true that our Precise and Formal Notion of the Body as it is precisely a Thing or Capable of Existing is not the Notion of Space which is a Mode of the Thing But why must it therefore be Nothing of Body when 't is evidently one kind of Conception or Consideration of it that is when 't is nothing but Body as grounding the Notion of Space In a word Since Space is not of it self A Thing or Res it must and can only be Modus Rei and therefore to Fancy an Idea of it which excludes Body is to make it a Mode of Nothing and consequently no Mode which is to destroy the Notion of Space while he goes about to refine it This for the present till we come to reflect farther upon that Tenet in its proper Place PRELIMINARY Fourth Of the Particular Manner how all sorts of Notions are bred in us and by what way those Elements of Knowledge do first come into the Soul 1. THE former Grounds being laid shewing what Knowledge is and in what it consists the next thing that comes to be consider'd is to shew in particular the Manner how we come to know at first or by what Connatural Steps the Things or which is the same our Notions of them which are the Materials of Knowledge are introduced into our Minds And let it be noted that it is not my Intention here to shew what compleat Knowledges or Judgments are in our Soul before others in Priority of Nature which I have already done in my Method Book 2. Lesson 4. What I aim at here is to acquaint the Reader very particularly with my Thoughts how our Mind comes first to be imbu'd with both Direct and Reflex Notions which are the Elements or Materials of which our Compleat Knowledges or Judgments are compounded 2. The Difficulty of conceiving how Corporeal Things that are without us could get into our Soul which is Spiritual and affect it was so puzzling to the Greatest Philosophers hitherto that it has made them rack their best Wits to invent some congruous Way how this could be performed Aristotle who ought to have done this since he advanced that Position above-mentioned which required it should be done gives us no particular Account of it but being resolved it seems to follow the sullen Principle he had taken up viz. Acroases ita esse edendas ut non sint editae left it to Posterity to find it out Which affected Humour of his whether it proceeded from Envy of Knowledge to the World an unpardonable Fault in a Professor of Knowledge or from Vanity or out of Policy to bring more Scholars to his walking School has certainly brought much Disparagement to his Doctrine hindred its Currency and help'd forward by the Schools who undertook to explicate him and did it untowardly has pester'd the World with diverse Schemes of Philosophy either newly invented or furbish'd up afresh Whether he did explain after what manner we come to know to his Scholars I know not only it may seem wonderful if he had done it that none of them should have deliver'd it down to us But letting Aristotle alone with his Faults which blemish'd his other great Vertues and come to the other Philosophers since his time 3. These Learned Men saw clearly that all Corporeal Agents work by Local Motion and that no Operation of theirs could be transacted without such Motion at least accompanying all their Actions they being all of them Successive or Quantitative and they could not conceive how Local Motion should be received or wrought in a Soul whose Nature it being Spiritual is incapable of it For it must as the very Notion of it imports be made first in one part of the Subject afterwards in another which can with no Sense be apply'd to the Soul which it being Indivisible has no Parts at all They were not so well skill'd in Metaphysicks as to reflect that it was very congruous to Reason to affirm That the Notion or Nature of Things speaking of Created Beings did abstract from all Existence and therefore that the same thing might have different manners of Existing and be in our Soul Spiritually tho' out of it Corporeally And those few who did apprehend the thing might thus exist in the Soul when in it were still at a Nonplus how it could get into it Perhaps the Difficulty of explaining this might be one Reason why Cartesius not knowing how to give an Account of this thought fit rather to study how he might avoid giving any Account at all of it and thence recurr'd to the Position of Innate Ideas At least this is the best Excuse I can make in his behalf for embracing a Tenet so totally praeternatural in case as his Words give us just occasion to think it were really his Doctrine 4. The Schoolmen whose way it is when they are at a Plunge how to find out a Reason for any difficult Point to create some Entity which God and Nature never made and then to alledge 't was that Entity which did the business invented their Species Intentionales which if they were not the same with our Notions or the Things in our Knowledge were meer Resemblances coined by Fancy as our Modern Ideas generally are But this raised a new Difficulty instead of laying the old one For besides that those Species were such unaccountable things that none knew what to make of them or under what Head to rank them they could do the Question no Service at all For if they were Corporeal they could only affect the Soul by way of Local Motion of which being Spiritual she is not capable And if they were Spiritual it will be ask'd How they came to be such being caused by a Corporeal Agent as also how being sent from a Body they could get into the Soul or by what Vehicle Being thus at a Loss they invented another Entity called Intellectus Agens whose Office it was to depure the Phantasms from their Dross of Materiality that they might become fit thus refined to be receiv'd in the Soul But this still multiply'd more Difficulties and solv'd none For First What other Reason had they from Nature to put such a Power in the Soul Or what other thing was it good for but to purifie the Species If it had no other Office nor served for any thing but to do this Job 't is manifest 't was invented gratis to get rid of the Difficulty that stunn'd them and taken up for an Asylum Ignorantiae when they were hard put to it and wanted something else to say Secondly Were those Phantasms before they were Spiritualiz'd in the Soul or Intellectus or out of it If in it the old Question returns How got they thither If out of it How could the Soul's Acts of Understanding which are Immanent Acts become Transitive and affect a Thing which is without her Thirdly Since the Understanding or this Intellectus Agens can only work by Knowledge how
Will and consequently of its Acts of Love is an Appearing Good and the Lively Appearance of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually whence since that which breeds Pleasure in us must needs appear Lively to be a Good to us there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most Pleasant or most Agreeable to our True Nature Reason such as the best Spiritual Goods are and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best Greatest and Purest Pleasure Eternal Glory REFLEXION Twelfth ON The 21th CHAPTER 1. IN this Chapter of Power I find more to admire than confute The Author always Ingenious even when he errs has here much out done his former self Particularly his Explication of Freewill is generally speaking both Solid and Acute and his Doctrine that Liberty is consistent with a perfect Determination to Goodness and Virtue is both Learned and Pious Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method in making my Discourses Subservient and in shewing them to be Agreeable to Christian Principles 2. 'T is an excellent Thought that The Clearest Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit For Bodies can act no otherwise than as they are acted on themselves nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not Body or by some Spiritual Agent which therefore has the truest Notion of Agency in it without any Mixture of Patiency because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the Idea of Action and Passion from the Effects we see daily wrought by Natural Causes on fit Subjects yet the Clearest Idea of Action is given us by our Reason finding out that the Beginner of Corporeal Action is a Separated Spirit or pure Act and therefore not at all Passive from any other Creature nor from the Body it operates on by Reaction as is found in Corporeal Agents And our Reason gives us this Idea as it does many other Reflex ones by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be Processus in infinitum amongst Corporeal Agents nor can they of themselves alone begin to move themselves nor move one another Circularly and therefore the First Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some Pure Spirit or Angel Now Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul according to her Faculty call'd Will moving the Body gives him this clearest Idea of Active Power which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd formerly and shown that the Soul by reason of her Potential State here cannot principiate any Bodily Action nor the Man neither unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent which is in act it self 3. He Judges with good reason that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers in making every Faculty or Power a Distinct Entity has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy which humour of Multiplying Entities I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand in making the Understanding and Will to be one and the same Power and affirming that they only differ formally in Degree He shows clearly how in proper Speech the Will is not Free but the Man unless it be signified with a Reduplication that by the Word Will is meant Man according to that Power in him call'd the Will For Powers as he discourses well belong only to Agents and are Attributes only of Substances and not of the Powers themselves Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position that the Understanding and Will are the same Power Those who make them two do this because they find in the Notion of Will only a Power of Acting and not of knowing and in the Notion of Understanding only a Power of knowing and not of Acting But the same Men make the Understanding direct the Will which they call a Blind Power by which they make one of those Powers formally as such to work upon the other as if the former were an Agent and the latter a Patient I add moreover that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible for what avails it the Will to be directed by the Understanding if it does not know how the Understanding directs it And to make the Will to know is to make it a knowing Power which is to make the Will tho' they never meant it to be the Understanding Not reflecting in the mean time when our Understanding is full of any Apparent Good the Man pursues it and so becomes or has in him a Principle or Power of Acting which is what we call Will. 4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse beginning from the Principles in this affair if exprest Literally and pursu'd home by Immediate Consequences may set this whole business in a Clearer Light and show us very evidently how Man determins himself to Action and therefore is Free as also how he is Predetermin'd to determin himself than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour Which tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them yet not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand they can never be steady but are now and then liable to some Errours 5. Beginning then with the Animal part in Man and considering him barely as an Animal and wrought upon as other Animals are I discourse thus Particles agreeable to the Nature of the Animal being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain do if they be but Few lightly affect it and work no other effect but a kind of small Liking of it If more they make it as we say begin to Fancy it But if they be very many and sent from an Object very Agreeable or Good to such a Nature they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength cause naturally a Tendency towards it and powerfully excite the Spirits so as to make the Animal pursue it that is they will become such a Principle of Action which in meer Animals we call Appetite To which Action that meer Animal is not carry'd thro' Choice or Freely but is naturally and necessarily Determin'd to Act for the Attainment of that Good in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone But if we consider this Animal as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join'd to it things will be order'd after another manner For those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain even into the Soul it self which is endow'd with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions whence she gains exacter Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them Nor only so but she can reflect upon her own Operations too and know that she knows them by which means she comes acquainted with her own Nature and comes to see that Knowledge and Reason is that Nature of hers which she finds is a Nobler part of the
Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit 8. Vacuum must either be Res or Modus Rei otherwise we can have no Notion of it 9. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted 10. VVe can set Bounds to Space Time and to all Durations but God's 11. Annihilation implies a Contradiction and is not an Act of Omnipotency but of Impotency 12. The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum 13. The having an Idea of Vacuum distinct from that of Plenum no Argument to prove it Reflexion Eighth § 1. THE plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time 2. Duration is not Succession but rather Opposite to it 3. 'T is a strange Paradox to say the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Mind 4. Our not perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it 5. This Tenet is against Experience 6. And against the Nature of Things and of Resemblances too 7. One Motion if Known and Regular may and must be a Measure to another 8. There is no Shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas 9. This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. Locke Reflexion Ninth § 1. IMaginary Time before the VVorld a meer Illusion of Fancy 2. They who advance Tenets against Nature must alter the Meaning of those VVords that express our Natural Notions 3. God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space 4. VVe can have no Notion of a Vacuum but a Fancy onely 5. Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers unless they be most Plain and Literally meant 6. Onely Self-Existence and what flows from that Notion is peculiar to God 7. Our Natural Notions assure us that 't is meer Fancy to explicate God's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures Reflexion Tenth § 1. ENdless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity 2. How we come to have that Notion 3. And with what Ease 4. The Notion of Infinite is most perfectly Positive 5. Duration easily conceivable without Succession Reflexion Eleventh § 1. THoughts are not to be called Sensations § 2. Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul § 3. Mr. Locke's Position that Things are Good or Evil onely in reference to Pleasure or Pain is True and Solid Reflexion Twelfth § 1. THE due Commendation of Mr. Locke's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power 2. That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies The VVill cannot move our Bodies 3. The Understanding and VVill not Distinct Powers 4. Man's Freedom or Self-Determination deduced from Principles 5. The Difference between Men and Brutes in their Determination to Action 6. Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason or Virtuous Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation 7. Therefore Supernatural Motives are added to strengthen Man's Weaken'd Nature or Reason 8. Supernatural Motives being the Stronger would always prevail were they duely apply'd to a Subject disposed 9. Why the Understanding and VVill must be the same Power Substantially 10. How to Conquer in our Spiritual Warfare 11. 'T is evident that Man Determins himself to Action 12. Yet as Pre-determin'd by God 13. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect and not destroy Freedom 14. Good if evidently appearing such does certainly Determin the VVill. 15. How Wrong Judgments come § 16. Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments 17. Of Uneasiness and Mr. Locke's Discourse concerning it 18. Good is the onely Determiner of the Will and not Uneasiness 19. Prov'd from our Natural Defire of Happiness 20. The Appearance of Good is of Greatest Weight but in a manner disregarded by Mr. Locke 21. Putting this Appearance his Reasons do not conclude 22. Prov'd because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul 23. The Truth of this Point stated 24. Mr. Locke omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing tho' Nature suggests and forces it Reflexion Thirteenth § 1. OUR Mixture of our Notions is Regular Mr. Locke's Irregular and Disorderly 2. Without knowing what Substance or Thing is we cannot pretend to Philosophy 3. All our Notions and amongst them that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing 4. We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing 5. We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly And Individual Essence the least of all 6. To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing we must consider it abstractedly from its Modes singly Consider'd 7. The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents or the Thing and its Modes are exactly known § 8. 'T is impossible not to know Extension it being in a manner Self-evident 9. The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs and can onely be known by Metaphysicks 10. Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes 11. We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion 12. The Reason why and the Manner how Reflexion Fourteenth § 1. THE Mind alone does not collect Notions or compare them 2. Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language but for want of a Real Ground 3. What Causality is and what Grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect 4. The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity 5. What gives the Ground to specifie all Notions 6. What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum 7. How Individual Men are constituted 8. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation 9. The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essence 10. An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind and an Individual Person too § 11. The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar nor from Extravagant Suppositions 12. Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity 13. That Consciousness is Inseparable from every Individual Man 14. Yet Angels who are pure Acts are Constituted in part by the Act of Knowing themselves 15. No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter The Notion of the Individuum is Essential The Substance is the same tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go Reflexion Fifteenth § 1. THat is onely True Virtue which is according to Right Reason 2. How we come to have Confus'd Ideas or Notions 3. The VVhole Thing as it needs not so it cannot be known clearly 4. The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums should be almost infinitely Various 5. VVe can Sufficiently know Things without Comprehending fully this Complexion 6. No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions Reflexion Sixteenth § 1. WHence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and VVords have their Origin 2. The General Rules to know the Right Sense of VVords § 3. Words of Art most liable to be mistaken 4. The Way how to avoid being
nice respect The Common Explication of Extension defended Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit Vacuum must either be Res or Modus Rei otherwise we can have no Notion of it * Preliminary 4. §. 39. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted Psal. 103. v. 24. We can set Bounds to Space Time and to all Duration but GOD's Annihilation implies a Contradiction and is not an Act of Omnipotency but of Impotency The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum The having an Idea of Vacuum distinct from that of Plenum no Argument to prove it The plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time Duration is not Succession but rather opposit to it 'T is a strange Paradox to say the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Head Our not Perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it This Tenet is against Experience And against the Nature of Things and of Resemblances too One Motion if Known and Regular may and must be a Measure to another There is no shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. L. ImaginaryTime before the World a meer Illusion of Fancy They who advance Tenets against Nature must alter the Meaning of those Words that express our Natural Notions God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space We can have no Notion of a Vacuum but a Fancy only Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers unless they be most Plain and Literally meant Only Self Existence and what flows from that Notion is Peculiar to GOD. Our Natural Notions assure us that 't is meer Fancy to explicate GOD's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures Endless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity How we come to have that Notion * Prelim. 4. § 31 32. And with what Ease The Notion of Infinite is most perfectly Positive Duration easily conceivable without Succession * James 1. 17. * Apocal. cap. 1. v. 7. Thoughts are not to be call'd Sensations Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul Mr. L.'s Position that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain is True and Solid The due Commendation of Mr. L's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies The Will cannot move our Bodies * Preliminary 4. §. 25. 26. Refl 5. §. 1. The Understanding and Will not Distinct Powers Man's Freedom or Self determination deduced from Principles The Difference between Man and Brutes in their Determination to Action Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason or Virtuous Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation Therefore Supernatural Motives are added to strengthen Man's weaken'd Nature or Reason Supernatural Motives being the stronger would always prevail were they duly Apply'd to a Subject dispos'd Why the Understanding and Will must be the same Power substantially How to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare 'T is evident that Man determines himself to Action Yet as Predetermin'd by GOD. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect and not destroy Freedom Good if evidently Appearing such does certainly determine the Will How Wrong Judgments come Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments Of Uneasiness and Mr. L's discourse concerning it Good is the only Determiner of the Will and not Uneasiness Prov'd from our Natural Desire of Happiness The Appearance of the Good is of greatest weight but in a manner disregarded by Mr. Locke Putting this Appearance his Reasons do not conclude Prov'd because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul The Truth of this Point stated Mr. L. omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing tho' Nature suggests iâ— Our Mixture of our Notions is Regular Mr. L.'s Irregular and Disorderly Without knowing what Substance or Thing is we cannos pretend to Philosophy All our Notions and amongst them that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly And the Individual Essence least of all To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing me must consider it abstractedly from its Modes singly consider'd The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents or the Thing and its Modes are distinctly known 'T is impossible not to know Extension is being in a manner Self-evident The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs and can only be known by Metaphysicks Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion The Reason Why and the Manner How * Reflex 9. §. 7. * See Method to Science B. 4. C. 6. §. 18. The Mind alone does not collect Notions or compare them Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language but for want of a Real Ground What Causality is and what grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must anteceede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity What gives the Ground to Specify all Notions What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum How Individual Men are constituted * Method to Science B. 2. L. 1. §. 10. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essences An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind and an Individual Person too The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar nor from Extravagant Suppositions Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity * Reflex 2. § 2 3 4 5. That Consciousnes is Inseparable from every Individual Man Yet Angels who are Pure Acts are constituted in part by the Act of Knowing themselves No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter The Notion of the Individuum is Essential The Substance is the same tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go That is only true Virtue which is according to Right Reason How we come to have Confused Ideas or Notions The whole Thing as it needs not so it cannot be known clearly The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums should be almost infinitely various * Job 36. 26. We can sufficiently know Things without comprehending fully this Câ—mplexion No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions Whence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and Words have their Origin The General Rules to know the right Sense of Words Words of Art most liable to be mistaken The way how to avoid being mistaken in Words of Art Even in Terms of Art the Thing is chiefly signify'd Metaphysical Words not Unintelligible but most Clear This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary Whence J. S. is not much concern'd to
that it might be some Fancy of the Painter for ought I know by the Picture Indeed had I known such things formerly then a Resemblance of them might in that case revive and call into my mind the knowledge of them but how it should beget the first knowledge of them as our late Philosophers put those Resemblances to do is altogether impossible and inexplicable 15. Again since Mr. L. affirms that we know nothing either by Direct or Reflex Knowledges but by having Ideas of it it must follow that when by a Reflex Act I know my first Idea got by a direct Impression I must have an Idea of that Direct Idea and another Idea when I know that Reflex one of it and still another of that and so still on all the time while I go on reflecting upon my former Knowledges Now what sense can we make of an Idea of an Idea or what means a Similitude of a Similitude or an Image of an Image Each succeeding Knowledge must be different from the former because it has still a different Object to represent and that Object cannot be known without its proper Idea and it is not only the immediately preceeding Act which must be thus different but the immediately-preceding Idea too which is the Object of each succeeding Act And in what shall we conceive the difference of those successive Ideas to consist It may perhaps be said that plain reason tells us it must be so though we know not the particular manner how it is done I answer The same Reason tells us far more plainly that it looks very untowardly and aukwardly it should be so or that there should be a Resemblance of a Resemblance And my advancing this Objection does oblige me to show in due place how both our Direct and Reflex Knowledges may be performed after a Connatural manner without straining either good Sense or the Nature of Things Were it a Material Resemblance it might by rebounding from one place to another cause a Resemblance of its self but here 't is quite otherwise for the first Idea it coming by a Direct Impression from the Corporeal Object without me must resemble It and the Idea of that Idea or else of my First Direct Act which is the Object of my First Reflex Act must be a Similitude of an Idea that came from the Object in Nature and is like it and the second Reflex Idea must resemble an Idea which was like an Idea that represented a thing of a quite different or of a Corporeal Nature and so endwayes which would put all our Reflex Ideas into Confusion as involving still others in them 16. 'T is yet as great a difficulty if not greater how the Soul should have a power in its self as Mr. L. conceives to reflect upon its own Actions that is to form Ideas of its former Ideas it being as I verily judge metaphysically demonstrable that an indivisible Nature cannot work upon it self or produce in its self a new Act or a new Idea by its own single power or by it self move the Body at pleasure as we seem to experience in those motions we call Voluntary or so much as have any succession of Acts but by means of the Body only which and not the Soul is Quantitative and consequently of it self capable of succession The farther explicating and elucidating which Points are reserved to their proper places 17. Many other Arguments against these Ideas will I believe occurr hereafter which I at present omit because I would not fore-stall But e're I leave this point I must do the right to this ingenuous Author to dâ—clare that it was besides his intention in his Treatise to discourse particularly about the nature of his Ideas and therefore I cannot be said properly to confute or over-throw what he never went about to advance or establish Though I cannot but judge that it had been far more satisfactory to his acute Readers and most highly important to Science to have done so and most necessary for his Book since without distinguishing his Ideas from Phantasms and letting us know distinctly what his Ideas are his whole Essay is unintelligible and all his Discourses built on the ambiguous word Idea are inconclusive And had his penetrating Wit set it self to that study I doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his own thoughts and to have enlightned others I desire then it may be understood that it is not in order to him only I have enlarged on this point but to meet with the mistakes of others also who do customarily use the word Idea and yet as I have good reason to fear do not perfectly understand their own meanings Lastly I thought it fit to dilate first on this point that I might prepare the way to my next Discourse to which it naturally leads COROLLARY FRom this whole Discourse collected into a Summary I deduce this Corollary that since the word IDEA according to this Author signifies a Resemblance Similitude or Image and consequently is indifferent to Corporeal and Spiritual Resemblances that is to what 's in the Mind and what 's only in the Fancy and that only that which is in the Mind can be the proper Material of all our Knowledges hence that word is most improper to be used in Philosophy which is the Study of Knowledge Also that as taken thus undistinguisht it does in another regard highly prejudice all true Knowledge of Things or Science in regard it confounds Corporeal and Spiritual Natures which contain the two General Objects of all our Knowledges and are besides most vastly disparate PRELIMINARY Second That the Elements or Materials of all our Knowledges are properly to be called NOTINOS and what those Notions are 1. BUT if the word IDEA be Equivocal and Improper to be used in Philosophy as being unfit to signify the first Conceptions of our Mind which are as Mr. L. says well the Materials of Science and consequently are apt to make us entertain Erroneous Fancies for Real Knowledges it will be be ask'd what other word we can invent which is Univocal Proper and not liable to signify a Superficial Resemblance nor dangerous to seduce us by taking Fantastical Appearances for the true Knowledge of the Things but is of its own Nature fit to express distinctly those Solid Materials by the Composition of which the Structure of Science is to be raised I reply the word Notions is such and answers all these Intentions and therefore this is the only word to be made use of by Philosophers who seriously and sincerely pursue the Knowledge of Things and not their own witty Conceits or Imaginations 'T is Univocal and Unambiguous because Men of Art or Philosophers who are the best Reflecters on the Operations of our Mind and have the truest Right to express those Thoughts their Art has given them have constantly used it hitherto to signify our simple Apprehensions or the first Operation
Man than is the Body because by it she excels and governs Beasts and in great part under God manages Corporeal Nature Moreover she can discourse her Thoughts compare the Objects or the Goods they propose and gather the Preference some ought to have above others 6. Things standing thus with the Man it is evident that he has now not only that Nature called the Body to provide for but another and that a Spiritual and much better Nature to look to and to procure for it all the Good he can and such Goods as are Agreeable to it He finds evidently that no Corporeal Things can be its Proper Good taking it as 't is Distinct from the Body He may easily discern that its Distinct Nature being Knowing or Rational nothing can perfect it but what is according to Reason or improves Knowledge and that the Acquisition of Science does perfect it in the latter Regard and Virtue in the Former Virtue being nothing but a Disposition to act according to Right Reason in such and such Matters or in such and such Occasions Reason therefore is the Ground of all true Morality and to act according to Reason is to act Virtuously Wherefore to act Virtuously would be most Natural to Man if his True Nature be not depraved which it cannot without Impiety be thought to be if we consider it as it came immediately from God's Hand Wherefore if it be not so now but be blinded and mis-led from Reason and Virtue by Passion and Vice as we experience it is it is demonstrable hence a posteriori that it has been some way or other perverted since its Creation which Christianity tells us has happen'd thro' Original Sin transfus'd from Adam Moreover as the Sense of Corporeal or Sensible Pleasure or Pain invites the Man to pursue what is for the Good of the Body and makes him tend towards what 's Agreeable and eschew what 's Harmful to it so in Man as he is Rational there is or ought to be answerable to those a Spiritual Pleasure and Pain viz. the Satisfaction and Dis-satisfaction of Mind which we call Conscience or the Law of Nature annex'd to all our Actions our Thoughts as St. Paul says accusing or excusing one another so to keep us from Unreasonableness or Vice and make us more pliable to follow Reason or Virtue For as Grief or Pain is caus'd in us by our Knowing that our Bodies for which we have a great Concern is Disorder'd so the Stings of Conscience as far as they proceed from Nature come from our Knowing that our better part our Soul for which we ought to have an incomparably higher Concern is wounded or disorder'd in her Rationality which is her Essence 7. Hence is seen that Man is apt to be wrought upon by two several sorts of Motives viz. those which are sutable to the Good of the Body and those which are agreeable to the Good of the Soul Now were not Humane Nature as was said perverted these two could not clash nor would there be any Inclination in the Man to do any thing which could prejudice his Superior Part Reason to which the Inferior the Body is naturally Subservient But Man's Nature being poison'd in the Spring-head the Motives of the First Kind did hazard quite to over-bear the Motives of the Second Sort and so Mankind became liable to act in a manner perpetually against Reason or to express it in Christian Language all his Actions might have been Sinful and himself a Slave to Sin Wherefore to obviate the violent Impulses of Passion and to strengthen our Reason against its Assaults God's Wisdom Goodness and Mercy took care to give us a Doctrine full of Supernatural Motives and those the most powerful ones that could be conceiv'd taught us by a Divine Master and ascertain'd after the best Manner so to make the Appearance of the Eternal Goods it proposed if reflected on Lively which might keep us upright and move us effectually to follow our true Nature Reason and so pursue our true Last End by the Practice of Virtue 8. Now there can be no Question but that both in the State of Pure and Uncorrupted Nature as also in the Corrupted State of it thus powerfully assisted the Innate Propension of the Will tending strongly to Good or Happiness and Good and Motive being in our Case the same Eternal Goods would most strongly carry the Will and prevail over Temporal ones as certainly as Heat ut octo would prevail over Heat ut duo were there the same Application of one as of the other to the same Object equally well Dispos'd in case the Proposal or Appearance of both these Goods were but Equal 9. Both these Motives Natural and Supernatural have their several Species or Phantasms beating upon the Seat of Knowledge with this difference that the Natural Phantasms being directly imprinted are Proper ones but those Reflex ones being of Spiritual Natures as the Words and Language they are express'd in do testifie are Metaphorical and Improper As then when in a meer Animal a Sensation is made by a small Number of Agreeable Effluviums they make only a slight Fancy Imagination or Representation of it but when an Impression is made by a great Multitude of them the Animal is Naturally ripe for Action and is Enabled or has a Power to act which Power thus prompt to act we call Appetite So as was said above in a Rational or Knowing Animal a small Quantity of Reflex Notions may serve to give it a speculative Knowledge of the Object proposed But when those Reflex Impressions are many and of such Objects as being very Agreeable or Good to our true Nature are therefore highly concerning us to have them the Appearance of them is so Lively and the Strength of their Motive Force is so great that the Man becomes fit to act for them which Principle of Action we call Will. So that Knowledge and Will differ but in Degree as did Fancy and Appetite in a meer Animal By which Explication are avoided all the Incoherent Positions about this Subject such as are that the Understanding directs the Will that the Will knows that one Power works upon another c. Whence is seen 10. First That the way to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare is to strive to Multiply and Strengthen those Reflex Thoughts especially those given us by Supernatural Motives and to make their Appearance Lively in the Soul that so it may be able to beat down and overcome the opposite Band of Impressions from Corporeal Objects which assault it Which I conceive to be what is Literally meant by a Lively Faith working in us that best Virtue Charity Next in order to the same End we must endeavour by a cautious and prudent Avoidance to lessen and weaken the Impressions from Corporeal Objects which is done by that Virtue which we call Temperance or when 't is to some high degree Mortification and by that
into fashion For he gives no reason why he did not rather constantly use the word Notion which importing a part of Cognition does most certainly better suit with a Treatise about Human Understanding 4. As for the Sense in which he takes the word IDEA he professes that he uses it to express whatever is meant by Phantasm Notion Species or whatever it is that the mind can be employ'd about in thinking Which manifests that he uses that word very Equivocally For a Phantasm and a Notion differ as widely as Body and Spirit the one being a Corporeal the other a Spiritual Resemblance or rather the one being a Resemblance or a kind of Image or Picture the other the thing Resembled as will be seen hereafter Again 't is agreed to by all the World that Brutes have Phantasms but they can have no Notions for these are the Elements or Materialls whose agreeable Connexion furnishes our Mind with Science of which Beasts which have no Mind are incapable and therefore it were both unnatural and to no purpose to put Notions which are the Primary Affections of the Mind in those meer Animals I am more at a loss to find that in the last page but one in his Epistle to the Reader he seems to contradistinguish Notions to Ideas which how it consists with the indifferency he grants the word Idea here to signify Notions I cannot at all comprehend 5. I must confess it is generally a fruitless contest to dispute about a Word which is nothing but a Sound or a Character were but the determinate Meaning of it told us by the user of it Let it be A or B or what he pleases provided the distinct Sense of it be clearly manifested by the Writer or Speaker it were in that case Logomachy and impertinent Cavil to except against it But when the Author 's own Explication of it does contrary to the Nature of Explications declare it is used ambiguously it laies a force on me to remark it lest it may lead the Reader as it infallibly must into great Errors unless it 's double Sense be warily distinguisht in the ensuing discourse which I have not observed to be done any where by this otherwise accurate Author 6. From this undistinguish'd Ambiguity of the word Idea it follows naturally that even his own excellent Judgment and consequently his Reader 's must necessarily sometimes deviate and tho' his general intention was only to pursue the Knowledge of Things yet he must needs be sometimes misâ—ed at unawares to entertain Fancies for Real Knowledges as will occasionally be shown hereafter For the present I cannot omit one particular it being of such main importance 7. The Author believes all sorts of Animals to have in some degree Perception Now Perception as I conceive signifies Knowledge for under what sort of material Action to rank it I confess my self at a loss But let it be only the first step and degree towards Knowledge and the in-let of all the Materials of it still he says the dulness of the faculties of some Brutes makes them remote from that Knowledge which is to be found in some Men So that it seems in other Men there may possibly be no more Knowledge at least in some things than in Brutes nor does he any more than probably conjecture that Beasts have not the power of comparing which may be observed in Mâ—n belonging to general Ideas and useful to abstract Reasonings Now this so jumbles together Spiritual Natures with those which are meerly Corporeal that if this be so we shall be at some loss to know our own Kind to define what Man is or to distinguish our selves from our younger Brothers in knowledge Brutes or our Souls from theirs For if by Ideas there be meant Notions as his Expressions leave it indifferent and that a Man's knowledge consists in having these Ideas in him and Brutes have also such Ideas and that moreover they may possibly have also in some sort a power to compare those Notions and both judging and discoursing most evidently consist in comparing our Notions I see no Operations peculiar to a Man but what Brutes may perform in a lower degree and since Degrees do not vary the Species for otherwise dull Men would be of another Species from those who have more wit we could consequently never know what Mankind meant or who is a Man who not unless in outward appearance nor lastly how our Souls or Minds do differ from their Fancies or Imaginations Again M. L. affirms B. 2. Ch. 11. § 11. that it seems as evident to him that Beasts do reason as that they have Sense than which certainly nothing in the world can be more evident or undeniable Now if this be so all those who hold that a Rational Animal is a proper and adequate Definition of Man ought to hold Brutes to be Men. Mr. L. will say that Brutes can only reason in Particulars having no General Ideas because they cannot Abstract nor do we see they make use of any General Signes to express Universal Ideas Indeed they have no such Signes as Words to notify they have any such Ideas but if we may conclude from their Outward Actions on which only Mr. L. seems to ground his good Opinion of them that they have Reason we may as well gather from the same ground that they have General Ideas too For example when a Horse sees a Man a far off he can only have an Idea that it is something for the Object cannot at that distance imprint a more particular Idea of it self but that most General one and therefore 't is evident the Horse must either have a General Idea of it or none at all whereas yet he must have some Idea of it because he sees it though confusedly Coming nearer the Object imprints a more distinct Idea of a Man yet not so distinct as to represent this Man in particular At length coming very near the same Object is apt to imprint an Idea of this particular Man which shews plainly that all those Ideas the Object gave him before were General ones To proceed we may observe that while it appear'd only to be something which was a very abstract Idea the Horse carry'd it abstractedly too and remain'd unconcern'd When it appear'd to be a Man it began to be a little concern'd having to do with such kind of things as us'd to do it either Good or Harm and therefore it stares at it a common carriage in sheep especially as if it study'd or consider'd what to make of it in order to its own Interest or Self-preservation But when the Object imprints an Idea of this particular Man who either us'd to bring him Provender or come to catch him to make him work he either comes towards him or runs away which different behaviour of theirs if outward Actions were in this case worth building on is as good a sign that Brutes have General Ideas as we can expect
their Modes do perfectly abstract from being and not being much more from all Manners of being 3. This appears evidently by those Words which signifie them the Meaning of which Words is the same with our Notions For Example Take Gabriel Peter Bucephalus an Oak a Stone a Yard Whiteness or what other Thing or Mode of Thing we please 't is evident that the Sense of them which is the same with our Notion of them does not at all include hint or intimate Existence or Non-Existence Wherefore 't is set above all farther Dispute and as far as I can fore-see beyond all imaginable Objection that our Notion of the Thing is the self-same with the Thing in Nature which is conceived by us Q. E. D. 23. Now if our Soul when it knows any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it and therefore is intellectually that thing for to be such a thing is nothing but to have the Nature of such a thing in it it follows that considering her precisely as knowing a Stone a Tree Fire c. she is that Stone Tree and Fire intellectually Whence we may discover how Rational and how Necessary and Important a Truth that saying of Aristotle is that Anima intelligendo fit omnia In a word 't is due to the Nature of our Soul as it is Spiritual and to the Eminency of her Essence to comprehend after her manner the whole Inferiour Nature of Bodies and much more or to be an Intellectual World as soon as she is her self and depur'd from her dull Material Compart as is shown in my Method Nor can this making the Soul to know so much nay much more be deemed an Extravagant Conceit or too high a Privilege for her by any well instructed Christian who reflects as is also clearly Demonstrable in Metaphysicks that she is made for or is capable of a Knowledge infinitely higher viz. the beatifying Sight of GOD in comparison of which the Knowing the whole Universality of Creatures is but a meer Trifle 24. I much fear that such Readers who are not raised above Fancy and have not well reflected how all Truths and all our Judgments and Discourses that are rightly made do consist in the Connexion of Terms will look upon all Efforts of Close Reason as Chimerical and think them to be only a kind of Chiquaning and little Tricks of Logick Wherefore to comfort the uneasy Fancies of such weak Speculaters I desire them to consider how all things were in the Divine Understanding before they were Created and are still there and how their Ideas that is their Essences had there another and that a more incomparable manner of being then they had in themselves afterwards From which Divine Archetypes they were copied into Nature and thence transcribed by Impressions on our Senses into Human Understandings This Reflexion will I hope let them see how it is not impossible but Consonant to Reason that the self-same thing may have both a Natural and an Intellectual manner of Existing I note by the way that whereas I have insisted so much on the Impropriety and Novelty of the word Idea our Modern Ideists will alledge that Plato did make use of that word before them and that they do but eccho him while they use it after him But I believe they will find upon Examination that Plato meant by that word the Essences or Natures of Things and in likelihood those very Essences in the Divine Understanding however some thought he misapplied it to Universal Ideas or Essences subsisting alone and not in the Individuals Now did our Moderns take it in the same Sense he did that is for Essences and not for Resemblances only I should not except against them as to that particular but to use his word and affix another Sense to it is as I conceive to abuse it 25. Corollary II. From this whole discourse and the many several Arguments in it it appears evidently that unless the word Idea be taken as we take the word Notion that is unless Ideas or Notions or whatever else we please to call them be the very things in our understanding and not meer Resemblances of them they can never reach or engage the Thing it self or give us Knowledge of it that is they can never make us know any thing any more than a Picture can make us know a Man we never saw nor ever shall or can see but by means of that Picture that is not at all And therefore as I cannot but judge what I here advance to be True and withall most necessary to be told so I am obliged without asking leave of any to do that Right to Truth as to declare that those many Schems of Doctrine woven upon such Ideas as their Groundwork tho' they be never so Ingenious and coherent within themselves and may be of some use in Logick to distinguish our Notions are both meerly Superficial and perfectly useless in Philosophy which is the Knowledge of Things and can only serve to please the Daedalean Fancies of the ingenious Contrivers and witty Descanters upon them but can never bring us to the Solid Knowledge of any one Thing in Nature nor verify any one Predication or Judgment we make nor enable us in our Speculative or even Common Discourses about any Thing to speak one word of good Sense Not that I think that Mr. Locke does still take the word Idea in that unaccountable meaning but that the acuteness of his Natural Genius does generally carry him perhaps unreflectingly to mean by that word the same I mean by Notion tho' to say the truth he totally abstracts from meddling designedly with this abstruse point 26. Corollary III. Hence also we may gain some light what Knowledge is For it has been demonstrated that our Notions on which all our Knowledges are grounded and of which they are Compounded are the very Natures of the thing known and consequently that our Soul considered precisely as knowing those Natures or having them in her as in their Subject is as such those very Things which are constituted by those Natures Wherefore our knowing that those things are or are such or such which is Compleat Knowledge is the having those things and their Predicates of Existent or of their being affected with such or such Accidents so in the Judging Power as they are in the things without that is the things within her must be as the things in Nature are Wherefore when the Soul knows any thing in Nature she must be that thing as it is Another thing distinct from her So that in a word To know is Esse aliud ut aliud To be another thing as it is another For Example To know the Bell is in the Steeple she must not only have the Bell existent in the Steeple within her but also that the Bell in the Steeple is without her or is in her as another thing which is neither her nor any Thing or Mode belonging to
her To explicate which hard point we may reflect that all the Essential Notions of a Thing were it possible to comprehend them all of a Body for example are Intrinsecal to it as also all those Modes or Accidents of it the Complexion of which does constitute the Essence of that Body and even taking them singly as meer Accidents they depend for their being on that Body as on their Substance But it is not so with the Natures of those Bodies or their Modes or Accidents as they are in the Soul For they are no Determinations or Modes suitable or belonging to her Nature as 't is Spiritual nor depend Solely on her as on their Subject for their Existence as all Modes in their Natural Subjects do Whence follows that when she knows them they are purely in her as Extrinsecall to her or as other Things and as having their genuin Existence elsewhere or out of the Mind And in this consists the Excellency of a Spiritual Nature from which we may demonstrate her Immateriality and by Consequence her Immortality that by reason of the Superlative Nobleness of her Essence she can comprehend the whole Nature of Bodies tho' she may know other higher Natures also all its Accidents its Existence without us and whatever can belong to it and yet so as to stand a-loof from it and preserve her Distance and Height above it and is withall through the Amplitude of her Nature able to engraft on her infinitely capacious Stock of Being all other things and give them besides their own if they be inferiour Natures or Bodies a far Nobler Existence in her self This Definition of Knowing will I doubt not look like Gibberish to short-sighted Speculaters who have not reflected steadily on the Souls Spiritual Operations and on what Manner things are in the Mind But if each step to it be as I cannot doubt but it is demonstrable the Evidence of the Premisses and the Necessity of the Consequence ought to obtain of every Learned Man not be startled at the Strangeness of the Conclusion because Fancy is dissatisfyed That Inferiour Faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow Sphere and forbid to meddle with Spiritual Subjects which are beyond its reach and Skill and are only manageable by Reason grounding it self on such Notions as are above Matter And if it appears by this Rigorous Test that our Notions are the very things as distinct from us all the rest of it will follow of Course by a Natural and Necessary Consequence PRELIMINARY Third That all our Science is grounded on the Things themselves and How this is performed 1. BUT how can the Things be in our Understanding since the Thing in its first and proper signification being an Individual Substance is the subject of Innumerable Modes or Accidents which we can never reach or comprehend and therefore it can never be known by us compleatly as Mr. Locke has very elaborately demonstrated at large and as my self have also proved in my Method This being so clear and confess'd a Truth it seems to follow hence against us both that neither the Ideists have any Idea of it Resembling it fully nor we any Notion of it which is truly and entirely the same with it intellectually and so neither of us can properly speaking pretend to know any Thing as we ought 2. To clear this important Difficulty on which the whole Affair of Science and the Confutation of Scepticism seems mainly to depend it is to be noted 3. First That the Notion of the Individuum Thing or Suppositum can never for the Reason now given be Distinct and Compleat but Confused and Imperfect For let us take any Individual thing v. g. a Stone we shall find that it has in it what answers to the Notion of a Thing or what has Being as also of Extended Dense Hard Opacous Dinted c. it is Divisible into innumerable Particles its peculiar Mixture consists of many diverse-natured Parts with such an Order or Position amongst them c. of all which our Senses with their best Assistances can not afford us clear Knowledge nor consequently imprint any Clear Notion of that whole Thing in our Mind 4. Secondly That since to know a Thing is to have the Notion of it in our Mind our Knowledge must be such as the Notion is If the Notion be Clear Intire and Distinct our Knowledge too is such and if the Notion be Obscure Partial and Confused our Knowledge must be Obscure Partial and Confused likewise 5. Thirdly We can have such a Notion of every Individual thing if it be not as the smallest Atoms are too little to be perceptible by our Sense as tho' it be Confused as to it self may serve to distinguish it from all other Things and to make us know it Exists separately from all others and independently on them Moreover that it is the Suppositum or Subject which has its own Nature or Essence in it and also all the Modes or Accidents belonging to it Thus when we see a Bag of Sand or Wheat poured out our Senses acquaint our Mind pre-imbued by some common Notions that each Grain can exist separate and has sustains or gives Being to its own Accidents without the Assistance of any of its Fellow-Grains 6. Fourthly This Confused Knowledge of the Thing in gross is sufficient for such a Degree of Science of it as we can have in this State For tho' we cannot have a distinct Knowledge of it all taken in the Lump and therefore do not pretend to have Science of it thus considered nor of each Considerability in it taken by Detail yet we know that Confusedly it contains in it self what answers to all the many distinct Conceptions we make of it which are the Ground of all the Science we have they being all stored up and amassed in the Thing and apt to be drawn or parcell'd out thence by our Abstractive Considerations of it 7. Lastly That our Distinct Knowledge or Science is built on our Distinct Notions of the Thing fram'd in our Minds by Impressions on the Senses which are many and the Manners of their affecting us also manifold Hence our Soul in this State can have no Distinct or Clear Knowledge of the Thing but by piece-meal or by Distinct Different Partial Inadequate or as they are generally and properly called Abstract Notions as Mr. Locke has frequently and judiciously exemplify'd in the several Conceptions or Notions we have of Gold which we may consider as yellow heavy solid malleable dissolvable in aqua Regia c. Whence tho' it be perhaps impossible for us to reach all the Considerabilities that may be found in it which ground our Different Notions yet each Notion we have of it being Distinct from all the rest and being truly the Thing as far as 't is thus Consider'd hence we can have Science of the Thing tho' confusedly of the whole yet Distinctly of
Dispositions properly Previous to that Form And therefore does as truly by Informing that Matter Make or constitute the Man One Thing as any other Corporeal Form does any Body in Nature 14. Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man which is immediately united with the Soul as the Matter with its Form and therefore is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual and includes both Natures Whence when that Part is affected after its peculiar Nature Corporeally the Soul is affected after its Nature that is Spiritually or Knowingly which Part Cartesius thinks is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Glandula Pinealis 15. Therefore the Manner how and the Reason why those Corporeal Effluviums do come to affect the Soul and cause in her Spiritual Notions of the Thing is because of the immediate Identification of the Matter and Form in that part whence follows that the one cannot be affected but the other must be affected too after its Different manner proper to its Distinct Nature In the same manner abating the Diversity peculiar to each of those Natures as when the Matter of Wood is wrought upon the Form of it or the Complexion of Accidents making up one Thing with it does also suffer Change Whence by the way is seen the Reason of that received Maxim that Actiones Passiones sunt suppositorum So that 't is the whole Thing which acts or suffers tho' according to this or that Part of it and hence it is that the Whole Thing is conceiv'd tho' by an Inadequate Notion we conceive but but one Part of it as it were distinctly 16. This Part immediately inform'd by the Soul as 't is Spiritual which we will call the Seat of Knowledge must whatever it is be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies and to their several Modes as can be conceived and as far as Matter can bear Abstract from them all both that it may be connaturally more sensible of the Different Effluviums by which their several Natures are to be understood as also more fit to beget in the Soul Universal Notions such as are those of Ens or Being by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Acts of Judging and Discoursing is managed Tho' I am apt to judge that those General Notions are also caus'd when the Impression is Confused or Indistinct as those of Ens or Being are and the same is to be said of the Rest in proportion Thus when we see a Thing a-far off and have but a Confused View of it it only appears to us to be something we know not particularly what or A Thing without making us know in the least what Kind of Thing or Body it is Afterwards coming nearer we discern it moves it self whence we gain the Notion of a Living Thing Then approaching still nearer we by a more distinct Impression know 't is a Horse And lastly when it is within convenient Distance to give us a perfectly Distinct View of it we know 't is such a Particular Horse of our own 17. That Part called the Seat of Knowledge must moreover be the most Sensible and the most Tender that can be imagin'd that as was said the least Effluviums may affect it And yet it must not be of a Glutinous Nature so as to entangle them and make them stick there but that reverberated thence they may light in some near adjacent place to serve by their renewed Impulses afterwards for the Use of Memory and to excite again former Knowledges as also as will be shewn to cause Reflex Acts. That it must not be in the least Glutinous appears hence evidently that did the Effluviums stick there we should whether we would or no perpetually contemplate or think of those Objects which would also hinder our Perception of others by mingling the former Effluviums with those which supervene 18. The orderly disposure of the world by Gradual steps arising from less perfect Natures to those which are more Noble and more Perfect does evince that this Part call'd the Seat of Knowledge is the most Supremely Noble production of Material things and nearest ally'd as it were to Spiritual Nature that can be imagin'd so that all the best Perfections that are to be found in Corporeal things are center'd in it Whence tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Physician that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a baser part of Man's Body than the Intestinum Rectum yet I cannot approve of Cartesius his Conceit that it is a Glandule which is one of the Ignoblest parts we have but judge it has a peculiar Temperature of its own not only specifically distinct from other parts but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it 19. Whether amongst its other Special Qualities it partakes of the Nature of those Bodies which in the dark do reflect Light and that the Glossy and Lively Appearances and Resemblances which we call Fancies or Phantasms do spring thence I leave to others to determin I think it is the Interest of those who make the Septum Lucidum to be the Seat of Knowledge to embrace that Opinion 20. Those Effluviums sent out from Bodies have the very Natures of those Bodies in them or rather are themselves Lesser Bodies of the Self-same Nature as the smallest imperceptible parts of Bread and Flesh are truly Bread and Flesh which are cut off by Natural Agents from the great Lump and therefore by Application of themselves they imprint the very Body it self or a Body of that Nature on that material part which is the Seat of Knowledge Whence the Soul being at the same time affected after her manner or Knowingly as that part was affected she has also the very Nature of that Body as far as the Sense exhibits it put in her by that conformable Impression when she has a Notion of it 21. Therefore those Effluviums striking the Seat of Knowledge and immediately as has been said falling off from it do affect it as a Thing distinct from the Mâ—n For they are not there as belonging at all to the Intrinsecal Constitution of the Body but as meer strangers to it Whence the Soul has the Nature of that Body in her and consequently is that Body as 't is another Thing from her which illustrates the Explication of knowing given formerly and that 't is to be another thing as it is another 22. The Reason why those Effluviums containing the Essence or Nature of the Bodies whence they flow do not breed a Notion in the Soul of their whole Essences is because they are convey'd to that part by many different Conduits the Senses which being diverse and each of them according to their circumstances apt to be affected diversely do therefore receive and imprint them after a different Manner For example those which by the smart motion of the Ayr do come in thro' the Drum of the Ear and consequently by the Auditory Nerve which
is joined to it and immediately conveys them to the Seat of Knowledge do affect it with a kind of Vibration or as we may say Soundingly Those which come in by the Eye affect it Luminously or as accompany'd with Light and so of all the rest whence are caused in our Soul all our Distinct or Abstracted Notions of the Thing or which is the same of the Nature of the Thing in part or according to such a Consideration of it on which because of the Distinctness and consequently Clearness of those impressions all the Science we have of the Thing is grounded 23. There is moreover on the Soul's side which is the Subject that receives those Impressions another thing highly conducing to make our Notions yet more Clear and perfectly Distinct which deserves our best Reflexion 'T is this that the Nature of our Soul being Indivisible it gives an Indivisibility to all those Notions or Natures in her which as they existed without her and were convey'd into her by Effluviums being Corporeal were Divisible and therefore something Indistinct and Confus'd This appears clearly in most of the Objects about which the Soul is conversant perhaps in all viz. in Figures Points Lines Superficies Instants Measures Comparisons Predications Respects Negations Denominations Relations c. For example There is not perhaps in all Nature any Body Perfectly or Mathematically Flat Sphaerical or Triangular or just a yard nor any Duration mark't out to be just an Hour but by reason that Bodies are affected with quantity which is perpetually variable by a world of Agents of diverse Figures assaulting it as also because of the Divisibility of Quantity in infinitum it is warpt from those Exact Figures or deviates from those Just Measures Whereas on the contrary those things as they exist in the Soul are adjusted and Stinted even to an Indivisible so that the very least imaginable Consideration added or detracted quite alters the Notion to another Species Now nothing can be so concisely Distinct from another or more impossible to be Confounded with it than what is so comprized within its own Bounds as to be This and no other or so much and no more even to an Indivisible Whence 't is demonstrable that the Thing as in our Soul or as standing under our Notion or Conception is a most Proper Ground for that Distinct and Clear Knowledge called Science This is evidently seen throughout the whole Body of the Mathematicks and the same will be found by Reflexion in all other Sciences whatever I note here on the by that this Power or Faculty of the Soul which is so proper and so natural to her of Reducing all things in her from the Indistinctness found in them as they stand in Nature or from Divisibility to Indivisibility does ground most evident Demonstrations of her Immateriality and consequently of her Immortality were it pursu'd home But this is not my business at present 24. That Part called the Seat of Knowledge can be affected with many coherent Impressions at once which cause in the Soul Complex or Compounded Notions This is too evident to need any Dilating on it I call those Impressions coherent which are caused by Effluviums making singly different Impressions either from the same Thing or the same sort of Thing But it is on this occasion to be well noted that lest our Knowledges or Discourses be lost in a Croud or run astray in a pathless Wood of Notions disorderly aggregated the Art of Logick is absolutely necessary to range and distinguish our Notions into Common Heads and to descend from those General Heads all along by Intrinsecal Differences that is to divide them by more and less of the Common Notion so to keep them still within that Line or Head without which they must needs interfere and breed Confusion This Method of Distinguishing and keeping distinct our Notions is as necessary for Scientifical Discourses as 't is for an Army to be Marshalled in Rank or File without which 't is but a Medly or Confused Multitude Whence those who slight this Methodizing their Notions must necessarily in rigorous Reason talk Ramblingly tho' perhaps ingeniously according to such a sort of Wit as Men use when they would maintain Paradoxes or as Erasmus us'd to praise Folly 25. It being demonstrable in Metaphysicks that whatever is only in Power to have a new Act cannot of it self produce that Act in it self unless it be wrought upon first by some other Agent which is in Act and much less can such a Power do this as is of an Indivisible or Spiritual Nature in regard it has no Parts one whereof being in Act it self may produce an Act in the rest as it happens in the Wheels of a Watch or in our Bodies when one part of them moves another It follows hence that our Soul can produce no new Act either of Memory or of Reflexion upon her own former Acts nor of Thinking or Willing c. without being first affected by some Object without her or anew by some Part or Particle within the Man which being in Act it self may cause those new Acts of Knowledge in her 26. The Effluviums which by affecting the Seat of Knowledge gave her to know at first are the properest Agents to produce connaturally these new Acts of Reflexion or Memory in case it can be found that they are duely qualify'd for such an Efficiency 27. Those Effluviums as was prov'd above not sticking on that part which is the Seat of Knowledge do consequently fall off from it and are lodged near it whence 't is consonant that That Part also having its Effluviums when thus sollicited by the Impulse of those Atomes sent from without and therefore all Natural Action causing Reaction when they rebound thence they carry away some minute Particles of the said Part. Wherefore these Outward Effluviums thus imbu'd and qualify'd with some tang of the Seat of Knowledge when they come to be Excited again by some Exteriour or Interiour Causes must affect it afterwards accordingly and thence they become duely qualify'd to cause a Notion of it as Fore-known which we call to reflect upon it or remember it By which we see how Reflexion and Reminiscence are caused by the new Impulse of those former Atoms to the Seat of Knowledge tinctur'd with some Particles of that Part it self For which Reason the oftner this is done the Memory of it is more Easie and Lively Whence is seen that there is no need of multiplying succeeding Ideas to know the preceding ones when we have Acts of Reflexion a new Impression of the Effluviums or Phantasms thus qualify'd repeating still the same former Notion with the Connotate of Foreknown 28. Memory and Remembrance are inexplicable without putting those first-imprinted Atoms to reside still in the Brain and to be excited there anew For were this put to be perform'd by a meer Motion upon the Nerve as most of our Modern
which are hardest of all to explicate as wanting any Common Genus or any thing like it to explicate them by I intended once to dilate upon them in this Preliminary as being a Subject very worthy of our Reflexion and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve But seeing upon Review how Prolix I have been already in my Preliminaries I am forced to content my self with Noting them in short leaving it to others to enlarge upon them They are these distributed into their several Ranks 23. First Ens taken in its whole Latitude for the Thing and its Modes Secondly The Properties of Ens taken in that large Signification such as are Unum Verum Bonum and their Opposites Non-Unum or Divisum Falsum and Malum For the Notions of all the Modes being improperly Entia have by Consequence only improper Essences or Entities of their own and consequently Properties of those Improper Essences Thirdly Idem Diversum and in general Relatum taking this last Word in the largest Sense for all kinds of Respects whatsoever In which Signification all Things or properly called Entia do relate to Existence and all their Modes or Accidents do respect them diversly as certain Manners how they are Of which Nature also are the aforesaid Common Words Mode and Accident which are Transcendents in respect of the Nine last Predicaments Fourthly Completum Incompletum Partial and Total Generical and Specifical Superior and Inferior Simple and Compound and such like Most of which kind of Transcendents seem rather to respect the Manner of Being which Things have in our Understanding than the Manner of Being they have out of it Of the last Sort are Which What That which Something Somewhat c. which are the most Confused Words imaginable and signifie any Notion but that of meer Nothing By these we make a Bastard or Illegitimate Definition of Ens and say that a Thing is That which is capable of Existing c. I call it an Illegitimate or Improper Definition because the Notion of the Genus which is one part of a proper one has a Determinate Sense Whereas That which which for want of a better supplies the place of the Genus has none For 'T is to be noted that in all Transcendents unless perhaps some of those of the Fifth Sort which have a kind of blind Confused Sense the Name only is Common or Applicable to more and not the Notion for having no one Notion that is Common to all those Common Heads they have none till it be Determin'd since no Notion can exist in the Mind unless it be This or That or one any more than a Thing can exist in Nature unless it be determin'd to be such a Particular or Individual Thing Much less has any of them proper Differences dividing them by more and less of the Common Notion as every Notion that is truly Common to more may and must have 23. Whence extreme Care must be taken how Students in Philosophy do use these Transcendent Words and that they do distinguish their Sense most exactly when they have Occasion to make use of them For they having an Indifferency to many Senses and those as vastly disparate as the Common Heads themselves are that is as the Schools properly phrase it Senses differing toto Genere I may add Generalissimo it must follow that every time they do use them confusedly or with a Conceit that they are Univocal their Discourse must needs straggle widely now one way now another and thence confound all our Commonest Notions which of all others ought to be kept Distinct the want of doing which hinders all Coherence or Connexion of Terms in which only Science consists and breeds innumerable and most Enormous Errours It would be tedious I doubt to my Readers tho' perhaps not hard for me to show what Prodigious Inconveniences do arise from the Mis-acceptions of one of those many Different Senses such Words may bear for Another I will only bring one Instance hoping that by this as by a Sea-mark my Readers may avoid the Shoals and Rocks of Errors in other like Occasions 25. The Word Compounded may either mean the Composition of Matter with its Essential Form or that of the Essence with its Suppositum which is conceived to have the Essence in it or of the Superiour Notions of Ens with the Individuum All which are Compositions belonging to the Line of Ens. Coming next to the Modes or Accidents the whole Ens or Suppositum may be considered as Compounded with its Primary Mode called Quantity or with some Quality or Relation Or with some Action or Passion Time Place Situation or Habit. Whence accrues to the Subject the Denominations of Agent Patient Living or being at such a time or in such a Place Sitting Armed c. All which Nine last Compositions are Modifying or Accidental ones and not Essential or such as concern directly and precisely the Notion of Thing or Being as did those of the first sort Now come Cartesius and his Followers who loath to say the Body and Soul are two Suppositums and wanting Skill in Metaphysicks to comprehend what the Union of Entitative Parts is or how made which are Points too hard for Mathematicians and of which de la Forge tho' he talks prettily can make nothing at all they would have the Soul and Body compound One Thing because they Act together or assist one another mutually to produce some sorts of Actions Whereas Action being only a Mode and so presupposing the Res or Thing which it modifies can only determin and denominate its Subject to be Acting and therefore Joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the Soul and Body Co-Acters which is a vastly disparate Notion from the Constituting and Denominating them One Thing as common Sense informs us We will put an Instance My Hand and my Pen do both of them concur to the Action of Writing and so compound one Joint-Acter nay they depend mutually on one another as to the producing this Action For the Hand cannot write without the Pen nor the Pen without the Hand Besides they are in some sort fitted to one another in order to perform this Action for the Fingers are so fram'd as to hold and guide the Pen very commodiously and the Pen taking in its Handle and the Nib-end too is fitted very commodiously to be held and guided by my Hand so as to draw the Letters such as they ought to be Lastly which is much more and a Parallel very agreeable to the Co-action of Soul and Body they both of them do modifie each other's Action For the best Scrivener writes but scurvily with a Bad Pen and the Best Pen writes but scurvily in an unskilful Hand And yet the Hand and the Pen are not one Jot the nearer being one Thing notwithstanding their Concurrence to this Joint-Action tho' it be qualify'd with Mutuality Fitness of the Co-Agents and the Modification which the Action receives from both of
them jointly and each of them severally Besides they put the Cart before the Horse while they pretend that the Acting as one Thing is to make them one-Thing For since the Res is in Priority of Nature and Reason before Modus rei and Being before Acting and that nothing can Act otherwise than it is 't is Evident from plainest Principles and even from the very Terms that they must first Be one Thing e'er they can Act as one Thing or Be such a Compound before they can Act as such a Compound And so the Point sticks where it was viz. How the Soul and Body come to be thus Compounded into one Ens of which I have given some Account Preliminary 4. § 8 9 10 13. 26. On this Occasion I cannot but Reflect that the Cartesians were very Unadvised to meddle with such a Point as puts them quite past their Mathematicks as likewise that tho' they have fram'd a Logick or Method suitable to explicate their Mathematical Philosophy yet they are but very bad Distinguishers of our Natural Notions into Common Heads which is one Principal Part of true Logick as appears by their rambling so irregularly from one to the other as has been shewn elsewhere in their making Extension or Quantity which is a Mode the Form which is Essential to their First Matter and here in putting Composition according to the Notion of Action to be Composition according to the Notion of Ens. And whoever impartially Examins the Distribution of their Notions into Heads will find it not to be such as Reason naturally forced as ours is but such as Design voluntarily and ingeniously invented REFLEXIONS ON Mr. LOCKE's ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Understanding REFLEXION First ON The FIRST BOOK 1. THIS Book gives me little Occasion to make any Reflexions but such as I must be forced to make through his whole Essay which is on the Penetrative and clear Wit and happy Expression of its Author in his pursuing the Design which he had prefix'd to himself I could wish indeed that he had thought fit to take his Rise higher or to speak more properly had laid his Grounds deeper But it is to be expected that every Author should write according to those Thoughts or Principles with which the Casual Circumstances of his fore-past Life had imbu'd him or as his Natural Genius leads him His steering such an Impartial Mean between Scepticism and Dogmatizing does certainly argue a very even Temper of Judgment and a Sincere Love of Truth And I shall hope that whoever peruses attentively my Method B. 1. Less 2. from § 5. to § 11. will discern that I have so exactly measur'd out the Pitch of Knowledge attainable by us in this State that I am as little a Friend to Over-Weening as I profess my self a Declar'd Enemy to Scepticism 2. I am a little apprehensive from some Words in his Introduction expressing his Dis-like that Men let loose their Thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being and his Conceit that this brings Men to Doubts and Scepticism that he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks whose proper Object is those Notions of the Thing which abstract from Matter and Motion and concern Being only Were I assur'd that I did not mistake him I would for his sake enlarge on that Point and display fully the Excellency of that most Solid most Clear and most Incomparable Science which I shall only touch upon at present by giving my Reader a Summary of its Principal Objects 3. It treats of the Formal or Essential Parts of Physical Entities or Bodies in Common and in Specie Of the Essential Unity and Distinction of them and whence 't is taken particularly of the Essential Constituents of Elements Mixts Vegetables and Animals and when and how they come to be Essentially or Individually Chang'd Thence advancing to the Chief Animal Man he treats of his Form the Soul and of its Proper Action Of the Superior Part of it the Mind and of its Progress towards its last End or its Declension from it Thus far demonstrated it proceeds to treat of the Separation of the Soul from the Body and to shew evidently its Immateriality and consequently its Immortality Of the Science of a Soul separated and the Eminency of her Acts in that State above what she had in the Body and lastly of the Felicity and Infelicity connaturally following out of her Actions here and the Good or Bad Dispositions found in her at her Separation as also of the Immutability of her Condition afterwards It treats of the Notion or Nature of Existence and how 't is Accidental or Unessential to the Natures of every Created Being and thence demonstrates a First Being or a God to whom 't is Essential to be that is whose Nature is Self-Existence Whence follows by necessary Consequence that his Nature is Infinitely Pure or Simple Eternal Infinitely Perfect and Immutable All-knowing Willing ever what 's most Wise and therefore most Free in all his Actions and that the Divine Essence is Unconceivable by any Notion we can frame or have of it and Unexpressible by any Name we can give it which is Proper and not most highly Metaphorical Lastly It demonstrates there are Pure Spiritual Beings which have no Matter or Potentiality in them call'd Intelligences or Angels and likewise in Common of their Number Distinction and Subordination as also of their Proper Operations both Internal and External 4. These and such as these are the Objects proper to that Supream Science Metaphysicks which any Man of Sense would think ought to make it deserve the Esteem of the Best and most Elevated Portion of Mankind and not to be ridicul'd by Drollish Fops who turn all they understand not into Buffoonery All these high Subjects it treats of I say if possible as I believe it is with more Close more Necessary and more Immediate Connexion than the Mathematicks can pretend to since the Evidence and Certainty of the Principles of this Science as also of Logick do depend on are subordinate to and are borrow'd from the Principles of the other which is the Sovereign and Mistress of all other Sciences whatever 5. It will I doubt not be apprehended that such High Knowledges are above our reach and Impossible to be attain'd by us in this State They are indeed above Fancy and I believe this Objection is made by Fancy or by Men attending to the Resemblances of Fancy which fall short of representing to us such Sublime Objects But why they should be above our Reason I cannot imagin or why they should be deem'd so Mysterious as not to be Knowable without a Divine Revelation It is manifest that we can have Abstract Notions of Existence Thing Immaterial Incorporeal Knowledge Will Operation c. that is we can Consider the Common Subject Thing as Existent Capable of Being and if it be a Spirit as Immaterial Incorporeal Knowing Willing and Operating c. as well as Mathematicians
Act only till afterwards we come to reflect upon it by a new Act which is to know it not by Experience but by Reflexion My Reason why I am so positive in my Assertion is this Nothing can be known by any Act of Knowledge but the Object of that Act For the Object of Knowing and the Thing known are the same almost in the very Terms and perfectly the same in Sense Put case then I know by a Direct Impression what we call Extension in this case Extension is the sole Object of that Act of Knowledge and not my Act of Knowledge it self therefore I am not conscious I know that is I do not know I know when I have the Act of knowing Extension For were it so Extension would not be the Sole Object of that Act but the Complex made up of Extension and the Act it self by which I know Extension which Objects being of Disparate Natures ought to be the Objects of Different Acts. Besides this would hinder any External Object or Corporeal Mode to be known Distinctly for the Idea of it would be Confounded and Mingled with a kind of Spiritual Compart viz. my very Act it self for this Act being known according to him at the same time with Extension must needs make up part of the Object of this Act. Lastly If we know our own Act Experientially we should confound Direct Knowledges with Keflex ones For if I understand Mr. Locke rightly he with good Reason makes the Internal Operations of the Mind to be the proper Objects of the Reflex Acts and that the genuin Difference of those two sorts of Acts does consist in this that by Direct ones we know the Objects which are in Nature or without us and by Reflex ones what 's in the Soul or her Operations and not the Things in Nature otherwise than as they are in that Act But if I be Conscious or know that I know when I know the Object without me I must by the same Act know what 's within me and what 's without me both at once and so my Act of Direct Knowledge would be Reflex or rather that one Act would be both Direct and Reflex which makes it Chimerical 5. The same Argument demonstrates that we cannot be Conscious of our Reflex Acts at the very time we produce them For my First Reflex Act has for its sole Object that Operation of the Mind which I had immediately before by a Direct one and my Second Reflex Act has for its Object the First and in the same manner each succeeding Reflexion has for its Object that Act which immediately preceded Wherefore if the First Reflex Act had for its Object at the same time both the Direct and it self too that is did we when we first Reflected know by that very Act it self that we did thus reflect then the Second Reflex Act would be forestall'd and have no Proper Object left for it To clear this better let us assign one Reflexion to be the Last It were not the Last Reflexion unless the Object of it were that Reflexion which was the last but one Wherefore unless that Reflexion that went last before was known by that Act and the last of all remain'd unknown the Last would have two Objects viz. The Preceding Reflexion and its self too This seems to me as plain Reason as plain can be and I believe Mr. Locke's Different Thoughts proceeded from not adverting with what Incredible Celerity our Reflex Thoughts do generally succeed the Direct ones and one another Whence it comes that not aware of the imperceptible Time between them we are apt to conceit that the Reflex Act is experientially known by the very Act it self Since then nothing can be known by any Act but the Object of that Act and as might easily be shown it would Confound our Natural Notions strangely to say the Act is its own Object it follows that it cannot be known by its self but must be known if at all by the next Reflexion Whence results this Certain and Evident Corollary that It is impossible we should ever come to know our last Reflexion 6. These are my Reasons why I recede from Mr. Locke in his Opinion that A Man cannot think without being Conscious of it But the Consequence he seems to draw thence that therefore Consciousness is that which causes Individuation I must absolutely deny and cannot but judge that it draws after it a Train of farther Consequences which are altogether Extravagant Of which more when we come to examin his Principle of Individuation As for the Position That Men do always think which he impugns and in my Judgment quite overthrows I cannot but wonder what the Asserters of it mean They grant the Soul has Modes and Affections peculiar to her own Nature and consequently of which she is properly the Subject Why she may not therefore retain them in her habitually as it were without exerting or exercising them as well as the Body may those proper to its Nature is altogether Unconceivable Indeed were the Soul in this condition she has here a Pure Act as Angels are it would consist with good Reason but being here in a Potential State as appears by her being Capable still of New Knowledges and her being but a Part of that one Actual Thing call'd Man and depending on the Material Compart in her Operations I cannot see on what Principle either Physical or Metaphysical they can pretend to ground such a Paradox This makes me fear that this Tenet savours strongly of that odd Opinion That the Soul here is a Pure Act as the Angels are or a Distinct Thing from the Body that is a Forma Assistens and not Informans tho' they are loath to own it barefacedly but shift it off with witty Explications of their own Doctrine which when brought to the Test of Close Reason vanish into Air at which ingenious ways of Evasion it must be confess'd they are very great Artists REFLEXION Third ON The Second Third and Fourth CHAPTERS 1. I Must except against his making or naming the Objects of our Senses simple Ideas having already prov'd that the only absolutely simple Idea or Notion is that of Existence To which are Respective which argues some Complexion or Composition one way or other all our other Notions of the Thing which we have or can have as is shown in my Method B. 1. Less 2d from § 14. to § 20. I could wish he had taken the Distinction and Order of his Notions from Nature which Teaches us that the Notion of Res is before Modus Rei and that the Consideration or Notion of Thing is more Knowable than that of any Mode and the Mode of quantity is that which naturally antecedes and grounds all the other Modes that can be conceiv'd belonging to Body Nor will it excuse this Deviation from Nature that we have no exact Notions of Individuals since we can abstract the Notion of
all likewise that is all Bodies or the whole Nature of Body that is the Entire Bulk of Body must be Continued And therefore 't is as great a Contradiction that some Bodies or some Parts of Body should not be Continued or which is the same that there should be a Vacuum as that Triangularity should be in some one Body and yet it should not be Triangular that Whiteness should be in a Wall and yet it should not be White or Unity in a Thing and yet it self should not be Unum This is my Way of Demonstrating against Vacuum within the World to prove and not suppose the World Full or Continued which I draw out of the Abstract Notion of Quantity or of Body consider'd as Quantitative and out of those Notions most Intimately and Essentially Connected with it Which why it should not be as Evident as any Demonstration in Mathematicks or why we cannot draw as clear a Demonstration from the Nature of Quantity in Common as we can from the Nature of such a Quantity I desire any Man who is so wise as to know that all Science and Demonstration do consist in the Connexion of Terms to inform me I say any such Man for if he knows not This it is Impossible he should know any Thing at all in Philosophy or even in Logick and so he is not worth discoursing with 6. Hence is seen that it is impossible that a Sucker in a Pump may draw up Water and yet the next Body not follow We may Fancy it if we please but our Fancy cannot change the Natures of Things It cannot make Continuity not to be Continuity Quantitative Unity not to be such an Unity nor Quantity not to be Quantity any more than his Solidity can be Non-Solidity or the Parts of Body penetrate one another Had Mr. Locke had a Notion of Space taken indifferently from Body and something that 's not Body as we have of Sensitiveness from Man and Brute he might in that Case have fram'd an Abstract Notion of it Common and Indifferent to Body and Vacuum for then it had been grounded on the Thing and had been a solid and true Notion but since he had the Idea or Notion of Space from Body only and therefore as was largely prov'd above it could be of nothing else but of Body thus Modified it must be confin'd to Body with which as all Modes are it is Identified and therefore the Idea or Notion of it can never be applicable to what is not a Body REFLEXION Fourth ON The Seventh and Eighth CHAPTERS 1. HAving already shewn that our only Simple Notion is that of Existence I have no Occasion to make any Remarks on his 7th Chapter but that 't is highly Commendable in the Author to reduce his Speculations to Piety and Contemplation This being not only our Duty but that Best End to which all Solid Speculation naturally leads us 2. As for his 8th Chapter I grant that all the Ideas or Notions we have are Positive in the Understanding at least in part but the Reason of it is because they do all of them include the Thing as 't is thus consider'd without which we could have no Ideas of Privations or Negations at all For Non-Ens formally as such or as totally Excluding Ens can have no Intelligibility nor consequently any Notion by which we can understand it And Privations differ from Negations only in this that they include in their Notion a Capacity of the Subjects having such or such a Mode annex'd to its not having it which Capacity clearly Connotates the Thing since there cannot be a Capacity without some Thing that is Capable or has that Capacity Add that I see not how Ideas being Resemblances an Idea consider'd by us as a Positive real Being can ever resemble or represent Privations they being of at least Subcontrary Natures What I hold is that when we conceive a Thing as having some Privation in it the Idea of it is partly Positive partly Privative and the Material Part of it is the Thing the Formal as Privative or as thus Modify'd For Ideas I mean Notions of Privations without including the Thing are Unconceivable and Impossible as whoever looks into their Definition will discern clearly Of this Nature in Common are all the Notions we have of the Modes or Accidents no Notion being truly or perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Thing I cannot grant that our Ideas or Notions or even Phantasms are caus'd in us by meer Motions continued from our Senses to the Brain or the Seat of Sensation but must judge for the Reasons alledg'd above that this is perform'd by those Imperceptible Bodies there spoken of or by the Effluviums themselves convey'd thither and afterwards lodged there In embracing which Opinion of our Knowledge being wrought by meer Motions made by the Objects his Excellent Wit suffers it self to be led astray by our Moderns His Reason which I conceive is also theirs is because it is not more impossible to conceive that God should annex such Ideas to such Motions than Pain to a piece of Steel dividing the Body with which that Idea has no Resemblance How unlike a Reason this is appears at first fight and I am sure this Parallel has no Resemblance at all with the Thing it is brought for I know of no Annexing the Idea of Pain to a piece of Steel but must think 't is a most highly extravagant Conceit The Business passes thus in Nature A piece of Steel being Denser and withall sharp is a proper Cause of Dividing the Body the Dividing of it is a proper Cause of its being disorder'd and render'd unable to assist the Soul or the Man in his necessary Operations This breeds naturally a Conception in the Soul or the Man that he is hurt which Naturally produces in the Knower who is highly concern'd in it Grief or Pain So that all is here carry'd on by a Train of proper Causes to proper Effects and needs no Annexing by God more than to conserve the Order of Second Causes which himself has establish'd On the other side there is no Natural Resemblance of such a Motion to such an Idea as is confess'd nor is the former a Proper Cause of the other which puts them to have recourse to this Voluntary Annexion to them by God Add that it is an odd kind of Argument to alledge that it is not impossible to conceive that God may do this or that without proving he has done it Nor is it at all allowable in Philosophy to bring in a Deus è Machinâ at every turn when our selves are at a loss to give a Reason for our Thesis Nor is it to be expected that God will alter the Nature of Things for the Interest of any Man's Tenet but since his Wisdom in his Ordinary Government of the World carries on the Course of it according to the Nature of Second Causes it must first
be prov'd that what we maintain is Agreeable to the Course of Natural Causes e'er we ought to think or imagin that God will have any hand in it And if we can prove this we need no Immediate or particular Recourse to God's favouring us by doing This or That to make good our Argument 4. I must deny too consequently to my former Doctrine that Sensible Qualities are nothing in the Objects but Powers to produce various Sensations in us unless it be meant that they have Powers to send out such Effluviums into the Brain by the Senses as imprint their very Natures in our Mind and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them existing in the Bodies themselves nor be Resemblances of them If this be true why are they call'd Ideas which either signifies Resemblances or Nothing Again since the Bodies are put to cause them how can we think they are nothing like them Can any Man think the Effect is nothing like the Cause when every Effect can be nothing but a Participation of the Cause or something coming into the Subject from the Efficient which was in it some way or other before Lastly If these Secondary Qualities be compounded of the Primary ones viz. of Solidity Extension Figure and Mobility in our Understanding why should not those Primary Qualities in re as well compound those Secondary ones in the Thing or out of our Understanding And if they do as 't is evident they must since they are all there then why are not those Secondary Ideas full as like those Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the Thing as the Primary Ideas were like the Primary Qualities in the same Thing and consequently resemble them as well as the others did their proper Originals I much doubt that the Author rather consulted his Fancy in this particular than his good Reason And because those Effluviums or the Figures of Parts which cause our Sensations are too Subtile and Indiscernable to cause Distinct Phantasms of themselves as the Primary ones did but are of a Confus'd Uniformness in Appearance he judges hence they are Nothing like the others Whereas Reason will inform Reflecters that since Colour is nothing but the Surface of a Body as 't is apt to reflect Light the manner of Reflexion found in the Surface of a White Thing which is apt to reflect much Light is to our Reason and in our Notion such as it was in the Thing imprinting it and consequently every thing Acting as it is such as came from it Whence those who by Reflex Thoughts and using their Reason do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of Whiteness do make it consist in such a Reflexion of Light bringing Effluviums with it from a Surface so advantagiously Figur'd And so the Notion of Whiteness is the same in the Thing and in the Understanding viz. those Effluviums thus Figur'd or Modified however the Appearance of it in the Fancy reaches not the true Nature of the Thing as 't is White which indeed Fancy never does 5. The Reason why the Pain which we feel is not in the Thing that Caus'd it and Sensible Qualities are so is because these last are Proper Univocal and Immediate Effects of Bodies sending out Effluviums of their own Natures but Pain being an Affection of the Soul springing from a Perception that its dear Compart is hurt and disorder'd is an Improper Remoter and Equivocal Production The Altering Disordering or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature is as was shewn the Immediate and Proper Effect of those Offensive Agents but 't is Accidental to their manner of Operating that they cause Pain or Pleasure even remotely and it lights only that sometimes they do this because the Subject or the Body in which they produce these their proper Effects haps to be Identified with a Knowing Nature only which is properly capable to Grieve or be Delighted when a Harmful or Pleasing Impression is made on the Body which is Part of the Man and in some sort himself The like is to be said of Manna and other such Instances The Alterations or Disorder made in the Guts and Stomach are Natural Proper and Immediate Effects of it but the Pain ensuing thence which is a Spiritual Disposition of the Mind is a Remote Accidental and Improper Effect of it 6. By this Time Mr. Locke sees that I agree with him that the Bodies in Nature have a Power in them to cause our several Sensations and that this Power is that which we call such a Quality of it But I disagree with him that they are only Powers to cause such a Motion and affirm it is a Power when duly Circumstanced with other Requisites as with Light to convey Visible Qualities Moisture Gustable ones c. to send out Effluviums of their own Nature to the Brain which therefore are Inherent in and Proper Parts of those Objects whether they cause Actual Sensation or no. The Sun sends out his Beams which scatter'd thinly at this remote distance from the Fountain are therefore one of Mr. Locke's Secondary Qualities which we call Light yet contracted by a Burning-Glass they perform the Proper Effect of Fire Burning whence we ought to conclude they are of the Nature of Fire Can we then deny or doubt but that the Body of the Sun which communicates or sends them out is it self Fire or that being such those Rays and the Sun have no Similitude with one another Or that when they strike the Eye they stop there and are not carry'd into the Brain Hippocrates tells us that Omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles meaning that they are pervious to the Humours which are gross Things in comparison of the Sun-Beams How can it then be doubted but that they reach the Fancy and thence the Soul and imprint their Notions or Natures there And tho' some may deny they are the same in the Mind as they are in Nature yet can it with any Shew of Reason be deny'd they are at all like the Cause that produced them The like Discourse holds in all other Sensible Qualities to what Sense soever they belong 7. To close this Discourse I am apt to think that Mr. Locke intended to oppose those who hold that the Sensible Qualities are a little kind of Distinct Entities Next I declare that tho' the Thing has accidentally a Power in it to make it self perceiv'd yet taking the Thing as an Object as he does it is but Improperly called a Power and not Properly as are our Powers or Faculties of Seeing Hearing Knowing c. are For the Act being the End for which the Power was given the Faculties or Powers are better'd and perfected by being reduced to Act and so there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object Whereas neither the Object or Thing nor
on his attributing Knowledge to Brutes about which I have been too large already He denies indeed that they have the power of Abstracting or of having General Ideas But if they have true Knowledge or any more than King David meant when he says The Sun knows his going down I see no reason why they may not have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too For if they have any Degree of Reason as he grants they have they may do all this and I am sure and have already shown their Outward Actions do as much countenance their having Reason as any signs they give us do shew that they cannot Abstract or have General Ideas since General Ideas as every good Reflecter may observe are nothing but Imperfect Ideas of the Thing and in a Thousand occasions the Object or Thing affords them no more but Imperfect or General Ideas and therefore they must have them I am much pleased with his Distinction between Wit and Judgment and I could wish that our Men of Fancy who affect to bring Religion and all they understand not to Drollery would apply it to themselves 2. The Author discourses very acutely how our Reason and Judgment are misguided by our not distinguishing our Notions exactly whence we may inferr that that part of Logick which teaches us how to distinguish them accurately and to keep them distinct is of exceeding great use and that the Study of it is to be earnestly pursu'd by all Pretenders to Science especially by new Beginners Of which I hope I have elaborately treated in the First Book of my Method 3. In order to the 12th Chapter there is no doubt but that we can unite several simpler Ideas or Notions into one and signify them by one Name but I deny that if we conjoin them otherwise than as they are or may be united in External Objects or in the Thing we can have any Complex Notions tho' we may have a Fancy of them or a kind of Imitation of some thing which once affected our Senses For since I cannot but think I have demonstrated that our Notion is the Thing as conceiv'd by us or the Thing existing in the understanding If I have any Complexion of more Simple Notions in my Mind not found to be united in the Thing the Idea in my Mind is not conformable to the Thing it self nor is it as I have prov'd it to be that Thing and then to what end should I have such an Idea as if I come to predicate it of the Thing the Proposition would be False which consequently would fill our mind with Falshoods Next as has been often prov'd formerly I deny the Soul can Unite or Act of her self or by her peculiar power tho' the Man may but is oblig'd to take what 's given her by Impressions on the Seat of Knowledge In which case what the Thing or Object by a Genuin Impression gives her is Orderly Solid and a Seed of true knowledge or Science but that which the Fancy gives her otherwise than as the Thing did directly imprint it is Disorderly Superficial and a Ground of Errour Indeed she is forc'd to apprehend whenever the Phantasms strike the Seat of Knowledge tho' their Motions and Complexions be never so Disorderly or even Monstrous Now whenever this is done Judicious Men direct their Eye to the Thing and examine whether the Conjunction of such or such Ideas is truly found in re or is agreeable to those Direct Impressions it had received thence which if it be the Soul entertains it after Examination and lets it sink into her it being the true nature of the Thing and so a Ground to Truth to see which her Essence was made If it be not she rejects it for it grounds a Contradiction to the Nature of the Thing which is the only Ground of Truth and makes or counterfeits it to be what it is not and it is directly against her Nature to admit Contradictory Judgments Now what Judicious Men by their recourse to the Thing thus reject those Unskilful Thinkers who are led by Fancy do admit and by this means their Souls become full of Phantastick Conceits which never can be brought to any Coherence or Connexion of Terms For no Terms can Cohere unless the Notions meant by each of them be really in the Thing it self and those Coherences made in the Mind by any other way or of any other Materials are far from Solid or True as we experience in People that are Splenetick or Enthusiaistck 4. Wherefore whenever the Ideas are connected otherwise than they are or may be in re the Object of that Act can have no Metaphysical Verity Unity nor consequently Entity in it the two former of which being Properties of Ens cannot be where Ens or Thing is not Whence the Objects of those Fantastick Acts is some non-Ens taken for an Ens which if pursu'd home by a good Logician must end in a Contradiction For example I can have Notions of Hircus and Ceruus aparted from one another but if I will unite them in my Mind otherwise than Nature exhibited them and take them conjoyntly as Fancy may and frame a a Complex Idea of a Hirco-Ceruus or Goat-Stag it must needs be perfectly Fantastical and Chimerical This will farther appear if we take one of Mr. L's Complex Ideas viz. Beauty consisting of a certain Composition of Figure and Colour Now if such Figure and Colour had not been found or might not be found united by Nature in the same Thing the Idea of it could not have been conformable to what 's in Nature or the Idea of any Reality but purely Fantastical and Counterfeit The same may be said of his Idea of Lead with its proper Qualities or of the Ordinary Idea of a Man describ'd here to be a Substance or Thing with Motion Thought and Reasoning join'd to it Which Qualities were they not join'd in the Thing they belong to or identify'd with it the Complex Ideas of them would be nothing but meer Groundless Fancies This Point is so Important that it will deserve to be clear'd as perfectly as possible I shall therefore allow it a more elaborate Explanation tho' I spend less Pains and Time in my other Reflexions When I consider an Individual Thing in Nature v. g. A Man according to the Notion of Being I have two Notions of him viz. That he is capable of Existing and that he actually Exists the former of which he has by means of Second Causes which by Determining the Matter gives him his Determinate Nature or Essence The other he has immediately from the First Being and I have a Complex Notion of him accordingly Next considering the same thing precisely as a Body or such an Ens as we call by that Name I find in it somewhat by which it is Corruptible or Changeable into another and somewhat by which it is Determin'd to be This sort of Thing or Body or
Reflex Notions have for their proper Object the Direct ones which are already in our Minds Wherefore if the Notion of Infinity can be had any other way than by adding Non to Finite it must come from our Reason finding out by Discourse that there is a First and Self-existent Being whose Essence and Attributes are beyond all Limits or actually Infinite Whence follows that since clear Reason demonstrates that all Created Entities and consequently all the Modes belonging to them are Finite and only God is Infinite in his Essence and in all his Intrinsecal Attributes And Reason also tells us that all which is in God to whom only the Notion of Infinite can belong is most highly Positive the same Reason teaches us to correct in our Thoughts the Grammatical Negativeness of the Word Infinite which can only be apply'd to Him and to look upon it and esteem it as most perfectly Positive 5. I cannot pass by unreflected on a Passage § 16. in which Mr. Locke's Fancy imposes strangely upon his Reason He says that Nothing is more unconceivable to him than Duration without Succession What thinks he of the Duration of God in whom is no Vicissitude or Shadow of Change which Text I believe no Man at least no Christian but holds to be Plain and Literally True whereas Succession is essentially perpetual Change Let him please to reflect that To Endure so long is nothing else but to be so long which done by cutting off so long in both those Sayings he will sind that To Endure is neither more nor less but simply To be Whence his Conceit is so far from being True that Nothing more wrongs Duration or Being than does Succession or Motion And therefore our Duration here which is Unsteady Unconstant and Transitory is justly reputed to be the worst sort of Duration or Being and the next to Not-Being or Not-Enduring at all Again Common Sense tells us that nothing moves meerly for Motion's sake and therefore that all Motion is to attain something which is Not-Motion but the End of it that is Rest. Wherefore Eternal Rest or that Duration called Eternity is the End of all the Motion of the whole World conformably to what the Holy Scripture speaking of the State of Eternity tells us that Tempus non erit amplius Time nor consequently Succession shall be no more Wherefore since taking away Motion and Succession 't is impossible to imagin any thing in Duration but only Being and Eternity is an infinitely better Duration or State of Being than this Transitory one which is Successive it follows that Eternal Rest in which we have all we can have or could acquire by Motion at once is the only true Duration and our Duration here only the way to it So far is Duration from being Unconceivable without Succession if we guide our Thoughts by Principles and not by meer Fancy REFLEXION Eleventh ON The Eighteenth Nineteenth and Twentieth CHAPTERS 1. THE three next Chapters of Simple Modes are very suitable to Mr. Locke's Doctrine delivered formerly and almost all of them agreeable to Nature particularly the 20th which gives us more genuin Definitions of the several Passions and more aptly in my Judgment expresses them than Mr. Hobbes has done tho' he is justly held to have a great Talent in delivering his Conceptions But I must deny that the Perception or Thought made by Impressions on the Body by Outward Objects is to be called Sensation For if Thoughts be Sensations then the Sense can Think which being the proper Act of the Mind I believe none will say if he reflects that our Soul is of a Spiritual Nature Nor are the Modes of Thinking at all proper to the Senses The Truth is that Man having two Natures in one Suppositum all the Impressions upon him as he is an Animal do also at the same time I may say the same Instant affect him also as he is Spiritual whence they are to be called Sensations as they are receiv'd in that material Part called the Seat of Knowledge and the same Direct Impressions as they proceed farther and affect his Soul are call'd Notions or Simple Apprehensions Wherefore as the two Natures in Man are Distinct and have their Distinct Properties and Modes so the Words that are to express what 's peculiar to each of those Natures are to be Distinguish'd too and kept to their proper Signification which cannot be if Thought which is peculiar to the Mind be confounded with Sensation which properly belongs to the Corporeal part But I suspect the Printer may be here in the Fault and not the Author the Sense in this place being something imperfect 2. To the Question proposed Cap. 19. § 9. Whether it be not probable that Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul I answer That 't is more than probable for 't is Demonstrable that 't is only the Action and not the Essence of it For in such Natures as are potential or apt to receive Impressions from other things as the Soul is in this State and therefore their Essence does not consist in being Pure Acts as Angels are Being must necessarily be presuppos'd to Operating especially when their first Operation as Thinking is to the Soul is a meer Passion caus'd by Impressions from another thing which are therefore purely Accidental to the Subject that receives them And I wonder Mr. Locke would even propose this as a Question to be yet decided or think it but Probable since he has formerly maintain'd assertively That Men do not always think For if it be not certain that Thinking is not the Essence of the Soul it follows necessarily that Men must always think since the Soul can never be without her Essence or what 's Essential to her 3. His Position that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain however it may hap to be misunderstood by some well-meaning Bigots is a most solid Truth and is exceedingly useful to explicate Christian Principles and to shew God's Wisdom and Goodness in governing Mankind Connaturally He proposes to him Fulness of Joy and Pleasures for evermore and such as being Spiritual and most Agreeable to the Nature of the Soul are Pure Durable and filling the whole Capacity of its boundless Desire not Transitory Mean and Base which tho' they cloy never satisfie Heaven would not be Heaven if it were not infinitely Pleasant and Delightful nor would Hell be Hell if it were not Penal And in case that Explication of Epicurus his Tenet which is given it by some of his Followers be truly his which makes Man's Summum Bonum consist in Pleasure at large and chiefly in the best Pleasures of the Mind it would not misbecome a Christian Philosopher Whence results this Corollary that The whole Body of Christian Morality depends as on its Practical Principle upon our making a wise Choice of the Pleasures we pursue here For the Object of our
is because it is Good to him I believe it is impossible with any Shew of Reason to deny it Now if this be so it will follow that 't is Good only which is the Formal Motive of the Will and Ease no otherwise than as it is Good 19. Secondly All that we naturally affect being only to be Happy or to be well it follows that Good only is that which our Rational Appetite the Will strives to attain or pursues and acts for 20. Thirdly Appearing Good being held by all to be the Object of the Will for none hold that Good will move it unless it appears such and the Greater Appearance of it having a greater and sometimes the Greatest Power to move it I observe that tho' Mr. Locke does now and then touch slightly at the Appearance of the Good proposed to the Understanding yet he no where gives the full Weight to the Influence the several Degrees of this Appearance have over the Understanding to make the Man will it but only denies that Good or the Greater Good in it self determines the Will Whereas even the Greatest Good â—dimly appearing such may not perhaps out-weigh the least Good if it be very Lively represented or Apply'd close to our view by a Full Appearance of it Hence his Argument that Everlasting Unspeakable Goods do not hold the Will whereas very great Uneasiness does has not the least Force because he still leaves out the Degree of their Appearing such to us For since especially in our Case eadem est ratio non entium non apparentium and no Cause works its Effect but as it is Apply'd he should either have put an Equal Appearance of the two Contesting Motives or nothing will follow 21. Fourthly This Equal Appearance put his Argument is not Conclusive but opposes himself For the prodigious Torments inflicted by the Heathen Persecuters upon the Primitive Martyrs were doubtlesly the Greatest present Uneasiness Flesh and Blood could undergo yet the Lively Appearance of their Eternal Happiness tho' Distant and Absent which their Well-grounded Faith and Erected Hope assur'd them of after those Short tho' most Penal Sufferings overcame all that Inconceivable Uneasiness they suffer'd at present 22. Lastly How can it be thought that the getting rid of Uneasiness or which is the same the Obtaining of Ease can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will Powers are ordain'd to perfect the Subject to which they belong and the better the Object is which they are employ'd about so much in proportion the Man is the Perfecter who applies that Power to attain it It cannot then be doubted but True Happiness being the Ultimate Perfection Man can aim or arrive at which is only attainable by Acts of his Will that Power was naturally ordain'd to bring Man to his highest State of Perfection by such an Acquisition or by loving above all Things and pursuing that Object and consequently since this consists in obtaining his Summum Bonum 't is the Goodness of the Object apprehended and conceited such which determines the Will and therefore the Straining after Greater and even the Greatest Goods and being Determin'd to them is what by the Design of Nature his Will was given him for Now who can think that meerly to be at Ease is this Greatest Good or the Motive Object End or Determiner of the Will Ease without any farther Prospect seems rather to be the Object of an Idle Drone who cares not for perfecting himself at all but sits still satisfy'd with his Dull and Stupid Indolency It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all Virtue which is Arduous and not perform'd but by Contrasting with Ease and present Satisfactions It quite takes away the very Notion of the Heroick Virtue of Fortitude whose very Object is the Overcoming Ease and attempting such Things as are Difficult and Inconsistent with it I expect Mr. Locke will say that all these Candidates of Virtue had not acted had they not according to their present Thoughts found it Uneasie not to act as they did But I reply that Uneasiness was not their Sole Motive of Acting nor the only or Formal Determiner of their Will For in that case if meerly to be rid of Uneasiness had mov'd them to act meer Ease had satisfy'd them Whereas 't is Evident they aim'd at a Greater Good than meerly to be at Ease In a Word Ease bears in its Notion a Sluggish Unactive and most Imperfect Disposition It seems to sute only with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Insensibility of a Stoick Pleasure and Joy have some Briskness in their Signification Desire is Active and implies a Tendency to some Good we affect But the meer being at Ease denotes no more but a Stupid Indisturbance which Noble Souls hate as mean and are weary of it And if Ease be the proper Motive and Determiner of the Will and the Greatest Good the Will can have or wish is Eternal Glory it would follow that the Glory of the Saints and Angels in Heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at Ease which is far from Elevating the Soul to the highest Degree of Perfection as Glory or the Beatifying Sight of God does and only signifies she is when in Heaven securely out of Harm's way or free from being disturb'd ever after By which no great Good accrues to her but only a kind of Neutral State in which she shall receive no Hurt 23. The true Point then seems to me to stand thus The Object of the Will an Appearing Good works many Effects immediately consequent to one another First When the Appearance is but slight it begets a Liking of it when Lively a Love of it which determines the Will to it to which if Great follows an Effectual Tendency towards it called Desire of it Desire not satisfy'd troubles us or makes us Uneasie Uneasiness makes us strive to change our Condition to get Ease This makes us to cast about and Consider how to find Means to do it Means found we make use of them and actually go about to rid our selves of what was Uneasie to us Now tho' some of these are nearer to our Outward Action than others yet the Appearing Good in the Object is the Common Cause which produces all those Orderly Dispositions in virtue of which as the First Motive they do all Act Assist and Concurr to determine our Will to go about the Outward Action with Vigour 24. Ere I part with this Chapter of Power I am to observe that Mr. Locke has not any where so much as touch'd at the Power to be a Thing tho' Nature gives us as Clear a Notion of it as of any other Power whatever For as oft as we see one Thing made of Another which we know is not Created anew so often our Natural Reason forces us to acknowledge that somewhat of the former Thing could be made another Thing and this as evidently as when we see a Thing Act
all its parts Continued or Coherent as Duality does make a Stone and a Tree formally Two or Rotundity in a Body makes it Round or any other Formal Cause is engag'd by its very Essence to put its Formal Effect which would induce a Clear Contradiction if it should not 10. 'T is not in this Occasion only but in many others too that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out Natural Causes for divers Effects the true Reason for which is only owing to Trans-natural ones or from these Altissimae Causae which only Metaphysicks give us and it happens also not seldom that Men beat their Brains to find out Efficients for that which depends only on Formal Causes whose most certain Causality depends on no Second Causes but only on the First Cause God's Creative Wisdom which establish'd their Essences to be what they are Let any one ask a Naturalist why Rotundity does formally make a Thing Round and you will see what a Plunge he will be put to not finding in all Nature a Proper Reason for it The same in other Terms is the Ground of Mr. Locke's Perplexity how Extended Parts do cohere to which the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is because there is Quantity in them which is Essentially Continued and so does Formally give Coherence of Parts to Body its Subject By the same means we have a Clear Reason afforded us why Bodies impell one another which Mr. Locke thinks is Inexplicable For putting one Body to be thrust against another the Body that is Passive must either be shov'd forwards or there must necessarily be Penetration of Parts unless perhaps at first the Impulsive Force be so slight and leisurely that it is able to cause only some Degree of Condensation Every thing therefore acting as it is if the Body or the Quantity of it be Extended or have one Part without the other and therefore it be impossible its Parts should be penetrated or be one within the other the Motion of the Passive Body must necessarily ensue 11. To proceed Mr. Locke makes account we have as clear a Knowledge of Spirits as we have of Bodies and then argues that we ought no more to deny the Existence of Those than of These Which I should like well did he maintain and prove first that the Nature of Bodily Substances is clearly Intelligible But to make those Notions which are most Essential and Proper to Bodies and most Obvious of all others viz. their Entity or Substance and their Extension to be Unintelligible and then to tell us that The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance which he takes such pains to shew is not Clear at all is as I conceive no great Argument for their Clearness nor their Existence neither but rather a strong Argument against both The Parallel amounting to this that we know not what to make either of the one or of the other 12. As for the Knowledge we have of Spiritual Natures my Principles oblige me to discourse it thus We can have no Proper or Direct Notions of Spiritual Natures because they can make no Impressions on our Senses yet as was shewn above our Reflexion on the Operations and Modes which are in our Soul make us acknowledge those Modes are not Corporeal and therefore that the Immediate Subject of those Modes our Soul is not a Body but of another nature vastly different which we call Spiritual Our Reason assures us also by demonstrating that the first Motion of Bodies could neither proceed immediately from God nor from our Soul which presupposes both that and many other Motions to her Being that there must be another sort of Spiritual Nature distinct from our Soul from which that Motion proceeds which therefore being Active and so in Act it self is not a Compart but a Whole and Subsistent alone which we call Angels Their Operations prove they have Actual Being and therefore a fortiori they are capable to be or Things Whence we must correct our Negative Expressions of them by our Reason and hold they are Positive Things all Notions of Thing being Positive Farther we can as evidently discourse of those Beings or Things tho' Negatively express'd as we can of any Body v. g. if an Angel be Non-quantus we can demonstrate it is Non-extensus Non-locabilis c. and from its having no Matter or Power which is the Ground of all Potentiality and Change 't is hence collected that 't is a Pure Act and therefore that once Determin'd it is Immutable at least Naturally Lastly I affirm that this presupposed we can discourse far more clearly of Spirit than of Bodies For there are thousands of Accidents belonging intrinsecally or extrinsecally to every Individual Body whence all our Confusion and Ignorance of it comes whereas in a Pure Spirit there are only three or four Notions viz. Being Knowledge Will and Operation for us to Reflect on and Manage and therefore the Knowledge of them is as far as this Consideration carries more Clearly attainable than is the Knowledge of Bodies REFLEXION Fourteenth ON The 24th 25th 26th and 27th CHAPTERS 1. THE 24th Chapter Of the Collective Ideas of Substance gives me no Occasion to reflect Only when he lays as it were for his Ground that the Mind has a Power to compare or collect many Ideas into one I am to suppose he means that the Mind does not this of her self alone without the Joint-acting of the Body as has been often prov'd above for otherwise the whole or the Man cannot be said to be the Author of that Action 2. The 25th Chapter gives us the true Notion of Relation and very clearly express'd which he seconds with divers other Solid Truths viz. That some Terms which seem Absolute are Relatives that Relation can be only betwixt two Things and that All things are capable of Relation What I reflect on is that he gives us not the true Difference between Real and meerly Verbal Relations nor the true Reason why some Relative Terms have and others have not Correlates He thinks the Reasons why we call some of them ExtrinsecalDenominations which is the same with Verbal Relations proceed from Defect in our Language or because we want a Word to signifie them Whereas this matters not a Jot since we can have the Idea or Notion of Relation in our Minds if we have good Ground for it whether we have a Word to signifie it or no or rather if we have a Real Ground for it we shall quickly invent either some one Word or else some Circumlocution to express it Let us see then what our Principles in this Affair say to us 3. Relation is not here taken for our Act of Relating for then it would belong to another common Head of Notions call'd Action but for the Thing as it is referred by our Comparative Power to another Wherefore there must be some Ground in the Thing for our thus referring in
nor consequently in proper Speech a Thing it follows again that that Complexion of Acccidents which gave the Thing its Primigenial Constitution in the very first Instant it was thus ultimately Determin'd to be This or Different from all others of the same Kind did truly and properly Individuate it Note that this Discourse holds equally in Elementary Mix'd Living Vegetable and Animal Individuums allowing only for the smaller or greater Number of Accidents which goes to the constituting each of them respectively Why Mr. Locke who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the Specifick Nature should not follow the same Principle in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinsecally distinguish the Individuum from all others and so constitute It I cannot imagin it being so perfectly Consonant and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine and agreeable to Evident Principles 7. Applying then this Discourse to Man Since it is the constant Method of God's Wisdom as he is the Author of Nature to carry on the Course of it by Dispositions on the Matter 's side and therefore to adjust and fit that which Supervenes to what Pre-exists and especially to sute the Form to the Matter and since 't is evident that the Embrio pre-exists to the Infusion of the Soul as the peculiar Matter to its Form it follows that the Soul is adjusted to the Bodily or Animal Part and according to the Degree that part of it call'd the Fancy is better or worse fitted as far as is on its side to perform such Actions when it is ripe or more or less fit to work comparatively in which all Judging and Discoursing consists there will be infused a Soul apt to judge and discourse more perfectly or less perfectly according as the Matter requires And were it otherwise so that the Soul were apt to work more perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it first that greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be lost and in vain and next the Man God's Workmanship would be disproportion'd and in a manner Monstrous in his most Essential Parts Putting then those Parts orderly fitted to one another which can only be done as was shewn by suting the Supervening Part to that which pre-existed it follows necessarily that as the Bodily or meerly Animal Matter of Man the Embryo was in the Instant before the Soul was infused and the Man made individually different from all of the same Kind or from all other Embryo's and so was consequently just to such a Degree fit by the peculiar Disposition of its Brain as it s conjoin'd Instrument to act with the Soul comparatively so it is impossible the Soul being proportion'd to that Matter as its Form that any two Souls should be perfectly Alike or Equal in Rationality or rather that any Two Men should have a Capacity of Knowing or Reasoning to the self-same Degree For were they equally Rational those two Men would be but one and the same Man Essentially or under the Notion of such a Species in regard that tho' they might have many Accidental Differences yet they would have nothing in the Line of such a Rational Ens or Man to distinguish them Essentially or make and constitute them formally Two such Entities or Things as we call Men or Rational Animals 8. This premis'd I come to examin Mr. L's Discourses upon this Subject He imagins Existence is the Principle of Individuation which can consist with no show of Reason For since Thing in Common cannot exist and therefore what 's Ultimately determin'd to be this Thing or an Individuum can only be capable of Actual Being 't is evident that the Individual Thing must in priority of Nature or Reason be first constituted such ere it can be capable of Existence Wherefore 't is impossible that Existence consider it how we will can be in any manner the Principle of Individuation the constitution of the Individuum being presupposed to it Again since as has been shown above the Notion of a Thing or an Individuum speaking of Creatures is Capable to be 't is impossible that Actual Being or Existence should constitute the Potentiality or Capacity of Being any more then the meer Power of walking can constitute or denominate a Man Actually walking Besides both Logick and Metaphysicks demonstrate that Existence it being the immediate Effect of the first Cause who is Essentially an Infinitly-Pure Actuality of Being is therefore the most Actual of any Notion we have or can have Wherefore since whatever does difference or distinguish Another must necessarily be more Actual than the Notion Distinguish'd it follows that Existence is of its own Nature a most perfectly uniform and Undistinguishable Effect that is one and the same in all Creatures whatsoever as far as concerns its own precise Nature or Notion For Reflexion will inform us clearly that whatever Notion is Distinguishable is Potential and that the Distinguishing Notion is more Actual than it Since then no Notion can be more Actual than is that of Existence it follows it cannot possibly be Distinguish'd at all Whence follows this Unexpected tho' Clear Consequence that if Existence does constitute the Individuality all the Individuums in the world as having one and the Self-same Constituter would be but one Individuum 9. Next Mr. L. fancies that the Existing of a Thing in the same Time and Place constitutes the Identity of a Thing and the being in several Times and Places constitutes its Diversity By which 't is easy to discern that he distinguishes not between the Extrinsecal Marks and Signes by which we may know the Distinction of Individuals and what Intrinsecally and Essentially constitutes or makes them differeut Things Who sees not that Time and Place are meerly Extrinsecal to the Notion of Substance or rather toto genere different from it as belonging to other Common Heads And therefore they are too Superficial Considerations for their Identity and Diversity which are Relations grounded on their Essence to consist in them Besides Time and Place are evidently no more but Circumstances of the Thing wherefore that very word Circumstance shows plainly that they cannot be Intrinsecal much less Essential to it and it evidences moreover that they suppose the Thing already constituted to which they are annext Tho' then Practical men may have light thence to distinguish Individuums yet it is very Improper for Philosophers or Speculative Reflecters to make the Entity of Things which grounds the Relations of Identity and Diversity to consist in these Outward Signes and Circumstantial Tokens 10. This Learned Gentleman conceives there must be a Different Reason for the Individual Identity of Man To make way to which he premises and would perswade us gratis that it is one thing to be the same Substance another the same Man and a third to be the same Person But I must forestall all his Subsequent Discourses by denying this Preliminary to them For speaking of one and the
or as we use to call them must be Intrinsecal which as is demonstrated in my Method can be no other but more and less of the immediate Superiour Notions The First two Differences of Ens for Example join'd with the Common Head it self gives us the Definitions of the two first Subaltern Genera and each of those two and of the inferiour Genus's being for the same Reason divided after the same manner do still give us naturally as it were the Definitions of the next two Members immediately under them and so still endways till we come at the Individuums each of which being constituted by an innumerable Multitude of Accidents we are when we come there lost in a pathless Wood and can no longer Define or give a clear and entire Account of the Intrinsecal Dictinction of those Particulars but are forced to content our selves with some few Notions belonging to them which distinguish them from others or to describe them by Outward Signs and Circumstances for our Use and Practice our Speculation being here Nonplust 10. When Mr. Locke shall have leisurely consider'd each Step of this short Discourse he will find that Nature forces us upon this Method of Defining by a Genus and a Difference that Art which is nothing but Nature well reflected on shews us it must be so and that his own Definition of Man will oblige him even while he opposes this Method to have recourse to it for Refuge For when he puts Man to be a Solid Extended Substance should it be deny'd because there is but one part of Man his Body that is Solid and Extended and not his Spiritual part the Soul his only Defence can be this that those Words were meant only for the General Notion or what was Common to Man and all other Bodies for which Reason Substance there is the Highest Genus and that which follows is meant to difference or distinguish him from them Next it will be unanswerably objected that Man being a Thing or which is the same a Substance which signifies meerly what 's capable to be and a Definition telling us the Essence of the Notion defin'd he deviates manifestly from the Fundamental Laws of Art by taking in such Differences to distinguish Substance viz. Solidity and Extension which are Foreign to this Common Head of Being or Thing and belong to other Common Heads which are only Modes of Thing viz. those of Quantity and Quality Add That this seems also to contradict his own Doctrin B. 2. Chap. 13. § 11 12. and B. 3. Chap 6. § 21. where he makes Extension and Body not to be the same I suppose he means in part which were Extension a Proper and Intrinsecal Difference of Substance constituting the Essence of Body could not be said Now as was lately shewn all these Rubs are avoided if we separate our Notions into Common Heads and by dividing those Heads by Intrinsecal Differences at the same time make our Definitions of each Inferior Notion Nor can it be objected that we also use Extrinsecal Differences while we divide Substance by Divisible and Indivisible and yet make Divisibility the Notion of Quantity for all such Exceptions are fore-stall'd in my Method B. 1. Less 3. and particularly §§ 5. and 6. 11. The like Errour and no less Fundamental is his Assertion Chap. 3. L. 11. that Generals and Universals belong not to the Real Existence of Things but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding made by it for its own Use and concern only Signs whether Words or Ideas Had he said that Universals belong not to the Existence of Things as they are in Nature or that Universals as such are not capable of Existing there I could understand him But if he means they do not belong to the Existence of Things in the Understanding or that they are designedly invented or fram'd or made use of by it for its own Convenience I must utterly deny it For it is as evident that Nature makes them in our Mind as it is that because we cannot here comprehend Individuals therefore Nature by imprinting Objects diversly in us and by different Senses forces the Mind to have Partial or Inadequate Notions of it Now every Inadequate Notion in what Line soever is an Universal Notion as will appear to any Man who reflects upon the Ideas or Notions of Ens Corpus Vivens Animal Homo all which are Inadequate and withall Universal Notions in respect of the Individuum When I see a Thing a-far off so that I can yet make nothing of it but that 't is something or some Body 't is evident that I have only an Universal Notion of it since I know not yet what it is in particular and that this General Notion is not Invented or Created by my Mind but given me by Nature The like happens when I hear one knock at the Door without knowing who it is in particular and in a Hundred such like Occasions So that the Mind and it only is indeed Capable of Universal Notions but 't is only Nature and not her self which begets in her those Notions Her only Work is to Compare or Discern the Identity or Diversity of those Notions but Nature gives her those Objects or Materials on which she thus works Thus when we see two or many Things agree 't is those Natural Objects that have in them something Agreeing to both which causes in me a Common Notion called Animal or Homo and the mind lends nothing but her Comparing Nature to make those Common Notions which Artificial Reflecters designedly re-viewing call them Genus and Species Let us hold to the Things in Nature Our Mind as was often said is not here in an Actual State but in a Potential one and therefore when we ascribe to her singly any Activity we make her do what she cannot do and so missing the true Causes of such Effects we fall into great Errours 12. As for that Catachresis of Nominal Essences which answer to those few Abstract Notions we have Actually of the Things when we name them making a Complex Idea I deny we have any such Intention as he speaks of in naming any Thing For tho' at that time we do actually know but Few of those Accidents whose Complexion does indeed go to the whole Essence yet being pre-assur'd the Thing has more Modes in it than we know or think of we do not nominate them precisely according to what we do then actually know exclusively of all others but including them confusedly Rather otherwise we cannot know the Thing at all because it involves confusedly all the Modes that are in it Known or Unknown as their Subject For tho' we should afterwards discover more particular Accidents in Gold than we did formerly yet we should not alter the Name which signifies its Substance or Essence nor would call it any thing but Gold still however the newly discover'd Mode gave us a new Idea of it self Annex'd to that
in it or no. It may be said that the Mind knows the Thing by the Idea because it is a Picture or Similitude that represents it But I way walk in a Gallery and see a Hundred Pictures in it of Men and many other Things in Nature and yet not know one jot the better any one of the Things represented unless I had know them formerly tho' Apelles himself had drawn them I may remember them again indeed if I had known them before which cannot be said in our case because those Ideas of theirs are to give them the First Knowledge of the Thing 3. Being thus at a loss to explicate Intervention or to know what It or the Idea or Representation serves for we will reflect next upon the Word know which Mr. Locke applies tho' not so immediately yet indifferently to the Thing and to the Idea Now if this be so and that to to be known agrees to them both then as the Idea is in the Mind when it is known so the Thing when known should be in the Mind too which is our very Position thought by the Ideists so Paradoxical and yet here forcibly admitted by themselves And if neither the Idea brings the Thing into the Knowing Power or which is the same into the Mind nor the Mind or Knowing Power goes out of the Soul to it I know not how they can pretend to show how the Knowing Power and the Thing known can ever come to meet as they must when ever an Act of Knowledge is made 'T is to no purpose then to alledge that the Thing comes into the mind or is brought thither by means of the Idea for if it comes or is brought thither let it be by what means it will 't is most incontestably Evident that after it is come or brought thither it is there Nor can all the Wit of Man avoid this Consequence unless plain words must lose their Signification Wherefore Mr. L. in pursuance of his own Principles should not have said that the Mind does not know Things immediately but by means of the Ideas but that it does not know them at all neither mediately nor immediately for if the Thing be in the Knowledge at all they must be in the Mind where onely the Knowledge is which comes over thus far to our Position 4. It must be confess'd that Mr. Locke has here § 3. put the Objection against the Ideists as strongly and home as it is possible But I must still persist and avow that neither his own excellent Wit which had he light on right Principles could reach to any thing that is within the Compass of Possibility nor all the World joining in his Assistance can clear that Objection so as to satisfie any Intelligent Man who is true to his Reason guiding it self as it ought by Connexion of Terms and not by Fancy nor shew that by his Ideas any Knowledge at all of the Thing can be possibly had First He alledges the Agreement or Conformity of the Things with his Simple Ideas And I reply that he cannot by the Principles of the Ideists shâ—w that the Things do agree or disagree with his Simple Ideas at all To demonstrate which I argue thus Ere he can know that the Representation and the Thing represented do agree Common Sense tells us he must have both the Idea and the Thing in his Comparing Power that is in his Mind that so he may take a View of both of them and consider them in order to one another and by doing this see whether the one does truly resemble the other or no. But this is directly against the Principles of the Ideists who do not allow that the Thing can be in the Mind but the Idea only Next he alledges that his Complex Ideas are Archetypes and not Conformable to the Things as the others were but to themselves only and therefore he says they cannot lead us into Errour because they cannot but represent themselves I pass by the Oddness of the Position that the Idea which is a Picture should be a Picture of it self or represent it self I only note that this Allegation which should clear the Point quite loses it and gives it up For the Question is whether his Ideas do give us the Knowledge of the Things in Nature and 't is evident and confess'd they cannot give us this Knowledge of them but by representing them Now he tells us that his Complex Ideas are not Copies of the Things nor represent them but themselves only Whence is evidently concluded that we are never the nearer to the Knowing of Things by them no not obliquely and at Second hand or by the Intervention of those Ideas or Similitudes representing them as was pretended formerly Whence for any thing he has produced we may justly doubt whether such Ideas are not Whimsical Fancies without any Reality at all since he will not allow them even that slightest Relation to the Things of so much as representing them But which is much worse he affirms § 5. that those Ideas themselves are consider'd as the Archetypes and the Things no otherwise regarded but as they are conformable to them Now this seems to me a strange way of proving the Reality of our Knowledge by Ideas to affirm that we are not to regard the Things but as conformable to our Ideas Is not this to make Philosophy not the Knowledge of Things but of Ideas only and to pretend that the Thing must only be held True if it be Conformable to our Ideas He might as well have said Fancies for he expresly says these Complex Ideas are made by the Mind and not taken from the Thing nor like it And whatever is neither the Res nor so much as like it can neither have Reality nor Shew of Reality and therefore must be a meer Fancy Now these Complex Ideas reach much farther than all the others do viz. to Modes Substances and Relations as is seen Book 1. Chap. 12. So that this Discourse of his destroys the Reality of our Knowledge in almost all the Things we are to know He will perhaps say those Complex Ideas are the Effects of certain Powers to Cause them found in the Thing and by this Means they bring the Things as being their Causes into their Mind But the Argument returns still with the same Force for if they bring the Thing into the Mind then the Thing is in the Mind when it is brought thither Add that this makes them Resemblances of the Thing which he denies for the Effect being a Participation of the Cause must necessarily resemble it especially if it be a Natural Effect Nor can he say they make us know the Thing because they are made up of Simple ones For as the Simple Ideas only made us know the Thing by representing it so these other not representing It have lost the Power of making us know it at all So that let them turn which way they will either the Thing
consequently become Opacous or Visible or it may by the same Causes become Rarer and be turn'd into Fire Also being Divisible it may have parts of which one must be without the other that is it must be Impenetrable as to its own parts and thence be able to protrude another Material being and be Solid too in his Sense of that Word which is the same with Impenetrable Moreover since it must be Divisible it must be Quantitative or Extended and this not Infinitely but Finitely that is it must be Terminated wherefore Termination of Quantity being the Notion of Figure it may have Figure too In a Word if it may possibly be Material there is no Property of Body but may agree to the Soul and therefore the Soul tho' Spiritual may be Corporeal and so the Nature of Body and Spirit may be one and the same But what needs more than meerly his ascribing Materiality to it at least permitting it to belong to it Our Notion of Matter is taken from Body and from nothing else and therefore can be nothing but Body consider'd as not what it actually is but as 't is Alterable Changeable or apt to be another Thing that is as 't is Corruptible which I am sure Mr. L. will not say or think of our Soul Perhaps he may say that he only means that it may have Matter annex'd to its Spirituality But then he must grant that since this Materiality did not as an Accident accrue to the Soul afterwards she had it from her Nature and therefore it must be Intrinsecal to her and help to constitute her peculiar Nature and if this be so then when this Material kind of Compart is dissolv'd or corrupted for if Material it may be Alter'd wrought upon and Corrupted as other Material Compounds may the Complex or Compound it self is dissolv'd and so no longer the same but perish'd Besides what should the Soul do with two Material Comparts one Organical the other Inorganical Especially since there are as subtil Parts in this Visible Body of ours with which as the Form of the Body she is united viz. the Spirits as any perhaps Mr. Locke can conceive to be annex'd to her 4. To proceed He does but think it possible for any thing he knows that the Soul may have some Materiality but he positively judges that Brutes have Reason nay that 't is as Evident to him as that they have Sense Now if they have Reason they must know how to draw Consequences this being Essential to the Notion of Reason or rather the same Thing in other Words Again If they can Reason they can compare what 's meant by our Terms and have the Sense of those Sayings we call Propositions in their Knowing Power And since that Reason is not given them for nothing but for their Preservation they can compare Agreeable and Disagreeable Objects and pursue out of that Reason that which is most Agreeable that is they can Will Chuse and Act freely which are naturally consequent to their gathering by their Reason what is better or worse for them and thence Determining themselves to it accordingly I say themselves for if they have Reason then Reason is part of Themselves and not a Distinct Thing from them Out of which Two Things follow One That the Nature of Man and Brute are Confounded since all those Chief Operations Proper to Man are Communicable to Brutes Secondly That Mr. Locke will be at a loss to get an Idea of the Spirituality of his Soul or of other Spiritual Beings by reflecting on the Operations of his Mind since the same may possibly be found in such Beings as are meerly Corporeal Wherefore to conclude this Discourse all our Natural Notions of Body and Spirit and of all their Operations must be jumbled together in a kind of Indifferency to either and therefore those two Natures must be Confounded if either the Soul which is Spiritual may have Materiality Annex'd to her or Brutes which are material Entities may have Thought Knowledge and Reason Annex'd to them And since Mr. Locke affirms very rationally that one of his Ideas is not Another I cannot but think he becomes the more oblig'd to shew out of the Natures of those two Things liquidly and precisely how those two Natures are distinguish'd or else his way of Ideas will be conceiv'd to be meerly Phantastick and Unphilosophical being most unlike the Ideas in the Divine Understanding the Original Ground of all Truth which do not confound Natures but establish them in a most perfect Distinction to be what they are and no other I press not here how no Discourse at all in Philosophy can be Conclusive unless the Nature of Body and Spirit be perfectly and clearly contradistinguish'd nor repeat what I have shewn Reflex 9. § 7. that our Natural Notions teach us to distinguish perfectly between Body and Spirit which his Ideas do not but confound them and thence deprave our Natural Knowledge of Things I know he says but proves not that the having General Ideas puts a perfect Difference between Brutes and us to which I have spoken formerly I add that 't is a thousand times easier to have General Ideas they being but Imperfect Perceptions of the Thing than to have Reason as is easie to be demonstrated and has been manifested above 5. As for making something out of Nothing or Creating after we have prov'd that Existence is Essential to God and not Accidental to him which Mr. L. clearly demonstrates it follows thence and out of the Commonest Notion of Causality that it is not a matter of Wonderment or hard to believe that he should Create but that if he pleases to operate ad extra this is his Peculiar Action since nothing is more Evident than that Every Thing acts as it is Whence if God's Essence and his very Nature be Existence or Actual Being 't is demonstrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to cause Actual Being or Create as it is for Fire to heat or Light to enlighten but moreover that this is the onely Effect that can immediately or without the intervention of Second Causes proceed from him 6. I much fear that it may seem something to weaken the true Argument for the Possibility of Creation to bring the Instance of our Thought moving our Body whence he concludes that Gods Power to do a Thing is not to be deny'd because we cannot comprehend its Operation For 1. Mr. Locke thinks he experiences this viz. that the Soul moves the Body whereas we do not experience that God Created any thing 2. As Mr. Locke has shown very ingeniously that onely the Man is Free So I affirm 't is the Man that wrought upon himself moves his Body and not his Thought onely And that as when we gaind our First Notions the Man was acted upon both according to his Corporeal and Spiritual Part so every New Act he had afterwards that proceeded from him as he was
Sensation our own Existence as well as that of any other Body whatever I doubt not but Mr. Locke will grant they would Since then the Embryo in the Womb lies in a Roundish Posture why may not one part of it by touching another or operating upon it cause in us as soon as the Soul which has a Capacity of Receiving Notions is in it a Notion of our own Existence by way of Sensation Especially since Operation is nothing but the Existence of the Agent Body press'd or imprinted as it were upon another by Motion Certainly it becomes us who deny Innate Ideas to shew how all our First Notions do come into us by Impressions on the Senses and not to say rawly that some of them come by Intuition which is the Way of Knowing Proper to Angels whose Knowledges are all Innate and none of them Acquir'd either by Sense or Discourse for they have neither This I say is certainly best for the Interest of our Tenet of which Intuition gives but a slender Account I believe Mr. Locke proceeds upon this that he finds he not only does but must as firmly assent to the Proposition Ego sum as he does to the most Evident Proposition whatever nor can he at all doubt of it nor can it need Proof But my Judgment is that this Introversion and Studying our own Interiour is a very Fallacious Guide and will often lead us astray if we keep not a steady Eye attentively bent to our Principles which he seems here to neglect For many Positions need no Proof and force our Assent and yet their Certainty may depend on Different Causes 10. The 12th Chapter treats of the Improvement of our Knowledge which Mr. Locke says does not depend on Maxims But First he mistakes the Use of General Maxims They are not made for the Vulgar or Beginners to gather Knowledge by them tho' it may be observ'd that Men of all sorts do naturally use them when they sute their purpose nay sometimes make Proverbs of them Nor was this Maxim a Whole is bigger than a Part ever intended for Boys or to teach them that their Hand is bigger than their Little Finger or such like but being premised to the ensuing Proofs they are occasionally made use of by Learned Men in the Process of their Discourse to clinch the Truth of the Point when it needs it by their Self-Evidence In the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to Metaphysical Principles and made use of them in my Preliminaries and Reflexions as Occasion presented to make my Discourses Evident and to rivet the Truths I advance in the Minds of my Readers as any Attentive Peruser of them may easily observe He speaks against our Receiving Principles without Examination and of Principles that are not Certain that is against such Sayings as are no Principles for if they can either need or admit of Examination or if they be not Certain none but meer Fops will let them pass for Prinples Yet tho' Mr. Locke does thus oppose Maxims and Principles 't is notwithstanding very evident that himself must make use of some Maxims and Principles all the while he disputes aganst their Usefulness otherwise he cannot discourse at all or his Discourse can have no Force In the same manner as he that wrastles with another must either fix his Foot on some Firm Ground or he will fall himself instead of overthrowing his Adversary Let us then examin his Principles He alledges that the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles depends only upon the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas This then is one of his Principles both because it runs through good part of his 3d and 4th Books as also because 't is Equivalent to this Universal All Certainty of Principles depends c. Now this is so far from Self-evident that it needs Examination enough and is one of those I judge not Certain and therefore can be no Ground or Principle at all Nor is it possible it should unless the Word Idea be cleared to mean Spiritual Notions in our Mind and not meer Resemblances or Material Representations in our Fancy to clear which tho' the whole Treatise needs it no Provision is made but on the contrary those two vastly different things are rather carelesly confounded as is shewn in my First Preliminary Another Principle seems to be this None ought with a Blind and Implicit Faith to Receive and Swallow Principles This is of Universal Influence and Self-Evident and therefore in all Points well qualify'd for a Principle For Principles were not Principles if they needed either Faith or Deductions of Reason to make them go down since they ought to be Evident by their own Light But what Good can this do to any but to such as have renounc'd Common Sense even to Ridiculousness And perhaps Mr. Locke had some such weak Writers in his Eye when he advanc'd this cautious Position as a Warning to Learners 11. Now the General Maxims and Principles on which the Learned Part of the World has hitherto proceeded can onely be overthrown if they must needs be so by other Principles more Evident than themselves are or else it will be but a drawn Match and so they may hope still to stand as the Lawyers phrase it in their full Force Effect and Vertue We are to consider then what Principle Mr. Locke has substituted in their room when they are discarded for 't is a very ill Case to be left without any Principles at all 'T is this All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles and consequently the Way to improve our Knowledge is to get and fix in our Minds Clear Distinct and Compleat Ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them Proper and Constant Names Now if the Ideas must be Clear the Terms must be very Simple and consequently as was shewn above General ones and this will force us back upon General Maxims which it was intended we should avoid as good for little To be Distinct if we go to work like Artists we must distinguish those General and Common Notions which will bring us back into the old Road of those Ten Common Heads called Predicaments and consequently of Genus Species and Differences which was lately dislik'd I suppose because it was too much travell'd in and beaten tho' I think such a Common Path should not be left because some may have here and there laid a Block or Briar in the way Lastly Compleat Ideas as he grants are not to be had of the Species much less of the Individuums And as for Names 't is not we that are to annex them but the Common Usage of the Vulgar or of the Generality of Learned Men in case they be Artificial ones for these are they who gave them their Constant and Proper Signification Whence is seen that so many Difficulties are involv'd in this one Thesis or Principle besides what is said
in all the other Lines come to be connaturally Subordinate to those which have a Superiour Notion for their Object and how Perfect Knowledge or Skill in the Inferiour Science is Unattainable without Knowledge or Skill in the Superiour Corollary V. Hence is demonstrated that Metaphysicks is absolutely the Highest Science and that without Knowledge or Skill in it none can perfectly understand the Inferiour Sciences so as to resolve them into their First and most Evident Principles Corollary VI. And since the Greater Clearness of that Notion which is the Object of any Science gives a greater Clearness and Evidence to the Science it self and the Greater Clearness of any Notion arises from its being more Simple and the more General they are the more Simple they are and the Notion of Ens is Evidently more General than all the rest It follows demonstratively that the Science of Metaphysicks which treats of Ens as Ens is the most Clear of any others and in the Highest Degree Evident and that they who think otherwise do guide themselves by Fancy to which such very Abstract Notions are Unsuitable Corollary VII And since Evidence determins our Understanding to Assent and therefore Certainty which is the Determination of our Judging Power follows Evidence as its Proper Cause it follows that as no Inferiour Science can be Evident without Knowledge in Metaphysicks so neither can our Knowledge of any of them be perfectly or in the Highest Degree Certain but by virtue of It or of such Maxims or First Principles as belong to It. Corollary VIII The same Discourse that is made here of Objects found in the Line of Ens and their proper Sciences may be made and have Equal force in the Objects belonging to all the Lines of Accidents and the Sciences Proper to them Corollary last Hence the Doctrine of Words is no part of Philosophy taking them as aparted from our Notions because it has neither for its Object Rem nor Modum rei nor any thing found in Nature or Belonging to it since Words are meerly Signes appointed by our Voluntary Designation to assist us in Communicating our Conceptions to others which can be no part of the Knowledge of Things or true Philosophy Words being neither Simple nor Complex Adequate or Inadequate Notions nor in any Manner taken from the Things themselves FINIS THE CONTENTS Preliminary First § 1. INtroduction § 2. The Using the word Idea in disparate Senses obstructs the way to Science 3. Philosophical Words generally used not to be laid aside without great Necessity much less changed for Others less proper 4. Mr. L.'s Acception of the word Idea very Ambiguous 5. The Ambiguity of it not clear'd by him 7. The putting Brutes to have Knowledge associates them with Mankind 8. The First Consideration pre-requir'd ere we ought to think that Brutes know 9. The Second Consideration pre-requir'd 10. That our selves both asleep and awake do without Knowledg perform as strange Operations as Brutes do 11. The Resemblance of Reason in some Actions of Brutes no Argument of their Knowledge 12. Brutes have Phantasms but no Notions or Meanings § 13. Ideas if not Spiritual Notions Inexplicable 14. Experience that we have Ideas gives no Distinct Account what they are Nor the saying they are Resemblances 15. To have Ideas of our own Ideas inexplicable 16. No Operation External or Internal begins from the Soul alone 17. Mr. L. not only nor directly oppos'd by this Discourse 18. To ground all Knowledge on Ideas not distinguish'd from Phantasms makes Science Impossible Preliminary Second § 1. THat the Elements or Materials of our Knowledge are properly to be called NOTIONS 2. The word Notion and Cognition are taken here objectively 3. What Notions are 4. Fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about Spiritual Conceptions 5. The Question about Notions stated 6. A Notion is the Thing it self in our Understanding Proof 1. Because Knowing is an Immanent Act. 7. Proof 2. Because the Thing known must be in our Knowing Power 8. Proof 3. Because a Resemblance is not the Object of our Knowledge nor sufficient to cause it 9. Otherwise Ideas only could be said to be Known 10. Proof 4. Because otherwise all Philosophy would be destroy'd 11. Proof 5. Because Similitudes cannot possibly give us the First Knowledge of Things § 12. As was prov'd formerly 13. Proof 6. Because ere we can know the Idea resembles the Thing right both of them must be in the Mind to be there compar'd 14. Proof 7. Because both the Correlates must be in the Understanding Proof 8. Because the Prototype must be first known 15. Proof 9. Because the Notions are what 's meant by Words 16. Proof 10. Because when the Thing it self is intended to be made known the Thing it self is the First Meaning or what 's first meant by the words 17. Proof 11. Because the Ideas cannot be foreknown to our Agreement what the Words are to signifie but the Things only Hence the Question whether the Things or our Notions are immediately signified by VVords is frivolous 18. Proof 12. From the Verification of Propositions 19. Proof 13. Because what 's perfectly Like is the Same 20. Proof 14. This last Reason maintain'd by the Instance of the Notion of Existence 21. Proof 15. The same Reason abetted by the Natural Sayings of Mankind 22. The Difference in the Manner of Existing prejudices not the Identity of the Notion and the Thing 23. The Eminency of the Spiritual Nature of the Soul gives her a Power to be all Things Intellectually § 24. Shewn that Things may have two Different Manners of Existing 25. No Solid Philosophy can be built on Ideas 26. What Knowledge is Preliminary Third § 1. AN Objection against the Possibility of the Whole Thing being in our Mind 2. Some Notes premis'd to clear this Objection 3. Our Knowledge is such as our Notions are 4. We can have such a Notion of a Thing or Essence as distinguishes it from all other Things 5. Confused Notions suffice for a Remote Ground of Science 6. Only Distinct or Abstracted Notions are the Immediate Ground of Distinct Knowledge or Science 7. Science thus grounded is truly called the Knowledge of the Thing 8. Abstracted Ideas tho' Exclusive of one another do Include or connotate the Thing 9. This Point farther explicated and enforc'd 10. Arg. 1. Prov'd because Abstracted Notions if Essential do evidently include the Thing 11. Arg. 2. Prov'd because all Modes do the same 12. Arg. 3. As having no Being of their own 13. This makes or shews Philosophy to be the Knowledge of Things 14. Hence Aristotle expresses the Modes or Accidents by Concrete VVords This Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words 15. Hence Space without Body or Vacuum is a Contradiction Preliminary Fourth § 1. The State of the Question 2. Aristotle neglects to shew particularly how Knowledge is made 3. Later Philosophers were at a great Puzzle about it 4. How the Schools explicated this Point 5. How
the Ideists behaved themselves as to this Point 6. How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty 7. The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions 8. And therefore he affists Nature if dispos'd when it cannot reach 9. Therefore if the Matter can be dispos'd for a Rational Soul God will give it 10. There can be such a Disposition in Matter 11. Therefore some Material Part by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Objects 12. Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. 13. Therefore Man is truly One Thing which is Corporeo-Spiritual 14. Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual or has both those Natures in it 15. VVhich is affected according to both those Natures because of their Identification in that part 16. The peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency 17. That Part very tender and Sensible yet not Tenacious § 18. That Part the most Noble of all Material Nature 19. Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light or Lucid. 20. The Effluviums have in them the Nature of the Bodies whence they are sent 21. They affect that Part as Things Distinct from the Man 22. VVhy they Imprint Abstract Notions 23. The peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly Distinct and Indivisible 24. VVhence Complex Notions come 25. The Soul cannot alone produce any new Act in her self 26. But by the Phantasms exciting her a-new 27. How Reminiscence is made 28. Memory and Reminiscence Inexplicable unless Phantasms remain in the Brain The Manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes 29. How Reflexion is connaturally made 30. Direct Notions are Common to all Mankind and their Words Proper Reflex ones Improper and their Words Metaphorical 31. Whence we come to have Negative Notions 32. But those Negative Notions do not abstract from the Subject 33. How we come to have a Notion of Nothing 34. Hence great Care to be had lest we take Non-Entities or Nothings for Things 35. Logical Notions are Real ones 36. The Test to try Artificial Notions Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge 37. How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions or as we call them Fancies How to avoid being deluded by them 38. How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions § 39. We can have no Proper Notion of God 's Essence 40. The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions or of Judgments 41. The Author's Apology for this Discourse and what can be the onely Way to go about to confute it Preliminary Fifth § 1. THE Design of the Author here § 2. The Meaning of the Word Existence 3. The Extream Danger of Misconceiving it 4. The Meaning of Ens or Thing 5. The Meaning of Entity or Essence 6. The Meaning of Matter and Form or of Power and Act. 7. What is meant literally by the common Saying that Matter and Form compound Body 8. The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility 9. What is the Principle of Individuation 10. The Meaning of the Word Substance The Word Improper 11. That the Word Supporting and Inhering taken Metaphorically may be allow'd and ought not to be Ridicul'd 12. The Meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis 13. The Meaning of Suppositality 14. The Meaning of the Word Individuum 15. The Meaning of Substantia Prima and Substantia Secunda 16. The Word Accidents is Improper § 17. The Word Modes more Proper 18. The Word Quantity is very Proper 19. The Word Extension very Improper 20. The Meaning of Divisibility Impenetrability Space and Measurability 21. A short Explication what Quantity Quality and Relation are 22. What Transcendents are 23. The Five Sorts of Transcendents 24. Great Care to be had that Transcendent Words be not held Univocal 25. What great Errours spring thence shewn in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent Word Compounded 26. The Cartesians Unadvised in going ultra Crepidam Reflexion First § 1. THE Excellent Wit and Unbyass'd Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledg'd 2. 'T is probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks 3. The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks shewn from the Objects it treats of 4. And from the Manner by which it handles them 5. The Knowledge of these High Objects Attainable by Natural Reason 6. Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas Solidly Grounded and Unanswerable Reflexion Second § 1. IN what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke 2. We may have Notions without perceiving we have them § 3. VVe may think without being Conscious that we think 4. 'T is impossible to be Conscious or know we know without a new Act of Reflexion 5. 'T is impossible to be Conscious of or know our present Reflex Act but by a new Reflex one Hence we can never come to know our Last Reflexion 6. 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation The Unreasonableness of the Opinion that Men do always think Reflexion Third § 1. NO Notion Simple but that of Existence The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature 2. The word Solidity arbitrarily and abusively taken by Mr. Locke 3. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body 4. Space without Body or Vacuum is a meer Groundless Fancy 5. The Contrary to that Tenet demonstrated 6. Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum Reflexion Fourth § 1. MR. Locke's First Chapter commendable § 2. Privative Notions connotate the Subject 3. Meer Motions made upon the Senses Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects 4. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects as in the Mind § 5. The Pretence of God's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects is Unphilosophical 6. The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge is improperly such Reflexion Fifth § 1. IDeas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions but the Object perceiv'd and durably remaining It destroys the Nature of Memory to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas The Mind cannot revive Perceptions 2. Ideas in the Fancy may fade but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul Reflexion Sixth § 1. IF Brutes can know they may have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too 2. The Distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right 3. All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of Simpler ones united in the Thing 4. Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies 5. The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made elaborately explain'd 6. How the Doctrine of Cartesius Mr. Locke and J. S. differ as to this Point Reflection Seventh § 1. EXtension not well Explicated Immensity worse 2. Place well Explicated 3. Body and Extension not the same Notion § 4. Space cannot be without Extension 5. Extension and Space differ onely Formally or in some nice respect 6. The Common Explication of Extension defended 7.
they be not wanting to themselves 5. To Assent upon a Probability is against the Commonest Light of Reason 6. There cannot be in Proper Speech any Degrees of Assent 7. Probable Assent is Nonsense or Impertinent 8. What Kinds of Distinctions are disallowable in Disputation §9 Charity to Sincere and Weak Mis-understanders is a Christian Duty 10. Tradition built on meer Hear-say has little or no Force 11. A more Firm Assent is due to Points certainly known to be reveal'd than to Scientifical Conclusions Reflexion Twenty Second §1 HOW Syllogisms came to be invented at first §2 The True Use and Abuse of them 3. Objections against Syllogistick Arguing clear'd 4. Syllogisms are useful for Demonstration 5. Syllogisms are of no Use in Probable Discourses 6. Other Mistakes about Syllogisms Clear'd 7. Inferences and Consequences of Words abstracting from their Sense is strangely against all Reason and Preposterous 8. What is due to Reason what to Divine Revelation The First Caution to be observ'd in order to this Point 9. The Second Caution to be used in this Point 10. Reason not to be rely'd on in Things beyond its Sphere 11. The Notion of is True must be distinguish'd from the Notion of may be True or may not be True 12. Therefore that no Assent ought to be built upon Probable Mediums is Demonstrable 13. All Errour comes by Assenting upon Probabilities 14. The Tenet that we ought to Assent upon Probability is highly Prejudicial to Piety and to best Christian Morality § 15. To apply our selves to the Right Method to find out Truth and Science is the onely Antidote against Errour 16. No Possible Way or Certain Standard to take the Just Measure of Probabilities 17. The Certain Rule not to be mis-led by Authority 18. Mr. Locke seems to take some Things for onely Probable which or the Authority for them are Demonstrable 19. The Members of Mr. Locke's Division of Sciences are partly Co-incident partly not belonging to Science at all 20. The Connatural Way how Sciences are to be Divided and Subordinate Some very Useful Corollaries concerning that Subject FINIS ERRATA PAge 6. line 11. which last l. 19. Notion which p. 13. l. ult poor weak p. 17. l. 19. so far p. 28. l. 3. to be p. 88. l. 28. extra Causas p. 99. l. ult Words do p. 100. l. 1. Definition p. 115. l. 11. it treats p. 170. l. 2 3. at least p. 179. l. 16. insuperably p. 181. l. 8. GOD at p. 191. l. 25. no otherwise p. 202. l. 14. found in p. 212. l. penult to be so p. 247. l. 30. as is fetch'd p. 253. l. 16. the referring it p. 266. l 2. Supposition p 272. l. 15. given them p. 340. l. 22. may walk p. 348. l. 33. t is hard p. 393. l. 13. l. 5. or other p. 432. l. 3. brought to p. 434. l. 23. Enquiries p. 439. contrast p. 451. l. 12 13. Probable the next perhaps improbable The using the word Idea in disparate Senses obstructs the way to Science Philosophical Words generally used not to be laid a side without great Necessity Much less chang'd for others less proper Mr. L's Acception of the word Idea very Ambiguous The Ambiguity of it not clear'd by him The putting Brutes to have Knowledge associates them with Mankind * Method to Science B. 2. Less 1. §. 12. The first consideration pre-requir'd ere we ought to think that Brutes know The Second consideration prerequir'd That our selves both asleep and awake do without Knowledge perform as strange Operations as Brutes do The Resemblance of Reason in some Actions of Brutes no Argument of their Knowledge Brutes have Phantasms but no Notions or Meanings Ideas if not Spiritual Notions Inexplicable Experience that we have Ideas gives no distinct Account what they are Nâ—r to say they are Resemblances To have Ideas of our own Ideas inexplicable No Operation internal or external begins from the Soul alone Mr. L. not only nor directly oppos'd by this Discourse To ground all Knowledge on Ideas not distinguish'd from Phantasms makes Science impossible That the Elements or Materials of our Knowledges are properly to be called NOTIONS The word Notion and Cognition are taken here Objectively What Notions are Fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about Spiritual Conceptions The Question about Notions Stated A Notion is the Thing it self in our Understanding Proof 1. Because Knowing is an Immanent Act. Proof 2. Because the Thing Known must be in our Knowing Power Proof 3. Because a Resemblance is not the Object of Knowledge nor sufficient to cause it Otherwise Ideas only could be said to be known Proof 4. Because otherwise all Philosophy would be destroy'd Proof 5. Because Similitudes cannot possibly give us the First Knowledge of Things As was prov'd formerly Proof 6. Because ere we can know the Idea resembles the Thing right both of them must be in the Mind to be there Compar'd Proof 7. Because both the Correlates must be in the Understanding Proof 8. Because the Prototype must be first known Proof 9. Because Notions are what 's meant by Words Proof 10th Because when the thing it self is intended to be made known the Thing it self is the first meaning or what is first meant by the words Proof 11. Because the Ideas cannot be fore-known to our Agreement what VVords are to signifie but the Things only Hence the Question VVhether the Things or our Notions are immediately signified by VVords is Frivolous Proof 12. From the Verification of Propositions Proof 13. Because what 's perfectly like is the same Proof 14. This last Reason maintain'd by the Instance of the Notion of Existence Proof 15. The same Reason abâ—tted by the Natural Sayings of Mankind The Difference in the Manner of Existing prejudices not the Identity of the Notion and the Thing The Eminency of the the spiritual Nature of the Soul gives her a Power to be all Things intellectually * B. 3. L. 4. §. 14. Shown that Things may have two different Manners of Existing No Solid Philosophy can be built on Ideas 1. VVhat Knowledge is An Objection against the Possibility of the whole Thing being in one mind cleared * B. 1. L. 2. § 7. Some Notes premis'd to clear this Objection Our Knowledge is such as our Notions are We can have such a Notion of a Thing or Essence as distinguishes it from all other things Confused Notions suffice for a Remote Ground of Science Only Distinct or Abstracted Notions are the Immediate Ground of Distinct Knowledge or Science Science thus grounded is truly called The Knowledge of the Thing Abstracted Ideas tho' Exclusive of one another do include or connocate the Thing This Point farther explicated and enforced Prov'd because Abstract Notions if Essential do evidently include the Thing Prov'd because all Modes do the same As having no Being of their own This makes or shews Philosophy to be the Knowledge of Things Hence Aristotle expresses the Modes or Accidents by Concrete Words The
Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words Hence Space without Body or Vacuum is a Contradiction The State of the Question Aristotle neglects to shew particularly how Knowledge was made Later Philosophers were at a great puzzle about it How the Schools explicated this Point How the Ideists behav'd themselves as to this Point How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions And therefore he assists Nature if Dispos'd when it cannot reach Therefore if the Matter can be Dispos'd for a Rational Soul GOD will give it There can be such a Disposition in Matter Therefore some Material Part by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Object Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. Therefore Man is truly One Thing which is Corporeo-Spiritual Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual or has both those Natures in it Which is affected according to both those Natures because of their Identification in that Part. The Peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency That Part very Tender and Sensible yet not Tenacious That part the most Noble of all Material Nature Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light or Lucid. The Effluviums have in them the Naturee of the Bodies whence they are sent They affect that Part as Things Distinct from the Man Why they imprint Abstract Notions The Peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly distinct and Indivisible Whence Complex Notions come * Method to Science Book 1. Less 3. § 2. The Soul cannot Alone produce any New Act in her self But by the Phantasms exciting her anew How Reminiscence is made Memory and Reminiscence inexplicable unless Phantasms remain in the Brain The manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes How Reflexion is connaturally made Direct Notions common to all Mankind and their Words Proper Reflex ones Improper and their Words Metaphorical Whence we come to have Negative Notions But Negative Notions as they are Negative do not abstract from the Subject How we come to have a Notion of Nothing Hence great Care is to be had lest we take Non-Entities or Nothings for Things Logical Notions are Real ones The Test to try Artificial Notions * See Method to Science B. 1. L. 7. §. 13 14. Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions or as we call them Fancies How to avoid being deluded by them How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions We can have no Proper Notion of GOD's Essence The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions or of Judgments The Author's Apology for this Discourse and what can be the only way to go about to confute it The Design of the Author here * Book 1. Less 11. The Meaning of the word Existence * Method 1. B. 1. L. 2. § 14. The Extreme Danger of Misconceiving it The meaning of Ens or Thing * B. 3. L. 7. * Ibid. The Meaning of Entity or Essence The Meaning of Matter and Form or of Power and Act. What 's meant literally by the common saying that Matter and Form compound Body The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility What is the Principle of Individuation The Meaning of the word Substance The word Improper That the words Supporting and Inhering taken metaphorically may be allow'd and ought not to be Ridicul'd The meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis The Meaning of Suppositality The Meaning of the word Individuum The Meaning of Substantia Prima and SubstantiaSecunda The VVord Accidents is improper The Word Mode more proper The VVord Quantity is very Proper The VVord Extension very improper The Meaning of Divisibility Impenetrability Space and Measurability A Short Explication what Quantity Quality and Relation are VVhat Transcendents are The Five Sorts of Transcendents Great Care to be had that Transcendent VVords be not held Univocal VVhat great Errors spring thence shown in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent word Compounded The Cartesians unadvis'd in going ultra Crepidam The Excellent Wit and Unbyassed Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledged 'T is Probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks shewn from the Objects it treats of And from the Manner by which it handles them The Knowledge of these high Objects attainable by Natural Reason Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas Solidly Grounded and Unanswerable In what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke We may have Notions without perceiving we have them We may Think without being Conscious that we Think 'T is impossible to be Conscious or know we know without a new Act of Reflexion 'T is impossible to be Conscious of or know our present Reflex Act but by a new Reflex one Hence we can never come to know our last Reflexion 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation The Unreasonableness of the Opinion that Men do always think No Notion Simple but that of Existence The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature The Word Solidity arbitrarily and abusively taken by M. L. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body Space without Body or Vacuum is a meer Groundless Fancy The Contrary to that Tenet Demonstrated Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum * Method to Science B. 1. L. 2. §. 14. Mr. Locke's First Chapter commendable Privative Notions must Connotate the Subject * See Prelim. 3. §. 9 10 11. Meer Motions made upon the Senses Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects * Prelim. 4. §. 26 27 28 c. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects as in the Mind The Pretence of GOD's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects is Unphilosophical The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge is Improperly such * B. 1. L. 7. §. 9 10 11. Ideas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions but the Object perceiv'd and durably remaining It destroys the Nature of Memory to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas The Mind cannot revive Perceptions * Prelim. 4. § 26 27 28. Ideas in the Fancy may fade but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul If Brutes can know they may have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too The distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of simpler ones united in the Thing Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made elaborately explain'd How the Doctrine of Cartesius Mr. Locke and J. S. differ as to this point Extension not well Explicated Immensity worse Place well explicated Body and Extension not the same Notion Space cannot be without Extension Extension and Space differ only Formally or in some
could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual when as yet it had no Knowledge at all in it as before those Species were refined and fitted to be received in it it had none Lastly Are those Species they put when purify'd perfectly like the Thing or imperfectly If perfectly like then they are the same with it as our Notions are and so the Thing it self is in the Soul and then those Species of theirs are to no purpose for the Thing being there in Person as it were there can need no Proxy of Species to stand for it nor can it bear any Sense to call the Thing a Species of it self If they be imperfectly like the Thing they are no more but Resemblances of it and then 't is already abundantly demonstrated that the Thing can never be known by them So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Rudiments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul or how the Thing could come to be known by them 5. The Ideists on this Occasion have taken two ways and both of them very short ones which is to skip over all those Difficulties at one Leap The Cartesians tell us in one Word That God gave the Soul her Ideas or as some of them say some of them at the same time he gave her her Being and that by having those Ideas in her she comes to know and so by making this quick work the Question is at an End This is soon said but not so easily proved Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence to hinder its Currency in the Preface to my Method and in the Book it self as Occasion presented and shall add many more in case their Opposition shall invite me to it But what needs any more since Mr. Locke has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply Other Ideists there are who think it their best Play to abstract totally from that hard Question and finding by Experience that they have Ideas and Resemblances in their Head when they know they content themselves with That without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are or how they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature These Men do certainly act more prudently than the former for 't is much more wise and safe in order to the Common Good of Learning to wave an obscure Point totally than by advancing false Positions in a matter of universal Concern in Philosophy to affirm what cannot be maintain'd Tho' I must declare that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point which influences the whole Body of Science ought not to be pretermitted For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Lessons of my Method reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be presented which seems to offer it self at present 6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the Soul and particularly as it is the Form of such an Animal Body which may not improperly be called Physicks or Animasticks Besides it were too great a Boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with Evident Demonstration Yet I think I may promise my Readers that the Positions I shall lay down orderly to clear it will have that Coherence amongst themselves and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences that it will be hard in just Reason to find any considerable Flaw in it I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point and these are my Thoughts 7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by Causes and Effects and on the Matter 's side by Dispositions to further Productions Thus Wood is heated by Degrees e're it becomes Fire and breaks out into a Flame and in the Generation of every thing in Nature there are are many Previous Alterations of the Matter ere it acquires Another Form or becomes Another Thing 8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wisdom and Goodness of God as he is the First Cause that if in the Ordinary Course of the World the Subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the Power of Second Causes to step in to Nature's Assistance and help her immediately by his own Hand Thus when the Individuality is compleated that is when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Second Causes so that it is become distinct from all other Entities or apt to be This and so fitted for Existence which Existence Second Causes cannot give God whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of does give them Existence immediately by himself 9. Therefore if there can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo that grown riper it is apt as far as is on the Matters side to act Comparatively which is the Disposition for Rationality And that this cannot be done but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Spiritual Nature which Second Causes cannot produce it is certain God will by himself assist it by infusing such a Form 10. There can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Comparatively that is to Judge and Discourse since we experience that we do this actually now in part by the means of the Brain or something that 's near it or belongs to it 11. Wherefore since this cannot be done without having those Materials in us of which Compounded or Compared we are to Judge and Discourse which we call Simple Apprehensions or Notions it follows that there must be such a Disposition in some Bodily Part as to convey into the Soul such Notions 12. Wherefore since Bodies in their whole Quantity or Bulk cannot be convey'd by the Senses into the Brain the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies upon the least Motion of Natural Causes Internal or External which is never wanting should send out Effluviums or most minute and imperceptible Particles which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs called the Senses and so be carried to the Brain 13. This Natural Compound called Man is truly One Thing and not aggregated of more Things Actually Distinct since the Form called the Soul did tho' not so Naturally yet as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter taking it as Seconded and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the First Cause as the Form of Fire or of any other Body in Nature does out of the