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A87710 The idiot in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus.; Idiota. English. Nicholas, of Cusa, Cardinal, 1401-1464. 1650 (1650) Wing K394; Thomason E1383_1; ESTC R202666 78,826 217

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is lead to perfection Phil. Paradventure thou wilt likewise admit that the understanding should be called the passion of the mind Id. Yes that I will for the understanding is the motion of the mind the beginning whereof is passion Phil. Therefore conception is a passion too Id. It follows not as thou seest of thy self In like manner although the kinds and species be the understanding yet are they not therefore passions of the soul for the passions of the soul vanish and yet the kinds and species of things remaine Phil. Enough of this seeing divers men speak diversly thereof But tell me how doest thou call that power of the mind by which it sees all things in the necessity of complexion and that other by which it sees them in an absolute necessity Id. I that am an Idiot do not much regard words yet I thinke that power may conveniently be called discipline whereby the mind looking to its own immutability considers the forms of things without matter because that by discipline and learning men come to this consideration of the form But that power by which the mind looking to its own simplicity doth therein behold all things without composition may be called intelligence Phil. It is read that some men call that power which thou callest doctrine or learning intelligence and that which thou callest intelligence intelligibility Id. It doth not displease me for they may conveniently be so called Orat. I could wish to hear from thee Philosopher how the Naturalists suppose sensations are done for in this I thinke thee more skilfull then the Idiot who will also be glad if thou wilt so do Phil. I should be glad if I could rehearse any part of that which I have heard That which thou required is thus The Naturalists say that the soul is mixt with a most thin and subtile spirit scattered clean through the Arteries so that that spirit is the carryage of the soul and the vehiculum or carryage of that spirit is the blood There is therefore one nerve or artery full of that spirit which is directed to the eyes so that near unto the eyes it is forked and being filled with that spirit it comes to the bals of the eyes wherein is the apple that spirit then so dispersed through the arteries the instrument of the soul by which it exerciseth the sense of seeing Two arteries full of the same spirit are directed to the eares likewise to the nostrils and to the palate are certaine arteries directed and that spirit is diffused by the marrow even unto the extremities or ends of the joynts That spirit which is directed to the eyes is most active and nimble and therefore when it finds any outward objects the spirit is repercussed or stricken back and the soul is stirred up to see that which it meets withall So in the ear it is repercussed with the voice and the soul excited to comprehend and as hearing is done in a most thin aire so is smelling in a thick or rather fumous aire which when it entreth the nostrils by its sumosity retards the spirit so that the soul is excited to comprehend the odour of that fumosity Likewise when a spongious humour enters the palate the spirit is retarded and the soul excited to taste So the soul useth the spirit diffused through the marrow for the instrument of touching for when any solid thing meets with the body the spirit is offended and after a manner retarded and thence is touching About the eyes the soule useth a fiery power about the ears an aethereall or rather a pure ayrie one about the nostrils a thick and fumous ayrie one about the palate a watery power about the marrow an earthy one And this according to the order of the foure elements That as the eyes are higher then the eares so the spirit which is directed to the eyes is higher and superiour and may after a manner be called fiery So that in man the disposition of the senses is in a manner like the disposition of the order of the four elements whereupon seeing is swifter then hearing and therefore we see the lightning before we hear the thunder although they be both at once Moreover the strong subtile and acute direction of the beams of the eyes makes the aire give way unto it and nothing can withstand it except it bee grosse earthy or watery Seeing then the spirit is the instrument of the senses and the eyes nostrils and other sensories are as windowes and wayes by which that spirit may go out to perceive it is manifest that nothing is perceived but by a let or obstacle that as soon as any thing hinders it that spirit which is the instrument of perceiving may be retarded and the soul being as it were retarded may confusedly by the senses comprehend the thing that hinders it For the sense of it self terminates nothing and if when we see any thing we put a bound in it that is not the worke of the sense but of the imagination which is joyned to the sense There is moreover in the fore part of the head in the phantasticall cell a certain spirit much more subtile and nimble then that which is diffused through the Arteries which when the mind useth as its instrument it is made more subtile that though the thing be absent it can comprehend the form in the matter which power of the soul is called imagination because by it the soul conforms unto it self the image of the thing absent and it differs in this from the sense because the sense comprehends the form in the matter onely while the thing is present but imagination doth it as well when the thing is absent but confusedly so that it discernes not the state but comprehends many states together confusedly But there is in the middle part of the head to wit in that cell which is called rationall a most subtile spirit thinner far then that in the fantasticall cell and when the soul useth that spirit as her instrument it is yet more subtible insomuch that it discerneth state from state yet doth it not comprehend the truth of things because it comprehends formes mingled with matter but matter confounds the thing formed so that the truth of it cannot be comprehended And this power of the soul is called reason After these three manners the soul useth a corporall nstrument By it self the soul comprehends when it takes it self into it self or retires into it selfe so that it useth it self for an instrument as we have heard from thee CHAP. IX How the mind measureth all things by making a point a line and a surface how one point it both the complication and explication of a line and of the nature of complication and how it makes adequate measure of divers things and by what it is stirred up to do it Orat. THe Naturalists that after experience have made these things manifest are much to be commended cettainely because they are faire and pleasant
Thou saist right and it pleaseth me well to have heard this word from thee for as all knowledge of the taste of that thing which was never tasted is empty and barren untill the sense of tasting do reach it so likewise of this wisdome which no man tasteth by hearsay but he onely tasteth which receives it in his internall taste and he beares witnesse not of those things he hath heard but which he hath experimentally tasted in himselfe To know the many descriptions of love which the Saints have left unto us without the taste of love is but a certaine emptinesse Wherefore for him that seekes eternal wisdome it is not sufficient to know those things which are read of it but it is very necessary that having found by his understanding where it is he then make it his owne as he that hath found a field wherein there is a great treasure cannot rejoyce in or enjoy that treasure being in another mans and not his owne field therefore he selleth all and byeth that field that he may have the treasure in his owne field he must then sell and give away all his owne things for the eternall wisdome will not be had but where the haver kept nothing of his owne to the end he might have that and that which we have of our owne are our vices and that which we have of the eternall wisdome are nothing else but good things Wherefore the spirit of Wisdome dwelleth not in a body subject to sinnes nor in an evill willing soule But in his own pure field and sapientiall clean image as in his holy temple for where the eternall wisdome dwels there is the Lords field bearing immortall fruit for it is the field of vertues which wisdome tilleth from whence growe the fruits of the Spirit which are Righteousnesse Peace Fortitude Temperance Chastity Patience and such like Orator Thou hast abundantly explained these things but now answer me I pray thee is not God the beginning of all things Idiot Who doubts it Orator Is the eternall wisdome any thing else but God Idiot Farre be it we should say it is any thing else It is God Orator Did not God forme or create all things by his word Idiot He did Orator Is the Word God Idiot It is Orator Is wisedom so Idiot To say that God made all things in wisdome is no more to say then that that God created all things by his word but consider how all that is might be and might so be and is and God that gives it the actualnesse of being is he with whom there is power by which the thing might be produced from not being to being and he is God the Father which may be called Entity or Unity because he doth by his omnipotence necessitate that to be which was nothing for God gives it such a beeing that it is this as heaven for example and nothing else neither more nor lesse And this God is the word the wisedom the son of the Father and may be called the equality of Unity or Entity Then there is a being and being so united that it is and this it hath from God which is the connection knitting all things together and it is God the holy Spirit for it is the Spirit that unites and knits together all things in the univers and in us As therefore nothing begets unity but it is the first principle not principiated or the first beginning not begun so nothing begets the Father who is eternall and equality proceeds from or is begotten of unity so the son from the Father and the knot or bond proceedeth from unity and its equality so the holy spirit from the Father and the sonne wherefore every thing that it may have being and such a beeing in which it is hath need of a unitrine principle namely of God three and one of whom there might much more be said if the time would give leave the wisedome therefore which is the equality it selfe of being is the word or reason of things for it is as an infinite intellectuall forme for the forme gives to the thing that it is form'd Therefore an infinite forme is the actuality of al formable things formes and the most precise equality of them all for as if there were an infinite circle it would be the true samplar of all figurable figures and the equality of the being of every figure for it would be a triangle an hexagone a decagone so forth the most adequate measure of them all though a most simple figure so infinite wisedome is simplicity complicating all formes the most adequate measure of them all as if the most perfect Idea of omnipotent art should be the art it selfe and most simple forme of every thing formable by art So that if thou looke upon the form of a man thou shalt finde the forme of the divine art the most precise sampler thereof as if it were nothing else at all then the sampler of the forme of a man so if thou looke to the forme of Heaven and turn thy selfe to the forme of the divine art thou shalt not be able to conceive it any other thing then the sampler of this forme of Heaven And so of all formes form'd or formable The art or wisedome of God the Father is the most simple forme and yet the only and most equall example of infinite formable formes although variable O how admirable is that forme whose most simple infinity all formable formes cannot explicate or shew the uttermost of And he onely that by a most sublime understanding lifteth himselfe above all opposition sees it to be most true as if any man would marke the naturall force which is in a unity he should see that power if he would conceive the same to be in act as a cetaine forme visible by the understanding only and that afarre of and because the power of a unity would be most simple it must needs be a most simple infinity In the next place if the fame man would turne himselfe to the forme of numbers in considering a duality a or a tennality and would then return to the actuall power of a unity he should see that forme which is put to be the actuall power of the unity to be the most precise samplar of duality tennality or any other numerable number for this would the infinity of that forme doe which is called the power of unity that whilest thou lookest to duality that forme can be neither greater nor lesse then the forme of duality whereof it is the most precise samplar Thus thou seest that one and the same simple wisedome of God because it is infinite is the most true samplar of all formable formes and this is his reaching by which he reacheth all things boundeth or limiteth and disposeth them for it is in all formes as the truth in the image the samplar in the thing exemplified the forme in the figure and precisenesse in assimilation or likenesse and although
it is unity uniting that it understands singularly it hath it likewise from unity which is singularity that it understands formerly it hath it from unity which is immutability and that it understands divisibly it hath it from unity for division descends from unity CHAP. XII How the understanding in all men is not one and how the number of seperated minds is not numerable by us but known to God Phil. THere are yet some things wherein I would faine know what thou thinkest some Peripateticks say that the understanding is one in all men others as certaine Platonists say that there is not one intellective soul but that our souls are of the same substance with the soul of the world which as they say comprehends all our souls yet they say our souls do differ numerically because they have a divers manner of operartion but that they are all after death resolved into the soul of the worlds Tellus what thou thinkest of it Id I affirme as thou heardest that the mind is the understanding but how there should be one mind in all men I cannot conceive For the mind having an office by which it is called die soul doth therefore require a convenient habitude of the body adequately proportioned unto it which as it is found in one body is not to be found in another As therefore the identity of proportion is unmultipliable so is the identity of the mind which without an adequate proportion of the body cannot animate For as the sight of thine eye could not be the sight of any other though it were seperated from thine eye and joyned to anothers eye because it could not find the same proportion in anothers eye that it had in thine so neither the discretion which is in thy sight could be the discretion in the sight of another So neither could the understand of that discretion be the understanding of an others discretion Therefore I conclude it not possible that there should be one understanding in all men But because number seemes to be taken away when the variablenesse of the matter is taken away as appears by that I have already said and that the nature of a mind out of the body is free and acquited from all variety of matter therefore it may be that the Platonists said that our souls are resolved into one soul which is the common comprehender of all ours But I do not think this resolution true For although we cannot understand how number should be multiplyed when the variety of matter it taken away yet for all this that purality of things ceaseth not which is the number of the Divine mind Therefore the number of seperated sustances is no more unto us a number then it is no number because it is so numerable by us that yet it is neither even nor odd neither great nor small nor doth it in any thing agree with a number numerable by us As if any man should hear an exceeding great voice made by a mighty army of men and yet he should not know that it was an army that made it it is manifest that in the voice which he hears every mans voice is different and distinct though he that heard it could not give judgement of the number and therefore judgeth it to be one voice because he hath no means to reach the number Or as if in one chamber many candles were burning and the chamber enlightned by them all yet the light of every candle remaines distinct from the light of another as we find by experience when they are carried out of the room one after one because the light is diminished when every one that is carried out carrieth his light with it Suppose therefore that the burning candles in that chamber should be all put out and yet the light remaine and that one should come into that chamber so enlightned he although he saw the lightsomenesse of the chamber yet cannot be possibly reach the distinction and discretion of the lights nay he could not conceive how there should be plurality of lights there except he knew that there were the light of many candles put out and if he did know this namely that there were many yet he could never numerically discerne or distinguish one light from another The like examples thou mayest bring in the other senses and help thy self how the impossibility of numerical difference may in regard of us stand with the knowledge of plurality but he that shall more diligently observe how natures abstracted from all variety of matter that is any wayes intelligile by us yet in regard of God who is infinitely absolute are not simply abstracted from all change seeing they may be by him changed and lead into destruction in as much as God alone doth according to his nature dwell in imortality be sees withall that no creature can possibly escape the number of the Divine mind CHAP. XIII How that which Plato called the soul of the worlds and Aristotle nature is God which worketh all things in all things and how he crealeth the mind in us Phil. ENough of this what saiest thou of the soul of the world Id. The time will not suffer all things to be discursed but I thinke Plato called that the soul of the world which Aristotle called nature and for my part I suppose that neither that soul nor that nature are any other thing then God which worketh all things in all things and whom we call the spirit of all things Phil. Plato said that that soul doth indelibly containe the samplars of things and move all things Aristotle said that it was wise nature that moves all things Id. It may be Plato meant that the soul of the world is as the soul of a servant that knows the mind of his Lord and executes his will and this knowledge he called notions or samplars which are never defaced by oblivion that the execution of the Divine providence may not faile And that which Plato cals the knowledge of the soul of the world Arisiotle would have to be the sagacity of nature which had understanding to fulfill the will of God Therefore to that soul of nature they attributed the necessity of complexion because it is determinately necessitated so to doe as absolute necessity commandeth but that is nothing but the manner of understanding namely when our minde conceiveth God as the Architectonicall Art whereunto there is another art of executing subordinate that the divine conception may proceed into being but in asmuch as all things do necessarily obey the will of the almighty therefore the will of God needs no other executor for in omnipotence willing and doing do coincide As a glasse-maker whilest he makes glass blows in a breath which executes his will in which breath is the word or conception and the power for unlesse the power and conception of the glasse-maker were in the breath which he sends forth there would not arise or be made such a glasse Conceive therfore an
absolute creative art subsisting by it self that the art may be the workman and the mastery the master this art hath in its essence necessarily omnipotence that nothing can resist it wisdome to know what it doth and the connexion of omnipotence with wisdom that what it willeth may be done That connexion having in it self wisdome and omnipotence is the spirit as it were will or desire for of things impossible and utterly unkown there is neither will nor desire So in the most perfect will there is wisdome and power and by a certain similitude it is called a spirit because motion is not without spirit insomuch that whatsoever causeth motion in the mind and all things else we call a spirit And by motion all men do what they will do Therefore the power of a creative art which is an absolute and infinite art or the blesshed God doth all things in his spirit or will in the which is the wisdome of the Son and the omnipotence of the Father that his worke may be of one individed Trinity Of this connexin spirit or will the Platonists were ignorant which did not see this spirit to be God but thought it to be principiated by God and to be the soul of the world as our understanding soul animates our body Nor did the Peripateticks see this spirit which thought this power to be nature hidden in all things from which is motion and rest when indeed it is God absolute blessed for evermore Orat. How it rejoyceth me to hear so plain an exposition but I pray thee help us againe with some example to conceive the creation of our mind in this our body Id. Thou hast already heard of this matter but because variety of examples makes that which in it self is unexpressible somewhat more clear I will obey thee Behold thou knowest that our mind is a certaine power having the image of that Divine art we spake of Therefore all things which are most truly in the Divine art are truly in our mind as the image thereof Therefore our mind is created by that creating art as if that art would create it self And because that infinite art is un-multiplyable it behooveth that there arise an image thereof even as if a painter would paint himself and himself being not multiplyable by painting himself there should rise his image And because an image how perfect soever if it cannot become more and more perfect and conformable to the samplar is never so perfect as any imperfect image which hath power to conform it self more and more without limitation to the unapproachable samplar for in this the image after the best manner it may doth imitate infinity As if a painter should make two pictures of himself whereof the one being dead should seem actually more like him but the other should be alive and though for the present lesse like yet such a one as being by its object stirred up to motion could alwayes make it self more and more conformable to the samplar no man would doubt that this second picture were more perfect and more expressing the art of the painter So every mind yea even ours though created beneath all others hath from God that as well as it can it is a perfect and living image of the infinite art Therefore it is three and one having power wisdome and the connexion of both after such a manner that as a perfect image of the art being stirred up it can more and more conforme its self to its samplar So that our mind though in the beginning of its creation it have no actuall resplendence of the creating art in Trinity and unity yet it hath that concreated power that being stirred up it can make it self more and more conformable to the actuality of the Divine art And therefore in the unity of its essence is power wisdome and will And in-its essence do coinside the master and the mastery as in a living image ot the infinite art which being stirred up can all wayes without end make it self more and more conformable to the Divine actuality the inaccessible precision of the infinite art alwayes remaining Orat. Most wonderfully and plainly but I pray thee how it the mind infused by creation Id. Then haft heretofore heard me of this argument Now take the same thing againe by another example Ath. Then the Idiot taking a glasse and letting it hang down between his finger and thumb he touched the glasse and it gave a found and after a little while the glasse was crack'd and the sound ceaseth Then said the Id. In this fame hanging glasse by my power there arose a certaine power which moved the glasse whence came sound and when that proportion of the glasse in the which the sound was and by consequence the motion resided was dissolved the motion there ceased and likewise upon the ceasing of the motion the sound But it that power had not depended upon the glasse and therefore would not have ceased upon the cracking of the glasse but have subsisted without the glasse thou should'st have an example how that power is created in us which makes motion and harmony and then ceaseth to make it when the proportion is dissolved though for all that it doth not cease to be As if I in giving thee a Lute should in and with the Lute give thee the skill cunning to play upon a Lute if the art and skill did not depend upon the given Lute though given in and with the Lute then although the Lute were broken yet the art and skill for all that would not be dissipated though there were never a Lute found in the whole world that were fit for thee CHAP. XIV How the mind is said to come down from the milky way through the planets to the body and so to returne and how the notions of separated spirits are indelible and ours delible Phil. THou bringest fit and faire examples for things so strange and remote from sense and because the Sun is ready to set and so we can stay no longer together tell us I pray the what the Philosophers mean in saying that the souls came down from the milky way through the Planets into bodies and so return to the milky way againe and why Aristotle willing to expresse the power of the soul begins at Reason saying that the soul from Reason ascends to doctrine from doctrine to intellectibility but Plato contrarywise makes intellectibility the beginning and saith that by degenerating intellectibility is made doctrine or intelligence and intelligence by degenerating becomes Reason Id. I know not their writings But peradventure the first that spoke of the assent and discent of souls meant the same that Plato and Aristotle did For Plato looking to the image of the Creator which is chiefly in intelectibility where the mind conforms it self to the Divine simplicity there placed the beginning and made it the subfstance of the mind which he will have remaine after death that by the order of
turned themselves with all their power there they finde sorrow and death for infinite wisdome is the never fayling food of life of which our spirit lives eternally which can love nothing but Wisdome and truth for every understanding desires being it s being is living its living is understanding its understanding is to be fed with wisdome and truth whereupon it followeth that the understanding which tasteth not clear wisdome is as an eye in darknesse for it is an eye but it sees not because it is not in the light and because it wants the delightfull life which is in seeing it is therefore in paine and torment and this is death rather then life so the understanding being turned to any other thing then the food of eternall wisdome shall finde it self without or besides life wrapped up in the darkeness of ignorance rather dead then alive and this is the interminable torment that the understanding should have a being and yet never understand for it is onely the eternall wisedome in which every understanding can understand Orator Thou tellest me things both good and rare now proceede I pray thee to shew how I may be lifted up to some manner of taste of eternall wisdome Idiot The eternall wisdome is tasted in every tastable thing it is delight in every delightfull thing It is the beauty in every thing beauteous It is the appetite in everyappetible thing so say of all desirable things how can it choose then but be tasted is not thy life pleasant to thee when it is according to thy desire Orator Yes nothing more Idiot Seeing then this thy desire is not but by the eternall wisdome in which and of which it is and this happy life likewise which thou desirest is not but from the same eternal wisdome in which it is and without which it cannot be hence it followeth that in all the desire of intellectuall life thou desirest nothing else then the eternall wisdome which is the complement of thy desire the beginning middle and end thereof If therefore this desire of immortall life that thou mayest live eternally happy be sweet unto thee thou doest already finde within thy selfe a certaine fore-taste of the eternall wisdome for there is nothing desired that is utterly unknowne as among the Indians there are apples whose foretaste because we have not we do not desire them but being we cannot live without nourishment nourishment we desire of nourishment we have a certaine fore-taste that we may live sensibly therefore a childe having a certaine fore-tafte of milke in his own nature when he is hungry is moved unto milke for we are nourished by those things of which we are So the understanding hath its life from the eternall wisdome and of that it hath such as it is a certaine fore-taste whereupon in all feeding which that it may live is necessary unto it it is not moved but to be fed from thence from whence it hath this intellectuall being If therefore in all thy desire of intellectuall life thou wouldest marke from whom the understanding is by what it is moved and to what thou wouldest finde in thy selfe that it is the sweetnesse of eternall wisdome which makes thy desire so sweet and delightfull unto thee that thou art carried with an unspeakeable affection to the comprehension of it as unto the immortality of thy life And if thou looke upon the example of iron and the load-stone thou shalt finde that the iron hath in the load-stone a certaine beginning of his effluence or flowing out And whilest the load-stone by its presence stirres up the heavy and ponderous iron the iron with a wonderfull desire is carryed contrary to the motion of nature by which for its heavinesse it ought to presse downwards is moved upwards by uniting it selfe to its principle for except there were in iron a certaine naturall fore-taste of the load-stone it would no more be moved to the load-stone than to any other stone and except there were in the stone a greater inclination to iron than to copper there would not be that attraction and drawing Our intellectuall spirit hath accordingly from the eternall wisdome a principle or beginning of being so intellectually which being is more conformable unto wisdome than any other not intellectuall being Hence the irradiation or immission into a holy Soule is in the stirring up a desirefull motion for he that by an intellectuall motion seeketh wisdome he being inwardly touched to the fore-tasted sweetnesse forgetting himselfe it is received in the body as if he were without the body the weight of all sensible things cannot hold him untill he unites himselfe to the attracting wisdome and this makes the soule that by an amazing admiration forsakes the sense growes so mad that it makes no account of ought else besides that wisdome and to such a one it is sweete to leave this world and this life that they may the more readily be carried into the wisdome of immortality This foretaste makes that which appeareth delightfull abominable to holy men who the sooner to attaine unto it do most evenly and patiently beare all corporall torments It instructeth us that this our spirit being turned unto it can never faile for if this our body cannot by any sensible ligament or tie hold the spirit but that letting go all performance of dutyes to the body it is most greedily carried to that eternall wisedome then surely though the body faile it can never faile for this assimilation and likenesse which is naturally in our spirit by which it is not quieted but in that wisdome it selfe is as it were the lively image thereof for the image is not quieted but in that whereof it is the image and from which it hath the beginning midst and end now the living image by its life doth of it selfe put forth motion towards the Sampler in which onely it resteth for the life of the image cannot rest in it selfe being but the life of the life of truth and not its owne hereupon it is moved to the sampler as to the truth of its being If therefore the sampler be eternall and the image have life in which it fore-tasteth its sampler and so be desirefully moved unto it and seeing that motion if it be vitall or lively cannot reft but in the infinite life which is eternall wisdome hence it followeth that that spirituall motion can never cease which doth never infinitely reach or touch infinite life for it is alwaies with a most pleasant desire moved to reach it which because of the delightfulnesse of the attraction is never loathed for wisdome is the most s avoury meat which so satisfieth that it never diminisheth the desire of taking it so that the delight of that eternall feeding never ceaseth Orator I doe assuredly understand that thou hast very well spoken onely I see there is a great deale of difference betweene the taste of wisdome and whatsoever can be said of the sense of tasting Idiot
by reason handle the immortality of the soul which notwithstanding there 's none of all these that doth not by faith alone bold most assured which makes them take such a deal of care and pains that after death their souls may be darkened with no sin and so taken up into a most bright desired lift Phil. Thou tellest me a great matter and a true one O my friend for I have spent all my time in going about the world and addressing my self to wise men that I might be more assured of the immortality of the soul In as much as the knowledge of a mans self was in times past enjoyned by the Oracle of Delphi that the mind should know it self and feel it self conjoyned to the divine mind but to this hour I could never by the clearnesse of reason so perfectly reach unto that which I desire as this ignorant people doth by faith Orat. If I may in civility ask I pray thee tell me what moved thee who seemest a Peripatetick to come to Rome doest thou think to find any man here by whome thou mayest better thy self Phil. I had heard that in this place out of the Temple in the Capitol dedicated by Titus Attilius Crassus to the mind there were found many writings of wise men concerning the mind But I have peradventure lost my labour unlesse thou which seemest to me a good and understanding Citizen help me Orat. That Crassus dedicated a Temple to the mind it is certain but whether there were any books there concerning the mind and what they were after so many sackings of Rome no man can tell But least thou grieve for thy lost labour thou shalt hear one that is in my judgement an admirable man though an Idiot discourse of what things soever thou wilt Phil. I pray thee let me as soon as ever thou canst possibly Orat. Follow me then Auth. And when they came near the Temple of Eternity they went down into a little place under ground and there finding the Idiot making a wooden Spoons the Oratour thus spake to him Orat. I am ashamed Idiot that thou shouldest be found by this great Philosopher thus busied about these rustical workes he will never beleeve that he shall hear any speculations from thee Id. I do willingly imploy my self about those exercises which do continually feed both my mind and my body And if this man whom thou bringest be a Philosopher I do not think he will despise me ever the more for being a Spoon-maker Phil. Thou sayest very well for even Plato is said to have practised painting between whiles which it is thought he would never have done if it had been any hinderance to his contemplation Orat. It may be too that Plato had from the Art of painting familiar examples by which he made great matters very easie Id. So do I in this my art symbolically enquire and seek for whatsoever I list and so feed my mind and then I change my spoons for other necessaries and refresh my body and so as much as is sufficient for me I get all that I have need of Phil. It is my fashion when I come to any man that hath the report of a wise man to be principally solicitous and carefull of those things that do most trouble me and to compare writings of the learned one with an other and to seek out the meaning of them But thou being an Idiot I know not how to get thee to speak or how to occasion some discourse that I may see what understanding thou hast of the mind Id. I do not think there is any man alive needs lesse compulsion to speak his mind than I do for being that I confesse my self an ignorant Idiot I never fear to answer any thing Learned Philosophers and such as have the reputation of knowledge deliberate carefully because they have need to fear falling Therefore if thou wilt plainly tell me what it is thou wouldest have with me I shall as plainly answer thee Phil. I cannot in few words expresse my self if it please you let us all sit and talk together Id. It pleaseth me well Aut. And when they had set stools in a triangle and placed themselves in order thus spake the Orat. Thou seest O Philosopher the simplicity and plainnesse of this man that useth none of the Ceremonies ordinary in the entertainment of a man of suck worth now make triall of him in those things which as thou sayest do most trouble thee he will conceal nothing from thee which he knows and I think thou wilt confesse thou wert not brought hither in vain Phil. All these things please me well Now let us go to the matter in the mean time be thou silent I pray thee and let not our long discourse seem tedious Orat. Thou shalt find me rather desirous to have you continue your discourse than as one weary of it Phil. Tell me then Idiot for so thou sayest thy name is if thou hast any conjecture of the mind Id. I think there is not nor ever was any perfect man that did not frame some conception of the mind such as it was I for my part have a conception that the mind is the bond and measure of all things and I conjecture it is called Mens a mensurando the mind from measuring Phil. Doest thou think the mind is one thing and the soul another Id. I do certainly think so for the mind subsisting in it self is one thing and in the body another The mind subsisting in it self is either infinite or the image of the infinite And of these minds which are the image of the infinite being they are not the greatest or absolute and infinite subsisting in it self I admit that some may animate humane bodies and then I grant that the same are by vertue of their office souls Phil. Thou grantest therefore that the mind and the soul of a man are the same the mind by its self the soul by its office Id. I grant it As the sensitive and seeing part of the eye in a living Wight is one power CHAP. II. How there is a naturall word and another imposed according to it and how there is a simple beginning which is the Art of arts and how the eternal Art of the Philosophers is complicated Phil. THou saidest the mind was so called of measuring amongst all the several derivations of the word I read of no man that holds that point The first thing therefore I intreat thee is that thou wouldest open unto me the cause of thy so saying Id. If we must diligently enquire of the power of the word I am of opinion that that power which is in us and notionally complicates all the samplars of things which we call the mind is not properly named For as humane reason reacheth not the quiddity of things so doth not the name For words are imposed by the motion of reason For we call one thing by one name and for a certain reason and another thing
likenesse of beings for those things that agree to the Divine mind as to infinite truth agree to our mind as the nearest image of truth If all things be in the Divine mind as in their precise and proper truth all things are in our mind as in the image or similitude of their proper truth to wit notionally for knowledge is by likenesse All things are in God but there the samplars of things all things are in our mind but here the similitudes of things As God is the absalute entity which is the complication of all things that are so our mind is the image of that infinite entity which is the complication of all images no otherwise then the first picture of an unknown King is the samplar of all other copies that are painted according to it for the knowledge or face of God descends not but in the mentall nature whereof truth is the object and further it descendeth not but by the mind so that the mind is the image of God and the samplar of all the images of God after it self Therefore look how much all things after the simple mind do partake of the mind so much do they also partake of Gods image so that the mind of it self is the image of God and all things after the mind no wayes but by the mind CHAP. IV. How our mind is not the explication but a certaine image of the eternall complication how those things that are after the mind are not such an image How the mind is without notions and yet hath a conere ate judgement and why the body it necessary for it Phil. Hou seemest out of the great fulnesse of thy mind as though thou meantest that as the infinite minde is the absolute formative power so the finite minde is the conformative or configurative power Id. I doe indeed for that which is to be said cannot conveniently be expressed therefore is the multiplication of speech very profitable Now marke further than an image is one thing and an explication another for equality is the image of unitie for from unitie once ariseth equalitie Therefore is equality the image of unitie yet is not equality but plurality the explication of unitie therefore is equally the image of the explication of of unity not the explication So doe I meane that the minde is the most simple image of the divine minde amongst all the images of divine complication And so is the minde the first image of that divine complication which by his simplicity and power complicateth all images of complication For as God is the complication of complications so the minde which is the image of God is the image of the complication of complications and after the images are the plurality of things which explicate the divine complication As number explicates unity motion rests time eternity composition simplicity time the present greatness a point motion a moment inequality equality diversity identity and so of the rest From hence gather the admirable power of our minde for in the vertue thereof is complicated the assimulative power of the complication of a point by which it finds in it self a power wherein it assimulates it selfe to every greatnesse So also because of the assimulative power of the complication of unity it hath power to assimulate it selfe to every multitude And so by the assimulative power of the complication of now or the present it hath power assimulate it selfe to all time and so by the assimulative power of th complication of rests to all motion and of simplicity to every composition and of identity to all diversity and of equality to all inaquality and of conjunctionto every dis-junction And by the image of the absolute complication which is the infinite minde it hath power by which it can assimulate it selfe to every explication and many such things thou seest of thy selfe may be said which our mind hath because it is a certaine image of the infinite simplicity which complicateth all things Phil. It seemeth then that onely the mind is the image of God Id. So it is properly because all things that are after or beneath the mind are not the image of God but only ly so far forth as the mind shineth or appeareth in them as it more shineth in perfect living wights then in imperfect ones and more insensible things then in vegetables and more in vegetables then in minerals so that creatures that want the mind are rather explications then images of the Divine simplicity although according to the shining or appearing of the mentall image in explication they do diversly partake of the image Phil. Aristotle said there was no notion concreate or made together with the minder or soul because he likened it to a smooth and shaven table but Plato saith there were notions concreated with it yet that for the moles and weights of the body the soul forgot them what do'st thou thinke to be the truh Id. Undoubtedly our mind was by God put into this body to the profit and advantage thereof and therefore it must needs have from God all that without which it could not acquire that profit and advantage it is not therefore credible that there were notions concreated with the soul which it lost in the body but because it hath need of a body that the concreated power may proceed unto act As the visive power of the soul cannot see actually except it be stirred up by the object and that cannot be but by the representing of multiplied specis by then esn of the organ and so it hath need of the eye Even so the power of the mind which is the comprehensive and nationall power cannot porceed to its opperations except it be stirred up by sensible things which it cannot be but by the mediation of sensible phantasmis Therefore it hath need of an organicall body and such an one without which it could not be stired up In this therefore Aristotle seems to have thought aright that there are no notions of the soul concreated from the beginning which it lost by being incorporated But because it cannot profit if it want all udgement as a deaf man can never profit to become a lutenist because he hath in himself no judgement of harmony by which he may discerne whether he do profit therefore our soul hath a concreated judgement without which it could not profit This judging power is naturally concreated with the mind by which of it self it judgeth whether discourses be weak strong or concluding Which power if Plato called a concreated notion he was not out of the way at all Phil. How clear is thy delivery which every man that hears is forced to assent unto These things must be diligently marked for we plainly find a spirit in our mind speaking and judging this good that just the other true and reprehending us if we decline from the just which speech and judgement it learned not and therefore it is connate or concreate Id. By this we
prove that the mind is that power which though it want all notionall form yet being stired up can assimilate it self to every form and make notions of all things like after a manner to a sound eye which is in darkness and never saw the light for it wanteth all actuall notion of visible things yet comming into light and being stirred up it assimilates it selfe to the thing visible that it may make a notion Ora. Plato saith that judgement is then required when the sence ministers contrary things at once Id. He spake subtilly for when the touch confusedly finds hard and so ft or heavy and light one contrary in another then there is recourse to the understanding that it may judge of the quiddity of both so confusedly perceived that there are many things discreet So when the sight confusedly sees great and little is there not need of the discretive judgement of the understanding what is great and what little but if the sence were of it self sufficient there would no recourse be had to the judgements of the understanding as in the sight of that which is light when there is nothing presented which is contrary to it CHAP. V. How the minde is a living substance created in the body and of the manner how whether ther reason be in bruit beast and how the living minde is the description of the eternall wisdome Phil. ALmost all the Peripateticks say that the understanding which thou seemest to call the minde is a certain power of the Soul and that to understand is an accident what sayest thou to it Id. The minde is a living substance which we finde by experience doth inwardly speak and judge in us and which of all spirituall powers that we finde in our selves is more then any other power assimulated and made like to the infinite substance an absolute forme The office of the mind in this body to quicken it and from hence it is called the soul wherefore the minde is a substantiall forme or a power that after its fastion complicates in it selfe all things and by quickning the living soul whereby it animates the body complicates the vegetative and sensitive life and the power discoursive and intellectual and intelligible Phil. Wilt thou have the minde which thou confest to be also the intellectuall soul to have been before the body and afterwards incorporated as Pythagoras and the Platonists meane Id. In nature not in time for I compared it as thou hardest to the sight in darknesse now the sight was not actually before the eye but onely in nature wherefore because the minde is a certaine divine seed that by its own power doth notionally complicate the Samplers of all things therefore is it by God from whom it hath this power in asmuch as it received its being at the same time placed and in a convenient earth where it may bring forth fruit and of it selfe notionally explicate the university of things otherwise this seminall power had been given it in vaine if there had not been given withall oppertunity to break into act Phil. Thou speakest weightily But I much desire to heare how this is done in us Id. The divine manners or waies are never to be reached precisely yet wee make guesses and conjectures of them some more cleare and some more darke ones I thinke this similitude which I will tell thee sufficient For thou knowest that the fight by its owne proper nature doth not discern but in a certaine Globe and confusedly perceives the obectacle meeting it within the speare of its motion the eye which objectacle is generated by the multiplication of the species of the object into the eye Therefore if the sight be present in the eye with out discretion as in infants where the use of discretion is wanting then the minde comes so to the sensible soul as discretion to the sight by which it judgeth between colours And as this visive disc etion is found in perfect brute living wights as in Dogs that know their owne masters by sight and is by God given unto the sight as the perfection and forme of seeing so unto mans nature besides that discretion which is found in bruits there is given a higher power that is unto annimall discretion ust as that is to the sensible power so that the minde is the forme of the annimall discretion and the perfection thereof Phi. Exceedingly well and sweetly but me thinks thou drawest somewhat near the oppinion of the wise Philo that said there was reason in beasts Id. We finde by experience that there is in brute beasts a descretive discourse without which their nature could not well subsist Whereupon their discourse because it wants the forme namely the understanding or minde is confused for it wants judgement and knowledge and because all discretion is from reason therefore Philo seemes to have said as he did not without reason or absurdly Phil. Declare I pray thee how the minde is the forme of the discoursing reason Id. I have already told thee that as the sight seeth and knoweth not what it seeth without discretion to informe enlighten and perfect it so reason syllogyzeth and knoweth not what it syllogizeth without the minde but the mind enforms enlightens and perfects raciocination or discourse that may know what it syllogizeth as if an Idiot not knowing the power of words should read some booke reading proceeds from the force of reason for he readeth by running through the difference of letters which he compounds and devideth and this is the worke of reason and yet bee knoweth not what he reads and let there be another which reads and knowes and understands what hee reads This is a certaine similitude of reason confused and reason formed by the minde for the minde hath the descretive judgement of the reasons which reason is good and which is sophisticall so that the minde is the discretive forme of reasons as reason is the discretive forme of sences and imaginations Phil. From whence hath the minde this judgement for she seeme to give judgement of all things Id. It hath it from hence because it is the image of the Samplar of all things for God is the Samplar of all things Therefore whereas the Smplar of all things shineth in the minde as the truth in the image it hath in it selfe that where it looketh and according to which it giveth judgement of outward things as if there were a living Law written that Law because living would read in it self the things that are to be judged Right so the minde is a living description of the eternall and infinite wisdome but in cur minds from the beginning that life is like unto one that is a sleepe untill it be stirred up by admiration proceeding from sensible things to be moved then by the motion of its intellectual life it finds described in it self that which it seeketh But thou must understand that this description is a resplendance or shining of the Samplar of all things after
that a number is compounded of the same in regard of the common or universall of that which is divers in regard of singulars or particulars which both are waies of the minds understanding Phil. Go on I pray thee to declare how the minde may be said to be a number moving it selfe Id. I thinke no man can deny but that the minde is a certaine divine living number excellently proportioned to the resplendence of manifesting and shewing of the divine harmony and complicating every sensible rational and intellectual harmony and whatsoever can be better expressed about this matter Insomuch that every number proportion and harmony which proceeds from our minde doth as little reach or come near our minde as our minde doth to the infinite minde For the minde though it be a divine number yet it is so a number that it is a simple unity by its own power putting forth its number So that look what proportion there is between God and his workes the same there is between the workes of the minde and the minde it selfe Phil. There are very many that would have our minde to be of the divine nature and most meerly conjoyned to the divine minde ld I doe not think they meant any otherwise then as I have laid although they had another manner of speaking For between the divine minde and ours there is the same difference that there is between doing and seeing for the divine minde by conceiving creates but ours by conceiving assimilates in making notions or intellectual visions The divine minde is a power making things to be but ours an assimilative power Orat. I see that the Philosopher hath not time enough to satisfie himselfe and therefore I have kept silence a long time I have heard many and very pleasing things yet would I faine heare further how the minde of it selfe puts forth the formes of things by way of assimulation Id. The minde is so assimilative that in the sight it makes it selfe like visible things and in the hearing to audible things in the taste to things tastable in the smell to things odorable in the touch to things tangible in the sense to things sensible in the imagination to things imaginable and in the reason to reasonable things For the image in the absence of sensible things is as some sense without the discretion of sensible things for it conformes it selfe to sensible things absent but confusedly and without discerning of state from state But in reason it conformes it selfe to things with discerning of state from state In all those places our minde is carried in the spirit of the Arteries vvhich being stir'd up by meeting vvith species multipli'd from the objects to the spirits assimilates it selfe by the things to the species that by assimilation it may give judgement of the objects Whereupon that subtile spirit of the Arteries which is enlivened by the minde is so by the minde conform'd unto the similitude of the species which was objected to the motion of the spirit As soft wax is by a man having the use and art of the minde configured unto the thing then presently presented to the work-man for all configurations whether in the art of carving painting or hammering cannot be done without the mind for it is the mind which terminates all things Therefore if we could imagine a piece of wax inform'd by the minde then the minde being within it would configure it or make it like to every figure presented unto it as now the minde of the Artificer being applied from without labours to doe So likewise of clay and every flexible or fashionable thing So in our body the minde according to the various flexiblenesse of the spirits of the Arteries in the Organs makes divers configurations subtile and grosse and one spirit is not configurable to that to which another is because the spirit in the optick nerve cannot be met withall and incountred by the species of sounds but onely by the species of colours therefore is configurable to the species of colours and not of sounds and so of the rest There is likewise another spirit which is configurable to all sensible species which is in the Organ of the imaginative power but after a grosse and indiscreet or undistinguished manner And there is another in the Organ of the ratiocinative or discursive power which is configurable to al sensible things discretly and clearly And all these configurations are assimilations to sensible things when thy are done by the meanes of corporall spirits though never so subtile wherefore when the minde makes these assimilations that it may have the motions of sensible things and so is drownned in the corporall spirit then it acteth as the soul animating a body by which animation the power of a living wight is constituted And hereupon the soul of brute beasts makes the like assimilation after its manner though more confused that it may after its manner attaine to notions But our power of the minde from such notions as these so elicited drawn out by assimilation makes Mechanick arts physicall and logicall conjectures and reacheth things in the manner whereby they are conceived in the possibility of being or matter and in the manner whereby the possibility of being or matter is determined by the forme Wherefore seeing that by these assimilations it reacheth none but the notions of sensible things where the formes of things are not true but shadowed with the variablenesse of matter therefore all such notions are rather conjectures then truth for this cause I say that the notions which are reached by rationall assimilations are uncertain because they are rather according to the images of formes then the truths Afterwards our minde not as drowned in the body which it animates but as it is the minde of it selfe yet in possibility of being united to the body while it lookes unto its immutability makes assimilation of formes not as they are drowned in the matter but as they are in and of themselves and conceives the immutable quiddities of things using it selfe for an instrument without any organicall spirit As whilst it conceives that a circle is a figure from whose center all the lines drawne to the circumference are equall after which manner of being a circle without the minde cannot be in matter for it is impossible there should be given in matter two equall lines and it is lesse possible that such a circle should be figured and therefore a circle in the mind is the Samplar and measure of the truth of a circle in the pavement So wee say that the truth of things in the minde is in the necessity of complexion to wit after the manner that the truth of a thing requireth as we have said of the circle And because the minde as in it selfe and abstracted from matter makes these assimilations therefore it assimilateth it selfe to abstracted formes And according to this power it shewes or puts forth certain mathematicall sciences and finds its power to bee