irradiation Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state so far as any is made virtuose so far he is made free The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate as that indeed they have one and the same beginning progresse and consummation By how much the more ample spiritual pure and perfect the Soul is by so much the more free it is and whence springs the Amplitude Spiritualitie Puritie and Perfection of the Soul but from virtuose habits Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue and moral Good whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That according to Plato Virtue only was good That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident because hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its first Cause and last End which is the top of moral Libertie For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar which is the Divine Bonitie And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas Dispositio perfecti ad optimum The Disposition of a perfect Subject to the most perfect Exemplar and End Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self so Aquinas Grace saith he in it self and according to its essence is more noble than the nature of the Soul because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie and that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie That which belongs to God by nature belongs to us by Grace And Suarez saith That Grace is the Bond whereby man is conjoined to God his last end Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God by so much the more sublime free and perfect its state and condition is In sum Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul whereby it is enabled to understand embrace and adhere to what is good in that manner and measure as it ought Take al the notions of true moral Libertie and they agree to none but the virtuose man 1. Virtue gives Deminion Libertie is defined by the Platonist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Principalitie or Dominion of Life also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a plenary power over althings Which the Stoics interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving autoritie or power And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over it self and other things but from virtuose habits Plato assures us That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stronger than himself i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part Again Repub. 9. he instructes us That he who is best is most happie and august or royal because he is able to governe himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he that is most wicked is most miserable because he is a Tyrant over himself May we account him a man fit to governe himself who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts The Orator defines Libertie a power of living as men list and who hath this power to live as he list but the virtuose man whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts as by so many wild Horses Can it be imagined that the ambitiose man lives as he list whose mind is stil on the rack of ambitiose designes Doth the avaricious man live as he list who the more he has the more he wants It 's most evident that no man lives as he list but the virtuose man who has a wil slexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie Hos 11.12 So Hos 11.12 But Judah yet ruleth with God and is faithful with the Saints 1 Observe That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim who ruled also but not with God as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel c. But Judah ruled with God and was faithful with the Saints 2 Judah rules with God i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things he lives as he lists because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil. 2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life Health Vigor Virtue gives life health vigor and force and Force of the Soul which also ariseth from virtuose Habits Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres and so by a paritie of reason al moral spiritual Libertie supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful active and perfect Whence by how much the more noble excellent and perfect the life of any thing is by so much the more raised noble and excellent is its state and al its operations Life is that which seasoneth every thing and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature so the spiritual divine virtuose life has Principes above human Nature more noble and excellent and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors c. So in the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue truly is a certain health pulchritude and good habitude of Soul but sin is the disease turpitude and infirmitie thereof Health according to Augustine and Jansenius consistes in the vigor force and strength of Nature and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature but from its Spirits And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul Plato once and again assertes So in his Gorgias pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is of good c. Also pag. 470. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be able to do much is to be good And in his Hippias pag. 375. he saith Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul for the more righteous the Soul is the more potent it is Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul which strongly impels it to its last end What more potent than Love whereby the Soul adheres to its last end By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is by so much the stronger it is and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul Again the strength of every
God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our last end because he alone is to be loved for himself He that loves any thing with God and not for God loves him not as he ought 2. Vnion The next part of Fruition is Possession of and Vnion with the Object beloved Al complete Fruition supposeth Possession and Vnion Frui est terminus desiderii Suar. for if the object be absent there can be only love of desire not perfect Fruition because to enjoy a thing is the terme of desire Plato in his Timaeus informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beatitude consistes in nothing else but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to have a good Demon dwelling in himself c. whereby he understands God The like also in his Politicus pag. 309. he shews how the Soul being united to the first Beautie or chiefest Good it thereby becomes happie And Thales being asked What was most sweet answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to possesse meaning the chiefest Good This possession of the supreme Good which belongs to Fruition is wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art 37. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the virtue of possession and of worke is not the same For the virtue of possession is that it might be most estimed precious and dear Where by Possession he seems to mean Fruition as by worke Vse So Aristotle Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. speaking of Rich men their Fruition of riches as their last end saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They receive a great impression from the possession of riches for they are so affected as if they enjoyed al good i. e. possessing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefest good and so have their spirits formed by yea transformed into them for althings are fashioned and framed into the image and idea of those good things which they possesse and enjoy as their last end Fruition breeds first imitation of or likenesse unto and then union with what we enjoy Neither doth Fruition import possession only but also union with its last end i. e. moral and objective union at least if not physic and real for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we possesse Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefest Good is most intimate firme and inviolable For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firme than that of bodies among themselves or with Spirits The senses in extracting pleasures out of sensible good are conversant only about the externe accidents Moreover the pleasures taken in by the senses come not in altogether but gradually and by parcels therefore the union of object and subject is more remote and partial only But the Soul in the Fruition of the chiefest sweetest good being spiritual and of the same nature with its object has a more complete reception thereof and intimate union therewith whence the pleasures that attend the same are of al the most spiritual pure intense and permanent as hereafter 3. Al Fruition importes Communion with our chiefest Good Communion Frui ex vi nominis est capere fructum à re Suar. For to enjoy a thing according to the origination of the word among the Latines is to participate of the fruits thereof And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefest Good without communion therewith Indeed al union at least with the supreme Good is in order to communion which doth formalise yea consummate the Souls Beatitude in its most perfect state It is not the possession of any good can make them happy that have it unlesse they enjoy what they possesse This is lively illustrated by Plato in his Phaedo pag. 80 c. This Phaedo coming to Socrates at the time when he was ready to die Socrates philosophiseth even to admiration on the Souls immortal state after death and its felicitie in communion with the chiefest Good His words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the Soul being a thing invisible departs to such a place as is most generous pure and invisible namely to the state of the dead where it enjoys God the most wise and choicest Good where if God wil my Soul must immediately go Thence he addes pag. 81. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like it self I say that divine immortal and wise Being Where when it arrives doth it not evade altogether happy being freed from Error Ignorance Terrors wild Loves and other human Infirmities and as we say of those who are initiated in Sacreds spend the rest of its time in communion with God This he makes to be the state of pure Souls separated whereas impure polluted Souls passe unto their place of punishment as he in what follows demonstrates This Communion with God Plato Contemplation Tim. 90. makes to consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in giving the Soul its proper food and motions which he chiefly placeth 1 in the Contemplation of God This he more fully explicates Conviv pag. 211. where he makes The Contemplation of the first Beautie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. that divine sincere uniforme simple pure incontaminate perfect Beautie to be the most ravishing spectacle and that which makes us perfectly happie Acts of Contemplation on God are most tranquille pleasant congenial to the Soul uniforme self-sufficient and permanent Thus Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 179. Art 1. Every thing manifestes its life by that operation which is most proper to it and whereunto it is chiefly inclined Now in as much as Contemplation is the proper act of man whereunto he is most inclined and wherein he delights most it follows that herein the main of his life consistes To contemplate the first cause and last end of althings how delicious and agreable is it Contemplation binds the mind to its object and thence insensibly transformes it thereinto Is it not sweet to the eye to contemplate light And is not the last end the prime light of the Soul Doth not the contemplation of our last end give us a divine light to improve al other objects we converse with And are not althings hereby turned into God Doth not the Contemplation of God as our choicest Good enable us to live in God and to him 2 But yet together with Contemplation there must be divine Love and Complacence Love which is another part of the Souls communion with its last end Contemplation brings in the chiefest Good into the Soul but divine Love carries out the Soul to it by adherence to and delight in it The amorous Soul living in God by love dies in it self How many artifices doth divine Love use for the enjoyment of its choicest Good As man lost God by loving the Creature more than God so by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God and satisfaction in him Love to God settles the Soul in one point out of which it needs not stir to find Felicitie
Principes which are the foundation of al demonstration so in Practics and Morals there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes which are the Rule of Conversation Thus also we are to understand the Stoics if we wil make a right use of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of which Diog. Laâ—rt in Zeno The Stoics say that to live according to nature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits which is right Reason diffusing it self throughout althings Where it deserves a remarque That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason but of objective it may Again they say This right Reason diffuseth it self throughout althings Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason which is confined to individuals but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature which is diffused throughout the whole Creation according to the various conditions of things Thus Hierocles in Pythagor Carm. pag. 106. saith That the vices of the mind are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aversions and Errata from right Reason And pag. 209. he addes This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of al human affairs c. And Stobaeus de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informes us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a Syntaxe or orderly contexture according to right Reason but Vice a Transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature not that darke subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind Thus also we must understand Parker Amyraldus and other Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue Though I denie not but that the Stoics generally and perhaps Aristotle as many of his Followers among the Schole-men by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in mens minds yet I am very apt to persuade my self that Socrates and Plato who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature whereof some more commun Precepts were conveighed down by the posteritie of Noah but those irradiant and bright notices thereof which shone among them they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses wherein Plato was not a little versed and which by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 royal Law he seems to allude unto 5. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule Prop. That Divine Law which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonitie is no where to be found but in the sacred Philosophie or Scriptures Here and here only is extant Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This sacred Rule whereof he had great notices he sometimes cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine Word Here also Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras Lycurgus Solon Minos and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature and al divine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses which is thence stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matrices of the Law and its roots And indeed what are the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law but a Transumt Compend Abstract or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law Is not the formal reason of al Equitie prescribed and expressed in the moral Law Ought not this then to be the terme measure and scope of al Laws To clear which we are to remember that the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law must not be taken literally as ten Words but in a more ample extensive notion as Christian Pandects or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets our great Lord and his Apostles Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Gospel yet it doth command obedience to al that are or shal be specified and expresseth every particular Dutie generically or synecdochically and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept til it was specified in the Gospel yet when it is once a Dutie the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue Indeed are there not almost in al the Precepts manifest Synecdoches Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins as Murder Adultery Theft c. and place them as so many commun Heads in the Decalogue that so by these we may be instructed how black and odiose al those other sins reducible to those heads are Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments we must in a particular manner inquire 1 What in every Command is treated of 2 The end for which it was given 3 What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God And after al we shal find that the moral Law is spiritual holy just and good as Rom. 7.12 14. reaching al the motions and dispositions of the heart And indeed how absurd is it to conceit that he who made the heart and knows al the diverticules or turnings and windings of it should make a Law to reach only the outward acts and not the inward principes and motions May we not then conclude that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul and al its Principes Powers Inclinations Thoughts Affections and Operations interne and externe directing the same to their right objects and ends affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications clothing them with their immutable circumstances in such sort that the action good by this Law can never be made evil that which is evil by this Law can never be made good that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power as I take it of the Law of Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonitie that great bond of union by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil yea man himself one with God Whence as Tyndal pag. 83. wel observes Mans
the Soul he understands it in his darke way according to the mind of sacred Philosophie whence he borrowed this as other of the choisest of his Philosophemes Now in sacred Philosophie this moral death of the Soul is not hyperbolic but real albeit metaphorically expressed Psal 5.9 Rom. 3.13 Thus Psal 5.9 cited by Paul Rom. 3.13 Their throat is an open sepulchre What David ascribes to the throat Plato Gorg. 499. attributes to the whole bodie namely that it is but the sepulchre of the Soul Whence he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be by a Paronomasie derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sepulchre as before And Democritus said That the diseases of the Soul were the greatest which if men could open they should find there 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sepulchre ful of evils David cals the throat an open sepulchre because 1 the heart or soul of al by nature lies morally dead and rotten in the bodie as in a sepulchre 2 The Soul lying dead in this sepulchre continually sends forth loathsome and noisome smels as if you draw nigh to an open sepulchre where dead bodies newly rotten lie buried you wil soon scent their noisome sumes 3 Mens mouths and throats are as it were the mouth of this sepulchre by which mens dead rotten hearts breathe forth their loathsome smels You may scent mens corrupt hearts in their words which passe through their throats those open sepulchres Again that men are borne naturally and morally dead in sin is wel illustrated Esa 1.4 Ah! Esa 1.4 sinful nation a people laden with iniquitie as with a mountain of lead But lest men should conceit that al this iniquitie comes only by custome and frequence of sinful acts he addes a seed of evil doers or maligne sinners This notes that men are borne sinners a sinful brood that sin is hereditarie and not only by custome Esa 57.4 Thus Esa 57.4 Children of transgression i. e. 1 borne in sin of sinful parents 2 Addicted to transgression given up to it for according to the Hebrew Idiome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a child being used with a Genitive Case of Appellatives is taken for such an one as is wholly addicted and devoted to such a thing Thence it follows a seed of falsehood i. e. a lumpe or masse of hypocrisie wholly composed and made up of iniquitie an adulterous brood Al sin is in the heart of man and the heart of man is in al sin albeit he be not always hurried into al acts of sin Hence Plato mentions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an innate and connate evil or vitiositie of nature commun to al as before § 2. of this Chapter And Seneca assures us That corrupt Nature has drunke in such deep draughts of iniquitie which are so far incorporated with its bowels as that you cannot get it out but by tearing out its very bowels Hence 2. Prop. There are no seeds of spiritual life No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature no active power or disposition to what is spiritually good in corrupt Nature Thence Cyril Alexandr termes Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above the Creation And Chrysostome in Gen. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Gift above Nature overcoming Nature it self Where there is a spiritual death there is a total privation without the least seed of active power for the production of a virtuose life Free-wil in corrupt nature is alive to do evil but dead as to the doing what is good it is mighty knowing and potent to do evil as Jer. 4.22 but every way ignorant and impotent as to doing what is good it can find legs to run away from God but none to run to him And if the person be dead can his acts or workes be alive May we expect a good thought or word or deed from such al their days so long as they continue in such a dead state of sin Is it possible for a dead corps to take up its coffin and grave upon its back and thence to arise and walke And is it not much more impossible for a dead Soul to dispose it self towards a virtuose life It is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie That there are no seeds of spiritual life in corrupt nature A human power is not sufficient to produce an act more than human The divine life and motion towards God must procede from God Mans sin and miserie come from his own free-wil but al Virtue and Beatitude from free Grace he that is not acted by divine Grace is necessarily acted by carnal lust corrupt nature is not only emty of but contrary to al good and therefore al workes done by it are dead workes because they procede from a dead nature and tend to death wherefore true moral Virtue cannot be extracted out of the power of Nature Thus Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's proper to human Nature in no wise to receive any heavenly gifts of Grace out of its own nature but to enrich it self with the gifts of God above Nature This Hypothesis albeit the Stoics and Aristoteleans contradict it is evidently deducible from Socrates and Plato's Philosophie Thus Plato Meno pag. 99. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue comes not by Nature neither from the Institutes of Learning but by divine Afflation or Inspiration without the concurse of the human mind in those in whom it 's produced It 's true the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Virtue might be taught because there were sparkes or seeds thereof in human Nature which might be drawen forth by good institution but this Socrates greatly opposed as that which was inconsistent with the depraved state of the Soul and divine concurse for the production of Virtue And sacred Philosophie is most positive in this that there are no seeds of spiritual life or virtue in man Psal 5.9 Thus Psal ◠9 Their inward part or the most sublime refined intimate part of the Soul is very wickednesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wickednesses pravities The Plural for the Singular and abstract for the concrete which denotes 1 an Vniversalitie both of the predicate and subject that al their inward parts were ful of sin and that al sin was in their inward parts 2 The perfection of Sin For abstracts specially in the Plural Number speak Essences and Spirits The Elixir and Spirits of Sin are in the inwards of corrupt Nature Hence 3. Prop. The inclination of corrupt Nature to evil Natural impotence to what is good and its impotence as to what is good is universal and total This naturally follows from what precedes for if the Soul be morally dead in sin without any seeds of spiritual life or moral virtue then it follows that its impotence to good is total for as in naturals death is a total privation of life there is not the least seed for the reduction of the life lost so in morals such
Plato Leg. 12. pag. 951. institutes a College for the inspection and conservation of Laws His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let him have recourse to their College which is constituted for the inspection of Laws Let this College consiste of Juniors and Seniors and daily at the break of day before the Sun rising let them convene First let there be of the Priests such as excel in the offices of Virtue then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Conservators of the Laws ten of those that excel in age and virtue c. The sum of al is this In as much as Laws without diligent conservation are apt to degenerate and fal under depravation from the unbridled lusts of men therefore there is need of certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Conservators of Laws to keep their Autoritie inviolable on which account Plato constituted this his sacred College 9. From what has been laid down of Laws in the general A Law what we may with facilitie forme a particular Idea of a Law which Definit Platon is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Law is a politic Decree of the Communitie constituted not for a certain time only This last clause is added to discriminate a Law from a Suffrage or Vote which is there thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Vote or Suffrage is a politic Decree constituted only for a certain time To speak more distinctly of a Law it includes two formal essential parts 1. It s Equitie Equitie and politic Constitution 1 Eqitio is as the Soul of the Law that which gives vital spirits and life to it and is one and the same immutable Reason which ought to diffuse it self throughout al Laws Whence a Law is defined by Pet. à Sancto Joseph The Ordination of Reason promulgated by him that hath the care of the Communitie for the commun Good Whence he proves That al Laws so far as they participate of right reason are derived from the eternal Law as also from natural Precepts By the Eternal Law they understand the Divine Decree or soverain pleasure of God whence the Reason and Equitie of al Laws both natural and politic receives its derivation Of this Equitie we have suffiiently discoursed in what immediately precedes 2. It s Constitution 2 Politic Constitution is that which draws down general equitie and applies it to this or that politic Societie according to the various exigences circumstances and reasons of State which are peculiar to that Societie or Republic for which the Laws are made 1 This politic Constitution is that which gives formal reason to politic Laws and renders them obligatorie to the Societie for which they are made Thence Definit Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Legislator is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Framer of Laws accordin gto which we ought to live in Republics 2 This politic Constitution is the measure of al Controversies Determinations and Civil Justice in any politic Bodie Whence Definite Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Disceptation whether things be done justly or not And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Bonitie of Laws is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the obedience of right Laws 3 This politic Constitution is that which gives Order to al Politie Thence Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a similitude of Office and Action of al those things that are compared among themselves or more briefly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Symmetrie or proportion of Societie i.e. when al that appertein to such a Societie consent to walke and live together by soem commun Law That politic Constitution or Law gives Beautie Perfection and Order to al politic Bodies we are assured by Plato in his Gorgias pag. 503 504. where he shews that althings both natural and artificial receive their perfection from Order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore an house having acquired order and ornament wil be good and commodous Whence he concludes That as health is the virtue and order of the bodie natural so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Legal and Law is the Order of the Soul as also of Bodies politic Politic Law and Order are intimely conjoined both as to Name and Thing As for Names whence had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order its origination but from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dath or as we may pronounce it tat Law Order Hence sprang 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with its Derivates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Law as wel as Order so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distribute orderly Order as wel as Law Neither do Law and Order agree in the reciprocation of Names only but also in their Natures Hence Plato oft useth them promiscuously one for the other and joins them together as exegetic each of other So â—eg 7. pag. 780. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For whatever in a Republic is comprehended under a certain Order and Law and by the conduct thereof is governed cannot but be conjoined with the greatest goods But on the contrary either when there is no Order or when things are il constituted there cannot but follow the greatest perturbation which pervertes that good Order and al that Vtilitie that floweth thence Wherein we have these observables 1 He useth Order and Law promiscuously for one and the same thing So Leg. 9. pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. In the next place we ought to choose Order and Law which propose what we are to consider and concernes the commun use of life 2 He saith that from this legal Order and its conduct the bonitie and perfection of things politic ariseth 3 that from the defect and want of this legal Order al perturbation confusion and evils in a politic bodie do arise More touching Order see § 1. § 6. Having explicated Legislation The several kinds of politic Administration which takes in the first part of Empire we now passe on to the second namely Administration or Jurisdiction which in Plato's Philosophie passeth under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Regiment or Governement from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arche a Prince Principatie or Governement Whence Lot is stiled by the Rabbines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince of the Judges So Rom. 8.38 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is taken for Principaties Definit Platon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Principatie is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The care or charge of the whole Which is a good Idea of politic Jurisdiction and Administration And that which we are herein to consider may be reduced to these two commun Heads 1 The several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration with their preferences 2 The Civil Magistrate who is the Administrator of politic Jurisdiction First as for the several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration they are reduced by Plato as
2 The Heirs of Salvation shal at last day be made conformable to and equal with the Holy Angels and together with them shal praise serve and enjoy God in al manner of intime communion unto al eternitie Luk. 20.36 For they are equal to the Angels Thus some interpret Zech. 3.7 And I wil give thee places to walk Zech. 3.7 or walks among those that stand by i. e. the Holy Angels that minister before God This may include Service both in the Church Militant on Earth as also the Church Triumphant in Heaven for Angels stand by and minister in both How potent promt and agile the holy Angels are to execute every Wil of God is wel expressed by Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. The Angels saith he are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Angels are potent and promt to fulfil the Divine Wil and are by the agilitie of their nature found every where present as the Divine beck commandes them So much for the Gubernation of the Holy Angels § 4. Divine Gubernation extendes it self not only to the good Angles but also to the Evil. Satan by Gods providential permission Gods Gubernation as to Evil Angels is the God of the wicked world who rules in the Children of disobedience 1. Satan is the Prince of this World Joh. 12.31 1 He is not a Lawful Prince but Vsurper he usurpes Christs Crown and intrudes himself on his Throne He affectes a Deitie to be God over the noblest part in Man his Mind as 2 Cor. 4.4 2 He is not an Absolute Prince but limited his Power is much narrower than his Wil and Malice He can do nothing but by Divine Permission and Gubernation 3 He is not a Free Prince but Vassal confined by Chains of Providential Gubernation Jude 6. 4 The main of his Kingdome consistes in the Free Election of wicked men Evil men electively put the Crown on his Head and bow the knee before him His Crown is supported by the voluntary subjection of wicked men Ephes 2.2 Ephes 2.2 According to the Prince Arbitrio Principis i. e. according to the Soverain pleasure of the Prince of the power of the Air 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here notes his Dominion and Soveraintie in the Air i. e. in this inferior part of the Universe The Spirit that now worketh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes his working with efficacitie in the Children of Disobedience i. e. Such as are addicted and have given up themselves to the disobedience of God but obedience unto Satan such as are his voluntary slaves 5 Satan is a Magnificent Prince having Legions and vast Armies under his command Eph. 6.12 Rev. 12.6 7. 6 He is a Prince of great Wisdome Experience and Subtiltie to deceive al that listen to him His Prudence as a Spirit is vast and his Experience of more than 6000 years greatly addes thereto 2 Cor. 2.11 So 2 Cor. 2.11 Lest Satan should get an advantage of us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lest we should be over-reached or circumvented by Satan It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily to have more than we ought thence to cheat defraude c. The Metaphor seems taken from avaricious Merchants who take al occasions to circumvent Thence he addes For we are not ignorant of his devices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes here Stratagemes Machinations Plots Fallacies c. which he termes Ephes 6.11 Ephes 6.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wiles of Satan 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Chrysost is artificially to circumvent to cheat by rules of Art by a compendiose method to reduce persons or things under our power So that Satan it seems has got the art and method of deluding and cheating souls Whence he is stiled Joh. 8.44 The Grand Old Lyer 2 Tim. 2.26 or Cheater We read also 2 Tim. 2.26 of the snare of the Devil whereby he takes men captive at his wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a military word and signifies to take alive from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So 2 Chron. 25.12 Satan has such a snare as he can thereby take sinners captive alive and at his pleasure 7 As he is a Prince of Power and Prudence so also of great malice and rage against the good of Souls 1 Pet. 5.8 Thus 1 Pet. 5.8 he is termed a Roaring Lion which notes his rage seeking whom he may devour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 drink up at a draught Yea so great is his Rage against the good of Souls that he counts it a torment to be curbed or hindered in the execution of his malitiose designes as Matt. 8.29 Mat. 8.29 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to torment us O! what a torment is it to him to see a Soul delivered out of his snare Hence 2. Satan being the Prince and God of this World has Satan's Power to temte by providential permission a great power to temte and draw men unto sin 1 Satan as to us is not a mere Creator of his own Tentations but he takes the mater from those whom he temtes or from some circumstances that environ them Satan is oft the Father but Sin the Mother of Tentation 2 Satan cannot reach the human Soul or any Act thereof immediately The heart of Man is a privie Chamber into which none can enter but the King of Kings The thoughts and inclinations of the Soul have a covering over them which none can take off but he that made the Soul Satan may cast in Fire bals or send in Messengers and Letters by the mediation of the Phantasie but he cannot enter into the heart directly nor compel it to sin 3 Satan by Gods permission can worke curiously and efficaciously on the Organs of the Bodie Spirits Bloud and other Humors as Melancholie c. which are united to the Soul and have no smal indirect influence thereon 4 Though Satan cannot worke immediately on the heart yet he can worke immediately on the corporeous sensitive Soul particularly on the phantasie by making impressions thereon and forming such Ideas there as may affect the mind Satan may temte and persuade to Sin not only Morally by false suggestions and Images offered but also in some sense Physically by impressing and fixing those Images on the phantasie and coloring them over with the apparence of good 5 Satan has a very great and intime accesse unto the spirits of men not only as he is a Spirit but also as he is an unclean Spirit and his Kingdome a Kingdome of darknesse Hence he is said Luke 22.3 Luk 22.3 to enter into Judas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes an intime accesse into Judas as into his proper house He had been casting in darts into Judas's heart before as John 13.2 The Devil having now put into the heart of Judas to betray him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Devil having now injected or cast in this Tentation into his heart to betray his Lord. Now
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
most regular and best state of a rational Creature Whether Virtue be a Power Affection Habit or merely Act has been disputed among the ancient Philosophers Gratia non est habitus propriè sed habitudo sive sanitas mentis Aq. 1.2 Quaest. 100. Art 3. as wel as Schole-Divines But the communly received opinion is that it is an Habit or as Aquinas expresseth it an Habitude of the Soul That Virtue is an Habit Aristotle largely demonstrates Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 3. An Habit properly is of a middle nature between a Power and an Act which gives the power an accidental facilitie of acting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is of it self effective or operative but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Habit is desined pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a disposition of the Soul whereby we are said to be so or so qualified for acting So that every Habit is in order of nature at least if not of time before the Act but subsequent to the Power For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object Subject Mode of existing in their Subject and Acts. For the forme of the Act follows the forme of the Agent and such as the Habit is in relation to its object such is the Agent Hence by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is by so much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation Whence Virtue is a supernatural Habitude Habit or active Forme whereby the Soul is elevated to supernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Completive of Nature This indeed might be evinced out of Plato's Definition of Virtue drawen into forme by Serranus Meno pag. 68. Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power the best worke and aiming at the best end So that al Virtue requires not only the best mater or object but also the best end And indeed such as the habitual aptitude or disposition of the Soul is such wil the end be as Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of every action is such as the habit is as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts Again lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such as every man is such is his action and speech and such is his life i.e. such as a mans habitual frame of Spirit is such is his end acts and life Al habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul whereby it is strongly bent and inclined towards objects ends and acts suitable thereto Al habitual Vertues are one and the same in regard of principe and seed though different as to their proper objects and acts The same habitual Entitie as it facilitates to know God is called Divine Knowlege but as it facilitates to love God it 's called Divine Love and so in the other virtuose Habits That Supernaturalitie is a Mode intrinsecally and essentially included in al virtuose Habits is evident because human Nature specially as now corrupted cannot reach an end or act supernatural For if a natural power should have any activitie in respect of a supernatural act and object it may by a paritie of reason by degrees attain to the highest supernatural objects and acts as Alvarez de Auxil Disp 65. demonstrates Of the nature of Supernaturalitie and how it is intrinsecally and essentially included in the substance of al graciose Habits see Choquetius de Grat. l. 1. Disp 7. 12. Also Thomas Hurtado Praecursor Theologus de Supernaturalitate Entis Disp 1. Controvers 1 c. § 2. Moral Libertie as to state in virtuose Habits From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows that al moral Libertie ariseth from those virtuose habits the Soul is clothed with and agreable exercices flowing therefrom What Natural Libertie is has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. Sect. 3. § 11. How much moral Libertie differs from natural may easily be discerned by any that impartially considers the same The later indeed is essential to and inseparable from man as man and al human acts but the former is proper to man as virtuose as wil sufficiently appear by what follows Every man is so far morally free as he is near to God Althings aim at Unitie God who is the supreme Unitie convertes althings to himself and every thing is so far free and perfect as it comes near to God The human Soul has a twofold approche to God 1 by Similitude 2 by actual real Vnion and Fruition 1 The more like the Soul is to God the more one it is with him and free al similitude is a kind of Unitie and whence springs the Souls similitude to God but from virtuose habits 2 The Soul has actual real union with and fruition of God by virtuose exercices Hence ariseth a twofold moral Libertie 1 As to State 2 As to Exercice in that state The former depends on habitual Virtue the later on virtuose exercices Of each in their order Moral Libertie as to state consistes in virtuose dispositions of Soul whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God Thus the spurious Dionysius Eccles Hier. cap. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Seing the Divine Nativitie or Regeneration is a certain Divine state certainly he that has not attained to that divine state shal never know much lesse do the things delivered by God Whence also he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The principal progresse of divine dilection in the sacred observation of divine Commands consistes in the most ineffable framing of our divine state This Athanasius Dialog 1. contr Macedon termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The participation of sanctitie by Grace And the supposed Ignatius ad Magn. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the forment of Grace i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul And Greg. Nyssenus stiles this State of Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transelementation or Restauration of the Principes of the divine life or of the Soul whereby it is made like to God and capable of adhering to him Whence Damascene Orthodox Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man as invested with the Image of God God made man a little world in the greater another Angel an Inspector of the visible Creature and Disciple of the intellectual King of those things that are on earth both terrene and celeste temporal and immortal and that which is supreme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by accesse to God to be deified but to be deified not by transalition into the Divine Essence but by participation of the divine
〈◊〉 a select peculiar superexcellent people And Psal 16.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 16.3 Saints is interpreted inwhat follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 magnisicent eximious which shews that none are truly magnificent but virtuose holy persons Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 holy pure is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 veneration worship and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to worship which they also derive from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 azaz to honor That Sanctitie and Virtue is the Crown of al other Excellences is evident from Zach. 9.16 Zach. 9.16 For they shal be as the stones of a Crown lifted up as an Ensigne on his land i. e. God wil deliver his Saints out of their dangers and troubles as also lift them up to that honor which pretiose stones have in the Kings Diademe The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both Separation and a Crown which notes here that every Saint is separated by God as a Jewel in his Crown Thence God termes them Mal. 3.17 My Jewels Which notes both separation and proprietie as also dignitie and excellence Indeed Sanctitie and Virtue is the Glorie and Crown of al other Excellences because it implies separation from al impurities and a comprehension of the highest perfections It raiseth things and persons otherwise commun and vulgar to the highest degree of excellene even to the Image of God which is the perfection of human Nature Thus Plato Leg. 4. pag. 716. largely demonstrates That conformitie to the divine Image is the highest perfection of human Nature Of which see Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 3. § 5. But more particularly That Virtue brings with it the highest Nobilitie Magnificence and excellence is evident from many Platonic Philosophemes Thus Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nobilitie is desined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Virtue of generose manners So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magnificence is pag. 412. defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Dignitie according to the most august or venerable right Reason i. e. according to Virtue For indeed al the ancient Philosophers made Honor and Nobilitie to be but the shadow and reward of Virtue A free man according to the Hebrews is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib which signifies also a Prince or Noble man one endowed with noble generose virtuose dispositions What more sublime and noble than Vitue Ut foelicitatis est quantum velis posse sic magnitudinis quantum possis velle Plin. ad Trajan Is not that a generose Soul that is wel-disposed and inclined to generose heroic deeds Is any Soul more great than he who can despise great mundane things for Virtues sake It is accounted by some a great piece of felicitie to be able to do what they wil but is it not a greater piece of libertie to wil what we ought which alone belongs to virtuose persons Is he not truly great who has a great measure of Virtue Hence among the Heroic Virtues there was found out an Apotheosis which was nothing else but an extension of Virtues and human conditions to a perfection not human Virtuose persons are the greatest men in the world they have the greatest Souls yea nothing is really great but what is good The best Nobilitie lies in the mind indued with Virtue what mind more great than that which is subject to the great God Who is greater than he who is least in his own eyes Is not such a Soul most great in divine favor It was a great Saying of Zeno the Stoic You are not therefore good because great but you are therefore great beause good 5. Moral Libertie as to state implies Splendor Beautie and Glorie The Splendor Beautie and Glorie of Virtue Plato makes Beautie to arise from the predominance of the forme over the mater which otherwise is distorme By the forme I understand the spirituose active Principe and so indeed it holds true of the Soul the Beautie whereof consistes in the predominance of virtuose habits which are as the spirits and forme of the Soul For look as the Soul which is the forme of a man gives life vigor perfection and beautie to the human bodie so proportionably virtuose habits give life vigor perfection and beautie to the human Soul Plato abounds much in this argument that Virtue is the Beautie of the Soul So in his Phaedrus pag. 279. O Friend Pan the Ape of the Messias give me to be beautiful within i.e. in my Soul Thence pag. 250. he saith The Beautie of divine Wisdome which is the Spirit of Virtue is so illustrious and amiable that if it were seen with eyes it would stir up wonderful Loves Al Beautie ariseth from Light spirits and proportion of parts and what gives Light Spirits and proportion to the Soul but Virtue Some define Beautie the fulgor or bland face of Goodnesse and doth not this speak Virtue most beautiful Cicero defines Beautie a due congruence with suavitic of color and what hath a more due congruence and sweet color than Virtue Among the Beauties of Nature nothing more beautiful than Light and O1 what a gloriose illustrious Light attends Virtue Is not divine Veritie the Spring of Virtue the most virgin unspotted gloriose affective Light Plato in his Philebus pag. 64. saith That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea or face of Good is composed of three things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beautie and Symmetrie and Truth Yea he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The very Images of things beautiful are beautiful And is not God most beautiful yea the first Beautie as before Chap. 2. § 2. And what is true Virtue but the gloriose Image of this first Beautie Must it not then be most beautiful Aristotle Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. assures us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Delphic Inscription That which is most just is most beantiful And Seneca Epist 115. addes If it were lawful to look into the mind of a good man O! what a beautiful face should we see How holy how resplendent a mind composed of a magnific and placid countenance yea saith he Virtue is so graciose and beautiful that it is natural even to wicked men to approve better things neither has any one so far banished the natural Law or put off humanitie as to espouse wickednesse for wickednesse sake So Plato and Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No man is voluntarily wicked for wickednesse sake Which shews that Virtue in it self is most amiable Greg. Nyssenus Hom. 2. in Cant. termes Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of the Beautie of the Soul flowing from God the supreme Beautie And Basil in Psal saith That Grace is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Beautie of the Soul Also Corysostome ad Theodor. Paraen 1. tels us That a deformed bodie cannot be made beautiful but a deformed Soul may be rendred such by Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. To render the Soul
with greater dexteritie facilitie and alacritie in acting than virtuose Principes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Alacrite is defined Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A manifestation of practic election and who manifest more free practic election than such as act virtuosely Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Customes are defined by Galen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded Natures and Arist Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome is akin to Nature whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome makes every thing sweet Now virtuose exercices frequently repeted breed a divine spiritual custome which is attended with divine suavitie and delight The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile dexterous and sweet Experience teacheth us that whatever is long customary turnes into our natures even diseases and poisons How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending virtuose acts Thence Heb. 5.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 5.14 Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar pleasant and sweet and therefore most free for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them than virtuose exercices O! what sweet inspirations what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices are not the most difficult services made facile hereby Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure and therefore of libertie in it And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation and the more raised and spiritual the operation is the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end for the nearer things come to their first Principes the more joyful and free they are and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious real solid pure spiritual strong self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights as Psal 119.14 16 20 35 3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie Virtuose Exercices most lively The more excellent and noble the life is the more free the acts are and the more virtuose the acts are the more of the divine life they carry in them Thus Plato Charmid pag. 171. Sin being banisht from the Soul and Rectitude presiding in every act it 's necessary that those who are thus disposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do act wel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that those who act wel do live happily The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act that so we may live blessedly Whereby he intimates that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To live wel is to act wel The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation which is most proper to it and unto which it is most naturally inclined and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur tantò perfectior est modus vivendi Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self by so much the more perfect it mode of living is and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves Plato tels us Phaedr pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By which he shews That it is proper to life to move it self by it self And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self but when it acts virtuosely And as al life consistes in action even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions A virtuose Soul as it has Principes of life above Nature so also actings for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is by so much the more excellent is the operation The life and motion of virtuose hearts is upward like that of fire which is of al the most noble active and free life Thence in facred Philosophie Life is frequently put for a noble comfortable free blessed condition of life Psal 34.12 13. consisting in virtuose exercices So Psal 34.12 What man is he that desireth life i. e. a blessed free sweet life And how may such a life be acquired That he tels you vers 13 14. Depart from evil and do good c. The like Psal 22.26 69.33 Psal 119.77 Eccles 6.8 1 Pet. 3.10 And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie namely because there is no true life but what is virtuose blessed and free So that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts by so much the more divine and free its life is 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection but also enlargement and libertie Thence Psal 119.96 the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample and why because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil which is most ample Whence the Soul by actual adherence to the divine Law rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie Thus Psal 119.165 Great peace have they who love thy law Or Psal 119.165 ample peace with libertie as to walking Thence it follows and nothing shal offend them Or they shal have no stumbling block ie They shal walke in the Kings high-way according to the royal Law of Libertie with al manner of libertie and boldnesse Liber ab infinito ad infinitum super infnitum
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
and Law But is it so with thee Art thou not fallen into a miserable bondage Doth not thy fear thy running away and endeavor to hide thy self discover thy guilt and servitude 3 It is a sarcastic biting upbraiding question Where art thou O! how is it with thee now Adam Hast thou not brought thy self to a sine passe Where is the Deitie thou affectedst Plato seems to give frequent hints and intimations of this Fal of Man and the servitude that attends it So in his Phaedrus pag. 245. he compares the Soul in its innocent state to a winged Chariot that slies aloft but in its lapsed state he makes it to have lost its wings and to be imprisoned in the bodie And the Platonists generally complain of the Souls servitude in the bodie as a punishment of some former sin Which makes Steuch Eugubinus and others to thinke that Plato knew more of the Fal than he would discover which he disguised under that Hypothesis of the Preexistence of Souls So Eusebius Praep. Evang. lib. 12. cap. 11. pag. 584. thinkes that Plato in his Symposium expressed the Fal allegorically under the Symbol of Porus of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 5. § 1-6 2 Sin puls down and is repugnant to human Nature Sin strips off the Image of God as it divestes men of the Image of God Thus in sacred Philosophie Gen. 3.7 Gen. 3.7.22 And they knew that they were naked i.e. they perceived themselves divested of the image of God Thence v. 22. God said Behold man is become like one of us i.e. Ironically most unlike unto us a sad spectacle a prodigiose monster unlike the Creature made by us It alludes to the words of Satan v. 5. And ye shal be as Gods It is said Gen. 5.1 That Adam was created in the likenesse of God But v. 3. it 's added That he begat a son in his own likenesse i.e. sinful as he was This deprivation of the image of God is wel expressed by Paul Rom. 3.23 Rom. 3.23 For al have sinned and come short of the glorie of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are deprived spoiled divested of the glorie of God This may be taken 1 Actively Al have come short of the gloriose image of God and conformitie to his Law which Adam was at first invested with 2 Passively as to future Glorie The former sense seems primarily intended here Adams Soul was silled with the gloriose image of God but ah alas how has sin defaced and dissigured the Soul how far short doth it now come of that gloriose Image This Fal of man from the Image of God Plato was not altogether a stranger unto for in his Critias he saith that anciently there flourished in our first Parents 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a divine nature which rendred them happy but human custome or sin prevailing an inundation of evils followed 3 Sin brings down human Nature and is repugnant thereto Sin is enmitie against God in that it infuseth a Principe of confusion enmitie and rebellion against God The perfection of human Nature consistes in an intimate adherence and subjection to God but sin puts a law of enmitie and rebellion into the heart Rom. 8.7 Rom. 8.7 The carnal mind is enmitie against God i.e. a complexe or systeme of al manner of enmitie yea nothing but enmitie enmitie in the highest-degree for abstractes speak formes and essences Greg. Nazianzen in Apolog. makes three Species of the carnal minds Rebellion and Reluctance against Grace 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a servile departure from God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a contentiose aversion and obstinate reluctation against God 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a stupor in sin when men rush into sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a bare face The carnal mind is the greatest enemie God has Al sin in corrupt nature is a kind of Antipathie against God that which puts men upon al acts of rebellion against and aversation from him Hos 4.12 A spirit of fornication Hos 4.12 16. i.e. of Idolatrie which is spiritual fornication 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Spirit denotes a vehement fervor flame or impetus of lust such as carries with it the highest impetuositie effort and force For the Hebrews cal al the extraordinary motions or perturbations of the mind Spirit Thence it follows from under God i.e. from under his Power Empire and Dominion From under hath the force of a privation and denotes their aversion from God Thence he addes v. 16. For Israel slideth back as a back-sliding heifer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as a rebellious contumacious refractary heifer such as thinketh her self free casts off the yoke from her neck and is impatient of subjection as Deut. 32.15 The meaning is that Israel like a lascivious refractary Heifer had cast off al regard to divine Commands and wandred up and down according to her own lusts Thence follows her punishment answerable to her sin The Lord wil feed her in a large place She affects a wandring vagrant licentious course of life and she shal have it The Lord wil feed her in a large place or barren desert not in a fruitful place When Churches or people wander from God he wil feed them in a desert of affliction as Hos 2.14 Such is the state of those that wander from God Sacred Philosophie and the Greek Fathers expresse this enmitie of the carnal mind against God by such expressions as these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to resist God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to resist the Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to affect to overcome the power of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make void or repel Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to deride God And what greater bondage can there be than for a rational Creature to turne his back on God and flie from his chiefest good Doth not this pul down and impoverish human Nature Thence Plato in his Politicus tels us That after the Golden Age i.e. the state of Innocence had its period sin brought into the world a deluge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of confusion and disorder c. 4 Sin is most repugnant to human Nature Sin strips men of Humanitie in that it strips men of the right use of their Reason Wil Affections yea of their comfortable Being and Humanitie Plato in his Theaetetus assures us That the excellence of man consistes in his Ressemblance unto God but so far as he fals short thereof he fals under 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothingnesse and Inhumanitie Sin reduceth human Nature to a kind of Inhumanitie and Nothingnesse in that it spoils it of the right use of its rational Being and operations For man having an intrinsec relation unto God as his first efficient and last End he so far enjoys his Being as he doth adhere to God he that bids farewel to or departs from God bids farewel to and departs from himself as to al right use
filthy Idols such as pollute by the very touch So Levit. 26.30 Psal 106.28 The Soul by its lusts running into and being made one with filthy Idols is thereby made filthy and impure as on the contrary when it mingles with things above it God and things virtuose it 's thereby made more pure and excellent We read also Tit. 1.11 of filthy lucre Lucre is not filthy in it self but being beneath the Soul it defiles the same when it is coveted thereby For when the heart of man runs down into things beneath it self it is thereby defiled whence such things are called filthy Idols This also Plato observed whence in his Minos he tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A good man is of al most sacred but a wicked man most impure and polluted Sin indeed pollutes the whole man 1 It defiles mens persons whence sinners are termed Swine Mat. 7.6 which are the most unclean Creatures 2 It defiles mens Minds and Consciences Tit. 1.15 3 It defiles mens Discourses words and communications Esa 9.17 Every mouth speaketh folie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is rendred villanie Chap. 32.6 signifies the flowers and leaves of plants putrified and rotten So Ephes 4.29 No corrupt communication 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies rotten stinking noisome like rotten fruits or stinking breath 4 It defiles mens Actions and Fruits Mat. 7.17 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 maligne fruits 5 It pollutes whole Nations and Churches Hence Israel in her Apostasie is said to be Hos 8.8 Hos 8.8 a vessel wherein is no pleasure i.e. as some expound it like such vessels as are most abject and exposed to the most sordid uses to retein only excrements So Lam. 1.8 9. Zeph. 3.1 6 Yea Sin pollutes our very Righteousnesse and makes it unclean Esa 64.6 Esa 64.6 As an unclean thing or person because the terme is masculine As a lumpe of some filthy mater or such unclean stuffe as by the Law was to be burned Lev. 13.55 57. or like some leprose person or one laboring under some noisome disease even from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot as Chap. 1.6 Thence he addes And al our righteousnesses as filthy rags There are different interpretations of these words some take them as an allusion to Beggers Ragges others to Ragges polluted by putrified sores others to garments defiled by bloud others to menstruous ragges but al generally agree in this that the terme notes much defilement In sum there is this universal defilement on human Nature Adams person first polluted our nature and our natures polluted defile our persons and whatever procedes from us or is inherent in us Hence 5. Sin is the Reproche Sin ful of shame and reproche Dishonor Shame and Disgrace of the Soul As God has entailed honor and renown on true Virtue so shame and disgrace on Sin neither can the wit and power of man cut off this Entail This is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie which teacheth us That Sin doth degrade men and strip them of their highest excellence clothing them with shame and reproche Esa 32.5 Thuch Esa 32.5 The vile person shal no more be called liberal nor the churle said to be bountiful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nabal signifies primarily a vile person a man of no worth like a withered flower or leaf in Autumne Thence it signifies a fool as Abigal's speech importes 1 Sam. 25.25 Such a vile foolish sinner shal no more be called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib i.e. free noble ingenuous generose Prince No Nabal or vile sinner shal in the days of Christs gloriose reigne which this Text refers to as v. 1 c. be called Nadib free generose Prince Esa 14.20 This is more fully expressed Esa 14.20 The seed of evil-doers shal never be renowned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 shal not be named or shal not be men of name or renown for ever The great God delights to clothe proud sinners with shame and reproche Thus Esa 22.17 Esa 22.17 Behold the Lord wil carrie thee away with a mighty captivitie and wil surely cover thee Hebr. in covering wil cover thee This repetition according to the Hebrew Idiome importes 1 Certainty 2 Expedition 3 Abundance 4 Continuance He shal certainly speedily abundantly and continually cover thee Ay but with what With shame and reproche It implies such a covering as persons fallen into disgrace or carried captive or condemned to die were wont to have whose faces were covered as unworthy to see light And who was it who should be thus covered It was Shebna the Kings Treasurer a man covered and clothed with gorgeous apparel and many Titles of Honor as v. 18. God first or last clothes the highest of sinners with shame and reproche Sin strips men of their highest excellences and then God in just judgement clothes them with disgrace Exod. 32.25 So Exod. 32.25 And when Moses saw the people were naked 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 naked in the shame of their sins divested of the glorie of God So it follows For Aaron had made them naked unto their shame amongst their enemies Vnto their shame 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or unto their infamie LXX a rejoicing and mockery namely to their adversaries Sin makes men a shame infamie and reproche to their friends and the scorne mockery and rejoicing of their adversaries What more contumeliose and reprocheful to human Nature than to be a voluntary drudge of Sin and Satan Whiles Nations and Churches keep close to God they are formidable and terrible to their enemies but when by sin they depart from God they are the reproche of al. Thus Ephraim Hos 13.1 When Ephraim spake trembling Hos 13.1 2. he exalted himself in Israel Some read it thus Ephraim was a tremblement to him that heard him i.e. so long as he kept close to God he was formidable to al his enemies he was exalted in honor and renown But when he offended in Baal he died i.e. he is now most abject and contemtible in the eyes of al. And why because he hath departed from the Worship of God to worship Baal Thence it follows v. 2. And now they sin more and more Hebr. They adde sin to sin O! what an ignoble thing is sin Doth it not bring al under a scorne Thus Israel in Babylon Lam. 3.14 I am made a derision to al my people Or as others to al people namely round about Thence Paul demands of the Romans Rom. 6.21 What fruit had ye then in these things whereof ye are now ashamed The state of sin is always attended with shame and bondage This was also wel observed by Plato and many of the wiser Heathens Thus Plato in his Phaedrus cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concupiscence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contumelie or reproche of human Nature So in his Gorg. pag. 477. he saies 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The pravitie of the Soul is the basest and vilest of althings Yea he affirmes
more they have the more they want the encrease of what they lust after makes them poorer as to real comfort and satisfaction therein Sin indeed makes men most poor in that it deprives them of God who is the best riches O! what a poor shiftlesse forlorne miserable thing or rather nothing is Sin 8. Sin captivates the Soul Sin the fetters of the Soul puts chains and fetters on it which is a great piece of servitude Al lusts do contract pinion and bind up the Soul which is in it self most ample and extensive Thus Plato in his Phaedo pag. 83. saith The mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is bound or fettered by sensual lusts And he subjoins the reason Because every pleasure and every dolor of the mind being as it were armed with a nail doth fasten it to the bodie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and makes it corporeous or sensual like the bodie Wherein he gives us a lively symbolic image how the Soul by sensual lusts becomes glued and chained to the bodie yea transformed thereinto Every Idol lusted after captivates the heart so many lusts so many chains yea every repeted act of sin brings the Soul under new fetters and bonds the longer such go on in ways of sin the greater slaves they are It 's true some mens chains are lined with pleasures or gilded over with terrene richesse but yet that addes not to their libertie yea the greatest natures and most noble dispositions if sinful have the greatest chains for by how much the more free such conceit they are or affect to be by so much the more they are intangled in their lusts as Esa 44.20 Such as feed on any Idol are chained thereto neither is it possible for them to deliver their own Souls Thus Hos 4.17 Ephraim is joined to Idols 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bound glued chained It alludes to the conjunction of unclean persons whereby they become as it were one flesh as 1 Cor. 6.16 Israel was chained to her Idols by indissoluble bonds of false Worship and it was impossible to pul her thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idols from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies grief straits trouble Idols do greatly straiten torment and vexe sinners and yet they cannot part with them Plato Repub. 9. pag. 579. tels us That sinners are shut up in the prison of their own lusts and fettered by their irregular desires Yea indeed every sinner is chained to the worst of Idols himself and fettered by his own lusts This we find exemplified in Simon Magus Act. 8.9 giving out that himself was some great one i.e. potent in miracles Act. 8.9.23 one that could do great feats Ambitiose self was that unhappy Centre unto which he was chained And it is worthy our serious observation to consider how this Idol chains and fetters his heart even by and under a profession of Religion The case stood thus Simon perceiving the Apostles to outshine him in doing miracles he has a mind to turne Christian thereby to gain the same power they were invested with as v. 19. Give me also this power Peter smelling out his ambitiose ranke hypocrisie tels him in plain termes v. 23. I perceive thou art in the gal of bitternesse and bond of iniquitie This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bond of iniquitie signifies 1 a Covenant or compact with iniquitie such as is between Servants and Masters or those who are in some deep conspiracie And so the sense is he was stil a sworne slave of iniquitie one bound to sin by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie 2 It is used by the LXX to expresse the bands of iniquitie or a chain such as prisoners are kept in Esa 58.6 3 It denotes the binding up of many things together Thus was Simons heart bound up by the chains of many sins And we find something like to this in Plato's Cratylus pag. 415. where he saith That the vitiositie of the mind appears much in sloth and he thence concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore sloth indicates that the bond or chain of the Soul is most potent and tenacious 9. Sin is the greatest servitude in that it makes men sots fools Sin folie and madnesse and mad men it deprives of the use of reason Thus Plato Protagor pag. 332. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not they who act irregularly act foolishly and madly So in his Phaedrus pag. 231. he makes inordinate love a kind of madnesse Also in his Timaeus pag. 86. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ignorance specially of the supreme Being and Truth to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the disease and madnesse of the Soul And the reason is evident because the proper office and use of Reason is to unite the mind to its object Truth and so by consequence to that Truth primarily which is first and most intelligible in it self namely God in the contemplation of whom the minds perfection consistes But now sin disunites the mind from God and fils it with ignorance folie and madnesse Hence the knowlege of the wicked is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nocturnal knowlege because it neither illuminates nor directs nor delights them which are the three main offices of knowlege Thus our Lord the first Light and Truth assures us Mat. 6.23 That the very light and knowlege of wicked men though never so much cultivated and elevated by acquired notions or commun illuminations of the Spirit is but darknesse yea the blackest darknesse Stobaeus also informes us That according to Plato nothing was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ridiculous or absurd but sin And Grotius tels us That Plato conjoined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Luk. 23.41 so that nothing is indeed absurd but sin Hence frequently in sacred Philosophie sinners are said to be without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an heart i.e. practic judgement or conscience rightly informed as Jer. 5.21 and in the Proverbs oft Yea wicked men are stiled Psal 5 5. as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad men Thence it is said of the Prodigal Luk. 15.17 When he came to himself i.e. to an awakened conscience and sound mind which denotes that so long as he lived in sin he was not himself but like a mad man And indeed the more wit men have if under the power of sin the greater mad men fools and slaves they are because their wit doth but serve to entangle them in their lusts their reason doth but fortifie their minds with arguments and cavils against the means of their libertie 10. Sin Sin when prevalent makes men Bestes when in its dominion and prevalence transformes men into mere Brutes which is the worst of servitude Plato stiles sensual affections the brutish part of a man which when they prevail transforme him into a beste For whatever the heart of man doth vehemently adhere unto it receives a stampe and character from yea is transformed thereinto if the Soul strongly adhere to God it has
hath conceived mischief and brought forth a lie It 's spoken of Sauls mischievous yet abortive designes against David and it alludes to the pangs and torments of a woman in travel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies hard toilsome miserable labor such as poor slaves are tormented with The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in the Greek Glossary found at the end of Cyril is rendred dolor So in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies vexatious grief and torment as Rev. 16.10 11. 21.4 Hence the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an evil man received its derivation For every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conceives and brings forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 miserable torments David's meaning here is Qui voluptari tradidere principia non ipsi voluptatem sed ipsos voluptas habet cujus aut inopia torquentur aut copia strangulantur Sen. That Saul had been long hatching mischievous designes ful of torment and anxietie and endeavored by much travel and sore labor like a woman in travel to bring them forth and accomplish them but he could bring forth nothing but a mere lie he was frustrated in al his mischievous contrivements Note here an elegant Allegorie in these termes Conceiveth travelleth and brought forth which argues the highest vexation travel and torment which Sinners labor under in al their mischievous designes as Jer. 4.31 Wicked men are as much tormented with the sin they love as with the fear of the punishment they hate al their labor is pain So Jer. 51.58 Habak 2.13 Sinners are said to labor in the fire Jer. 51.58 or for the fire i. e. 1 In vain without any profit as if any one should weave a thread over the fire which brings not only losse of labor but of materials also 2 To labor in the fire notes a dangerous tedious toilsome servile labor such as is proper to slaves What more tedious irkesome and fruitlesse than the drudgerie of sin Eccles 10.15 So Eccles 10.15 The labor of the foolish wearieth every one of them As in Nature it is not stormes without but vapors within the bowels of the earth raised up by subterraneous fires that cause Earthquakes and Tremblements so in the Soul it is not afflictions from without but the interne fire of lusts and sinful vapors that cause torments and tremblement in Conscience It 's better to be possessed of the Devil in the bodie than of lusts in the heart which always breed labor and pain No Sinner ever attains to what he aims at he would be somewhat else than what he is and these desires breed anxietie and torment 4 The servitude of Sin is of al most penal in that eternal punishment is annexed to and entailed thereon This is the top of al punishment that Sinners shal be turned into Hel with al their sins at their back Neither was this kind of punishment altogether hid from Plato for in his Gorg. pag. 522. we find this punishment thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a Soul to descend down to Hel laden with many sins is the most extreme of evils A great Philosopheme for a Pagan and that which argues his acquaintance with sacred Philosophie which more fully instructes us that sin is eternally punished in Hel because it makes a man eternally willing to sin The righteous God takes the same course in punishing sin as men take in the committing of it he sees men have an eternal love for and delight in sin and therefore they shal have an eternal punishment for sin As sinners lay up eternal treasures of sin so God layes up eternal treasures of wrath and punishment In fine what more just than that he who by sin acts eternally against the wil of God should suffer eternal torments against his own wil And can there be a more penal afflictive servitude than this § 8. Having explicated and demonstrated the servitude that attends Sin Al men borne servants of and dead in Sin it now only remains to demonstrate that al mankind are borne in this state of servitude It 's a Maxime in the Civil Law Just Institut l. 1. tit 4. That among Servants there is no difference so as one should be more a Servant than another though among Free-men there are many differences This holds true in moral servitude for among the Ilaves of sin there is no difference as to state because al are dead in sin and death as wel moral as natural admits no degrees al dead men are equally such without difference Whence the Civilians have another great Saying That a Servant is reputed dead whiles he lives Such are al the servants of sin who are really dead whiles they seem to live Lapsed man is under a miserable natural yet voluntary necessitie of sinning wherefore altogether uncapable of erecting himself to a state of virtue as before § 7. That al men by nature are dead in sin is an Hypothesis avouched not only in sacred but also in Platonic Philosophie Thus Plato in his Gorgias pag. 493. I heard this from the wise men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we are now dead and that our bodie is the sepulchre of our Soul By the wise men I presume he means the Barbarians specially the Egyptians and Hebrews from whom he received this Tradition That men are naturally dead in sin Thus Clemens Alexandrinus Strom. 5. pag. 419. In the Barbaric Philosophie they cal those dead who have fallen from their Dogmes and subjected their minds to lusts This Pythagoras expressed by the Symbol of a Coffin which he placed in the room of any expelled out of his Schole thereby to indigitate that he was dead Thence that other Symbol of Pythagoras Abstain from the dead i.e. from conversation with dead sinners which Symbol Grotius makes to be derived from the Hebraic Philosophie according to that of our Lord Mat. 8.22 Let the dead burie the dead Moreover Plato cals the life of men dead in sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a life without life Also he saith That mens Souls are in this life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a ferine or brutish nature Yea Aristotle Problem S. 10. Prob. 45. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nature doth althings that are wicked Among the primitive Christians nothing more commun than this Hypothesis That Virtue or Grace could not be educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature because al men by nature are dead in sins Thus Clemens Alexandr Strom. 2. proves against the sectators of Basilides and Valentinus those fore-runners of the Pelagians That faith is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the good effect of freewil nor yet the prerogative of Nature But to explicate and demonstrate how al men by nature are under this spiritual death and moral servitude of sin take the following Propositions 1. Prop. This Philosopheme That al men are by Nature dead in sin is not hyperbolic but metaphoric and real Plato speaking of the moral death of
follows his Simplicitie The Simplicitie of God explicated which is most absolute as both Sacred and Platonic Philosophie teacheth Sacred Philosophie expresseth the absolute Simplicitie of God under the name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah as also by the Paraphrase thereon Exod. 3.14 I am that I am i. e. a simple pure Act Exod. 3.14 a Being necessarily existent in Act and therefore most simple without the least shadow of Power either objective or receptive So Psal 102.27 Psal 102.27 but thou art the same i. e. a uniforme simple Being Plato in imitation of sacred Philosophie expresseth the same by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first entire perfect uniforme most simple Being without the least composition Thence in his Conv. p. 211. he stiles God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sincere and uniforme Beautie because without al mixture and composition The Simplicitie of God is described by our Lord under the notion of a Spirit Joh. 4.24 God is a Spirit Joh. 4.24 i. e. 1 As he is a pure Act void of al passive power either physic or metaphysic Althings are so far spirital as they partake of Act and by how much the more spirital things are by so much the more simple Among the Elements the Wind and Fire are most simple because most spirital Angels and human Souls are in an higher degree spirital and simple because exemted from al Laws of physic Mater yet they are in some respect composite of Act and Power Substance and Accidents because they are under the laws of metaphysic obediential passive power as Creatures But God is so pure a Spirit and Act as that al metaphysic as wel as physic power is denied of him 2 God is said to be a Spirit as most vigorous and active Our Lord assures us that the Wind being of a spirital nature Joh. 3.8 bloweth whithersoever it listeth Yet Angels and human Spirits are much more active and potent But God infinitely transcendes al other Spirits in point of activitie and efficacitie which also speakes the simplicitie of his Being For by how much the more simple any thing is by so much the more active and vigorous Al mater is dul and phlegmatic Plato philosophiseth much of the Simplicitie of God So Repub 2. pag. 380. he saith God doth not varie his forme or shape but that he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a most simple Being and of althings least varies from his own Idea or Essence So pag. 381. he saith God remains always 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simply one and in the same forme Of which more in what follows of Gods Immutabilitie But he treats more fully of the Simplicitie of God in his Metaphysics Parmenid pag. 137. If one i. e. God be any thing it cannot truely be many i. e. compound and he gives this reason of his Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither can there be any part thereof neither can it be a whole for a part is the part of a whole and that is a whole to which no part is wanting Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore neither wil it be a whole neither wil it have parts if one shal be one His meaning is that God who is one simple Being is neither whole nor has he parts This Argument he more fully improves pag. 138. Simplicitie doth not adde any real entitie or mode to that which is thereby denominated simple but only a negation of composition For simplicitie is the same with perfect and indivisible Unitie This Simplicitie of God is most absolute For 1 he is not composed of Logic parts as of Genus and Differentia because there is nothing before God nor yet a Species contradistinct to him 2 God is not composed of physic parts either essential or integral because he is a Spirit Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. lib. 1. cap. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Whatever things are spoken of God corporally are spoken symbolically but they have an higher mind for the Deitie is simple and has no figure 3 Neither is he composed of metaphysic parts namely Act and Power because he is pure Act. 4 He is not composed of Ens and Essence or of Essence and Existence because he is Being in the abstract Exod. 3.14 He so lives as that he is life it self Joh. 5.26 14.6 5 He is not composed of Subject and Accident because whatever is in God is God Moreover God being the most perfect Being he can neither admit nor need any accidental perfection So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 18. In us habits come and go but not in God for in him nothing comes or goes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for he is inalterable and immutable neither is it lawful to ascribe any accident unto him for goodnesse in God is coincident with his Essence The same he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither may we say that there is a Qualitie in God or that he is compounded of Essence and Qualitie 6 He is not composed of Attributes because they are the same with his Essence Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 13. having spoken of the divine Attributes and Relations he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore al these must be considered in the whole Deitie in commun and as the same and indistinctly and unitely 7 Neither is he composed of Decrees because they differ not from his Nature 8 He is not composed of Essence and Relation or Nature and Personalitie because the personal relations albeit they admit some kind of distinction yet they give no composition seing each Person is the very divine Essence though with some incomprehensible modification Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Deitie is not a composite but in three perfect Persons one perfect indivisible and incomposite Essence So cap. 8. God is both Father always existing and ingenite God is also the Son who always eternally influxibly impassibly is begotten of the Father God also is the holy Spirit c. The Essence and Personalitie are included in the Person of the Father Son and Spirit in a way not of composition but of ineffable conjunction and union 9 Neither is the Deitie composed of Essence and Operation It 's true the operations of God considered in their passive Attingence and as they terminate on create effects are the same with or at least only modally distinct from the effect and therefore really distinct from God but if we consider them in regard of their active Attingence as relating to God the Principe so they are the same with the Divine Wil and therefore not really distinct from the Divine Essence as in what follows Chap. 7. § 3. Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The true word teacheth that God is simple and hath one simple operation So Chap. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The divine effulgence and operation is one Essence both simple and
in Essence and Perfection for that which renders every Creature finite is its essential constitution and composition of Act and passive Power either physic or metaphysic It 's true Angels and human Souls have no physic passive power yet they have metaphysic and obediential as made out of nothing and so reducible thereto if their Creator please But now the first Being God being one simple pure Act without the least shadow of passive power whereby al Creatures are terminated and bounded it thence necessarily follows that he must be infinite in Essence and Perfection God actually and eternally is whatsoever he may be and cannot hereafter be that which now he is not Al Creatures are somewhat in possibilitie which they are not as yet in act whence they have an inclination to or at least a passive power for something which they have not which being attained unto makes them more perfect But now where there is one pure Act al perfection is because there remains no passive power or capacitie of receiving additional perfection Every Act is by so much the more perfect by how much the lesse of passive power is mixed therewith whence the one simple pure Act which has nothing of passive power mixed therewith must necessarily be without termes of Essence and Perfection Again every Essence is so far perfect as it is in Act thence the Divine Essence being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a most transcendent singular and infinite degree actual it must needs be infinitely perfect Thus Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 28. Every thing is so far perfect as it is in Act but imperfect as it is in power with privation of Act. That therefore which is no way in power but pure Act must needs be most perfect such is God 3. We may explicate and demonstrate the Infinitude of Gods Essence and Perfection by his Transcendence in Being Thus Plato Gods Infinitude from his transcendent Essence Repub. 6. pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The chiefest Good God is not Essence but something greater and more august and infinitely transcending both in dignitie and virtue the nature of althings created Wherein he makes God to be the Cause of al Essences yet not properly Essence in that manner as the Creature is but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential or transcendent Essence self-Essence self-Eternitie This transcendent Essence and Perfection of God is termed in sacred Philosophie Magnitude as Psal 95.3 Psal 95.3 For the Lord is a great God and a great King above al Gods i. e. a transcendent Being This transcendent magnitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection must be understood principally intensively as God contains in him eminently and transcendently al perfections Thus Psal 145.3 Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised Psal 145.3 and of his magnitude there is no investigation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. the magnitude of his Essence is an infinite Abysse or Ocean which no mortal finite capacitie can dive into So the LXX 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 there is no terme or bound to it This is wel expressed by Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It the Deitie being above Intelligence and above Reason and above Life and above Essence c. Whence the commun title he gives God according to the Platonic mode is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superessential as before Chap. 3. § 1. This infinite transcendent Magnitude of the Divine Essence is also wel expressed by Plato Parmenid pag. 137. where treating of the one God without beginning and end he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is infinite therefore also without figure neither doth it partake of a round figure nor yet of a straight i. e. God being infinite in Essence is not limited by termes of magnitude or figure This Argument from the Transcendence of the Divine Essence may be thus improved That which is transcendently Ens or Being See Suarez Metaphys Disput 30. Sect. 2. is such per essentiam essentially thence it cannot be limited That which has Being only by participation from a superior Cause may be limited either by the pleasure of the superior Cause that gives it so much perfection and no more or else from the capacitie of the Recipient which is capable of receiving so much perfection and no more But now the Divine Essence being transcendently and essentially such without participation cannot be limited either way but is invested with an infinitude of essence and perfection altogether indivisible not precise and limited to one kind of perfection as it is with the Creature but containing in a most eminent transcendent manner whatever is of perfection in the Creature Whence it is that the divine Infinitude and Perfection admit a reciprocation For Being subsisting of it self contains in it the whole perfection of essence and the perfections of althings belong to the perfection of essence wherefore God being a pure Act and Being subsisting of himself nothing of perfection can be wanting to him Hence God the first necessary transcendent Being cannot be defined or limited to any certain degree of perfection but must be infinite as is wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disp 29. Sect. 3. Thus also the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God is invested with al Essence who also is incorruptible and ingenerable being the supreme Opificer and Creator of the whole structure of the Vniverse as Laertius in Zeno. The sum of al is this God being 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-Being and transcendent superessential Essence he must needs be universally and eminently al-Being and so infinite in essence and perfection of which more fully in the following Argument 4. Gods Infinitude from the nature of Perfection The Infinitude of the Divine Essence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonstrated from the formal Idea of Perfection and its peculiar appropriation to God Al perfection importes some kind of universitie because that is perfect to which there is nothing wanting whence the more any thing is contracted to some certain mode of perfection the lesse perfect it is and the more the universitie of perfection agrees to any thing the more it partakes of perfection Now God having the whole of essence in himself must necessarily have an universitie of perfection God has al kinds extents and degrees of perfection in him either formally or eminently he hath need of nothing because infinitely perfect in his essence there is nothing without or within him that may limit or bound his perfection The most perfect of Creatures have much of imperfection in them because they are limited in their Beings one excels in one perfection another in another but none in al perfections they are al negatively imperfect if not privatively Again the Creatures perfection is for the most part accidental and separable as it appears in fallen Angels and men But Gods perfection is essential absolute and universal and therefore infinite Thus in sacred Philoso phie Act.
contemplation of their Parent So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But those things that are spoken of God affirmatively are predicated of him as the cause of althings And he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he shal be more properly named from things more excellent and more akin to himself now things immaterial are more excellent Wherein he instructes us 1 That our affirmative notices of God are chiefly drawen from his effects 2 That among his effects those give us the most lively Ideas of God which are most excellent and akin to him namely things immaterial as the human Soul c. God so manifestes himself in the whole opifice of the Universe that we can no sooner open our eyes but may behold the gloriose Ideas of his Divine Wisdome Power and Goodnesse which ever way we turne our eye there shines forth some ray of the Divinitie What is the whole Universe but a visible Map or Picture of the invisible Deitie Is not the Creators Name written in golden Characters on every page of the Book of Nature It 's true some want eyes to see and read their Creators Name in the Book of Nature but it follows not hence that there is no natural knowlege of God as the Socinians would needs persuade us For that a thing be called natural it is not necessary that it be actually in al men but it sufficeth if it may be derived from a natural principe because some men are blind we may not thence conclude that sight is not natural to a man 2 Another natural grade or way of knowing God is by way of Eminence 2. By way of Eminence These Notices of God by way of Eminence are best when composed both of Affirmatives and Negatives as also of termes most simple Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The sweetest notion of God is that complexion of both Affirmatives and Negatives as superessential Essence superdivine Divinitie supercausal Cause and the like When we see any perfection in the Creature we attribute the same to God in a more eminent degree and manner And here we are to remember that the more general notions of created perfections albeit they are more imperfect as belonging to the Creature yet they are more properly attributed to God than more special notions because the former are more abstract and simple the later more concrete and composite For by how much the higher we ascend to the generic notions of things by so much the more simple our notions are Hence it is that Knowlege is more properly ascribed to God than Sense or Reason because it is more generic and simple so Life than Vegetation Spirit than Soul hence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being as Jehovah which denotes the same are the most proper Names we can give God because the most generic and simple notions And the reason of the whole is this Seing the Divine Essence is more aptly and familiarly expressed by Abnegation or Remotion than by Affirmation hence it follows that by how much the more concrete and special our notions are by so much the lesse they agree to God and on the contrary by how much the more simple and general they are by so much the more they agree to God because they are by so much the more remote from the imperfections of the Creature as Twisse Scient med pag. 309. Hence 3 The best natural way or degree of knowing God is by Negation or Remotion for the Divine Essence 3. By way of Remotion by reason of its Immensitie and Infinitude exceding al the Ideas or notions our Intellect can forme of it cannot better be apprehended than by removing al imperfections from it So Aquinas Sum. 1. Quaest 10. Art 1. Things simple are best defined by Negation not as if negation were essential to them but because our Intellect which first apprehendes things composite cannot arrive to the cognition of things simple but by the remotion of al composition The same he more fully explicates contra Gent. l. 1. c. 14. In the consideration of the Divine Essence the way of Remotion is chiefly to be used for the Divine Essence by reason of its Immensitie excedes al forme that our Intellect can attain unto wherefore we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is but we have some notices thereof by knowing what it is not For we by so much the more draw near to the knowlege of God by how much the more we can by our Intellect remove imperfections from God for we by so much the more perfectly know every thing by how much the more fully we contemplate its differences from other things for every thing has in it self its proper essence whereby it is distinguished from al other things But because in the consideration of the Divine Essence we cannot conceive what it is or its Genus nor its distinction from other things by affirmative differences it is therefore necessary that we conceive of it by negative differences Indeed the most simple spirital divine and excellent things are best set forth by negatives Hence God himself is best expressed and apprehended by way of negation We know rather what he is not than what he is 2. The supernatural grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either Graciose or Glorious The supernatural Grades whereby we ascend up to God 1 The grades of Grace whereby we ascend up to God are either objective or subjective 1 The supernatural objective grades of Grace are either simple or complexe 1. Christ. 1 The simple objective grade of Grace whereby we ascend up to God and the contemplation of him is Christ the Mediator who is the essential Glasse wherein al the Glorie of the Deitie is most resplendent as 2 Cor. 3.18 He is the image of God 2 Cor. 4.4 2 Cor. 4.4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an image is an expresse ressemblance or imitamen of an exemplar according to its forme or kind and so it differs from Vesâ—igium or a Footstep which gives only some darke notices of a thing by its causalitie There are some vestigia or footsteps of God impressed on the sensible world yea an accidental Image of God on the renewed Soul but Christ is an essential Image of God in whom al the invisibile perfections of God become visible to an eye of faith Thence he is said to be Col. 1.15 Col. 1.15 the image of the invisible God i. e. God who is invisible in himself becomes visible in his Son Whence also he is stiled Heb. 1.3 Heb. 1.3 the effulgence of his glorie and character of his person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the splendor or effulgence of the Sun communicated in and by its rayes specially as they fal on a cloud and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parelius or a reflexe image of the Sun which seems to be
another Sun so Christ he is the Parelius or reflexe Image of God who is in himself a Light inaccessible and ful of Glorie as 1 Tim. 6.16 Thence it is added and the character of his person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes an Effigies or expresse figure engraven or impressed Al the Divine Attributes and Perfections of God are impressed or engraven on Christ's human Nature in legible and golden Characters whence he is stiled Emmanuel God with us He is indeed the golden Arke wherein the Deitie lies couched a visible Image of the invisible Deitie whose mediatorie Offices and Relations seem imperfectly expressed in Plato's Demons of which before 2. The Scripture 2 The complexe objective grades of our ascent up to God are al divine Words or Revelations both preceptive and promissive whereby the Divine Nature and Wil is reveled to us as 1 Cor. 13.12 1 Cor. 13.12 For we now see thorough a glasse darkely We see the face of God in the glasse of divine Words and Ordinances yet only enigmatically and obscurely And Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word whereby things divine are reveled to us which 3. The light of Grace if I mistake him not alludes to the sacred Scriptures 2 The subjective grades whereby we ascend up to the knowlege of God are al Divine Illuminations whereof we find great notices and Philosophemes in Plato 4. The light of Glorie as hereafter Chap. 10. § 1. 2 There are also Grades of Glorie whereby glorified Spirits ascend up to the beatific Vision of God of which elsewhere These are the various descents of God to man and the ascents of man to God whereby his incomprehensible Being is in some degrees apprehended though never comprehended by poor mortals CHAP. V. Of Gods Life Knowlege Wil and Power The Life of God in the Actualitie of his Essence Gods Life most spirituose self-moving Life it self immortal and the Cause of al Lafe Gods Science its Perfection Object both complexe and incomplexe particularly the human Soul The Mode of Divine Science by the Divine Essence and Ideas Gods Science most simple intuitive immutable certain absolute eternal and perfect Simple Intelligence and Science of Vision Middle Science what The Wil of God its Object Actualitie Independence Immutabilitie Absolutenesse Antecedence Perfection Libertie Efficace Distinctions Gods Power and its Identitie with his Wil Its Object things possible Its Infinitude § 1. HItherto we have considered the Essence of God as existent The Life of God we now procede to consider it as actuose which is usually termed the Life of God whereof we find great notices in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In sacred Philosophie Life is ascribed to God on various reasons 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in opposition to al false Gods or Idols and so it denotes the Veritie and Truth of his Essence and Existence as Mat. 16.16 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mat. 16.16 of the living God i. e. of the true very God in opposition to al false Gods So Act. 14.15 1 Tim. 4.10 as in the O. T. Deut. 32.40 Psal 84.23 Jer. 5.2 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by way of Eminence to distinguish his Actualitie and manner of acting from that of the Creature for al life consisting in a spirituose actuositie every thing is said to live so far as it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving Principe as Plato phraseth it now God being the most pure Act and Spirit and the prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-moving Principe which moves althings but is moved by-none hence Life in the most eminent degree belongs to God as Joh. 1.4 and elsewhere 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 effectively as he gives life to al either natural Act. 17.28 Deut. 30.20 or spiritual Hos 1.10 2 Cor. 4.11 Ephes 4.18 or gloriose Joh. 14.9 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentially as the Divine Essence is in and of it self actuose For the Life of God is God himself hence when he swears by his life as Deut. 32.40 Deut. 32.40 he swears by himself And so men when they would swear by God they swear by his life 1 Sam. 14.39 Ruth 3.13 1 Sam. 14.39 And because Gods Essence is ever actuose therefore he is said to live for ever Dan. 4.34 Dan. 4.34 who liveth for ever So Rev. 4.9 This Life of God essentially considered is wel described by Plato in his Phaedo pag. 106. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God saith Socrates who is as I take it the very species forme or idea of life if any thing else be immortal can never die is confest by al. In which description of the Life of God we may consider 1 the mode of life he ascribes to God in that character 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the very species forme or idea of life whereby the Life of God is essentially differenced from al other Lifes For no created life can be said to be the forme or idea of life The Angelic life is of al created lifes the most actuose spirituose and noble yet it cannot be said to be the species or idea of life because it contains not the whole of life for the species and forme contains the whole essence But now the Life of God is the species forme or idea of life because it contains in it self eminently and essentially al life whatever Spirituositie or Actuositie there is in any created life it is in a transcendent eminent degree comprehended in the essential Life of God 2 Plato makes this Life of God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 immortal So Aristotle lib. 2. de Coelo cap. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Energie or Actuositie of God is Immortalitie and this is life eternal This Immortalitie of the Divine Life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1. Tim. 6.16 natural absolute and essential as 1 Tim. 6.16 but the immortalitie of Creatures is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite as Plato in his Timaeus or in the phrase of sacred Philosophie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by grace and free donation Angels and human Spirits are immortal by divine donation but they possesse not Immortalitie as the Divine Life doth But to explicate the Life of God more fully Of Life in its generic notion according to the Analogie it bears to the Animal and Rational Life we must a little examine what Life in its generic notion importes And here indeed we can give only some poor conjectures in as much as nothing is more difficult to be understood than Life albeit nothing more commun This is one of the Mysteries of Nature which not falling under the perception of sense farther than by its effects we can only give some probable conjectures of it But thus much we find by the effects to be included in the generic notion of Life 1 a spirituose Principe or Spirituositie So among Animals by how much the more spirituose they are by so much the more
perfect and noble their life is The animal life is indeed composed of vital and animal Spirits in agitation Hence vigor health strength sense vegetation and al the issues of life procede And by how much the more potent and vigorous the Spirits are by so much the more active and perfect is the life So in the rational Life the more spirituose the exercices of Reason and Wil are the more perfect the life is 2 Life in its generic notion importes also Actuositie Life consistes not in a mere spirituose principe but in the agitation of that principe And the more actuose the spirituose principe is the more perfect the life is 3 But the main character that seems most essential to life in the general is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-motion This Plato makes commun to al life as wel create as increate Brutes they have an animal self-motion men rational Angels intellectile but God absolute essential and independent Thus much being premissed of Life in its generic notion we now procede to explicate how far the Life of God participates hereof 1. The Life of God carries in it the most perfect Spirituositie The Life of God most spirituose as he is the most simple pure Spirit without the least shadow of Mater either physic or metaphysic The lesse any thing has of mater the more spirituose it is Angels and human Souls are called Spirits because they are void of al physic mater but yet they have metaphysic mater or passive obediential power and therefore are not pure simple Spirits metaphysically considered Though I cannot without inhuman violence to mine assent take in that notion of a Spirit given us by Learned More in his Divine Dialogues Dialog 1. Sect. 24. pag. 94 c. where he makes extension agreable to a Spirit and so not proper and essential to Mater solely according to the Cartesian and ancient Hypothesis For if a Spirit be capable of extension in a strict and physic notion which he seems to defend I cannot imagine how it should be exemt from physic mater and al those laws of physic corporeitie dissolution and corruption which attend Mater yet I can easily persuade my self and grant that learned Author that al Spirits have according to the degree of Spiritalitie an Amplitude of Essence which is not confined to the narrow space of a Needles point as the Scholes of old dreamed As for create Spirits both Angels and human Souls we may justly allow them without injurie offered to their spiritalitie metaphysic accidental extension according to the space they occupie as also metaphysic mater as composed of Act and passive obediential power without the least physic extension or mater But now God being void not only of physic but also of metaphysic Mater or al passive Power whatsoever therefore he is said to be a pure simple Spirit in the most eminent transcendent degree Joh. 4.24 as Joh. 4.24 God is a Spirit i. e. the most simple spirituose Being and therefore the most living Being Hence Christ in regard of his Deitie is stiled a quickening Spirit Joh. 6.63 or Spirit that gives life Joh. 6.63 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is the Spirit i. e. the Deitie which they were ignorant of that quickeneth or gives life Althings give and have life so far as they are spirituose Christ as God being the most pure Spirit he must therefore necessarily be the most living and life-giving or quickening Spirit 1 Cor. 15.45 So 1 Cor. 15.45 Christ as Mediator is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a quickening or life-giving Spirit as he is the Fountain of al spiritual life and gives out al to his Members Again Heb. 9.14 Heb. 9.14 it 's said that Christ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the eternal Spirit i. e. by the infinite efficacitie of his Deitie offered up himself So that the Life of God consistes much in his Spiritualitie or Spirituositie 2. 2. The Life of God most actuose The Life of God carries in it the most pure and perfect Actuositie This Character of the Divine Life follows on and flows from the former for by how much the more spirituose things are by so much the more actuose they are and by how much the more actuose they are by so much the more living Nothing can be said to live farther than it is actuose when it ceaseth to act it ceaseth to live Life may be considered either in actu primo the first act or in actu secundo the second act the first Act of life consistes in the spirituose Principe or Spirituositie of the Agent before mentioned the second Act of life consistes in the Actuositie or Operation that flows from the first Act or Principe But in the Life of God which is most perfect the first and second Act are one and the same because he is a pure Act without the least composition of Act and Power or first and second Act. In al created life the Principe or first Act is distinct from the Operation or second Act and both together make an accidental composition of Cause and Effect or Act and Power but in the Life of God there is an Actuation without any true causalitie or proper motion We must conceive therefore of the Life of God as having the most perfect Actuositie and Actuation yet so as to exclude al real Causalitie Composition and Imperfection which attendes every create life by reason of the distinction between its first and second Act which God admits not because he is pure Act without al Power either essential or accidental active or passive his Esse and Agere are the same his Act is his Essence which can be said of no create Being but of God it must be affirmed because he is the first most pure and perfect Act without al power either objective or receptive The pure Actualitie of God is demonstrated by this that pure Act is more perfect than Act and Power but God is most perfect therefore pure Act. Every power is indigent needing an Act to actuate the same whence it necessarily follows that we must either admit a progresse into infinite or grant some first pure Act which needs no other Act for its actuation as Bradwardine acutely demonstrates l. 1. c. 2. pag. 163 c. Whence we conclude that the Life of God is most actuose and perfect because it is a pure Act without al potentialitie Hence 3. The life of God is of al most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-moving The Life of God self-moving Plato aboundes much in this Character of Life which he makes to be most essential thereto So in his Phaedrus pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Every bodie that is moved by an externe pulse is inanimate but that which is moved by it self from an interne Principe is animate Wherein he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self motion from an interne Principe the essential character of life And by how
most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
power in God distinct from his Wil. This Proposition has been already demonstrated C. 5. § 4. Yet for more abundant conviction let us examine the Origine Necessitie and Vse of an executive Power in the Creature and then we shal see what little ground there is to ascribe the same to God The great Assertors and Promotors of executive power have been Aristotle and his Sectators who on false Hypotheses presume That a substance cannot act immediately without some executive power which they make a species of Qualitie Albeit such kind of Qualitative Powers are now generally exploded by al who resolve not to serve an Opinion of Aristotle yet there stil remains a place for executive powers in nature when the principal Agent cannot reach the effect immediately Thus the Soul of Man puts forth al Acts of sense and motion by some executive powers Yet the human Soul can and doth oft act immediately specially in its immanent acts without any executive power And thus God in al his Effects actes immediately by his omnipotent wil without any executive power For he is present in and with al effects and therefore needs no executive power to supplie his absence Again the Wil of God is Omnipotent as c. 5. § 3. and we shal anon prove it more fully and therefore it needs no executive power to execute what it wils Is not the Divine Wil proposed to us in Sacred Philosophic as Irresistible and if it be so can it not then execute its own pleasure without any executive power Indeed the greatest Scholastic wits have espoused and defended this Hypothesis namely That the Wil and Executive Power of God are really the same and not so much as rationally or formally distinct Thus Joan. Major 2. Sent. Dist 1. q. 1. proves That God Created the World by his Intellect and Wil without any executive Power formally distinct of which hereafter § 5.4 Prop. Thus Bradwardine l. 2. c. 29. Alvarez de Auxil l. 2. p. 129. with others of whom in the next Proposition And indeed Suarez Metaph. Disp 22. S. 2. p. 555. doth in part grant our Hypothesis in that he acknowlegeth That the concurse of God as it regardes the effective principe is the same with the Divine Wil which concurs with the Creature to its act This he cals concursus ad intrà the interne concurse which he makes to be the principe of al Acts adextrá Yet I must confesse elsewhere namely Disp 30. S. 17. he makes mention of an executive power in God the same with his Essence containing in it eminently al create perfections And so some Divines as wel as Philosophers assert an executive power in God Thus Heereboord Select Ex Philosoph Disp 8. endeavors to prove that Gods concurse whereby he influenceth things ad extra is not simply his volition because Gods volition simply is an immanent Act but his concurse is a transient Act ad extra But this Argument seems to be of no weight because we easily grant that the concurse of God quoad Attingentiam passivam as to its passive Attingence is distinct from God and the same with the concurse of the second cause or effect but that which we are now discoursing of is the concurse of God in regard of its active Attingence as it regardes God the Principe and in this respect we only assert That the concurse of God is the same with his volition simply considered This wil be further evident by the next Proposition 3. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self Omnipotent and Efficacious The Divine Wil Omnipotent This Proposition is most evident 1 because the Divine Wil cannot be frustrated Thus Suarez 1.2 ae Tract 3. Disput 11. Sect. 2. p. 311. We must say saith he that when God wils absolutely and efficaciously that man wil somewhat the human Wil cannot discord from the Divine The reason is clear because the Divine Wil efficacious and simply absolute cannot be fruitrated seeing it is infinite So Bradward l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to shew that the Divine Wil is universally efficacious insuperable and necessary in causing nor impedible and frustrablein any manner Who knows not that it necessarily follows if God can do any thing and wils it he doth it 2 The Divine Wil being the universal first cause of althings it cannot but be most efficacious For is not this the main difference between the first and second cause the universal and particular cause that this may fail of its effect but that can never A particular cause oft comes short of its effect by reason of the interposition of some other particular cause that may impede the same but the first universal cause can never come short of its effect because there is no other cause can interpose to hinder it 3 The Wil of God is infinite therefore Omnipotent and Irresistible for where the power of the Patient doth not excede or equalise the power of the Agent there can be no prevalent resistence what then can resist the Divine Wil which is infinite 4 If the Divine Wil were not omnipotent God were not infinitely happy For every one is so far happy as his Wil is fulfilled as Aristor Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. 5 It 's a common Hypothesis in the Scholes grounded on the highest Reason That it is impossible but that the Divine Wil should attain its effect So Aquinas Part. 1. q. 19. a. 6. as others Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil is of it self operative and influential on al second causes and effects Thus Augustin De Trinit l. 3. c. 4. The Wil of God operative of it self The Wil of God is the first and supreme cause of althings Again A thing is said to be done by God acting when it is done by God willing Apud Dominum hoc est velle quod facere qura ex ejus voluntate res habent esse Augustin in Psal 144. And the reasons of this Hypothesis are most manifest For 1 if Gods Wil were not of it self Operative and Effective it were not the first principe and cause of althings 2 The wil of man is in some things Operative of it self and must we not allow the same Prerogative to the Wil of God And if it be in somethings operative of it self why not in althings May we not then hence conclude That there is no active operation or motion received from God into the Wil or any other second cause but from the simple volition of God the motion of the human Wil or any other second cause necessarily follows This is evident in the first Creation of althings for by Gods fiat or volition which is eternal althings were made in time without any other impression or concurse received and if Gods first Creation of althings was by his simple volition without any transient concurse what hinders but that al other efficience of God should in the same manner consiste in the simple volition of his wil without any transient
the supreme infinite Being than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial social coordinate cause 2 This also is inconsistent with the Subordination Dependence and Inferioritie of the second cause For al social partial causes are as such coordinate and equal the effect dependes on each but they depend not each on the other To make the second cause social and coordinate with the first what is it but to make it a first cause 3 This also is inconsistent with the prioritie and antecedence of Gods concurse for a partial causalitie is only simultaneous which has been already refuted 4 The sober Scholastic Divines have ever owned and approved a Totalitie of Divine concurse So Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. It 's manifest saith he that the same effect is ascribed to the natural and second cause and to the Divine Efficace not as if it were partly from God and partly from the natural Agent but the whole effect is from both in a different mode as the same effect is attributed totally to the Instrument and yet totally to the principal cause The like Alvarez Disput 85. The Totalitie of Divine concurse as to the new Creature and Gratiose Effects is lively illustrated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Esa 43.7 Esa 43.7 Even every one that is called by my name for I have created him for my Glorie I have formed him yea I have made him Here Christ assumes to himself as the sole total principal Agent the Creation Formation and Consummation of the New Creature As in the old Creation God made first the rude Chaos out of nothing then out of the rude Chaos he formed the several species of the Universe and particularly the Bodie of Man out of the dust of the Earth which was Formation thence in the last place he breathed into Man a Rational Soul which gave Consummation to him So proportionably hereto Christ here assumes to himself a threefold concurse and each total in the framing of the New Creature he saith 1 I have created him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have educed or called him out of nothing as I did the first rude Chaos The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature but out of nothing by Divine Omnipotence But if this be not enough to expresse the Totalitie of his efficacious Essicience he addes 2 I have formed him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This also is a terme whereby the formation of Creatures out of the first chaos is expressed The sense is I have not only given him some first lines a rude masse or shape of a new Creature but I have fashioned and formed him as I at first formed Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay For so the word signifies to forme or shape a thing as the Potter doth his Clay to this or that forme And if al this wil not suffice to demonstrate that Christ is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature he addes yet farther 3 Yea I have made him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. I have perfected and completed the whole worke I have made him such as I would have him conforme to mine eternal Idea concerning him he has no part wanting or misplaced not a finger or little toe defective he is a complete perfect new Creature and that by virtue of my Creation Formation and Consummation Thus the whole of the new Creature as wel as of the old is to be ascribed to Christ totally and solely as the Creator Fictor and Effector thereof And here we are also to note that it was usual with the Hebrews to expresse the workes of the interne new Creation under the symbol of the externe old Creation The Totalitie of the Divine concurse is also we expressed Esa 63.5 and Psal 94.17 5. Gods concurse particular not general only The concurse of God as the first cause is particular and proper not only general This Adjunct or mode of operation may seem novel but really it is not so Before we come to the demonstration of it we must premit some Distinctions and Limitations 1 We must distinguish between a general providence and general concurse we denie not but that Gods Providence as it extendes to althings universally may be termed general which yet doth no way induce or suppose a general concurse i. e. such as is alike commun to al effects and determinable thereby as the concurse of the Sun is determinable by the effects it workes on Such a general concurse is unworthy of the first cause who determines al effects but is determinable by none Bradwardine de Causd Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influxe or concurse which he makes to be from the Pagan Philosophers ' specially the Astrologers who asserted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celestial Bodies which they supposed to be Gods on al subjects or maters 2 We must distinguish between a particular cause and a particular concurse We do not affirme that God is a particular cause but an universal cause concurring in a particular manner to al second causes and their effects And here Heereboord Select Disputat Vol. 1. Disput 10 and 11. whiles he justly opposeth his Master Burgersdicius for denying Gods concurse to be particular he himself false into this easie mistake of making God a particular cause For the obviating of which as also for the taking away the foundation of al the objections urged against our Hypothesis we say that God is an Vniversal Cause and yet his concurse as to the mode of its operation is particular God is said to be an Vniversal Cause in regard of the extent of his causalitie as it extendes to al objects effects and second causes universally and yet his concurse is particular as it is not like that of the Sun determinable by its object but doth in a particular manner according to the exigence and condition of the subject determine the same These things being premissed we procede to demonstrate that the concurse of God is not general but particular as to its manner of working with al second causes 1 From the nature of a General concourse which is of it self indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes on So the influxe of the Sun is only general and indifferent because modified by the mater it workes on as it is evident by the colors in a Rain-bow as also by the opposite effects it has on the waxe and clay To suppose Gods concurse to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unworthy of the first cause which determines al second causes but is determined by none To assert that the concurse of God is in the power of the second cause or mater it workes on what is this but to suppose the second cause to be first and the first second 2 From the manifold imperfections that are hereby imposed on God For if
before Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the Soul is more ancient than althings sithat it is the principe of motion His designe is to demonstrate the Providence of God from the Soul of the Vniverse which moves agitates foments vivisies influenceth orders and governes althings And he demonstrates this Universal Spirit or Soul of the Universe to be more ancient than althings i. e. Eternal and Increate because it gave forme life and motion to althings Thence he addes in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore shal we not necessarily acknowlege that the Soul doth universally governe and inhabit in althings that are moved yea that it governes Heaven Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This Soul therefore actuates and impels by its motions althings that are contained in the Vniversitie of Nature namely of Heaven Earth Sea c. So pag. 898. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Sithat this Vniversal Soul moves the Sun Again he addes That the Soul of the Vniverse which is in that round splendid bodie of the Sun moves it every where as the Soul which is in our bodie leads it every where He gives us in these three pages several great Philosophemes to prove That God is the Soul of the Vniverse who actuates vivisies conserves and governes althings as our Souls do our Bodies Thus Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. explicates the Platonic Mundane Spirit After Amelius saith he Porphyrie thinking to agree with Plotimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. cals the Supermundane Soul the Opificer or Framer of the world The Spirit of God is called by these Platonistes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supermundane Soul of the Vniverse as being elevated above the Universe yet animating actuating and influencing the whole and each part thereof Others terme him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul or the Soul inhabiting the Vniverse Al these Platonistes make the Universe to be as it were a great Animal and the Spirit of God to be the Soul that animates vegetates actuates and perfectes this Animal Thus Origen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 2. c. 1. As our Bodie is made up of many members and contained by one Soul so do I conceive that the whole world is to be looked on as one huge great Animal which is contained as it were by one Soul the Virtue and Reason of God And so much seems to be intimated in Scripture Thus also the Pythagoreans held as we are assured by Minutius Foelix That God was the Soul diffused throughout the whole Vniverse from whom althings received Life Being and Motion So the Stoics said That the Divine Mind is diffused throughout al parts of the Vniverse as our Soul throughout our bodie as Laertius in Zeno. And that these Philosophemes touching the Spirit or Soul of the Vniverse must be understood of the Spirit of God and were so intended though imperfectly by the wiser Heathens we are assured by Cyprian Sermo de Spiritu Sancto p. 329. Edit Basil 1558. This Holy Spirit from the beginning of the World is said Gen. 1.2 to be superfused on the waters not as if he needed the material waters as a vehicle which he rather sustained and gave congruous motion and fixed limits to what comprehended the firmament The Eternal Virtue and Divinitie of this Spirit albeit the Ancient Philosophers those Inquisitors of the Universe could not find him out in his proper nature yet by their subtile conjectures they conceived him to be present with althings giving Life Motion Termes Stabilitie and Use to every thing This Life this Motion this Essence of things the Philosophers stiled THE SOUL OF THE WORLD conceiving that al Celostial Bodies I mean the Sun Moon and Stars yea the very Firmament was moved and governed by the virtue of this Soul and that the Waters Earth and Air were impregnated by the Seeds hereof Who if they had believed that this Spirit is both Lord and Creator and Vivificator and Nutritor of althings that are under him they might have had some convenient accesse to life But the Majestie of so great a Mysterie was hid from the wise and prudent of this world neither could the pride of human Ingenie concerne it self in such celestial secrets and penetrate the altitude of this superessential nature and albeit they understood that the Divinitie was the Creatrix and Gubernatrix of things yet they could no way distinguish what was the Trinitie of the Deitie or what was the Unitie or what the proprietie of persons This is the Spirit of Life whose Vivific heat doth animate foment advance and make fruitful althings See Philosoph General l. 1. c. 2. sect 3. § 3. and l. 3. c. 2. sect 1. § 4. 4. Albeit the Efficience and Concurrence of the Spirit in al Providential Operations be as to its manner of working Immediate Providential means used by the Spirit yet this hinders not but that ordinarily he makes use of means for the execution thereof not from any defect of his Divine Efficience but from the abundance of his Benignitie that so in and by the mediation of Instruments he might render his own Efficience more illustrious and conspicuous and leave some marque of honor on the means Whence oft times the Spirit of God useth the most unapt and unlikely means for the production of the most Noble Effects Yea oft God brings about the Issues of his Providence by contrary means which carry in them a seeming contradiction to what God intends By how much the more potent the virtue of any Agent is by so much the more doth it extend its operation unto things remote Now is not the virtue of Divine Providence most efficacious May it not then extend its efficience to means and effects most remote Doth it not belong to the Majestie Splendor and Dignitie of a Prince to have many Ministers of State under him for the execution of his Soverain Wil and Commands And doth it not in like manner appertain to the Majestie of God the Supreme Lord to have varietie of instruments and means for the execution of his Providence Al Providence according to its formal Idea includes two things Ordination and Execution The Ordination being an Act of Intelligence and Sapience belongs to the Supreme Ordinator who by how much the more judicious and prudent he is by so much the more capacious he is to order al means and affaires in subservience to his end and designe But the Execution requiring only Force and Power may as wel and oft more aptly be transacted by inferior Agents or Ministers invested with executive force in order thereto Thus in Divine Providence the Ordination and Disposition of al means the most wise God reserveth to himself as a Prerogative peculiar to his Imperial Crown but the execution he frequently commits to second causes and instruments furnishing them with executive Forces for the production of the effect and
have more fully demonstrated in what precedes B. 2. C. 8. § 11. and Vanitie of Philosophie B. 2. C. § 4. also Philosoph Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. § 4. As al Divine Gubernation begins with a Law either natural or moral The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience so the Angels those intelligent celestial gloriose Creatures had their Law whereby they were to be directed and ordered to their supreme end What the particulars of the Angelie Law are is not specified but it is supposed they are for substance the same with those moral Precepts impressed on Adams Soul excepting such as relate to the gubernation of the human bodie which Angels are not invested with It 's most certain that those immaterial gloriose Creatures as they are in nature more pure and in power more potent than man so likewise those of them that have kept their station are in the Contemplation Admiration Affection Adoration Imitation and Obedience of their Creator perfectly conformed to that Law imposed on them Whence our Lord makes their obedience the Idea and Exemplar of what we are to pray for Mat. 6.10 18.10 Yet part of those gloriose Creatures through the voluntary breach of that Law whereby they were to be governed soon fel from their blessed station even before the Fal of Man What their sin was cannot be peremtorily determined yet it s generally conceived to be spiritual pride in the reflexion on their own sublimitie dignitie and excellence which ravished their understandings into such an exorbitant degree of self-admiration that they lost the sense of their subordination to and dependence on their Maker whence their Contemplation Admiration Adoration and Imitation of God immediately vanisht and of gloriose pure Spirits they became most impure and unclean as Luk. 8.2 9.42 As for the elect blessed Angels their offices as to God and Men are various The good Angels ministerie as to Gad. 1. As to God 1 they serve him by standing before his Face and observing al his Commands So Gabriel Luk. 1.19 Luk. 1.19 I am Gabriel that stand in the presence of God To stand in the presence of God denotes a posture for the observation of al his Commands and a promtitude to execute the same The allusion is taken from Courtiers who stand in the presence of their Prince ready to observe and obey al his dictates and commands The like Mat. 18.10 Their Angels do always behold the face of my Father So Rev. 8.2 Rev. 8.2 And I saw the seven Angels that stood before God i. e. to observe and execute his pleasure for the destruction of Babylon 2 They minister to the Sons of God Mat. 4.11 Joh. 1.51 3 They laude and adore God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ Luk 2.13 14. Rev. 5.11 12. 7.11 of which hereafter And these praises they performe with so much eloquence and suavitie as that it became a Proverbe To speak with the tongue of Angels whereby they understood the highest Divine eloquence and suavitie of speech as 1 Cor. 13.1 1 Cor. 13.1 Though I speak with the tongue of men and Angels c. 4 They also serve God in the executions of his Threats and Punishments on wicked men specially the Enemies of his Church As Act. 12.23 Rev. 7.1 2. 8.7 8 10 12. 9.1 13. 5 They shal attend and subserve Christ at his second Coming to Judgement As Mat. 16.27 25.31 Luk. 9.26 2 Thes 1.7 6 They ministred to Christ in the first promulgation of the Law and Gospel as in what follows 2. But our supreme Lord intending the Angels as ministering Spirits for the heirs of Salvation Heb. 1.14 Good Angels converse with Saints he has also joined them as Parties in the Communion of Saints under one Head who is Christ Col. 2.10 But because they are Spirits and have no flesh therefore under the Old Testament whiles the Church was in its Infant-state they frequently appeared in corporal visible shapes thereby to strengthen their Faith and assure them of their commerce with and ministration to the Elect of God Mede drives this notion much higher than I dare extend it who on Gen. 3.13 supposeth that the Law of Converse between Spirits and men requires that the Spirit always presentes himself under the shape of some visible thing yea of some such thing as may lesse or more ressemble its condition But I conceive that the highest Communion between Angels and Men is spiritual without the assumtion of human shapes specially in these last times Yet we must not denie but that the Patriarches and Saints under the Law had frequent Apparitions of Angels in visible formes of men who conversed with them eating and drinking and discoursing familiarly with them touching the affaires they were sent about as Gen. 18.1 19.1 and elsewhere Sometimes they appeared in more gloriose shapes like winged Creatures Esa 6.2 6.7 Dan. 8.15 17. 9.21 22. Sometimes they appeared but spake not as Gen. 18.12 And sometimes they spake when no mention is made of their Apparition Act. 8.26 As for the subordination and subservience to Divine Gubernation Angels employed at the giving of the Law in ministring to the Heirs of Salvation and Churches of Christ we find very great and illustrious notices thereof in sacred Philosophie 1. Divine Gubernation made use of Angels and their ministration to usher in both the severe Law on Mount Sinai as also the Mediator of the new Convenant who reignes on Mount Sion 1 That God made use of the ministration of Angels at the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai is evident from Act. 7.53 Gal. 3.19 Act. 7.53 Deut. 33.2 This also seems to be the import of Moses's words when he blessed the people Deut. 33.2 And he said The Lord came from Sinai and rose up from Seir unto them he shined forth from mount Paran and he came with ten thousands of Saints from his right hand went a fiery Law for them By the ten thousands of Saints we must understand the holy Angels that attended Gods Divine Gubernation in giving out the Law Heb. of Sanctitie i. e. Spirits of Sanctitie which Jonathan in his Thargum interpretes holy Angels Heb. 2.2 Whence the Law is called Heb. 2.2 the word spoken by Angels So Zech. 14.5 and al the Saints with thee this may be understood at least in part At Christs birth and for the propagation of the Gospel of holy Angels 2 Thus also the Lord of Glorie and Mediator of the New Covenant when he came into the World was ushered in by a Chorus of Angels Luke 2.13 14. And suddenly there was with the Angel a multitude of the heavenly Host praising God and saying Glorie to God in the highest and on earth peace good wil towards men These Angels stil sing loud the praises of the Lambe about the Throne of God as Rev. 5.11 12. 3 These blessed Spirits were employed also in the solemne Declaration of
Judas having yielded to the suggestion or injection of Satan it 's said Luke 22.3 Satan entered into him i. e. as into a conquered forteresse or Castel he now takes possession of him as one devoted to his service The Spirits of wicked men being very much like unto Satan by reason of Sin and impuritie as also they being his Children devoted to his obedience thence he comes to have a far greater accesse to and power over them than he had at first by Creation Satan being the Prince of darkenesse stirs up that darkenesse that is in the heart of man to oppose Divine Light as he stirs up Lust to oppose the Wil of God It is difficult but not necessary to know all the Mysteries of Satans Power whereby he ensnares poor Souls as Birds 2 Tim. 2.26 6 Satan has a very great Power over the Air and al sensible parts of the Universe He is said Ephes 2.2 6.12 Ephes 2.2 to be the Prince of the Air which is the Seat of his Empire Whence Ephes 6.12 those impure Spirits are termed spiritual wickednesses in heavenly places i. e. in the inferior Heaven or Regions of the Air. According to the sentiments of the Hebrews al that vast space between Earth and the Astriferous Heaven which we cal the Air is ful of these impure Spirits Thence Satan can by reason of his great sagacitie and skil in the mysteries of Nature together with his Power as a Spirit do wonders though not Miracles in and by the Air He can so applie Actives and Passives together as that thence shal follow various and strange transmutations in nature whereby he kept the Old Pagan World as now the Indians in great bondage 7 Lastly he can temte extrinsecally by visible Species and Representations or without as Mat. 4 1-8 Albeit Satan be the Prince and God of this World Satans restraint as to the Elect. yet as to the Heirs of Salvation he is cast out and remains under chains of irresistible Providence and Restraint John 12.31 2 Pet. 2.4 as John 12.31 2 Pet. 2.4 Satan and al his Host are in prison under the bolts and chains of invincible obduration and eternal despair It 's true he oft accuseth the Heirs of Salvation and winnows them by his Tentations but never prevails finally and totally to bring them under his Empire and Jurisdiction Luke 22.31 32. Thus we are assured Luk. 22.31 32. Simon behold Satan hath desired to have you that he may sist you as wheat◠But I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies not merely hath desired but as an Accuser hath demanded For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 among the Grecians notes to demand a Malefactor for Inquisition or torment Thus Satan demanded Job 1.11 So Revel 12.10 he is said to accuse them before God day and night He accuseth them as Hypocrites and demandes power to temte and torment them So it follows Luke 22.31 that he may sift you as wheat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is not a Verbe of frequent use yet to be found in Classic Authors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a cribe or sieve so Hesych 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chaffe of the wheat Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is expounded by Hesych 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to sift or winnow with a sieve as you winnow the chaffe from the corne Satan's demand was that he might winnow Peter and the rest of the Disciples as chaffe or Hypocrites But Christs prayer prevails as v. 32. I have prayed forthee as for al other believers Hence al Satans maliciose plots and undertakements against the Heirs of Salvation are so ordered by Divine Gubernation that they al tend to his torment but to their Salvation But so much for Divine Efficience and Gubernation CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural Creatural Dependence in the general Every Being Dependent or Independent One prime Independent Being Every Dependent Being by participation The Origine of Dependence 1 Passive Power 2 The Dominion of God Every Creature Dependent The Dependence of a Creature not distinct from its Essence Creatural Dependence in Subordination Posterioritie and Inferiorities Creatural Dependence 1 as to Futurition 2 As to Essence and Conservation 3 As to Operation The human wils Dependence on God Dependence Natural or Moral and Supernatural Supernatural Dependence for Habitual and Actual Grace § 1. Creatural Dependence AS appendent to Divine Efficience we may adde Creatural Dependence which also appertains to Metaphysic and prime Philosophie Paul being to discourse among the Philosophie Wits at Athens and to demonstrate the Unitie of God and thence the simplicitie of his worship he bottomes his Argument on the Creatures Dependence on God Act. 17.28 Act. 17.28 For in him we live and move and have our being Dependence on God for Being Life and Motion is essential to every Creature as such For al Creatures receiving whatever they have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by participation from God it thence necessarily follows that they depend on him for al. Plato also gives us frequent and good notices of this creatural Dependence So Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God having in himself the Principe Middle and End of althings goes straight on expanding his force and power throughout the whole Vniverse and al its parts Wherein we have 1 The Dependence of althings on God as their first Principe Middle and End God is the first Principe as he gives Being to althings the Middle as he conserves the Being conferred and moves it the End as he gives consummation and perfection to althings Thence that Platonic Effate That althings move from infinite upon or by infinite and to infinite i. e. from God as the Principe of their Beings upon or by God as the Principe or Cause of their conservation and motion to God as their last end 2 Gods expansion and diffusion of his force and power throughout the Vniverse and al its parts as it were an universal Soul or mundane Spirit which Plato oft inculcates whereby the dependence of althings on God is emphaticly illustrated Whence he addes pag. 716. That he who is puffed up by spiritual pride or swollen with self-confidence as though he were independent and needed not Divine conduct 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deserted by God and left destitute as to al Divine Efficace and Influence and being deserted disturbes al. A lively image of a self dependent Creature We find the whole of this creatural Dependence wel expressed according to Plato's mind by Proclus thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Althings depend on the ONE by MIND and SOVL i. e. to speak plainly althings depend on God that supreme Unitie by Christ the Eternal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Mind and by the Spirit that universal Soul or mundane Spirit as before c. 8. § 2. But to give a more