hath it not one onely part power or facultie or vertue as we may call it but diuers appointed for diuers and sundry offices For we being participant of the nature of all things liuing and those being deuided into three kinds it is necessary that man shold haue some part of euery of those three There is then one base and inferiour kind of life of lesse estimation then the rest and that is the life of trees and plants and of all such things as haue roote in the earth which spring grow bloome and bring forth fruite which fruit Aristotle sayth cometh from them in stead of excrement together with their seed And these trees and plants and such like growing things haue onely life deuoid of feeling though Pythagoras thought otherwise or of any knowledge but by the benefite of nature onely they spring they grow and bringforth fruite and seed for the vse of man and for the maintaining of their kind There is another kind of life lesse imperfect then that which is the same that perfect liuing creatures haue for of that life which is in maner a meane between the life of plants and this of sensible creatures we need not now to speake or if it were we should resemble it to that which Physitions call Embrio and is the creature vnperfect in the wombe whiles it is betweene the forme of seed and of the kind whence it cometh which life of perfect liuing creatures hath in it by nature power to feele and to moue from place to place For we see they stir and feele and haue power to desire those things that are meete for the maintaining of their life and of their nature And by natural inclination and for the increase and continuance of their kinds they couet the ioyning of their bodies to yeeld vnto nature that which of nature they haue receiued that is to ingender the like vnto themselues But this power of the soule cannot vse that force and vertue which naturally it hath if it haue not withall that former part which is proper as is said to plants is called vegetatiue you must giue me leaue to vse new words of Art such as are proper to expresse new conceits though they be yet strange and not denizened in our language because it giueth life and increase to growing things and without it the power of feeling doth vtterly faile Next after this cometh that excellent and diuine part of the soule which bringeth with it the light of reason containing in it the powers faculties or vertues of the other two For it hath that life which proceedeth from plants it hath sense or feeling motion frō place to place proper to the second kind and it hath besides that other part wherby it knoweth vnderstādeth discourseth cōsulteth chuseth and giueth it selfe to operation and to contemplate things naturall and diuine and this part is proper only to man And as by the two other faculties before mentioned we are like to plants and to bruite beasts so by this last we do participate of the diuine nature of God himselfe Wherefore Aristotle said that man was created vpright for no other cause then for that his substance was diuine whose nature and office is to know and vnderstand And truly this gift is giuen vnto vs by the maker and gouernour of all things because we might know our selues to be of a nature most perfect among earthly things and not farre inferiour to the diuine And that we haue receiued so singular a gift from Almightie God for no other cause but onely to the end we might perceiue how all other things that grow and liue on earth are corruptible and do resolue into their first principles or beginnings and cease any more to be as soone as the soule of life departeth from them but that our minds are immortal and incorruptible whereby we may rest assured of an eternall life Since then these three faculties of the soule are in vs it is cleare that as the plants among things that beare life are the most imperfect so that part of the soule is most vnperfect which is proper to their kind but it is so necessary to all other kinds as without it there is no life and with it the rest of the faculties that are ioyned therewith though they be worthier decay and fall And this necessitie of nature that without it she giueth no life maketh the same to be most base and ignoble For among natural things those which are so necessary as without them nothing can be done are alwaies held and reputed the most vnworthy Which thing we may see in that we call Materia prima which though it be in nature before the forme yet because of the necessitie thereof it is esteemed of no nobilitie in comparison of the forme And euen so likewise among the senses that of feeling is held the basest because no perfect liuing creature can be without it nor yet the rest of the senses vnlesse that be present And therefore Aristotle said that the other senses were giuen to man that thereby he might liue the better but the sense of feeling was giuen him because without it he could neither be nor liue Now for so much as life may be without sense because the sensitiue soule is not of such necessitie as is the vegetatiue therefore is that of more nobilitie then this somewhat yet inferiour to the intellectiue which can no more be without the sensitiue then the sensitiue without the vegetatiue And because the intellectiue soule is not of necessitie seruing to any other facultie or power therfore is she as Lady Mistris and Queene ouer all other the powers faculties or vertues of the soul so as there is none proper vnto man but that whereby he may be either good or bad happie or vnhappie and the same is it whereby we vnderstand and make choice rather of one course of life then of another This great gift hath God bestowed vpon vs to shew his great grace and goodnes and for this purpose that as he hath inuited vs through vertue of our vnderstanding to the knowledge of truth and by this knowledge to become like vnto himselfe so we should bend all our study and endeuours thereunto as the end and scope of our life in this world Of which the occasion of this our present speech did first arise Here I pawsing a while as to take breath and withall to order some of the papers the Lord Primate spake saying Hauing treated thus farre of the powers faculties vertues or parts of the soule I thinke it not impertinent to moue a question whether they be in man separate and in seuerall places or whether they be vnited all together and seated in one place This question quoth I is very pertinent to this place and by the author here resolued as a doubt not lightly or easie to be answered First for that there haue not wanted some who would needs haue that these three powers of the
soule were three distinct soules and not ioyned in one soule appointed for seuerall offices But because that opiniō hath bin esteemed but vaine it needeth not to be insisted vpon but briefly that I declare what Aristotle and Plato with their followers haue held The first with his scholers affirme the reasonable soule to be in substance indiuisible and albeit they assigne vnto her diuers vertues yet will they not haue them to be indeed seueral and diuers but that the diuersitie should proceed consist only in the maner of vnderstanding them supposing them to be in the soule after such a sort as in the line of a circle the inner part which is hollow or embowed and the outward which is bended Which two parts though we vnderstand them diuersly yet are they but one line and not seuerall Neither do they assigne vnto her diuers places but say that she is all and whole in all our body and in euery part of the same and apt there to exercise all her functions if the parts were apt to receiue them But because euery part is not disposed to receiue them therefore she maketh shew of them onely in such as are made fit instruments to execute her powers and faculties So giueth she vertue to the eye to see to the eare to heare and to the rest of the members that are the instruments of our senses But Plato and his sect haue giuē to euery power of facultie of the soule a peculiar seate in mans body for though they held the soul to be but one endued with seueral vertues or powers yet they affirmed that euery one of those had a seuerall seate appointed in mans body To the vegetatiue from which as from a fountaine they said the concupiscible appetite doth flow they appointed the Liuer for her place To the sensitiue whence cometh say they the feruent passion of anger they gaue the Heart But the reasonable soule as being the most diuine thing vnder heauen they assigned to hold her seate like a Queene in a royal chaire euen in the head vnto which opinion all the Greek authors of Physicke haue leaned and specially Galen the excellent interpreter of Hippocrates who hath not onely attributed three seuerall seates to the three seuerall faculties of the soule in respect of their operations but hath also shewed with what order those members are framed that must be the receptacles of those faculties For he sheweth how the first member that taketh forme after the conception is the liuer from whence spring all the veines that like small brookes carry bloud ouer all the body And in this member doth he place the liuing or nourishing soule which we haue termed vegetatiue affirming it to be most approching to nature Next vnto this he placeth the heart wherein all the vitall spirits are forged and receiue their strength for the generation whereof the liuer sendeth bloud thither where it is refined and made more pure and subtill and from thence by the arteries which all spring from the heart the same spirits are spread thoroughout the whole body And these two principall members are the seates of the two principall appetites the irascible and the concupiscible of that the heart of this the liuer And because all this while the creature hath yet no need as being vnperfect of sense or motion it is busied about nothing but receiuing of nourishment Somewhat further off from the heart beginneth the braine to grow and from it do all the senses flow and then loe beginneth the child to take forme and shape of a perfect creature the face the hands and the feet being then fashioned with the other parts of the body apt for feeling and voluntary mouing and from thence be deriued the sinewes the bands or ligaments and muscles are framed by which the motions of the members are disposed This part is the seate of the reasonable soule by vertue and power of which we vnderstand we will we discourse we know we chuse we contemplate and do all those operations which appertaine vnto reason And as nature hath placed the braine a good distance off from the other two principall members so hath she framed a cartilage or thin rynd or skin to seuer the heart from the liuer and other inward bowels as with a fence or hedge betweene them and the other baser parts that are lesse pure For the heart is purer and so is that bloud which conueyeth the spirits from it throughout the body then the liuer or the bloud which is ingendred in the same And in this respect was Aristotle iustly reprehended by Galen in that he gaue to the heart alone that which appertained to all three the principall members aforesaid For though he assigned diuers vertues or powers to the soule yet he placed them all in the heart alone from which he said contrary to that which common sense and experience teacheth that all the veines arteries and sinewes of the body were deriued But because we should go too farre astray from our purpose if I should discourse particularly all that which may be said in this matter I will returne if you so thinke good to our former purpose which I left to satisfie your demaund Thus much said the Lord Primate hath not a little opened the vnderstanding of this matter and therefore you may proceed vnlesse any other of the company haue any other doubt to propose But they all being silent and seeming attentiue to heare further I said Now that you haue vnderstood what the powers and faculties of the soule are it followeth to be declared how the ages of mās life haue similitude with the same As the soule of life therfore called vegetatiue is the foundatiō of the rest and consequently of the basest so is the age of childhood the foundatiō of the other ages and therfore the least noble for the necessity which it carieth with it And because vpō it the other ages are built there ought the greater diligence to be vsed about the same to make it passe on towards the other more noble then it self so as we may reasonably cōceiue a hope that frō a wel-guided childhood the child may enter into a cōmendable youth and thence passe to a more riper age by the directiō of vertue But first ye must vnderstād that Aristotle wil in no wise yeeld that this inferior soule should be capable of reason and therfore placeth in the sensible soule both the concupiscible and the irascible appetites And contrariwise Plato as before is said distinguisheth these two affects into both these faculties of the soule giuing to the first the concupiscible and the irascible to the other And because Plato his opinion hath generally bin better allowed then Aristotles I will speake thereof according as Plato hath determined This baser soule then being that whereby we be nourished we grow we sustaine life and receiue our body and being about whose maintaining and increase she vseth continually whether we wake or sleep
no hope of his amendment should rather kill himselfe then by liuing inuite so many others to the like course of life not vnlike to the opinion alreadie recited that it is better one die for a people then that his life should be the occasion of the death of many For Plato aymed euermore at the purging of all cities frō such caterpillers which appeereth manifestly by the pain he would haue inflicted vpon parricides But that it was abhomination to him for a man to kill himselfe he plainely sheweth in his ninth booke of Lawes by the sentence he setteth downe against such men Neuerthelesse this indeed may be found in Plato that vice was so odious vnto him that he would rather haue a man to die then to vndertake any vile vicious action which might breed him perpetuall infamie And Aristotle in this point agreeth with his master though in many he delight to carpe him that a man ought to chuse rather to die then commit any abhominable or grieuous fact or do that which might be for euer reprochful vnto him And Plato his expresse sence of this matter is to be vnderstood in the same dialogue which you first spake of where Socrates is brought to say that the Lord and Ruler of this whole world hauing sent vs into this life we are not to desire to leaue it without his consent and who so doth the contrary offends nature offendeth God And this is the mystery of that precept of Philolaus which forbiddeth a man to cleaue wood in the high way meaning that a man should not seuer or deuide the soule frō the body whiles he was in his way on this earthly pilgrimage but should be content that as God and nature had vnited and tied the soule to the bodie so by them it might be vnloosed againe therefore the Peripatetikes also thought that they which die a violent death cannot be thought to haue ended their dayes according to the course of time and nature And with this my Lord Primate rested satisfied I turned me to Captaine Carleil and sayd Now sir concerning your doubts proposed you may haue perceiued that whatsoeuer destinie be neither it nor the diuine prouidence of Almightie God imposeth any necessitie vpon vs that vertue and vice are in our power vertue growing in vs by the right vse of our free choice and vice by the abuse of the same when through corruption of the iudgement to do that is in apparance good it chuseth the euill and lastly what kind of ignorance is excusable and which not Concerning my demaunds sayd Captaine Carleil I am resolued But since I see our doings proceed from election I would gladly know of you what maner of thing it is for I cannot perceiue whether it be a desire or an anger or an opinion or what I should call it None of all these said I but rather a voluntary deliberation following a mature and aduised counsel which counsell by Plato was termed a diuine thing For election is not made in a moment but when a thing is proposed either to be accepted or refused there must first be a counsell taken respecting both the end of the action and the meanes by which the same is to be compassed so as there is required a time of consultation and therefore it is said that hast is enemie to counsell and that oftentimes repentance followes them that resolue without discussing or debating of matters Next vnto counsell cometh iudgement and after iudgement followeth election and from election issueth the action or the effects that are resolued vpon and accepted as the best And because fortune though she be a cause rather by accident then of her selfe hath no small part in most of our actions the wisest men haue said that counsel is the eye of the mind by helpe whereof men of prudence see how to defend themselues from the blind strokes of fortune and eschuing that which may hurt them take hold of that which is profitable Why then said my Lord Primate it shold seeme that our counsell were wholy in our power But Xenophon is of a contrary opinion for he sayeth that good counsell cometh from the Gods immortall and that their counsels prosper who haue them to be their friends and theirs not who haue them to be their enemies To haue God fauourable vnto vs said I in all our doings is not onely desirable but that it may please him to grant his grace so to be ought all men to craue by humble prayer at his hands But that God is the author of our counsels otherwise then as an vniuersall cause is to be doubted not that the singular gift of the mind and the power thereof to deliberate and consult commeth not from him for the not acknowledging thereof were not onely a grosse ignorance but also an expresse impietie an vnexcusable ingratitude Howbeit since it hath pleased him to bestow vpon vs so great and liberal a gift as the mind we may well beleeue that he will not take from vs the free vse therof For to say that God were the imediate cause of our counsell were as much as to take from vs the vse of reason without which we are not any more men as of late was sayd And therfore besides Aristotles authoritie grounded in that point vpon good reason we find in the Scripture that after God had made man and giuen him by breathing vpon him the spirit of life which is the soule of vnderstanding he left him in the hand of his owne counsell Whereby it appeereth that counsel commeth from our selues and that election is the office of prudence which is called the soule of the mind and the Platonikes call the knowledge of good and euill whereunto it seemed that Tullie agreed when he said that prudence was the science of things desirable or to be eschued which sentence S. Augustine reporteth And Fabius Maximus said that the Gods through prudence and our vertues did grant vs prosperous successes in our affaires as if he should haue said that though God as an vniuersall cause concurred to accomplish our deliberations yet we were to endeuour our selues and to sharpen our wits to consult on the best meanes to compasse our good purposes if we desire to haue his fauour and not to sit idle expecting what will fall out And to end the discourse hereof the auncient Philosophers of the best sort held that the Gods seeing vs employ our vertues and faculties of the mind which hath a resemblāce vnto them well and wisely become our friends and the rather grant vs their helpe and fauour According to which opinion Euripides sayed that the Gods did helpe them that were wise But because we shall haue occasion to speake more largely hereafter of Prudence we will now returne to that which we left long sithens to speake of by the interposing of the doubts moued and that is the knowledge of our selues as the thing that must guide vs to that best and most
would haue it so that the fantasie was the forme of the bodie for that dieth with the bodie as shall be shewed hereafter but he considered the vnderstanding it selfe as a soule and as the forme of the bodie and not as a separable intelligence the lowest of all others and common to all men as Theophrastus and Themistius though diuersly haue thought Neither yet that it was God Almightie as Alexander supposeth for God is not the forme of our bodies nor hath any man euer doubted whether God were immortall So as our vnderstanding is neither God nor yet a separate intelligence cōmon to all mē like those that gouerne an vniuersal spheare as they aboue mentioned haue thought as some of our Christians haue dreamed who being raised to Ecclesiasticall dignitie haue chosen rather to follow the Greeks vanity and the Arabians then fauour the religious and true interpreters of Aristotles mind Whereas they ought rather to haue rooted such opinions out of mens mindes as apt to draw them to perdition and not to maske them with the vizard of naturall Philosophers as if things naturall that may seeme contrary to Christianitie were to be set before men in writing to be confirmed by naturall reasons apparant at least though not true to perswade their mindes amisse But Iohannes Gramaticus among the Greekes hath declared Aristotles mind aright and so hath he that is called the Angelicall Doctour in sundry places as a most excellent spirit and a religious man whatsoeuer Scotus write against him And what better testimonie neede we haue of the vanitie of these mens interpretations then Aristotle himselfe who most effectually sheweth the same where he sayth that the waxing old of man proceedeth not from the Intellectiue soule but from the bodie wherein she is which neuerthelesse is to be vnderstood as she is the forme thereof and in so saying declareth that euery man hath his Intellectiue soule which soule is a meane betwixt separated substances and corporall and therefore partly she communicateth with the bodie to informe the same and partly she vseth as proper to her the vertue of the separated substances as much as her nature may beare in the vse of vnderstanding And since it is cleere that in nature the most perfect things containe the lesse perfect I cannot conceiue from whence proceedeth the frensie of these men that will rather draw the soule Intellectiue to be mortall then immortal seeing that to vnderstand is the most singular operation that the soule hath and to whom the powers of the other soules are referred as to the better end and obey as hand-maides to their mistresse in such as propose to themselues to liue like men Neither doth the reason alledged by some serue who say that because there is great imperfection in the Intellectiue soule in comparison of the separate intelligences it sheweth the same to be mortall For if this reason were true they might as well by the same conclude that the separate intelligences were also mortall For since Aristotle sayth that onely the first intelligence who in his phrase is the first mouer is perfect and that all the other compared to him are vnperfect imperfection being in these mens fancie the cause of mortalnesse it must follow that as imperfect they should be mortall which is as contrary to Aristotles mind as any thing can be Wherefore we must not say that imperfection in the intellectiue soule in respect of the intelligences separated causeth the same to die with the bodie since her office dependeth not on the bodie but it is onely to be sayd that she ceaseth to informe the bodie through the defect thereof not of her self who being freed from the bodie remaineth neuerthelesse perfect in her being For albeit she haue some respect to the bodie whiles she informeth the same yet hath she not her absolute being from it And therefore sayd Aristotle that the vertue of the sense is not equall to the vertue of the vnderstanding for that a mightie or strong Sensible weakeneth and oftentimes corrupteth the sense whereas from an excellent Intelligible the vnderstanding gathereth greater vertue which thing could not be sayd if the vnderstanding were as these people suppose a separate intelligence wherof the particulars did participate Wherefore we must needs say he meant of the vnderstanding of euery particular man as of the forme of this man and that man for he spake of the vnderstanding of particular men and not of intelligences as those men haue belike dreamed And this sheweth howsoeuer any thinke the contrary that as well the Agent vnderstanding and the possible also whereof this is ordained as matter to that and both necessary to vnderstand are essentiall parts of the soule and not two separate intelligences as Themistius would haue them The reason likewise which some alledge is not good when they argue that the soule being the forme of the bodie should euer haue a desire after she were separated from the same to reunite her selfe againe thereunto but the bodie being rotten and corrupted her desire in that behalfe should be vaine For I say that since the soule hath informed the body she hath done as much as to her appertained neither is she to desire any further to speake naturally then she hath accomplished and therefore she remaineth as a separate intelligence Which hath made the Peripatetikes to affirme that the soule separated from the bodie is not the same that she was when she was in the bodie because that ioyned to the bodie she was the forme thereof but separated she can no more be so But this difficultie which naturall Philosophers haue not knowne how to resolue as they ought our blessed Sauiour the Sonne of God hath fully resolued by rising againe the third day not to say any thing of others raised by him and promising to vs the like resurrection This said my Lord Primate all true Christians beleeue but since we are debating of Aristotles opinions where he saith that the passible vnderstanding dieth and some of his Interpreters say that it is the possible vnderstanding how shall we make this to agree with the immortalitie of the soule Well inough sayd I for they that so interpret him deceiue thēselues for there is as great difference as Aristotle himselfe teacheth betweene the passible soule and the possible soule as betweene that which is eternall and that which is corruptible The passible vnderstanding according to Aristotle is the fantasie or the imaginatiue or cogitatiue power call it how you please the which Auerroes sayd was taken at large but not properly for the vnderstanding and as an inward sense depending vpon the bodie receiueth the sensible kindes from the common sense and presenteth them to the possible vnderstanding which is the place of the intelligible kindes or formes as Aristotle in sundrie places declareth And who so shall well consider Themistius where he speaketh of the multiplication of the vnderstanding shall finde that he supposed it not
as our Christian writers doe but tooke the vertue fantastike for the vnderstanding multiplied in particular persons And therefore she being mingled with the bodie faileth also with the same and this is that interiour thing which Aristotle saith is corrupted whereby the vnderstanding loseth his vertue as shall be shewed which happeneth not to the possible vnderstanding because it is an essential part of the Intellectiue soule not mingled with the bodie and free from any passion as a diuine substance Of which bodie she vseth no part for her instrument to vnderstand though she haue neede of the fantasie to receiue the Intelligible formes whiles she is the forme of the bodie And this necessitie which the vnderstanding hath of the fantasie to vnderstand sheweth the contrarie of that which these fellowes inferre who hold the vnderstanding to be mortall in that respect For by this it appeareth that the vnderstanding proceedeth not from the power of the matter for if so it were it should haue no neede of the fantasie but should it selfe be the fantasie and therefore Aristotle right well perceiuing that our vnderstanding was not fantasie nor vsed anie part of the body for an instrument sayd that the vnderstanding came from abroad as shall be declared It is therefore no good consequence to say that because the passible soule dieth therefore the possible soule likewise is mortall Yea but said M. Spencer we haue frō Aristotle that the possible vnderstanding suffreth in the act of vnderstanding and to suffer importeth corruption by which reason it should be mortall as is the passible Neither is that reason quoth I sufficient for although the name of suffering agree with the possible vnderstanding and with the passible leauing the difference betweene Alexander and Aristotle in that point the reason and manner in them is different For the suffering of the passible vnderstanding tendeth to the destruction thereof whereas the suffering of the possible is to the greater perfection of the same And for this cause Aristotle telleth vs that the suffering of the senses and that of the vnderstanding are not both of one nature because the first breedes destruction and the later perfection and that therefore an excellent Intelligible giueth perfection to the vnderstanding whereas an excellent Sensible corrupteth the sense But not hauing any other word meete to expresse this suffering of the vnderstanding whiles it is in that act we vse the same that agreeth to the passible though the reason of them both be verie diuerse The possible vnderstanding as hath bene sayd alreadie being the place of the Intelligible formes standeth in respect of the Agent vnderstanding as the matter in respect of the forme for the first is but in power for which respect Auerroes called it the materiall vnderstanding and this later is in act And this Agent vnderstanding by illumining the formes which are in him as blind euen as colours are in things before they be made apparent to the eye by the illumination of light vnderstandeth the kinds of things and vnderstanding them vnderstandeth it selfe For in spirituall things that which vnderstandeth and that which is vnderstood become all one thing and turning it selfe about the vniuersall kinds vnderstandeth withall things particular And this is that which the possible vnderstanding suffereth from the Agent receiuing thereby that perfection which you haue heard Why said Maister Spenser doth it not seeme that Aristotle when he saith that after death we haue no memorie that he meant that this our vnderstanding was mortall For if it were not so man should not lose the remembrance of things done in this life Nay answered I what a sillie part had it bene of Aristotle rather if he had thought the intellectiue soule to be mortall to say that we remembred nothing after this life when nothing of vs should haue remained And therefore it may serue to proue the immortalitie of the soule and not the corruption as you surmise onely for arguments sake that truth may be sifted out But our not remembring then commeth from the corruptible part which is the vertue of the fantasie which being a power of the sensitiue soule that keepeth in store the remembrance of materiall things that vertue which should represent them failing in vs we cannot remember them after death For the memorie is no part of the vnderstanding but of the sensitiue soule and therefore Aristotle said that memorie came from sense insomuch as creatures wanting reason haue memorie though they haue not rememorating as man hath for thereto is discourse required which according to Aristotle is nothing else but an action of the vnderstanding in the vertue imaginatiue Which thing neither in those creatures deuoid of reason nor yet in separated intelligences can haue place because those want discourse and these are pure acts as Philosophers call them Doth not Aristotle sayd my Lord Primate in his Ethikes say that the contentmēts and the troubles of those which liue appertaine vnto the dead and breede them griefe or delight And how is it then that he should say we haue no memorie after this life Aristotle in that place sayd I spake in reproofe of Solon who had sayd that no man could be accounted happie till after his death and meant there to shew that although it were graunted that man had memorie after his death of things done in this life yet could he not be happie when he was dead by reason of the strange accidents which this life bringeth foorth and therefore he said not simply that we remember but that supposing we did yet could we not be happie when we were dead so making good his opinion against Solon by naturall reason Yet sayd Maister Spenser let me aske you this question if the vnderstanding be immortall and multiplied still to the number of all the men that haue bene are and shall be how can it stand with that which Aristotle telleth vs of multiplication which saith he proceedeth from the matter and things materiall are alwayes corruptible Marrie Sir said I this is to be vnderstood of materiall things and not of Intelligible and spirituall such as is the vnderstanding And that the vnderstanding might remaine after the matter were gone as the forme of the bodie he hath as before is said declared in his Metaphysikes affirming the Intellectiue soule to be perpetuall though it be separated from the bodie whose forme it was But how cometh it to passe replied Maister Spenser that the soule being immortall and impassible yet by experience we see dayly that she is troubled with Lethargies Phrensies Melancholie drunkennesse and such other passions by which we see her ouercome and to be debarred from her office and function These quoth I are passions of the vertue cogitatiue fantastike or imaginatiue called by Aristotle as I haue said alreadie the passible vnderstanding and not of the Intellectiue soule Which passible vnderstanding being an inward sense and therefore tyed to the bodie feeleth the passions of the same
without any endeuour of our owne her vertue and operation if food and nourishment faile not is in her ful force chiefly in childhood and as soone as the child is borne stirreth vp the desire of food to the end that by little and little it might gather strength of body to become apt for the vse of the soule whose organ or instrument it is for the accomplishing of the more noble operations meet for man And because the milk of the mother or of the nurse is the first fit food for the infant it were to be wished that it should receiue the same rather from the mother then from any strange woman for in reason the same should be more kindly and natural for the babe then any other In consideration whereof the instructors of ciuill life haue determined and taught that it is the fathers office to teach and instruct the child but the mothers to nourish it For wise men say that Nature hath giuen to women their brests not so much for defence of the hart as because they should nourish their children and that she hath giuē them two paps to the end that they might nourish two if by chance they shold be deliuered of two at once And truly it cannot be but that would much increase both the loue of the mother to the child and likewise that of the child to the mother Neuertheles if it fal out as oftentimes it doth that the mother cannot giue sucke to her child or for other considerations she giue it forth to be nursed to another woman yet is there special regard to be had in getting such a nurse as may be of good complexion and of louing nature and honest conditions that with milke it may also suck a disposition to a vertuous and commendable life By your licence said M. Dormer let me aske you a question whether you thinke that the mind taketh any qualitie from the nutriment of the body for if the mind be diuine me seemeth it is against reason that it should not be of greater power then to receiue corruption from the nutriment of the body You say very well quoth I and here shall you be resolued of that doubt That the mind is a diuine thing cannot be denied And if the vertue of the mind which is reason could be freed from the company of those other two faculties of the soule void of reason in respect of themselues it would doubtlesse remaine still in perfection of one nature and not receiue any vice from that nutriment which yeeldeth matter to the basest facultie of the soule to maintaine and increase the body but euermore practise her proper operations and vertue but because it hapneth too often partly by the ill qualitie of the nutriment and partly for want of care in the education that the part wherein the vegetatiue power lieth getteth ouermuch strength and allured by the delights of the sensible part giueth it selfe wholy to follow the pleasures of the senses the mind being oppressed cannot performe the offices and functions pertaining thereunto And for this cause Plato affirmed that vnhealthfull bodies make the minds weake And the body can neuer be sound or healthfull when it is giuen to follow that baser part of the soule and the lusts and sensualities of the same whereby it forceth the mind preuailing against reason Not but that the mind is neuertheles diuine but because the body being the necessary instrument of the mind when it is wrested and drawne to an ill habit the mind cannot vse it as it would and the light of reason is darkned hindred not through any defect of the mind but onely in respect of the instrument that is become rebellious Euen as if a candle should be put into a close vessell that the light thereof could not appeare for the not yeelding of light should not proceed from the defect of the candle but of the vessell that inclosed the same To the end therefore that the child receiue not any vicious habit by the qualitie of his first food and nourishment wise men haue aduised that the nurse to be chosen for a child should not be base or of vile condition that the child might be the apter to be brought vp to vertue that she be not of strange nation lest she should giue it strange or vnseemely manners vnfit or disagreeable to the customes and conditions of the house or citie wherein it is borne and wherein it is to liue and lastly that she be of good and commendable behauiour to the end that with the milk it may suck good conditions and an honest disposition to vertuous life And because the nurse may be kept in house or suffered to carry the child to her owne dwelling place of the two it is to be wished that the parents should rather keepe her in their owne house to the end that euen from his infancy it might learne to know the father and mother and the rest of the family and take by little and little the fashions and manners of the house For the minds of children whiles they be yong are like to the yong tender slips of trees which a man may bend and straighten as he list and are fashioned to such customes and conditions as may best beseeme them For looke what behauiour they first learne the same they retaine and keepe a long while after Wherefore Phocilides said right well Whiles yet in tender yeares the child doth grow Teach him betimes conditions generous Great is the care then that fathers ought to vse in framing the manners and disposition of their children when they be yong and tender in their owne houses and are yet in their nurses laps Hauing regard not to vse them either ouer-curstly or ouer-fondly for as the first ouer-aweth them maketh them dull and base and vile minded by taking away the generositie of their minds the other bringeth them to be wantons and waiward so as they will neuer be still but euer crying and wrawling for they wote not what For being yet but new in the world and not acquainted with those things the images whereof are presented to them by the senses of hearing and seeing they easily giue themselues to waywardnes and crying when they see any strange sight or images or heare a fearfull sound or noise the rather by reason of the melancholy humor which they bring with them from the mothers womb reason hauing yet little or no force in them and their iudgments being too weak to distinguish good from euill or what is hurtfull from what may do them good not that naturally they be so for that tender age is rather sanguine and aëriall but thorough the remnant of that bloud from which they receiued their nutriment in their mothers belly vnto which their crying the vsuall remedy is the mouing them from place to place the rocking of them in their cradles the dandling of them for such motions do diuert them from those fearfull impressions and make them the
loue of vertue or feare of lawes they could possibly be reclaimed to vertuous life I pray you said Captain Norreis let me interrupt you a little so shall you the better take breath in the meane while I noted not long sithens a saying of your author which me seemed somewhat strange and that is that the substance of the soule should be made perfect by the accidents You say right quoth I but let not that seeme strange vnto you for it ought rather to seeme strange vnto you if it were otherwise because the substance of euery thing is so called by reason that it is subiect vnto accidents neither can there be any accident to which it is proper to be in some subiect but it must fall into some substance and hardly would the substance perhaps be discerned by sense but that the accidents do make it to be knowne Yet hath nature giuen to the substance all that she could giue to enable the same to wit that it might by nature be of it selfe alone hauing no need of any other thing in respect of being and that it should be so necessary to all things else that is not a substance as without it they should be nothing Therefore the nature of the soule is such as the parts thereof haue their vertues and faculties perfect but in that concerneth the directing of them to ciuill life man cannot by nature onely compasse it nor attaine to that end of which we treate Then said Captaine Norreis If it be so as by nature we cannot haue that wherewith we should compasse our felicitie it must belike be in vs contrary to nature And all things contrary to nature being violent and of no continuance I cannot perceiue how this felicitie of ours may stand Sir said I it followeth not that whatsoeuer is not by nature must needs be contrary to nature But most true it is that the meanes to guide vs to this felicitie or our felicity it selfe is in vs not by nature for if it were so all men should naturally be happy and by nature haue the means to purchase the same because all men should of necessitie worke after one sort For things naturall vnlesse they be forced or hindered do alwayes bring foorth the same effects wheresoeuer they be and the powers which nature bestoweth are indifferently dispensed to all alike Which thing is to be vnderstood by the vegetatiue part of the soule which in plants and in creatures sensible attendeth onely by nature without counsell or election to nourish to increase to procreate and to preserue ne ceaseth at any time frō those offices but alwaies produceth like effects in al things that haue life And the sēsible soule euermore giueth the power and vertue of feeling to creatures sensible and neuer altereth her operation nor ceaseth to yeeld the same whiles life endureth except by some strange accident she be forced Seeing therefore the diuersitie of mans will the varietie of his operations and how differently they vse the faculties of the soule we must needes conclude that in respect of ciuill life they work not according to nature But we must not therfore say that their working to purchase their felicitie and the end we speake of is contrary to nature For such things are properly said to be contrary to nature as are violently forced to that which is not naturall and whereunto they haue no aptnesse or disposition at all As for example if a stone which is naturally heauy and therfore coueteth to moue to the center of the earth be cast vpward into the aire by force it is to be said that the motion of that stone so forced vpward is contrary to nature because it hath no instinct or mouing from nature to go vpward and though it were throwne vp ten thousand times so often wold it fal downe again if it were not retained otherwise frō falling And if fire which is light couets to ascend should be forced downeward that force would be contrary to nature and the force ceasing it would by nature ascend again because it hath not any vertue or principle or motion to descend but onely to ascend by which it striueth to come to the place which is proper to it by nature as it is fire and by which it is fire naturally For the elements haue alwayes their essence most perfect when they are nearest to the place assigned them by nature But man being a creature capable of reason and thereby apt to receiue those vertues the seeds whereof nature hath sowne in his mind it cannot be said that the meanes by which he is to be led to so noble an end as his felicitie should be in him contrary to nature For neuer any thing worketh contrary to nature in which is the beginning of that operation that it is to do Why said Captaine Norreis againe since you say that the seeds of vertues are in our minds naturally it seemeth strange to me that they should not bring forth generally in all men their fruite as the seed which is cast into the earth springeth buddeth flowreth and lastly in due seasō yeeldeth fruite according to kind Marry said I and so they do For if mans care and industry be not applied to manure the earth diligently and to weed out the il weeds that spring among the good seed which is sowne they would so choke the same as it would be quite lost And euen so if the seeds of vertue be not holpen with continuall culture and care taken to pul vp the vices which spring therewith and whereof the seeds are naturally as well in our mind as those of vertue they wil ouer-grow and choke them as the weeds of the garden ouer-grow and choke the good herbes planted or sowne therein For so grow vp the disordinate appetites vnreasonable anger ambitions greedie desires of wealth of honour wanton lusts of the flesh and such other affections spoken of before which haue their naturall rootes in those two baser parts of the soule deuoyde of reason And as we see the earth without manuring to bring forth wyld herbs and weeds more plentifully then other good seed which by industry and labor is cast into the same so do those passions affects and appetites of those baser parts of the soule spring and grow vp thicker and faster then the vertues whereby for the more part the fruit of those good seeds of vertue is lost if the mind be not diligently cleaned frō them by the care of others And these ill qualities are in yong men the worse when they suffer themselues to be transported without regard of reason or honestie and their right iudgement to be corrupted and their crooked to preuaile Which crooked iudgement is in effect the cause of all vices and ill affections turnes the braine making them like drunken men much like as coccle doth to them that feed thereupon But this hapneth not vnto that youth which succeedeth a well fashioned childhood such as yesterday was
apprehended yet free of any materiall condition and this part is to the vnderstanding as the hand is to the bodie For as the hand is apt to take hold of all instruments so is this power or facultie apt to apprehend the formes of all things from whence grow the vniuersals which though they haue their being in the materiall particulars which the Latins cal indiuidua yet are they not material because they are not according to Aristotle yet in act In which respect it is sayd that sense is busied about things particular and that onely things vniuersall are knowne because they be comprehended by the vnderstanding without matter It is neuerthelesse to be vnderstood that the kindes of things are in this possible part thus separated from matter but blind and obscure euen as colours are stil in substances though the light be taken away which light appearing and making the ayre transparent which before was darkened it giueth to things that illumination by which they are comprehended and knowne to the eye whose obiect properly colours are And the Sunne being the fountaine of light wise men haue said that the same Sunne giueth colours to things for that by meanes of his light they are seene with those visible colours which naturally they haue neuerthelesse in themselues though without light they could not be discerned and remaine there as if they were not at all This part of the soule then wherein reason is worketh the same effect towards things intelligible that the Sun doth towards things visible for it illumineth those kinds or formes which lie hidden in that part possible dark and confused deuoyde of place time and matter because they are not particular And hence it cometh that some haue said this possible vnderstanding as we may terme it to be such a thing as out of it all things should be made as if it were in stead of matter and the other agent vnderstanding to be the worker of all things and as it were the forme because this part which before was but in power to things intelligible becometh through the operation of the agent vnderstanding to be now in act And for this cause also is it said that the vnderstanding and things vnderstood become more properly and truly one selfe same thing then of matter and forme it may be said For it is credible that both the formes of things and the vnderstanding being immateriall they do the more perfectly vnite themselues and that the vnderstanding doth so make it selfe equall with the thing vnderstood that they both become one To which purpose Aristotle said very well that the reasonable soule whiles it vnderstandeth things intelligible becometh one selfe same thing with them And this is that very act of truth to wit the certain science or knowledge of any thing which knowledge or science is in effect nought else then the thing so knowne And this knowledge is not principally in man but in the soule wherin it remaineth as the forme therof This is briefly the summe of the order or maner of knowledge which those that follow Aristotle do set downe who therefore affirme that his sentence was that who so would vnderstand any thing had need of those formes and images which the senses offer to the fantasie From which sentence some not well aduised in my opinion haue gone about to argue that the soule of man should be mortal because Aristotle assigned no proper operation vnto her as if such had bin his opinion But they consider not that Aristotle in his bookes de Anima spake of the soule as she was naturall and the forme to the body performing her operations together with the body and as she was the mouer of the body and the body moued by her but not as she was distinct or separate from the bodie And right true it is that whiles she is tied to the bodie she cannot vnderstand but by the meanes of the senses but that being free and loosed from the body she hath not her proper operations that is most false For then hath she no need at all of the senses when being pure and simple she may exercise her owne power and vertue proper to her which is the contemplation of God Almightie the highest and onely true good nor yet of any other instrument but her selfe And in this respect perchance the better sort of Peripatetikes following their masters opinion haue said that the soule separated from the body is not the same she was whiles she was linked thereunto as well because then she was a part of the whole and was troubled with anger desire hatred loue such like passions cōmon to her with the body as because being imprisoned in the body she had neede of the senses but now that she was freed frō that imprisonment nor any way bound to the body she might vse her selfe and her vertue much more nobly and worthily then before And therefore Aristotle said that the soule separated frō the body could no more be called a soule but equiuocally But here is to be noted that it is one thing to speake of the intellectiue soule which is diuine and vncorruptible and another thing to speake of the soule simply For doubtlesse the vegetatiue and sensitiue soules which cannot vse their vertues and operations but by meane of the body die with the body But the intellectiue soule which is our onely true forme not drawne from the materiall power but created and sent into vs by the diuine maiestie dieth not with the body but remaineth immortal and euerlasting And thus much touching the maner of our learning according to Aristotles opinion may suffice But Plato doubtlesse was of opinion that our soule before it descended into vs had the knowledge of all things and that by comming into this mortall prison which his followers haue termed the sepulchre of the soule she was plunged as it were into profound darknesse from a most cleere light whereby she forgat all that erst she knew And that afterwards by occasion of those things which by meanes of the senses come before her the memory of that she knew before being stirred vp and wakened she came to resume her former knowledge and in this sort by way of rememorating and not of learning a new she attained the knowledge of sciences so as we learned nothing whereof before we had not the knowledge In conformitie of which their masters sentence the Platonikes say that since the body bringeth with it the seeds that appertaine vnto it by nature it is to be beleeued that the soule likewise being much more perfect should bring with it those seeds that appertaine to the mind And to this reason they adde that men euen from their first yeares desiring things that are good true honest and profitable and since no man can desire a thing which he knoweth not after some sort it may be cōcluded that we haue the knowledge of those things before But because it would be too long a matter to rehearse
remaining I wil briefly knit vp the rest that concerneth this matter Young men haue naturall heate so much abounding in them that they cannot rest but be still in motion as well of body as of mind The one with running leaping and other exercises and when all they faile the tongue ceaseth not which by reason of their age is the more bold and ready The other with passing from one discourse to another and from one passion to another now louing now hating now boyling with anger and choler now still and quiet with such like motions of the mind And because the motions of the body and the affections of the minde must haue their measure and their rule and the one and the other conuenient exercise and moderate rest therefore did the auncient wise men deuise two speciall Arts most apt and fit for both these purposes Whereof the one they called Gymnastica which is a skilfull and moderate exercise of the body and the other Musike by which name it is well knowne in all languages And when they had caused their youth to spend part of the day in learning those sciences and disciplines which they thought fit for that age for of all other things they abhorred the training them vp in ignorance because seldome can an ignorant man be good and that men without knowledge and learning are but figures of men and images of death without soule or life then would they draw them to honest exercises of the body by degrees For they held it a thing most necessary for the wel-founding of a Common-wealth to be continually carefull of the framing youth both in body and mind because they knew right well that good education maketh young men good and that such are Common-wealths and States as are the qualities and conditions of the men which they do breed Touching the body therfore they did deuise to strengthen and harden it with conuenient and temperate exercises as the play at ball leaping running dansing riding wrastling throwing the barre the stone or sledge and such like For the minde they thought best to stay and settle it selfe with the harmonie of Musike and from these two they resolued that two great good effects did ensue From the first strength of body and boldnesse of spirit and from the latter modesty and temperance inseparable companions for the most part vnto fortitude For some of them were of opinion that our soules were composed of harmonie and beleeued that Musike was able so to temper our affects and passions as they should not farre or discord among themselues but be so interlaced the one with the other in a sweet consent as wel guided and ordered actiō should proceed from the same euen as sweet and delightfull Musike proceedeth from the wel-tempering of tunable voices or well consorted instruments Neither would they haue the one to be exercised and the other omitted for that they thought if yong men should giue themselues onely to the exercises of the body they wold become too fierce and hardy and so be rather hurtfull to their commonweales then otherwise And if they should follow onely Musike which is proper to rest and quietnes and vsed as a recreation of the mind as Aristotle saith they would become soft minded and effeminate But by ioyning both these faculties together in one they sought to make a noble temper and to induce a most excellent habite as well in the mind as in the body So that if valor were required for the defence of their countrey or vanquishing of their enemies they were made fit and apt thereunto by the exercises of the body but with such measure and temper as should not exceed Which measure and temper they obtained from that harmonie which Musike imprinted in their mindes vnder which they comprehended not onely the ordering of the voice and sounds of instruments but all other orderly and seemely motions of the body which vpon their stages or Scaenes in the acting of Tragedies was chiefly to be discouered And that all orderly motions were comprehended vnder Musicke was held so certaine by Pythagoras Archetas Plato Cicero other famous Philosophers that they were of opinion that the orderly course and motions of the heauens could not be such as it is or continue without harmony though Aristotle do oppose him selfe to their opinion And for this cause did Lycurgus deuise that Musike should be conioyned with the military discipline of the Lacedemonians not onely to temper the heate and furie of their minds in fight but also to cause them to vse a certaine measure in that marching and other occasions of war In which respect they were wont to battell without certaine pipes according to the times whereof they vnderstood how to vse their bodies and weapons from which respect also cometh our vsing of drums and trumpets to giue souldiers knowledge when to march when to stand when to assault and when to retire and consequently how to ioyne order and measure with their valour against the enemy and the Lansknight and the Switzer vse also the fife at this day with the drum And to say truth great is the force of Musike skilfully vsed to stirre vp or to appease the mind For we reade that Pythagoras finding a wanton yong man enraged with lust ready to force the doore of an honest woman he so calmed his mind onely by changing the Phrigian tune and number into the Spondean that he gaue ouer his wicked purpose And Therpander when a great sedition was raised among the Lacedemonians he with his musike so quieted their mindes bent to fury that he reduced them to a perfect peace It is also written of the great Alexander that he was so moued by that tune and nūber of Musikes which the greeks called Orthios nomos which was a kind of haughtie tune to stirre men to battel that he rose from the boord to arme himselfe as if the trumpet had sounded the allarme But what talke we of the auncient opinions concerning the force of Musike to moue mens minds when we find they beleeued that their Gods were forced by the vertue of Musike to appease their wrath For the Lacedemonians being infested with a great pestilence Thales of Candia was said by musike to haue mitigated their anger and so to haue deliuered them frō that mortality The which thing Homer also signified when he said that the yongmen of Greece with their songs did appease Apollo his wrath and caused the plague to cease which had infected their campe And the Romanes likewise being annoied with a great pestilence receiued then first the singing of Satires into the Citie though but rudely tuned then as a remedy for that infectiō The force efficacie of musike then being such as I haue declared it is no maruel that the Aegiptiās after they had once receiued it into their Commonwealth as meet for the instruction of their youth wold neuer after allow that it shold be altered or changed but such as it was
represented I know right well that sometimes the contrary is seene through the inconstancy of humane things but if we consider what happeneth for the most part we shall find that good examples commonly are causes of good and bad examples causes of euill Since the child therfore is chiefly to learne of the father his forme of life it is the fathers part to be to him in his tender yeares a liuely patterne of vertue as we haue said wherby he may as it were ingraft into his childs mind that good and commendable kind of life which may bring him by vertuous actions to honour and estimation But because it cometh oftener to passe then were requisite that the father being busied about other matters concerning the order of his house and family or else in the managing of the affaires of the common-wealth he cannot attend the bringing vp of his child with that care that he ought therfore must he prouide for his education so as the same be not neglected For as the true images of vertue are easily imprinted in the minds of childrē whiles they be tender so do they quickly weare out and vanish if they be not refreshed and reuiued by the discretion and industry of some meet person appointed for that purpose and their contraries as soone ingraued in their places The father therefore ought in any wife to make choise of some such man to whom he may commit the charge and instruction of his child when he is past the age of three yeares as may be meet to giue him good example of life and season him with such doctrine as he may not degenerate or decline from that vertuous course of life which he hath endeuored to put into the babes mind euen whiles he was yet in his nurses armes and vnder the charge of women For if in those first dayes of infancy when yet he had almost no vnderstanding so great care was to be taken as we haue said to lay a good foundation how much more diligence is there now to be vsed when he beginneth to haue some knowledge and iudgement that the building may rise answerable to the same Wise men haue wisely said that nature is the best mistris we can haue and the custome of vertuous behauiour and wholsome doctrine being taken in tender yeares is conuerted not onely into an habite but euen into nature Wherefore let the father at those yeares giue his child in charge to some vertuous and godly man to be trained and instructed who must be neither too mild nor too seuere but such as may in some things agree with the manner of the nurses bringing vp to the end he may gently turne to other manners and behauiour then he had learned when he was most among women For to take a child from the brest and from his nurses bosome and to put him suddenly vnder the hard gouernment of a curst master would be too violent a change and force that tēder nature ouermuch But if he that shal then haue the ruling of him shall discreetly win him with mildnes from being fond after the nurse and by little and little draw him to a more firme kind of behauiour in such sort as he scarse perceiue that he hath forsaken his nurses lap the child wil quickly delight to be with him as much as with his nurse yea or with his father or mother and pratling or childishly crauing now one thing then another of him there wil soone spring in his mind a desire of knowledge which desire though indeed it be naturall borne with vs yet hath it need to be holpē and stirred vp to come forth and put it selfe in action for else will it lie hidden and couered with the vnworthiest part of the soule like to the fire which is couered with ashes which though it haue naturally vertue to giue light and heate yet vnlesse that impediment be taken away it wil do neither of both nor be apt to worke his naturall effect And therefore as before is said he which shall take the charge of the child after the nurse must be very discreet to win him to his discipline without bitternes or stripes which do rather dull and harden the childs mind then worke any good effect And the seruile feare which the ouer-sharpe and vnaduised vsage or beating of the child bringeth him vnto not fit for a generous mind maketh him to hate the thing he should learne before he can come to know it much lesse to loue it It is also a thing very profitable for his better instructing that there be others of like yeares in his company to learne with him for so will there arise a certaine emulation among them through which euery of them will striue to step before his fellow besides that the conuersation of such as are like in age and qualitie wel bred and brought vp is a very fit occasion to make them all wel mannered and of good behauiour those yong yeares being as before is sayd apt for the simplicitie thereof to take whatsoeuer forme is giuen vnto them And for this cause was Merides King of the Aegyptians greatly commended among the auncient wise men for that as soone as his sonne Sisostres was borne he caused all the children that were borne in the citie that same day to be gathered together and brought vp with his said son where they were instructed in all those disciplines and noble arts that in those dayes were in estimation and meet to direct to a commendable life And that the manner of good education is to proceed by degrees it appeared by the order which the Kings of Persia held in the bringing vp of those who were to succeed them in their Empire But because our discourse tendeth not to the instructing of Princes children but onely of such gentlemen of meaner qualitie as may be fit instruments for the seruice of their common-wealth or country it will be best to passe that ouer in silence Whiles in this place I was pawsing a while as to take some breath Captaine Carleil sayd in this sort I hope your author giueth not ouer so this matter For howsoeuer his purpose was to discourse of the ciuill life of priuate men yet the declaring of the order which was held in the instructing and training vp of the children of those Princes cannot but be as well profitable as delightfull Therefore let vs I pray you heare what is sayd by him touching the same That shal I willingly do said I for that the like request was made to him by one of that company and thus he proceedeth saying that though it might suffice to refer them to what Xenophon in his Ciropaedia hath left written of that subiect hauing learnedly and diligently vnder the person of Cirus framed an idaea or perfect patterne of an excellent Prince yet he meaning to follow Plato and Aristotle in his treatise will therefore report what he hath gathered out of Plato to that purpose and adde
spoken of though it be not sufficient to haue a childe either well brought vp or well instructed For a new care must be taken and new diligence be vsed to cherish the growth of the good seeds bestowed manured in the mind of the child which made Aristotle say that education onely was not enough to make a man vertuous For though the child be so well bred as hath bin prescribed yet vnlesse some care be had to bridle it so vnpleasing a thing it is for youth to liue within the compasse of modestie and temperance it is easily turned to that part to which pleasure and delight doth draw it Neuertheles that first culture bestowed vpon childhood doth so much auaile as the yong man that is disposed to hearken to good admonitions shall haue the lesse to do to liue vertuously and to tame that sensitiue part which he hath onely to striue withall and to make obedient to the rule of reason Captaine Carleil then said I pray you before you go any further let me aske this one question why vntil now your author hauing spoken of this moral science hath all this while made no mention of the speculatiue sciences wherein me thinketh a yong man hath special need to be instructed for they also I suppose are necessary to happinesse of life That doubt the author answereth thus said I Vertues are generally deuided into Speculatiue and Practike or we may say into Intellectiue and Actiue The speculatiue habites are fiue in number viz Vnderstanding called by the Latines Intellectus Science Wisedome Art and Prudence And because hitherto he hath spoken onely how men in ciuill life may attaine to be good or decline from being euill and that the speculatiue sciences declare but how wise how learned or how prudent they be and not how good or vertuous they be and that these two first ages are not of capacitie sufficient to embrace them therefore he reserueth the treating thereof vntill a fitter time which the course of our speech will leade vs vnto Yea but Aristotle saith quoth the Lord Primate that yong men may be Arithmeticians and Mathematicians and finally therin wise but yet he affirmeth that they can not be prudent That place of Aristotle said I is to be vnderstood not of this first degree of youth whereof the author hath spoken hitherto but of the perfection and ripenesse that in time it may attaine as after shall be declared when time doth serue That time said Captaine Carleil we will attend But because we see both vertues and sciences are to be learned and that I haue heard question and doubt made of the manner of learning them I pray let vs heare whether your author say ought thereof and specially whether our learning be but a rememorating of things which we knew formerly or else a learning a new This is indeed said I no light question which mine author handleth also euen in this place and there are on either side great and learned authors as Plato and Aristotle first whereof the one was accounted the God of Philosophers and the other the master of all learned men and ech hath his followers who with forcible arguments seeke to defend and maintaine the part of their master and captaine But before we enter into that matter you must vnderstand that Plato and Aristotle haue held a seuerall way each of them in their teaching For Plato from things eternall descended to mortall things and thence returned as it were by the same way from the earth to heauen againe rather affirming then proouing what he taught But Aristotle from earthly things as most manifest to our senses raised himselfe climing to heauenly things vsing the meane of that knowledge which the senses giue frō which his opiniō was that al humane knowledge doth come And where sensible reasons failed him there failed his proofes also Which thing as it hapned to him in diuine matters so did it likewise in the knowledge of the soule intellectiue as some of his interpreters say which being created by God to his owne likenesse be hath written so obscurely thereof that his resolute opinion in that matter cannot be picked out of his writings but that reasons may be gathered out of them in fauour of the one part and of the other as though the treatie of a matter so important and necessary to our knowledge were as schoole-men say a matter contingent about which arguments probable may be gathered on both sides yet had he before him his diuine master who as far as mans wit could stretch without grace had taught him cleerly that which was true that mans soule is by nature immortall and partaker of diuinitie howsoeuer some of the Peripatetikes seeme out of Aristotle to affirme that Plato was contrary to himself as making the soule somewhiles immortall and otherwhiles not which in truth is not in Plato to be found if he be rightly vnderstood But to the purpose The opinion of Aristotle was that our soule did not only not record any thing but that it shold be so wholy voyd of knowledge or science as it might be resembled to a pure white paper and therefore affirmed he that our knowledge was altogether newly gotten and that our soule had to that end need of sense and that sense failing her all science or knowledge should faile withall Because the senses are as ministers to the mind to receiue the images or formes particular of things which being apprehended by the common sense called sensus communis bring foorth afterwards the vniuersals Which common sense is a power or facultie of the sensitiue soule that distinguisheth betweene those things that the outward senses offer vnto it and is therefore called common because it receiueth commonly the formes or images with the exteriour senses present vnto it and hath power to distinguish the one from the other But as those senses know not the nature of things so is the same vnknowne also vnto the common sense to whom they offer things sensible Wherefore this commonsense being as we haue said a facultie of the sensitiue soule offereth them to the facultie imaginatiue which hath the same proportiō to the vertue intellectiue as things sensible haue to the sense aforesaid For it moueth the vnderstanding after it hath receiued the formes or images of things frō the outward senses layeth them vp materiall in the memory where they be kept This done Aristotle and his followers say that then the part of the soule capable of reason beginneth to vse her powers and they are as they affirme two the one intellectus possibilis and the other intellectus agens these latin words I must vse at this time because they be easie enough to be vnderstood and in English would seeme more harsh whereof the first is as the matter to the second and the second as forme to the first Into that possible facultie of the vnderstanding do the kinds or species of things passe which the fantasie hath
all the arguments which Plato his followers bring to proue this by our desiring of things by seeking them by finding them and by the discerning of them it may suffice to referre you to what Plato hath left of this matter written vnder the person of Socrates in his dialogs intitled Menon and Phoedon and diuers other places And likewise to that which his expositors haue written among whō Plotinus though he be somewhat obscure deserueth the chiefe place as best expressing Plato his sence and meaning But let our knowledge come how it will either by learning anew or by recording what the soule knew before she hauing need howsoeuer it be of the ministery of the senses and seeing it is almost necessary to passe through the same meanes from not knowing to knowledge we shall euer find the like difficulties whether we rememorate or learne anew For without much study great diligence and long trauel are sciences no way to be attained Which thing Socrates who haply was the author of Plato his opinion shewed vs plainely For when the curtizan Theodota scoffing at him said she was of greater skill then he for she had drawne diuers of Socrates scholers from him to her loue where Socrates could draw none of her louers to follow him he answered that he thereat maruelled nothing at all for said he thou leadest them by a plaine smooth way to lust and wantonnesse and I leade them to vertue by a rough and an vneasie path Here Captaine Norreis said Though this controuersie betweene two so great Philosophers be not for ought I see yet decided and that if we should take vpon vs to discerne whose opinion were the better it might be imputed to presumption yet would I for my part be very glad to know what was the reason that induced Plato to say that our soule had the knowledge of all things before it came into the body and I pray you if your author speake any thing thereof that you will therein satisfie my desire Yes marry doth he sir said I and your desire herein sheweth very well the excellencie of your wit and your attention to that which hath bin said and both may serue for a sufficient argument what hope is to be conceiued of a gentleman so inclined and desirous to learne Thus therefore he saith to your question That whereas we according to truth beleeue that our soules are by the diuine power of God incontinently created and infused into our bodies when we beginne to receiue life and sense in our mothers womb Plato contrarily held that they were long before the bodies created and produced in a number certaine by God and that they were as particles descended from the Gods aboue into our bodies and therfore he thought it nothing absurd that they should haue the knowledge of al things that may be knowne For that they being in heauen busied in the contemplation of the diuine nature free from any impediment of the body and that diuine nature containing in it as he said the essentiall Ideas of all things which Ideas according to his opinion were separate and eternall natures remaining in the diuine minde of God to the patterne of which all things created were made they might said he in an instant haue the knowledge of all that could be knowne If this opinion were true said Captaine Norreis happie had it bin for vs that our soules had continued stil after they were sent into our bodies to be of that sort that they had bin in heauen for then should we not haue needed so much labour and paine in seeking that knowledge which before they had so perfectly And being so perfect to what end did he say they were sent into our bodies to become vnperfect His opinion said I was that the soules were created in a certaine number to the end they might informe so many bodies and therfore if they should not haue come into those bodies they should haue failed of the end for which they were created In which bodies the Platonikes say further that they were to exercise themselues and were giuen to the bodies not onely because they should giue them power to moue to see to feele and to do those other operations which are naturall but to the end that they should in that which appertaineth to the mind not suffer vs to be drowsie and lie as it were asleepe but rather to waken and stirre vs vp to the knowledge of those things that are fit for vs to vnderstand and this was the most accomplished operation sayd they that the soule could giue vnto the bodie whiles it was linked thereunto I cannot see said the Lord Primate how this hangeth together For I haue read that these kind of Philosophers held an opinion that our soules all the while they were tied to our bodies did but sleepe and that all which they do or suffer in this life was but as a dreame It is true said I that the Platonikes said so indeed and that was because they knew that whatsoeuer we do in this life is but a dreame in comparison of that our soules shal do in the other world when they shal be loosed from those bands which tie them to our bodies here through which bands they are hindred from the knowledge of those things perfectly which here they learne In regard whereof Carneades Arcesilas and others the authors of the new Accademie said constantly that in this world there was no certaine knowledge of any thing And Nausifanes affirmed that of all those things which here seeme to vs to be we know nothing so certainly as that they were not Vnto which opinion Protagoras also agreed saying that men might dispute of any thing pro contra as if he should say that nothing could be assuredly knowen to vs whiles we are here as our soules shall know them whensoeuer they shall be freed from our bodies and lie no more inwrapped in these mortall shadowes because then they shall be wholy busied in the contemplation of truth neither shal they be deceiued by the senses as in this life they are oftentimes who offer vnto them the images of things vncertainly not through default of the senses but by reason of the meanes whereby they apprehend the formes of things For the sense by his owne nature if he be not deceiued or hindred in receiuing of things sensible comprehendeth them perfectly nay becometh one selfe same thing with them And this is the cause why it is said that our soules sleepe whiles they remaine in this life and that our knowledge here is but as a dreame According to which conceit the inamoured Poet speaking of his Ladie Laura said very properly vpon her death in this sort Thou hast faire Damsell slept but a short sleepe Now wak'd thou art among the heau'nly spirits Where blessed soules interne within their maker Shewing that our life here is but a slumber and seeming to infer that she was now interned or become inward in the
iudgement of whom the wisest men of al ages haue esteemed that to be old with a yong mans mind is all one as to be yong in yeeres For it is not grey haires or furrowes in the face but prudence and wisedome that make men venerable when they are old neither can there be any thing more vnseemly then an old man to liue in such maner as if he begā but then to liue which caused Aristotle to say that it imported little whether a man were young of yeeres or of behauiour Neuerthelesse because dayly experience teacheth vs that yeares commonly bring wisedome by reason of the varietie of affaires that haue passed thorough old mens hands and which they haue seene managed by other men and that commonly youth hath neede of a guide and director to take care of those things which himselfe cannot see or discerne Therefore haue lawes prouided tutors for the ages before mentioned vntill they had attained the yeers by them limited thenceforth left men to their owne direction vnlesse in some particular cases accidentall as when they be distraught of their wits or else through extreme olde age they become children againe as sometimes it falleth out Knowledge then is the thing that maketh a man meete to gouerne himselfe and the same being attained but by long studie and practise wise men haue therefore concluded that youth cannot be prudent For indeed the varietie of humane actions by which from many particular accidents an vniuersall rule must be gathered because as Aristotle sayth the knowledge of vniuersalities springeth from singularities maketh knowledge so hard to be gotten that many yeares are required thereunto And from this reason is it also concluded that humane felicitie cannot be attained in yong yeares since by the definition thereof it is a perfect operation according to vertue in a perfect life which perfection of life is not to be allowed but to many yeers But the way vnto it is made opē by knowledge and specially by the knowledge of a mans selfe To which good education hauing prepared him and made him apt when he is come to riper iudgement by yeares he may the better make choise of that way which shall leade him to the same as the most perfect end and scope of all his actions And this by cōsidering wel of his own nature which hauing annexed vnto it a spark of diuinitie he shal not only as a meere earthly creature but also as partaker of a more diuine excellency raise himself haue perfect light to see the ready way which leadeth to felicitie To this knowledge of himselfe so necessary for the purchasing of humane felicitie is Philosophie a singular helpe as being called the science of truth the mother of sciences and the instructor of all things appertaining to happie life and therefore should yong men apply themselues to the studie thereof with all carefulnesse that thereby they may refine their mindes and their iudgements and find the knowledge of his wel-nigh diuine nature so much the more easily And as this knowledge is of all other things most properly appertaining to humane wisedome so is the neglecting thereof the greatest and most harmefull folly of all others for from the said knowledge as from a fountaine or well head spring all vertues and goodnes euen as from the ignorance thereof slow all vices and euils that are among men But herein is one special regard to be had which is that self loue cary not away the mind from the direct path to the same for which cause Plato affirmed that men ought earnestly to pray to God that in seeking to know themselues they might not be misled by their selfe loue or by the ouer-weening of themselues M. Spenser then said If it be true that you say by Philosophie we must learne to know our selues how happened it that the Brachmani men of so great fame as you know in India would admit none to be their schollers in Philosophy if they had not first learned to know them selues as if they had concluded that such knowledge came not from Philosophie but appertained to some other skill or science Their opinion said I differeth not as my author thinketh from the opinion of the wise men of Greece But that the said Brachmani herein shewed the selfe same thing that Aristotle teacheth which is that a man ought to make some triall of himselfe before he determinate to follow any discipline that he may discerne and iudge whether there be in him any disposition wherby he may be apt to learne the same or no. And to the same effect in another place he affirmeth that there must be a custome of wel-doing in thē that wil learne to be vertuous which may frame in them an aptnesse to learne by making them loue what is honest and commendable and to hate those things that are dishonest and reprochfull For all men are not apt for all things neither is it enough that the teacher be ready to instruct and skilfull but the learner must also be apt of nature to apprehend and conceiue the instructions that shall be giuen vnto him And this knowledge of himselfe is fit for euery man to haue before he vndertake the studie of Philosophie to wit that he enter into himselfe to trie whether he can well frame himself to endure the discipline of this mother of sciences and the patience which is required in al those things besides which appertaine to honestie and vertuous life For he that will learne vertue in the schoole of Philosophie must not bring a mind corrupted with false opinions vices wickednesse disordinate appetites ambitions greedie desires of wealth nor wanton lusts and longings with such like which will stop his eares that he shall not be able to heare the holy voice of Philosophie Therefore Epictetus said very well that they which were willing to study Philosophie ought first to consider well whether their vessel be cleane and sweet lest it should corrupt that which they meant to put into it Declaring thereby withall that learning put into a vicious mind is dangerous But this maner of knowing a mans selfe is not that which I spake of before though it be that which the sayd Indian Philosophers meant and is also very necessary and profitable For to know a mans selfe perfectly according to the former maner is a matter of greater importance then so Which made Thales when he was asked what was the hardest thing for a man to learne answer that it was to know himselfe For this knowledge stayeth not at the consideration of this exteriour masse of our body which represents it selfe vnto our eyes though euen therein also may well be discerned the maruellous and artificiall handy-work of Gods diuine Maiestie but penetrateth to the examination of the true inward man which is the intellectuall soule to which this body is giuen but for an instrument here in this life And this knowledge is of so great importance that man guided by the light of
for those that apply themselues wholy to their pleasures and delights it is to be held that they neither can be accounted happie because forsaking their proper end and good which is honestie they bend themselues to the sensitiue part onely which is common with them to brute beasts Here M. Dormer interrupting me desired that I would stay a while to resolue him of one doubt which my former words had bred in his mind which was that hauing said riches were of small account among wise men and could not make men happie it might seeme that nature had in vaine produced them That followeth not said I of any thing which I haue spoken For I haue not said that they were not necessary for the vse of them for common sence experience and the want of things behouefull to mans life would say the contrary Besides that Aristotle in his tenth booke of Ethikes affirmeth that not onely to the attaining of ciuill felicitie but also for the contemplatiue life these exterior goods are needfull because a man may the better thereby contemplate when want distractetth not his minde though among the Platonikes some say the contrary alledging that men are better disposed to contemplation without them then with them But thus much indeede I said that they are not the true end or good of man nor could yeeld him happinesse of themselues or make him worthy honour And that they that bend their mindes onely to scrape and heape together mucke and pelfe are of all others the basest and vnworthiest yet being vsed as they ought to be for the behoofe and maintenance of mans life and not as an end or the proper good of man I do not only not discommend them but do also esteeme them in their quality so far forth as the infirmity of mans nature hath neede of them whereof since we shall haue occasion to speake more hereafter let vs in Gods name proceed to speake of the life of them that haue subiected their minds to that part of the soule which is wholy bent to sensualitie and delight These men are like vnto brute beasts wanting reason and worse for brute beasts following their naturall instinct and appetite passe not the bonds of nature and though they get no praise thereby yet incurre they not any blame in that behalfe But man who setting reason aside chuseth vaine pleasures as his scope and end and so plungeth his minde in them that reason cannot performe her office and dutie can in no wise escape from exceeding blame and reproch for the same Of which sort of men the Platonikes opinion was that they were so far from being happie as they were not to be reputed among the liuing but the dead not only in respect of the body but of the soule likewise For they held that the soule being drowned in delights might wel be reckoned as dead because beastly delight like an ill weed spreadeth it selfe in mans mind till it ouergrow all goodnesse and so taketh away the vse of reason as it depriueth him of the qualitie proper to man and draweth him into the pure qualitie of vnreasonable creatures which how grieuous and hatefull a thing it is neede not be declared Aristotle resembleth them to wilde young Stiers that must be tamed with the yoke But to shew you how this disordinate or tickling itch of delight proceedeth in this sort it is wheras man is composed of two principall parts the body and the soule or mind the latter to rule and commaund the former to obey and serue They which propose to them their delight and pleasure onely take a cleane contrary course making the body to commaund and rule and the minde to serue and obey And as in a houshold or family al wold go to wrack if the master or father of the family being prudent and carefull should be constrained to obey his sonne or seruant who were foolish and negligent euen so must it of necessitie be in him that by vice maketh his mind subiect to the bodie making it serue onely for the delighting thereof and neglecting that which he should most earnestly study to maintaine and cherish whence cometh as Socrates saith all euill and ruines among men For from these disordinate pleasures which spring from the senses of the body through that power which the facultie of the soule ministreth vnto them do all wicked affections take their beginning as angers furies fond loues hatreds ambitions lustes suspicions ielousies ill speaking backbiting false ioyes and true griefes and finally the consuming of the body and goods and the losse of honor and reputation And oftentimes it is seene that whiles a man spareth nothing so as he may purchase the fulfilling of his appetites how vnruly soeuer they be he looseth by infirmitie or other vnhappie accidents his owne bodie for whose pleasures he so earnestly trauelled For so it is writtē of Epicurus who being growne ful of sicknes through his disordinate life died miserably tormented with pains griefes the like wherof we may daily see in many if we consider their life and end In respect hereof some wise men haue thought that pleasures are not in any wise to be accounted among the goods that are requisite for the attaining of humane felicitie and Antisthenes so hated them that he wished he might rather become mad then to be ouer mastered by his sensuall delight And in very deed they are no otherwise to be esteemed then mad men who set their delights and pleasures before them as their end not caring what they do so as they may compasse the same Plato therfore not without good cause said that pleasure was the baite which allured men to all euil And Architas the Tarentine was of opinion that the pestilence was a lesser euill among men then pleasure of the bodie from whence came trecheries and betraying of countries destructions of common-weales murders rapes adulteries and all other euils euen as from a spring or fountain The cause whereof Pythagoras desiring to find out said that delight first crept into cities then satietie next violence and lastly the ruine and ouerthrow of the Common-wealth And to this opinion Tullie in his first booke of Lawes seemeth to leane where he sayth that this counterfetter of goodnesse and mother of all euils meaning pleasure intruding her selfe into our senses suffered vs not to discerne those goods which are naturall and true goods indeed and cary not with them such a scabbe and itch which pleasure euermore hath about her who finally is the roote of those principall passions from which as from the maine roote all the rest do spring as hope and feare sorrow and gladnesse For we receiue not any pleasure but that some molestation hath opened the way for it into our mindes as no man taketh pleasure to eate vntill the molestation of hunger call him thereunto nor yet to drinke if the annoyance of thirst go not before to shew that the vnnoblest and basest power of the minde must
may I say of my selfe that am tied to declare to you in our lāguage inferior much to the Italian al that he hath set downe touching the same Sure it is that if I were able to set before the eyes of your mindes a liuely image of this excellent end you wold be so delighted therewith that in regard thereof you would contemne and set light by all other pleasures in the world But howsoeuer my vtterance be which I will do my best to fit as wel as I can to so high a subiect you shall heare what he in substance saith therupon and I assure my self that the quality of the matter will easily supply whatsoeuer defect you may find in my phrase or maner of speech You are therefore to vnderstand that as they whose iudgements are corrupted and minds informed with an il habite to make them liue after the maner before mentioned do swarue frō the nature of man so much as they become like brute beasts or insensible plants voide of reason euen so are they among men as diuine creatures who apply themselues to liue according to reason And such haue aunciently bin called Heroes because they approched in their actions neerer to God then others that liued not so For they put all their endeuours to adorne and set foorth that part of man which maketh him like vnto the diuine nature or rather partaker of the same teacheth him what is good comely honest and honorable and inuiteth him continually to that which may conduct him to the highest and supreme good This part is the minde with the vse of reason proceeding from it as from a roote But because two speciall offices appertaine to the vse of reason so farre foorth as serueth to this purpose the one contemplation and the other action Touching the first it raiseth vs by the means of Arts and sciences which purge the minde from base and corrupt affections to the knowledge of those things that are vnchangeable and still remaine the same howsoeuer the heauens turne time runne on or fortune or any other cause rule things subiect vnto them By means of which sciences the minde climbing by degrees vp to the eternall causes considereth the order maner wherewith things are knit together linked in a perpetual bād And thence it comprehendeth the forme of regiment which the Creator and mouer of all things vseth in the maintaining and keeping them euerlastingly in their seuerall offices and duties And out of the consideration hereof we learne that he that directeth not his course of gouernment by this rule as neere as he can to guide himselfe his family and the Common-wealth can seldome or neuer attaine a good and happie end Wherefore he draweth the celestiall gouernement to the vse of humane and ciuill things so farre as mans frailtie will permit As Socrates did who was said to haue drawne Philosophie from heauen to the earth to reforme the life and māners of men Thus turning himselfe to the knowledge of his owne nature and finding that he is composed of three seuerall natures whereof ech hath her seuerall end yet seeketh he to draw the ends of the two lesse perfect to the end of that which is most perfect and proper to him But finding that continuall contemplation of higher things would be profitable onely to himself and to none other in that he should thereby purchase no happinesse to any but to himselfe And because he knoweth that he is not borne to himselfe alone but to ciuill societie and conuersation and to the good of others as well as of himselfe he therefore doth his endeuour with all care and diligence so to cary himselfe in words and in deeds as he might be a patterne and example to others of seemly and vertuous speeches and honest actions and do them all the good he could in reducing them to a good and commendable forme of life For the performance whereof he perceiueth how requisite it is that honestie and vertue be so vnited with profite and pleasure that by a iust and equall temper of them both himselfe and others may attaine that end which is the summum bonum and the thing wherupon all our discourse hath bin grounded This end is not to be attained but by the meanes of morall vertues which are the perfection of the minde setled habits in ruling the appetite which ariseth out of the vnreasonable parts of the soule for vertues are grounded in those parts which are without reason but yet are apt to be ruled by reason He therefore seeing morall vertues are not gotten by knowing onely what they be but through the long practise of many vertuous operations whereby they fasten themselues so to the mind as being conuerted once into an habite it is very hard afterwards to lose the same euen as of vicious actions on the other side the like ensueth therefore with all carefulnesse and diligence possible he laboreth to embrace the one and to eschue the other euermore striuing to hold himselfe in the meane and to auoide the approching of the extremes to which profite and delight vnder deceitful maskes of good would entise and allure him I pray you said Captain Norreis tel vs since you say that vertue is in the mids betweene two extremes whether that meane you speake of wherin vertue sits be so equally in the midst as the extremes which be vicious be alike distant from the same or no No said I they are not in that manner equidistant for oftentimes vertue approcheth neerer to one of the extremes then to the other As for example Fortitude which consisteth in a meane betweene fearefulnesse and foole-hardinesse hath yet a neerer resemblance to foole-hardinesse then to cowardise and consequently is not alike distant from them both and is in this manner to be vnderstood that albeit vertue consist in a meane between two extremes whereof the one is a defect and the other a superabundance yet she is neither of them both as by our example of Fortitude appeereth which is neither foole-hardines nor yet cowardise but onely a commendable meane or temper betweene them both And therfore Aristotle said right well that the meane of vertue betweene two extremes was a Geometricall meane which hath a respect to proportion and not an Arithmeticall meane which respecteth equall distance so as you must vnderstand that vertue is not called a meane betweene two extremes because she participateth of either of them both but because she is neither the one nor the other And why said Captaine Norreis is the Geometricall proportion rather to be obserued therein then the Arithmeticall Because said I though vertues are in the meane yet do they bend oftentimes towards one of the extremes more then to the other as hath bin said already and by proportion Geometricall they are in the middest which by Arithmeticall would not be so For thereby they must be in the iust middest and equally distant from both the extremes As for example let vs
suppose 6. to be the meane betweene 4. and 8 for 6. hath two more then 4 and so hath it two lesse then 8 and in respect of it selfe standeth iust in the midst betweene 4. and 8 and equally distant from them both And this is your Arithmetical meane But the Geometrical proportiō is after another maner For suppose 2. and 8. to be the extremes and 4. to be the mean here you see that 2. 4. haue a double proportion and so hath 4. and 8. the one to the other and so 4. participateth of that double proportion as well with 8. as with 2 and yet is neerer to 2. then to 8 which it doth likewise in another respect for if the two extremes be multiplied together as 2. with 8. they make 16 and so much doth 4. likewise being multiplied in it self for foure times 4. makes 16. And thus you see what difference is betweene Geometricall and Arithmeticall proportion Now though euery vertue haue peculiar extremes betweene which it is placed yet Philosophers say that they consist all generally about matter of pleasure or the contrary How can that be said M. Dormer when you haue told vs already that vertue is not pleasure It is said I one thing to say vertue is pleasure and an other to say that it consisteth in matter of pleasure or annoyance And true it is that pleasure is not the matter of vertue neither meant I so to say but onely that vertue is busied about these two passions of pleasure and displeasure whereof the fittest example may be taken from temperance For as the temperate man embraceth the delight of the mind so taketh he pleasure to abstaine from the vnseemely delights of the body And contrariwise the intemperate man is sad because he hath them not Well said M. Dormer that matter is soone answered but because I haue heard the Stoikes were of opinion that vertue was true felicitie and that Plotinus said that a man endued with vertue was sufficiētly furnished for his felicitie as being possessed of all the good that could be among men I pray you what is your authors opinion in that point If I well remember quoth I it is a good while sithens I told you that mans felicitie is attained by vertue but that vertue is his felicitie that saith not mine author And sure the opinion of Aristotle is better in that matter then that of the Stoikes For reason it selfe telleth vs that those things which are ordained to an end cannot be the end it selfe to which they be ordained And since vertues are ordained for the attaining of mans felicitie which is as hath bin sayd a perfect action according to vertue in a perfect life It is plaine that vertue cannot be felicitie though he that is vertuous approcheth neere to his felicitie You say true sayd M. Dormer I remember you expounded the clause of a perfect life to be intended a long life yet the same Stoikes held that a yong man might be happie alledging felicitie was not to be measured by quantitie but by qualitie and that not length of time but perfection onely is to be respected which they say may be as well in a yong man as in an old And they giue the example of hunger and thirst for suppose say they that two hungry or thirstie folke be called to eate or to drink and the one to asswage his hunger or thirst be satisfied with a little and the other require much meate or drink to be satiated yet is he as well satisfied with the little whose nature requireth little as he that requireth a great deale euen so say they in humane felicitie the length of time or number of yeeres is not to be respected but happinesse it selfe and as happie is the young man who in a few yeeres hath attained his felicitie as the olde man that hath bin many yeeres about it For Plotinus saith that the happie man cannot reckon vpon the yeeres past of his felicitie but onely on the present The Stoikes held strange opinions sayd I in many things But if experience be needfull as hath bin formerly sayd and many actions to make an habite in vertue so as a man may by custome be brought to that passe as he shall not do any thing but according to vertue then is length of life necessary for the attaining of vertue which must first be gotten before a man can hope for any felicitie Moreouer if Prudence be the very knot and band of all the morall vertues and that the young man cannot be prudent how can he then haue perfect vertue Wherfore the diffinitiō of humane felicitie to be a perfect operation according to vertue hath need of this addition in a perfect life which must be long and haue a happie end For though a man haue runne through many yeeres in continuall prosperitie and afterwards fall into grieuous calamitie though he cannot be thereby made miserable which vice onely and not aduersitie may bring him vnto yet may he not be rightly intitled happie Youth therfore hath this defect in it that albeit man be the subiect of felicitie yet a yong man cannot be properly and actually the subiect thereof and the child much lesse because he is furder off from prudence and because neither of them can haue either perfect life or perfect vertue And as for the opinion of Plotinus he as a Platonike considered the soule simple and pure freed from the other two powers that are rebellious to reason and meant him onely to be happie who separating the vertues of the mind from the senses from worldly delights and concupiscences did so interne himselfe with his thoughts in the contemplation of his Creator as he despiseth riches dignities and honors with all transitorie and fraile commodities still looking to that good which is the highest and perfectest among all goods which is God Omnipotent And this he called the chiefe action of the vnderstanding and highest felicitie And because he supposed that the mind should neuer depart from that action he sayd that the time past was not to be accounted of in mans felicitie By which it may appeere that he spake not in that place of humane or ciuil felicitie wherof our discourse is now according to Aristotles opinion neither doth the authoritie of Plotinus help the Stoikes any whit at al whose opinion is in that point to be reiected Since we are resolued said Capt. Carleil that vertues are but the meane to purchase felicitie and not felicitie it selfe we would be glad to heare you declare how many they are and of what qualitie that we may know them and make our selues happie by the purchase of them To answer you to this question said I according as I find the matter set downe by mine author wold perhaps not satisfie you so fully as you would desire or I could wish for that in my opinion he hath treated of some of these morall vertues somewhat too briefly and confusedly I haue
of our maker and the Creator of all things we may plainely discerne that whatsoeuer is here among vs on earth is but smoke and dust and that to be euen glutted with all the good that this life can affoord is but a possession of smoke and a shadow of the true good which is aboue And so knowing that the mind is the true man giuen vnto vs of speciall grace to guide the body we may turne our selues to that happinesse which maketh vs immortal by raising the mind to the height of that heauenly felicitie the sweetnesse and delight whereof is so much greater then that of humane felicitie though without this the other cannot be as the habit of that excellent power of the vertue intellectiue is employed about a more noble obiect then that which the vertue actiue doth intend For it is euermore busied about things eternall and vniuersal and about the contemplation of the most high and gracious God Of this excellent degree of felicitie hath Aristotle spoken in his first and tenth books of Ethikes declaring how it ought to be the finall end of all our operations and hath attributed this excellent kind of faculty to those men only who are properly called Sages or wise men because they by the meanes of actions and of sciences finding that these mortall things are not able to bring a man to full and perfect happinesse do so raise themselues from these baser cogitations as they apply their mind and vnderstanding wholy to the knowledge of diuine essences And such men saith he as haue attained that degree are rather to be esteemed diuine then humane For whiles they liue in contemplation they are not like men liuing among men composed of body and soule but as diuine creatures freed from mortall affections arising from the body and bent onely to that which may purchase the neuer-ending felicitie of the soule which according to Plato and Aristotle is the true man And to this opinion did our Sauiour Christ who is the infallible veritie giue authoritie and confirmation when he said that we ought to haue such care of that soule which is in vs according to the image of God that we should esteeme nothing how great or precious soeuer the world esteemed it at so high a rate as for the purchasing thereof we should hurt or loose the same for his words are What auaileth it a man to gaine all the world and loose his owne soule By this opinion of these two Philosophers we may plainly vnderstand that euen in that darknesse of auncient superstition God had yet giuen such light of reason to the mindes of men to illumine them withall that they saw how through sciences and wisedome they were to seeke the way that should leade them to their perfect felicitie that is to God Almightie himselfe who is such an end as no other end can be supposed beyond him but to him all other ends are directed as to the true and most happie terme bound or limit of all vertues and vertuous actions and of ciuill felicitie it selfe But because that diuine part of the Intellectiue soule which is in vs is to haue consideration not onely of our present state of life but also to that eternitie wherein our immortall mindes made to the likenesse of God are to liue with him eternally Therfore did Aristotle fitly teach that men ought to bend and frame their minds wholy to that true and absolute end for that the minde being diuine it is his proper office to seeke to vnite it selfe to his first principle or beginning which is God Neither hath his diuine Maiestie of his aboundant grace bestowed the vertue intellectiue vpon man to any other end then that he might know it to be his speciall dutie to raise himselfe to him as to the author and free giuer of all goodnesse and as he hath bestowed on him a soule made to his own likenes so he should therewith bend his endeuour to be like him in all his actions as farre as the corruption contracted by the communion of the bodie will permit Which thing the Platonikes considering haue spoken much more largely thereof then Aristotle following therein the steps of their master But some will say that Aristotle spake the lesse thereof thinking that the soule of man euen concerning the vnderstanding was not immortall because it seemeth to them that when the soule hath no more the senses of the bodie to serue her as instruments whereby she vnderstandeth and knoweth she should no longer liue For since nature cannot suffer any thing to be idle in the world and the soule wanting the bodie can haue no operation therefore they thinke it is to be concluded that with the bodie she must needs fall and die for that if she should happen to remaine after she were separated from the bodie yet she should not haue any operation insomuch as hauing the vnderstanding for her proper operatiō and seeing she cannot vnderstand but by the ministery of the senses from which she can haue no helpe when she is loosed from the bodie it followeth that she hath no operation and then must she be idle in nature which is in no sort to be allowed But my author as afore is said doth thinke that these men mistake Aristotle not considering that he speaking as a natural Philosopher of the soule was not to treate thereof but naturally and in so doing was to restraine himselfe within the bounds of nature according to which he is not to consider any forme separate from the matter from which we as all other natural things haue our bodies This Aristotle considering and knowing that as a natural Philosopher he was not to speake of the Intellectiue soule said that vnderstanding being separated from the other powers of the minde as a thing eternall seuered from the corruptible part it appertained not to him to treate thereof in that place where he spake of the soule as she was the actor of the bodie and vsed it as her instrument For he saw wel inough that though the vnderstanding tooke beginning with the bodie because it was the forme thereof yet was it not the actor of the body so as it should vse any member thereof as an instrument but was onely aforme that was to exercise all the other powers of the other soules For it is likewise Aristotles opinion that where the vnderstanding is in things corruptible there hath it also the faculties of all the other soules within it selfe Which thing he shewed more cleerely in his first booke de Partibus Animalium saying that to speake of the Intellectiue soule all that might be sayd was not the office of a naturall Philosopher And this for two reasons The one is that the Intellectiue soule is no actor of the bodie because she hath in her no part of motion either of her selfe or accidentally For she neither increaseth nor diminisheth the bodie she nourisheth it not nor maintaineth it for these are functions appertaining
to the vegetatiue soule shee chaungeth it not nor mooueth it from place to place for that is the office of the sensitiue soule and these be the motions which the bodie can haue from the soule sauing generation and corruption which are changes made in an instant therefore inasmuch as she is intellectiue she is not subiect to the consideration of the naturall Philosopher The other reason is for that the naturall Philosopher considereth not the substances separated from the matter and therefore his office is not to consider the excellencie of the Intellectiue soule which is not the actor of the bodie though she be the forme thereof And therefore Aristotle telleth vs in his second booke of Physikes that the terme or bound of the naturall Philosphers consideration is the Intellectiue soule For albeit he may consider the soule so farre as she moueth and is not moued as he may also the first mouer yet doth he not consider her essence nor the essence of the first mouer for this appertaineth to the Metaphysike who considereth of the substances separated and immortall And hence commeth it that Aristotle treating in his booke of Physikes of nature as she is the beginning of all mouings and of rest when he is come to the first mouer who is immoueable yet moueth all that is moued in the world proceeded not any further to shew his nature vnderstanding right well that the naturall Philosophers office was not to consider any thing that is simply immoueable as well in respect of the whole as of the parts as the first mouer is But let vs without questioning further thereupon hold this for certaine not onely by that which Christian Religion teacheth vs but also by that which Aristotle hath held that our soules are immorall For if it were otherwise we should be of all other creatures that nature produceth the most vnhappie and in vaine should that desire of immortalitie which all men haue be giuen vnto vs. Besides that man as man that is to say as a creature intellectiue should not haue that end which is ordained for him which is contemplatiue felicitie Neither is it to the purpose to say that such felicitie is not attained by morall vertues but by wisedome only or that there be but few so wise as to seek this excellent felicitie and infinite the number of those that thinke but little vpon it for all men are borne apt vnto it if they will apply their minds vnto the same And though among all generations of men there should be but three or foure that bent their endeuour to attaine it they onely were sufficient to proue our intention because it is most certaine that the number of foolish men is infinite who not knowing themselues cannot tell how to vse themselues direct their endeuours to that which is the proper end of man Of whom it is said People on whom night commeth before Sunne-set A wicked generation whose whole life-time flieth from them vnprofitably in such sort as they can scarce perceiue that they haue liued For although there be infinitely more such in this world then of quicke and eleuated spirits yet ought not we to endure that their negligence who know not themselues to be men should preiudice the mindes of such as know what they are and raise their thoughts carefully to diuine things And therefore leauing their opinions that will needs say that Aristole impiously and madly hath held the contrary it shall be best to proceed in our discourse of the felicitie that is to be attained by contemplation I pray you said Captaine Carleil since there is a contrarietie of opinions amōg Philosophers concerning the immortalitie of the soule and that the knowledge therof appertaineth to the better vnderstanding of this contemplatiue felicitie let vs heare if your author giue any furder light thereunto since such good fellowes seeke to cast so darke a mist before our eyes vnder the cloke of Aristotles opinion For albeit you spake somewhat of it yesterday so farre as concerned our maner of learning according to Aristotle yet was it but by the way and not as it concerned this felicitie and if such a matter as this were twise repeated it could not but be profitable to vs though it be somewhat troublesome to you Whereupon I said that which my author was not willing to vndertake you presse me vnto as if you were the same persons and had the same sence that those introduced by him had and therefore since you also will haue it so I am content to close vp this your feast with this last dish notwithstanding that the euening draw on and that to speake thereof at large would aske a long time But knitting vp as well as I can a great volume in a little roome I will deliuer vnto you that which the shortnesse of our time wil permit and pray with mine author his diuine Maiestie who hath giuen vs an immortall soule that he wil vouchsafe vs his grace to say so much and no more of this matter as may be to his glory and to all our comforts Know ye then that these men that out of Aristotles writings gather our intellectiue soule to be mortall take for their foundation and ground this that the soule is the actor of the bodie and vseth it but after the maner before mentioned And to maintaine this their opinion they wrest diuers places of his vntruly and contrary to the mind of this great Philosopher as shall be declared vnto you True it is that while the intellectiue soule is the forme of the body she hath some need of him to vnderstand For without the fantasie we can vnderstand nothing in this life since from the senses the formes of all things are represented vnto vs as yesterday was declared And this did Aristotle meane to teach vs when contrary to the opinion of some former Philosophers he said that sense and vnderstanding was not all one although there be some similitude betweene them And because the essences of things are knowne by their operations according to Aristotle and that the intellectiue soule vnderstandeth which is a spiritual operatiō it followeth that simply of her owne nature she is all spirit and therefore immortall for else to vnderstand would not be her propertie Whereunto also Aristotle agreeth in saying that some parts of the soule are not conioyned to the bodie and therefore are separable and that the vnderstanding and the cōtemplatiue power was another kind of soule and not drawne from the power of matter as the other two are whose operations were ordained for the Intellectiue soule insomuch as she is the forme of the bodie which sheweth plainely that she is eternall and immortall And in the twelfth of his Metaphysikes making a doubt whether any forme remaine after the extinguishing of the matter he sayd doubtfully of the other two that not euery soule but the Intellectiue onely remained And here is to be noted that his opinion was not though some
whereby it is offended and cannot performe his office towards the other but runneth into such inconueniences by reason of his infirmity and for want of reasons direction And whereas Hippocrates saith that they that being sicke in minde and touched with anie corporall disease haue little or no feeling of paine it sheweth plainely that it is as I haue said For if you marke it well this word feele explaneth the whole since feeling is a propertie of the Sensitiue soule and the vnderstanding feeleth not And in like manner are the words of Aristotle to be vnderstood where he saith that such whose flesh is soft are apt to learne and they that are melancholy to be wise For that the Sensitiue vertue taketh more easily the formes or kindes of things in such subiects according to their nature and representeth them to the vnderstāding from whence knowledge and vnderstanding proceedeth as yesterday was sayd And this happeneth not onely in these passions but also in all other alterations as of gladnesse of sorow of hope and of feare with such like which appertaine not to the vnderstanding to which sayd Aristotle who would ascribe such affects might as well say that the vnderstanding layed bricke to build or cast a loome to weaue Why say M. Spencer doth your author meane as some haue not sticked euen in our dayes to affirme that there are in vs two seuerall soules the one sensitiue and mortall and the other Intellectiue and Diuine Nothing lesse said I for that I hold were manifest heresie as well in Philosophie as in Christianitie For Aristotle teacheth vs that the Vegetatiue and Sensitiue soule or their powers were in the soule Intellectiue as the triangle is in the square which could not be if the sensitiue were separated from the Intellectiue And speaking of the varietie of soules and of their powers he sayth that the Sensitiue could not be without the Vegetatiue but that this latter might well be without the former and that all the other vertues of all the three soules are in those creatures that haue reason and vnderstanding It cannot therefore be sayd according to Aristotle that the Sensitiue soule in man is seuered from the Intellectiue And because man participateth as hath bene sayd of all the three faculties of the soules I see not why these fellowes that mention two speake not of all three as well seeing that in man are the operations of all three For if they say that it sufficeth to speake of the Sensitiue by which man is a liuing creature and containeth the Vegetatiue why should they not as well say that the Intellectiue alone includeth both the other and then is there no need of seuering at all By which it may appeere that this frantike opinion gathered from the Assirians is not onely contrary to Aristotle but to reason it selfe For Aristotle saith that all things haue their being from their formes and that in naturall things the more perfect containe the lesse perfect when the lesser is ordained for the more and that therefore onely the Intellectiue soule which containeth within it the natures of both the others is the onely and true forme of man malgre all such dolts as would haue man to be by reason of diuers formes both a brute and a reasonable creature who seeke to set men astray from the right way with such fanaticall deuices Let vs therefore conclude with Aristotle that both the passible and the possible vnderstandings are vertues of the Intellectiue soule insomuch as she is the particular and proper forme of euery man and that as a humane soule she is euerlasting impassible not mingled with the bodie but seuered from the same simple and diuine not drawne from any power of matter but infused into vs from abroade not ingendred by seede which being once freed from the bodie because nature admitteth nothing that is idle is altogether bent and intent to contemplation being then as Philosophers call it actus purus a pure vnderstanding not needing the bodie either as an obiect or as a subiect In consideration whereof Aristotle sayd that man through contemplation became diuine and that the true man which both he and his diuine master agreed to be the minde did enioy thereby not as a mortall man liuing in the world but as a diuine creature that high felicitie to which ciuill felicitie was ordained and attained to wisedome science after the exercise of the morall vertues as meanes to guide and conduct him to the same And not impertinently haue the Platonikes following their master in that point sayd that nature had giuen vs sense not because we should stay thereupon but to the end that thereby might grow in vs imagination from imagination discourse from discourse intelligence and from intelligence gladnesse vnspeakable which might raise vs as diuine and freed from the bands of the flesh to the knowledge of God who is the beginning and the end of all goodnesse towards whom we ought with all endeuour to lift vp our minds as to our chiefe and most perfect good for he onely is our summum bonum For to them it seemed that the man whom contemplation had raised to such a degree of felicitie became all wholy vnderstanding by that light which God imparteth to the spirits that are so purged through the exercise of morall vertues which vertues are termed by Plato the purgers of the mind stirring vp therein a most ardent desire to forsake this mortall bodie and to vnite it selfe with him And this is that contemplation of death which the Philosophie of Plato calleth vs vnto For he that is come to this degree of perfection is as dead to the world and worldly pleasures because he considereth that God is the center of al perfections that about him al our thoughts desires are to be turned employed Such doth God draw vnto himselfe and afterwards maketh them partakers of his ioyes euerlasting giuing them in the meane while a most sweet tast euen in this life of that other life most happie and those exceeding delights beyond which no desire can extend nor yet reach vnto the same So as being full of this excellent felicitie they thinke euery minute of an houre to be a long time that debarreth them from issuing out of this mortall prison to returne into their heauenly countrey where with that vertue which is proper to the soule alone they may among the blessed spirits enioy their maker whose Maiestie and power all the parts of the world declare the heauens the earth the sea the day the night whereat the infernall spirits tremble and shake euen as good men on earth bow downe and worship the same with continuall himnes and praises and in heauen no lesse all the orders and blessed companie of Saints and Angels do the like world without end This loe is as much as mine author hath discoursed vpon this subiect which I haue Englished for my exercise in both languages and haue at your intreaties communicated vnto you I will not say being betrayed by M. Spencer but surely cunningly thrust in to take vp this taske whereby he might shift himselfe from that trouble But howsoeuer it be if it haue liked you as it is I shall thinke my time well spent both in the translating of it at the first and in the relating of it vpon this occasion in this manner For as I sayd before I began that I would not tye my selfe to the strict lawes of an interpreter so haue I in some places omitted here and there haply some sentences without which this our Discourse might be complete enough because they are rather points of subtiller inuestigation then our speech required though the Author therein perhaps aymed at the commendation of a great reader or absolute Philosopher and in the descriptions of some of the morall vertues added somewhat out of others And what hath beene sayd concerning ciuill felicitie by him and deliuered in substance by me I thinke you will allow to be sufficient Since therefore my taske is done and that it groweth late with this onely petition that you will be content to beare with the roughnesse of my speech in reporting that vnto you which in his language our Author hath eloquently set downe I end Here all the companie arose and giuing me great thankes seemed to rest very well satisfied as well with the manner as with the matter at the least so of their courtesie they protested And taking their leaues departed towards the Citie FINIS ERRATA PAge 12. line 17. climbing pag. 16. lin 32 auoyde pag. 68. lin 14. speake of pag. 81. lin 4. meere pag. 82. lin 1. Politikes pag. 95. lin 10. men pag. 109. lin 15. Dioxippus pag. 140. lin 15. leaue out to pag. 143. lin 13. supposing that c pag. 145. lin 6. their marching pag. eadē lin 7. they neuer went pag. 163. lin 17. flow pag. 164. lin 4. determine pag. 168. lin 25. hath man pag. 173. lin 9. Platonikes pag. 199. lin 17. leaue out to pag. ib. lin 18. leaue out vvhich pag. 216. lin 5. make shew of pag. ibid. lin 18. that she be Pag. 238. lin 14. himselfe
to liue among men These how faire soeuer be they children or men that cary one thing in their tongue and another in their heart be they that deserue to be hunted out of all ciuill societie that are ingrate for benefites receiued who hurt or seeke to hurt them that haue done them good and hate them onely because they cannot but know themselues to be bound vnto them These be they that in very truth are crooked mis-shapen and monstrous and might well be condemned to be buried quicke not simple innocent babes who hauing no election can yeeld not tokens either of good or euill against whom to pronounce sentence of death before they haue offended is great iniustice and exceeding crueltie And this loe is the sentence of this author touching the doubt proposed wherein if you rest satisfied I will proceede All the companie assented to the same and then Master Dormer said Now then I pray you let vs heare you declare what this end is whereof you were discoursing when this doubt was proposed and withall we must expect that you shall shew vs and set vs in the way wherein we are to trauel for the attaining thereof and giue vs precepts whereby that perfection may be purchased vnto which all men desirous to become happie in this life direct their actions and their endeuours Of this expectation quoth I you need not feare to be frustrated for here shall you haue enough I assure my selfe to fulfill your desire and therewith perusing my papers I thus followed The end of man in this life is happinesse or felicitie and an end it is called as before was said because all vertuous actions are directed thereunto and because for it chiefly man laboureth and trauelleth in this world But for that this felicitie is found to be of two kinds wherof one is called ciuill and the other contemplatiue you shall vnderstand that the ciuill felicitie is nothing else then a perfect operation of the mind proceeding of excellent vertue in a perfect life and is atchieued by the temper of reason ruling the disordinate affects stirred vp in vs by the vnreasonable parts of the mind as when the time shall serue will be declared and guiding vs by the meane of vertue to happy life The other which is called contemplation or contemplatiue felicitie is likewise an operation of the mind but of that part thereof which is called intellectiue so that those parts which are void of reasō haue no intermedling with the same for he which giueth himselfe to follow this felicitie suppresseth all his passions and abandoning all earthly cares bendeth his studies and his thoughts wholy vnto heauenly things and kindled and inflamed with diuine loue laboureth to enioy that vnspeakable beauty which hath bin the cause so to inflame him and to raise his thoughts to so high a pitch But forasmuch as our purpose is now to intreate onely of the humane precepts and instructions and of that highest good which in this vale of misery may be obtained ye shall vnderstand that the end whereunto man ought to direct all his actions is properly that ciuill felicitie before mentioned which is an inward reward for morall vertues and wherein fortune can chalenge no part or interest at all And this end is so peculiar to reason that not onely vnreasonable creatures can be no partakers thereof but yong children also are excluded from the same For albeit they be naturally capable of reason yet haue they no vse of her through the imperfection of their yong age because this end being to be attained by perfect operations in a perfect life neither of which the child nor the yong man is able to performe it followeth that neither of them can be accounted happie And by the same reason it commeth to passe that though man be the subiect of felicitie yet neither the child nor the yong man may be said properly to be the subiect therof but in power and possibilitie only yet the yong man approcheth nearer thereunto then the child And thus much may suffice for a beginning to satisfie the first part of your demaund Then said Captaine Carleil seeing you haue proposed to vs this end which is the marke as it were whereat all ciuill actions do leuel as at their highest or chiefest good we will now be attentiue to heare the rest and how you will prescribe a man to order his life so as from his childhood and so forward from age to age he may direct his thoughts and studies to the compassing of this good or summum bonum as Philosophers do terme it That shal you also vnderstand quoth I but then must the discourse thereof be drawne from a deeper consideration Those men that haue established lawes for people to be ruled by ought to haue framed some among the rest for the foundation of mans life by which a true and certaine forme of life might be conceiued and such as beginning to leade him from his childhood might haue serued him for a guide vntill he had attained to those riper yeares wherein he might rather haue bin able to instruct others then need to be himselfe instructed For the foundation of honest and vertuous liuing beginneth euen in childhood neither shal he euer be good yong mā that in his childhood is naught nor a wicked yong man lightly proue good when he is old For such as are the principles and beginnings of things such are the proceedings Whereupon the wisest men of the world haue euer thought that the way to haue cities and common-wealths furnished with vertuous and ciuil men consisted in the bringing vp of childrē commendably But among all the lawes of our time there is no one that treateth of any such matter There are orders and lawes both vniuersall and particular how to determine causes of controuersie to end strifes and debates and how to punish malefactors but there is no part in the whole body of the law that setteth downe any order in a thing of so great importance Yet Plato held it of such moment as knowing that the well bringing vp of children was the spring or wel-head of honest life he thought it not sufficient that the fathers onely should take care of nurturing their children but appointed besides publike magistrates in the common-wealth who should attend that matter as a thing most necessary For though man be framed by nature mild and gentle yet if he be not from the beginning diligently instructed and taught he becometh of humane and benigne that he was more fierce and cruell then the most wild and sauage beast of the field Wheras if he be conueniently brought vp and directed to a commendable course of life of benigne and humane that he is he becometh through vertue in a sort diuine And to the end the cause may be the better knowne why so great diligence is needful and requisite you must vnderstand that although our soule be but one in substance and properly our true forme yet