Reason though our Sight fails us in it shake these Fibres and communicate a part of their Motion If this Motion I say is moderate that of the extremity of the Fibres of the Brain which answer to the Hand will be moderate but if this Motion is violent enough in the Hand to separate some parts as it happens when a Man burns the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably more violent This is what happens to our Body when Objects Act upon it We must now consider what happens to the Soul It resides principally V. The effect thâ—â— Objects have upon the Soulâ— and Reasans why the Soul dâ—â— nâ—t perceive the Motions of the Fibre of the Bod. if I may be permitted to say so in this part of the Brain where all the Strings of our Nerves meet together 't is placed there to cherish and conserve all the parts of our Body and consequently it 's necessary that it be advertis'd of all the Changes which happen thereto and that it can distinguish those which are Conformable to the Constitution of its Body from the others because it would be very useless to know 'em absolutely and without any relation to its Body Since therefore all these Changes of our Fibres which have no other real Existence but in the Motions which commonly differ only as to the more or less it 's necessary that the Soul look upon 'em as Changes essentially different for although in themselves they differ but little This â—â—â—fu◠〈…〉 〈◊〉 is only a Compos'd Sensation yet we must always consider 'em as essentially different in respect of the preservation of the Body Motion for Example which causes Pain very often differs but a little from that which causes Titillation it is not necessary that there be an Essential difference between these two Motions but it 's necessary that there be an Essential difference between Titillation and Pain which these two Motions cause in the Soul for the shaking of the Fibres which accompanies Titillation 〈…〉 I 〈…〉 of Natural Judgments in â— 1. Lib. 1. informs the Soul of the good Constitution of it's Body that there is power enough to resist the impression of the Object and that it must not apprehend it self hurt but the Motion which accompanies Pain being a little more violent is capable of breaking fome Fibre of the Body and the Soul must be advertis'd by fome disagreeable Sensation to take care thereof Thus although the Motions which pass in the Body differ only as to more or less between themselves yet if they are consider'd in respect to the preservation of our Life it may be said that they differ essentially Hence our Soul is sensible only of the Action of Objects upon the Fibres of our Flesh it would be of no use at all to it to know them nor could it receive from them sufficient light to judge whether the things about us were capable of destroying or cherishing the Oeconony of our Body but it perceives it self touch'd by these Sensations which differ essentially and precisely observing the Qualities of Objects as they stand related to the Body they make it to perceive very distinctly whether or no these Objects are capable of hurting it Besides this we must consider that if the Soul only perceives that which passes in its Hand when burnt if it only sees the Motion and Separation of fome Fibres it would not be at all concern'd and it might even sometimes out of Fancy and Caprice take a satisfaction in it like those Madmen that divert themselves by breaking every thing to pieces in their Fury Or else even as a Prisoner would not be uneasie to see one demolish the Walls that confin'd him but would even rejoyce in hopes of being deliver'd very soon so if we only perceive the separation of the parts of our Body when we are burnt or receive any hurt we should soon be persuaded that our Happiness is not confin'd in the Body which rather obstructs it and therefore we should be very glad to see it destroy'd Hence it is observable that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body hath with great Wisdom ordain'd that we should be sensible of pain when there happens a change to the Body which is capable of hurting it as when a Needle pierces the Flesh or Fire separates fome parts thereof and that we should be sensible of Titillation or an agreeable Heat when these Motions are moderated without perceiving either the truth of what passes in our Body or the Motions of these Fibres of which we have already spoke First Because in perceiving Pain and Pleasure which differ otherwise than in the more and less we more easily distinguish Objects which are the occasion of them Secondly because this way of informing us whether we ought to unite or separate from Bodies which are about us is more short and does less imploy the Capacity of the Mind which was made for God Lastly Because Pain and Pleasure being Modifications of the Soul which it perceives by means of its Body and which affect more than the knowledge of Motion or fome Fibres which belong thereto this obliges the Mind to be much concern'd and strengthens the Union betwixt the Soul and Body of Man From all this it is evident that our Senses were not given us to teach us truth but for the preservation of our Body What we have said of Titillation and of Pain must be generally understood of all other Sensations as will be better seen hereafter We began with these two Sensations rather than with others because they are more lively and help us to conceive more sensibly what was to be said It is now very easily shewn how we fall into an Infinity of Errors about Light and Colours and generally about all sensible Qualities Cold. Heat Odours Sapors Sound Pain Titillation c. And if I would stay to particularize every one belonging to every Object of the Senses whole years would not suffice to enumerate them because they are almost infinite I shall therefore content my self to speak of 'em in General In almost all Sensations there are four different things which are confounded VI. Four things which are confounded in every Sensation because they are done all together and as it were in an Instant and this is the Principle of all the other Errors of our Senses The first is the Action of the Object that is in Heat for Example the Impulsion or Agitation of the Particles of Wood against the Fibres of the Hand The second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense that is the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caus'd by that of the Particles of Fire which Agitation is communicated to the Brain because otherwise the Soul would perceive nothing The third is the Passion Sensation or Perception of the Soul that is what every one feels who is near the Fire The fourth is the Judgment that the Soul makes
Thousand sides or a Circular or Ecliptick Figure which may be consider'd as made up of an Infinity of Angles and Sides There is an infinite number of different Species of each of these Figures an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds besides other Figures of four six ten or Ten Thousand sides and infinite Poligons For the Circle the Ellipsis and generally every regular or irregular curve-lin'd Figure may be consider'd as an infinite Poligone The Ellipsis for example as an infinite Poligone but whose Angles or sides are unequal being greater towards the lesser Diameter than the other And thus of infinite other Poligones more compounded and irregular A simple piece of Wax is capable of infinite or rather infinitely infinite different Modifications which no Mind can comprehend What reason then is there to imagine that the Soul which is more noble than the Body is not capable of more Modifications besides those which it has yet receiv'd If we had never felt Pain nor Pleasure if we had never seen Colour or Light or if we had been as Blind or Deaf in relation to Colours and Sounds ought we thence to conclude that we were incapable of all the Sensations which we now have of Objects since these Sensations are only Modifications of our Soul as we have proved in the Treatise of the Senses We must then grant that the Capacity which the Soul has of receiving different Modifications is probably greater than the Capacity which it has of conceiving I mean as the Mind cannot draw out or conceive all the Figures whereof Matter is capable so it cannot comprehend all the different Modifications which the powerful Hand of God can produce in the Soul even though we should as distinctly know the Capacity of the Soul as that of Matter Which is Absurd from the Reasons brought in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of this Book Our Soul therefore receives very few Modifications here because it is united to the Body upon which it depends All its Sensations carry it to its Body and whereas it cannot enjoy God it can have no other Modifications besides what the other Enjoyments produce Matter which our Body is composed of is capable of very few Modifications in this Life this Matter cannot be resolv'd into Earth and Vapour till after Death it cannot now become Air Fire Diamond Metal it cannot be Square Round Triangular it must be Flesh and have the Figure of Man that the Soul may be united to it It is even so with our Soul it is necessary that it have Sensations of Heat Cold Colour Light Sounds Odours Sapors and many other Modifications that it may be united to its Body All these Sensations engage it to the Preservation of its Machine they agitate it and terrifie it so soon as the least Spring is loosed or broken And thus the Soul must be subject thereto as long as the Body shall be subject to Corruption but as soon as it shall be invested with Immortality and there shall be no farther Fear of a Dissolution of its Parts it 's reasonable to believe that it will no longer be affected with these Incommodious Sensations which we unwillingly feel but with an Infinity of all other different Things of which we have now no Idea which shall surpass all our Thoughts and be worthy of the Greatness and Goodness of God whom we shall enjoy 'T is therefore against all Reason that Men imagine to penetrate so into the Nature of the Soul as to be well assur'd that it 's only capable of Knowing and Loving This indeed might be maintain'd by those who attribute their Sensations to External Objects or to their own Body or who pretend that their Passions are in their Heart For indeed if we retrench from the Soul all its Passions and Sensations whatever can be known in that which is left behind is only a Chain of Knowledge and Love But I cannot apprehend how those who have taken their leave of the Illusions of their Senses can be perswaded that all our Sensations and Passions are only Knowledge and Love I mean the confused kinds of Judgments which the Soul draws from Objects relating to the Body which it Animates I do not apprehend how it may be said That Light Colours Odours c. are Judgments of the Soul for on the contrary it seems to me that Colours Odours and other Sensations are Modifications very different from Judgments Let us choose some of the quickest Sensations which most affect the Mind and let us see what these Men can say of Colour or of Pleasure They think according to many very Famous * St. Aug. Book 6. De Musica Descartes dans son homme c. Authors that these Sensations are only Consequences of the Faculty which we have of Knowing and Willing and that Pain for Example is nothing else but a certain Sollicitude Repugnancy and Aversion of the Will against things which it knows to be Hurtful to its Dear Body But it 's evident to me that this is to confound Pain with Sadness and make Pain a Consequence of the Knowledge and Action of the Will whereas on the contrary it precedes both For Example If a hot Coal was put into the Hand of a Person that was asleep or should hold his Hands behind his Back no one I believe with any probability of Truth would affirm that this Person would forthwith know that there were some Motions in his Hands contrary to a good Constitution of Body that afterwards his Will would oppose it and that this Pain would be a Consequence of this Knowledge of his Mind and this Opposition of his Will But rather on the contrary the first thing that this Person would conceive when the Coal touch'd his Hand would be Pain and this Knowledge of the Mind and Opposition of the Will would be only Consequences of Pain though indeed they were the Cause of Sadness which followed the Pains But there is much difference between the Pain and the Sadness which it produces Pain is the first thing which the Soul feels it precedes Knowledge and can never be agreeable in it self But on the contrary Sadness is the last thing which the Soul feels Knowledge always precedes it and it is always pleasant in it self This is evident from the Pleasure we perceive at the Lamentable Representations of Tragedies for this Pleasure increases with the Sadness but Pleasure never increases with Pain Comedians who study the Art of Pleasing know well that the Stage is not to be imbru'd with Slaughter because the Image of a Murder is rather Terrible than Pleasant But they are not afraid to affect the Spectators with too great a Sadness because indeed Sadness is always agreeable when there is a proper Subject of Sadness there is then an Essential Difference betwixt Sadness and Pain and one cannot say that Pain is only a Knowledge of the Mind joyn'd to an Opposition of the Will As for other Sensations such as
all their Modes because Stones are Substances or Beings and not Modifications of the Wax In like manner though God should Annihilate one half of some Bodies it would not follow that the other half should be Annihilated This last half is United with the other but it is not one with it Thus one half being Annihilated it follows indeed according to Reason that the other half has no longer any relation to it but it do's not follow that it ceases to be because as its Being is different it cannot be Annihilated by the Annihilation of the other Therefore it is clear that the Thought not being the Modification of Extension our Soul is not Annihilated though we should suppose that the Body were Annihilated by Death But there is no reason to believe that even the Body is Annihilated when it is destroy'd The parts which Compose it are dissipated into Vapours and reduc'd to Powder They are no longer seen nor are they any longer known this is true but it is no reason to conclude that they are no longer in Being for the Mind perceives them still Dividing a Grain of Mustard into Two into Four or Twenty parts it would be Annihilated to our sight because it would be no longer seen But it would not be Annihilated in it self nor yet to the Mind for the Mind would see it though it were divided into a Thousand or an Hundred Thousand Parts 'T is a common Notion among Men who consult their Reason more than their Senses that nothing can be Annihilated by the common force of Nature for as Naturally nothing can be made out of nothing neither can a Substance or Being become nothing Bodies may be corrupted if we may call the Alterations they are liable to Corruption but they cannot be Annihilated What is Round may become Square What is Flesh may become Earth Vapour and what you please for all sorts of Extensions are capable of all manner of Configurations But the Substance of what is Round and of what is Flesh cannot perish There are certain Laws Establish'd in Nature according to which Bodies change their Forms successively for those Successive Forms Compose the Beauty of the Universe and Create an Admiration in us for its Author But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihilation of any Being because Annihilation has nothing of Beauty or Good in it self and because the Author of Nature loves his Work Therefore Bodies may Alter but they cannot Perish But if relying on the Testimony of the Senses Men would maintain obstinately that the Reduction of Bodies is a real Annihilation by reason that the Parts into which they are reduc'd are Imperceptible Let them remember at least that Bodies can only be divided into those Imperceptible Parts because they are Extended But if the Mind is not Extended it will not be Divisible and if it be not Divisible it must be granted that in that Sense it will not be Corruptible But how could any Body imagin that the Mind were Extended and Divisible We may by a right Line cut a Square into two Triangles into two Paralelogrammes or long Squares into two Trapeza's But by what Line can it be conceiv'd that a Pleasure a Pain or a Desire can be Cut And what Figure would result of that Division Truly I cannot think that Imagination can be fruitful enough in false Idea's to satisfie it self upon that Subject The Mind then is not Extended consequently it is not Divisible It is not liable to the same Alterations as the Body Nevertheless it must be granted that it is not Immutable by its Nature If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures and of different Configurations the Mind is capable of an infinite number of different Idea's and different Modifications As after our Death the substance of our Flesh will be reduc'd to Earth to Vapours and to an infinite number of other Bodies without being Annihilated So our Souls without being again reduc'd to nothing will have Thoughts and Sentiments very different from those they had in Life It is also necessary while we are alive that our Body should be Compos'd of Flesh and Bones It is also necessary in order to Live that our Soul should have the Idea's and Sentiments it has in relation to the Body to which it is united But when the Soul shall be separated from its Body it will be at full Liberty to receive all sorts of Idea's and Modifications very different from those it has at present as our Body on its part will be capable of receiving all sorts of Figures and Configurations very different from those it is necessary it should have to be the Body of a Living Man What I have said does in my Opinion sufficiently show that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing so difficult to be apprehended What then is the reason that so many question it unless it be that they are unwilling to apply themselves as much as may be to examin the Reasons which prove it in order to be Convinc'd And why is it that they are unwilling to do it unless it be that their Will being uneasie and inconstant keeps their Understanding in a continual Agitation insomuch that it is not at leisure distinctly to perceive those very Idea's which are most present to it as those of Thought and of Extension Just like a Man agitated by some Passion turning his Eyes continually on all sides for the most part does not distinguish the nearest Objects and the most Expos'd to his Sight For indeed the Question about the Immortality of the Soul is one of the easiest Questions to resolve when without Consulting our Imagination we consider with some Attention of Mind the clear and distinct Idea of Extension and the Relation it can have to Thought If the Inconstancy and Levity of our Will does not permit our Understanding to penetrate into the Bottom of things which are present to it and which we are highly concern'd to know it is easie to judge that it will be more averse to let us meditate on those that are distant and which have no relation to us So that if we are very Ignorant of most of those things which it is very necessary for us to know we shall not have a great Insight into those which seem absolutely vain and useless to us It will not be necessary for me to endeavour to prove this by tedious Examples which have no considerable Truths in them for if we may be allow'd to be Ignorant of any thing it is of those things which are of no Use And I had rather not be believed than to make the Reader lose his Time in reading things that are wholly useless Though there are not many persons who apply themselves seriously to things absolutely Vain and Useless yet the number of them is but too great But there can never be too many of those who do not apply themselves to them and who despise them provided
Infallibility without any present Pretensions to it We ought not to imagine any great Toyl in an Enquiry after Truth 't is but opening our Eyes becoming attentive and exactly observing the * Book VI. following Rules Exactness of Thought has not that Trouble and Slavery in it that the Imagination represents Nay though we should meet some little Uneasiness at first yet the attending Satisfaction will abundantly recompence our Pains for in fine 't is that which produces Light and discovers Truth But to spend no more time in preparing the Reader 's mind to a Search after Truth which we are willing to believe is already sufficiently dispos'd thereto let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errors And since the Method of examining things in their Original is more regular and clear and helps us to a deeper Knowledge of them than any other Process let us Essay to put it in practice here The Mind of Man having nothing of Matter or Extension in it I. Of the Nature and Properties of the Understanding is undoubtedly a simple and indivisible Substance and without any Composition of parts yet it has been usual to make a distinction of two Faculties in it Vnderstanding and Will which we shall soon explain for it seems the Notions or Idea's that Men have of them are not so clear and distinct as they ought to be But because these Idea's are very abstract and not the proper Objects of the Imagination perhaps it will not be amiss to express them by their Relation to those Properties which are agreeable to Matter which being easie to be imagin'd will render the Notions which 't is fit to apply to these Expressions Vnderstanding and Will more distinct and familiar to us We must only take heed to remember that these Relations betwixt Mind and Matter are not truly adequate and that the Comparison of these different kinds of Beings serve only to make the Mind more attentive and as it were sensible of the Subject we Discourse upon Matter or Extension includes in it two Properties Receptibility of different Figures and Capability of Motion even so the Mind of Man has two Faculties Vnderstanding which is receptible of different Idea's and Will which is capable of different Inclinations or of willing different things We shall explain in order the Relation that the first Property of Matter has to the first Faculty of the Mind Extension is capable of receiving two sorts of Figures External as Roundness in a piece of Wax Internal as that which is proper to all the Particles whereof the Wax is compos'd for 't is certain that all the Particles which make up a piece of Wax are very different in Shape from those which compose a piece of Iron I call then for distinction sake that simply a Figure which is External and that Configuration which is Internal and which is necessary to all the Particles whereof the Wax is compos'd so as to be what it is Thus also the Idea's of the Soul are of two Sorts taking the name Idea in general for every thing that the Mind immediately perceives the first represents something without us as that of a Square a House c. the second that which passes within us as Sensation whether of Grief Pleasure c. And we shall see hereafter that these last Idea's are nothing else but a Manner of the Mind's Existence and therefore I shall call them the Modifications of the Mind We might also call the Inclinations of the Soul the Modifications thereof For 't is evident that the Inclination of the Will is a Manner of the Souls Existence and therefore it might be call'd the Modification of Soul as motion in Bodies being a Manner of their Existence might be call'd a Modification of Matter However I neither call the Inclinations of the Will nor Motions of Matter Modifications since these Inclinations and these Motions have ordinarily relation to something External for the Inclinations have relation to Good and Motions have relation to some External Body But the Figures and Configurations of Bodies and the Sensations of the Soul have no necessary relation to any thing without For even as a Figure is round when all the External parts of a Body are equally distant from the Center without any relation to things External so all the Sensations of which we are capable could subsist if there were no Object without us their Existence includes no necessary relation to Bodies which seem to cause them as shall be proved elsewhere and they are nothing else but the Soul modified after such or such a manner so that they are properly the Modifications of the Soul I shall then take the Liberty to call them so to explain my self The first and principal agreement betwixt that Property that matter has of reserving different Figures and different Configurations and that Faculty which the Soul has of receiving different Idea's and different Modifications is this even as the Property of receiving different Figures and different Configurations is entirely passive and includes no action so also the Faculty of receiving different Idea's and different Modifications in the Mind is entirely passive and includes no action I call this Faculty or Capacity which the Soul has of receiving all things VNDERSTANDING Whence we must conclude that 't is the Vnderstanding which perceives since there is nothing else that receives the Idea's of Objects for 't is the same thing for the Soul to perceive an Object as to receive the Idea which represents it 'T is also the Understanding which perceives the Modifications of the Soul for I mean by the word Vnderstanding that passive Faculty of the Soul by which it receives all the different Modifications whereof it is capable For 't is the same thing to the Soul to receive that manner of Existence which is call'd Pain as to perceive Pain since it can receive Pain no other way but by perceiving it whence we must conclude that 't is the Understanding which imagines absent Objects and perceives those that are present and that the Sense and Imagination are only the Understanding perceiving Objects by the Organs of the Body as shall be explain'd hereafter Because when Men feel Pain or any thing else they perceive it ordinarily by the means of the Organs of Sense they commonly say that 't is the Senses which perceive it without knowing distinctly what they mean by the Term Sense they fancy there 's some Faculty distinct from the Soul which makes it of the Body capable of feeling for they believe the Organs of Sense do really participate of our perceptions They imagine that the Body does so far assist the Mind to perceive that if the Mind was separated from the Body it could perceive nothing at all But these thoughts are the effects of Prejudice and of judging according to our present State of Life in which we perceive nothing without the Help of the Organs of Sense as shall be explain'd more at
large 'T is to accommodate my self to the common way of speaking that I shall say hereafter the Senses perceive but by the word Sense I only mean that passive Faculty of the Soul just mention'd that is the Understanding perceiving something by means of what passes in in the Organs of the Body according to the Institution of Nature as shall be elsewhere explain'd Another agreement between the passive Faculty of the Soul and that of Matter is that as Matter is not truly chang'd by an alteration of its Figure for Instance Wax receives no considerable Change for being round or square so the Mind receives no Change by the Diversity of Idea's which it has I mean the Mind receives no considerable Change although it receives an Idea of a Square or a Circle in perceiving a Square or a Circle Farther as it may be said that Matter undergoes considerable Changes when it looses the Configuration proper to the parts of the Wax to receive that which is proper to Fire and Smoke when the Wax is chang'd into Fire and Smoke so it may be said that the Soul receives very considerable Alterations when it changes its Modifications and suffers Pain after having felt Pleasure Whence we must conclude that Idea's are to the Soul very near what Figures are to Matter and that Configurations are much the same to Matter that Sensations are to the Soul There are yet other agreements betwixt the Figures and Configurations of Matter and the Idea's and Modifications of the Mind for it seems that Matter is an Image of the Mind I only mean there are Properties in Matter which have betwixt themselves Relations much like those which are found amongst the Properties belonging to the Mind although the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter as shall be clearly shewn hereafter From all that I have said I would have it well remembred that by the Understanding I mean that passive Faculty which the Soul has of perceiving that is of receiving not only different Idea's but also innumerable Sensations even as Matter is capable of receiving all Manner of External Figures and Internal Configurations The other Property of Matter is that 't is capable of receiving several Motions and the other Faculty of the Soul is that 't is capable of receiving several Inclinations let us compare these together As the Author of Nature is the Universal Cause of all Motions which are found in Matter so is He also the General Cause of all the Natural Inclinations in our Minds and even as all Motions are made in a Streight Line if they do not meet with some particular and foreign Causes which determine and change them into Curve Lines so all the Inclinations we receive from God are right and could not have any other End but the possession of Good and Truth were there not some Extraneous Cause which determines the Impression of Nature towards evil ends Now 't is this foreign Cause which is the Origin of all our Evils and which Corrupts all our Inclinations To understand this well we must know that there is a very considerable Difference betwixt the Impression or Motion which the Author of Nature produces in Matter and the Impression or Motion towards Good in General which the same Author of Nature continually Impresses on the Mind for Matter is wholly unactive it has no power to stop it's Motion or to determine or turn it self one way rather than another Its motion as I have said before is made always in a Strait Line and when diverted from this motion it describes a Curve the nearest to a right line that 's possible because 't is God that impresses on it its Motion and regulates its Determination But 't is not to with the Will * See the Explanations it may be said in one sense to be active and to have in it self a Power of determining differently the Inclination or Impression that God gives it for tho' it cannot stop this Impression it may in a sense be said to turn it which way it pleases and thereby cause all the disorders that are in its Inclinations and all the Miseries which are the certain and necessary Consequences of Sin So that by the Word WILL I wou'd be understood to mean the Natural Impression or Motion which carries us towards indetermin'd and universal Good And by the Word LIBERTY I only understand the Power which the Mind has of turning that Impression towards agreeable Objects and so sixing our natural Inclinations on some particular Object which before were loose and indetermin'd to Vniversal Good that is to God who comprehends in himself all that 's Good Whence 't is easie to discover that tho' our Natural Inclinations are voluntary yet they are not always free with that Liberty of Indifference that I am speaking of which includes the Power of Willing or not Willing or of Willing the contrary to what our Natural Inclinations carry us for tho' 't is voluntarily and freely that Men love Good in General since they can't love against their Will and 't is a Contradiction to suppose the Will should ever suffer Constraint however they love it not freely in the sense that I have just explain'd since 't is out of the Power of our Will not to wish to be Happy But it must be well observ'd that the Mind consider'd as push'd on towards Good in General can't determine its Motion towards a particular Good if the same Mind consider'd as susceptible of Idea's has not the Knowledge of this particular Good that is in the common way of speaking the Will is a blind Power which can only desire those things that the Understanding represents to it So that the Will can't differently determine the Impression it has for Good and all its Natural Inclinations but by commanding the Understanding to represent to it some particular Object The Power then that the Will has of determining its Inclinations necessarily includes an ability of carrying the Understanding towards agreeable Objects I will explain by an Example what I have said concerning Will and Liberty A Man represents to himself a Preferment under the Notion of a Good which he can hope for immediately the Will wills this Good that is the Impression that the Mind continually receives towards Indetermin'd and Universal Good inclines it to this Preferment But as this Preferment is not the Universal Good and is not consider'd in a clear and distinct view of the Mind as Universal Good for the Mind never sees clearly that which is not the Impression that he had receiv'd of Vniversal Good is not wholly stopt by this particular Good the Mind has some motion to go yet farther it is not necessarily nor invincibly in Love with this Dignity but is at Liberty in respect thereof Now its Liberty consists in this that being not fully convinc'd that this Dignity includes all the Good which he is capable of loving he may suspend his Judgment and Love
him because not being yet disordered his Body was necessarily subject to his Mind Yet 't is not likely that he could forbear having Sensations of Objects at such time as he had not stopt the Motions which they produc'd in some part of his Body to which his Soul was immediately United for the Union of the Soul and Body consisting chiefly in a Mutual Relation between the Sensations of the Soul and the Motions of the Organs of the Body it appears that it would have been rather Arbitrary than Natural if Adam could have been Insensible when the chief part of his Body receiv'd some Impression from External Objects but I forbear making my self a Party in these two Opinions The first Man then took Pleasure in that which added Perfection to his Body even as in that which did so to his Soul and because he was in a perfect State he found the Pleasure of the Soul much greater than that of the Body so that it was much easier for him to preserve his Righteousness without the Grace of Jesus Christ than it is for us fince without it we feel but little satisfaction in our Duty S. Greg. Hom. 39. upon the Gospels yet he suffer'd himself unhappily to be Seduc'd and lost his Righteousness by his Disobedience and the principal Change which happen'd to him and which caus'd all the Disorder of his Senses and Passions is That God forsook him by way of Punishment and would no longer be his Good or rather would not any longer make him sensible of that Pleasure which assur'd him that he was his Good So that Sensible Pleasures which do but incline a Man to Corporeal Good remaining only and being no longer Counterballanc'd by these which formerly carry'd him to his true Good the strict Union which he had with God is strangely weaken'd and that which he had with his Body is much strengthned Sensible Pleasure reigns in his Corrupted Heart by enslaving him to all Sensible Objects and the Corruption of his Heart hath darkned his Mind by turning it aside from that Light which Enlightens it and inclining it to Judge only of Things as they can have any Relation with Bodies But after all we cannot say that there was any great Change in respect of the Senses 't is as if two Weights hang'd in Aequilibrio in a Ballance and I should take something from one of them the other would weigh down without any Change in its self in Relation to the first Weight since it is still the same Thus after the Fall of Adam the Pleasures of the Senses have Sensualiz'd the Soul for want of those Internal Delights which before Counterballanc'd the Inclination we have for Sensible Goods but without such a considerable Change in the Senses as is commonly imagin'd But to come to the second way of Explaining the Disorders of Sin and which is certainly more Reasonable than the preceeding 'T is very different from the former because it depends upon a different Principle however they both agree in what respects the Senses Because we are Compos'd of Mind and Body we have two sorts of Goods to enquire after viz. Those of the Mind and those of the Body We have also two ways of knowing whether a thing is good or bad for us by the Help of the Mind only or by the Assistance of the Mind and Body together We can know what is Good for us by a clear and evident Knowledge as also by a Confus'd Sensation I know by Reason that Justice is Amiable I also know by Taste that such Fruit is Good The Beauty of Justice is not Tasted the Goodness of Fruit is not known by Reason the Goods of the Body deserve not the application of a Mind which God has made only for himself the Mind then must receive such kind of Goods by a short and Incontestable Proof of Sensation without examining any further Stones are improper for Nourishment Experience proves it and Taste alone will convince all Men of it Pleasure and Pain are therefore Natural and Indubitable Characters of Good and Evil I confess it but 't is for such things only as in their own Nature are neither good nor bad nor can be known for such by a clear and distinct Knowledge and 't is only for such things that being below the Mind of Man can neither Reward nor Punish it In fine 't is for such things only as are unworthy the Application of the Mind and about which God being unwilling our Mind should be imploy'd inclines us to them only by a certain Instinct I mean by agreeable or disagreeable Sensations But as for God who is only the true Good of the Mind and who only is above it who only can Reward it a thousand different ways who is only worthy its Application and who is not afraid that those that Love him should not find him Amiable He is not content to be lov'd with a Blind Love or a Love of Instinct but will be lov'd with a Rational Love and a Love of Choice If the Mind saw only those things in Objects that are truly there with adding other things to them by the Imagination which really are not it would find much difficulty to Love or make Use of them so that it is as it were necessary for them to appear agreeable by causing Sensations which they have not but 't is not so with God it 's sufficient to see him as he is to incline us to him and it is not necessary that he make use of this Instinct of Pleasure as a kind of Artifice to draw our Love to him without his deserving it Hence we must conclude that Adam was not carried to the Love of God and his Duty by * Soe the Explanations prepossessed Pleasure because the Knowledge which he had of God as his Good and the Joy that he continually felt Deus ab initio constituit hominem reliquit illum in manu consilii sui adjecit mandata precepta sua Ecc. 15.15 as a necessary consequent of seeing his Happiness in being United to God might suffice to keep him to his Duty and make him act more Deservingly than if he had been as it were Determin'd by a prepossess'd Pleasure After this manner he enjoy'd full Liberty and perhaps 't was in this Condition that the Holy Scripture would Represent him by these Words God made Man in the beginning and after having propos'd his Commandments to him he left him to himself that is without determining him by the Sense of some Prepossess'd Pleasure only keeping him close to a clear Light of his Happiness and Duty But Experience hath shown the frailty of Adam in so Regulated and Happy Estate as that he was in before his Fall to the Shame of Free Will and the Glory of God alone But it cannot be said that Adam was inclin'd to seek after and make use of Sensible Things by an exact Knowledge of the Relation they might have with his
the chief Fibres of all the Muscles which is the Heart that they encompass its Orifices Auricles and Arteries that they spread themselves even in the substance of the Lungs and so by their different motions produce very considerable changes in the Blood For the Nerves which are dispersed through the Fibres of the Heart cause it somerimes to extend and then again to contract with too much force and precipitancy pushing with much violence a great quantity of Blood towards the Head and all the external parts of the Body yet sometimes these Nerves produce an effect directly contrary And the Nerves which encompass the Orifices Auricles and Arteries of the Heart cause very near the same effect with those Spiracles or breathing Holes with which the Chymists moderate the heat of their Furnaces and as the Spouts do which are made use of in Fountains to diminish or encrease the force of the stream For the use of these Nerves is diversly to contract or dilate the Orifices of the Heart and so to hasten or retard the filling and evacuation of the Blood and thereby to augment of diminish its heat Thus the Nerves which are dispersed through the Lungs have also the same use for the Lungs are compos'd only of the branches of the Wind-pipe of the Venous Artery and Arterious Vein interwoven one with another it is visible that the Nerves which are extended throughout the whole substance by contracting of them hinders the Air from passing with so much liberty through the branches of the Wind-pipe and likewise impedes the motion of the Blood through the Venous Artery into the Arterious Vein and so into the Heart Thus these Nerves according to their different agitation still augment and diminish the heat and motion of the Blood In all our Passions we have very sensible Experiments of these different degrees of heat in our Heart Sometimes we feel it manifestly encrease and diminish all of a sudden and as we falsely judge that our Sensations are in the parts of our Bodies and so by that means excite our Soul as it was explained in the first Book so almost all our Philosophers have imagined that the Heart was the principal seat of the Passions of the Soul and this is still the most commonly received Opinion Now because the faculty of Imagining receives great changes by what happens to the Animal Spirits and that the Animal Spirits differ very much according to the different fermentation of the Blood which is made in the Heart it is very easie to discover why passionate Persons imagine things quite after another manner from those who consider them in cold Blood The other Cause which contributes very much either to the augmenting or diminishing these extraordinary fermentations of the Blood in the Heart consists in the action of many other branches of the Nerves which we have already spoke of These branches spread themselves in the Liver II. Of the change of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Liver to the Spleen and the rest of the Bowels which contains the most subtile part of the Blood or what is commonly called the Bile and in the Spleen which contains the more gross or Melancholy in the Pancreas which contains an acid Juice very proper for fermentation In the Stomach Bowels and other parts which contain the Chyle And indeed they are dispersed through every place which can contribute any thing to the varying the fermentation of the Blood in the Heart Also the Arteries and Veins are united to these Nerves as Willis has discovered of the lower Trunk of the great Artery which is ty'd to them near the Heart of the Axillary Artery on the right side the Emulgent Vein and of some others Thus the use of the Nerves being diversly to act those parts to which they are join'd it is easie to conceive how the Nerve which environs the Liver may in contracting it cause a great quantity of Bile to run into the Veins and into the Duct of the Bile which being mingled with the Blood in the Veins and with the Chyle enters into the Heart through the Duct of the Bile and there produces a more violent heat than ordinary Thus when we are mov'd with certain Passions the Blood boils in the Arteries and Veins and this heat spreads it self through the whole Body the Head is inflamed and filled with so great a number of Animal Spirits which being too brisk and too much agitated by their impetuous course hinder the Imagination from representing any other things than those whose Images they form in the Brain that is from thinking of any other Objects besides those of the Passion which Rules It is the same of the little Nerves that go to the Spleen or to other parts which contain a thicker Matter and less susceptible of Heat and Motion it renders the Imagination altogether languishing and dull in causing some gross Matter and such as is difficult to be put in Motion to run into the Blood As for those Nerves which environ the Arteries and Veins their use is to hinder the Blood from passing and by contracting them compel it to run into such places as it finds the freest passage to So that part of the great Artery which supplies all the parts above the Heart with Blood being connected and compressed by these Nerves the Blood must necessarily enter into the Head in great quantities and this way produce a change in the Animal Spirits and by consequence in the Imagination But it must be well observed III. That these Judgments happen without the concurrence of our Will by the order of Providence that all this is performed meerly by Mechanism I mean that all the different Motions of these Nerves in all the different Passions are not produced by the Command of the Will but on the contrary are made without nay even contrary to its Orders So that a Body whose Soul is not so well disposed as that of a healthful Man shall be capable of all the Motions which accompany our Passions Thus even Beasts may have the like altho' they should be only pure Machines And indeed this ought to make us admire the incomprehensible Wisdom of him who hath so well ordered all these Springs that it is sufficient for an Object to move the Optick Nerve after such and such a manner to produce so many different Motions in the Heart the other parts of the Body and even in the Face it self for it hath lately been discovered that the same Nerve which extends some of its branches into the Heart and into the other interior parts also communicates some of its branches to the Eye to the Mouth and to the other parts of the Face So that it cannot raise any Passion within us but it also appears outwardly because there can no motion happen to the branches which go to the Heart but it also communicates it self to some one of those which are dispersed through the Face The
hours are dissipated by transpiration through the Pores of those Vessels that contain them and it very often happens that others succeed which do not perfectly resemble them but the Fibres of the Brain are not so easily dissipated there does not often happen any considerable Change in them and their whole substance cannot be changed but after many years The most considerable differences that are found in a Man's Brain during the whole Course of his Life are in Infancy at his full Strength and in Old Age. The Fibres of the Brain in Children are soft flexible and delicate in perfect Age they become more dry hard and strong but in Old Age they become wholly inflexible gross and sometimes mingled with superfluous humours that the feeble heat of this Age cannot be any longer dissipated For as we see the Fibres which compose the Flesh harden in time and that the Flesh of a young Partridge is without dispute more tender than that of an old one so the Fibres of the Brain of a Child or Youth will be much more soft and delicate than those of Persons that are more advanced in years We shall soon see the reason of these Changes if we but consider how these Fibres are continually agitated by the Animal Spirits which run round about them in many different ways For as the Wind drys the Earth by blowing upon it so the Animal Spirits through their continual agitation by little and little render the greatest part of the Fibres of Man's Brain more dry compressed and solid so that Persons a little advanced in Years will almost always have them more inflexible then those that are Younger And for those that are of the same Age as Drunkards who for many years have used Wine to Excess or such Liquors as have been able to stupifie them will also have them more solid and more inflexible then such as are deprived of those Drinks during their whole Lives Now the different Constitutions of the Brain in Children Men at full growth and old Men are very considerable Causes of the difference that is observed in their faculty of Imagining of which we shall afterwards speak CHAP. VII I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother and that of her Child II. Of the Communication that is between our Brain and the other parts of our Body which carries us to Imitation and Compassion III. An Explanation of the generation of Monstrous Children and of the Propagation of the Species IV. Some Irregularities of the Mind and some Inclinations of the Will explained V. Of Concupiscence and Original Sin VI. Objections and Answers IT is sufficiently evident to me that we incline to all things and that we have a Natural relation to every thing about us that is most useful for the Preservation and conveniency of Life But these relations are not equal we are more inclined to France than to China to the Sun than to any Star and to our own House more than to our Neighbours There are invsible ties which unite us more strictly to Men than to Beasts to our Relations and Friends than to Strangers to those we depend upon for the preservation of our Lives than such from whom we neither fear nor hope any thing What is chiefly to be observed in this Natural Union which is between us and other Men is that 't is so much the greater as we have more need of them Relations and Friends are strictly United one to another we may say their Griefs and Miseries are Common as well as their Joys and Happiness for all the Passions and Sensations of our Friends are communicated to us by the impression of their aspect and air of their Face Yet because we cannot absolutely live without them there is also another stricter Union then that Natural and Mutual one which is betwixt us and them Children in their Mothers Bellies I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother and that of a Child whose Bodies are not yet entirely formed who are of themselves in as weak and helpless a condition as can be conceived must also be united with their Mothers in the stricktest manner that can be imagined And althâ— their Souls are separated from their Mothers yet their Bodies being linked together we must think they have the same Sensations and Passions and indeed the same thoughts which are excited in the Soul by the motions that are produced in the Body Thus Infants see what their Mothers see they hear the same Crys receive the same impressions of Objects and are agitated with the same Passions For since the air of a passionate Mans face penetrates those who look upon him and naturally imprints in them a passion like that which agitates him although the Union of the Man with those that consider him is not so great it seems reasonable to me to think that Mothers are capable of impressing upon their Children all the same Sensations they are affected with and all the same passions by which they are agitated For the body of an Infant makes but one with that of the Mothers the Blood and Spirits are common to both and Sensations and Passions are the Natural Consequence of the Motion of the Spirits and Blood which Motions necessarily Communicate themselves from the Mother to the Child Therefore the passions sensations and generally all the thoughts which proceed from the body are common both to the Mother and Child These things appear unquestionable for many reasons and I advance them only here as a supposition agreeable to my thoughts but shall sufficiently demonstrate them hereafter For whatsoever hypothesis can resolve all difficulties that can be brought against it ought to pass for an unquestionable principle The invisible bonds by which the Author of Nature unites all these Works are worthy the Wisdom of God and admiration of Men there is nothing that 's both more surprizing and instructive together but we think not of it we suffer our selves to be conducted without considering who it is that conducts us Nature is hidden from us as well as its Author and we feel the Motions which she produces in us without considering the Causes of 'em yet are there few things more necessary to be known for 't is upon their knowledge that the Explanation of whatsoever belongs to Man depends There are certainly springs in our Brain which Naturally incline us to Imitation II. Of the Communication there is between our Brain and the other parts of our bodies which inclines us to Imitation and Compassion for it is very necessary to Civil Society It is not only requisite that Children should believe their Fathers Disciples their Masters and Inferiors those which are above them for all Men must have some disposition to take the same manners and to do the same actions with those they live with To unite Men together there must be a resemblance both of Body and Mind this is the principle of an infinite Number
Brain for that the Soul always represents to her self those things of which she has the largest and deepest Traces To these we may add other Examples more Compos'd A Distemper is a Novelty it makes such Havock as surprizes the World This imprints such deep Traces in the Brain that the Distemper is always present to the Mind Suppose this Disease for Example be call'd the Scurvy all Distempers will be the Scurvy The Scurvy is new therefore all Distempers shall be the Scurvy The Scurvy is attended with several Symptoms many of which are common to other Diseases That 's nothing to the purpose if it happen that the Sick Person has any one of those Symptoms he shall be sick of the Scurvy and they shall not so much as think of other Distempers that are accompanied with the same Symptoms they will expect that all the Accidents that they have known Scorbutic Persons labour under befal them also They shall prescribe the same Remedies and shall wonder why they do not work the same Effects as they have wrought in others An Author applies himself to one sort of Study upon which the Traces of the Subject of his Employment make so deep an Impression and irradiate so vigorously over all the Brain that many times they confound and deface the Traces of such things as are very different one from another There was one for Example who compil'd several Volumes upon the Cross this made him see Crosses where ever he came Nor was it without reason that Father Morin derides him for believing that a Medal represented a Cross when it represented quite another thing And by Vertue of such a sort of Imagination as this it was that Gilbert and several others after they had study'd the Loadstone and admir'd its Properties would needs apply to Magnetick Qualities a great Number of Natural Effects which have not the least Correspondence with them The Examples here cited are sufficient to prove that from this extraordinary easiness of the Imagination to represent to it self the Objects which are most familiar to it and the difficulty which it undergoes to imagine those which are new and unusual it come to pass that Men are always forming Idea's which may be call'd Mix'd and Impure and that the Mind never Judges of things but with reference to it self and its first Thoughts Thus the different Passions of Men their Inclinations their Conditions their Employments their Qualities their Studies in a word all their various Manners of Living producing very great differences in their Idea's And this it is that makes them fall into an Infinite number of Errors of which we shall discourse more at large hereafter This was it that made the Lord Chancellor Bacon utter these Judicious Expressions All Perceptions as well of the Sense as of the Mind are Ex analogia Hominis not ex analogia Vniversi estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inequalis ad radios rerum qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet camque destorquet inficit CHAP. III. Of the Mutual Connexion between the Idea's of the Mind and the Traces of the Brain and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces and between Idea's and Idea's AMong all Material Things there is none more worthy the serious Study of Men than the Structure of their Bodies and the Correspondence between all the Parts that Compose it and of all Spiritual Things there is none of which the Knowledge is more Necessary than that of the Soul and how it is Related indispensably to God and naturally to the Body 'T is not sufficient to perceive or know confusedly that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another and that they are attended by the Motion of the Animal Spirits that the Traces being stirred up in the Brain likewise stir up the Idea's in the Mind and that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits excite the Passions in the Will 'T is requisite therefore as much as may be to understand distinctly the cause of all those different Unions and chiefly the Effects which they are capable of producing We must understand the cause of them to the end we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is only able to act within us and to make us Happy or Miserable and it becomes us to understand the Effects because we should know our selves as much as in us lyes and other Men with whom we Converse For then we shall understand the ways and means of Conducting Governing and Preserving our selves in the most Happy and Perfect condition to which it is possible for us to attain according to the Order of Nature and the Rules of the Gospel and we shall be able to live with other Men when we know how to make use of them in our Necessities and assist them in their Miseries I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter a Subject of so vast and so large an Extent Nor do I pretend to it altogether in the whole Work There are many things of which I am Ignorant as yet and which I never hope to understand exactly there are other things which I believe I know but which I cannot for all that Explain For there is no Wit how mean soever it be that by Meditation cannot discover more Truths than the most Eloquent Man in the World can relate I. We are not to imagine Of the Union of the Soul with the Body as the greatest part of Philosophers do that the Soul becomes Corporeal when it is united with the Body and that the Body becomes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul The Soul is not diffus'd into all the Parts of the Body to give it Life and Motion as the Imagination fancies nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its union with the Soul as our deluding Senses would seem to convince us Every Substance remains what it is and as the Soul is not capable of Extension and Motion neither is the Body capable of Sensation and Inclinations All the Alliance of the Body and Soul which is known to us consists in a Natural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul with the Traces or Phantoms of the Brain and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Spirits So soon as the Soul receives some new Idea's it imprints new Traces in the Brain and so soon as the Objects produce new Traces the Soul receives new Idea's Not that it considers those Traces for it has no knowledge of them nor that those Traces include those Idea's because they have no Relation one with another Nor lastly that the Soul receives her Idea's from those Traces for as we shall show in another place it is not to be conceiv'd that the Soul can receive any thing from the Body or that it becomes more Knowing or more Enlightned by adverting to it as the Philosophers pretend who would have it that the Soul should perceive all Things per conversionem ad Phantasmata
Disposition of their Heart Those who begin their Conversion have commonly need of a prepossessed and an indeliberate Pleasure to free them from their Sensible Goods to which they are united by other preventing and indeliberate Pleasures Sadness and Remorse of Conscience is not enough and they do not yet taste any Joy But the Just can live by Faith and in Want and it 's even in this Condition that they deserve more because Men being reasonable God will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice rather than with a Love of Instinct and an indeliberate Love like that by which they love Sensible things without knowing them to be Good otherwise than by the Pleasure which they receive from them However the greatest part of Men have little Faith and being continually led to taste Pleasure they cannot long preserve their elective Love for God against a Natural Love for Sensible Goods if their Delight in Grace does not uphold them against the Efforts of Pleasure for a Delight in Grace begets preserves and increases Charity as Sensible Pleasures do Desire It is evident from what has been said V. Of Mens Ignorance That Men being never without some Passion or agreeable or disagreeable Sensations much of the Capacity and Extension of their Mind is taken up with them And when they are willing to employ the rest of their Capacity to examine some Truth they are often diverted by some new Sensations or by a Disgust which they find in this Exercise and by an Inconstancy of the Will which agitates and runs the Mind from one Object to another so that unless they have accustom'd themselves to overcome these Oppositions from their Youth as has been explain'd in the Second Part they will at last be incapable of penetrating into any thing that is a little Difficult or which requires a little Application We must then conclude That all Sciences especially those that include Questions very difficult to be resolv'd are full of an infinite Number of Errors and that we ought to suspect all those great Volumes which are every day composed upon Physicks Natural Philosophy and Morality and especially upon the particular Propositions of these Sciences which are much more compounded than general ones We ought even to judge that these Books are so much the more to be Contemned as they are better received by the generality of Men I mean those who are but little capable of Application and who know not how to make a good use of their Judgment because the Applause of the Vulgar in any difficult Matter is a certain Argument of the Falsity of that Opinion and that it is only maintained upon the delusive Notions of the Senses or some false Lights of the Imagination Yet it is not impossible but that a Man may of himself discover a greater Number of Truths which have been conceal'd from former Ages provided he does not want a good Judgment but lives in some retired place where nothing can divert him if he Seriously apply himself to an enquiry into Truth Wherefore those are very unreasonable who despise the Philosophy of Descartes without knowing it only for this reason because it appears impossible that one Man of himself should be able to discover the Truth in so Mysterious a Subject as that of Nature But if they knew the Manner how this Philosopher lived the Method he took in his Studies to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being diverted by any other Objects besides those whose Truth he would discover the Clearness of the Idea's upon which he establish'd his Philosophy and generally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients by new Discoveries I say If they consider these things they would doubtless receive a more reasonable Prejudice in favour of Descartes than of Antiquity which Authorizes Aristotle Plato and many others Yet I advise them not to stop at this Prejudice nor to believe that Descartes is a great Man and that his Philosophy is good because he may be advantageously spoke of Descartes was a Man subject to Error and mistakes like others There are none of his Works even not excepting his Geometry wherein there are not some Footsteps of the Weakness of the Humane Mind He must not therefore be believ'd upon his Word but be read with Precaution as he himself advises us to do examining if he was not deceiv'd and believing nothing of what he says but what Evidence and the Secret Reproaches of our Reason oblige us to believe for indeed the Mind knows nothing truly but what it sees evidently We have shown in the preceding Chapters that our Mind is not infinite but on the contrary that it had a very mean Capacity which is commonly filled with the Sensations of the Soul And lastly That the Mind receiving its Direction from the Will cannot firmly consider any Object without being soon diverted from it through its Inconstancy and Levity These things are certainly the most general Causes of our Errors and we might longer insist upon them here but what I have said is sufficient to discover the Weakness of the Humane Mind to Persons that are capable of any Attention In the Fourth and Fifth Book we shall treat more largely of the Errors which our Inclinations and Passions lead us into and of which we have already said something in this Chapter THE SECOND PART OF THE Pure Understanding Of the Nature of IDEA'S CHAP. I. I. What is meant by Idea's That they truly Exist and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen I Think every one will confess that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves We see the Sun the Stars and many Objects without us and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body and walk as it were through the Heavens to Contemplate all those Objects there She does not then see them by themselves and as the immediate Object of Mind when it sees the Sun for instance it is not the Sun but something which is nearly united to our Soul and it is that which I call Idea So that here by this word Idea I mean only what is the immediate Object or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing It must be observed that to make the Mind perceive any Object it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present of which we can have no doubt but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea for it often happens that we perceive things which are not and which never had a being So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were For instance when a Man imagins a Mountain of Gold it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind When a Mad Man a Man in a high Fever or a Man that is
MALEBRANCH's SEARCH AFTER TRUTH OR A Treatise of the Nature OF THE Humane Mind AND Of its Management for avoiding Error in the Sciences VOL. I. Done out of French from the last Edition LONDON Printed for I. Dunton at the Raven in the Poultrey and S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhil 1694. TO THE Marquess of NORMANBY My LORD THis Learned Treatise of the Famous Malebranch begs the Favour of your Lordships Patronage and if any thing could do so would almost deserve it All great Genius's are nearly related to one another at least there is a sort of Sympathy between them and the Wits of France have never fail'd of a kind Reception from those in England which the most Cruel Wars cannot hinder nor does Love to our Country forbid us from doing Justice to theirs The Translation of good French Books into our Tongue is a Reprisal on their Nation who have taken the same way by such Writings as are Famous in Antiquity doing all that was in their Power for an Universal Language perhaps to make way for Universal Empire So that Translation from them again is only a Countermining them and Fencing with them at their own Weapons And this perhaps might succeed as well in our Language as any in Europe since 't is much fuller and stronger and consequently capable of mending an Original and indeed nothing can hinder it but want of Encouragement from Men in Power or Weakness in the Performance For the First there is no one that can justly complain of it who has the Ambition of placing the Name of Normanby before his Writings it gives him a new Soul and he ought neither to think or write meanly when he considers at whose Altars his Labours are offer'd For the Second I have as little to say for it as I could wish our Criticks may have to say against it The Errors that have escap'd the Press in the Original the Difficulty of the Subject the Confinement of Language for fear of spoiling the Philosopher to gratifie the Gentleman my own necessary Avocations and the very little time I did it in cannot promise so correct a Translation as perhaps it otherwise might have been yet I am willing to believe it may in some measure be useful to such as can read it without Prejudice and it being design'd by the Author only for such as are willing to know the Errors of their Senses and Imagination and the Weakness of the Humane Mind in order to discover Truth and Happiness I cannot be very uneasie about anticipating its Fate amongst others especially under your Lordships Protection Indeed I may very well be Ambitious and Proud of such a Protection when the Government begins to be so very Sensible of the Happy Influences of your great Abilities and Interest 'T is a rare Happiness to have Prudence in Council joyn'd with Bravery in Action Nay the same Man may be a Politick-General and Master of much Personal Valour yet be far enough from an Accomplish'd Statesman But to think coolly yet act warmly to seize and improve every Advantage and yet pierce into the Depths of Futurity and disintangle intricate and distant Causes and Effects are only Accomplishments for such a King as ours and such a Minister of State as your Lordship Nor are your great Abilities to serve the Publick Good without particular Instances of your Personal Hazards and Signal Zeal for its Preservation in the late Dutch Wars when your Lordship was pleased to Command the Royal Catherine a Post that was the greatest Evidence of your Lordships Loyalty and Bravery The highest Military and Civil Honours which require great Application hinder not your Lordship from excelling in the less Severe Studies a great Genius will do best upon whatever Employment it fixes it self witness your Lordships Essay on Poetry and that admirable Product of your Youth the Temple of Death with several other Miscellany Pieces of your Lordships which like our great Roscommon's Works have a particular noble Air that is not only the Effect of a great Genius but also of a Genteel and Happy Education and therefore unimitable by our best Wits who can only plead the former Qualification Nor is it any Wonder that so great a Master should Patronize others who have excell'd in the same Divine Art which requires that force of Spirit and fineness of Thought that are necessary to all that even in Prose shall do any thing extraordinary or worthy the Perusal of such Judges as your Lordship this Malebranch is allow'd by all to have in his Native Language and therefore if he gives your Lordship no Entertainment the Defect must be in the Translation not the Original the very Faults of this great Man have something in them extreamly Beautiful and the Jewel is so dazling that the flaws are scarce discern'd The inscribing these Papers to your Lordships most honorable Patronage is the occasion of this Address wherein I have the Honor to testifie both to your Lordship and the World with how profound a Deference and Respect I am My LORD Your Lordships most Humble and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault THE PREFACE THE Mind of Man is by its Nature as it were situated between its Creator and Corporeal Creatures since according to * Nihil est potentius illâ Creaturâ quae mens dicitur rationalis nihil est sublimius Quidquid supra illam est jam Creator est Tr. 23. upon St. John St. Austin there is nothing above it but God alone and nothing below it but Bodies But as the great Elevation it has above all Material things does not hinder it from being united to them and from depending in some measure upon a Portion of Matter so the infinite distance that is between the Sovereign Being and the Mind of Man does not hinder it from being immediately and in a very strict manner united to him This last Vnion raises it above all things it gives it Life Light and all its Felicity and * Quod rationali animâ melius est omnibus consentientibus Deus est Aug. St. Austin speaks of this Vnion in many Passages of his Works as of that which is the most Natural and the most Essential to the Mind On the contrary the Vnion of the Mind with the Body debases Man exceedingly and is the Principal Cause of all our Errors and Miseries I do not wonder that the common sort of Men or that the Heathen Philosophers should only consider in the Soul its Retation and Vnion with the Body without distinguishing its Relation and Vnion with God But I am surprised that Christian Philosophers who should prefer the Mind of God to the Mind of Man Moses to Aristotle St. Austin to some wretched Commentator upon a Heathen Philosopher should look upon the Soul rather as the Form of the Body than as being made after the Image and for the Image of God that is according to * Ad ipsam similitudinem non omnia facta sunt sed
sola substantia rationalis Quare omnia per ipsam sed ad ipsam non nisi anima rationalis Itaque substantia rationalis per ipsam facta est ad ipsam Non enim est ulla natura interposita Lib. Imp. de Gen. ad Litt. St. Austin for Truth to which alone it is immediately united It is true the Soul is united to the Body and is naturally the Form of it but it is also true that it is united to God after a much stricter and more Essential manner The relation it has to its Body might not be but the relation it has to God is so Essential that it is impossible to conceive that God could create a Spirit without that Relation It is evident that God can only Act for himself that he can only Create Spirits to Know and Love him that he can neither give them any Knowledge nor imprint any Love in them but what is for him and what tends towards him But he was not oblig'd to unite Spirits to Bodies as he has done Therefore the * Rectissimè dicitur factus ad imaginem similitudinem Dei non enim aliter incommutabilem veritatem posset mente conspicere De vera Rel. Relation which our Minds have to God is Natural Necessary and absolutely Indispensible but the Relation of our Spirits to our Bodies though Natural is neither absolutely Necessary nor Indispensible This is not a proper place to set forth all the Authorities and Reasons which may induce us to believe that it is more suitable to the Nature of our Mind to be united to God than to a Body these things would lead us too far To place this Truth in a just Light it would be necessary to destroy the Principal Foundations of Heathen Philosophy to explain the Disorders of Sin to engage what is falsly called Experience and to argue against the Prejudices and Illusions of the Senses Therefore to make the common sort of Mankind apprehend this Truth perfectly is too hard a Task to attempt in a Preface Nevertheless it is not difficult to prove it to attentive Minds which are acquainted with true Philosophy for it is enough to put them in mind that since the Will of God regulates the Nature of every thing it is more suitable to the Nature of the Soul to be united to God by the Knowledge of Truth and the Love of Good than to be united to a Body since it is certain as above that God has created Spirits to Know and Love him rather than to Inform Bodies This Proof is able at first sight to startle Ingenious Minds then to render them attentive and lastly to convince them But it is morally Impossible that Sensualiz'd Spirits who can know nothing but what is felt should ever be convinc'd by such Arguments These sort of Men must have gross sensible Proofs because nothing seems real to them unless it makes an Impression upon their Senses The Fall of the first Man has so much weakned the * Mens quod non sentit nisi cum purissima beatisma est nulla Cohaeret nisi ipsi veritati quae similitudo Imago patris sapientia dicitur Aug. lib. Imp. de Gen. ad Litt. Vnion of our Mind with God that none but those are sensible of it whose Heart is purified and whose Mind is inlightned for this Vnion seems Imaginary to all those who blindly follow the Judgments of the Senses and the Motions of the Passions On the contrary it has so much strengthned the Vnion of our Soul with our Body that these two parts of our selves seem to us to be no longer but one and the same Substance or rather it has made us such Slaves to our Senses and Passions that we are inclin'd to believe our Body is the Principal of the two Parts of which we are composed When we consider the different Employments of Men we have a great deal of reason to believe that they have a mean and low Opinion of themselves for as they all love Felicity and the Perfection of their Being and only labour to make themselves Happier or more Perfect have we not reason to believe that they have a greater Value for their Body and the Goods of their Body than for their Mind and the Goods thereof when we see them commonly imploy'd about things that have a Relation to the Body seldom or never thinking on those which are absolutely necessary for the Perfection of the Mind The greatest part of Men labour with so much Industry and Toil only to maintain a miserable Life and to leave their Children some necessary Conveniencies for the Preservation of their Bodies Those who by the good Fortune or Chance of their Birth are not subject to this Necessity do not shew better by their Business and Imployments that they look upon their Soul as the noblest part of their Being Hunting Dancing Gaming Entertainments are their common Imployments their Soul being a Slave to their Body Esteems and Cherishes all those Divertisements though altogether Vnworthy of it but because their Body has a relation to all Sensible Things the Soul is not only inslav'd to the Body but also to all sensible things by the Body and for the Body for 't is by the Body that Men are united to their Relations their Friends their Country their Imployments and to all sensible Enjoyments the Preservation of which seems to them as necessary and as valuable as the Preservation of their own Being Thus the Care of their Estates and the Desire of increasing them the Passion of Glory and Grandeur agitates and imploys them infinitely more than the perfecting of their Soul Moreover the Learned and those who pretend to Wit spend more than half their Life in Actions purely Animal or such as incline us to think that they value their Health their Estate and their Reputation more than the Perfection of their Mind They study more to attain a Chimerical Grandeur in the Opinion of other Men than increase the Power and Capacity of their Mind They make their Heads a kind of Wardrobe in which they Store up without choice or order whatever bears any Character of Learning I mean whatever may appear Rare and Extraordinary and excite the Admiration of other Men. They are proud of being like those Cabinets of Curiosity and Antiquity which have nothing Rich or Solid in them the Value whereof only depends on Fancy Passion and Chance and they seldom labour to improve their Mind and to regulate the Motions of their Heart Yet it is not that Men are wholly Ignorant they have a * Non exigua hominis portio sed totius Humana Universitatis substantia est Amb. 6. Hexa 7. Soul and that this Soul is the chief part of their Being They have also been convinc'd a thousand times by Reason and Experience that it is no very considerable Advantage to have some Reputation Riches and Health for some Years and generally that all the
Advantages of the Body and such as are only possess'd by the Body and for the Body are Imaginary and perishable Goods Men are sensible that it is better to be Just than Rich to be Reasonable than Learned to have a lively penetrating Mind than a quick and active Body These Truths can never be effac'd out of their Mind and they discover them Infallibly whenever they are pleas'd to think on them Homer for instance who praises his Hero for his Nimbleness in Running might have observ'd if had so pleas'd that it is a Praise fit for Horses and Grey-hounds Alexander so Famous in History for his Illustrious Thefts had sometimes the same Reproaeches from his Reason as Murtherers and Thieves have notwithstanding the confused Noise of the Flatterers that were about him And Cesar at the passage of the Rubicon could not forbear discovering that these Reproaches terrified him when he resolv'd to Sacrifice the Liberty of his Country to his Ambition The Soul though strictly united to the Body is nevertheless united to * Ubique veritas praesides omnibus consulentibus te simulque respondes omnibus etiam diversa consulentibus God and at that very time when it receives by its Body those lively but confused Sensations which the Passions Inspire it receives from the Eternal †Liquidè tu respondes sed non liquidè omnes audiunt Omnes unde volunt consulunt sed non semper quod volunt audiunt Conf. S. Aug. Book 10. C. 26.5 Quint. Cur. Book 7. c. 8. Truth which presides in its Mind the Knowledge of its Duty and Disorders When the Body deceives it God undeceives it when it Flatters it God Mortifies it and when it Praises and Applauds it God Reproaches it severely and Condemns it by the Manifestation of a more Pure and Holy Law than that of the Flesh which it has followed There was no need for the Scythians to come to Alexander to teach him his Duty in a forreign Tongue he knew from him who instructs the Scythians and the most Barbarous Nations the Rules of Justice which he ought to follow * Intus in domicilio cogitationis nec Hebraea nec Graeca nec Latina nec Barbara Veritas sine oris Lingua organis sine strepitu Syllabarum Conf. S. Aug. B. 11. c. 3. The Light of Truth which lightens all the World enlighten'd him also and the Voice of Nature which speaks neither Greek nor Scythian c. spoke to him as to the rest of Mankind in a very Intelligible Tongue Whatever Reproaches the Scythians could fasten upon him about his Conduct they only spoke to his Ears because God spoke not to his Heart or rather God spoke to his Heart but he only hearkning to the Scythians who did nothing but exasperate his Passion and unman'd him so that he heard not the Voice of Truth although it thunder'd within him nor did he see her Light although it pierc'd him thorough It is true our Vnion with God diminishes and weakens by degrees according as that which we have with sensible things Increases and Strengthens but it is impossible that that Vnion should be wholly broken without the Dissolution of our Being For though such as are plung'd in Vice and indulge their Pleasure are Insensible of Truth they are nevertheless united to it * Videtur quasi ipse à te occidere cum tu ab ipsa occidas Au. in Ps 25 Nam etiam sol iste videntis faciem illustrat caesi ambobus sol praesens est sed praesene sole unus absens est Sic sapientia Dei Dominus J. C. ubique praesens est quia ubique est veritas ubique sapientia Aug. in Joan. Tract 35. It does not forsake them but they forsake it It s Light shines in Darkness but it does not always expel it Just as the light of the Sun encompasses the Blind and those that close their Eyes though it enlightens neither * What I say in this place of the two Unions of the Mind with God and with the Body is to be understood according to the common way of conceiving things For it is certain the Mind can only be immediately united to God I mean the Mind only depends truly on God and if it be united to the Body or if it depends on it it is because the Will of God efficaciously causes that Union or that Dependance This will be easily apprehended by the Sequel of this Work The Vnion of our Mind with our Body is the same This Vnion diminishes by degrees as that which we have with God increases but it is never quite dissolv'd but by our Death For though we were as much enlightned and as much above the Pleasures of Sense as the Apostles were yet it is necessary since the Fall that our Mind should depend on our Body and that we should feel the Law of our Flesh continually resisting and opposing the Law of our Mind The Mind becomes Purer Stronger more Perspicuous and more inlarged proportionably as its Vnion with God increases for 't is he from whom it derives all its Perfection On the contrary it becomes Corrupted Blind Weak and is contracted by degrees as the Vnion which it has with its Body Increases and Strengthens because that Vnion also causes all its Imperfections Therefore a Man who judges of all things by his Senses who follows the Motions of his Passions in all things who perceives nothing but what he feels and who loves nothing but what flatters him is in the most wretched Disposition of Mind that he can possibly be in In that condition he is at a vast distance from Truth and from his Good But when a Man only judges of things by the pure * Quis enim bene se inspiciens non expertus est Tanto se aliquid intellexisse sincerius quanto removere atq subducere intentionem mentis à corporis sensibus potuit Aug. de Immort animae Ch. 10. Idea's of the Mind when he carefully avoids the confused noise of Creatures and looking within himself hearkens to his Sovereign Master in the Silence of his Senses and Passions it is impossible for him to fall into Error God never deceives those who interrogate him by a serious Application and by an entire Conversion of their Mind towards him though they do not always hear his Answers but when the Mind removing from God diffuses it self Externally when it only Interrogates the Body to learn Truth hearkning only to its Senses its Imagination and Passions which continually speak to it it must needs be deceiv'd Wisdom Truth Perfection and Felicity are not Goods that can be expected from the Body he alone who is above us and from whom we have a Being can give it Perfection This is what * Principium Creaturae intellectualis est aeterna sapientia quod principium manens in se incommutabiter nullo modo cessat occulta inspiratione vocationis lequi ei Creaturae cui principium
est ut convertatur ad id ex quo est quod aliter formata ac perfecta esse non possit S. de Gen. ad Litt. Ch. 50. St. Austin teaches us in these fine words Eternal Wisdom says he is the Principle of all Creatures that are capable of Intelligence and this Wisdom always remaining the same never ceases to speak to his Creatures in the secret Recesses of their Reason that they may turn towards their Principle because nothing but the sight of the Eternal Wisdom gives a Being to Spirits and can as it were finish them and give them the last Perfection they are capable of * Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est Joan. Ep. 1. c. 3. v. 2. Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam Sap. 9.10 When we see God as he is we shall be like him says the Apostle St. John By that Contemplation of Eternal Truth we shall be elevated to that degree of Greatness to which all Spiritual Creatures tend by the necessity of their Nature But while we are on Earth the weight of the Body Stupifies the Mind it removes it continually from the Presence of God or of that Internal Light which Illuminates it it makes continual Efforts to strengthen its Vnion with Sensible Objects and obliges it to represent to it self all things not as they are in themselves but according to the relation they have towards the Preservation of Life * Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore Sap. 9.15 The Body says the Wise Man fills the Mind with so great a number of Sensations that it becomes incapable of knowing those things that are but a little conceal'd The sight of the Body dazles and dissipates that of the Mind and it is difficult to perceive Truths clearly by the Eyes of the Soul while we make use of the Eyes of our Body to discover it This shews that it is only by the Attention of the Mind that Truths are discover'd and that all Sciences are Learned for the Attention of the Mind is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God who is our only Master and who only can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance as * Deus intelligibilis lux in quo à quo per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia S. Sol. Insinuavit nobis Christus animam humanam non vegetari non illuminari non beatificari nisi ab ipsa Substantia Dei Aug. in Joan. St. Austin speaks It is plain by all these things that we must continually resist the Effort which the Body makes against the Mind and by degrees accustom our selves to disbelieve the Testimonies of our Senses in respect of all Bodies which are about us and which they always represent to us as worthy our Application and Esteem because we ought never to six upon any thing that is Sensible nor imploy our selves about it 'T is one of the Truths which the Eternal Wisdom seems to have been willing to reveal to us by his Incarnation for after having raised a sensible Body to the highest Dignity that can be apprehended he has shew'd us by the deepest Humiliation of the same Body which was the greatest of all sensible things how much we ought to despise all the Objects of our Senses It is perhaps for the same reason St. Paul said that he knew not Jesus Christ according to the Flesh For it is not the Flesh of Christ we must rest upon it is the Spirit which is conceal'd under that Flesh Caro vas fuit quod habebat attende non quod erat says St. Austin That which is * Illa autoritas Divina dicenda est quae non solum insensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem sed ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quo usque se propter ipsum depresserit non teneri sensibus quibus videntur illa miranda sed ad intellectum jubet evolare simul demonstrans quanta hic possit cur haec faciat quam parvi pendat Aug. 2. de Ord. 9. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum jam non secundum carnem novimus 2 ad Cor. Tr. in Joan. 27. visible or sensible in Jesus Christ only deserves our Adoration because it is united with the Word which can only be the Object of the Mind It is absolutely necessary for those who aim at Wisdom and Happiness to be fully convinc'd and affected with what I have said It is not enough to believe it upon my word nor to be perswaded of it by the Lustre of a Transitory Light they must know it by many Experiences and many undeniable Demonstrations These things must never be in danger of being effaced out of their Mind they must ever be present to it in all their Studies and other Imployments of their Life Those who will give themselves the Trouble to read the Work with some Application which is here publish'd will if I am not deceiv'd commence such a Disposition of Mind for we have demonstrated in it the different ways wherein our Senses Imagination and Passions are absolutely useless to the discovery of Truth and Good On the contrary that they dazle and seduce us on all occasions and generally that all the Knowledge the Mind receives by the Body or by some inward Motions of the Body are all false and confused in respect of the Objects they represent although they are very useful towards the Preservation of the Body and of the Goods which have relation to the Body Several Errors are engaged in it and particularly those that are most universally receiv'd or that occasion the greatest Disorder of the Mind and we shew that most of them proceed from the Vnion of the Mind with the Body We design in several places to make the Mind sensible of its Servitude and of the Dependance it has on all sensible things that it may awake from its Drowsiness and make some Efforts for its Deliverance We do not only make a bare Exposition of our Errors but also explain the Nature of the Mind We do not for instance insist upon a great Enumeration of all the particular Errors of the Senses or Imagination but upon the Causes of those Errors We shew at once in the Explanation of these Faculties and general Errors to which we are subject an almost infinite Number of those particular Errors into which Men fall Thus the subject of this Work is the whole Mind of Man we consider it in it self in relation to the Body and in relation to God we examine the Nature of all its Faculties and observe the uses we ought to make from hence to avoid Error Lastly We explain most of those things we thought useful to advance in the Knowledge of Man The finest the most agreeable and most necessary Knowledge
is undoubtedly the Knowledge of our selves Of all Humane Sciences the Science of Man is the most worthy of Man Nevertheless that Science is not the most cultivated or accomplish'd Science we have The common sort of Mankind neglects it wholly even among those that value themselves upon Sciences there are but few that apply themselves to it and there are yet fewer who successfully apply themselves to it Most of those who are esteem'd Learned in the World have but a confused Knowledge of the Essential Difference that is between the Mind and Body St. Conf. Book 4. Chap. 15. Austin himself who has distinguish'd those two Beings so well confesses that it was a long time before he could know it And though it must be granted that he has explain'd the Properties of the Soul and Body better than any of those that were before him and who have succeeded him until our Age yet it were to be wish'd that he had not attributed to External Bodies all the Sensible Qualities which we perceive by their means for indeed they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea he had of Matter So that one may confidently say That the Difference between the Mind and the Body has not been known clearly enough till of late Years Some fancy they know the Nature of the Mind Others are perswaded that it is impossible to know any thing about it The greatest part of Men are insensible of the Vsefulness of that Knowledge and for that reason they despise it But all these common Opinions are rather Effects of the Imagination and Inclination of Men than the Consequences of a clear and distinct Sight of their Mind It is because they are loath to look within themselves there to discover their Weaknesses and Infirmities but they delight in curious Discoveries and fine Sciences never looking within themselves they are insensible of the Disorders that happen there they think they are well because they are insensible they find fault with those who knowing their own Distemper apply Remedies to it and say that they make themselves Sick because they endeavour to cure themselves But these great Genius's who penetrate into the most mysterious Secrets of Nature who in their Mind ascend into the Heavens and who descend even into the Abyss ought to remember what they are These great Objects perhaps only serve to dazle them The Mind must go out of it self to attain to so many things but it cannot do it without being dissipated Men are not born to become Astronomers or Chymists to spend all their Life in gazing through a Telescope or in Sweating at a Furnace in order to infer little insignificant Consequences from their Laborious Observations I grant that an Astronomer was the first that discovered Lands Seas and Mountains in the Moon that he was the first that observ'd Spots in the Sun and exactly calculated their Motions I grant that a Chymist hath at last found the Secret of fixing Mercury or making the Alkaist by which Vanhelmont boasted he could dissolve all Bodies but are they become the Wiser or the Happier for this They may have got some Reputation by it in the World but if they have consider'd it that Reputation has only increased their Servitude Men may look upon Astronomy Chymistry and most Sciences as proper Divertisements for a Gentleman but they ought not to suffer themselves to be deluded by them nor to prefer them to the Science of Man for the Imagination fixes a certain Idea of Grandeur upon Astronomy because that Science considers great Objects glorious Objects Objects which are infinitely above all that are about us the Mind ought not blindly to embrace that Idea We should make our selves Judges and Masters of it and divest it of that sensible Greatness which astonishes our Reason The Mind ought to judge of all things according to its Internal Knowledge without hearkning to the false and confused Testimony of the Senses and Imagination and if it examines all Humane Sciences by the pure Light of Truth which guides it we dare affirm that it will despise most of them and will have more respect for that which teaches us what we are than for all others whatever Therefore we chuse to advise those who are Lovers of Truth to judge of the Subject of this Work according to the Answers they will receive from the Sovereign Masters of all Men after having made their Application to him by serious Reflection rather than to prevent them by a long Discourse which they might perhaps look upon as common Places or the vain Ornaments of a Preface If they think this Subject worthy their Application and Study they are desir'd again not to judge of the matter it contains by the good or ill manner in which they are express'd but to look within themselves to hear there the Decisions they are to follow and according to which they ought to judge Because we are perswaded that Men cannot teach each other and those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears unless he that has discover'd them to us reveal them at the same time to their Mind we find our selves oblig'd to advise those who will profitably read this Work not to believe us upon our word out of Inclination nor to oppose what we say out of Aversion For though we * Nolite putâ—re quemquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae si non fit intus qui doceat in anis fit strepitus noster Aug. in Joan. Auditus per me factus intellectus per quem Dixit aliquis ad eos vestrum sed non eum videtis Si intellexistis fratres dictum est cordi vestro Munus Dei est Intelligentia Aug. in Joan. Tr. 40. think we have advanc'd nothing but what we have learn'd by Meditation we should be very sorry that others should content themselves to retain and believe our Sentiments without knowing them or that they should be deceiv'd either for want of understanding them or because we are deceiv'd * The Book de Magistro of St. Aust The Pride of some of the Learned who will be believ'd upon their Word seems insupportable to us They will not allow us to consult God after they have spoken because they do not consult him themselves They are angry as soon as any body opposes their Sentiments and they will needs force Men to prefer the Obscurity of their Imagination to the pure Light of Truth which guides the Mind We are Thanks be to God far from being guilty of this way of proceeding though we are often accused of it We desire indeed that Men should believe the Facts and Experiences we relate because those things cannot be learn'd by the Application of the Mind to the Sovereign and Vniversal Reason But as for all Truths that are discover'd in the true Idea's of those things which Eternal Truth represents in the Recesses of our *
Noli putare teipsam esse lucem Aus in Psal Reason we expresly advise them not to rely upon what we think of them for we judge it no small Crime for a Man to compare himself to God by thus usurping Authority over the Mind The chief reason that we have for desiring those who shall read this Work to apply themselves seriously to it is That we are willing to be made sensible of the Faults we may have committed in it for we do not pretend to Infallibility The Mind has so strict a relation to the Body and has so great a Dependance on it that we may reasonably fear we have not always clearly distinguish'd the confused Noise of the Imagination from the pure Voice of Truth which speaks to the Mind Did God only speak and did we only judge according to what we hear we might perhaps use these words of Jesus Christ * Sicut audio sic judico jucicium meum justum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam Joan. Ch. 5.30 I Judge according to what I hear and my Judgment is Just and True But we have a Body which speaks lowder than God himself and that Body never speaks Truth We have Self-love which corrupts the Words of him who always speaks Truth And we have Pride which inspires us with Boldness to judge without hearkning to the Words of Truth according to which only we ought to judge For the principal Cause of our Errors is That our Judgments extend themselves further than the clear prospect of our Mind Therefore I desire those to whom God shall discover my Mistakes to make me sensible of them that this Work which I only give as an Essay whose subject is very worthy of Mens Appâ—ication may be perfected by degrees I had only undertaken it at first with a design to instruct my self but some Persons having thought that it might be useful for the Publick I willingly consented to publish it the rather because one of the chief reasons they gave me for it did suit with the desire I had to be useful to my self The real way said they to be instructed in any Matter is to propose our Sentiments about it to some Learned Men. It excites our Attention and theirs Sometimes they have Truths which are unknown to us and sometimes they go through certain Discoveries which we have neglected out of Inadvertency or have abandon'd for want of Courage and Power It was vpon this Prospect of my particular Benefit and that of some others I venture to be an Author but that my hopes may not prove vain I give this Advice that Men should not be disgusted at first if they find things that contradict the common Opinions that are generally approv'd of by all Men and in all Ages The Errors I endeavour to destroy are those that are most general If Men were very much enlighten'd Vniversal Approbation would be a reason but 't is quite contrary Therefore let it be well remembred that Reason only ought to preside in the Judgment of all Humane Opinions which have no relation to Faith which God only instructs us in after a very different manner from that by which he discovers natural things to us Let Men look within themselves and draw near unto the Light which shines there continually that their Reason may be the more illuminated Let them carefully avoid the Sensations which are too lively and all the Emotions of the Soul which take up the Capacity of the Mind For the least Noise the least Appearance of Light often dissipates the sight of the Mind It is good to avoid all those things though it is not absolutely necessary And if in using our utmost * Qui hoc videre non potest oret agat ut possemereatur nec ad hominem disputatorem pulset ut quod non legit legat sed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non valet veleat Ep. 112. c. 12. Suplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat ut intelligat Cont. Ep. Fund c. 33. Endeavours we cannot resist the continual Impressions which our Bodies and the Prejudices of our Infancy make upon our Imagination we must have recourse to Prayer to receive that from God which we cannot have by our own Power but still without ceasing to resist our Senses for that ought to be the continual Employment of those who in Imitation of St. Austin have a great Love for Truth The CONTENTS BOOK I. Of the Errors of the Senses Chap. 1. I. OF the Nature and Properties of the Vnderstanding II. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and wherein its Liberty consists Page 1 Chap. 2. I. Of Judgments and Reasonings II. That they depend upon the Will III. What use must be made of its Liberty in respect of them IV. Two General Rules to avoid Error and Sin V. Necessary Reflections upon these Rules p. 9 Chap. 3. I. Answers to some Objections II. Remarks upon what hath been said about the necessity of Evidence p. 16 Chap. 4. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error and that of these there are Five Principal ones II. The General Design of the whole Work and the particular Design of the first Book p. 22 Chap. 5. Of the Senses I. Two ways of Explaining how they are corrupted by Sin II. That 't is not our Senses but our Liberty which is the true Cause of our Errors III. A Rule not to be deceiv'd in the Vse of our Senses p. 25 Chap. 6. I. Of the Errors of the Sight in respect of Extension consider'd in it self II. An Enumeration of these Errors as to invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of the Sight concerning relative Extension p. 33 Chap. 7. I. Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Figures II. We have no Knowledge of the least things III. The Knowledge we have of the greatest things is not exact IV. An Explication of certain Natural Judgments which keep us from being deceiv'd V. That these very Judgments deceive us in particular Occurrences p. 44 Chap. 8. I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is is unknown III. Examples of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest p. 49 Chap. 9. A Continuation of the same Subject I. A General Proof of the Errors of our Sight about Motion II. That it's necessary to know the distance of Objects to judge of the swiftness of their Motion III. An Examination of Means to know their distances p. 54 Chap. 10. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united IV. How Objects act upon Bodies V. How upon the Soul with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are Confounded in every
9 Chap. 3. I. That Philosophers dissipate their Mind by applying it to Subjects which include too many Relations and which depend upon too many things without keeping any Order in their Studies II. An Example drawn from Aristotle III. That Geometricians on the contrary proceed well in an Enquiry after Truth especially those who make use of Algebra IV. That their method increases the power of the Mind and that Aristotle's Logick weakens it V. Another defect of studious Persons p. 15 Chap. 4. I. The Mind cannot long apply it self to any Object which neither relates to it self nor to Infinity II. The Inconstancy and consequently the Error of the Will proceeds from this Defect of Application III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners V. And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind p. 20 The Second Part of the Pure Understanding Of the Nature of IDEA'S Chap. 1. I. WHat is meant by Idea's That they truly Exist and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen p. 29 Chap. 2. That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them p. 33 Chap. 3. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject p. 35 Chap. 4. That we do not sie Objects by the means of Idea's which were created with us And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them p. 41 Chap. 5 That the Mind neither sees the Essence nor Existence of Objects in considering its own Perfections That none but God sees them in that manner p. 44 Chap. 6. That we see all things in God p. 46 Chap. 7. I. Four different ways of seeing things II. How we know God III. How we know Bodies IV. How we know our Soul V. How we know the Souls of other Men and pure Spirits p. 55 Chap. 8. I. The Intimate Presence of the Wandering Idea of Being in General is the Cause of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind and of the greatest part of the Chimera's of common Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from discovering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philosophy II. Example concerning the Essence of Matter p. 6â— Chap. 9. I. The last General Cause of our Errors II. That the Idea's of things are not always present to the Mind as soon as 't is desir'd III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error and why IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies or Spirits nor that God is a Spirit as we conceive Spirits p. 71 Chap. 10. Examples of some Physical Errors into which Men fall because they suppose that things which differ in their Nature Qualities Extension Duration and Proportion are alike in all things p. 77 Chap. 11. Examples of some Errors of Morality which depend on the same Principle p. 87 The Conclusion of the Foree first Books p. 91 BOOK IV. Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind Chap. 1. I. IT 's necessary the Mind have Inclinations as well as the Body Motions II. God acts the Humane Mind only for himself III. Mens Minds are only inclin'd to Particular Good through the Motion they have to Good in General IV. The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclinations which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book p. 1 Chap. 2. I. The Inclination for Good in General is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance III. First Example Morality little known to many Men. IV. Second Example The Immortality of the Soul disputed by some Men. V. That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things or such as have but little Relation to us p. 7 Chap. 3. I. Curiosity is natural and necessary II. Three Rules to moderate it III. Explanation of the first of these Rules p. 20 Chap. 4. A Continuation of the same Subject I. Explanation of the Second Rule of Curiosity II. Explanation of the Third p. 27 Chap. 5. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-Love II. It is divided into the Love of Being and Well-Being or of Greatness and Pleasure p. 31 Chap. 6. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes p. 35 Chap. 7. Of the desire of Science and of the Judgments of pretenders to Learning p. 42 Chap. 8. I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned II. Of the Conversation of pretenders to Learning III. Of their Works p. 48 Chap. 9. How the Inclination we have for Honours and Riches lead us to Error p. 56 Chap. 10. Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights p. 58 Chap. 11. Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Speculative Sciences I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth II. Some Examples p. 65 Chap. 12. Of the Effects which the thought of Future Bliss and Sufferings is capable of producing in the Mind p. 79 Chap. 13. I. Of the Third Natural Inclination which is the Friendship we have for other Men. II. It induces us to approve our Friends Thoughts and to deceive them by False Praises p. 85 A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK I. Of the Errors of the Senses CHAP. I. I. Of the Nature and Properties of the UNDERSTANDING II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WILL and wherein its Liberty consists ERROR is the Cause of Man's Misery the corrupt Principle that has produc'd Evil in the World 't is this which begets and cherishes in our Souls all the Evils that afflict us and we can never expect a true and solid Happiness but by a serious Endeavour to avoid it Holy Scripture teaches us that Men are miserable only because they are Sinners and Criminals and they would be neither if they did not make themselves the Slaves of Sin by assenting to Error If it be true then that Error is the Origin of Men's Misery how very just is it that they should endeavour their Deliverance from it and certainly an Effort towards it would not be vain and unrewarded though perhaps it might not have all the effect that could be desired admit we could not arrive at Infallibility and accomplish an absolute Victory yet we should be less deceiv'd and subject to fewer Evils We are not to expect an entire Felicity in this Life because we cannot pretend to Infallibility but our Endeavours to avoid Error must be as continual as are our Aversions for Misery In a word as we earnestly desire Happiness without Hopes of attaining it here so we must vigorously pursue
occasionally deceive us fince they are able to incline us to precipitate and rash Assents Now since 't is necessary first to convince the Soul of its Weakness and Errors to create in it just desires of being delivered from them and that it may more easily lay aside its Prejudices we shall endeavour to make an exact Division of all its Modes of Perception which will be as so many Heads to every one of which we shall hereafter refer the different Errors we are subject to The Soul can perceive things three ways by the pure Vnderstanding by the Imagination and by the Senses It perceives by the pure Understanding Spiritual and Universal Things common Notions the Idea of Perfection and of an Infinitely perfect Being and generally all its Thoughts when it knows them by Self-reflection It also perceives some Material Things by the pure Understanding as Extension with its Properties for 't is only the pure Understanding which can perceive a Circle a perfect Square a Figure with a thousand Angles and such like things These kinds of Perceptions I call pure Intellections or pure Perceptions because 't is not necessary for the Mind to form Corporeal Images in the Brain to represent all those things The Soul perceives only Material Things by the Imagination which represents them when absent as if they were present by forming Images of them in the Brain 'T is thus that we imagine all sorts of Figures as a Circle a Triangle a Face a Horse Cities Campaignes c. whether we have ever seen them or not These sorts of Perceptions I call Imaginations because the Soul represents these things by forming Images of them in the Brain and because we cannot form Images of Spiritual Things it follows that the Soul cannot imagine them which ought to be well observed In fine the Soul only perceives sensible and gross Objects by the Senses which when present make an Impression upon the External Organs of its Body Thus it sees Plains and Rocks when presented to its Eyes and feels the hardness of Iron the point of a Sword and such like things and these sorts of Perceptions I call Sentiments or Sensations The Soul then only perceives things after these three ways which is evident if we consider that all things we perceive are either Spiritual or Material if they are Spiritual 't is only the pure Vnderstanding which can know them but if they are Material they will be either present or absent if they are absent the Soul perceives them only by the Imagination if present by the Impression which they make upon its Senses and thus as we said before our Souls only perceive things after three ways by the pure Vnderstanding by the Imagination and by the Senses We may then look upon these three Faculties as certain Heads to which we may refer Mens Errors and the Causes of these Errors and so avoid the Confusion wherein their great number would infallibly involve us if we should speak of 'em without any Method But our Inclinations and Passions act also very strongly upon us they dazle our Minds by their false lights they cover and fill it with darkness Thus our Inclinations and Passions engage us in an infinite number of Errors when we follow this false light which they produce in us We must then consider them with the three Faculties of the Mind as the Sources of our Errors and Miscarriages and to the Errors of the Senses Imagination and pure Vnderstanding also join these that may be attributed to the Passions and Natural Inclinations Thus we may refer all the Errors of Men and the Causes of these Errors to Five Heads of which we shall Treat as follows First we shall speak of the Errors of the Senses secondly of the Errors of the Imagination thirdly of the Errors of the pure Vnderstanding fourthly of the Errors of the Inclinations fifthly of the Errors of the Passions In fine after having essayed to free the Mind from these Errors to which it is subject we shall give a General Method to conduct it in a Search after Truth Let us first Explain the Errors of our Senses or rather the Errors which we fall into for want of making a right Use of our Senses We shall not insist so much upon particular Errors which are almost infinite as upon the General Causes of these Errors and of such things as we believe necessary for the Knowledge of the Nature of Mans Mind CHAP V. OF THE SENSES I. Two ways of Explaining how they are corrupted by Sin II. That 't is not our Senses but our Liberty which is the true Cause of our Errors III. A Rule not to be deceiv'd in the Vse of our Senses WHen we seriously Examine the Senses and Passions of Man we find 'em so proportion'd to the end for which they are given us that we are not of their Opinion who say they are wholly corrupted by Original Sin But to shew that 't is not without Reason that we dissent from them 't is necessary to explain in what Order the Faculties and Passions of our first Parent were whilst in a State of Righteousness and the Changes and Disorders which happen'd in them after his Sin These things may be conceiv'd two ways the first of which is this It appears Two ways of Explaining the Corruption of the Senses by Sin if we consider the Genuine Order of things that the Soul is sensible of greater pleasure proportionably to the greatness of the Goods which it enjoys Pleasure is an Instinct of Nature or to speak more intelligibly 't is an Impression of God himself inclining us towards some Good which must be so much the stronger as the Good is greater According to this Principle I think we cannot doubt but that our first Parent coming out of the Hands of God and before his Sin found the greatest pleasure in the most solid Goods Since therefore he was Created to Love God and since God was his true Good it may said that he was inclined to delight in God who induc'd him to his Love by a Sensation of Pleasure and gave him such Internal Satisfactions in his Duty as counterbalanc'd the greatest Pleasures of Sense and such as since the Fall Men are insensible of without a particular Grace Nevertheless as he had a Body which God would have him preserve and look upon as part of himself he also made him perceive such Pleasures by his Senses as we taste in the use of things that are proper for the Preservation of Life We dare not decide whether the first Man before his Fall could avoid agreeable or disagreeable Sensations in the very moment that the Principal part of his Brain was mov'd by the Actual use of Sensible Things perhaps he had this Command over himself because of his Submission to God yet the contrary appears more probable for tho' Adam could stay the Emotions of the Spirits and Blood and the Shaking of the Brain which Objects excited in
Body for if he had he must have Examin'd the Configurations of the parts of some Fruit with all the parts of his own Body and the Relation resulting from both to be able to Judge whether in the heat of his Blood and a thousand other Dispositions of his Body this Fruit would be proper for his Nourishment 't is plain that his Mind was intirely imploy'd upon things that were unworthy its application and even unprositably enough because he was not long preserv'd after this manner If we consider then that the Mind of Adam was not Infinite we may safely say that he knew not all the Properties of Bodies that were about him since 't is manifest that they are Infinite and if it be granted which cannot reasonably be deny'd that his Mind was not made to Examine the Motions and Configurations of Matter but for the Contemplation of God no one can be displeas'd if we assert that it was biass'd and disorder'd in that time wherein all things should have been perfectly well order'd if he had been oblig'd to turn his Mind from the Consideration of the Perfection of his true Good to Examine the Nature of some Fruit for his Nourishment Adam then had the same Sensations as we have which suggested to him what was necessary for his Body without being diverted from God he was Sensible of Pleasures as we are and even of Pains or prepossess'd and indeliberate Aversions but these Pleasures and Pains could not Enslave him or render him Unhappy like us because that being Absolute Master of all the Motions which were excited in his Body he immediately put a stop to them if he only wish'd they might cease and certainly he always wish'd it in respect of Pain How happy had he been and we also if he had done the same in respect of Pleasure and if he had not voluntary strayed from the presence of his God by suffering his Mind to be taken up with the Beauty and expected Sweetness of the Forbidden Fruit or perhaps with a Presumptuous Joy that was excited in his Soul at the Consideration of his Natural Perfections But after he had Sin'd those Pleasures which before only modestly Accosted him and those Pains which without disturbing his Felicity only put him in mind that he might Fall and become Miserable were not any longer under his Command his Senses and Passions Revolted against him they became Irregular and made him like us a Slave to all Sensible Things Thus the Senses and Passions do not derive their Origination from Sin but only the Power they have of Tyrannizing over Sinners and this Power has not so much disorder'd the Senses as the Mind and Will of Men which ceasing to be so strictly united to God do not any longer receive that Light and Vigour by which they might preserve their Liberty and Happiness From these two ways of Explaining the Disorders of Sin we may easily gather A Remedy for that Disorder which Original Sin hath caused in the World and the foundation of Christian Morality that there are two things necessary for our Recovery The first is That we must lessen that Load we sink under and which drags towards Sensible Goods by continually Retrenching our Pleasures and Mortifying our Sensuality with Repentance and Circumcision of Heart The second is That we must beg the Assistance of God's Grace and that prepossess'd Delight which * See the Explanations Jesus Christ hath particularly Merited for us without which whatever we retrench from that first load will still oppress us and however small it is it will Infallibly draw into Sin and Disorder These two things are absolutely Necessary for us to begin and persevere in our Duty Reason as we have show'd does perfectly agree with the Gospel in this and from both we learn that Humility Self-denial and the Diminution of the Power of Sin are necessary Preparations for our Recovery by the Power of Grace and Re-union with God But in our present State tho' we are continually oblig'd to strive against our Senses yet we must not thence conclude that they are absolutely corrupted and deprav'd for if we consider that they are given us for the Preservation of our Bodies we shall find that they admirably well perform their Duty and conduct us after so just and faithful a manner for the end we receiv'd them that it seems very injurious so to accuse them of Corruption and Disorder they so readily inform the Soul by Pain and Pleasure by agreeable and disagreeable Sensations of what is necessary to be done or omitted for the Preservation of Life that we have little reason to say this order and exactness is the Consequence of Sin 'T is not our Serser but our all use of our Lâ—hertâ— that â—◠〈…〉 Our Senses then are not so deprav'd as is imagin'd but the inward Constitution of our Soul 't is our Liberty that is Corrupted 't is not our Senses but our Will that deceives us by its precipitate Judgments For Example when we see the Light 't is certain that we see it when we feel Warmth we are not deceiv'd if we believe we feel it whether before or after Sin but we are deceiv'd when we judge that the Heat we feel is out of the Soul that feels it as shall be Explained hereafter The Senses then do not deceive us if we make a good use of our Liberty and if we accustom not our selves upon their account to Judge of things with too much precipitation but since it is very difficult to refrain from it and we are as it were constrain'd thereto because of the strict Union between our Soul and Body I shall lay down a Method to conduct us in our use of them so as to avoid Error We must exactly observe this Rule A Rule to avoid Error in using our Senses Never to Judge by the Senses of things as they are in themselves but only of the Relation that they have between themselves for indeed they are not given us to know the Truth of Things in themselves but only for the Conservation of our Body But that we may be wholly deliver'd from that easiness and inclination we have of following our Senses in a Search after Truth we shall particularize in the following Chapters some of the chief and general Errors which we are liable to whence the Truth of what we have advanc'd will be more Evident CHAP. VI. I. Of the Errors of the Sight in respect of Extension consider'd in it self II. An Enumeration of these Errors as to Invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of the Sight concerning Relative Extension SIght is the first the most Noble and most Extensive of all the Senses if then they were given us for a Discovery of Truth this alone would assist us more than all the others together So that if we can destroy that Authority which our Eyes have over our Reason there 's little need of any thing else to undeceive us and to
of this nature he would absolutely doubt whether of the two Vessels were in Motion in vain would he Consult his Eyes and even his Reason to discover where the Motion lay CHAP. IX A Continuation of the same Subject I. A General Proof of the Errors of our Sight about Motion II. That it's necessary to know the distance of Objects to judge of the swiftness of their Motion III. An Examination of Means to know their distances TAke this General Proof of all the Errors we are liable to in respect of Motion Let A be the Eye of the Beholder C the Object which I suppose at a considerable distance from A I say that though the Object remains immovable in C he may believe it as distant as D or as near him as B and though the Object should recede to D or approach to B he might believe it immovable in C on the contrary although it approach towards B he may believe it immovable in C or receding towards D And although the Object advances from C to E H G or K he may believe that it 's only mov'd from C to F or I On the contrary although the Object were remov'd from C to F or â— he might believe that it was mov'd to E or H or else to G or K. But if the Object be mov'd in a line equally distant from the Beholder that is by a Circumference whose Center should be the Eye of the Beholder although the Object move from C to P he may believe that it moves only from B to O and on the contrary if it moves from B to O he may believe it moves from C to P. If beyond the Object C there be another Object M which he believes immovable although it moves towards N or if C moves more slowly towards F than M towards N it will appear to move towards Y and on the contrary if c. II. That it is necessary to know the distance of Objects to find the swiftness of the Motion It 's evident that the Proof of all these Propositions except the last in which there 's no difficulty depends only upon one thing that is we can't always make a certain Judgment of the distance of Objects and if so it follows that we cannot know whether C is advanc'd towards D or whether it approaches towards B and thus also of the other Propositions Now to see whether the Judgments we form about the distance of Objects are certain we are only to examine the Means we are to make use of in judging and if these Means are uncertain III. An Examination of the Means of knowing the distance of Objects we cannot judge infallibly there are many of them and they must be explain'd The first the most general and sometimes the most certain way that we have to judge of the distance of Objects is the Angle which the Rays of our Eyes make whose point of Concurrence is or measures the Object When this Angle is very great we see the Object very near on the contrary when it is very little we see it very distant And the Change which happens in the Situation of our Eyes according to the Changes of this Angle is the means whereof our * The Soul does not make all the Judgments that are attributed to it thâ—se Natural Judgments are only Sensations and I only speak thus that I may better explain things Soul makes use to judge of the distance or nearness of Objects for even as a blind Man who shou'd have in his Hands two streight Sticks whose length he did not know might by a kind of Natural Geometry judge very near of the distance of some Body in touching it with the end of these two Sticks by the disposition and distance of his hands So it may be said that the Soul Judges of the distance of an Object by the disposition of its Eyes which is not the same when the Angle by which he sees is sometimes greater See the 4th Article of Chap. 7. and sometimes less when the Object is nearer and when it is farther off We shall be easily perswaded of this if we take the pains to make this very easie Experiment Hang a Ring upon a Thread with the edge towards you or else thrust one Stick into the Earth and take another in your Hand which shall be crooked at the end go back two or three steps from the Ring or the Stick wink with one Eye and try to put the Stick in your Hand through the Ring or to touch the other in the Ground traversly about the height of your Eyes you will be surpriz'd not to be able to do that once in an hundred times which you believe is so easie to be done Now if you even lay by the Stick and attempt to put your Finger into the Ring hanging with the edge towards you you will find it difficult alt ho you were just at it But it must be well observ'd that what I have said about putting a crooked Stick through a Ring or touching another Stick traversly will not hold if the Eye be in a right Line with the opening of the Ring for then there would be no difficulty in it but it would be easier to effect it with one Eye shut than with both the Eyes open because that would guide us Now it may be said that the difficulty which is found in hitting the hole of the Ring traversly with but one Eye open is owing to this that the Eye being shut the Angle which I have spoken of is unknown for to know the bigness of the Angle at the Eye it is not sufficient to know the length of the Base and one of the Angles at the Base unless the other be right but we must also know the other Angle at the Base or the length of one of the sides which can't exactly be known but by opening the other Eye And thus the Soul cannot make use of its Natural Geometry to Judge of the distance of the Ring The disposition of the Eyes which accompanies the Angle form'd by the Visual Rays that meet in the Object is then one of the best and most Universal Methods which the Soul makes use of to Judge of the distance of Things If this Angle then does not admit of any Sensible Change when the Object is near if we approach to it or recede from it it will follow that the Method is false and that the Soul cannot make use of it to Judge of the distance of that Object Now 't is very easie to know that this Angle changes remarkably when an Object that is but one Foot from our Eyes is remov'd to four if it be only remov'd from four to eight the change is much less sensible if from eight to twelve 't is still less if from a thousand to a hundred thousand 't is yet less Lastly the change will be wholly insensible if the Object were remov'd into the Imaginary Spaces so that
if there were a considerable Space betwixt A and C the Soul could not by this means know whether the Object is nearer to B or D. 'T is for this reason that we see the Sun and Moon as if they were wrapt up in Clouds althô they are extreamly distant behind them and that we Naturally believe all the Stars are at an equal distance and that the Comets are fix'd or almost without any motion towards the latter end of their Course As also that they wholly dissipate after some Months because they remove from us in very near a right Line to our Eyes and lose themselves in the great Spaces whence they return not till after many Years or even after many Ages To explain the second way The second way of Judging of the distance of Objects which the Soul makes use of to Judge of the distance of Objects we must know that 't is absolutely necessary that the Figure of the Eye be different according to the different distance of the Objects that we see for when a Man sees an Object near him it 's necessary that his Eyes were more extended than if the Object were farther off because that to the end the Rays of this Object may meet upon the Optic Nerve which is necessary for Vision the distance between this Nerve and the Chrystaline Humour must be the greater It is true that if the Chrystaline Humour became more Convex when the Object is near it would have the same effect as if the Eye was more extended but it 's incredible that the Chrystaline Humour can easily change its Convexity and yet on the other side we have a very sensible Proof that the Eye is extended or drawn out in length for Anatomy teaches us that there are Muscles which encompass the middle of the Eye and that one may perceive the Effort of these Muscles in compressing or extending it when any Object is to be seen very near But 't is not necessary to know here after what manner this is done it 's enough that it happens from the change of the Eye whether it be that the Muscles that environ it compress it or whether the little Nerves that answer to the Ciliary Ligaments which keep the Chrystaline Humour suspended among the other Humours of the Eye do relax to encrease the Convexity of the Eye or contract themselves to diminish it For in fine the change which happens be it what it will is only to cause that the Rays of Objects may exactly meet together just upon the Optic Nerve Now 't is manifest that when the Object is five hundred Paces or ten thousand Leagues distant we see it with the same disposition of the Eye without any sensible change in the Muscles which encompass it or in the Nerves which answer to the Ciliary Ligaments of the Chrystaline Humour and the Rays of Objects meet very exactly upon the Retina or Optic Nerve Thus the Soul would Judge that Objects ten thousand or a hundred thousand Leagues distant are only five or six hundred Paces off if it Judg'd only of their distance by the disposition of the Eyes which I have spoken of However 't is certain that the Soul makes use of this means when the Object is near If for Example an Object is but half a Foot from us we distinguish well enough its distance by the disposition of the Muscles which compress our Eyes so as to extend them a little and even this disposition is painful If the Object is at the distance of two Foot we yet distinguish it because the disposition of the Muscles is a little sensible althô it is not any longer painful but if we remove the Object to some considerable distance this disposition of the Muscles becomes so insensible that it does not in the least assist us in Judging of the distance of the Object These are two Means that the Soul uses to Judge of the distance of Objects which are very useless when the Object is five or six hundred Paces distant from us and which also are not certain althô the Object were nearer The third Means consists in the bigness of the Image The third Means to Judge of the distance of Objects which is Painted at the bottom of the Eye and which represents the Objects as we see them 'T is granted that this Image diminishes in proportion to the distance of the Object but by how much the Object that changes its distances removes farther off by so much is the diminution less sensible For when an Object is at some reasonable distance suppose five or six hundred Paces more or less in proportion to its magnitude there arises very considerable alterations in its Elongation without any sensible change in the Image which represents it as is easie to be showed Thus also this third Means has the same defect as the two preceding It may be further observ'd that the Soul judges not of distant Objects whose Image is Painted very small upon the Retina For Example when I see a Man or a Tree at the distance of a hundred Paces or else many Stars in the Heavens I judge not that the Man is more distant than the Tree or that little Stars are farther off than the great ones althô the Images of the Man and little Stars are Painted less upon the Retina than the Tree or the great Stars Moreover the bigness of the Object must be known to judge near of its distance and because I know that a House is greater than a Man altho' the Image thereof be less than that of a Man yet I do not therefore judge it nearer imagine the same of the Stars our Eyes representing them all at the same distance althô it be very reasonable to believe some more distant from us than others Thus there are an Infinity of Objects whose distance we cannot know since there 's an Infinity of them whose greatness we are ignorant of We also Judge of the distance of the Object The fourth and fifth Means by the power whereby it acts upon our Eyes because a distant one acts more weakly than another also by the distinction and clearness of the Image which is form'd in the Eye because when an Object is distant its necessary that the Eye-sight dilate and consequently the Rays meet together a little confusedly Hence it is that Objects which are but a little distinct or such as we see confusedly appear distant from us and on the contrary clear and distinct Objects appear to be near us It 's evident enough that these last means are not proper to Judge of the distance of Objects with any certainty I shall not insist upon the last of all which is that that helps the Imagination and which easily carries the Soul to Judge of very distant Objects The sixth and principle Means consists in this The sixth Means to Judge of the distance of Bodies That the Eye does not exhibit to the Soul an Object by it self and
that they do not help us to the Knowledge of Things but in respect to the preservation of our Body and not according to what they are in themselves is exactly true in this case since we have a more exact Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in proportion to their nearness and which we cou'd examine by the Senses than when they are so distant That the Relation they have to our Bodies ceases as when they are five or six hundred Paces from us if they are of an ordinary bigness and even nearer than that if they are less or in fine farther off if they are greater CHAP. X. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately Vnited IV. How Objects act upon Bodies V. How upon the Soul with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are Confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the preceding Chapters that the Judgments we form by these means of our Eyes about Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true yet we must confess they are not absolutely false they include at least this Truth That Extension Figure and Motion whatever they are are without us It 's true we often see things which are not and which never were and we ought not to conclude that a thing is without us from hence only that we see it without us there is no necessary connexion between an Idea that is presented to the Mind of Man and the Existence of a thing which this Idea represents That which happens to those who sleep or are delirious sufficiently proves this however we can ordinarily be assur'd that Extension Figures and Motions which we see are without us These are not meer imaginary things they are real and we are not deceiv'd if we believe they have a real Existence and which is independant of our Mind though it 's very * See the Explanations difficult to prove it It is then evident that the Judgments we make about the Extension Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth but the same cannot be said of those things that belong to Light Colours Sapors Odours and all other sensible Qualities for Truth is never to be found there as we have shown before We do not here distinguish Light from Colours because we believe they are not very different nor can be separately explain'd We shall be oblig'd to speak of other sensible Qualities in General at the same time that we treat of these two because they might be explain'd from the same Principles We ought to be very attentive to the things that follow for they are of the most important Consequence and much more useful than those things we have yet spoken of I suppose first Distinction of the Soul and Body that the Reader has made some Reflexion upon the two * I here cast Idea every thing that is the immediate Object of the Mind Idea's which are found in our Soul one which represents the Body to us and the other the Mind that he is able to distinguish them by the positive Attributes which they include in a word that he be well persuaded that Extention is different from Thought Or else I suppose him to have Read and Consider'd some Places of St. Augustin as the 10th Chapt. of the 10th Book of the Trinity the 4th and 14th Chap. of the Book of the Quantity of the Soul or the Meditations of Descartes especially that which respects the Distinction of the Soul and Body Or lastly the Sixth Discourse of M. de Cordemoy du discernement de l'ame du Corps I suppose also II. Explication of the Organs of the Senses that he knows the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses and that they are compos'd of small Branches which have their Original in the middle of the Brain whence they disperse themselves through all the Members of Sensation and that at last without any interruption terminate at the Extreme parts of the Body That whilst we are Awake or in Health one of their Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other is also mov'd because of their perpetual Intension just as an extended Cord cannot be mov'd in one part without communicating motion to another The Reader must also know that these little Strings or Branches may be affected after two ways either at the end which is at the extremity of the Body or at that which is in the Brain If these little Strings are shaken by the Action of External Bodies upon them and this Motion is not communicated to the Brain as it often happens in sleep then the Mind receives no new Sensation by that Action but if these Strings are mov'd in the Brain by the Course of the Animal Spirits or by some other Cause the Soul perceives something although the parts of these Strings which are out of the Brain and which are dispers'd through all the parts of our Bodies be in perfect rest as it often happens in sleep It is not amiss to observe here by the by III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Strings of the Organs of the Senses meet how Experience teaches us that we do sometimes feel pain in such parts of our Bodies as have been cut off because the Strings of the Brain which belong to those respective parts being shaken after the same manner as if they were effectually hurt the Soul feels a very real Pain in these Imaginary Parts Now all these things shew visibly that the Soul immediately resides in that part of the Brain where all the Organs of Sense meet I mean it perceives all the Changes which pass there by means of Objects which Cause or have been accustom'd to Cause them and perceives nothing that passes out of this part but by the interposition of the Fibres which terminate there This Position being well conceiv'd it will not be very difficult to shew how Sensation is made which must be explain'd by some Example When I thrust the Point of a Needle into my Hand IV. An Example how Objects affect Bodies this Point removes and separates the Fibres of the Flesh the Fibres are continued from this place to the Brain and when one sleeps they are extended enough not to be shaken unless those of the Brain be also shaken it follows then that the Extremities of these Fibres which are in the Brain are also moved If the Motion of the Fibres in my Hand is moderate that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so also and if the Motion is violent to break something upon my Hand it will be much stronger and more violent in the Brain Thus also if I come near the Fire the small parts of Wood which it continually in great number and with much violence disperses as may be prov'd by
as to that which is in the Hand or in the Fire Now this Judgment is Natural or rather it is a Compounded Sensation But this Sensation or this Natural Judgment is almost always follow'd by another free Judgment which the Soul is so accustom'd to that it can scarce refrain from it These four things are very different as may be shewed however Men do not carefully distinguish them but are inclin'd to confound them by reason of the strict union betwixt the Soul and Body which hinders us from separating the Properties of Matter from those of the Mind Yet it is easie for any Man to know that of these four things which pass in us when we perceive some Object the two first are proper to the Body and the two last to the Soul provided he consider a little the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to do which I have suppos'd But these things must be explain'd in Particulars CHAP. XI I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of that Error III. An Objection and Answer IN this and the three following Chapters we shall Treat of these Four Things which are confounded and taken for pure Sensation and shall only in general explain the Errors we are subject to because if we should enter into particulars it would be endless Yet I do not doubt but I may so assist the Mind of such as will seriously Meditate upon what shall be said as to make them capable of discovering with great facility all the Errors that are caused from our Senses but it will be requisite then that they shou'd think with fome application both upon the preceding and following Chapters The first of these things which we confound in all our Sensations I. Of the Erro we are juâ—ject to in respect to the Objects acting upon the Fibres of our Serses is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body It is most certain that there is hardly any distinction made between the Sensation of the Soul and this Action of the Objects of which there needs no proof for Example almost all Men imagine that the heat they feel is in the Fire which causes it that Light is in the Air and Colours upon Coloured Objects they have no thoughts upon the Motions of fome imperceptible Bodies which cause these Sensations It is true II. The Cause of the Error that they do not imagine that pain is in the Needle that pricks them as they judge heat to be in the Fire the reason is because the Needle and its Action are visible but the Particles of the Wood which go out from the Fire and their Motion against our Hands are not seen so that seeing nothing that strikes our Hands when we warm our selves and feeling heat we naturally judge this heat to be in the Fire because we see nothing else there So that 't is commonly true that we attribute our Sensations to Objects when the Causes of these Sensations are unknown to us and because Pain and Tititation are produced by sensible Bodies as with a Needle a Feather which we see and touch and therefre we do not judge that there is any thing like to these Sentiments in those Objects that cause them in us It is certain indeed III. Objection that we do not imagine that the burning is in the Fire but only in the Hand although it is caused by Particles of the Wood as well as the Heat which we always attribute to the Fire But the reason of it is the burning is a kind of Pain and having many times judged that Pain is not in the External Body which Causes it we are induced also to make the same Judgment of Burning What further persuades us to judge after this manner is that Pain or Burning does strongly apply our Soul to the affected parts of our Bodies and that diverts us from thinking on other things Thus the Mind unites the Sensation of burning to that Object that is nearest to it And because we soon after perceive that the burning hath left fome visible Marks in that part where we felt the Pain this confirms us in the Judgment we have made that the burning is in the Hand But this must not hinder us from receiving this general Rule that we use to attribute our Sensations to Objects every time they act upon us by the Motion of fome invisible Particle This is the reason that we generally believe that Colours Light Odours Taste Sound and fome other Sensations are in the Air or in the External Objects which cause them because all Sensations are produced in us by the Motion of fome Imperceptible Bodies CHAP. XII I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That either we perceive not these Motions or else confound them with our Sensations III. Experience which proves it IV. Three sorts of Sensations V. The Errors which accompany them THE second thing that may be observed in each of our Sensations I. Errors concerning the motions or shaking of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we confound them with the Sensaâ—on of our Soul and sometime again do not perceive them is the shaking of the Fibres of our Nerves which is communicated unto the Brain and we deceive our selves in this that we confound this shaking with the Sensation of the Soul and judge there is none when we perceive it not by the Senses We confound for instance the Motion that the Fire excites in the Fibres of our Hands with the Sensation of Heat and we say that the Heat is in our Hand But because we feel not the shaking that visible Objects produce in the Optick Nerve which is in the bottom of the Eye we think that this Nerve is not shaken and that it is not cover'd with the Colours that appear to us on the contrary we judge that 't is only external Objects upon which these Colours are dispersed yet we may see by the following Experiment that Colours are almost as strong and lively in the bottom of the Optick Nerve as upon visible Objects Take the Eye of an Ox that is newly killed III. Experience which proves it and strip the Skins from it that are opposite to the Apple of of the Eye in the place where the Optick Nerve is and put in their room a little bit of Paper that is very thin and place this Eye in the hole of a Window so that the Apple be in the Air and the back part of the Eye be in the Chamber which must be shut close so that it may be very dark and then all the Colours of the Objects which are without the Chamber will appear upon the bottom of the Eye but represented upside down And if these Colours shou'd happen not to be very lively if the Objects which are painted at the bottom of the Eye are too near the
Eye must be lengthned by pressing the sides closer together and on the contrary it must be compess'd if the Objects are too far off By this Experiment 't is plain that we ought to judge or be sensible of the Colours at the bottom of our Eyes after the same manner as we judge the Heat to be in our Hand if our Senses were given us to discover the truth and if we were guided by Reason in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senses But to be able to give a Reason for the variety of our Judgments upon sensible Qualities 't is necessary that we consider how strictly the Soul is united to the Body and that it is so sensualized since Original Sin that many things are attributed to it which belong to the Body and that it is now hardly to be distinguished from it so that it ascribes to it not only all its Sensations which we are speaking of but also the force of Imagining and even sometimes the power of Reasoning For there has been a great number of Philosophers that have been ignorant and foolish enough to believe that the Soul was only a more fine and subtile part of the Body If we read Tertullian we shall soon see too many proofs of what I say since we shall find him of the same Opinion with a great number of Authors whom he Cites It is true in the Book of the Soul he endeavours to prove that Faith Scripture and even particular Revelation oblige us to believe that the Soul is Corporeal I will not refute these Opinions because I have already supposed that we ought to have read fome of St. Augustin or Descartes Works which wou'd have sufficiently shewn the extravagancy of these Thoughts and also wou'd have confirm'd the Mind in the distinction betwixt Extention and Thought betwixt the Soul and Body The Soul is then so blind that she is ignorant of her self and does not see that her own Sensations belong to her II. An Explanation of the three kinds of the Sensations of the Soul To explain this we must distinguish three sorts of Sensations in the Soul some strong and lively others weak and languishing and some again in the medium between both The strong and lively Sensations are those which surprize the Mind and awaken it with some force because they are either very agreeable or very troublesome such as are Pain or Pleasure Heat or Cold and generally all such as are not only accompanied with Impressions in the Brain but also with some Motions of the Spirit such as are proper for the exciting the Passions as shall afterwards be explained The Weak and Languishing Sensations are those which very little affect the Soul and which are neither very agreeable nor very troublesome as a Moderate Light all Colours Ordinary Sounds which are very weak c. And the Medium between both I call those sort of Sensations which indifferently touch the Soul as a great Light a violent Sound c. Now it is to be observed that a Weak and Languishing Sensation may become indifferent and afterwards strong and lively For Example the Sensation that we have of Light is weak when the Light of a Flambeau is weak and languishing or very far from us and afterwards this Sensation may become indifferent if the Flambeau be brought near enough to us and at last it may become very strong and lively if the Flambeau be brought so near our Eyes that they be dazled with it or else when we look upon the Sun Thus the Sensation of Light may be strong weak or moderate according to its different degrees These are then the Judgments that our Soul makes of these three sorts of Sensations V. Errors which accompany our Sensations wherein we may perceive that it almost always blindly follows the sensible Impressions or Natural Judgments of our Senses and that it is pleased if we may so say in dispersing it self over all the Objects that it considers and by divesting it self to cloath them The first of these Sensations is so lively and moving that the Soul can scarce hinder it self from acknowledging that in some respect they belong to it so that it does not only judge them to be in the Object but also believes them to be in the Members of the Body which it considers as a part of it self Thus it judges that Cold and Heat are not only in the Ice and Fire but that they are also in its own Hands The Languishing Sensations so little affect the Soul that it does not believe them to belong to it nor that they are either within it self or the Body but only in the Objects 'T is for this reason that we take away Light and Colours from our Soul and Eyes thereby to adorn External Objects with them although Reason teaches us that they are not in the Idea we have of Matter And Experience shews us we ought to judge them in our Eyes as well as upon Objects since we see them as well there as in the Objects as I have proved by the Instance of an Oxe's Eye placed at the hole of a Window Now the Reason why all Men do not immediately see that Colours Odours Taste and all other Sensations are only Modifications of their Soul is because we have no clear Idea of our Soul For when we know any thing by the Idea which represents it we clearly know all the Modifications it can have All Men agree for Example that Roundness is a Modification of Extension by a clear Idea which represents it See Chap. 7. 2d part of the 3d Book Thus not knowing our Soul by its Idea as I shall explain hereafter but only by the Internal Sentiment we have thereof we know not by a simple Sight but only by Reasoning whether Whiteness Light Colours and other Weak and Languishing Sensations are not Modifications of our Soul but for the lively Sensations such as Pain and Pleasure we easily judge they are within us because we are very sensible that they affect us and have no need to know them by their Ideas to perceive they belong us As for Indifferent Sensations the Soul is very much perplexed with them for on the one hand it wou'd follow the Natural Judgments of the Senses and therefore it removes from it as much as possible these sort of Sensations to attribute them to the Objects but on the other side it cannot avoid feeling within self that they belong to it especially when these Sensations come near those that I call strong and lively so that 't is after this manner that it guides it self in the Judgment it makes of them if a Sensation affects it very much it concludes it to be in its own Body as well as in the Object and if it touches it but a little the Soul believes it only in the Object And if this Sensation is exactly in the Medium between the Strong and Weak then it knows not what to
determine if it Judges by the Senses For Instance if one looks upon a Candle at a little distance the Soul judges that the Light is only in the Object but if the Candle is brought nearer it judges it to be not only in the Candle but also in the Eyes But if we draw back about a foot from it the Soul continues sometime without judging whether or no the Light is only in the Object never thinking as it ought to do that this Light is or can be only a Propriety or Modification of Matter and that it is only within it self because it does not think it necessary to make use of its Reason to discover the Truth of what appears therein but only of the Senses which never discovers it and are only given us for the preservation of our Bodies Now why the Soul makes no use of her Reason that is of her Understanding when she considers an Object which may be perceived by the Senses is because she is not affected by things that she perceives by the pure Understanding and that on the contrary she is most lively touch'd by Sensible things for the Soul applies it self much to what affects it much and neglects applying it self to things that do not touch it Thus she almost always conforms her free Judgments to the Natural Judgments of her Senses To be able to Judge rightly of Light and Colours as well as all other Sensible Qualities we must carefully distinguish the Sensation of Colour from the Motion of the Optic Nerve and by Reason discover that Motions and Impulsions are Proprieties of Bodies and that thus they may meet in Objects and in the Organs of our Senses but that Light and Colours which we see are Modifications of the Soul very different from others and of which also we have as different Idea's It is certain for instance that a Country Man sees Colours very plainly and distinguishes them from every thing that has no Colour It is also as certain that he perceives no Motion either in Coloured Objects or in the bottom of his Eyes and that therefore he concludes Colour is not Motion Likewise a Country man is as sensible of Heat and hath a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish it from all things which are not Heat and yet he does not think that 't is only because the Fibres of his Hands are moved he thinks the Heat therefore that he feels is not Motion since his Idea's of Heat and Motion are very different and he can have the one without the other For there is no reason to be given that a Square is not round but only because our Idea of a Square is different from that we have of a Circle and that we can think of the one without thinking of the other There 's only a little attention requisite to be able to know that 't is not necessary that the Cause which makes us feel such or such a thing contains it in it self Thus it is not needful that I have Light in my Hand that I might see it when I strike my Eyes nor is it necessary that there shou'd be Heat in the Fire to make me feel it when I hold my Hand to it or that any other Sensible Quality that I perceive shou'd be in the Object it is sufficient that they cause some Motion in the Fibres of my Flesh so that my Soul which is united thereto be Modified by some Sensation There is no Relation between Motions and Sensations it is true but there is none also between the Body and Mind and since Nature or the Will of our Creator has joined these two Substances together how opposite soever they are in their Nature it must not seem surprizing if their Modifications are Reciprocal it is necessary that they shou'd be so that they may together make an entire Being We must observe that our Senses being given us for the Preservation of our Bodies it is very proper that they shou'd incline us to make such Judgments as we do of Sensible Qualities It is much more advantageous to us to feel Pain and Heat as being in our Bodies than if we Judg'd them only to be in the Objects that cause them because that Pain and Heat being capable of prejudicing our Members it is fit we shou'd be advertiz'd when they are affected therewith so as to prevent their being hurt by them But it is not so with Colours they cannot easily hurt the bottom of the Eye where they meet together and it is of no use for us to know they are Painted there These Colours are only necessary to discover Objects more distinctly and that is the reason our Senses induce us to attribute them only to the Objects So the Judgments to which the impression of our Senses carry us are more Just if we consider them with relation to the Preservation of our Bodies but nevertheless they are various and very far from the Truth as has already been shown in part and will more evidently appear hereafter CHAP. XIII I. Of the Nature of Sensations II. That we know them better than we lelieve we do III. An Objection and Answer IV. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations V. That we deceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects VI. Objection and Answer THE third thing that is in each of our Sensations I. A Definition of Sensations or in what we feel for Example when we are near the Fire is a Modification of our Soul in relation to what passes in the Body to which it is united This Modification is agreeable when what passes in the Body is proper to assist the Circulation of the Blood and the other Functions of Life which is called by the Equivocal Term of Heat and this Modification is painful and perfectly different from the other when what passes in the Body is capable of incommoding and burning it that is when the Motions that are in the Body are capable of breaking any of its Fibres and this is generally called Pain or Burning and so of other Sensations but these are the common thoughts Men have upon this subject The first Error is that we unreasonably imagine we have no knowledge of our Sensations II. That we know our own Sensations better than we believe we do We see a great many Men every day who much concern themselves to know what Pleasure Pain and the other Sensations are they grant that they are only in the Soul and that they are but the Modifications of it 'T is true these sort of Men are very much to be admired at for being willing to learn what they cannot but know already for it is not possible that a Man shou'd be entirely ignorant what Pain is when he feels it A Person for Instance that burns his Hand distinguishes very well the Pain he feels from Light Colour Sound Taste Smell Pleasure and from all other Pain than what he feels He very well
that the same Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optic Nerve do not cause the same Sensations in different persons that is to see the same Colours and that such a Motion may happen which shall cause in one the Sensation of Green or Gray in another or even a new Sensation which no body before ever had It is certain that this may be and that Reason does not demonstrate the contrary to us yet 't is generally agreed that 't is not probable it should be so It is much more reasonable to believe that God acts always after the same manner in respect to the Union he hath created between our Souls and Bodies and that he hath tyed the same Idea's and the same Sensations to like Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain altho' in different Persons Let us take it for granted then as the same Motions of those Fibres which end in the middle of the Brain are accompanied with the same Sensations in all Men so if it happens that the same Objects produce not the same Motions in their Brain by consequence they do not excite the same Sensations in their Soul Now it appears indisputable to me that all Mens Organs of their Senses not being disposed after the same manner they cannot receive the same impressions from the same Objects For instance The blows a Porter hits himself over the sides to warm himself wou'd be sufficient to lame a great many Men The same blow wou'd produce many different Motions and by consequence as many different Sensations in a Man of a strong Constitution and in a Child or a Woman that is of a weak Constitution So that there not being two Persons in the World who we can be certain have the Organs of their Senses in a perfect conformity we cannot affirm that there is two Persons in the World who have exactly the same Sensations of the same Objects This is the Original of that strange variety which we meet with in the Inclinations of Men. There are some who love Musick extreamly and others who are insensible of it and even amongst those that delight in it some love one kind of Musick and others another according to the almost infinite diversity that is found in the Fibres of the Nerve of the Ear in the Blood and in the Spirits For instance how great a difference there is between the Musick of France that of Italy of Chinese and other places and by consequence between the Tastes that different People have of different kinds of Musick Nay it even happens that at different times by the same Consorts we receive different Impressions for if the Imagination is heated by a great quantity of agitated Spirits we are much more pleased with a bold and dissonant Musick than with one that is more sweet and more agreeable to mathematical Rules and Exactness This Experience proves and it is not very difficult to give a reason of it It is the same also of Odours he that loves to smell of the Flower of an Orange it may be cannot endure a Rose and the contrary There is likewise as much diversity in Tastes as in any other of the Sensations Sauces must be very different equally to please different Persons nay to please the same Person at different times One loves that which is sweet another that which is sowre one thinks Wine agreeable another hates it and the same Person who liked it when he was well thinks it bitter and unpleasant when he 's in a Fever and so of the rest of the Senses Yet all Men love Pleasure they all delight in agreeable Sensations and have all in respect to that the same Inclination they receive not then the same Sensations of the same Objects fince they love them not equally Thus what makes one Man say he loves that which is sweet is because the Sensation he has thereof is agreeable and that which causes another to say he does not love what is sweet is that indeed he has not the same Sensation as he that loves it And when he says he loves not that which is sweet he does not mean he does not love to have the same Sensation with the other but that he has it not So that he speaks improperly when he says he loves not that which is sweet he ought to say he does not love Sugar Hony c. that every one else thinks to be sweet and agreeable and that he has not the same Taste as others have because the Fibres of his Tongue are otherwise disposed This is a very Sensible Example Suppose that of twenty Persons there was one amongst them who had his Hands very cold and knew not the Words that are made use of to explain the Sensations of heat and cold and that on the contrary all the rest had their Hands extreamly hot If in Winter cold Water was carried to all of them to Wash in those whose Hands were very hot would immediately upon washing one after another say this Water is very cold I don't love it but when the other whose Hands were extreamly cold should come at last to wash his Hands he wou'd say on the contrary I don't know why you don't love cold Water for my part I take a great deal of pleasure in feeling the cold and washing my Hands in it From this Instance 't is very clear that when this last shou'd say I love cold it shou'd signifie nothing else but that he loves heat and feels it whereas the others feel the contrary And so when a Man says I love what is bitter and cannot abide sweet things it is only to be understood that he has not the same Sensations as those who say they love sweet Things and have an aversion for whatsoever is bitter It is then certain that a Sensation which is agreeable to one Person is also to all those who feel the same but that the same Objects cause not the same Sensation in all the World because of the different dispositions of the Organs of the Senses which is of the highest consequence to be observ'd both in respect to Philosophy and Morality 'T is true an Objection may here be rais'd but 't will be very easily solved viz. It sometimes happens that persons who extreamly love certain sorts of Food come afterwards to have an aversion for them either because in Eating they have found some Dirt in them or have been Sick because they have Eat to excess of them or else for some other reasons These same Persons say they no longer love the same Sensations that they loved formerly for they have them still when they Eat the same Food and yet they are not agreeable to them To answer to this Objection it must be observed that when those Persons taste any Food that they have so much aversion to they have two very different Sensations at the same time they have that of the Food they Eat according to the Objection and they have also another Sensation
of Dislike which for instance proceeds from the strong Imagination they have of the Dirt in what they Eat The reason of it is that when two Motions are made in the Brain at the same time the one is never excited after the other except it be after a considerable time Thus because the agreeable Sensation never comes without this other disgustful one and because we confound things that are produced at the same time we imagine that this Sensation that was formerly agreeable to us is now no longer so Yet if it is always the same it is necessary that it should always be agreeable So that if we imagine it is not agreeable 't is because it is join'd and confounded with another that causes more distaste than the other does of agreeableness There is more difficulty to prove that Colours and some other Sensations which I have called weak and languishing are not the same in all Men because all those Sensations so little affect the Soul that we cannot distinguish them so well as we can Tastes or other Sensations more strong and lively the one being more agreeable than the other and thus to discover the diversity of Sensations that are found in different Persons by the variety of their pleasure or dislike Reason which always shows that the other Sensations are not the same in different Persons tells us also that there will be a variety in the Sensations they have of Colours And indeed there is no doubt but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight in different Persons as well as in those of the Ear or the Taste for there is no reason to suppose a perfect resemblance in the disposition of the Optic Nerve in all Men since there is an infinite variety in every thing in Nature and chiefly in those that are Material 't is therefore very probable that all Men see not the same Colours in the same Objects Yet I believe it never or very rarely happens that Persons see White or Black to be of any other Colour than we do altho' they do not see it equally White or Black But for mixt Colours as Red Yellow and Blue and chiefly such as are compounded of all three I believe there are few Persons who have perfectly the same Sensation of them For Instance there are some Persons who when they look upon cettain Bodies with one Eye take them to be Yellow and when they behold them with the other see them to be Green or Blue yet if we suppos'd these Persons Born blind of one Eye or with both their Eyes so dispos'd to see that Blue which we call Green they wou'd believe they saw Objects of the same colour as we see them because by Green or Blue they wou'd always have understood what they see Yellow or Red. We may further prove that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour because according to the observation of some the same Colours do not equally please all sorts of Persons and if these Sensations were the same they wou'd be equally agreeable to all Men but because very weighty doubts may be raised against the Answer I have given to the precedent Objection I do not believe it solid enough to insist upon it Indeed it is very seldom that we are as much more pleased with one Colour than another even as we are much more pleased with one Taste than another The reason is the Sensations of Colours are not given us to Judge whether or no Bodies are proper for our Nourishment that is distinguished by Pleasure and Pain which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil Objects in respect to their Colour are neither good nor bad to Eat If Objects appear agreeable or disagreeable to us in respect to their Colour their sight wou'd be always followed with the course of those Spirits which excite and accompany the Passions since the Soul cannot be touched without moving it and we shou'd often hate good Things and love bad so that we shou'd not long preserve our lives In fine the Sensations of Colours are only given us to distinguish Bodies from one another and therefore it does as well if we see Herbs Red as if we see them Green provided the Person that sees them Red or Green sees them always after the same manner But we have said enough of these Sensations let us now speak of Natural Judgments and the free Judgments which accompany them which is the fourth thing that we confound with the three others that we have already mention'd CHAP. XIV I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. Reasons of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments 'T IS easily foreseen I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them that we shall not meet with many Persons that will not be offended with this General Proposition that I here advance viz. That we have no Sensation of External Objects which include not one or many Judgments we know very well that the generality of the World do not believe that there is so much as one Judgment in our Sensations either true or false so that these Persons being surprized with the Novelty of this Proposition will say without doubt in themselves But how can it be I do not Judge this Wall to be white I see very well what it is Nor do I Judge Pain to be in my Hand I most certainly feel it to be there And who can doubt of things so certain if they do not feel Objects otherwise than I do Indeed their Inclinations for the Prejudices which they have imbib'd from their Infancy carries them much further and if they do not Reproach and Contemn those whom they believe to be perswaded of a contrary Opinion to their own without doubt they deserve to be placed in the Number of Moderate Persons But we must not here stay to Prophesie of the ill success of our Thoughts it will be more to the purpose to endeavour to produce them with the strongest Proofs and so clearly discover them that they may be no sooner well examin'd or attentively consider'd but they must be submitted to Since 't is necessary to prove that we have no Sensation of External Objects which does not include some false Judgment take it thus It seems Indisputable to me that our Souls do not fill those vast Spaces which are between us and the fixt Stars altho' it shou'd be granted that themselves are extended so likewise it is not reasonable to believe that our Souls are in the Firmament when they behold the fixt Stars there Nor is it Credible that they should go out of their Bodies a thousand Paces to see Houses at that distance It is therefore necessary that our Souls see Houses and Stars where they are not since it goes not out of the Body where it is and yet sees them out
of it self Now as the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul which are those only that it can see are not in the Heavens it from thence follows that all Men who see Stars in the Heavens and afterwards voluntarily Judging that they are there make two false Judgments whereof the one is Natural and the other Free One is a Judgment of the Senses or a Compounded Sensation according to which we ought not to Judge the other is a Free Judgment of the Will which we cannot hinder our selves from making and by conquence which we ought not to do if we would avoid Error But the reason that we believe that these Stars II. The Reasons of these false Judgments which we see immediately are out of the Soul and in the Firmament is because it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when it pleases for it cannot perceive them when the Motions to which the Idea's of these Objects are Naturally ty'd happen in its Brain Now because the Soul perceives not the Motions of its Organs but only its own Sensations and that it knows these same Sensations are not produced in it by its own power it is induced to Judge that they are without and in the cause which represents them to it and it hath so often made these kind of Judgments in the same time it perceived the Objects that it can scarcely hinder it self from making them It will be very necessary to explain the foundation of what I have said to shew the usefulness of this infinite number of little Beings that we call Species and Idea's which are as nothing and which represent all things that we create and destroy when we please and that our Ignorance hath made us imagine to render a Reason for things that we understand not We shou'd show the solidity of their Opinion who believe God is the true Father of Light who only Instructs all Men without whom the most simple Truths cou'd not be Intelligible and the Sun tho' never so bright wou'd not be so much as Visible to us who acknowledge no other Nature than the Will of God and who upon these Reflexions have confessed that the Idea's which represent the Creatures to us are only the Perfections of God which answer to these same Creatures and represent them to us It wou'd be requisite also to show the Nature of Idea's and then it wou'd be easie to speak more clearly of what I have mentioned but that it wou'd carry us too far In the third Book these things shall be more fully explained and order requires it shou'd be referred till then It suffices for the present that I bring a most Sensible and Indisputable Example wherein we shall find many Judgments confounded with one and the same Sensation I believe there is no body in the World who looks upon the Moon but sees it about a thousand Paces from himself and who thinks it not greater when it Rises or Sets than when it is very high above the Horizon and it may be also that we only believe we see it greater without thinking that we make any Judgment in its Sensation Yet it is Indisputable that if there was not some kind of Judgment included in the Sensation we shou'd not see the Moon in the distance it appears to be And besides it wou'd appear less to us when it rises than when it is got a great way above the Horizon since we see it great when it rises only because we believe it farther off by a Natural Judgment which I have spoken of in the 6th Chapter But besides our Natural Judgments which we may look upon as compounded Sensations there is almost in all our Sensations a free Judgment for Men not only determine by a Natural Judgment that Pain for instance is in their Hand but they also make a free Judgment thereof they not only feel it there but likewise believe it so and have so habituated themselves to form such Judgments that they find it very difficult to avoid it Yet these Judgments are very false in themselves altho' very useful for the preservation of Life for our Senses Instruct us only for our Bodies and all our free Judgments which are conformable to our Senses are very far from the Truth But that we may not leave all these things without giving some Means to discover the Reasons thereof we must know that there are two sorts of Beings such as our Soul sees immediately and others that it knows only through the Means of the first For Instance when I perceive the Sun rising I first perceive that which I see immediately and because I perceive that first Sun only by reason there is something without me which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and Brain I Judge that this first Sun which is in my Soul is without and that it Exists It may further happen that we see this first Sun which is intirely united to our Soul tho' the other be not upon the Horizon and even whether it exists or no so we may see this first Sun greater when the other rises than when it is very high and altho' it be true that this first Sun that we immediately see be greater than the other rises it follows not from thence that this other be greater for 't is not properly that which rises that we see since it is distant from us many Millions of Miles but it is that first that is truly greater and such as we see it because all things that we immediately see are always what we see them to be and we deceive our selves only because we Judge that what we immediately see is in the External Object which causes that Vision in us So when we see Light in seeing this first Sun which is immediately united to our Mind we do not deceive our selves in believing we see it it is not possible to doubt thereof But our Error is our Willing without any Reason nay against all Reason that this Light that we immediately see exists in the Sun which is without us 'T is also the same thing in respect to other Objects of our Senses III. Error is not in our Sensations but only in our Judgments If we observe carefully what has been said in the beginning and continuation of this Work we shall easily see that of all things that happen in each Sensation Error proceeds from the Judgments we make by which we think that our Sensations are in the Objects First it is not an Error to be ignorant that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their parts and that this Motion communicates it self to the Organs of our Senses which are the two first things to be observed in each Sensation for there is a great deal of difference between being ignorant of a thing and having a false Notion of it Secondly we deceive our selves not in the third which is properly Sensation when we feel Heat see Light Colours
or other Objects it is true that we see them altho' at the same time we shou'd be Mad for there is nothing more certain than that all the Visionaries see what they think they do and their Error consists only in this that they Judge what they see to exist truly without them because they see it so It is this Judgment that includes a Consent of our Liberty and by consequence that which is subject to Error and we ought always to hinder our selves from making it according to the Rule we have laid down in the beginning of this Book that we ought never to Judge of any thing when we can hinder our selves from it and where Evidence and Certainty does not constrain us thereto as it happens here for altho' we feel our selves extreamly inclined by a strong Habit to Judge that our Sensations are in the Objects as that Heat is in the Fire and Colours in Pictures yet we see not that certain Evidence and Reason which presses and obliges us to believe it and thus we voluntarily submit to Error by the ill use that we make of our Liberty when we freely form such Judgments CHAP. XV. An Explanation of the particular Errors of Sight which may serve us as an Example of the General Errors of our Senses THE Way I believe is now made plain for the discovery of the Errors of our Senses in general as they have any Relation to Sensible Qualities which have been treated on upon the occasion of Light and Colours which in order ought to be first explained It seems necessary now to come to particulars and to examine severally the Errors into which every one of our Senses betray us but we shall not now enlarge upon these things because from what has been already said a little attention will easily supply a long Discourse which we should be oblig'd to make We shall produce only the general Errors into which our Sight betrays us in reference to Light and Colours and we doubt not but this Example alone will be sufficient to inform us of the Errors of all the other Senses When we have look'd some time upon the Sun this is what passes in our Eyes and Soul and these are the Errors we fall into Those who know the first Elements of Dioptrics and any thing of the admirable Structure of our Eyes are not ignorant that the Rays of the Sun are refracted in the Chrystaline and other Humours and that they meet afterwards upon the Retina or Optic Nerve which as it were furnishes with Hangings all the bottom of the Eye even as the Rays of the Sun which pass through a Convex Glass meet together in the focus at two three or four Fingers breadth distant in proportion to its Convexity Now Experience shows that if one put at the focus of the Convex-Glass a little piece of Stuff or black Paper * Black Paper easily burns but there must be a greater Convexity to burn White Paper in the same time the Rays of the Sun make so great an impression upon this Stuff or Paper and agitate the small Particles thereof with so great a violence that they break and separate them from one another In a word they burn them or reduce them into Smoak and Ashes Thus we must conclude from this Experience that if the Pupil through which the Light passes were so dilated that it would permit an easie passage for the Rays of the Sun or on the contrary was so contracted as to obstruct them our Retina would suffer the same thing as the piece of Stuff or black Paper and the Fibres would be so very much agitated that they would soon be broken and burnt It is for this reason that most Men are sensible of a Pain if they look upon the Sun but for one moment because they cannot so well close up the Orifice of the Pupil but that there will enter sufficient Rays to agitate the Strings of the Optic Nerve with much violence and not without danger of breaking them The Soul has no knowledge of what we have spoke and when it looks upon the Sun it neither perceives its Optic Nerve nor any Motion in it but that 's not the Error 't is only a simple Ignorance The first Error it falls into is that it Judges the Pain it feels is in its Eye If immediately after looking upon the Sun we go into a dark place with our Eyes open the Motion of the Fibres of the Optic Nerve caus'd by the Rays of the Sun diminishes and changes by little and little This is all the Change that can be perceived in the Eyes however 't is not what the Soul perceives there but only a White and Yellow Light Its second Error is it Judges that the Light it sees is in the Eyes or upon the next Wall In fine the agitation of the Fibres of the Retina always diminishes and ceases by little and little for when a Body has been shaken nothing can be perceived in it but a diminution of its Motion but 't is not that which the Soul perceives in its Eyes it sees the White become an Orange colour afterwards Red and then Blue And the reason of this Error is that we Judge there are changes in our Eyes or upon the next Wall that differ much as to the more or less because the Blue Orange and Red Colours which we see differ much otherwise among themselves besides in the more and less These are some Errors which we are subject to in reference to Light and Colours and these Errors beget many others which shall be explain'd in the following Chapters CHAP. XVI I. That the Errors of our Senses are the most general and fruitful Principles whence we draw all the false conclusions which in their turns also serve us for Principles II. The Origine of Essential Differences III. Of substantial Forms IV. Of some other Errors in the Philosophy of the Schools I Suppose I have sufficiently explain'd I. The Errors of our Senses serve us for the most useful and fruitful Principles to draw false Consequences which in their turns also serve for Principles to unprejudic'd Persons and such as are capable of any attention of Mind in what our Sensations consist and the general Errors which are found in them It rests now to show that Men use these general Errors as incontestable Principles by which they will explain all things that they draw an Infinity of false Consequences from them which also in their turns serve for Principles to draw other Consequences and that thus by little and little they have compos'd Imaginary Sciences that have nothing of substance or reality in them and which they follow with a blind impetuosity but which like Phantasms exhibit to those that embrace them only confusion and the shame of being seduc'd or that Character of Folly which makes us take pleasure in feeding upon Illusions and Chimera's But this must be particulariz'd in some Examples It has been already
said that we are accustom'd to attribute our own Sensations to Objects and that we judge Colours Odours Sapours and other Sensible Qualities to be in Objects that are Colour'd Odiferous c. We have discover'd that this is an Error we must now show that we make use of this Error as a Principle whence we draw our false Consequences which Consequences we also esteem as other Principles upon which we build our Reasonings In a word we must here explain in what order the Mind proceeds in searching out some special Truths where this false Principle viz. Our Sensations are in Objects is once so imbib'd that it looks upon it as indubitable But to render this more Sensible let us take some particular Body whose Nature we would enquire into and let us see for Example what a Man would do that should apply himself to know the Nature of Honey and Salt The first thing would be to consider their Colour Smell Taste and other Sensible Qualities what those of the Honey are and what those of the Salt in what they agree and in what they differ and what Relation they can have with the Qualities of other Bodies This being done I believe he would reason much after this manner supposing he believ'd it an incontestable Principle that Sensations were in Objects The Original differences that are attributed to Objects that these differences are in the Soul Whatever I perceive by tasting seeing and feeling this Hony and Salt are in this Hony and Salt Now 't is certain that what I perceive in this Hony differs essentially from what I perceive in this Salt the whiteness of the Salt does without doubt differ more from the Colour of the Hony than in the more or less and the sweetness of the Hony from the pungent taste of the Salt and consequently there must be an essential difference betwixt Hony and Salt since all that I am sensible of in both does not only differ as to the more or less but also essentially This would be the first step this Man would make for doubtless he cannot judge that Hony and Salt differ essentially but because there are some appearances in the one essentially different from the other I mean the Sensations that he has of Hony differ essentially from those of Salt since he only judges thereof by the Impressions they make upon the Senses he then looks upon this Consequence as a new Principle from whence he draws other conclusions after this manner Since then the Hony and Salt The Original of substantiâ—l Forms and other natural Bodies differ essentially from one another it follows that those are grosly deceiv'd who would perswade us that all the difference betwixt these Bodies consists only in the different Configuration of the Particles which compose them For since Figure is not essential to different Bodies let the Figure of those Particles which are imagin'd to be in the Hony be changed the Hony will remain still Hony altho' its parts shou'd receive the Figure of the Parts of Salt So that it 's necessary there shou'd be some substance which being join'd to the first common Matter of all different Bodies constitutes their essential difference from one another This is the second advance which this Man would make and this is the happy discovery of substantial Forms These are the fruitful substances which produce every thing in Nature altho' they only subsist in the Imagination of our Philosophers But let us see the Properties which he will liberally bestow upon this Entity of his Invention for no doubt but he will dispoil other Substances of their essential Properties to Cloath this Since then The Original of all other general Errors in the Physics of the Schools there are in every Natural Body two Substances which compose it one which is common to Hony Salt and other Bodies the other which makes Hony to be Hony Salt Salt and other Bodies to be what they are It follows that the first which is Matter having no contrariety and being indifferent to all Forms must rest without any force or action because it has no need of defending it self but for others which are substantial Forms they have need of being always accompanied with Qualities and Faculties to defend them they must always be upon their Guard for fear of being surprized they must perpetually look to their own Preservation extend their Empire over their Neighbouring Matter and push their Conquests as far as they can for if they were weak and actionless other Forms would surprize them and soon annihilate them they must then always fight and nourish these Antipathies and Irreconcileable Hatreds against other Hostile Forms which endeavour to destroy them If it happens that one Form shou'd take the Matter of another Form As if for Example the form of a Carcass seize the Body of a Dog this form must not be barely contented to annihilate the form of a Dog its hatred must also extend to the destruction of all those qualities which its Enemy had the hair of the Carcass must forthwith wax white with a whiteness of a new creation the Blood must be red after such a manner as we cannot suspect it to be counterfeit and the whole Body must be cover'd with qualities that are faithful to the new form and defend it according to the little power which the qualities of a dead Body have which must also be destroy'd in their turn But because they cannot always fight and because all things seek rest it 's certainly necessary that the Fire for instance have its Center whether it always tends by its lightness and natural Inclination that it may once be at rest and burn no more and that it may even lay by its heat which it only kept here below for its defence These are a few of the Consequences which result from this last Principle that there are Substantial Forms which we have made our Philosopher conclude with a little too much liberty for these are usually deliver'd with a graver Air. There are yet an Infinity of other Consequences which every Philosopher is continually making according to his Humour and Inclination according to the Fruitfulness or Barrenness of his Imagination for these are the only things which make them differ from one another We must not stop here to overthrow these Chimerical Substances other Persons have sufficiently examin'd them and shown that there are no such things in Nature and that they serve only to afford a very great number of ridiculous and even contradictory Consequences We are satisfy'd that we have discover'd their Original in the Mind of Man and to have show'd that they are all owing at this time to the common Prejudice That Sensations are in the Objects perceived For if what has been said be consider'd with little attention viz. That it 's necessary for the preservation of our Body to have Sensations that are essentially different altho' the Impressions which Objects make upon our Bodies differ
very little We shall clearly see that 't is a fault to imagine so great differences in the Objects of our Senses But I must here mention by the by that there 's nothing to be objected against these Terms Form and Essential difference Hony is certainly Hony by its form and 't is thus that it essentially differs from Salt but this form or this essential difference consists only in the different Configuration of its parts 't is this different Configuration which causes Hony to be Hony and Salt Salt And altho' its only accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Hony or Salt and so to have the form of Hony or Salt it may nevertheless be said that it is essential to Hony or Salt to be what they are to have such or such a Configuration of Parts Even as Sensations of Cold Heat Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul as a Soul but because it is by these Sensations that it 's said to be sensible of Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics IT has been sufficiently proved in my Opinion that this Prejudice Our Sensations are in Objects is a very fruitful Principle of Error in Physics it must now be shown from Reasons drawn from Morals that the same Prejudice join'd with this That Objects are the only and true Causes of our Sensations is also very dangerous There 's nothing so common in the World I. An Example drawn from Morals that our Senses only offer us false Goods as to see Men who are Wedded to Sensible Goods Some love Musick others good Eating and others are passionate for other things Now thus they reason to perswade themselves that all these Objects are Goods viz. All these agreeable Tastes which please us in Banquets these Sounds which affect the Ear and these other Pleasures which we perceive upon other occasions are certainly included in Sensible Objects or at least 't is these Objects that are the occasion of them or in sine we cannot have Sensations without them Now 't is impossible to doubt whether Pleasure be Good whether Pain be Evil we are inwardly convinc'd thereof and consequently the Objects of our Senses are very real Goods which we ought to enjoy that we may be happy This is the Reasoning that we ordinarily I shall explain in the last Book in what sense Objects work upon Bodies and inconsiderately make and this is that which inclines us to believe that our Sensations are in Objects that Objects have in themselves the power of making us Sensible that we look upon things as our Goods which are infinitely below us which can only act upon our Bodies by producing some Motions in their Fibres but can never act upon our Souls or make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if it is not the Soul which acts upon it self upon occasion of what passes in the Body nothing else but God can do it and if it is not the Soul which causes Pleasure or Pain according to the different shaking of the Fibres of its Body as it 's very likely it does not since it often perceives Pleasure and Pain without its consent I know no other Hand that is powerful enough to produce this Sensation in it but that of the Author of Nature Indeed there 's none but God that is our true Good II. That 't is God only who is our Good and that all Sensible Objects can't make us sensible of Pleasure 't is he only that can affect us with all these Pleasures we are capable of and who in his Knowledge and Love haâ—â— Decreed to excite them in us And these Pleasures which he hath link'd to the Motions which pass in our Body to make us careful of our own Preservation are very little very weak and very short altho' we are enslav'd to them in this State whereinto Sin has reduc'd us but the Pleasures which he will excite in his Elect in Heaven are infinitely greater since he made us to know and love him for according to the Order of Nature greater Goods affect us with greater Pleasure and since God is infinitely above all things the Pleasure of those that shall enjoy him will certainly surpass all Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors III. The Original of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoâ—es in reference to Good does sufficiently inform us of the falsness of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans about the Supream Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because they felt it as well in Vice as in Vertue and even more commonly in the first than the second they gave themselves up to all sorts of Voluptuousness Now the first Cause of their Error was that Judging falsely there was something agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the true Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being besides this convinc'd by an inward Sensation which they had in themselves that Pleasure was a Good for them or at least for the time they enjoy'd it they gave themselves up to the Government of all the Passions which they apprehended would not incommode them afterwards whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure which is felt in Sensible Things cannot be in these things as their true Causes nor after any other manner and consequently that Sensible Goods cannot be such in respect of our Soul They should also have consider'd the other Things which we have explain'd The Stoics on the contrary being perswaded that Sensible Pleasures were only in the Body and for the Body and that the Soul ought to have its particular Good placed its Happiness in Vertue Now this is the Origine of their Errors they believ'd that Sensible Pain and Pleasures were not in the Soul but only in the Body they made use of this false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain is not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of Sense are not good in themselves but that they are common to Men and Beasts And nevertheless it is easie to show that altho' the Epicureans and Stoics were deceiv'd in many things yet they were in the right in some for the happiness of the Happy consists in an accomplish'd Vertue I would say in the Knowledge and Love of God and is a very great Pleasure which continually attends them Let us then well remember that external Objects include nothing neither agreeable nor disagreeable that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures and that we have no reason either to fear or love them but that God only is to be fear'd and lov'd because he only is able to Punish or Reward us to make us Sensible of Pain or Pleasure In fine 't
is only in God and from God that we can expect Pleasures for which we have so strong so natural and so just an Inclination CHAP. XVIII I. Our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Men. III. We must not confide in Sensible Habits WE have sufficiently explain'd the Errors of our Senses in respect of their Objects as of Light Colours and other Sensible Qualities we must now show how they seduce us about Objects to which they have no relation by obstructing our serious attention and inclining us to Judge of them upon their Testimony This is what deserves very well to be Explain'd Attention and Application of Mind I. That our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible to the clear and distinct Idea's we have of Objects is the most necessary thing in the World to know their Nature for as it is impossible to see the Beauty of any Work without opening our Eyes and looking earnestly upon it so the Mind cannot evidently see the greatest part of Things with the Relations they have to one another unless it considers them attentively Now 't is certain that nothing diverts us more from attending the clear and distinct Idea's of our Senses and consequently from removing us farther from the Truth and also deceiving us To apprehend this Truth it 's necessary to know that the three ways of perceiving viz. by the Senses Imaginations and Pure Vnderstanding do not all equally affect the Soul and consequently not afford the same equal attention to every thing it perceives by their means for it is much affected with what touches it much and less with that which touches it little Now that which it perceives by the Senses touches and engages it extreamly but that which it knows by the Imagination affects much less but what the Understanding represents to it I mean what it perceives of it self independent of the Senses and Imagination does very seldom excite it No body can doubt but that the least pain of the Senses is more present to the Mind and renders it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of much greater consequence The reason of this is that the Senses represent Objects as present but the Imagination as absent Now according to the Laws of Order amongst many Goods or Evils proposed to the Soul those which are present touch and affect the Soul more than all the others which are absent because it 's necessary for the Soul to determine readily upon what is to be done in this occurrence Thus it is much more affected with a little Pricking than with the most elevated Speculations and the Pleasures and Evils of this World make a greater impression upon it than the terrible Pains or infinite Pleasures of Eternity The Senses then extreamly affect the Soul with what they represent to it now as it is limited and cannot clearly conceive many things at a time so it cannot clearly apprehend what the Understanding represents to it at the same time as the Senses offer something to its consideration it then forsakes the clear and distinct Idea's of the Understanding however proper they are to discover the Truth of things as they are in themselves and applies it self only to the confus'd Idea's of the Senses which affect it more and which represent things unto it not as they are in themselves but only according to the Relation they have with its Body If a Man II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Mâ—n for Example would explain some Truth it 's necessary that he make use of Speech and that he express his internal Motions and Sentiments in sensible Motions and Ways Now the Soul cannot at the same time perceive distinctly many things Thus having always a great attention for what comes by the Senses it very seldom considers the reasons propos'd to it but it is much affected with the sensible Pleasure which depends upon the Measure of Periods upon the Relations of Gestures with Words upon the Beauties of a Face upon the Air and Manner of one that speaks however after it has heard it must Judge this is the Custom Thus its Judgments must be different according to the diversity of Impressions which it shall receive by the Senses If for Example he that speaks delivers himself easily if he keeps an agreeable Measure in his Periods if he has the Air of a Gentleman and a Man of Sense and if he is a Person of Quality if he has a great Retinue if he speaks with Authority and Gravity if others hear him with Respect and Silence if he Converses with Wits of the first Classis in sine if he is happy enough to please and to be esteemed he shall have Reason in whatever he advances his very Dress shall pass for Demonstration But if he is so unhappy as to have the contrary Qualities however concludingly he demonstrates he shall prove nothing at all Let him speak the finest things in the World they shall never be taken notice of the attention of his Auditors being only to that which touches the Senses the disgust they shall entertain to see a Man appear despicably shall wholly take them up and divert that application which is due to his Thoughts his attire shall make its Master and every thing that he says contemptible and his way of speaking being that which is peculiar to a Thoughtful Philosopher shall incline his Auditors to believe that these sublime Truths he treats of being above their ordinary Capacity are only delirious and extravagant Notions These are the Judgments of Men their Eyes and Ears Judge of Truth and not of Reason even in these very things which depend only on Reason because Men are only affected with sensible and agreeable Objects and scarce ever bring with them a strong and serious Attention for the discovery of Truth III. We must not rest upon a sensible and agreeable manner of doing 〈◊〉 thing Nevertheless it is very unjust to Judge of things after that manner and to despise Truth because it wants those Ornaments which please and slatter our Senses Philosophers and discerning Persons should be asham'd to enquire more Industriously into agreeable Matters than into Truth it self and to feed their Mind with the Vanity of Words rather than the Truth of Things 'T is common to the unthinking part of the World to Souls of Flesh and Blood to suffer themselves to be won by the fine Periods Figures and Motions which excite the Passions Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt Veraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt Aures lepido quae sunt fucata sonore But Wise men endeavour to Guard themselves against the Malignant Power and prevailing Charms of these sensible Manners of doing things their Senses impose upon them as well as other Mens for indeed they are Men but they generously despise their Testimonies they
imitate the famous Example of the Judges of Areopagus who forbad the Advocates to make use of deceitful Words and Figures and would never hear them but in a dark place lest their agreeable Gestures should perswade them in prejudice of Truth and Justice And lastly that they might apply themselves the better to consider the solidity of their Reasons CHAP. XIX Two other EXAMPLES I. The first of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies II. The second of those that relate to the Qualities of these Bodies WE have show'd that there are a great number of Errors whose first Original is owing to the strong application of the Soul for whatever comes by the Senses and the inadvertence for things which the Understanding represents to it We have given an Example of it drawn from the Conversation of Men which is of very great consequence in Morals Here are now others deduc'd from the Nature of Things which its very necessary to observe in Physics One of the principal Errors that respects Physics I. Errors about the Nature of Bodies is that Men imagine a much greater substance in Bodies which fall under the Cognizance of their Senses than others which they perceive not the greatest part of Men believe that there is much more Matter in Gold and Lead than in Air or Water And even Children who only observe by their Senses the effects of Air commonly imagine that there is nothing real in it Gold and Siver are very heavy very hard and sensible Water and Air on the contrary are insensible From thence Men conclude that the first have more reality than the last they judge of the Truth of Things by the sensible Impression which always deceives us and neglect the clear and distinct Idea's of the Mind which never deceive us because what is Sensible affects and touches us more but what is intelligible stupifies us These false Judgments respect the substance of Bodies here 's another which relates to the Qualities of these same Bodies Men frequently Judge II. Errors about their Qualities and Perfection that Objects which excite in them the most agreeable Sensations are the most perfect and pure without knowing in what Perfection and the Purity of Matter consists and even without being concerned about it They say for Example that Dirt is impure and that Water is very clear and pure but Camels who love muddy Waters and those Animals that delight in Dirt are not of their Opinion These are Beasts 't is true but Men that love the Entrails of a Woodcock the Excrements of a Polcat say not that this is impurity altho' they say the same of all other kinds of Animals Lastly Musk and Amber are generally esteemed of all Men tho' they are nothing else but Excrements Certainly Men never Judge of the Perfection of Matter and its Purity but only in relation to their own Senses and thence it happens that the Senses being different in all Men as has been sufficiently explain'd they must judge very differently of the Perfection and Purity of Matter Thus the Books which are daily Compos'd upon the Imaginary Perfections that are attributed to certain Bodies are necessarily fill'd with Errors and variety of strange Fancies since the Reasonings which they contain are grounded only upon the false confus'd and irregular Idea's of our Senses Philosophers must not say that Matter is Pure or Impure they know not what they precisely mean by the Words Pure and Impure they should not speak without knowing what they say I mean without having clear and distinct Idea's which answer to the terms they make use of for if they had join'd clear and distinct Idea's to each of these Words they would see that that which they call Pure would very often be Impure and that which appears to them to be Impure would oftentimes be found very Pure If they would for Example that that Matter should be the most Pure and Perfect whose Parts are most thin and apt for Motion Gold Silver and precious Stones would be very imperfect Bodies Air and Fire contrariwise would be very perfect Flesh beginning to corrupt and smell ill would be tending to Perfection and a noisome Carcass would be more perfect than common flesh But if on the contrary they would have it that the most perfect Bodies are they whose parts were most gross and solid and more unapt for Motion the Earth would be more perfect than Gold and the Air and Fire would be the most imperfect of all Bodies But if they would not affix these clear and distinct Idea's to the terms Pure and Perfect which I have mentioned they are at liberty to substitute others in their room but if they only pretend to define these Words by sensible Notions they will eternally confound all things since they will never fix a signification to the terms which expresses them All Men as I have already prov'd have very different Sensations of the same Objects we must not therefore define Objects by the Sensations which we have of them except we delight in obscurity and confusion But in short I cannot see that there is any Matter not excepting even that which the very Heavens are compos'd of that is more perfect than another All Matter seems only capable of Figure and Motion and 't is the same thing to it to have regular or irregular Figures and Motions Reason does not tell us that the Sun is more Perfect or Luminous than Dirt nor that the Beauties of our Romances and Poets have any advantage over corrupted Carcasses 't is our false and delusive Senses which thus dictate to us Whatever is objected against this all Railleries Exclamations c. will certainly appear ridiculous and cold to any one which shall attentively examine the Reasons that I have brought Those who perceive or only have Sensations believe the Sun full of Light but those who know how to perceive and reason do not believe it provided they use as much Reason as Sensation I am verily perswaded that all those who differ the most as to the Testimony of their Senses would change their Opinion if they would seriously meditate upon what has been said but they love much to indulge the illusions of their Senses they subject themselves a great while to their Prejudices they too much forget their Mind to know that all the Perfections which they seem to see in Bodies are only such in relation to it 'T is not these sort of Men that I speak to I am not concern'd for their Approbation or Esteem they will not hear therefore they cannot Judge it 's enough that Truth is defended and approved by those who seriously endeavour to be deliver'd from the Errors of their Senses and to make a good use of the Light of their Mind 'T is these Persons only would desire to Meditate upon these Thoughts with the greatest attention they are capable of in order to judge of them I leave the Cause to them to condemn or approve it
little Fibres may be moved two ways either by beginning at the ends which terminate in the Brain or those that terminate in the Exterior parts of the body The agitation of these Fibres cannot be communicated unto the Brain but the Soul must perceive something If this Motion begins by an impression that the objects make upon the extremity of the Fibres of our Nerves is so communicated to the Brain then the Soul perceives and judges that what it * By a Natural judgment which I 〈◊〉 before judge of in many places feels is without that is it perceives an object as present But if it is only the inward Fibres which are agitated by the course of the 〈◊〉 of Spirit or by some other way the Soul imagines and judges that what it imagines is not without but within the Brain that is it perceives an object as absent This is the difference there is between Sensation and Imagination But it is requisite to observe that the Fibres of the Brain are much more agitated by the impression of Objects than by the course of the Spirits and that that is the reason why the Soul is made more sensible by external Objects which it looks upon as present and as it were capable of making it immediately feel either pleasure or pain than by the course of the Animal Spirits Nevertheless it sometimes happens in Persons who have their Animal Spirits very much agitated by Fasting Watching a high Fever or by some violent Passion that these Spirits move the internal Fibres of the Brain with as much force as outward objects could do so that these Persons perceive what they ought only to imagine and think they see those objects before their Eyes which are only in their Imagination From whence it plainly appears that in respect to what passes in the Body the Senses and Imagination differ only as to More or Less as I have before advanced But to give a more particular and distinct Idea of Imagination we must know that every time there happens any change in that part of the Brain where the Nerves meet there likewise happens some change in the Soul that is as we have already explain'd if in this part there is any Motion that changes the order of its Fibres there also happens some New perception in the Soul and it feels or imagines some New thing and the Soul can never perceive or imagine any thing anew except there be some change in the Fibres of this same part of the Brain So that the faculty of Imagining or the Imagination consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to its self Images of objects in producing a change in the Fibres of this part of the Brain which may be called the principal part since it answers to all the parts of our bodies and is the place where our Soul immediately resides if we may be permitted to say so That shews us very evidently that this power which the Soul hath of forming Images includes two things the one depending upon the Soul it self and the other upon the Body II. Two faculties in the imagination one Active and the other Passive The first is Action and the Command of the Will The second is the Obedience that is given to it by the Animal Spirits which trace these Images and to the Fibres of the Brain upon which they must be imprinted In this discourse the name of Imagination is indifferently given to either of these two things nor are they distinguished by the words Active and Passive which might be given to them because by the sense of what we shall speak may easily be understood which of the two we mean whether it be of the active imagination of the Soul or passive imagination of the Body We have not yet determined in particular what that principal part is which we have just spoke of First because we believe it very unnecessary Secondly because we have not a certain knowledge of it And in fine we think it better to be silent in a matter whose truth cannot here be demonstrated to others altho it were manifest to us what that principal part is Let it be then according to the opinion of Willis that common Sense resides in those two Corpuscles he calls Corpora Striata Let the sinuosity of the Brain preserve the Species of the Memory and let the Callous body be the seat of the Imagination or following the Opinion of Fernellius let us suppose it in the Pia Mater which involves the substance of the Brain or with D'Cartes in the Glandula Pinealis or in fine let it be in some other part hitherto unknown that our Soul exercises its principal functions 't will will be very indifferent to me It suffices that there is a principal part Nay it is absolutely necessary there shou'd be such an one as also that the foundation of D'Cartes system should subsist for it ought to be well observed that althô he were deceived when he assures us that the Soul is immediately united to the Glandula Pinealis that ought not nevertheless to injure the foundation of his System from which we shall always gather all the usefulness that can be expected from Truth to improve our selves in the knowledge of Man Since then the Imagination consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to it self Images of Objects by imprinting them if we may so say III. The general cause of the Changes that happen in the Imagination and the design of the 2d Book in the Fibres of its Brain the more distinct and larger the footsteps of these Animal Spirits be which are the traces of these Images the more strongly and distinctly the Soul will imagine these Objects Now even as breadth depth and clearness of the traces of any Graving depend upon the force wherewith the Instrument is acted and on the Obedience that the Copper renders to the Workman so the depth and clearness of the Impressions made on the Imagination depend upon the force of the Animal Spirits and the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain 't is the variety that is found in both these which makes almost all this great difference that we observe in Persons Minds For 't is no difficult thing to give a reason for all the different Characters which we meet with in the Mind of Man On the one side through Abundance and Want Agitation and Slowness or largeness and smalness of the Animal Spirits and on the other side through the Delicateness and Courseness Humidity and Dryness Flexibility or Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain and in fine through the relation that these Animal Spirits may have with these Fibres And it would be very reasonable for every one first to endeavour to represent to himself the different Combinations of these things and to apply them to all the different Dispositions they meet with because it is always more useful nay even more agreeable to make
any other Liquors do It gives us the Foil to speak with Plautus and produces many effects in the Mind which are not so advantageous as those that Horace describes in these Verses Quid non ebrietas designat Operta recludit Spes jubet esse ratas in praelia tendit inermes Sollicitis animis onus eximit addocet artes Faecundi Calices quem non fecere disertum Contracta quem non in paupertate solutum It would be easie enough to give a reason of the principal effects that the mingling of the Chyle with the Blood produces in the Animal Spirits and afterwards in the Brain and even in the Soul it self As why Wine rejoyces us and gives a certain Vivacity to the Wit when it is taken with Moderation and for sometime besots Men when 't is drank to Excess From whence proceeds the heaviness after Meals and many other such things for which generally very ridiculous reasons has been given But though we shall not here make a Book of Natural Philosophy yet it will be necessary to give some Idea of the Anatomy of the Brain or make some Suppositions as Mr. D'Cartes has done in his Treatise of Man without which 't will be impossible to explain our selves But if one reads this Treatise of Monsieur D'Cartes with attention we may satisfie our selves upon these questions because he explains all these things or at least gives a sufficient light to discover them as he has done by Meditation provided one has some Knowledge of his PRINCIPLES CHAP. III. That the Air one breaths causes likewise some change in the Spirits THE second general Cause of the changes which happens in the Animal Spirits is the Air we breath for altho' it does immediately make as sensible impressions as the Chyle nevertheless in some time it produces the same effect as the Juice of our Food does presently This Air enters from Branches of the Wind-pipe into that of the Venous Artery and from thence it mingles it self and ferments with the rest of the Blood in the Heart and according to its particular disposition and that of the Blood it produces great changes in the Animal Spirits and by consequence in the faculty of Imagining I know that there are some Persons who do not believe that the Air mingles it self with the Blood in the Lungs and Heart because by their Eyes they cannot discover in the branches of the Wind-pipe and those of the Venous Artery the passages whereby the Air is communicated But we must not confine the Action of the Mind to that of the Senses it can penetrate what is impenetrable by them and apply it self to such things which they cannot 'T is certain that some parts of the Blood continually pass from the branches of the Venous Artery into those of the Wind-pipe as the smell and moistness of the breath sufficiently proves and yet the passages of this communication are imperceptible why therefore cannot the subtile parts of the Air pass from the branches of the Wind-pipe into the Venous Artery altho' the passages of this communication are not so visible In short more humours are evacuated by transpiration from the imperceptible Pores of the Arteries and Skin than by any other passages of the Body and even the Pores of the most solid Metals are not so small but that there are Bodies in Nature small enough to find a free passage for otherwise these Pores would be clos'd up It is true that the Gross and branchy parts of the Air cannot pass through the ordinary Pores of Bodies and that even Water altho' very gross can glide through those passages where this Air is sometime forced to stop But we are not speaking here of those gross and branchy parts of the Air they are it seems unuseful enough for fermentation 't is only of the smallest parts such as are swift and sharp that we speak of and which have none or very small branches to stop them because they are the most proper for the fermentation of the Blood I might nevertheless affirm upon the Relation of Silvius that even the grossest part of the Air pass from the Wind-pipe into the Heart since he assures us that he hath seen it pass thither by the help of M. de Swamerdam for it is more reasonable to believe a Man who says he has seen it than a thousand others who only speak of it by chance It is then certain that the most subtile parts of the Air which we breath enters into our Heart and with the Blood and Chyle maintains there that fire which gives Life and Motion to our Bodies and that according to their different Qualities they produce great changes in the fermentation of the Blood and in the Animal Spirits The truth of this is every day made evident by the divers Humours and different Characters of Persons dispositions that are of different Countries For Example the Gascons have a more lively Imagination than the Normans those of Roan Diep and Picardy differ very much among themselves and that much more from the Lower Normans Nunquid non ultra est sapientia in Teman Jer. c. 49. v. 7. altho' they be very near together But if we consider Men whose Countries are at a greater distance we shall meet with differences still more strange as an Italian and German or a Dutchman In fine there has in all times been some places that have been renowned for the Wisdom of their Inhabitants as Teman and Athens and others for their Stupidity as Thebes Abdera and some others Athenis tenue coelum ex quo acutiores etiam putantur Attici crassum Thebis Cic. de fato Abderitanae pectora plebis habes Mart. Boeotum in crasso jurares aere natum Hor. CHAP. IV. I. Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits by the Nerves that go to the Lungs and Heart II. Of that which is caused by the Nerves that pass from the Liver to the Spleen and so into the Bowels III. That all this is done without the assistance of our Will but cannot be effected without a Providence THE third Cause of those changes that happen to the Animal Spirits is the most general and most active of all because it is that which produces maintains and fortifies all the Passions To apprehend which well it 's necessary that we know that the fifth sixth and eighth pair of the Nerves have most of their branches extended through the Breast and Belly where they are very useful for the preservation of the Body but extreamly dangerous to the Soul because the action of these Nerves do not depend upon the Will as those do which serve to move the Arms Legs and other external parts of the Body I. of the change of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Lungs and Heart for they act much more upon the Soul than that does upon them It must therefore be consider'd that many branches of the eight pair of the Nerves cast themselves amongst
Correspondence and Sympathy which is found between the Nerves of the Face and some others that answer to other parts of the Body and which want a Name is yet more remarkable and that which produces this great Sympathy is that as in the other Passions the little Nerves that go to the face are only branches of that which descends lower When we are surprized with any violent Passion if we carefully reflect upon what we feel in our Bowels and the other parts of the Body where these Nerves infold themselves as also upon the changes which accompany it in the face and if we consider that all these diverse agitations of our Nerves are wholly involuntary and that they happen notwithstanding all the resistance our Will can make against them we shall not find it so difficult to suffer out selves to be perswaded of this plain Exposition that has been made of all those Relations the Nerves have one to another But if we examine the reasons and end of all these things we shall find therein so much Order and Wisdom that but a little serious attention will be requisite to convince those Persons that are the most Wedded to Epicurus and Lucretius that there is a Providence which rules the World When I see a Watch. I have reason to conclude that there is an Intelligence since it is impossible that Chance shou'd have produc'd and dispersed all its Wheels into order How then can it be possible that Chance and the meeting together of Atoms shou'd be able so justly and proportionably to dispose all those divers Springs as appear both in Man and other Animals And that Man and all other living Creatures shou'd beget others which bear such an absolute resemblance to them So it is ridiculous to think or say with Lucretius that 't is Chance that has form'd all the parts whereof Man is composed that the Eyes were not made to see but Men were induced to see because they had Eyes and so of the other parts of the Body These are his Words Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata Prospicere ut possimus ut proferre viai Proceras passus ideo fastigia posse Surarum ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari Bâ—achia tum porro validis exapta lacertis Esse manusque datus utrâque ex parte ministras Vt facere ad vitam possimus quae foret usus Caetera de genere hoc inter quaecumque pretantur Omnia perversà praepostera sunt ratione Nil ideo natu'est in nostro corpore ut uti Possimus sed quod natum est id procreat usum Must not one have a strange aversion for a Providence thus voluntarily to be blinded for fear of acknowledging it and endeavour to render our selves insensible to proofs so strong and convincing as those that Nature has furnished us with It is true that if once we come to affect being thought great Wits or rather Impious as the Epicureans have done we shall immediately find our selves surrounded with darkness and perceive only by false Lights boldly deny those things that are most clear and arrogantly and magisteriously affirm what is most false and obscure This Poet may serve for a proof of the blindness of these mighty Wits for he boldly determines tho' contrary to all appearance of Truth upon the most difficult and obscure Questions and it seems that he did not perceive even those Idea's that are most clear and evident If I shou'd stay to relate some more passages of this Author to justifie what I say I shou'd make too long and tedious a digression altho' it may be permitted to make such reflections as may for a moment divert the Mind from more essential Truths yet is it never permitted to make such digressions as for a considerable time take off the Mind from giving attention to the most important Subjects to apply it to trivial things CHAP. V. I. Of the Memory II. Of Habits WE have already explain'd the general Causes as well external as internal which produce any change in the Animal Spirits and by consequence in the faculty of Imagining we have show'd that the external are the Food which nourishes us and the Air we breath and that the internal consists in the involuntary agitation of certain Nerves We know of no other general Causes and even dare affirm there are none So that the faculty of Imagining depending in respect to the Body only upon these two things the Animal Spirits and the disposition of the Brain upon which they act there remains nothing more in order to the giving a perfect knowledge of the Imagination but only to shew the different changes that can happen in the substance of the Brain We will examine them after we have given some Idea of the Memory and of Habits that is of the faculty that we have of thinking of those things that we have before thought of and of acting things over again which we have already done Order requires this Method For the Explanation of the Memory I. Of the Memory 't is necessary to remember what has already been repeated so many times that all our different Perceptions depend upon the changes that happen to those Fibres that are in that part of the Brain in which the Soul more particularly resides This only supposed the nature of the Memory is explained for even as the Branches of a Tree which have continued sometime bent in a certain form still preserve an aptitude to be bent anew after the same manner So the Fibres of the Brain having once received certain impressions by the course of the Animal Spirits and by the action of Objects along time retain some facility to receive these same dispositions Now the Memory consists only in this facility since we think on the same things when the Brain receives the same impressions As the Animal Spirits act sometimes with more and sometimes with less force upon the substance of the Brain and that sensible Objects make a much greater impression than the Imagination alone it is easie from thence to discover why we do not equally remember all things we perceive For example why what one often perceives is commonly represented more lively to the Soul than what one perceives but once or twice why we remember more distinctly what we have seen than what we have only imagined and so likewise why one shou'd know better how the Veins are dispersed through the Liver after having but once seen a dissection of this part than after having many times read in a Book of Anatomy and other like things But if we shou'd reflect upon what hath been before said of the Imagination and the short discourse made on the Memory supposing us once delivered from this prejudice that our Brain is too small to preserve a very great number of traces and impressions we shall have the pleasure to discover the cause of all these surprizing effects of the Memory whereof St. Austine speaks with so much
admiration in his tenth Book of Confessions We shall not explain these things more fully because 't will be more proper for every one to examine them himself with some application of Mind because such things as we discover by this Method are always more agreeable and make a deeper impression on us than what we learn from others In order to explain Habits II Of the Habits it is necessary to know the manner how we believe the Soul moves those parts of the Bodies to which it is united According to all appearance there is always in certain places of the Brain be they where they will a great number of Animal Spirits much agitated by the heat of the Heart from whence they come and are ready to run into those places into which they find free passage All the Nerves end in the receptacle of these Spirits and the Soul hath the * I explain elsewhere in what this power consists power of determining their Motion and conducting them by these Nerves into all the Muscles of the Body these Spiriâ—s being entered there they swell them up and by consequence contract them Thus they move those parts to which the Muscles are united We shall not find it so difficult to be perswaded that the Soul moves the Body after the same manner already explained if we observe that when we have been a long time without Eating and are willing to give certain motions to our Bodies we cannot essect it and even feel it very troublesome to stand upon our feet But if we find the means to make any thing that is very spiritous run into our Heart as Wine or some other like Nourishment we are loon sensible that the body obeys with much more facility and moves it self after what manner we desire For this Experiment alone makes it seem very plain to me That the Soul could not give Motion to the Body through the defect of Animal Spirits and that 't is by their means that it hath recovered its Empire over it Now the infiations of the Muscles are so visible and so sensible in the agitation of our Arms and all the parts of our Body and it is so reasonable to believe that these Muscles cannot be blown up but because some body enters into them even as a Foot-ball cannot grow big and turgid except by the Admission of Air or some such like thing It seems I say that there can remain no doubt but that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain through the Nerves into the Muscles to blow them up and to produce there all the Motions that we can wish for a Muscle being full it is necessarily shorter then if it was empty so it draws and moves the part to which it is united as we may see more at large in D'Cartes Book of the Passions We don't give this Explanation as perfectly demonstrated in all its parts For to make it entirely evident there are still many things to be wish'd which 't is almost impossible to explain But it is also useful enough in our subject to know them for whether this Explanation be true or false it remains however equally useful to discover the Nature of Habits Because if the Soul does not move the Body after this manner it necessarily moves it some other way which is very like it from whence we may draw such consequences as we shall make use of But in order to the pursuing our Explanation it must be observed that the Spirits do not always find the ways so open and free by which they should pass and that makes us for example sometimes have so much difficulty in the moving our Fingers so quick as is necessary for the playing upon Msiucal Instruments or the Muscles that serve for pronounciation to pronounce the word of a strange tongue But by little and little the Animal Spirits by their continual course open and clear these passages so that in time one finds no longer resistance Now Habits consist in this facility that the Animal Spirits have to pass through the Members of our Bodies It is very casie according to this Explanation to resolve an infinite Number of questions which respect Habits As for Example why Children are more capable of acquiring new Habits then older Persons are Why it is so difficult to break our selves of long habits Why Men by much speaking have acquired so great a facility to it that they pronounce their words with an incredible swiftness and even without thinking thereof As it too often happens to those that say the Prayers which they have been accustomed to many years and yet to pronounce one word only many Muscles must move together in a certain time and order as those of the Tongue the Lips Throat and Diaphragme But one cannot with a little Meditation satisfie ones self about these questions and many others very curious and useful but it is not necessary to insist upon these things here It is visible from what has been said that there is much relation between the Memory and Habits and that in one sense the Memory may pass for a kind of Habit. For even as Corporeal Habits consist in the facility that the Spirits have acquired to pass through certain places of our Bodies so the Memory consists in the traces that the same Spirits have impressed on the Brain which are the causes of the facility we have in recalling things again to our Mind That if there were no perceptions that depended upon the Course of the Animal Spirits nor on these traces there would be no difference between the Memory and the other Habits It is not also more difficult to conceive that Beasts although without a Soul and incapable of any perception after their manner remember such things as have made an impression in their Brain then to conceive they are capable of acquiring different Habits See the Explanations upon Memory and Spiritual Hâ—bits And after what I have said of Habits I don't see much more difficulty in representing to our selves how the Members of their Bodies may by degrees acquire different Habits then in conceiving how a Machine first made is not so fitly disposed for Action as after it has been used for some time CHAP. VI. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages ALL the Parts of Living Bodies are in continual Motion both the Solid and Fluid parts the Flesh as well as the Blood there is only this difference between their Motions that that of the parts of the Blood is visible and sensible and that of the Fibres of our Flesh is wholly imperceptible There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits and the substance of the Brain that the Animal Spirits are very much agitated and very fluid and the substance of the Brain hath some Solidity and Consistence so that the Spirits divide themselves into little parts and in a few
of things that we shall afterwards treat of but for what we shall speak of in this Chapter it is necessary that we know there is Natural dispositions in the Brain which incline us to Compassion as well as Imitation We must then consider that not only the Animal Spirits carry themselves Naturally into the parts of our Bodies to cause the same Actions and Motions we see in others but also in some manner to receive their Injuries and to take part in their Miseries for Experience teaches us that when we very attentively consider any one that is rudely hurt or that hath any great wound the Spirits are carried with great force into such parts of our Bodies as answer to those that we see hurt in another Provided that we do not turn the course of the Animal Spirits otherways by an industrious and voluntary titillation of some other part of the body Or except their Natural course to the Heart and Bowels which is wont to happen in sudden Motions draw them along with it self or change that course which we speak of Or lastly except some extraordinary connection with the traâ—â—s of the Brain and Motions of the Spirits produce the same effect The Spirits being thus carried into the parts of the Body which answer to those that we see hurt in oothers make a very sensible Impression in delicate Persons who have a lively Imagination and very tender and soft flesh for they very often feel a kind of trembling in their Legs if they attentively look upon any one that hath an Ulcer or that has actually received some blow there This that one of my Friends writ me an account of confirms my Opinion An Old Man that lived at one of my Sisteâ—s being sick a young Maid Servant of the House held the Candle whilst he was let blood in the Foâ—t and when she saw the Surgeon give the prick with the Lancet she was seized with such an apprehension that she felt so lively a pain in the same place of the Foot for three or four days afterwards that she was forced to keep her Bed all that time The reason of these accidents is that the Spirits forcibly diffusing themselves into those parts of our body which answer to what we see hurt in others being kept more bent they make the Soul more sensible and put it upon its guard to avoid those evils that it sees happen to others This Compassion in the Body produces one in the Mind it excites us to help and assist others because in that we relieve our selves and it also stops our Malice and Cruelty for the horrour of Blood the fear of Death and in a word the sensible impression of Compassion often hinders those from killing of Beasts who even are much perswaded that they are only Machines because the generality of Mankind cannot kill them without hurting themselves by the counterstroke of Compassion What is chiefly to be observed here is that the sensible sight of a wound that any Person receives produces in those that see it another hurt so much the more sensible as the beholder is more weak and delicate because this sensible sight pushes the Animal Spirits with more violence into those parts of the body which answer to what they see hurt and so make a greater Impression in the Fibres of a delicate body than in one that is more strong and robust So Men who are strong and vigorous are not hurt by the sight of a Murder they are not so much inclined to Compassion because this sight offends their Bodies but because it offends their Reason These Persons have no pity for Criminals they are immoveabie and inexorable But Women and Children suffer much Pain by the Wounds they see others receive they have a Mecanical Compassion for the Miserable Nay they cannot see a Dog beat or hear him cry without being disturbed at it As for Infants who are yet in their Mothers Belly the delicacy of the Fibres of their Flesh being infinitely greater than that of Women or Children the Course of the Spirits will produce more considerable changes in them as we shall afterwards observe Let what I have said be look'd upon as a simple Supposition if it is desired yet we must endeavour to comprehend it well if we will distinctly conceive what I would explain in this Chapter For the two Suppositions that I have made are the principles of an infinite Number of things which have been generally believed very hidden and mysterious and which appear impossible to me to be explained without receiving these Suppositions Of which here are some Examples About Seven or Eight years ago I saw in the * An Hospital in France for such as we past Cure III. An Explanation of the generation of Mâ—nstrous Children and of the prâ—pagâ—tion of the Species Incurables a young Man who was born a Fool and his body broken after the same manner as Criminals are broke on the Wheel He had lived near twenty Years in this condition many Persons have seen him and the late Queen-Mother going to visit this Hospital had the Curiosity to see him and to touch the Arms and Legs of this young Man in the same places where they were broke According to the principles that I have established the Cause of this sad Accident was that his Mother who heard a Criminal was to be broken went to see him executed all the blows that this miserable Man received so strongly smote the Imagination of this Mother and by a kind of Counter-blow the render delicate Brain of her * According to the first Supposition Child The Fibres of this Womans Brain were strangely shaken and it may be broke in some places by the impetuous Course of the Animal Spirits caused by the sight of so terrible an Action but she was strong enough to hinder their absolute ruine though on the contrary the Fibres of this Child's Brain being not able to resist the torrent of these Spirits were entirely dissipated and the shock was great enough to make him wholly lose his Wits and this was the reason he came into the World deprived of his Understanding this was likewise the cause that the same parts of his body was broken as those of the Criminal whom his Mother saw executed At the sight of this Execution which was so capable of frighting a Woman the violent course of the Mothers Animal Spirits went impetuously from her Brain to all the parts of her Body which answer'd to those of the Criminal * According to the second Supposition and the same thing passed in the Infant But because the Bones of the Mother were able to resist the Violence of these Spirits they received no hurt Nay it may be she did feel no pain nor the least trembling in her Legs when the Criminal was broken but the rapid stream of the Spirits was capable to separate the soft and tender Bones of the Infant for the Bones are the last parts of the
by some violent passion for then as we have already explain'd this communication charges the conformation of the body of the Child and the Mother is so much the more apt to miscarry of the the Foetus as it has more resemblance to the desired Fruits and as the Spirits find less resistance in the Fibres of the Infants body Now it cannot be deny'd but that God without this Communication was able to have disposed all things in so exact and regular a manner as would have been necesary for the Propagation of the Species for insinite Ages that Mothers should never have Miscarried and even that they should always have had Children of the same bigness of the same Colour and that would have resembled in all things For we must not measure the power of God by our weak Imagination and we know not the Reasons he had in the construction of his work We see every day that without the help of this Communication Plants and Trees produce their kinds regularly enough and that Fowls and many other Animals have no need of it to cherish and bring forth other Animals when they sit upon Eggs of different kinds as when a Hen sits on a Partridges Eggs. For although we may reasonably conclude that the Seeds and Eggs contain in themselves the Plants and Birds which proceeds from 'em and that they may produce the little bodies of these Birds having received their Conformation by the Communication we have spoke of and the Plants theirs by another Equivocal Communication yet we cannot be certain of it But although we cannot discover the reasons why God has made every thing as it is we must not conclude from thence that he could make 'em no otherwise If we consider further that Plants who receive their growth by the action of the Female Plant resemble her much more than those which come from the seed as Tuleps for instance which come from the Root are of the same Colour as the Tulep it self and yet those that proceed from the Seed thereof are almost very different we cannot doubt that if the Communication of the Female Plant with the Fruit is not absolutely necessary to form the same kind yet it is always requisite to make the Fruit intirely like her So that although God foresaw that this Communication of the Mothers Brain with that of the Infants would sometimes destroy the Foetus and produce Monsters because of the Irregularity of the Mothers imagination yet this Communication is so admirable and so necessary for the Reasons before-mentioned and for many others that I could yet add that this knowledge that God had of these inconvencies ought not to have hindred him from executing his design We may say in one sense that God never had a design to make Monsters for it appears evident to me that if God should create one Animal only it would not be Monstrous But designing to produce an admirable work by the most simple ways and unite all these Creatures one to another he foresaw certain effects that would necessarily follow from the Order and Nature of things and this hath not diverted him from his design For although a Monster simply considered be an imperfect work yet when it is joyn'd with the rest of the creatures it does not render the World imperfect We have sufficiently explain'd what power the Imagination of a Mother has over the body of her Child let us now examine the power it hath over its Mind and that way discover the first Irregularities of the Mind and Will of Men in his Original For this is our chief design It is evident that the traces of the Brain are accompanied with Sentiments and Ideas of the Soul IV. An Explanation of some irregularities of the Mind and of the inclinations of the Will and that the emotion of the Animal Spirits have no effect in the Body but what the Motions in the Soul answer to and in a word it is certain that all the Sensations and Passions of the Body are accompany'd with true Sentiments and Passions in the Soul Now according to our first supposition Mothers first communicate the traces of their Brain to their Children and afterwards the Motions of their Animal Spirits and so produce the same passion in the mind of their Children with which they themselves are affected and by consequence they cortupt both their affections and reason in several respects If so many Children are observed to bear upon their Faces the Marks and Traces of the Idea that affected their Mother although the Fibres of the skin make much more resistance against the course of the Spirits than the soft parts of the Brain and thô the Spirits are much more agitated in the Brain than towards the Skin we cannot reasonably doubt but that the Animal Spirits of the Mother produce in the Brain of the Infant many traces by their irregular emotions Now the great traces of the Brain and the emotion of the Spirits which answer to them continuing a long time and sometimes all the life it is certain that as there are few Women who have not some weaknesses and who have not been moved with some Passion during their being with Child it cannot be expected but that there will be very few Children who are not ill inclined to something and who have not some predominant passion We have only too much experience of these things and all the World is sensible that there are whole Families who are afflicted with great weakness of Imagination which they have drawn from their Parents but it is not necessary here to give any particular Examples thereof On the contrary 't is more proper for the consolation of some Persons to assure 'em that those weaknesses of the Parents not being Natural or proper to the Nature of Man the traces and impressions of the Brain which are the cause of them may be effaced by time We may yet add here the Example of King James I. of England of whom Sir Kenelm Digby speaks in his Book which he writ of the Sympathetic Powder He tells us that Mary Stuart being with Child of King James some Scotch Lords entred her Chamber and in her presence killed her Secretary who was an Italian altho' she cast her self before him to hinder them that this Princess received some slight hurts by them and the frights she had made so great an impression in her Imagination that she communicated it to the Child in her Womb So that King James cou'd never endure to see a Naked Sword He says that he himself was a witness of it for when he was Knighted this Prince coming to lay the Sword upon his Shoulder run it strait at his Face and had wounded him if some body had not directed it aright where it ought to be There are so many instances of the like Nature that 't would be needless to search Authors for them I believe there is no body that will dispute these things for we see a
all those that 〈…〉 had whilst in the Womb. For since it every day 〈◊〉 that a great pain causes us to forget those that 〈…〉 it is not possible but that such lively 〈…〉 Children receive the first time the impression of 〈◊〉 is made upon the delicate organs of their 〈…〉 efface the greatest part of the traces that they haâ—â— received from the same objects only by a kind of 〈◊〉 stroke when they were as it were covered in their Mothers ' Womb. Yet when these traces are formed by a strong passion and accompanied with a violent agitation of the Blood and Spirits in the Mother they act with so much force on the Child's Brain and on the rest of its body that they imprint there Traces as deep and lasting as Natural ones As in the Example of Sir Kenelm Digby in the Child that became a Fool and all broken in the Brain and all the Members in which the Imagination of the Mother had produced such great disorders and likewise in the example of the general corruption of Man's Fature Nor is it to be wondered if the Children of King James had not the same weakness as their Father First because these sort of Traces are never imprinted so far into the rest of the Body as the Natural ones are Secondly because the Mother not having the same weakness with the Father she hinder'd its happening through the goodness of her Constitution and because the Mother acts insinitely more upon the Brain than the Father does as is evident by what has been already said But it must be observed that all these reasons which prove that the Children of King James cou'd not participate of the weakness of their Father prove nothing against the Explanation of Original Sin or this powerful Inclination for Sensible Things nor this great distance from God which we hold from our first Parents because the Traces that sensible Objects have imprinted in the Brain of the first Man were very deep and were accompanied and augmented with violent Passions and fortified by the continual use of sensible Things and such as were necessary to the preservation of life not only in Adam and Eve but also which must be well observed in the greatest Saints in all Men and all Women from whom we descend so that there is nothing which can put a stop to this corruption of Nature So far are these Traces of our first Fathers from being effaced by little and little that on the contrary they are augmented daily and without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST which continually opposes this torrent what this Heathen Poet has said wou'd be absolutely true Aetas Parentum pejor avis tulit Nos nequiores mox daturos Progeniem vitiosiorem For it must be well observed that those impressions that stir up Sentiments of Piety in the most Devout Mothers do not communicare it to their unborn Infants and that on the contrary the Traces which excite the Idea of sensible Things and which are followed lowed with Passions fail not to communicate to the Infants the Sensation and Love of Sensible Things A Mother for Instance who is excited to love God by the Motion of the Spirits which accompany the Trace of the Image of a venerable Old Man because this Mother has united the Idea of God to this Trace of the Old Man for as we shall soon see in the Chapter of the connexion of Idea's that it may easily be done altho' there is no relation between God and the Image of an Old Man This Mother I say can only produce in the Brain of her Child the Trace of an Old Man and an inclination for Old Men which is not the love of God wherewith she was affected For indeed there is no Traces in the Brain which can of themselves stir up any other Idea's than those of Sensible Things because the Body is not made to Instruct the Mind and speaks not to the Soul as to it self Thus a Mother whose Brain is filled with Traces which by their nature relate to sensible things and which she cannot efface since concupiscence still remains in her because her Body is not brought under subjection necessarily communicates them to her Child and begets it a sinner altho' she be righteous This Mother is righteous because actually loving or having loved God by a love of choice this concupiscence makes her no longer criminal altho' she shou'd follow the Motions thereof in her sleep But the Child she begets not loving God by a love of choice and its heart not being turned towards God it is evident that it is subject to disorder and irregularity and that there is nothing in it which deserves not the wrath of God But when they are regenerated by Baptism and have been justified either by a disposition of heart like to that which remains in righteous Persons during the illusions of the Night or it may be by a free act of love to God as they have made being delivered some moments from the dominion of the Body through the power of this Sacrament for as God hath made them to love him we cannot conceive that they are actually in the righteousness and order of God if they love him not or have not loved him or at least if their heart is not disposed after the same manner as it wou'd be if they actually loved him Then altho' they submit to concupiscence during their Infancy their concupiscence is no longer Sin it makes them no longer guilty and worthy of wrath they cease not to be righteous and agreeable to God by the same reason as we do not lose Grace altho' in our sleep we shou'd follow the Motions of concupiscence for the Brain of Infants is so soft and they receive so lively and strong impressions of the weakest Objects as they have not sufficient freedom of Mind to resist them But I stay too long upon these things which do not absolutely belong to the subject I treat of 'T is enough that I may conclude here from what I have explained in this Chapter that all these false Traces See the Explanations that Mothers imprint in the Brain of their Children make their Minds false and corrupt their Imagination and that thus the generality of Men are subject to imagine things otherwise than they are in giving some false colour or irregular draught to the Idea's of those things they perceive CHAP. VIII I. The changes that happen to the Imagination of a Child after it is Born by the Conversation it has with its Nurse its Mother and other Persons II. Advice how to Educate it well IN the precedent Chapter we have consider'd the Brain of an Infant whilest in the Womb let us now examine what happens to it as soon as it is Born In the same time that it quits Darkness and first sees Light the cold of the outward Air seizes it the tenderest embraces of the Woman that receives it offends its delicate Members all external Objects
by Conversion to the Phantasmes or Traces of the Brain So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move the Arm is moved tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move and so soon as the Animal Spirits are agitated the Soul finds it self mov'd tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body When I come to treat of the Passions I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain and the Motions of the Spirits and of that between the Idea's and Emotions of the Soul for that all the Passions depend upon it My business here is only to treat of the affinity between Idea's and Traces and the Connexion of the Traces one with another There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces Three considerable Causes of the union between the Idea's and Traces the first and most general is the Identity of Time For frequently it suffices that we had certain Thoughts at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain so that those Traces cannot be produced again without renewing the same Thoughts If the Idea of God present it self to my Mind at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters Iah or with the sound of the Word it self 't is enough if the Traces which those Characters have produc'd be excited to make me think of God And I cannot think of God but there will be produc'd in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters or Sounds which accompany'd the Thought which I had of God for the Brain being never without Phantasmes there are always such as have some Relation to what we think tho' many times these Phantasmes are very imperfect and very confus'd The second Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces and which always supposes the first is the Will of Man This Will 〈◊〉 necessary that this connexion of the Idea's with the Traces may be regulated and proper for Use For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination to agree between themselves to affix their Idea's to Sensible Signs not only this Connexion of Idea's wou'd be absolutely unprofitable for Society but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect First because Idea's are never strongly united with the Traces but when the Spirits being agitated they render those Traces deep and durable So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions if Men had no such Union to communicate their Sentiments and participate of those of others 't is evident that the exact Union of their Idea's with certain Traces would be very weak because they do not subject themselves to those Exact and Regular Connexions but to render themselves Intelligible Secondly the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Idea's with the same Traces being necessary to form a Connexion that may be of long continuance since the meeting unless it be accompany'd with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits suffices not to make strong Connexions 't is clear that if Men should refuse to assent it would be the greatest Chance in the World if the same Traces and Idea's should meet together so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Idea's with the same Traces tho' this Will of Agreement be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason as an Impression of the Author of Nature who has made us altogether one for another and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind as well as in Body The third Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces is the Constant and Immutable Nature or Will of the Creator For example There is a Natural Connexion and which depends not upon our Will between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or Mountain which we behold and the Idea's of a Tree or Mountain between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast that suffer Pain beget in our Brain the Air of one who threatens us or of whom we stand in fear and the Idea's of Grief of Strength or Weakness as also between the Sentiments of Compassion of Fear and Courage which are excitedin us These Natural Bands are the strongest of all they are generally alike in all Men and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will for if the Band or Connexion of Idea's with certain Sounds and Characters be but feeble and very different in several Countries 't is because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it is because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life but only for living like Men that are to form among themselves a Rational Society Here we must observe that the Connexion of Idea's that represent to us Spiritual Things and such as are distinct from us with the Traces of our Brain is not nor can be Natural and by consequence it is or may be different in all Men for that it has no other Cause than their Will and the Identity of Time of which I have spoken before On the other side the Connexion of the Idea's of all Material Things with certain particular Traces is Natural and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square upon the sight of a Square because that Connexion is Natural but 't is to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea when they hear the Word Square pronounced because that Connexion is entirely voluntary The same thing may also be thought of all Traces that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things But because the Traces which have a Natural Connexion with Idea's do affect the Mind and consequently render it attentive the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths that is the mutual Relations that are between Bodies On the other side because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what is voluntary do never vigorously strike the Mind 't is not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths that is the mutual Relations between things that fall not under the Imagination But when these Relations are never so little compounded they appear absolutely Incomprehensible especially to those that are not accustomed to them in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of those abstracted Idea's with their Traces by continual Meditation and tho' others have perfectly comprehended them they forget them in a short time because this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one It is so true that all the trouble Men have to comprehend and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Connexion of their Idea's
body may be an Eye-witness of their Error But when Cato assures us that they who struck him never hurt him he asserts it or may assert it with so much Confidence and Gravity that a Man may justly question whether he be really the same as he appears to be And we may be inclin'd to think that his Soul is not to be shaken because his Body seems to be immovable For the outward Air of the Body is generally a mark of the inward disposition of the Mind So that a daring and undaunted Lyar perswades us sometimes to believe things incredible because their talking with so much Confidence is a Proof that affects the Senses and therefore a most effectual Argument that strongly convinces the generality of People Few there are therefore who look upon the Stoicks as Visionaries or as Audacious Lyars because we have no sensible Proof of that which lies reserv'd in their Breast and because the Air of the Face is a most sensible Proof that easily imposes upon us besides that our innate Vanity readily induces us to believe that Man is capable of that Grandeur and Independency to which he pretends Hence it is apparent that those Errors which abound in Seneca's Writings are of all others the most Pernicious and Contagious because they are a sort of Delicate Insinuating Errors proportion'd to the Vanity of Mankind and like to that wherein the Devil engag'd our first Parents They are likewise array'd with those Pompous and Magnificent Ornaments which make way for 'em into most Mens Minds They enter take possession stupifie and captivate 'em not with a Blindness that inclines those miserable Mortals to Humility a sensibleness of their own Ignorance and an acknowledgment of it before others but with a Haughty dazling Blindness and a Blindness accompanied with some false Glimmerings And when once Men are smitten with this blindness of Pride they presently rank themselves in the number of fine and great Wits Others also reckon 'em in the same Order and admire ' em So that there is nothing that can be thought more Contagious than this Blindness because the Vanity and Sensuality of Men the Corruption of their Senses and Passions dispose them to be known thereby and puts 'em also upon infecting others with it I believe then there is no Author more proper than Seneca to demonstrate how contagious the Imagination of some Men is who are call'd fine and great Wits and what a Command strong and vigorous Imaginations have over Weak and more Illiterate People not by the strength or evidence of their Arguments which are the productions of Wit but by a certain turn and liveliness of Expression which depends upon the Force of Imagination I know well that this Author is highly esteem'd in the World and that I shall be accus'd of more than ordinary rashness for having spoken of him as of a Man that had a Strong Imagination but little Judgment But it was chiefly by reason of this Esteem that I undertook to speak of him not out of Envy or any Morose Humour but because his great Reputation will excite many to consider more attentively those Errors of his which I have hinted We ought as much as in us lies to produce famous Examples for the confirmation of things that we assert when they are of Consequence and he that Criticizes upon a Book sometimes does it an honour However it be if I find fault with any thing in Seneca's Writings I am not single in that Opinion For not to speak of some Illustrious Persons in this Age 't is about 1600 years ago that a certain Judicious Author observ'd 1. In Philosophia parum diligens 2. Velles eum dixisse suo ingenio alieno judicio 3. Si aliqua Contempsisset c. consensu potius Eruditorum quam puerorum amore comprobaretur Quintil. l. 10. c. 1. 1. That there was little Exactness in his Philosophy 2. Little Judgment or Exactness in his Elocution 3. That his Reputation was more grounded upon the Imprudent Heat of Young Men than confirm'd by the consent of the Wise and Learned 'T is in vain to Encounter palpable Errors with Publick Writings because they are not Contagious 'T is ridiculous to admonish Men that Hypochondraical Persons are in some measure mad they know it well enough But if they for whom they have a high value mistake 't is necessary to bid 'em have a care of such for fear lest they adhere to their Errors Now it is manifest that Seneca's Spirit is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity Therefore since Pride according to the Scripture is the Original of Sin Initium peccati Superbia the Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the Gospel Nor can his Morals have any alliance with Christian Morals which are only true and solid 'T is certain that all Seneca's thoughts are neither false nor dangerous They who being endu'd with a found Wit have attain'd the Doctrine of Christian Morals may read him to good advantage Great Men have made a profitable use of him neither is it my intention to blame those who being willing to comply with the weakness of other Men who had so high an esteem for him have drawn Arguments from the Writings of that Author to defend the Morals of Jesus Christ and to engage the Enemies of the Gospel with their own Weapons There are some good things in the Alcoran and we find some true Prophecies in the Centuries of Nostra Damus We make use of the Alcoran to confound the Religion of the Turks and the Prophecies of Nestra Damus may be serviceable to convince some Whimsical Persons But it does not follow because there is something good in the Alcoran that the Alcoran is to be call'd a good Book as some true Explanations of Nostra Damus's Centuries will not make Nostra Damus a Right Prophet and they who make use of these Books to the ends aforesaid cannot be said to have a real Esteem for ' em It would be in vain for any Man to oppose what I have said concerning Seneca by bringing a great number of Passages out of that Author conformable to the solid Truths of the Gospel I agree that there are some such as there are also in the Alcoran and in other Impious Books And they would do me wrong to overwhelm me with the Authority of an infinite number of People that have made use of Seneca because we may sometimes make use of a Book which we believe to be impertinent provided they with whom we have to deal have not the same Opinion of the Author as we have To ruine all the Philosophy of the Stoicks there needs but only one thing sufficiently prov'd by Experience as also by what we have already said That we should be bound to our Body our Parents our Friends our Prince our Country by those ties that we neither can and which it would be a shame for us to endeavour to break Our Soul is united to our Body
among Men not only in what concerns the Nature of the Mind but in every thing else For since there is an Essential Difference between Knowing and Doubting if the Academics speak what they think when they assure us they know nothing we may justly say they are the most ignorant of all Men. Nor are they only the most ignorant of all Men but they are also the most obstinate Assertors of the most Irrational Opinions For they not only reject whatever is most certain and most universally received that they may be accounted great Wits but by the same violence of the Imagination they please themselves with talking after a decisive manner of the most uncertain and improbable things Montagne apparently labours under this Distemper and therefore of necessity we must conclude that he was not only ignorant of the Nature of Mans Mind but also that he was intangled in many gross Errors in reference to that Subject granting that he spoke what he thought as it became him to do For what may we say of a Man who confounds Mind and Matter together who recites the most extravagant Opinions of the Philosophers upon the anture of the Soul yet so far from condemning 'em that he rather approves 'em though most repugnant to Reason who sees not the Necessity of the Immortality of our Souls who believes that Human Reason is not capable of understanding it â— 2. c. 12. and looks upon all the Prooss that are brought to confirm it as so many ' Dreams which the desire of Immortality produces in us Somnia non decentis sed optantis who is angry with Men because they separate themselves from the Croud of other Creatures and distinguish themselves from Beasts which he calls our Fellow Brethren and our Companions and which as he believes discourse together understand one another and laugh at us as we speak understand each other and deride them who believes there is a greater difference between a Man and a Man than between a Man and a Beast and who attributes even to Spiders Deliberation Thought and Conclusion and who after he has asserted that the Frame of Mans Body has no advantage over that of Beasts willingly embraces the following Sentiment That it is not Reason nor Ratiocination nor the Soul that renders Mâ—n more Excellent than Beasts but our Beauty our Complexion and the Structure of our Limbs above which Prerogatives we ought not to prefer our Vnderstanding our Prudence and other Vertues c. Can a Man who relying upon these Whimsical Opinions conclude That 't is not for his Ratiocination but his Pride and Obstinacy that Man Extolls himself above Beasts Can such a Man I say have an exact knowledge of the Mind of Man or is it to be thought that he can persuade others he has it But we must do Justice to all the World and give a faithful Character of Montegne's Parts He had a bad Memory and a worse Judgment 't is true but those two Qualities together do not compose that which usually the World calls the Beauty of the Mind 'T is the Elegancy the Vivacity the Extention of the Imagination that procures a Man the Reputation of being a good Wit The Common sort of People admire that which glitters not that which is solid because they have a greater value for that which affects their Senses than for that which informs their Reason And therefore mistaking Elegancy of Imagination for Elegancy of Wit it may be said that Montagne had an Elegant and Extraordinary Wit His Idea's are false but splendid his Expressions irregular or bold but pleasant his Discourses ill supported by Reason but well imagin'd There is throughout his Book a Character of an Original which pleases infinitely Though he be an Usurper of others Mens Draughts it may be said that his Bold and Strong Imagination gives the Turn of an Original to every thing he Copies Lastly he has all those things ready at hand which are necessary to please and allure nor have I obscurely demonstrated as I am apt to believe that he has acquir'd Admiration among so many Men not by convincing their Reason by Evident Arguments but by subduing their Minds by the Commanding and Victorious power of his Imagination CHAP. VI. I. Of Imaginary Wizards and Lycanthropi or Wolf-Men II. A Conclusion of the Two First Books THere is nothing wherein the force of the Imagination more prodigiously shews it self than in the hideous number of Goblines Apparitions Witchcrafts Characters Inchantments Charms and generally of all those things which are thought to depend upon the Power of the Devil There is nothing more terrible or formidable to the Mind or which produces in the Brain deeper Traces than the Idea of an Invisible Power which we are not able to resist and which meditates nothing but to do us Mischief All Discourses which revive that Idea are listen'd to with Fear and Curiosity Men adhering to every thing that is extraordinary take a Phantastic delight to tell surprizing and prodigious Stories of the Power and Malice of Wizards as well to frighten others as to terrifie themselves So that 't is no wonder that Wizards are so common in some Countreys where the Belief of those Nocturnal Meetings of Wizards called Sabbaths has too much prevail'd where all the most extravagant Tales of Witchcrafts are heard as so many Authentic Histories and where real Madmen and Visionaries whose Imagination was at first disordered as well by the rehearsal of such Tales as by the Corruption of their own Hearts are burnt for Wizards I know that many People will blame me for attributing the greatest part of Witchcrafts to the force of Imagination because there are some Men who delight in terrifying things and are angry with those that go about to disabuse 'em and who are like those that are sick through the power of Imagination who listen most awfully to their Physicians that foretell some dismal thing that is to befall 'em and obey their Prescriptions exactly Superstition is not easily destroy'd and when ever it is attacqued it finds a great number of Champions and this same proneness to believe all the Dotages of Daemonographers is produc'd and cherish'd by the same cause that renders the Superstitious obstinate as may be easily prov'd However it will not be amiss to set down in few Words how in my Judgment such Opinions as these came to get footing in the World A Shepherd in his Cottage after Supper tells his Wife and Children what was done at the Convention of Wizards called the Sabbat Now when his Imagination comes to be heated by the Vapours of the Wine and that he begins to believe himself to have been present at that Imaginary Assembly he fails not to speak of it after a strong and vigorous manner His Natural Eloquence together with the Proneness of his Family to give Ear to so new and terrible a Story could not but produce strange Traces in their weak Imaginations Nor is it otherwise
Fruitful and Inexhaustible Sources of our Errors and Illusions but the Mind acting of it self is not so subject to Error We were troubled to finish the two preceding Treatises and we are uneasie to begin this it is not because the Nature or Properties of the Mind is a barren Subject but because we enquire not so much here into its Properties as Weaknesses Let no one be Surprised if this Treatise is not so large nor discovers so many Errors as the preceding Books nor let any one complain if the Subject is a little dry abâ—â—râ—cted and difficult The Senses and Imagination â—â—â—â—ot always be moved nor is it necessary they should When a Subject is abstracted he that would renâ—â—â— it Sensible will obscure it it 's enough to make it Intelligible There is nothing so Unjust as the common Complaints of those who would know every thing but would apply their Mind to nothing they are angry if we desire them to become Attentive they would always have us Affect and Flatter their Senses and Passions But why We know we cannot satisfie them Those who make Romances and Comedies are oblig'd to please and captivate the Attention 't is enough for us to instruct those who endeavour to become Attentive The Errors of the Senses and Imagination depend upon the Nature and Constitution of the Body and are discover'd by considering the Power they have over the Soul but the Errors of the Pure Understanding cannot be discover'd but by considering the Nature of the Mind it self and of the Idea's which are necessary to it in order to know Objects So that to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors of the Pure Understanding it will be necessary for us to insist in this Book upon the Consideration of the Nature of the Mind and of Intellectual Idea's We shall first speak of the Mind as it is in it self and without any relation to the Body to which it is united So that what we shall say of it might be said of Pure Intelligences â—nd with greater Reason because we here call it the Pure Understanding By the word Pure Vnderstanding we pretend not to design that Faculty which the Mind has of knowing Objects without us without framing Corporeal Images of them in the Brain to represent them We shall afterwards treat of Intellectual Idea's by whose means the Pure Understanding perceives Objects without us I do not believe that after having thought Seriously I. Thought only is Essential to the Mind To Think and Imagine are only its Modifications we can doubt that the Essence of the Mind consists only in Thought even as the Essence of Matter consists in Extension And that according to the different Modifications of Thinking the Mind can now Will then Imagine and lastly Participate of many other particular Forms so that according to the different Modifications of Extension Matter is now Water then Fire and is capable of infinite other particular Forms By the word Thought By the Essence of a thing I understand that which is first conceived in a thing upon which all the Modifications observed in that thing depend I do not here understand particular Modifications of the Soul that is Such or such a Thought but a Thought that is capable of all kinds of Modifications or Thoughts even as by Extension I do not understand such or such a sort of Extension as Round Square c. but an Extension capable of all sorts of Modifications or Figures And there was no need of this Comparison but because we have not so clear an Idea of Thought as of Extension for Thought is only known by an interior Sentiment or by Conscience as shall hereafter be explained I do not believe it possible * Second Part of the Pure Mind Chap. 7. to conceive a Mind which cannot Think although it 's easie to conceive one which neither Thinks Imagines nor Wills even as it 's impossible to conceive Matter that is not extended though one may easily conceive it to be neither Earth Metal Square Round and even without Motion Hence we may conclude That as there may be Matter which is neither Earth Metal Square Round or without Motion so there may also be a Mind which is neither Sensible of Heat or Cold which neither Rejoyces is Sad Imagines or Wills any thing So that all these Modifications are not Essential to it Thought only is of the Essence of the Mind as Extension only is of the Essence of Matter But even as if Matter or Extension were without Motion it would be wholly useless and incapable of this Variety of Forms for which it was design'd And as it would be impossible to conceive an Intelligent Being to Will such a Creation that is Matter without Motion or incapable of Form so if the Mind or Thought were without Will it 's evident that it would be wholly useless since it would be sometimes carried towards the Objects of its Perceptions and would not love the Good for which it was made so that it is impossible to conceive that an Intelligent Being would create it in this Estate Nevertheless as Motion is not Essential to Matter as Extension is so to Will is not Essential to the Mind since Willing supposes Perception Therefore Thought only is properly Constitutive of the Essence of the Mind and the different Manners of Thinking as Perceiving and Imagining are only the Modifications of which it is capable and with which it is not always modified But to Will is a Property which always accompanies it whether it be united to or separated from the Body which nevertheless is not Essential to it since it supposes Thought and we may conceive a Mind without Will even as a Body without Motion The Power of Willing is always Inseparable from the Mind although it is not Essential to it for even as it is impossible to conceive Matter that cannot be moved so it is impossible to conceive a Mind which cannot Will or which is incapable of any Natural Inclination but as we conceive Matter can exist without Motion so we can conceive a Mind to exist without any Impression from the Author of Nature towards Good and consequently without Will for the Will is nothing else but an Impression of the Author of Nature II. We do not know all the Modifications of which our Soul is capable which carries us towards Good in general as we have more largely explain'd in the first Chapter of the Treatise upon the Senses What we said before in the Treatise upon the Senses and what we have just now said of the Nature of the Mind does not suppose that we know all the Modifications whereof it is capable we do not suppose such things but rather believe that there is in the Mind of Man a Capacity of receiving Successively an infinite Number of different Modifications which the Mind it self is Ignorant of The least Portion of Matter can receive a Figure of three six ten or Ten
Odours Sapours Sounds Colours c. the greatest part of Men do not think them to be Modifications of the Soul but on the contrary that they are dispersed upon Objects or at least they are in the Soul as the Idea of a Square or Circle that is They are united to the Soul but are not Modifications thereof They judge thus of them because they are not more affected by them as was shown in the Explanation of the Errors of the Senses We must therefore agree that we know not all the Modifications whereof our Soul is capable and besides those which it has by the Organs of the Senses it may have innumerable more which it has not yet try'd nor shall know till it be deliver'd from the Prison of its Body However we must confess that even as Matter is capable of infinite Configurations because of its Extension so it 's visible that the Soul would not be incapable of the Modifications of Pleasure Pain nor even of all others which are indifferent to it if it were incapable of Perception or Thought It is sufficient therefore to know that the Principle of all these Modifications is Thought and if any one will have it that there is any thing in the Soul antecedent to Thought I shall not dispute it but as I am certain that no one has any knowledge of his Soul but by Thought or by an internal Sentiment of whatever passes in his Mind so I am also assur'd that if any one will reason upon the Nature of the Soul he must consult this internal Sentiment which will always represent him to himself such as he is and he must not imagin against his own Conscience that the Soul is an invisible Fire a subtil Air a Harmony or other like thing CHAP. II. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing that relates to Infinity II. Its limitation is the Original of many Errors III. And chiefly of Heresies IV. We must submit our Minds to Faith WE discover at first sight I. The mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing which relates to infinity that the Human Mind is very much limited from whence two very important Consequences may be drawn The first That the Soul can have no perfect Knowledge of Infinity The second That it can't know distinctly many things at the same time For as a piece of Wax is not capable of having many different Figures at the same time so neither is the Soul capable of having the knowledge of many things at the same time Likewise a piece of Wax cannot be Square and Round at the same time but only part Square and part Round and so many more different Figures it shall have they will be so much the less perfect and distinct Thus the Soul cannot perceive many things at once and its Thoughts are so much the more confused as they are greater in Number If a piece of Wax should have a Thousand Sides and in each Side a different Figure it would be neither Square Round nor Oval and we could not say of what Figure it would be so it happens sometimes that we have so great a number of different Thoughts that we imagin we think nothing at all as happens to those that are in a Swound The Animal Spirits turning irregularly in the Brain stirs up so great a number of Traces that they do not sufficiently open any one of 'em to excite a particular or distinct Idea in the Mind so that these persons perceive so great a number things at once that they perceive nothing distinct which induces them to think they have perceived nothing at all There are some who sometimes Swound away for want of Animal Spirits but then the Soul having only thoughts of pure Intellection which leave no Traces in the Brain they remember nothing when they come to themselves again which makes them believe they thought of nothing I have said this by the by to shew those are mistaken who believe the Soul does not think always because it sometimes imagins that it thinks on nothing Every one that does but reflect a little upon their own Thoughts II. The limitation of the mind is the Original of many Errors have experience enough that the Mind cannot apply it self to many things at the same time and much more that it cannot penetrate into Infinity Yet I know not by what Caprice some persons who are not ignorant of this busie themselves more about the study of infinite Objects and such Questions as require an infinite Capacity of the Mind than about what better suits the Capacity of their own Minds and also why there are a great number of others that are desirous to know every thing and apply themselves to so many Sciences in the same time that it confounds them and makes them uncapable of knowing any Science truly How many Men are there who would comprehend the infinite Divisibility of Matter and how a little Grain of Sand contains as many parts as the whole World although much less in proportion How many Questions are formed upon these Subjects which are never resolved and upon many others which include any thing of Infinity which yet they would find a Solution of in their own Minds They apply themselves to it with all possible Attention But at last all they gain is this they are prejudic'd with some Extravagance and Error Is it not a pleasant thing to see some Men who deny the infinite Divisibility of Matter from hence only because they cannot comprehend it Although they very well comprehend the demonstrations that prove it and at the same time confess that the Human Mind cannot comprehend Infinity The Proofs which are brought for the infinite Divisibility of Matter are as Demonstrative as any thing else in Nature and these Men confess it when they seriously consider them however if we propose to them such Objections as they cannot Solve their Mind leaves that Evidence which just before they perceived and they begin to doubt of it they are strongly possest with the Objection they cannot Resolve and invent some frivolous distinction against the demonstrations of the Infinite Divisibility of Matter and at last they conclude they were deceiv'd as also the World with them and so embrace the contrary Opinion This they defend with Chimerical Atoms and other like Absurdities with which the Imagination always furnishes them Now the Original of all their Errors is this they are not inwardly convinc'd that the Mind of Man is Finite and that to be perswaded of the infinite Divisibility of Matter it is not necessary to Comprehend it because all Objections that cannot be resolv'd without Comprehending it are Objections which its impossible to Resolve If Mens Curiosity would be terminated by Questions of this Nature we should have no great reason to be concern'd for if some Men were prepossessed with such Errors they are Errors of little Consequence As for others they have not wholly lost their time in thinking of
asleep sees any terrible Animal before his Eyes it is certain that the Idea of this Animal truly Exists and yet this Mountain of Gold and this Animal never were However Men being Naturally inclined to believe that there is none but Corporeal Objects which Exist they Judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite after another manner than they ought to do for as soon as they are sensible of any Object they will certainly have it that this Object Exists although it often happens that there is nothing without And further they affirm that this Object is exactly the same as they see it which never happens But in respect to the Idea which necessarily Exists and which can be nothing else besides what it appears to be they without any reflection commonly Judge it to be nothing as if Idea's had not a very great number of Properties As if the Idea's of a Square for instance was not very different from that of some number and did not represent things perfectly distinct which could never happen to nothing since nothing has no Propriety It is therefore indisputable that Idea's have a real Existence But let us examine their Nature and Essence and see what it can be in the Soul that is capable of representing all things Whatever things the Soul perceives are either in or out of its self those which are in the Soul are its own thoughts that is all its different Modifications for by these words Thought manner of Thinking or modification of the Soul I understand in general all things that can be in the Soul without her perceiving them as her own Sensations Imaginations pure Intellections or simple Conceptions even her Passions and Natural Inclinations Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things because they are within the Soul or rather the Soul it self after such or such a manner Even as the real roundness of some Body and its Motion are only this Body Figured and moved after such or such a manner But as for things that are out of the Soul we can perceive them only by the means of Idea's supposing that these things cannot be intimately united to it There are two sorts of them Spiritual and Material As for the Spiritual there is some probability that they may discover themselves to the Soul without Idea's and by themselves For although Experience teaches us that we cannot immediately and of our selves declare our Thoughts to one another but only by words or some other sensible Sign to which we have assixed our Idea's We may say that God has ordained it so only during this Life to hinder those Disorders that would soon happen if Men could make themselves be understood as they pleased But when Justice and Order shall Reign and we shall be delivered from the Captivity of our Bodies we shall perhaps make our selves mutually understood by an intimate Union of our selves as its probable the Angels do in Heaven so that it does not seem absolutely necessary to admit Idea's to represent spiritual things to the Soul because it may be we may see them by themselves although after a very imperfect manner I examine not here how two Spirits can be united one to the other and if they can after this manner mutually discover one anothers Thoughts I believe however that there is no Substance purely intelligible but that of God nothing can be evidently known but in his Light and that the Vnion of Spirits cannot make them Visible For although we are most strictly united to our selves we are and shall be unintelligible to our selves until we see our selves in God and that he represents to us the perfect intelligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his So that although I may seem here to grant that Angels can manifest one to another what they are and what they think 't is only because I will not dispute of it provided I am granted what is not to be doubted viz. That we cannot see material things by themselves and without Idea's I shall explain in the Seventh Chapter my Opinion how we know Spirits and will shew that at present we cannot absolutely know them by themselves although it may be they are united to us But I speak here chiesly of material things which certainly cannot be united to the Soul in such a manner as is necessary for us to perceive them Because being extended and the Soul not there is no proportion between them Besides our Souls go not out of our Bodies to measure the greatness of the Heaven and consequently they cannot see External Bodies but by the Idea's which represent them This is what all the World ought to grant We are assured then II. A division of the several ways whereby External Objects may be seen that it 's absolutely necessary that the Idea's we have of Bodies and of all other Objects which we perceive not by themselves proceed from these Bodies or these Objects or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's or that God Created them with our Souls or that he produces them every time that we think of any Object or else that the Soul has all those Perfections in it self that it sees in these Bodies Or in fine that it is united with a perfect Being which in general includes all the Perfections of Created Beings We cannot see Objects but after one of these ways Let us examin without prejudice and without frighting our selves with the difficulty of the Question which of them seems most probable It may be we may resolve it very clearly although we do not pretend here to give such Demonstrations as will satisfie all sorts of persons but only convincing Proofs to those at least as will meditate with serious Attention upon them for perhaps it would be thought too rash if we should pretend otherwise CHAP. II. That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them THe most common received Opinion is that of the Peripateticks who think that External Objects emit Species which resemble them and that those Species are carried by the External Senses to the Common Sense or Understanding They call these Species impressed because the Object imprints them on the External Senses These impressed Species being Material and Sensible are render'd intelligible by means of the active or active intellect and are fit to be received in the passive intellect These Species thus spiritualiz'd are called express'd Species because they are express'd by the impress'd ones and 't is by them that the Passive Intellect knows all material things We shall not stay to explain at large these sine things and the divers manners in which different Philosophers conceive them for although they do not agree as to the number of Faculties which they attribute to the Interior Sense and the Understanding and though there are not a few who doubt whether they have need of any active Intellect to know sensible Objects yet however they generally agree
times in a day almost all conclude that the Will which accompanies the production or rather the presence of Idea's is truly the Cause of them Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to and they imagin the Idea's no longer Exist when the Mind sees them no longer and that they revive again anew when they are again represented to the Mind 'T is for these Reasons some Judge that External Objects emit Images which resemble them as we have mention'd in the precedent Chapter For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves but only by their Idea's they judge the Object produces the Idea because as soon as it is present they see it and as soon as absent they see it no longer and because the presence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this that the Idea's of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them they should only conclude that according to the Order of Nature their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea's Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind and much less that the Will produces them from nothing or after the manner they explain it Nor ought they to conclude that Objects emit Species resembling them because the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present but only that the Object is for the most part necessary in order to the Idea's being present to the Mind And lastly that a Bowl put into Motion is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way since the first had not the power of Motion in its self They can only determin that the meeting of two Bowls is an occasion to the Author of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will which is the Universal Cause of all things See Ch. 3. Of the Second Part of Method in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first that is to speak more clearly in willing that the last should acquire so much more Motion as the first lost for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them as we shall shew elsewhere CHAP. IV. That we do not see Objects by the Means of Idea's which were created with us And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them THE Third Opinion is That of those who say all Idea's are created with us To discover the Improbability of this Opinion it will be necessary to consider that there is many different things in the World of which we have Idea's But to speak only of simple Figures it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite Nay even if we consider but one only as the Ellipsis we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of different Kinds of them when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity and the other always continue the same So the heighth of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely the base being always the same we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them And also which I desire may be consider'd here The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number although we can imagine but very few of them and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of different Kinds But what must chiefly be observed is That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of different Kinds is sufficient to prove That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea's And in short If we comprehend not their Infinity 't is not the Defect of the Idea's or that Infinity is not represented to us but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind If a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles although he should eternally continue this sort of Study he would never want new and particular Idea's but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued What I have said of Triangles may be applied to five six a hundred a thousand or ten thousand sided Figures and so on ad infinitum Now if the sides of a Triangle which have infinite relations one with the other make Triangles of infinite Kinds it is plain that four five or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides than simple Triangles are The Mind then sees all these things it hath Idea's of them and these Idea's would never fail it although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden or comprehended not their Infinity 't is only because its Extension is very much limited It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's Do I say an infinite Number It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's as there are different Figures to be consider'd So that since there is an infinite Number of different Figures it 's necessary that to know the Figures the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's Now I ask If it 's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man For my part it does not appear so to me chiefly since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner as we shall soon see For as God always acts by the most simple ways it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects by admitting the Creation of an infinite Number of Beings since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's which are necessary for it to see things it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them For instance how it can represent the Sun to it self whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain resembles not the Idea we have thereof as has been elsewhere proved and since the Soul perceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes and in the Brain it 's inconceivable how it should exactly guess amongst these infinite Number of Idea's that it has which it must represent to it self to imagine or to see the Sun We cannot therefore say That the Idea's of things were created with us it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment as we perceive different things this has been sufficiently refuted from what has been said in this
Order is a Law I mean that they know the Eternal Laws How we must love Good and fly from Evil That we must love Justice more than all Riches That it is better to Obey God than to Command Men and many other Natural Laws For the knowledge of all those Laws is not different from the knowledge of that Impression which they always feel in themselves though they do not always follow it by the free choice of their Will which they know to be Common to all Spirits though it is not equally strong in all It is by that Dependance Relation and Union of our Mind to the Word of God and of our Will to his Love that we are made after the Image and Likeness of God And although this may be very much defac'd by Sin yet it is necessary that it should subsist as long as we do But if we bear the Image of the Word humbled upon Earth and if we follow the Motions of the Holy Ghost that Primitive Image of our first Creation that Union of our Mind with the Word of the Father and to the Love of the Father and of the Son will be re-established and render'd indelible We shall be like God if we are like the Man God In fine God will be all in us and we all in God in a far more perfect manner than that by which it is necessary for us to subsist that we should be in him and he in us Here are some reasons which may perswade us See the Explanations that Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Presence of him who Comprehends all in the Simplicity of his Being Every one will Judge of it according to the Internal Conviction he shall receive of it after having seriously consider'd it But 't is thought that there will be no probability in all the other ways of explaining these things and that this last will appear more than probable Thus our Souls depend on God in all respects For as it is he who makes them feel Grief Pleasure and all other Sensations by the Natural Union he has Establish'd between them and our Body which is no other than his Decree and general Will Thus it is he who by the Natural Union which he has made between the Will of Man and the Representation of the Idea's which the Immensity of the Divine Being includes that makes them know whatever they do know and that Natural Union is also nothing else but his general Will. So that none but he can direct us by representing all things to us as none but he can make us Happy by making us taste all manner of Pleasures Let us therefore keep to this Opinion That God is the Intelligible World or the place of Spirits as the material World is the place of Bodies That they receive all their Modifications from his Power That they find all their Idea's in his Wisdom And that it is by his Love that they are acted in all their regular Motions and since his Power and Love are nothing but himself let us believe with St. Paul that he is not far from every one of us and that it is in him we have Life Motion and a Being Act. Apost c. 17.28 Non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum in ipso enim vivimus movemur sumus CHAP. VII I. Four different ways of seeing things II. How we know God III. How we know Bodies IV. How we know our Soul V. How we know the Souls of other Men and pure Spirits IN order to Abridge and Illustrate the Opinion I have set down concerning the manner how the Mind perceives the different Objects of its Knowledge it is necessary to distinguish in it four ways of knowing The First is to know things by themselves The Second to know them by their Idea's that is in the Sense I take it here by something that is different from them The Third to know them by Conscience or by Internal Sentiment The Fourth to know them by Conjecture Things are known by themselves I. Four ways of seeing things and without Idea's when being very Intelligible they are able to Penetrate the Mind or Discover themselves to it Things are known by their Idea's when they are not Intelligible of themselves either because they are Corporeal or because they cannot penetrate the Mind or discover themselves to it We know all those things by Conscience which are not distinguish'd from us Lastly we know those things by Conjecture which are different from us and from those that are known of themselves and by Idea's when we think that some things are like unto others which we know God only is known by himself II. How we know God for though there are other Spiritual Beings besides himself which seem to be Intelligible by their Nature there are none at present but he only which penetrate the Mind and discover themselves to it We only see God with a direct and immediate Sight Perhaps he only can direct the Mind by his own Substance Lastly in this Life it is only by the Union we have with him that we are capable of knowing what we know as we have shewn in the preceding Chapter Humanis mentibus nulla interposita natura praeside Aug. l. de Vera Religione c. 55. For he is our only Master that presides in our Mind according to St. Austin without the Mediation of any Creature We can never conceive that any thing that is Created should be able to represent Infinity that the unlimited Being the immense Being the universal Being can be perceiv'd by an Idea that is by a particular Being by a Being different from the Universal and Infinite Being But as for particular Beings it is not difficult to conceive that they may be represented by the Infinite Being which includes them and which includes them after a Spiritual and consequently very intelligible manner Therefore it is necessary to say that we know God by himself notwithstanding the knowledge we have of him in this Life is very imperfect and that we know Corporeal Things by their Idea's that is in God since God only includes the Intelligible World in which we find the Idea's of all things But though all things may be seen in God it does not follow that we see them all in him We only see such things in God of which we have Idea's and there are things which are seen without Idea's All the things that are in this World III. How we know Bedies of which we have some Knowledge are either Bodies or Spirits proprieties of Bodies or proprieties of Spirits No body can question but that we see Bodies with their Proprieties by their Idea's because not being Intelligible in themselves we can only see them in the Being which includes them after an intelligible manner Thus it is in God and by their Idea's that we see Bodies with their Proprieties and for that reason the knowledge we have of them is very perfect I
mean the Idea we have of Extension is sufficient to make us know all the Proprieties which Extension is capable of and we can never desire to have a more distinct and fuller Idea of Extension of Figures and Motions than that which God gives us of them Whereas the Idea's of the things which are in God include all their Proprieties whoever sees their Idea's may successively have all their Proprieties For when we see things as they are in God we see them always after a very perfect manner and it would be infinitely perfect if the Mind that sees them there were Infinite That which is wanting in the knowledge we have of Extension of Figures and Motions is not a defect of the Idea which represents it but of our Mind which considers it It is not so with the Soul IV. How we know our Soul we do not know it by its Idea We do not see it in God we only know it by Conscience and therefore the knowledge we have of it is imperfect We know no more of our Soul than what we feel passes within us Had we never felt Pain Heat Light c. we could not know whether our Soul would be capable of them because we do not know it by its Idea But did we see in God the Idea which answers to our Soul See the Explanations we should know at the same time or might know all the properties it is capable of As we know all the Properties that Extension is capable of because we do know Extension by the Idea of it It is true we know by our Conscience or by the Internal Sense we have of our selves that our Soul is something that is Great But it may be that which we do know of it is hardly any thing of what it is in it self If we had no more knowledge of Matter than that of Twenty or Thirty Figures it had been modified into certainly we should hardly know any thing of it in comparison of what we do know by the Idea which represents it It is not therefore sufficient to have a perfect knowledge of the Soul to know what we do know of it by the Internal Sense alone since the Conscience we have of our selves perhaps only shews us the least part of our Being It may be concluded from what has been said that though we know the Existence of our Soul more distinctly than the Existence of our Body and of those that are about us yet we have not so perfect a knowledge of the Nature of the Soul as of the Nature of Bodies and may serve to reconcile the different Opinions of those that say nothing is better known than the Soul and of those that maintain there is nothing of which they have less knowledge It may also serve to prove that the Idea's which represent some External thing to us are not Modifications of our Soul For if the Soul saw all things in considering its own Modifications it would know its Essence or Nature more clearly than that of Bodies and all the Sensations or Modifications it is capable of than the Figures or Modifications which Bodies are capable of Nevertheless it does not find that it is capable of such a Sensation by the sight it has of it self but only by Experience Whereas it knows that Extension is capable of an infinite number of Figures by the Idea it has of Extension Moreover there are certain Sensations as Colours and Sounds which most Men cannot discover whether or no they are Modifications of the Soul and Men know all manner of Figures by the Idea they have of Extension to be the Modification of Bodies What I have said also shows the Reason why it is Impossible to give a Definition that may explain the Modifications of the Soul for since we neither know the Soul nor the Modifications of it by Idea's but only by Sensations and that such Sensations of Pleasure for instance of Pain of Heat c. are not tied to words it is evident that if a Man had never seen Colours nor felt Heat it would be impossible to make him Sensible of those Sensations by whatever Definitions we could give him in order thereunto Now Men having only their Sensations upon the account of the Body and their Bodies not being dispos'd in the same manner in all of them it often happens that words are Equivocal that those which are used to express the Modifications of our Souls signifie quite contrary to what we design and we often make Men think on Bitterness for Example when we design to make them think on Sweetness Although we have not a full Knowledge of our Soul that which we have by Conscience suffices to demonstrate the Immortality Spirituality Liberty and some other Attributes of iâ— which it is necessary we should know And for that reason God does not give us the Knowledge of it by its Idea as he gives us the Knowledge of Bodies 'T is true The Knowledge we have of our Souls by our Conscience is Imperfect but it is not False The Knowledge on the contrary which we have of Bodies by Sensation or Conscience if we may call the Sensation of what passes in our Body Conscience is not only Imperfect but False Therefore it was necessary we should have an Idea of Bodies to correct the Sensations we have of them But we do not stand in need of the Idea of our Soul since the Conscience we have of it does not engage us into Error And not to be deceiv'd in the Knowledge of it it is sufficient not to Confound it with the Body which our Reason might induce us to do In sine Had we had a clear Idea of the Soul like unto that we have of the Body that Idea would have made us consider it too much as separated from it And thus it would have lessen'd the Union of our Soul with our Body by hindering us from looking upon it as being diffus'd through all our Members which I shall explain no farther V. How we know the Souls of other Men. Of all the Objects of our Knowledge there only remains the Souls of other Men and the Pure Intelligences and it is evident that we only know them by Conjecture We know them now neither in themselves nor by their Idea's and as they are distinct from us it is impossible that we should know them by Conscience We conjecture that the Souls of other Men are of the same Species with ours we think they feel what we feel in our selves and even when those Sensations have no relation to the Body we are certain that we are not deceiv'd Because we see in God certain Idea's and certain Immutable Laws according to which we know certainly that God acts equally in all Spirits I know that two and two are four that it is better to be Just than Rich and I am not mistaken in believing that others know those Truths as well as my self I love Good and Pleasure
determine any thing about the Number of Species of Beings which God has Created by the Idea's we have of them since it is absolutely possible that God may have Reasons to Conceal them from us which we do not know if it were only because those Beings having no Relation to us it would be useless for us to know them By the same reason as he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth of a Hand-worm because it is not very material for the preservation of our Body to have such a piercing Sight But though we think no body ought to Judge rashly that all Beings are Spirits or Bodies we think nevertheless that it is directly contrary to Reason that Philosophers in order to explain Natural Effects should use other Idea's than those that depend on Thought and Extension since indeed they are the only we have that are distinct or particular Nothing can be more unreasonable than to imagin an Infinity of Beings upon bare Idea's of Logick to impute an Infinity of Proprieties to them and thus to endeavour to explain things we do not understand by things which do not only conceive but which is not possible for us to conceive 'T is just as if the Blind having a mind to speak of Colours among themselves and to maintain a Thesis about them should in order thereunto make use of the Definitions which Philosophers give them and draw several Conclusions from the same For as those Blind could only give pleasant and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours because they could have no perfect Idea's of them and yet would argue about them upon General and Logical Idea's So Philosophers can never argue solidly upon the Effects of Nature when to that end they only make use of general Logical Idea's of Act Power Being Cause Principle Form Quality and the like It is absolutely necessary for them only to rely on distinct and particular Idea's of Thought and Extension and those they include as Figure Motion c. For it is in vain to pretend to understand Nature but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it and it is better never to meditate than upon Chimera's Nevertheless we cannot affirm that there are only Bodies and Spirits Beings that think and that are extended because we may be deceiv'd in it For though they are sufficient to Explain Nature and consequently we may conclude without fear of being deceiv'd that the Natural Things we have some knowledge of depend on Extension and Thought yet it is certainly possible that there may be others of which we have no Idea and of which we see no Effects Men therefore Judge rashly when they Judge as an Infallible Principle that all Substances are Bodies or Spirits But they also infer a rash Conclusion from thence when they conclude by the bare Testimony of Reason that God is a Spirit It is true that since we are Created after his Image and Likeness and that Holy Writ teaches us in several Places that God is a Spirit we ought to believe it and to call him so But Reason alone cannot teach it us That tells us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfect and that he is rather a Spirit than a Body since our Soul is more perfect than our Body But it does not assure us that there are no Beings besides more perfect than our Spirits and more above our Spirits than our Spirits are above our Bodies Now supposing that there were such Beings as it undeniably appears that it was in the power of God to Create such it is clear that they would participate more of the likeness of God than we do The same Reason teaches us that God would sooner have the Perfections of their Beings than ours which would only be Imperfections compar'd to them Therefore we must not Judge rashly that the word Spirit which we use to express what God is and what we are is an Equivocal Term which signifies the same things or things that are very like God is more above Created Spirits than those Spirits are above Bodies and we ought not so much to call God a Spirit to shew positively what he is as to signifie that he is not Material He is a Being infinitely Perfect no body can question it But as we must not imagin with the Anthropomorphites that he must have a Human Figure because it seems to be most perfect although we should suppose him Corporeal neither must we imagin that the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts And that his Spirit is like unto ours because we know nothing that is more perfect than our Spirit We must rather believe that as he possesses the Perfections of Matter without being Material since it is certain that Matter has a relation to some Perfections that are in God he also possesses the Perfections of Created Spirits without being a Spirit in the manner as we conceive Spirits That his Name is He that is that is the unlimited Being the All-Being the Infinite and Universal Being CHAP. X. Examples of some Physical Errors into which Men fall because they suppose that things which differ in their Nature Qualities Extension Duration and proportion are alike in all things WE have seen in the preceding Chapter that Men Judge rashly when they Judge that all Beings are only of two sorts Spirits or Bodies We will shew in the following that their Judgments are not only rash but also very false which are the principles of an infinite number of Errors when they Judge that Beings are not different in their Relations nor Manners because they have no Idea's of those differences It is most certain that the Mind of Man only looks for the relations of Things first those which the Objects it considers may have with it and in the next place those they have towards one another For the Mind of Man only seeks its Good and Truth In order to find its Good it carefully considers by Reason and by Taste or Sensation whether Objects have a Relation of agreement with it To discover the Truth it considers whether Objects have a Relation of Equality or of Likeness one with another or what is the exact measure of their Inequality For as Good is only the good of the Mind because it is convenient for it So Truth is only Truth by the Relation of Equality or of Likeness that is found between two or many things Whether between two or many Objects as between a Yard and Cloth for it is true that this Cloth holds out a Yard because there is an Equality between the Yard and the Cloth Whether between Two or many Idea's as between the two Idea's of Three and Three and that of Six for it is true that three and three are Six because there is an Equality between the two Idea's of Three and Three and that of Six Lastly Whether between Idea's and Things when the Idea's represent what the Things are For when I say that there is a Sun
my proposition is True because the Idea's I have of Existence and of the Sun represent that the Sun does really Exist So that all the Action and all the Attention of the Mind upon Objects is only in order to endeavour to discover the Relations of them since Men only apply themselves to Things that they may discover the Truth or Goodness of them But as we have already noted in the preceding Chapter Attention Fatigues the Mind It is soon tir'd with resisting the Impression of the Senses which removes it from its Object and leads it to others which the Love it has to its Body renders agreeable to it It is extreamly limited and thus the differences which are between the Subjects which it Examins being Infinite or almost Infinite it is not capable to distinguish them The Mind therefore supposes Imaginary Resemblances in which it observes no positive and real differences The Idea's of Resemblance being more present to it more familiar and plainer than others For it is plain that Resemblance includes but one Relation and that one Idea is sufficient to Judge that a Thousand Things are alike Whereas in order to Judge without fear of being deceiv'd that a Thousand Objects are different among themselves it is absolutely necessary to have a Thousand different Idea's present to the Mind Therefore Men imagin that things of a different Nature are of the same Nature and that all things of the same Species scarce differ from one another They Judge that unequal things are Equal that those that are Inconstant are Constant and that those that are without Order and Proportion are well order'd and proportion'd In a word they often think that Things that are different in Nature Quality Extension Duration and Proportion are alike in all those things But that deserves to be explain'd more at large by some Examples because it occasions many Errors The Mind and Body the Substance which Thinks and that which is Extended are two kinds of Being altogether different and directly opposite What is proper for the one is improper for the other Nevertheless most Men reflecting but little on the Idea they have of Thought and being continually affected with Bodies look upon the Soul and Body as one and the same thing Imagining a Resemblance between two things that are different They fancy the Soul to be Material that is Extended throughout the whole Body and Figur'd like the Body They impute that to the Mind which only suits with the Body Moreover Men being sensible of Pleasure Pain Odours Tastes c. and their Body being more present to them than their Soul That is easily imagining their Body and not being able to imagin their Soul they attribute to it the faculties of Feeling Imagining and even sometimes of Conceiving which can only belong to the Soul But the following Examples will be more sensible It is certain that all Natural Bodies even those that are call'd Species differ one from another that Gold is not absolutely like Gold and that one drop of Water is different from another It is with all Bodies of the same Species as it is with Faces All Faces have Eyes a Nose a Mouth they are all Faces and Mens Faces and yet there never were two perfectly alike So a piece of Gold has parts like unto another piece of Gold and a drop of Water has undoubtedly a great Resemblance with another drop of Water Nevertheless one may affirm that it is impossible to give two drops of it though taken out of the same River perfectly alike And that Philosophers inconsiderably suppose Essential Resemblances between Bodies of the same Species or Resemblances which consist in Indivisibility for the Essences of Things consist in an Indivisible according to their False Opinions The Reason of their falling into so gross an Error is because they will not consider those things carefully upon which they nevertheless compose large Volumes For as Men do not allow a perfect Resemblance between Faces because they observe them nearly and the habit of distinguishing them makes us observe the least differences in them So if Philosophers would consider Nature with some Attention they would discover a sufficient number of Causes of Diversity in those very things which produce the same Sensations in us and which for that reason we say are of the same Species nor would they so easily suppose Essential Resemblances Blind Men would be to blame in supposing an Essential Resemblance between Faces which should consist in Indivisibility because they do not sensibly perceive the differences of them Therefore Philosophers ought not to suppose such Resemblances in Bodies of the same Species because they observe no difference in them by the Sensations they have of them The Inclination we have to suppose a Resemblance in Things inclines us also to believe that there is a determin'd number of Differences and Forms and that those Forms are neither capable of more or less We Fancy that all Bodies differ one from another as it were by degrees That those very Degrees observe certain Proportions among them In a word we Judge of Material Things as of Numbers It is clear the Reason of all this is that the Mind loses it self in the Relations of Incommensurable Things such as Infinite Differences are which are not within Natural Bodies and that it pleases it self when it imagins some Resemblance or some Proportion among them because then it represents several things to it self with a great deal of Ease For as I haue already said one Idea is sufficient to Judge that several things are alike and there must be several to Judge that they are different from one another For instance if the Number of Angels be known and there are Ten Arch-Angels for every Angel and Ten Thrones for every Arch-Angel and thus forward keeping the same proportion from One to Ten unto the last Order of Intelligences the Mind may easily know the Number of those Blessed Spirits nay even Judge of them partly at one Prospect by a strong Attention which delights it infinitely And perhaps it is that which has induc'd some Persons to Judge thus of the Numbers of Celestial Spirits Which is the Case of some Philosophers who have put a Decuple proportion of Weight and of Lightness among the Elements supposing Fire to be Ten times Lighter than Air and so of the rest When the Mind finds its self oblig'd to admit differences between Bodies by the different Sensations it has of them as also by some other particular Reasons it always puts the least it can For that reason it is easily perswaded that the Essences of Things consist in an Indivisibile and that they are like Numbers as we said before because one Idea is sufficient to Represent to us all the Bodies which are call'd of the same Species For example if you put a Glass of Water in an Hogshead of Wine Philosophers will have it that the Essence of the Wine still remains the same and that
manner to maintain their Sentiments they are alike in that though they differ in the main This is sufficient for those who do not weigh the difference of Reasons to Judge that they are alike in all things because they are alike in that manner which every Body is capable to Judge of Devout Persons are not then obstinate they are only steddy as they ought to be But the Vicious and Libertines are always obstinate though they should not persist one Hour in their Sentiments Because Men are only obstinate when they defend a False Opinion although they should only defend it a little while This is the Case of some Philosophers who have maintain'd Chimerical Opinions which they lay aside at last They would have those who defend constant Truths whose certainty they see evidently to part with them as bare Opinions as they have done with those they had foolishly been prejudic'd with And because it is difficult to have a deference for them in prejudice of Truth as also because the Love we have Naturally for it inclines us to defend it earnestly they Judge us to be obstinate Those Men are to blame to defend their Chimera's obstinately but the others are in the right to defend Truth with Vigour and Steddiness of Mind The manner of both is the same but their Sentiments are different and it is that difference of Sentiment which makes the one constant and the others obstinate THE CONCLUSION OF THE Three First Books IN the beginning of this Book I have distinguished two Parts in the Simple and Indivisible Being of the Soul one purely Passive and the other both Passive and Active The first is the Mind or Understanding the second is the Will I have attributed three Faculties to the Mind because it receives its Modifications and Idea's from the Author of Nature after three different ways I have called it Sense When it receives from God its Idea's that are confounded with Sensations viz. Sensible Idea's occasion'd by certain Motions which pass in the Organs of its Senses at the Presence of Objects I have called it Imagination and Memory When it receives from God Idea's that are confounded with Images which are a kind of Weak and Languishing Sensations that the Mind receives only through some Traces that are produc'd or are stirr'd up in the Brain by the Course of the Spirits Lastly I have called it Pure Mind or Understanding when it receives from God pure Idea's of Truth without any mixture of Sensations and Images with it Not by the Union it hath with the Body but through that it hath with the Word or Wisdom of God not because it is in the Material and Sensible World but because it subsists in the Immaterial and Intelligible one Not to know Mutable things fit for the Preservation of the Life of the Body but to discover unchangeable Truths which preserve the Life of the Mind I have shown in the first and second Book that our Senses and Imaginations are very useful to discover to us the Relation betwixt External Bodies and our own that all the Idea's which the Mind receives through the Body are for the use of the Body that it is impossible clearly to discover any Truth whatsoever by the Idea's of our Senses and Imaginations that those confus'd Idea's serve only to engage us to our Body and through our Body to all Sensible things And lastly That if we would avoid Error we ought not to trust to them I also concluded it Morally Impossible to know by the pure Idea's of the Mind the Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and ours That we must not argue according to these Idea's to know if an Apple or a Pear are good to eat but we must judge it by our Taste And although we may make use of our Minds to discover after some confused manner the Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and our own yet it is always the surest way to make use of our Senses I will give another Example for we cannot impress too much on the Mind things that are so Essential and Necessary Supposing I would examine which is most Advantageous to be Religious or Rich if I open the Eyes of my Body Justice appears a Chimera I see no Attractives in it I see the Just are Miserable Abandoned Persecuted Defenceless and without Consolation for he that Comforts and Upholds them does not appear to my Eyes and indeed I do not see of what use Justice or Virtue can be but if I turn my Eyes upon Riches I soon perceive their Lustre and am dazled with it Power Grandeur Pleasures and all Sensible Goods accompany Riches I cannot doubt but Riches are necessary to make one Happy So likewise if I make use of my Ears I hear that all Men esteem Riches they speak of nothing but the ways of getting them and they always Praise and Honour those that possess them These two Senses and all the rest tell me That to be Happy I must be Rich And if I shut my Eyes and Ears and ask my Imagination it continually represents to me what my Eyes have seen and my Ears heard as to the Advantage of Riches but yet it will represent these things to me quite after another manner than my Senses did for the Imagination always enlarges the Idea's of those things that have any relation to the Body or which we Love If I will but permit it my Imagination will soon conduct me to an inchanted Palace like those of which Poets and Romances have made such Magnificent Descriptions of and there I shall see such Beauties which would be useless for me to describe This would convince me that the God of Riches who inhabits it is only capable of making me Happy This is what my Body is able to perswade me to for it speaks only for it self it is necessary for its Good that the Imagination should stoop before the Grandeur and Splendor of Riches But if I consider that the Body is infinitely below the Mind that it cannot be Master of it that it cannot instruct it in the Truth nor produce Light in it and that recollecting my self I ask my self or rather since I am neither my own Master nor Light if I draw near to God and in the Silence of my Senses and Passions ask him whether I ought to prefer Riches to Virtue or Virtue to Riches I shall hear a clear and distinct Answer of what I ought to do an Eternal Answer which has always been given is now given and will always be given an Answer which it is not necessary I should explain because all the World knows it either those who read this Book or those who read it not which is neither Greek Latin French or German and which is conceived by all Nations Lastly An Answer which Comforts the Just in their Poverty and which disturbs Sinners in the midst of their Riches I shall hear this Answer and be convinced of it I shall laugh at the Fancies
extraordinary Things as the Reparation of Natural Heat of Radical Moisture of Vital Spirits or other things they do not understand and you will straight excite their Vain Curiosity It is sufficient in order to blind and to gain them to propose Paradoxes to them to use obscure Words Terms of Influence and the Authority of some unknown Authors or else to perform some very sensible and extraordinary Experiment although it has no manner of relation to the thing proposed for it is enough to Surprise them in order to Convince them If a Physician a Chyâ—urgion an Empirick quote Passages in Greek and Latin and make use of new and extraordinary Terms they pass immediately for great Men Men give them a Power over Life and Death they are believ'd like Oracles they fancy themselves far above the common Level of Mankind and think they penetrate into the bottom of things And when some are so Indiscreet as to intimate that they are not satisfied with five or six words which really signifie and prove nothing they fancy that those People have not commom Sense and that they deny first Principles And indeed the first Principles of those Men are four or five Scraps of Latin out of some Author or some Greek Passage if they are better Scholars Moreover It is necessary that Learned Physicians should sometimes speak a Language which their Patients do not understand in order to gain some Reputation and to be obey'd A Physician who only understands Latin may be esteem'd in a Village because Latin is both Greek and Arabick to Peasants But unless a Physician can at least read Greek to learn some of Hypocrates's Aphorisms he must not expect to pass for a Learned Man in Cities where most People understand Latin For which reason even the most Learned Physicians knowing this Humour of Men are oblig'd to speak like Quacks and Illiterate Men and one must not always judge of their Capacity and Sense by what they say in their Visits CHAP. V. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-Love II. It is divided into the Love of Being and of Well-Being or of Greatness and Pleasure THe Second Inclination which the Author of Nature imprints continually in our Will I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-Love is the Love of our selves and of our own Preservation We have already said That God loves all his Works and that it is only the Love he bears them that preserves them and which Wills That all created Spirits should have the same Inclinations with him Therefore it is his Will that they should all have a Natural Inclination for their Preservation and that they should Love themselves Thus it is lawful and reasonable to Love our selves since we are Amiable since God himself Loves us and since it is his Pleasure that we should Love our selves But this is no reason that we should Love our selves more than God since God is Infinitely more Amiable than we are It is Unjust to place our Final End in our selves and not to Love our selves in relation to God because as we have no Goodness nor any Subsistance of our selves but only what we participate of the Goodness and Being of God we are not Amiable of our selves but only in relation to him Nevertheless The Inclination we should have for God is lost by Sin and all that remains of it is an Infinite Capacity in our Will for all Felicities or for Good in General and a strong Inclination to possess them which can never be destroy'd But the Inclination we ought to have for our Preservation or Self-Love has increased it self to that degree that it is at last become absolute Master of the Will It has moreover chang'd and transform'd into its own Nature the Love of God or the Inclination which we have for Good in General and the Love which we ought to have for other Men. For we may say now That we only Love our selves since we Love nothing but in relation to our selves whereas we ought only to Love God and all things in relation to God If Faith and Reason teach us that God is the only Sovereign Good and that he alone can make us perfectly Happy we may easily conclude that we must Love him and we are easily enough inclin'd to it But without Grace it is still Self-Love that Induces us to Love him Pure Charity is so much above our Strength that we are so far from Loving God for himself that Humane Reason cannot easily conceive that we can Love him otherwise than in relation to our selves and that we have any other Final End but our own Satisfaction Self-love then is the absolute Master of our Will since the Disorder of Sin and the Love of God and of our Neighbour are now only the Consequences of it since we no longer Love any thing but because that in Loving it we expect some Advantage or that we actually receive some Pleasure by it This Self-love may be divided into two Kinds II. Self-love is divided into the Love of our Being and Well-being or of Greatness and Pleasure viz. Into the Love of Greatness and into the Love of Pleasure or else into the Love of our Being and of the Perfection of our Being and into the Love of our Well-being or of Felicity By the Love of Greatness we affect Power Preferment Independency and that our Being should subsist of it self We desire in some respect to have a Necessary Being In one Sense we are desirous to be like Gods for none but God has properly a Being which is necessarily Existent since that whatever is Dependent exists only by the Will of him on whom it depends Therefore Men wishing the Necessity of their Being also desire a Power over others But by the Love of Pleasure they desire not only a Being but a Well-being because Pleasure is a manner of Being which is best and most Advantageous to the Soul We must note that Greatness Excellence and Independence of the Creature are not kinds of Being which make us Happy of themselves since it often happens that Men become Miserable in proportion to their growing Great But as for Pleasure it is a kind of Being which we cannot receive actually without actually becoming more Happy Greatness and Independence for the most part are not in us and commonly they only consist in the relation we have to those things which are about us But Pleasures are in the very Soul and they are real Modes by which it is modified and which by their own Nature are capable of satisfying it Therefore we look upon Excellence Greatness and Independence as things that are proper for the Preservation of our Being and even sometimes as very useful according to the Order of Nature for the Preservation of the Well-being But Pleasure is always a manner of Being of the Mind which by it self makes it Happy and satisfies it so that Pleasure is a Well-being and the Love of Pleasure the Love
of Well-being Now the Love of Well-being is so Powerful that it sometimes proves Stronger than the Love of Being and Self-Love makes us sometimes desire not to be because we have not a Well-being This is the Case of all the Damned who according to the Word of Jesus Christ had better not to be than to be so Unhappy as they are because these Wretches being declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodness Centers and who is the Sole Cause of Pleasure and of Pain which we are capable of it is impossible they should enjoy any Satisfaction they are and will be Eternally Unhappy because their Will will ever remain in the same Disposition and in the same Irregularity So that Self-Love includes two Loves the Love of Greatness of Power of Independence and generality of all things which seem to be proper for the Preservation of our Being and the Love of Pleasure and of all things that are necessary for our Well-being that is To be Happy and Satisfied Those two Loves may be divided several ways Whether because we are composed of two different parts of Soul and Body according to which they may be divided or because they may be distinguish'd or specified by the different Objects that are useful for our Preservation However we will not inlarge upon that because as we do not design to make a Treatise of Morality it is not necessary to make an Inquiry into and an exact Division of all the things we look upon as our Felicities It was only necessary to make this Division to relate the cause of our Errors in some order Therefore we shall first speak of those Errors which are caused by our Inclination for Greatness and for all those things that makes our Being Independant of others And afterwards we shall treat of those which proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleasure and for all those things which render our Being the best it can be for us or that contents us most CHAP. VI. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect as Science and Virtue I. Of the Inclination we have for all that raises us above other Persons or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful as Dignities and Riches seem in some measure to make us Independent All those that are beneath us have a Respect for us and fear us they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preservation and they dare neither Prejudice us nor oppose our Desires Therefore Men constantly endeavour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others For they never consider that both their Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God above and not on Men and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy does not consist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men as Weak and as Miserable as themselves but in an humble Submission to the Will of God who being Just will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Vertue Dignities and Riches they also use their utmost Efforts in order to persuade others that they do really possess them And if it may be said that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so it may also be said that they often take less care to be Virtuous than to appear so For as the Author of the Book Entituled Reflectiones Morales fays agreeably Virtue would not go far unless it were accompanied with Vanity The Reputation of being Rich Learned and Virtuous produces in the Imagination of those that are about us or that are more nearly related to us very convenient Dispositions for us It makes them fall at our Feet it makes them act in our Favour it Inspires them with all the Motions that tend to the Preservation of our Being and to the Increase of our Grandeur Thus Men preserve their Reputation as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue Learning Dignities and Riches and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages We will now endeavour to show by some Examples how those Inclinations may engage them into Error Let us begin by the Inclination that Men have for Virtue or for the Appearance of Virtue Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous commonly imploy their Mind and Time to understand Religion and to exercise themselves in good Works They only desire with St. Paul to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly and to know their Duty after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness And therefore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation No Fault can be found with that Conduct it is Infinitely to be valued II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly and they often repent their not having followed it more But this is unapprovable that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane very Certain and Useful which disingage the Mind from Sensible Things and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel some Pious Persons without having examin'd them condemn them too freely either as being Useless or Uncertain It is true that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless Men are partly in the right to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use No body is oblig'd to study them and it is better to despise them than to suffer ones self to be deceiv'd or blinded by them Nevertheless we may affirm That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths The Universal Knowledge or the Existence of a God is absolutely necessary since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God It is necessary to know that it is his Will which makes and which regulates Nature That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will In a word That all things whatever depend on God It is also necessary to know what Truth is the means to distinguish it from Error the Distinction between the Mind and Body the Consequences that may be drawn from it as the Immortality of the Soul and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty The Knowledge of Man or of ones self is a Science that cannot be reasonably despis'd it contains a World of
that is Because they shall be Happy Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just Virtuous and Perfect because they are in the Order that God has prescrib'd and Perfection consists in following him but they are not Happy because they Suffer A time will come when they will Suffer no more and then they will be Happy as well as Just and Perfect However I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life by the strength of their Hope and Faith which render those future Felicities as it were present to their Mind For it is certain that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively it draws it nearer to the Mind and gives it a taste thereof before-hand And thus it makes us Happy in some measure since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure which makes us Happy Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier since it is not true and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune We must tell them that those Pleasures are good in themselves and capable to make them Happy in some measure Nevertheless they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementioned but they cannot avoid them of themselves Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclination which they cannot overcome and those transitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid satisfie it in some measure Thus they are in a miserable Necessity of losing themselves unless they are assisted It is necessary to tell them these things that they may distinctly know their Weakness and the want they have of a Redeemer We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ and not like the Stoicks who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds They must continually be told that they must hate and despise themselves and not look for an Establishment or Happiness on Earth That they must daily carry their Cross or the Instrument of their suffering and that they must lose their Life at present in order to preserve it Eternally They must be taught that they are oblig'd to act contrary to their desire to make 'em sensible of their inability to good For Men wou'd be invincibly Happy and they cannot be actually so unless they do what they please Perhaps being convinced of their present Evils and knowing their future sufferings they may humble themselves on Earth Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven and seek a Mediatour be afraid of sensible Objects and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence And it may be they may thus obtain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace and without which there is no Power no Health nor no Salvation to be expected We are inwardly convinc'd that Pleasure is Good II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible Delights and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False for Pleasure is really Good We are Naturally Convinc'd that Pleasure is the Character of Good and that Natural Conviction is certainly true for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good and very Lovely But we are not convinc'd that either sensible Objects or our Souls themselves are capable of producing Pleasure in us for there is no reason to believe it and there are a Thousand against it Therefore sensible Objects are neither Good nor Lovely Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life we ought to use them But as they are not capable of Acting in us we ought not to Love them The Soul must only Love him that is Good who only is capable to make it Happier and more perfect Therefore it should only Love that which is above it since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below or equal to it But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect when it always attends it we fancy that they are Sensible Objects which act in us because at their approach we have new Sensations and because we do not see him that produces them really in us We taste a Fruit and we find a Sweetness we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit we conclude that it causes it and even that it contains it We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit we do not so much as think on him nor perhaps on our selves Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul we impute both the Cause and the Effect to that Fruit which we eat What I have said of Sensations which have a relation to the Body is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it as those which are found in pure Intelligences The Mind considers it self it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow It straight fancies that it is the sight of its Happiness which produces in it self that Sentiment of Joy because the said Sentiment always attends that sight It also imagines that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in it self that Sentiment of Grief since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight The real Cause of those Sentiments which is God alone does not appear before it It does not so much as think on God for he acts in us without our knowing it God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be that we may remain in it that our Disquiet may cease and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be so that we may not remain in it and that we might earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us For God pushes us continually toward Good when we are Sensible that we do not possess it and he fixes us powerfully upon it when we find that we possess it fully So that it seems evident to me that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief as well as the Sensible ones are no voluntary Productions of the Mind Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss and which disguises it self to our Mind under Sensible Appearances We must Adore it we must Love it but we must also Fear it for since it fills us with Pleasures it may also overwhelm us with Grief We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice by a Sensible Love by a Love worthy of God when
a general Being of an unlimited Being of an infinite Being is not a Fiction of the Mind It is not a Compounded Idea which includes any Contradiction nothing can be plainer though it Comprehends all that is and whatever may be Now that plain and natural Idea of Being or Infinity includes a necessary Existence for it is evident that Being I do not say such a Being has Existence in it self and that Being cannot actually not be Being since it is impossible and contradictory that Real Being should be without an Existence It may chance that Bodies may not be because Bodies are such Beings as participate of Being and depend on it But unlimited Being is necessary it is Independent it derives what it is from it self All that is proceeds from it If there is any thing it is since all proceeds from it But though there were nothing in particular it would be because it is of it self and we cannot conceive it clearly as not Being unless we look upon it as Being in particular or like such a Being and that we thus consider all other Idea's besides that of Being For those that do not see that God is commonly do not consider Being but such a Being and consequently a Being that may be and may not be Moreover that we may yet more distinctly apprehend this proof of the Existence of God and answer some Objections that might be made more clearly we must remember that when we see a Creature we do not see it in it self nor by it self for we only see it as it has been prov'd in the Third Book by the sight of some Perfections that are in God which represent it Thus we may see the Essence of that Creature without seeing its Existence we may see in God that which represents it without its Existing Therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea which represents it it not being necessary that it should be to the End it may be seen But the Case is very different in the insinitely perfect Being It can only be seen in it self for nothing that is Finite can represent Infinity So that we cannot see God unless he Exists It is impossible to see the Essence of a Being infinitely Perfect without seeing the Existence of it We cannot see it barely as a possible Being Nothing Comprehends it and if we think on it it must be But it is useless to propose these kind of Demonstrations to the common sort of Mankind These Demonstrations may be call'd Personal by reason that they do not generally convince all Men. We must use more sensible ones in order to Convince them and indeed they are not wanting For no Truth has more Proofs than that of the Existence of God This was only urg'd to shew that refin'd Truths making hardly any Impressions on our Senses are taken for Illusions and Chimera's whereas when gross palpable Truths affect the Senses forcing the Soul to consider them we are easily perswaded that they have a great deal of reality for since the Fall they make strong Impressions on our Mind 'T is for the same reason that there is no prospect to hope that the common part of Mankind will ever submit to this Demonstration to prove that Animals are not sensible viz. that being Innocent which all the World grants and I suppose it if they were capable of Sensation it would happen that under a God infinitely Just and Almighty an Innocent should suffer Grief which is a pain and the punishment of Sin Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom Sub justo Deo quisquam nisi mereatur miser esse non potest which St. Austin makes use of with a great deal of Reason against Julian to prove Original Sin and the Corruption of our Nature They Fancy that there is neither Force nor Solidity in this Axiom and in some others which prove that Beasts are not sensible because as we have already said those Axioms are refin'd and include nothing that is sensible or palpable or make any Impression upon our Senses The sensible Actions and Motions of Beasts towards the preservation of that Life are Reasons which though only probable affect us more and which consequently incline us much more powerfully to believe that they are sensible of Pain or Grief when they cry out being struck â—â—an that refin'd Reason of the pure Mind though most certain and evident in it self For it is certain that most Men have no other reason to believe that Animals have Souls I speak according to the Common Opinion which is that the Chicken is form'd from the Egg tho perhaps it only receives its Nutriment from it but the sensible Sight of all what Beasts do for the preservation of their Life That is apparent enough from this that most People do not imagin there is a Soul in an Egg although the Transformation of an Egg into a Chicken is infinitely more difficult than the bare preservation of the Chicken when it is absolutely form'd For as more Ingenuity is requi d to make a Watch out of a piece of Iron than to make it go when it is finish'd it would be more reasonable to admit a Soul in an Egg in order to Form a Chicken than to make that Chicken live when it is perfectly Form'd But Men do not see the admirable manner how a Chicken is Form'd as they always sensibly see in what manner they seek for those things that are necessary for their preservation Therefore they are not inclin'd to believe that there are Souls in Eggs by some sensible Impression of necessary Motions to Transform Eggs into Chickens but they allow Animals Souls by reason of the sensible Impression of the External Actions of those Animals for preservation of their Life although the reason I have here alledg'd is stronger to give Souls to Eggs than to Chickens The second Reason which is that Matter is incapable of feeling and of desiring is certainly demonstrative against those who say that Animals are sensible notwithstanding their Soul is Corporeal But Men will Eternally Confound and Intangle those Reasons rather than own a thing contrary to Proofs that are not only probable but very sensible and feeling And there is no way to convince them absolutely but in opposing sensible proofs to their sensible proofs and in shewing them visibly that all the parts of Animals are only Machinal and that they may move without a Soul by the meer Impression of Objects and by their peculiar Constitution as Monsieur Descartes has begun to do it in his Treatise of Man For all the most certain and evident reasons of the Understanding alone will never perswade them the contrary of the obscure Proofs they have by the Senses And we only expose our selves to the Laughter of Persons of a superficial Understanding that are not capable of much Attention when we undertake to convince them by Reasons above the common Level that Animals have no Feeling Therefore it behoves
of our Prince and even the new Discoveries of the new World seem to add something to our Subsistance Being united to all these things we rejoyce at their Grandeur and Extension we could even wish that this World had no Limits and that thought of some Philosophers that the Works of God have no Bounds does not only seem worthy of God but also very agreeable to Man who feels a Secret Joy at his being a part of Infinity because as little as he is in himself he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite by defusing himself into the Infinite Beings that are about him It is true that the Union which we have with all the Bodies that move in those great Spaces is not very strict and therefore it is not Sensible to most Men And there are some who matter the new Discoveries that are made in the Heavens so little that one might believe they are no-wise united to it by Nature if it were not known that it is either for want of Knowledge or because they are too much engag'd to other things The Soul though united to the Body it Animates does not always feel the Motions of it or if it does it does not always apply it self to them The Passion which moves it being sometimes greater than the Sensations which affects it it seems to be more powerfully engag'd to the Object of its Passion than to its own Body For it is principally by the Passions that the Soul defuses it self upon External Objects that it feels it is really united to every thing about it as it is chiefly by Sensation that it defuses it self in its own Body and is Sensible that it is united to all the Parts that Compose it But whereas one cannot conclude that the Soul of a Passionate Person is not united to his Body because he is prodigal of his Life and takes no Care for the Preservation of it So there is no reason to imagine that we are not naturally engag'd to all things because there are some for which we are not concern'd Would you for Example know whether Men are united to their Prince or their Country Seek out some who understand their Interest and have no particular Affairs to take up their Mind Then you will see how Earnest they are for News their Disquiet for Battles their Joy for Victories their Affliction in Defeats There you will clearly see that Men are strictly united to their Prince and their Country In like manner Would you know whether Men are united to China Japan or the Planets and fix'd Stars Seek out some or else imagine some whose Country and Family enjoy a profound Peace that have no particular Passions and that do not actually feel the Union that unites them to things that are nearer us than the Heavens and you will find that if they have any Knowledge of the Greatness and Nature of those Stars they will rejoyce at the Discovery of any of them they will consider them with Pleasure and if they are Ingenious they will willingly take the Trouble to observe and Calculate their Motions Those who are busied with Assairs seldom mind whether any Comet appears or whether there is an Eclipse But those who are not so closely united to the things that are near them are very fond of these sort of Events because there is nothing to which we are not united though we do not always feel it as we do not always feel that our Soul is united I do not say to our Arm or to our Hand but to our Heart and to our Brain The strongest Natural Union which God has put between us and his Works is that which united us with those Men we live with God has commanded us to Love them like our selves and that the Love of Choice by which we love them may be Firm and Constant he upholds and strengthens it continually by a Natural Love which he imprints in us In order thereunto he has laid upon us some Invisible Tyes which necessarily oblige us to Love them to watch their Preservation like our own to look upon them as necessary parts to the whole which we compose with them and without which we cannot Subsist There is nothing more Admirable than those Natural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclinations of the Minds of Men between the Motions of their Bodies and between these Inclinations and Motions All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can never be sufficiently admir'd and which can never be apprehended At the sight of any Pain which Surprises or that is felt for example we cry out that Cry which often comes out before we are aware of it by the Disposition of the Machine Infallibly strikes the Ears of those that are near enough to afford us the Assistance we stand in need of It penetrates through them and makes it self understood to People of all Nations and of all Qualities whatever for that Cry is of all Languages and of all Qualities as indeed it ought to be It moves the Brain and in a Moment changes the whole Disposition of the Body of those that are struck by it Morcover it makes them run to assist before they are aware of it But it is not long without acting upon the Mind and without obliging them to be willing to relieve them and of thinking of Means to secure those that have made that Natural Prayer provided always the said Prayer or rather this pressing Command be Just and according to the Rules of Society For an Indiscreet Cry made without a Cause or out of a vain Fear produces Indignation and Scorn in the Assistants instead of Compassion because in crying without a cause we abuse things establish'd by Nature for our Preservation That Indiscreet Cry naturally produces Aversion and the Desire of revenging the Abuse that has been offer'd to Nature I mean to the Order of things provided he that made it did it voluntarily But it ought only to produce the Passion of Laughter mix'd with some Compassion without Aversion and a Desire of Revenge when it proceeds from Fear that is from a false Appearance of a pressing Necessity which has induced any one to cry out For Laughter or Jest is necessary to repel their Fear and to correct them and Compassion is necessary to Succor them as Weak It is impossible to conceive any thing better order'd I do not pretend to explain by Example which are the Springs and the Relations which the Author of Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all Animals to maintain the Consent and Union which is necessary for their Preservation I only make some Reflections upon those Springs that People may think upon them and may carefully inquire not how those Springs move nor how their Motion is communicated by the Air by the Light and by all the little Bodies that surround us for that is almost Incomprehensible and is not necessary but at least to know what are the Effects of it One may