitted to the Execution of the Sentence pass'd upon his Life wherein he teaches that any one let him seem utterly illiterate and unexperienc'd if he answer directly to one that puts apt questions to him doth make it manifest that he doth not then learn those Matters anew but only recollect what he had before in his memory And that it were wholly impossible for us to have the Notions which the Greeks call common of so many and so great things from our Childhood imprinted and as it were registred in our Souls unless the Soul before it entred the Body had been employ'd in understanding the World And if it had been nothing as is in all places disputed by Plato for he thinks that to be nothing which cometh by Generation and turns to Corruption and that only to have being which is such always

Peripateticks accus'd of inconsistency but Epicurus much more YET unwary men are taken with these Flashes and by means of such fine Speeches multitudes of Disciples are drawn after them But it is the part of a subtle Disputant not to regard what any one says but what he should say As in that very Tenet which we have undertaken in this Dispute we would have all good men to be always happy What I mean by good men is manifest for we call men accomplish'd and adorn'd with all Vertues sometimes Wise and sometimes Good men Who are to be call'd happy let us consider I indeed think these who are possess'd of Goods without any Evil added thereto Nor is there any other Notion couch'd under this word when we say a Happy man but an Accumulation of all Goods without the mixture of any Evils Vertue cannot attain to this if there be any thing good besides it self For there will press in a throng of Evils if we count these Evils Poverty obscurity of Parentage Lowness Destitution loss of Friends and Relations grievous Pains of Body decay in Health Maims Blindness Destruction of ones Country Banishment Slavery Lastly a Wise man may be in these so many and so great Evils and those many more which may happen for chance inflicts them which may fall foul on a Wise man But if these things are Evil who can warrant that a Wise man shall always be happy when he may be even under all these at one time Therefore I do not easily yield it to my Friend Brutus s nor the Teachers of us both t nor those Ancients Aristotle Speusippus Xenocrates Polemo that having taken the things above-recounted for Evils they should yet hold a Wise man to be always happy But if they be taken with this plausible and specious Priviledge fitting to be claim'd by Pythagoras Socrates and Plato let them be contented to despise Strength Health Beauty Riches Honours Wealth with the Lustre of which they are so much dazled and utterly to slight their Contraries Then may they proclaim with the most loud Voice that they are neither terrify'd at the insults of Fortue nor the displeasure of the Multitude nor Pain nor Poverty and that all their Dependencies are on themselves nor is there any thing without the Power of their own choice which they reckon for good Nor can it any ways be granted that one Person should speak after this rate suitable to some great and losty Spirit and withall account for Good and Evil the same things which the Vulgar doth Epicurus proselyted with this glorious Doctrine sets up and his Wise man in good time must be ever Happy He is taken with the Dignity of this Assertion but would never say so if he were true to himself for what is less agreeable than that he who saith Pain is either the greatest or only Evil should likewise hold that a Wise man when he is rack'd with Pain should say Oh! how sweet this is Therefore Philosophers are not to be estimated by some single expression but by the constant Tenor and Analogy of their Doctrines r We would have all good men to be always Happy That is in a State of Happiness in every condition having a Title to the paternal Providence of God upon his Promise Had man persevered in Primitive Righteousness his Body would have been passible and the operativeness of external Agents no less efficacious so that his security must have been in the Divine Protection from harmful Casualties and supply of needful Enjoyments When there is argu'd from perfect Vertue to compleat Happiness the Divine Favour and Bounty must necessarily be included for when we say Vertue is its own reward it is not intended that the Vertuous have their Labours for their Pains Complacency of mind in fulfilling a Law ariseth from the Sense of our having promoted the ends of it in mutual Preservation and consequently our own or in having acquir'd the good Graces of the Law-giver by Obedience but to solve the doubt why ever it should go ill with the Good as it is often seen to do we must partly discount for the Defects of Goodness here and consider temporary Evils in such order'd for the bettering of the mind s Nor the Teachers of us both Antiochus and Aristus t Nor those Ancients Aristotle These were Doctors of the Peripatetick Chair Aristotle considering that man is made up of Soul and Body which requires Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life when he was in quest of the Good of Man concluded it to be conjunctly in the Mind together with the Body and external Circumstances Health and competent subsistence all men desire and Aristotle defineth that to be good which all men desire To undervalue the Benefits of God who is Good and doth Good restrains Prayer and suppresses Gratitude as in the Tenet of Aristo holding all other things besides Vertue indifferent but how then can the good man ensure his Happiness These Goods he pursues ordinately useth with Moderation and wants without Impatience he can be no otherwise self-dependent than by linking his Will to the ever-blessed Will of a Superior Wisdom Zeno deny'd bodily Inflictions and Misfortunes to be evil from ignorance of their being Penalties for the Violation of the Divine Law but to the truly Good their Nature is chang'd their Evil taken away and they made serviceable for Good SECT XI That the Stoicks cavil about Words S. YOU induce me to give you my assent but take heed least your consistency too be not questionable M. How so S. Because I have lately read over your fourth Book about the several Opinions concerning the chief Good in that disputing against Cato you seem'd to me to endeavour to shew what I extreamly like that there is no difference between Zeno and the Peripateticks but a novelty of Terms If this be so what reason is there but if Zeno thinks it reasonable that there is in Vertue sufficiency to Happiness of Life the Peripateticks may say the same for I think reality not words ought to be regarded M. Why you take of me a Bill under Hand and Seal and call Witnesses to what I said or writ at any time Deal so with others who Dispute under Articles subscribed we live from hand to mouth whatsoever smites us with an appearance of Truth that we allow Therefore we only are free but since we spoke a little before of consistency I do not think it to be at this time the enquiry whether that which Zeno and his Auditor Aristo held be true that only which is Honest to be good but if it were so then to place the whole Happiness of Life in Vertue alone Wherefore let us yield this to Brutus that a Wise man is always happy how agreeable it is to his Principles he must look to that What man is more worthy the Glory of this Assertion Yet let us hold that the same Wise man is most Happy although Zeno of Cittium a certain Forreigner