World is full of disorders Who can resist God but God himself But on the other hand who can be displeased that God loves his Wisdom more than his Work Let all those who love order adore and love his Conduct who makes it his inviolable Law let them love and adore his goodness who being fully sufficient to himself has vouchsafed to form a design of making them eternally happy LVI It may be said perhaps that these Laws are so simple and so fruitful that God must needs prefer them before all others and that loving only his glory his Son must needs become incarnate that thus he has done nothing only for his Elect. I confess that God hath done nothing only for his Elect 1 Cor. 3.23 for St Paul teaches us that he has made his Elect for Christ and J. Christ for himself If to render God Amiable to men he must be made to act only for us or after such a manner as is not the most wise I had rather say nothing than talk at this rate Reason teaches me to render God Amiable by considering him infinitely perfect and representing him so full of Charity for his Creatures that he hath made none of them with a design to render 'em miserable For if all be not so happy as to enjoy his presence it is because order requiring that so great a good should be merited all men do not merit it for Reasons which I have already mentioned Is not this to render God Amiable to represent him such that even the Reprobate cannot but adore his conduct and repent of their negligence Additions Altho Predestination be not founded but upon the prescience of God and the freedom of grace as may be seen in St Aust de dono Pers. from the 17. C. to the end nevertheless the greatest part of men to the Idea which answers to this word fix a divine decree so absolute that one seems to them to oppose free grace when he maintains that God was obliged by reason of his wisdom which he loves invincibly to choose those whom he hath chosen As the Palagians suppose that the reason of Gods choice is to be found in the natural merits of men and St. Augustine with the whole Church having maintained that this depends upon the will of God many imagine that he opposes predestination who asserts that the choice of the Elect depends upon the will of God tho it be a will enlightned and conducted by eternal Wisdom To say that the reason of Gods choice is in man is to be a Pelagian and maintain that grace is given to merits But to assert that the reason of this choice is in the eternal wisdom which is the Law of God or the rule of his proceedings This is to cry out with St. Paul O altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae Scientiae Dei But many men do not understand these words in this sence they pretend that one is chosen and another reprobated meerly because God wills it and that his will is his only reason and that it is upon this account that the Elect are more especially obliged to God It is in condescension to this disposition of mind which I have observed in a great many honest men that I have composed this Article But they who will Meditate a little may easily see what are my thoughts thereof LVII In the mean time to satisfie those who suppose that God has predestinated every one of the Elect by a particular will it may be said without injuring the sentiment which I have Proposed that God before he created Souls to unite them to bodys foresaw all that should happen to them according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace and all that they should do in all possible circumstances Thus according to this supposition it being in his power to create the Soul of Paul or that of Peter and to unite it to such a body which he foresaw would be the body of one of the predestinated he resolved from all Eternity to create the Soul of Paul thro' the good will he had for him and to predestinate him by this choice to Eternal Life Whereas he creates the Soul of Peter and unites it to another body by a kind of necessity by reason of the Laws of Union of Souls with Bodies which he has very wisely established for as soon as Bodies are made he has obliged himself to unite Souls unto them which was advantageous for all before sin Now the Body of Peter being begotten by an Heathen Father or by a Father who has no care to Educate his Children or lastly Peter by Birth finding himself engaged in times places and employments which led him to that which is evil he will infallibly be amongst the reprobate In the mean time Peter will be useful to the designs of God for tho he himself does not make one of the Predestinated yet some of his posterity may He will promote the Beauty and Greatness of the Church of Jesus Christ by the many relations he will have to the Elect. In short he will not be miserable but proportionably to the ill use which he shall have made of his liberty For God does not punish with grief any but voluntary irregularities This is all I can say to satisfie the inclination of some persons But I do not clearly see that any one ought to stop here LVIII They who pretend that God has particular designs and wills for all the particular effects which are produced in consequence of general Laws do ordinarily make use of the authority of Scripture whereon to found their opinion Now seeing Scripture is made for all the World for the simple as well as for the learned it is full of Anthropologies It gives to God not only a Body a Throne a Chariot an Equipage the passions of Joy of Sadness of Anger Repentance and other motions of the soul but also attributes unto him those ways of acting which are usual among men that it may speak to the Vulgar after the most sensible manner If J. C. was made Man this was partly to satisfie the inclination of men who love that which resembles them and attend to that which affects them It is to persuade them by this true and real kind of Anthropology of those truths which they would not have been able to comprehend Thus St. Paul to accommodate himself to all men speaks of the Sanctification and predestination of the Saints as if God continually acted in them by particular wills And even J. C. himself speaks of his Father as if he did by such wills adorn the the Lilies and preserve even the hairs of the heads of his Disciples because in truth the goodness of God towards his Creatures being extream these expressions give a great Idea thereof and render God amiable even to those minds which are most gross and have most of self love in them Nevertheless since by the Idea which we have of God and by those
themselves to his mind very clearly without putting him to any trouble Now the soul of J. C. is personally united to the Word and the Word as the Word contains all possible being with their relations he contains all immutable necessary eternal truths J. C. as man can no sooner think of any truths but they are instantly discovered to his mind J. C. therefore knows all Sciences he knows all possible things since he may without any effort of mind see all that the Word contains as the Word For the same reason J. C. knows all the divine Perfections since the Word is a substantial representation of the divine Nature and the Father communicates to his Son all his Substance He knows even the Existence the Modifications the relations of the Creatures but by a kind of revelation which the Father gives to him whensoever he desires him according to those words of J. C. himself I know O Father that thou always hearest me For since the creatures are not the necessary emanations of the Divinity the Word as the Word does truly represent their Nature or Essence but not their Existence for their Existence depends upon the free will of the Creator which the Word meerly as the Word does not contain seeing the Divine Decrees are common to all the three Persons Thus the Existence of the Creatures cannot be known but by a kind of Revelation J. C. therefore as man knows all things In him are hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God but he does not actually think upon all things and this is evident For the soul of J. C. has not the capacity of an infinite mind And those who maintain that there are no succession of thoughts in J. C. and that he always knows whatsoever he does know thinking to attribute to the soul of J. C. a sort of immutability which is due only to God they necessarily make him liable to very great ignorance See the proof of this It is certain that natural effects are combined amongst themselves and with those of Grace after an infinitely infinite manner and that these combinations are every moment changed after infinite ways by reason of the mutability of Mens wills and the irregular course of the animal Spirits which change all our traces and all our Ideas in consequence of the Laws of Union of Soul and Body Now the capacity of thinking which the Soul of J. C. has as Man is finite Therefore if he knew or always actually thought upon that which he knows he must necessarily be ignorant of an infinite number of things Furthermore it is certain that the properties of numbers are not only infinite but infinitely infinite That in respect of Figures there may be for example an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds each of their sides being capable of being lengthned or shortned to infinity Now to say that J. C. knows not the properties of such Triangles or the relation of one of their sides or its Square or its Cube or its Quadrata-quadrate c. with other Sides or their Squares or their Cubes or their Quadrata-quadrates c. this is to suppose that J. C. is ignorant of that which the Geometricians know But if it be maintained that J. C. as Man always actually knows every thing that he knows it is necessary that he be ignorant of an infinite number of the properties of these Triangles Nevertheless let us suppose that Natural effects are not combined with the effects of Grace and that likewise all the thoughts of men their circumstances their combinations were something finite which the mind of man might discern all at once certainly to suppose that the Soul of J. C. does always think of them is to give unto him a very useless and troublesome knowledge It is troublesome for that which renders the soul of J. C. happy is the contemplation of the perfection of the Sovereign good Now the knowledge of all the Chimaeraes which do have and shall pass in our minds according to this supposition continually distracting the capacity of the soul of J. C. otherwise entertain'd in beholding the Beauties and tasting the sweetness of the chief Good would not be very agreeable to him For it must be observed that it is one thing to see God and another thing to see the Creatures and their modifications in God I think I have demonstrated that we see all in God in this life but this is not to see God or to enjoy him Thus it cannot be said that J. C. sees all our thoughts without dividing his capacity of thinking because he sees them all in God This actual knowledge therefore which some wou'd give to J. C. is troublesome for it is very irksome to think actually upon those things upon which we do not desire to think of A Geometrician who should have found out the Squaring of a Circle or any other more surprising Truth wou'd be very miserable should it be always present to his mind J. C. has an Object more worthy of his application than the modification of the Creatures therefore always to have an actual knowledge of our thoughts and needs pass'd and future would be very troublesome Moreover it would be altogether useless to him and to us Certainly it is sufficient that J. C. thinks of assisting me when I shall have need without thinking thereof for two or three Thousand years or rather from all Eternity For J. C. must actually think thereof from all Eternity if there be no succession of thoughts in his soul As in the Treatise of Nature and Grace which I composed for those Persons who are not over credulous I resolved not to propose any Principles which might be contested and since if I had supposed that the soul of J. C. had actually known all things my supposition might have been opposed by the reasons which I have produced and perhaps by others better I have therefore only supposed that J. C. has a clear Idea of the soul and the modifications of which it is capable to produce a noble effect in the Temple which he builds to the glory of his Father that which Reason and Faith do demonstrate Thus I suppose J. C. to act in consequence of this only supposition in the XIII XIV XV XVI Articles where I compare him to an Architect and to a Soul which should have power to form all the parts of its Body For as an Architect may form a Design and build an Edifice without concerning himself from whence the materials come he employs therein so J.C. by his union with the Word may form his designs and desires without thinking on the actual dispositions of all men He hath admonished them by his Counsels in his Gospel to put themselves in such a condition that Grace may not be useless to them It becomes him not to order his desires the distributive causes of his Graces according to the negligence or wickedness of men but according to the condition
better understood It seems to me that what I have hitherto said of Nature and Grace is sufficient to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons concerning an infinite number of Difficulties which disturb the Minds of those only who judge of God by themselves For if we do faithfully consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being of a general Cause of an infinite Wisdom and if the Principles I have establish'd of this Idea be granted I believe none will be surprized or offended with God's Conduct and that instead of condemning or murmuring at it Men will not forbear to admire and adore it The Third Discourse Of Grace and the Manner by which it Acts in us The First Part. Of Liberty I. THere is nothing more uncomely than the substance of Spirits if they are separated from God For what is a Mind without Understanding and Reason without Motion and Love In the mean time the Word and Wisdom of God is the Universal Reason of Spirits it is the Love by which God loves himself which gives to the Soul all the motion that it has towards happiness The Mind cannot know the Truth but by its natural and necessary union with Truth its self it cannot be reasonable but by reason in short it cannot in some sence be a Mind and Understanding but because its Substance is enlightned penetrated and perfected by the Light of God himself I have elsewhere explain'd these Truths Book III. of the Searchafter Truth and in the Explication of the Nature of Ideas As the substance of the Soul is not capable of loving that which is good but by its natural and necessary union with the eternal and substantial Love of the Soveraign Good so it moves not towards that which is good but so far forth as God carries it it is not Will but by the motion which God continually imprints upon it it lives not but by charity it wills not but by the love of good which God imparts unto it tho' it abuses it For in truth as God neither makes nor preserves Minds but for himself so he carries them towards himself as long as he preserves their being he communicates the love of happiness to them as far as they are capable Now this natural and continual motion of the Soul towards good in general towards good undetermined that is towards God is that which I here call the Will because it is this motion which makes the Soul capable of loving different goods II. This natural motion of the Soul towards good in general is invincible for it is not in our power to chuse not to be happy We necessarily love that we clearly know and sensibly feel to be the true good All minds love God by the necessity of their nature and if they love any thing but God by the free choice of the will it is not because they do not seek after God or the cause of their happiness but because having a confused sence that Bodies about them make them happy they look upon them as their Goods and by a natural and ordinary consequence love them and unite themselves to them III. But the love of all these particular goods is not naturally invincible Man considered as God made him may hinder himself from loving those goods which do not fill the whole capacity he has of loving Seeing there is a good which contains all others Man may sacrifice to the love of this good all other loves for God having made minds for himself he cannot engage them invincibly to love any thing but himself or with relation to himself The inward sentiment which we have of our selves teaches us that we may for example refuse any fruit tho we are inclin'd to receive it Now this power of loving or not loving particular goods this non-invincibility which is in that motion which carries the minds to love that which does not seem to them to contain all goods this power this non-invincibility is that which I call liberty Thus by putting the definition in the place of the thing defin'd this expression Our will is free signifies that the natural motion of our Soul towards good in general is not invincible in respect of any particular good We do also to this word free joyn the Idea of voluntary but hereafter I shall take this word in the sense which I have observ'd because this is most natural and most ordinary IV. The word good is equivocal it may signifie either pleasure which makes Men formally happy or else the true or apparent cause of pleasure I shall in this Discourse always take the word good in the second sense because in truth pleasure is imprinted upon the Soul to the end that she may love the cause of her happiness that by the motion of her love she may be carried towards it and be straitly united thereunto and so be continually happy When the Soul loves nothing but her pleasure she truly loves nothing but her self for pleasure is only a condition or modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy Now since the Soul cannot be to her self the cause of her happiness she is unjust she is ungrateful she is blind if she loves her pleasure without paying that love and respect which is due to the true cause which produces it in her Since there is none but God who can immediately and by himself act upon the Soul and make her feel pleasure by the actual efficacy of his Almighty Will there is none but he who can be truly good Nevertheless I call the creatures which are the apparent causes of those pleasures which they occasion in us by the name of goods For I would not avoid the ordinary way of speaking but as far as it is necessary clearly to express my self All the creatures tho good in themselves and perfect in respect of God's designs are not good in respect to us I mean they are not our good because they are not the true causes of our pleasure or our happiness V. The natural motion which God continually imprints upon the Soul to engage it to love him or to use a term which expresses several Ideas and which can neither be equivocal nor confused after the definition I have given thereof the will is determined towards particular goods either by clear and distinct knowledge or by a confused sentiment which shews us these goods If the mind neither sees nor tastes any particular good the motion of the Soul continues as it were undetermin'd it tends towards good in general But this motion receives a particular determination as soon as the mind has an idea or sentiment of any particular good for the Soul being incessantly moved towards good indetermin'd she must be moved as soon as any object seems to be good to her VI. Now when the good which is present to the Understanding and Senses does not altogether fill these two faculties when it appears under the idea of a particular good which does not contain all
passages of Scripture which agree with this Idea we correct the sence of some other places which ascribe unto God members or passions like unto ours So when we wou'd speak exactly of the manner of Gods acting in the order of Nature or grace we ought to explain the passages which make him act as a man or a particular cause by that Idea which we have of his wisdom and his goodness and by other places of Scripture which are agreable to this Idea For in conclusion if the Idea which we have of God permits nay obliges to say that he does not cause every drop of rain to fall by particular wills tho this sentiment is authorized by the natural sence of some places of Scripture there is the like necessity to think that notwithstanding certain authorities of the same Scripture God does not give to some sinners by particular wills all those good motions which are of no effect to them and yet to several others wou'd be effectual because otherwise it seems impossible to me to make the Holy Scripture agree either with reason or with its self as I think I have proved LIX If I thought that what I have already said was not sufficient to convince considering persons that God acts not by particular wills as particular causes or limited understandings do I should proceed to shew that there are few truths whereof more proofs may be given supposing it granted that God governs the World and that the Nature of HEATHEN PHILOSOPHERS is but a Chimaera For in truth nothing is done in the World which doth not prove this sentiment Miracles only excepted which nevertheless wou'd not be Miracles different from the effects which are called natural if it was true that God ordinarily acts by particular wills since Miracles are not such but because they happen not according to general Laws Thus do Miracles suppose these Laws and prove the sentiment which I have laid down but as for ordinary effects they clearly and directly demonstrate general Laws or Wills For example if a stone be let fall upon the head of one that passes by the stone will always fall with equal swiftness without distinguishing either the piety or the quality the good or evil dispositions of the passenger If any other effect be examined we shall see the same constancy in the action of the cause which produces it But no effect proves that God acts by particular wills tho men often imagine that God works Miracles every moment for their sakes Since the way by which they wou'd have God to act is agreable to ours since it flatters self-love which refers all things to its self since it comports well with the ignorance we are in of the combination of occasional causes which produce extraordinary effects it naturally enters into the mind when we do not sufficiently study Nature and consult with attention enough the abstracted Idea of an infinite Wisdom of an Universal Cause of a Being infinitely perfect Additions Let me be permitted to desire of the Reader that he do meditate some time upon this first Discourse before he reads that which follows The Second Discourse Of the Laws of Grace in particular and of the Occasional Causes which Govern and Determin their Efficacy First Part. Of the Grace of Jesus Christ Additions Before this 2d Dis read 3d. C. of 2d P. of Search after Truth and the Expli of the same C. where the Author opposes the Efficacy of pretended second causes I Have proved in the First Discourse the necessity of Occasional Causes in the Order of Grace as well as in that of Nature and I don't think that which I have written can be distinctly understood but it must be granted But now I am about to prove by those arguments which Faith supplies that Jesus Christ is this cause Since this is of the greatest consequence clearly to understand the principles of Religion and to make us draw near with confidence to the true Propitiatory or the occasional cause which never fails to determine the efficacy of the general Law of Grace I think I may require the Reader to Meditate upon this Second Discourse with all diligence and without prejudice I. Since there is none but God who acts immediately and by himself upon Spirits who produces in them all the different Modifications whereof they are capable it is he alone who enlightens our minds and inspires us with certain sentiments which determine our divers wills Thus there is none but God who can as the * By the true cause I understand the Cause which Acts by its own strength true cause produce grace in our Souls For the principle of all the regular motions of our love is necessarily either knowledge which teaches us or a sentiment which convinces us that God is our happiness since we never begin to love any object if we do not either clearly see by the light of Reason or confusedly feel by the taste of pleasure that the object is good I mean capable of rendring us more happy than we are II. But seeing all men are engaged in Original sin and all even by their nature infinitely below God it is only J. Christ who by the dignity of his Person and the holiness of his Sacrifice could have access to his Father reconcile us to him and merit his favours for us Thus it is J. C. only who cou'd be the Meritorous cause of Grace These truths are agreed on But we do not seek after the cause which Produces Grace by its proper efficacy nor that which merits it by his sacrifice and good works we seek after that which regulates and determines the efficacy of the general cause that which may be called the second particular and occasional III. For that the general cause may act by general Laws or Wills and that his action may be regular constant and uniform it is absolutely necessary that there be an occasional cause which determines the efficacy of these Laws and serves to establish them If the percussion of bodies or some such thing did not determine the EFFICACY of general LAWS of the Communication of motions it would be necessary that God should move bodies by particular wills The Laws of the union of the Soul and Body are made efficacious only by the changes which happen in each of these substances For if God should make the Soul feel a pungent pain tho the body was not pricked or if the brain shou'd not be moved as if the body was pricked he wou'd not act by the general Laws of the union between Soul and body but by a particular will If it shou'd rain upon the Earth any other ways but by the necessary consequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions the rain and the fall of each drop that composes it would be the effect of a particular will Insomuch that if order did not require that it should rain this will would be altogether unworthy of God It is therefore
necessary that in the order of Grace there be some occasional cause which establishes these Laws and determines the efficacy of them and this is that cause which we must endeavour to find out IV. Tho we never so little consult the Idea of Intelligible order or consider the sensible order which appears in the works of God we clearly discover that the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of the general Laws and establish them must necessarily have relation to the design for which God appoints these Laws For example we see by experience that God has not and Reason convinces us that he ought not to have made the motions of the Planets the occasional causes of the union of soul and body He could not have willed that our Arm shou'd be moved after such and such a manner nor the soul suffer the pain of the Tooth-ach at the time of the Moons conjunction with the Sun if this conjunction does not act upon the body The design of God being to unite the Soul to the Body he cou'd not give to the Soul the sentiments of grief but when some changes happen in the body which are contrary to it Thus we ought not to seek any where else but in the Soul and in the Body the occasional causes of their union V. Hence it follows that God having a design to form his Church by J. C. could not according to this design seek any where else but in J. C. and the Creatures united by reason to J. C. the occasional causes which serve to establish the general Laws of Grace by which the spirit of J. C. is shed upon his Members and communicates unto them his Life and Holiness Thus Grace is not showered down upon our hearts according to the divers scituation of the Stars nor according to the meeting of several bodies nor even according to the different motion of the animal spirits which give unto us motion and life No bodies can excite in us any motions and sentiments but what are purely natural for all that comes to the soul by the body is only for the body The Angels themselves are not made occasional causes of inward grace They are as well as we Members of that body of which J. C. alone is the Head they are Ministers of J. C. for the salvation of the Saints I grant that they may produce some change in the bodies which surround us and even in that which we animate and that thus they may remove some impediments of the efficacy of Grace But certainly they cannot distribute to men such a precious gift they have not immediate power over the minds of men which by their nature are equal to them To conclude St Paul teaches us Heb. 11.5 to believe that God has not subjected to them the future World or the Church of J. C. Thus the occasional cause of Grace cannot be found but in J. C. or in man VI. But seeing it is certain that grace is not granted to all those that desire it nor as soon as they desire it and it is often given to those who do not ask it it follows that even our desires are not the occasional cause of Grace For this kind of causes always have readily their effect and without them the effect is never produced For example the striking of bodies upon one another being the occasional cause of the change which happens in their motion if two bodies do not meet one another their motions are not changed and if they be changed we may be assured that they did The general Laws by which Grace is poured into our hearts do find nothing in our wills which may determine their efficacy like as the general Laws which govern the rains are not founded upon the dispositions of the places where it rains For whither Lands lye Fallow or whither they be cultivated it rains indifferently in all places even upon Sands and in the Sea VII We are then brought to maintain that since none but J. C. cou'd merit grace there is likewise none but he who cou'd give the occasions of the general Laws according to which it is given to men For the principle of the foundation of general Laws or that which determines their efficacy being necessarily either in us or in J. C. since it is certain it is not in us for the reasons above mentioned it must needs be found in J. C. Thus it was necessary that God after sin should have no regard to our wills Being all in disorder we cou'd no more be the occasion of Gods giving us Grace A Mediator therefore was necessary not only to give us access to God but also to be the natural or occasional cause of those favours we hope to receive from him VIII Since God designed to make his Son the Head of his Church it was convenient he should make him the natural or occasional cause of Grace which sanctifies it for it is from the Head that Life and motion ought to be given to the members And it was even with this foresight that God permitted sin for if man had continued in his Innocence without being assisted by the Grace of J. C. seeing his wills wou'd have merited Grace and even Glory God should have established in man the occasional cause of his perfection and happiness The inviolable Law of order requires this so that J. C. wou'd not have been the Head of his Church or such an Head whose influences the Members wou'd have had no need of IX If our soul had been in our body before it was form'd and all the parts which compose it disposed of according to our different wills with how many divers sentiments and motions wou'd she have been affected by all the effects which she would have known ought to have followed from her wills especially if she had had an extream desire to have made a more Vigorous and better form'd body Eph. I. 22 23. IV. 16. Col. 11.19 Act. IX 5. Col I. 24. 1 Cor. XII 27. c. Now the Holy Scripture does not only say that J. C. is the Head of the Church but it also teaches us that he begot it that he form'd it that he nourishes it that he suffered in it that he merits in it that he acts and influences it without ceasing The zeal which J. C. has for the glory of his Father and the love he bears to his Church inspires him continually with a desire of making it the most ample the most magnisicent and the most perfect he can possibly Thus seeing the soul of J. C. has not an infinite capacity and yet desires to give infinite beauties and ornaments to his Church we have all the reason to believe that there is a continual succession of thoughts and desires in his Soul in respect of his Mystical body which he continually forms X. Now these continual desires of the Soul of Jesus which sanctifie the Church and render it worthy of the Majesty of his Father
God hath made the occasional causes of the efficacy of the general Laws of Grace For Faith teaches us that God hath given to his Son an absolute power over Men by making him the Head of his Church and this cannot be conceived if the different wills of J. C. be not followed by their effects For it is visible I should have no power over mine arm if it should move it self whether I would or no and if when I desire to move it it should remain as if it was dead and without motion XI J. C. has merited his Sovereign power over men and this quality of Head of the Church by the Sacrifice he offered upon Earth and after his Resurrection he took full possession of this right Ioh. VII 39. 'T is upon this account that he is now Sovereign Priest of future good things and that by his many intercessions he continually prays unto the Father in the behalf of men Heb. 7.25 Rom. 8.34 1 Joh. II. 1. Joh. XI 42. And seeing his desires are occasional causes his prayers are always heard his Father denies him nothing as the Scripture teaches us Nevertheless he must pray and desire that he may obtain For the occasional physical natural causes for all these words signifie the same thing have no power of themselves to do any thing and all creatures even J. C. himself considered as man are in themselves nothing but weakness and impotence Additions I don't think that hitherto there is any difficulty if it be not in this last Article where I say that J. C. prayeth unto his Father for there are some Persons whom this very much offends For I speak as St. Paul to the Romans and to the Hebrews and as Jesus Christ himself I will pray the Father and he shall give you another Comforter which is to be understood of J. C. after his resurrection according to these words of St. John The spirit was not yet given because Jesus was not yet glorified For the Spirit fell not upon the Apostles till Ten days after J. C. was entered into the Holy of Holies a Sovereign Priest of true good things In all these Articles I speak only of J. C. as to his humanity according to which he received all power in Heaven and Earth because all his prayers or his desires which certainly are in his power or otherwise he has no power are executed in consequence of his qualities as Sovereign Priest of the House of God King of Israel Architect of the Eternal Temple Mediator betwixt God and men Head of the Church or to speak like the Philosophers for whom I chiefly write this Treatise the occasional natural or distributive cause of Grace The cause which Determines the Efficacy of the general Law by which God wou'd save all men in his Son XII J. C. having then successively divers thoughts in relation to the divers dispositions whereof Souls in general are capable these divers thoughts are accompanyed with certain desires in relation to the Sanctification of these Souls Now these desires being the occasional causes of Grace they must pour it down upon those persons in particular whose dispositions resemble that upon which the Soul of J. C. actually thinks And this Grace must be so much the stronger and more abundant as these desires of J. C. are greater and more lasting XIII When a person considers any part of his body which is not form'd as it ought to be he has naturally certain desires in relation to this part and the use he desires to make of it in common life and these desires are followed by certain insensible motions of the animal Spirits which tend to give that proportion or disposition to this part which we desire it shou'd have When the Body is altogether form'd and the flesh firm the motions change nothing in the construction of the parts they can only give them certain dispositions which are called Corporeal habits But when the body is not altogether form'd and the flesh is very soft and tender these motions which accompany the desires of the Soul do not only give the body certain particular dispositions but may also change the construction thereof This sufficiently appears by Children in the Womb for they are not only moved with the same passions as there Mothers but they also receive the marks of these passions in their bodies from which yet the Mothers are always free XIV The Mystical body of J. C. is not yet a perfect man Eph. IV. 13. it will not be so till the end of the world J. C. forms it continually for it is from the Head the whole body joyned together receives nourishment by the efficacy of his influence according to the measure which is proper to every one to the end it may be form'd and edified in love These are the truths which St Paul teaches us Now since the soul of J. C. has no other action but the divers motions of its heart 't is necessary that these desires be succeeded by the influence of grace which only can form J. C. in his Members and give them that beauty and proportion which must be the eternal object of the divine Love XV. The divers motions of the soul of J. C. being the occasional causes of Grace we ought not to be surprised if it be sometimes given to great sinners or those who make no use of it For the soul of J. C. designing to raise a Temple of vast extent and infinite beauty may desire that Grace may be given to the greatest sinners and if in this moment J. C. thinks actually for example upon Covetous persons the Covetous shall receive Grace Or else J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain merit for the construction of his Church which is not ordinarily acquired but by those who suffer certain persecutions of which the passions of men are the natural principle In a word J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain character for bringing to pass certain effects in his Church may in general apply himself to them by this application bestow upon them the Grace which sanctifies In like manner as the mind of an Architect thinks in general upon square stones for example when these sort of stones are actually necessary for his building XVI But as the soul of J. C. is not a general cause there is reason to think that it often has particular desires in respect of certain particular persons When we pretend to speak exactly of God we ought not to consult our selves and make him act as we do we ought to consult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect and make him act according to this Idea but when we speak of the action of the soul of Jesus we may consult our selves we may suppose it to act as particular causes would act which yet are joyned to eternal wisdom We have reason for example to believe that the calling of St. Paul was the effect of the efficacy of a particular
desire of J. Christ We may also look upon the desires of the soul of J. C. which generally relate to all the minds of one certain character as particular desires tho they comprehend many persons because these desires change every moment as those of particular causes do But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same because his wills must be firm and constant seeing his wisdom is infinite as I have shewn in the first Discourse Additions I think I have demonstrated that J. C. as man is the occasional cause of Grace Now since God acts not if Order doth not require or some occasional cause determine him thereunto and that in respect of Grace altogether free Order never requires that God shou'd give it seeing it cannot be merited 'T is evident that all the difficulties which we find in the distribution of Grace must be ascribed to J. C. as man This is that which I have already done in a general way for it was not at all necessary that I should particularly justifie the wisdom and goodness of God which was my only design in the construction of his Church as I did at first advertise But that the minds least able to discern the usefulness of the principles laid down may not fail to apprehend it I shall endeavour as clearly as possibly I can to shew the consequences which may be drawn from these principles There are many difficulties in vindicating Gods Conduct in his way of distributing the rain of Grace as well as in that by which he sends down the ordinary rain the chief of which are that it is not always proportioned to the need of sinners and that even in respect to the just tho it answer their necessities yet it does not always hinder them from falling into disorder God is wise he wills the conversion of sinners he has sworn so by his Prophet A Being infinitely wise proportions the means to the end How then can it be that the Grace which the sinner receives shou'd not be strong enough to make him quit his sin Or to take away all equivocation Why shou'd not such an Infant be Baptised Why should there be so many Nations who know not J. C. It is easily comprehended by what I have said in the first Discourse that this is a consequence of the simplicity of Gods ways and must proceed from the occasional cause which God has established for the executing his design after such a manner as best resembles his Divine Attributes For if it rains upon the High-ways upon the Sand upon the Sea as well as upon the Sown Lands it is because these rains are necessary consequences of the simplicity of those ways which God has established for making the Earth Fruitful But whence does it proceed that J. C. who is an intelligent occasional cause abandons so many sinners and so many nations Or to come to the greatest difficulty Whence is it that J. C. forsakes even the just the members of his body who are straight united to him by charity For as to sinners and they who do not call upon him it may be said that he neglects them as unworthy of his care But whence comes it to pass that he gives to the just exposed to temptation such a Grace which he well foresaw notwithstanding his assistance wou'd be overcome This Grace was altogether sufficient I grant and that it only depended upon the just to make it efficacious But why did not J. C. give it more force since he foresaw the fall of one of his well-beloved Children If my principle can clear up these difficulties without injuring the love of J. C. towards men as well as it defends the wisdom and goodness of God against the reasonings of Libertines certainly the consequences thereof will be very advantageous to Religion This is that which I am about to examine J. C. may be considered according to two respects one as Architect of the Eternal Temple the other as Head of the Church I have partly explained the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect because this manifested the fruitfulness and necessity of my principle But I wou'd not speak of the way by which he acts as Head of the Church by reason of the difficulty of the fall of the just which supposes certain things whereof I thought not then to speak That I may explain more particularly the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect upon the materials which do not as yet make part of his Temple and as Head in respect of the Just who are members of his Body I am obliged to say what I think concerning the holy Soul of J. C. which regulates all his desires with respect nevertheless to the divine Law the immutable and necessary order for the wills of J. C. are always agreeable to those of his Father Tho several of the * Athan. Orat. 4. in Arianos S. Iren Lib. V. S. Basil Ep. 391. ad Amphil. S. Greg. Naz. Orat 36. S. Cyr. of Alex. Thres lib. 9. C. 4. Theod Tom. 4. p. 731. Fathers and those especially who wrote against the Arrians as Athanasius were contented to attribute to Jesus Christ as God the knowledge of all things and expounded concerning J. C. as man that which St. Mark reports The Day of the Lord knoweth no Man no not the Son of Man himself and some of them feared not even to say that Ignorance is one of the defects of Humane Nature which J. C. took for our sakes Nevertheless I am far from this thought For I am perswaded that J. C. as man knows all Sciences and hath a perfect knowledge of all things that he not only knows all the Beings which God hath created with all their Modifications and all their relations but also upon much greater reason all those which God can create In a word all that which God contains in the immensity of his Being I say that J. C. knows upon much greater reason all possible Creatures than the existence and relation of those which God hath made because he knows the first by the right which his union with the Word which contains them as the Word gives him whereas he knows not the other but by a kind of a Revelation as I shall shew hereafter I believe then that J. C. as man knows all things but it ought to be observ'd that there is a great difference between knowing all things habitually and knowing all things actually between knowing all things and thinking of all things which is almost always confounded There is no man but knows that two and two make four and yet there are but few who actually think of it A Geometrician knows his Enclid but he is often a long time without thinking of any of the propositions of this Author A man knows a truth or Science when by his Labour or otherwise he has gain'd a right thereunto insomuch that he can no sooner think of these things but they immediately present
motions of the Soul of J. C. in their behalf since these same motions never fail of giving it Thus the desires of J. C. alone have infallibly their effect as occasional causes because God having made J. C. Head of the Church it is only by him that the Grace which sanctifies the Elect ought to be given XX. Now we may consider in the Soul of J. C. two sorts of desires actual transient and particular desires the efficacy of which continue but a little time constant and permanent desires which consist in a firm and lasting disposition of the soul of J. C. in relation to certain effects which tend to the execution of his design in general If our soul by its different motions did communicate to our bodies all that which is necessary to form and make it grow we might distinguish therein two kinds of desires for it would send into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits that give it certain dispositions in respect of the present Objects or actual thoughts of the mind by actual and transient desires But it would give to the Heart and the Lungs the natural motions which serve for respiration and circulation of the Blood by stable and permanent desires It would also by such like desires digest its nourishment and distribute it to all the parts which have need thereof because this sort of action is at all times necessary for the preservation of the body XXI By these actual transient and particular desires of the soul of J. C. Grace is given to persons who are not prepared and after a manner which hath something singular and extraordinary in it But it is given regularly by permanent desires to those who worthily receive the Sacraments For the Grace which we receive by the Sacraments is not given meerly by the Merit of our Action tho we receive with fit dispositions it is because of the merits of J.C. which are freely applyed to us in consequence of his permanent desires We receive by the Sacraments much more Grace than our preparation can deserve and it is even sufficient for the receiving some influence thereby that we do not put any impediment But it is also to abuse that which is most holy in Religion to receive them unworthily Additions Since J. C. as man does not act but by his desires and the Grace of the Sacraments is permanent it is evident that the Grace which he communicates to those who receives them worthily comes not from J. C. as the occasional cause If there be not in J. C. a permanent desire or a constant will to do good unto those who come unto the Sacraments there would be no great mistery in them XXII Among the actual and transient desires of the Soul of Jesus there are certainly some which are more lasting and frequent than others and the knowledge of the desires is of very great use in morality Doubtless J. C. thinks oftner upon them who observe his councels than on other men The motions of love which he has for the Faithful are more frequent and lasting than those which he hath for the Libertine and the Wicked And since all the Faithful are not equally disposed to enter into the Church of the predestinated the desires of the Soul of J. C. are not in respect of them all equally lively frequent abiding Man more earnestly desires those fruits which are more proper to nourish his Body he thinks oftner upon Bread and Wine than on those Meats which are difficultly digested J. C. having a design to form his Church ought therefore to concern himself more for those who may easily enter therein than for those who are very far from it Thus the H. Scripture teaches us that the humble the poor the penitent receive greater Graces than other men because they who dispise Honours Riches and Pleasures are much fitter for the Kingdom of God They who according to the example of J. C. have learnt to be meek and humble in heart shall find rest to their souls The yoak of J. C. which the Proud can't bear will become easie and light by the assistance of Grace For God hears the Prayers of the Humble he will comfort them he will justifie them he will save them he will heap Blessings upon them but he will bring down the Haughtiness of the Proud Blessed are the Poor in spirit for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven But Cursed are the Rich for they have received their Consolation in this World How hard is it says J C. for the Rich to enter into the Kingdom of GOD It is easier for a Camel to pass thro' the eye of a Needle Which cannot be without a Miracle As for them who like David humble their souls with Fasting put on Sack-cloath In a word afflict themselves at the sight of their Sins and the Holiness of God will become fit objects for the compassion of J. C. for God never will dispise an humble and a contrite Heart We always disarm his wrath when we prefer the interests of God before our own and take vengeance upon our selves XXIII Since the will of J. C. is altogether agreeable to Order of which all men have naturally some Idea it may further be discern'd by Reason that the soul of J. C. has more thoughts and desires in respect of some Persons than others For Order requires that J. C. should bestow more Graces for example upon those who are called to H. Orders than those whose vocation necessarily engages them in the business of the World In a word upon those who make the principal parts of the body of the Church Militant than they who have not the oversight of any or are engaged in the Ecclesiastical Function and raise themselves above others by ambition or interest For if it be fit that J. C. give Graces unto these in respect of the Persons whom they govern yet they don't deserve such as may sanctify them in that state which they have chosen by self-love They may have the gift of Prophecy without having that of Charity as Scripture teaches us XXIV We have proved that the different desires of the soul of J. C. are the occasional causes of Grace and we have endeavoured to discover something of these desires Let us now see of what kind of Grace they are the occasional causes For tho J. C. be the Meritorious cause of all graces it is not necessary he should be the occasional cause of the graces of knowledge and certain outward Graces which prepare the heart for conversion but cannot effect it for J. C. is always the occasional or necessary cause according to the order established by God in respect of all Graces which conduce to men salvation XXV Distinctly to understand what is the grace which J. C. as Head of his Church bestows upon his Members we must know what is the concupiscence which the first man has communicated to all his Posterity For the second Adam came to cure the disorders which
the first had caused and there is such a relation between the Sinful and Earthly Adam and the Innocent and Heavenly Adam that St. Rom. V. 14 17 18 19. 1 Cor. 15 48. Paul looks upon the first communicating sin to his Ofspring by his disobedience as the figure of the second giving to Christians by his obedience righteousness and holiness XXVI Order requires that the soul should govern the body and that she should not be distracted whither she will or no with all those sentiments and all those motions which turn her to sensible Objects Thus the first man before sin was so much Master of his sences and his passions that they were silent whensoever he desired it nothing was able to turn him from his duty against his will and all the pleasures which then prevented his reason did only respectfully after a gentle easie manner advertise him of what he was to do for the preservation of his life But after sin he lost all at once the power he had over his body so that not being able to stop the motions nor effuse those traces which sensible Objects made in the principal part of his brain his soul by the Order of Nature and as a punishment of his disobedience became miserably subject to the Law of Concupiscence to that Carnal Law which continually fights against the mind and every moment inspires it with the Love of sensible goods and rules over it by passions so strong and lively and yet at the same time so sweet and agreeable that it cannot nay will not make all necessary endeavours to break the bonds which captivates it For the infection of sin is communicated to all the Children of Adam by an infallible consequence of the Order of Nature as I have else where Explained XXVII The Heart of Man is always a slave to pleasure and when Reason teaches us it is not convenient to enjoy it yet we do not avoid it but that we may find another more sweet or solid We willingly sacrifice lesser pleasures to greater but the invincible impression which we have for our own happiness permits us not all our lives long to deprive our selves of that sweetness which we taste when we suffer our selves to follow our passions Additions In the third discourse you will see how this ought to be understood XXVIII It is certain that pleasure makes him happy who enjoys it at least while he does enjoy it Thus men being made to be happy pleasure always gives a touch to the will and moves it towards that object which causes it or seems to cause it The contrary must be said of grief Now Concupiscence consists only in a continual succession of sentiments motion which prevent reason which are not subject thereunto of pleasures which coming from the objects about us inspire us with the love of them of griefs which making the exercise of vertue harsh and painful give us an abhorrence of them It therefore became the second Adam that he might cure the disorders of the first to produce in us pleasures and aversions contrary to those of concupiscence pleasures with respect the true goods and horrors or aversions in respect of sensible goods Thus the grace whereof J. C. is the occasional cause and which as Head of the Church he continually bestows upon us is not the Grace of knowledge tho he has merited this Grace and tho he may sometimes communicate it as I shall shew by and by but it is the Grace of sentiments It is this previous delectation which produces and entertains the love of God in our hearts for pleasure naturally produces and entertains the love of those objects which cause or seem to cause it It is likewise the horror which sometimes accompanies sensible objects which gives us an aversion to them and makes us capable of governing the motions of our love by our knowledge XXIX The Grace of sentiment should be opposed to concupiscence pleasure to pleasure horror to horror that the influences of J. C. might be directly opposed to the influence of the first man The remedy that it may cure the disease must be contrary thereto For the Grace of knowledge cannot heal an Heart wounded with pleasure to this end this pleasure must either cease or another succeed in its room Pleasure is the weight of the soul which naturally enclines it towards it self sensible pleasures weigh it down towards the Earth That the soul may determine it self either these pleasures must be dissipated or the delectation of Grace raise her towards Heaven and put her almost in Equilibrio 'T is thus that the new Man opposes the old that the influences of our Head resists the influences of our Father Adam that J. C. overcomes all our domestick Enemies Since Man had no concupiscence before his sin it was not necessary he should be carried to the love of good by a previous delectation He clearly knew that God was his good it was not necessary that he should feel it There was no need that he should be drawn by pleasure to love him whom to love nothing hindred and who he knew was perfectly worthy of his love but after sin the Grace of delectation was necessary to him to counter-ballance the continual effort of concupiscence Thus knowledge is the Grace of the Creator delectation the Grace of the Redeemer Knowledge is communicated by J. C. as Eternal Wisdom Delectation is given by him as Wisdom Incarnate Knowledge in its original was no more than Nature Delectation was always pure Grace Knowledge after Sin was not granted to us but through the Merits of J. C. Delectation is given to us through the Merits and by the Efficacy of the power of J. C. In short Knowledge is sent down upon our minds according to our different desires and applications as I shall Explain But the Delectation of Grace is not shed upon our Hearts but according to the various desires of the Soul of J. C. Additions That the Healing Grace of J. C. consists in a preventing Delectation is a thing so much out of doubt with St. Augustine that F. Deschamps who has so Learnedly confuted Jansenius and is so opposite unto him agrees with him in this Point tho they differ from one another as to the manner in which Grace acts in us See Jansenius de Grat. Chr. Lib. IV. c. 1. and Deschamps Lib III. Disp III. c. 16. 19. I cannot perswade my self to continue the Explication of those things which to me seem clear of themselves Insomuch that what follows either needs it not or is not particular to me My Principles are sufficiently confirm'd by what has been said and if they be clearly understood I dont think there will be any difficulty in what follows XXX It is true that pleasure produces Knowledge because the soul gives more attention to the Objects from which she receives more pleasure Since the generallity of men dispise or neglect the truths of Religion because these
abstracted truths do not affect them it may be said that this delectation of Grace doth instruct them for making these truths sensible they learn them more easily by the attention which they bring to them 1 Joh. 11.72 'T is upon this account that St. John says the unction we receive from J. C. teaches us all things and that they who have this unction have no need to be instructed It is true that concupiscence such as we feel is not necessary in order to merit Jesus Christ whose sufferings were infinite was not at all subject to it But altho he was absolute Master of his Body he willingly suffered the most troublesome motions and sentiments to be excited therein that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him Of all the sentiments that of Grief is the most contrary to a soul which desires and deserves to be happy and yet he willingly suffered the most tormenting Pleasure makes him actually happy who actually enjoys it and yet he willingly depriv'd himself thereof Thus as we ought he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours but these his Sacrifices differed from those of the greatest Saints because he willingly excited in himself all those painful sentiments which in the rest of Men are the necessary consequences of sin and that thus these Sacrifices being altogether voluntary in him were more Pure and more Meritorious XXXI Nevertheless it must be observed that this Unction doth not of its self produce knowledge it only excites our attention which is the natural or occasional cause of our knowledge Thus we see that they who have the most Charity have not always the most Knowledge All men not being equally capable of attention the same unction doth not equally instruct all those who receive it Thus tho knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a supernatural infusion and it may often be produced by Charity nevertheless this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect because Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men but proportionally as it causes the soul to desire the knowledge of that which she loves For to conclude the various desires of the soul are the natural or occasional causes of the discoveries we make in any subject whatsoever But these truths I must explain more at length in the Second Part of this Discourse THE SECOND PART Of the Grace of the Creator XXXII I Know but two Principles which determine directly and by themselves the motions of our Love Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge by which we discern different goods Pleasure by which we taste them But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure Knowledge leaves us altogether to our selves it makes no attempt upon our liberty it does not force us to love any thing it does not produce in us a natural or necessary love it only puts us in a condition of determining our selves and loving the objects which it discovers to us with a love of choice or which is the same thing of fixing the general impression of Love which God continually gives us upon particular goods But Pleasure efficaciously determines the will it transports it as I may say towards the object which causes it or seems to cause it it produces in us a natural and necessary love it diminishes our liberty distracts our reason and does not leave us wholly to our selves A small attention to our inward sentiments may convince of these differences XXXIII Thus Man before sin having a perfect freedom and no Concupiscence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the motions of his Love and since he clearly saw that God was infinitely amiable it was not expedient he should have been determined by a preventing Delectation as I have already said nor by other Graces of Sentiment which might have diminished his merit and have engaged him to have loved by instinct that good which ought to be loved only by Reason But since sin besides Knowledge the Grace of sentiment has been necessary that he might thereby resist the motions of Concupiscence For Man invincibly desiring to be happy it is impossible he should continually sacrifice his Pleasure to his Knowledge his Pleasure which renders him actually happy which subsists in himself notwithstanding he never so much resists it to his knowledge which subsists not but by a troublesome application of mind which the least actual pleasure distracts which lastly doth not promise actual happiness till after death which to the imagination seems to be a real Annihilation XXXIV Knowledge therefore is necessary to Man for guiding him in the search after that which is good It is the Effect of natural order It supposes neither the Corruption nor the Restoration of Nature But Pleasure which draws us to true happiness is pure Grace for naturally what is truly good ought only to be loved by reason Hence the occasional causes of the Graces of sentiment must be found in J. C. because he is the Author of Grace But the occasional causes of Knowledge must ordinarily be found in the order of Nature because it is the Grace of the Creator Let us endeavour to find out these causes XXXV In the order established by Nature I only see two occasional causes which distribute knowledge to Spirits and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator The one in us which in some sort depends upon us the other which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us The first is nothing else but the different motions of our wills The second is the concourse of sensible objects which act upon our mind in consequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body XXXVI The inward sentiment which we have of our selves teaches us that our desires produce or excite knowledge in us and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us for all who apply themselves to truth discover it proportionably to their attention And if our prayer was not interrupted if our attention was not disturbed if we had any Idea of what we ask and if we asked it with necessary perseverance we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive But our prayers are continually interrupted if they be not preingaged by pleasure Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas and tho the truth we consult answers our request yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers or causes us presently to forget them XXXVII If it be considered that Man before sin was animated with Charity that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righteousness and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward it may easily be apprehended that the various desires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes
goods and when it is tasted by a sentiment which does not fill all the capacity of the Soul she must still further desire the sight and enjoyment of some other good she may suspend the judgment of her love she need not to rest in the actual enjoyment but may by her desires seek after some new object And seeing her desires are the occasional cause of her knowledge she may by the natural and necessary union of all Spirits with him who contains the ideas of all goods discover the true good and in the true good a great many other particular goods different from what she saw and tasted before Thus being acquainted with the vacuity and vanity of sensible goods attending to the secret reproaches of reason and to the remorse of her conscience to the complaints and threatnings of the true good who will not that we should sacrifice him to apparent and imaginary goods she may by the motion which God imprints continually upon her after good in general or the soveraign good that is towards himself stop her carrier after any good whatsoever She may resist all sensible perswasives seek and find other objects compare them betwixt themselves and with the indeleble idea of the soveraign good and love none of them with a determined love And if this soveraign good makes it self to be tasted she may prefer it to all particular goods tho the sweetness which they seem to transfer into the Soul be very great and very agreeable These Truths must be further explain'd VII The Soul is carried towards good in general she desires to possess all goods and would never confine her love there is no good which appears so to her that she refuses to love Therefore while she actually enjoys any particular good she has yet a motion to go further she still desires some other thing by the natural and invincible impression God puts into her and to change or divide her love it is sufficient to present unto her another good than that which she enjoys and to make her taste the sweetness of it Now the Soul may ordinarily seek and discover new goods she may also come near and enjoy them For in short these desires are the natural or occasional causes of her knowledge Objects discover themselves to her and approach unto her proportionally as she desires to know them An ambitious person who considers the splendour of some dignity may also think of the slavery of the constraint of the real ills which accompany humane greatness He may calculate weigh and compare all things together if his passion does not blind him For I confess there are times when the passions entirely rob the mind of its liberty and they always do diminish it Thus seeing any dignity how great so ever it may appear is not accounted by a Man free and reasonable as the universal and infinite good and since the will generally reaches to all goods this Man who is perfectly free and reasonable may seek and find others seeing he may desire them for 't is his desires which discover and present them unto him He may examine and compare them with that which he enjoys But because he can meet with none but particular goods upon earth he may and ought here below continually and without intermission seek and enquire or rather that he may not change every moment he ought generally to neglect all these transient goods and desire only those which are immutable and eternal VIII Nevertheless seeing Men do not love to search but to enjoy seeing the labour of examination is at present very troublesome but rest and enjoyment always very pleasant the Soul ordinarily stops as soon as she has found any good she fixes upon it that she may enjoy it She deceives her self because by deceiving her self and judging that she has found that she seeks her desire is chang'd into pleasure and pleasure renders her more happy than desire But her happiness cannot last long Her pleasure being ill grounded unjust and deceitful it presently troubles and disquiets her because she would be truly and solidly happy Thus the natural love of good awakens and produces new desires in her These confused desires represent new objects Seeing the Soul loves pleasure she runs after those which communicate it or seems to communicate it and because she loves repose she takes up with them She does not at first examine the defects of the present good whilst it prevents her by its sweetness she considers it rather on the fair side she applies her self to that which charms her thinks of nothing but enjoying it And the more she enjoys it the more she loves it the nearer she approaches to it the more she considers it But now the more she considers it the more defects she discovers in it and since she desires to be invincibly happy she cannot for ever be deceived When she is hungry thirsty and tired with seeking she presently satiates and fills her self with the first good she meets but she presently disgusts the nourishment for which Man was not made Thus the love of the true good still excites in her new desires after new objects and being in continual change all her life and all her happiness upon earth consists only in a continual circulation of thoughts desires and pleasures Such is the condition of a Soul which makes no use of its liberty which suffers its self to be lead at all adventures by the motion which transports her and by the fortuitous impression of objects which determine her This is the condition of one whose mind is so weak that he always takes false goods for the true and a heart so corrupted that he sells and blindly gives himself up to all that affects him or the good which makes him actually feel the most sweet and agreeable pleasures IX But a Man perfectly free such as we conceive Adam immediately after his creation clearly knows that God only is his good or the true cause of the pleasures which he enjoys Tho he feels sweetness by the approach of objects which are about him he does not love them he only loves God and if God forbids him to unite himself to bodies he is ready to forsake what pleasure so ever he finds therein He will not take up but in the enjoyment of the soveraign good to him he will sacrifice all others and how much so ever he desires to be happy or to enjoy pleasures no pleasure is too strong for his knowledge Not but that pleasures may blind him and disturb his reason and fill the capacity which he has of thinking for the mind being finite all pleasure may distract and divide it But the reason is because tho pleasures be under the Command of his Will he was not cautious to keep himself from being intoxicated therewith because the only invincible pleasure is that of the blessed or that which the first Man would have found in God if God would have prevented or hindred
natural strength or by the ordinary graces for in short Nature may be made serviceable to Grace a thousand ways THE SECOND PART Of Grace XVIII THE inequality which is to be found in the liberty of different persons being clearly understood it will not in my opinion be difficult to comprehend how Grace acts in us if to the word Grace we joyn clear and particular Ideas and if the difference between the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer be observ'd I have already said in the foregoing Discourse that there is this difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure that Knowledge leaves us intirely to our selves but Pleasure makes an attempt upon our Liberty For Knowledge is without us it does not touch or modifie our Souls it does not push us on towards the Objects it discovers it only makes us capable to determine our selves or to consent with freedom and reason to the impression which God gives us towards Happiness The knowledge of our Duty the clear Idea of Order separated from all sentiment the dry abstracted altogether pure and intelligible sight of good that is to say without taste or foretaste leaves the Soul in a perfect liberty But Pleasure is in the Soul it touches and modifies it Thus it lessens our liberty it makes us love good rather by the love of Instinct and unaccountable Passion than by the love of Choice and Reason it transports us as I may say towards sensible Objects Nevertheless this is not to be understood as if Pleasure was the same thing with Love or the motion of the Soul to good but because it produces it or determines it towards the object which renders us happy Since none but those Truths whereof we have clear Ideas can be demonstrated and since we have none such of our inward sentiments it is impossible that I should demonstrate that which I here maintain as the consequences which depend upon common Notions are demonstrated Every one therefore must consult the inward sentiment which he has within himself if he would be convinc'd of the difference there is betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure he must also carefully observe that ordinarily Knowledge is accompanied with Pleasure from which nevertheless it ought to be separated that we may judge solidly thereof XIX If then it be true that Pleasure naturally produces Love and that it is as it were a weight which makes the Soul incline to the good which causes it or seems to cause it it is visible that the Grace of J.C. or the Grace of Sentiment is efficacious in its self For tho the preventing delectation when it is weak may not wholly convert the Hearts of those who have very lively Passions nevertheless it always has its effect in that it always carries Men towards God it is always efficacious in some sense but it has not always all the effect which it might have because concupiscence opposes it XX. For example In one of the Scales of a Balance there is a Weight of ten Pounds and a Weight of six Pounds only in the other this last Weight truly weighs for if enough be put therein or taken out of the other Scale or lastly if the Balance be hung nearer the Scale which has more weight in it this weight of six Pound will turn the Balance But tho this Weight weighs it is plain that its effect always depends upon the Weights which resist it and the manner after which they resist it Thus the Grace of Sentiment is always efficacious in its self it always lessens the effort of Concupiscence because Pleasure naturally excites Love for the cause which produces it or seems to produce it But tho this Grace be always efficacious in its self it depends or rather its effect depends upon the actual dispositions of him to whom it is given The Weights of Concupiscence resist it and sensible Pleasures which tie us to the Creatures which seem to produce them in us hinder the Pleasures of Grace from uniting us strictly to him who is only capable to act in us and render us happy XXI But it is not the same of the Grace of Knowledge or of the Grace of the Creator It is not efficacious of its self it does not transport the Soul it does not give it any motion it leaves it freely to its self But tho it be not efficacious of its self it fails not to be attended with many effects when it is great and animated with some grace of sentiment which gives it vigour and strength or else when it finds no contrary pleasure which do much resist it This is the difference betwixt the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure betwixt the Grace which doth not suppose Concupiscence and the Grace which is given to counter-balance the Pleasures of Concupiscence The one is sufficient to a Man perfectly free and fortified by Charity the other is efficacious in a weak Man to whom Pleasure is necessary that he may be drawn to the love of the true good XXII But the strength and efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the action of Concupiscence with the light of Reason and especially with the degree of Liberty that Person hath to whom it is given And it ought not to be imagined that God dispenses it by particular Wills with a design it should produce in us certain effects and nothing more For when it is said that Grace always produces in the Heart the effect for which God gave it we are deceived if we suppose that God acts like Men with particular designs God dispenses his Grace with a general intention that it may sanctifie all those who receive it or as the occasional cause determines him to dispense it nevertheless he sees very well that in some Persons it will not have all the effect it will have in others not only by reason of the inequality of strength in respect of Grace but also the inequality of resistance in respect of Concupiscence XXIII Since Concupiscence has not altogether destroy'd Humane Liberty the Grace of J.C. as efficacious as it is is not absolutely invincible Sensible Pleasure may be overcome whilst it is weak The judgment of Love may be suspended when a Man is not hurried along by some violent Passion and when he yields to the courtship of this false Pleasure he is to be blamed for the ill use of his liberty In like manner the delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible the good Motions which it inspires and which separate us from the false good we love may be oppos'd This Grace does not so sill the Soul as to draw it along towards the true good without choice without understanding without free consent Thus when a Man resigns himself to its motion when a Man goes faster as I may say than it invincibly drives when he sacrifices the pleasures which lessen its efficacy or in short when he acts by reason or loves the true
good as he ought to love it he then merits by the good use which he makes of his Liberty XXIV It is true that the delectation of Grace considered in its self and without respect to the pleasures of Concupiscence which are contrary thereunto is always invincible because this Holy Pleasure being agreeable to the light of Reason nothing can hinder its effect in a Man perfectly free When the Mind clearly sees by the light of Reason that God is its happiness and has a lively sense thereof by the taste of pleasure it is impossible but that it should love him For the Mind desires to be happy and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable motions of its love it suffers no remorse opposite to its present happiness and is not restrain'd by pleasures contrary to that which it enjoys The delectation of Grace therefore is not invincible The love also which it produces is not Meritorious if it be not greater than this delight I mean the love which is meerly the natural or necessary effect of the delectation of Grace has nothing Meritorious in it tho this love be always good in its self For he that goes no faster than he is driven or rather no further than he receives present pay for has no right to be rewarded When a Man loves God no farther than he is drawn or only because he is drawn he does not love him by reason but by instinct he does not love him as he desires and ought to be beloved But when he loves God by Choice by Reason by the Knowledge which he has of his Amiableness then he Merits He Merits when he advances as I may say towards the true good after pleasure has only determined the motion of love XXV This reason alone demonstrates either that the first Man was not carried to the love of God by the blind instinct of pleasure or at least that this pleasure was not so lively as that which he felt from the sight of his natural perfections or in the actual use of sensible goods For 't is evident that this pleasure would have rendred him impeccable this pleasure would have put him into a state like to that of the Blessed who do no longer Merit not because they are not now in the Condition of Travellers for Spirits always Merit when they do Actions in themselves Meritorious and God being just it is necessary they should be rewarded for them but they Merit no more because the pleasure which they find in God is equal to their love because they are altogether wrap't up in him and because being delivered from all kind of grief and every motion of Concupiscence they have no longer any thing to sacrifice to God XXVI For that which renders a man impeccable does not altogether make him incapable of Meriting J.C. was impeccable yet nevertheless he Merited his own glory and that of the Church of which he is the Head Since he was perfectly free he loved the Father not by the instinct of Pleasure but by Choice and Reason he loved him because he saw by intuition how lovely he was For the most perfect Liberty is that of a Mind which has all possible Knowledge and is not determined by any Pleasure For all Pleasure preventing or other naturally produces some love and if Pleasure be not resisted it efficaciously determines the motions of the soul towards the agreeable object But Knowledge how great soever it be conceived leaves the mind perfectly free supposing that this Knowledge be considered singly and without any Pleasure XXVII Seeing J.C. is nothing but the Word or Reason Incarnate certainly he ought not to love the true good with a blind love with the love of instinct with the love of sentiment he ought to love him with reason He must not love a Being infinitely Amiable and which he knows to be perfectly worthy of his love as Men love those goods which are not Amiable and which they cannot know to be worthy of their love He ought not to love the Father with a love any wise like unto that by which Men love the vilest Creatures by which they love Bodies His love that it may be pure or at least perfectly Meritorious shou'd by no means be produced by preventing Pleasures For Pleasure may and ought to be the reward of lawful love as it really is at present in the Saints and in J.C. himself But it cannot be the principle of Merit it should not prevent Reason if it be not very much weakned Now Reason in J.C. was no wise weakned Sovereign Reason in him supported Created Reason J.C. not being subject to the motions of Concupiscence he had no need of preventing delectation to counter-ballance the sensible pleasures which surprize us perhaps he would not taste even the Pleasure of joy or the Pleasures which naturally follow'd the knowledge which he had of his Virtue and Perfections to the end that being deprived of all sorts of Pleasures his Sacrifice might be more Holy more Pure and more dis-interested Lastly it may be besides the privation of all preventing Pleasures and others he inwardly suffered those Horrible desertions which souls filled with Charity cannot better express than by being forsaken of God according to those words of J.C. upon the Cross My God my God why hast thou forsaken me But if you will have J.C. to be carried on even by preventing Pleasures to the love of the Father it is necessary to say according to the Principles which I have laid down either that he loved him with more zeal than he tasted Pleasure since natural love which the instinct of Pleasure produces is not at all Meritorious or at least that he Merited by the sensible griefs and by the continual Sacrifice he freely and voluntarily offered unto God Luke 24.26 Acts 17.3 For it became him to Suffer that he might enter into his Glory as the Scripture teaches us XXVIII If the delectation of Grace without respect to any contrary Pleasure infallibly turns the Consent of the Will the same cannot be said of the Pleasures of Concupiscence These Pleasures considered in themselves and without respect to actual Pleasures are not always invincible The light of Reason Condemns them remorse of Conscience gives us an Horror of them a Man may ordinarily suspend his Consent Thus the Grace of J.C. is stronger than Concupiscence It may be called Victorious Grace because it is always Master of the Heart when its Impression is equal to that of Concupiscence For when the Ballance of our Heart is in Equilibrio by the equal weights of two contrary Pleasures the most solid and most reasonable always turns it because Knowledge always favours its efficacy and Remorse of Conscience opposes the action of False Pleasure XXIX From all which has been said it may be concluded that we always Merit when we love the true-good by Reason and we do not Merit at all when we love it by Instinct We always Merit when we
love the true good by Reason because Order requires that the true good should be loved after this manner and because Knowledge alone does not transport or invincibly carry us towards the good which it discovers We do no wise Merit when we love the true good by Instinct or so far as Pleasure invincibly transports or determines the Mind because Order requires that the true good or the good of the Mind should be loved by Reason by a Free love by a love of Choice and Discretion and because the love which Pleasure alone produces is a Blind Natural and Necessary love I confess that when a Man goes further than he is carried by Pleasure he Merits but this is because he acts by Reason and as Order requires he shou'd act for that love which he has above the Pleasure is a Pure and a Reasonable love XXX In like manner it must be Concluded that a Man always demerits when he loves false goods by the instinct of Pleasure provided that he loves them more than he is invincibly engaged to love them For when we have naturally so little Liberty and Capacity of Mind that Pleasure invincibly transports us tho we be irregular and our love be bad and against Order we do not demerit For to demerit I mean to deserve to be punish'd a Man must run after false goods with more earnestness or go farther than Pleasure invincibly carrys him For it must be observed that there is a great deal of difference betwixt a Good action and a Meritorious Action betwixt an irregular action and an action which deserves to be punished the love of a Just Person is often irregular in sleep and yet deserves not to be punished Whatsoever is conformed to Order is good and all that is contrary thereunto is bad but nothing Merits or Demerits but the good or ill use of Liberty or that wherein we have some share Now a Man makes a good use of his Liberty when he follows his Knowledge when he goes on as I may say freely and of himself towards the true good whether he be at first determined by the preventing delectation or by the light of Reason When he sacrifices sensible Pleasures to his duty and conquers grief by the love of Order On the contrary he makes an ill use of his Liberty when his Pleasure is his Reason when he sacrifices his duty to his passions his perfection to his present happiness his love of Order to Self-love and does all this at the time when he is not really forced thereunto I shall still explain this more clearly XXXI When two Objects present themselves to the mind of Man and he will chuse one of them I confess that he will never fail to determine himself on that side where he shall find most Reason and Pleasure on that side where he 'll see most good Since the soul cannot will or love but by the love of good the will being nothing but the love of good or the natural motion of the soul towards good she infallibly loves that which has most conformity with that which she loves invincibly But it is certain that when sensible Pleasures or some such like thing does not disturb the Mind a Man may always suspend the judgment of his love and not determine himself especially in respect of false goods for the soul can have no evidence that false goods are true goods nor that the love of these false goods does perfectly agree with the motion which carrys us towards the true good Thus when a Man loves false goods at the time when his senses and passions do not altogether disturb his Reason he demerits because then he may and ought to suspend the judgment of his love For if he had staid a while to have examined what he ought to have done this false good would soon have appeared much the same as it is Remorse of Conscience and perhaps even the delectation of Grace would have changed all the dispositions of his mind and heart For the condition of a Traveller has nothing fixed a thousand different objects present themselves continually to his mind and the life of Man upon Earth is only a continual succession of thoughts and desires XXXII It seems at first that in respect of the true good Man cannot suspend the judgement of his love for we cannot suspend our judgment but when the evidence is not full Now we cannot but see that it is most evident that God is the true good and that also none but he can be good to us we know that he is infinitely more Amiable than we can comprehend But it must be observed that tho we cannot suspend the judgment of our Reason in respect of speculative truths when the evidence is full yet we may suspend the judgment of our love in respect of good what evidence soever there is in our Ideas For when Sentiments fight against Reason when Taste opposes Knowledge when we sensibly find that to be bitter and ungrateful which Reason clearly represents as sweet and agreeable we may chuse whether we will follow our Reason or our Senses We may act and indeed often do act against our Knowledge because when we attend to Sentiment Knowledge is lost if we do not use violence to retain it and because we ordinarily attend more to Sentiment than to Knowledge because Sentiment is more lively and agreeable than the most evident Knowledge XXXIII It is pleasure which makes minds actually happy Upon this account we ought to enjoy Pleasure when we love the true good the mind thinks upon God if it draws near to him by its love and tastes no other sweetness On the contrary God sometimes fills it with bitterness and desolation He forsakes He rejects it as I may say not that it should cease to love him but rather that its love may be more Humble more Pure and more Meritorious In short He commands it to do some things which makes it actually Miserable But if it draws near to Bodies it finds it self happy proportionably happy as it is united to them certainly that is a temptation what Knowledge soever one may have for we invincibly desire to be happy So that a Man Merits very much if fixing upon his Knowledge he denies himself notwithstanding all uncomfortable desertions if he sacrifices his actual happiness to the love of the true good if living by Faith and trusting in the Promises of God he continues inviolably true to his duty It therefore plainly appears that J. C. might Merit his Glory tho he most evidently knew the true good because having a great love for his Father he intirely submitted himself to his orders without being carried thereto by preventing Pleasures Because altogether complying with his Knowledge he suffered very great Asslictions and sacrificed all the most lively and sensible Pleasures to the love of God For he took a Body as we have that he might have a * Heb. 8.3 victim to offer unto God and
by his Body as the occasional or natural cause receiving a great number of divers sentiments he might sacrifice himself as an Holocaust in Honour of the true good by suffering afflictions and the privation of sensible Pleasures XXXIV That I may not leave in some Persons an imperfect Idea of the Grace of J. C. I think I ought further to say that it doth not consist in delectation alone for all Grace of sentiment is the Grace of J. C. Now of this sort of Grace there are several kinds and of each kind infinite degrees God sometimes gives disgust and bitterness to the objects of our passions he weakens their sensible perswasives or causes us to have an horror of them and this kind of grace of sentiment has the same effect as delectation It re-establishes and fortifies our Liberty it puts us almost in Equilibrio so that by this means we are in a condition of following our Knowledge in the motion of our love For to put a Ballance in a perfect Equilibrio or to change the inclination it is not necessary to increase the Weights which are too weak it is sufficient to take something from those which weigh too much Thus there are Graces of Sentiment of several kinds and each kind is capable of infinite degrees for there are Pleasures Horrors and Disgusts greater and lesser to infinity That which I have hitherto said of delectation may be easily applyed to other kinds of Graces of Sentiment I only took pleasure or delectation as a particular example that I might explain my self more clearly and without equivocation If there be any other principle of our determinations to good besides the Grace of Sentiment and that of Knowledge I confess to me they are altogether unknown and it is upon this account that I have explained the effects which are necessary to the conversion of the heart only by these two Principles lest I should have been accused of having spoken in general terms and such as only excite confused Ideas which I have avoided with all possible care But tho I have explained my self only in such terms as all Men understand since there is no person who knows not that Knowledge and Sentiment of good are the principles of our determinations nevertheless I don't pretend to oppose those who not making use of these clear Ideas say in general that God works in the souls of Men their Conversion by a particular action different perhaps from all that I have said here * First Explicat of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that God doth in us Since I experience nothing in my self but Motion towards good in general and Knowledge or Sentiment which determines this Motion I ought to suppose nothing else if by this alone I can give a reason of all that which the Scripture and the Councils have defined concerning the subjects of which I treat In a word I am sure that Knowledge and Sentiment are the Principles of our determinations but I declare that I know not whether there may be something else of which I have no knowledge XXXV Beside Grace efficacious in it self and the Grace the effect of which depends intirely upon the good dispositions of the Mind besides the Grace of Sentiment and the Grace of Knowledge the Just also have Habitual Grace which makes them agreeable to God and puts them in a condition of doing actions Meritorious of Salvation This Grace is Charity the Love of God the Love of Order Love which is not properly Charity if it be not stronger and greater than all other Loves As it is Pleasure which ordinarily produces the love of the object which cause it or seems to cause it so it is the delectation of Grace which produces the love of God It is the enjoyment of sensible pleasures which encreases Concupiscence It is also the Grace of Sentiment which augments Charity Concupiscence diminishes by the privation of sensible Pleasures and then Charity is easily preserved and encreased Charity also diminishes by the privation of the actual Grace of J. C. and Concupiscence is easily encreased and fortified For these two loves of Charity and Concupiscence continually engage one another and strengthen themselves by the weakness of their Enemy XXXVI All that proceeds from Charity is agreeable to God but Charity does not always act in the just themselves To the end it may act it ought at least to be enlightned for Knowledge is necessary to determine the motion of Love Thus the Grace necessary for every good work relating to Salvation is the Grace of Sentiment in those who begin their Conversion it is the Grace of Knowledge it is some motion of Faith and Hope in those who are animated by Charity For the Just may do good works without the Grace of delectation yet they have always need of some actual succours to determine the motion of their Charity But tho Charity without Delectation is sufficient to vanquish many temptations nevertheless the Grace of Sentiment is necessary in many occasions For Men cannot without the continual assistance of the second Adam resist the continual action of the first They cannot persevere in righteousness if they be not often assisted by the particular Grace of J. C. which produces augments and sustains Charity against the continual efforts of Concupiscence XXXVII The effects of Pleasure and all the sentiments of the Soul depend a thousand ways upon the actual dispositions of the Mind The same weight has not always the same effects Its action depends upon the machine by which it is applyed with respect to the contrary weights If a ballance be unequally hung the force of the weights being unequally apply'd the weaker may turn the stronger It is the same of the weights of pleasure they act one upon another and determine the motion of the Soul as they are differently applyed Pleasure must have more effect in one who has already a love to the Object which causes the pleasure than in him who has an aversion to it or who loves the opposite goods Pleasure forcibly determines him who clearly sees or lively imagines the advantages of the good which seems to produce it and it acts weakly upon the mind of him who knows this good only confusedly or contemns it In conclusion pleasure acts with all its force in him who blindly follows that which flatters Concupiscence and may perhaps have no effect in him who has attain'd to some habit of suspending the Judgment of his love XXXVIII Now the different degrees of Knowledge Charity Concupiscence and the degrees of Liberty being every moment combin'd after infinite ways with the different degrees of actual pleasures and these pleasures not having their effect but according to the relation which they have to the dispositions of the mind and heart It is plain that no finite mind can judge with any assurance what effect any particular Grace will produce in us For besides the Combination of all that which concurs to make it efficacious
or to produce its effect contains something infinite This Combination is not like the springs and machines whose effects are always infallible and necessary Thus no spirit can discover what passes in the heart of man but God being infinitely wise it is plain that he clearly knows all the effects which may result from the mixture and combination of all things and that diving into the heart of man he insallibly discovers even the effects which depends upon the free act or rather consent of our wills Nevertheless I confess that I cannot conceive how God can discover the Consequences of those Actions which have not their infallibility from his absolute degrees But I cannot prevail with my self to engage in Metaphysicks at the expence of morality and to maintain Opinions contrary to my inward sentiment as undeniable Truths or to speak to the ear a certain Language which in my Opinion says nothing clearly to the mind I know very well that Objections may be made which I may not be able clearly and evidently to Answer but this perhaps may be because even these Objections themselves may be full of obscurity and darkness Because they are grounded upon our ignorance of the properties of the Soul because as I have * Expli of the 7. Ch. lib. 2 part 3. elsewhere proved we have not a clear Idaea of what we are and because that which is in us which suffers its self to be overcome by those determinations which are not invincible is altogether unknown to us To Conclude if I cannot clearly Answer these Objections * First Explicat I can Answer them by other which yet seem more difficult to resolve I can from the principles opposite to mine draw more hard and invidious Consequences than those which are pretended to follow from that Liberty which I suppose to be in us But I will not enter particularly upon this because I take no pleasure in walking in the dark and leading others into precipices The First Explication OF THE TREATISE OF Nature and Grace What it is to Act by General Wills and what by Particular I. I Say that God acts by General Wills when he acts in consequence of the General Laws he has established For Example I say that God acts in me by General Wills when he makes me feel pain by the prick of a pin because in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the Union of Soul and Body which he hath established he makes me feel grief or pain when my body is indisposed In like manner when one bowl strikes upon a second I say God moves this last by a General Will because he moves it in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the communication of motions God having in general appointed that whensoever two bodies strike upon one another the motion should be divided betwixt them in certain proportions and 't is by the efficacy of this General Will that bodies should move one another II. On the contrary I say that God acts by particular wills when the efficacy of his will is not determined by any general law to produce the effect Thus supposing that God makes me feel the pain of the pricking of a pin tho there happens not in my body or in any other Creature any change which determines him to act in me according to general Laws I say that then God acts by particular wills Likewise supposing that a body begins to move without being struck upon by another or without any change happening in the will of any Spirits or any other Creature which determines the efficacy of any general Laws I say then that God moves this body by a particular will III. According to these definitions it appears that I am so far from denying providence that on the contrary I suppose that it is God who acts all in all that the nature of the Pagan Philosophers is a Chimaera and that properly speaking that which is called Nature is nothing else but the general Laws which God has establish'd for the making or preserving his Work after the most simple ways by an action always uniform constant perfectly worthy of infinite wisdom and the universal cause That which I here suppose tho certain for reasons which I have elsewhere given is not absolutely necessary to prove what I intend For if it be suppos'd that God has communicated his power to Creatures and that bodies which are about us have a real and true force by which they may act upon our soul and render it happy or miserable by pleasure or grief and that bodies in motion have in themselves a certain entity which is called a Quality imprinted which they give to those they meet and give it with that readiness and uniformity which they suppose it will be equally easie for me to prove that which I design for then the efficacy of the action of the Concourse of the general cause will be necessarily determined by the action of the particular cause God for example will be oblig'd according to these principles to afford his concourse to a body at the moment wherein it strikes upon others But this body may communicate motion to them and this is certainly to act by vertue of a general Law Nevertheless I don't reason according to this supposition because I believe it altogether false as I have shewed in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth in the Explication of the same Chapter and elsewhere These Truths supposed I here subjoyn the Marks by which it may be known whether an effect be produc'd by a general will or by a particular Marks by which it may be judged whether an effect is produced by a General or by a Particular Will IV. When we see an effect immediately follow the action of an occasional cause we ought to judge that this effect is produced by the efficacy of a general will A Body is immediately moved after it is struck the striking of bodies upon one another is the occasional cause therefore this body is mov'd by a general will A Stone falls upon the head of a Man and kills him and this stone falls as others do I mean that its motion is continued almost according to Arithmetical Proportion 1 3 5 7 9 c. This supposed I say that it is moved by the efficacy of a general will or according to the Laws of the communication of motion as it is easie to demonstrate V. When we see an effect produc'd and yet the occasional cause which is known to us is not concern'd therein we have reason to think that this effect is produc'd by a paticular will supposing that this effect be not visibly unworthy of its cause as I shall shew hereafter For example when a body is mov'd without being struck upon by another it is very probable that this body is moved by a particular will nevertheless we are not altogether assur'd thereof For supposing there should
be a general Law that bodies should be moved according to the different wills of Angels or any other such like it is plain that this body might be moved tho it was not struck since the particular will of any Angel according to this supposition might determine the will of the general cause to move it Thus we may be often assured that God acts by general wills but we can never be assur'd that he acts by particular wills even in the best attested miracles VI. Since we don't sufficiently know the divers combinations of occasionalc auses to discover whether such and such effects happen in consequence of their actions since we are not for example knowing enough to discern whether such a shower of rain be produc'd by the necessary consequence of the communication of motions or by a particular will we ought to judge that an effect is produced by a general will when it is plain that the cause is not designed for a particular end For the wills of intelligent beings have necessarily some end general wills one general end and particular a particular end Nothing is more evident For example tho I can't discover whether the rain which falls in a meadow falls there in consequence of general laws or by the particular will of God I have reason to think that it falls there in by a general will if I see that it falls as well upon the neighbouring Lands or into the River which runs by this Meadow as upon the Meadow its self For if GOD caused it to rain upon this Meadow by a particular good will which he has for the owner thereof this rain would not fall into the River where it is useless since it could not fall therein without a cause or a will in God which necessarily has some end VII But it is still much more reasonable to think that an effect is produced by a general will when the effect is contrary or else useless to the design which faith or reason teaches us the cause proposes to himself For Example the end which God proposes in the divers sensations which he gives to the soul when we taste different fruits is that we should eat those which are proper to nourish the body and reject others I suppose this to be so Therefore when God gives us a grateful sentiment at the time when we eat poison or fruits that are poisoned he does not act in us by particular wills We ought to judge thus for this grateful sentiment is the cause of our death and God does give us our sentiments that he may preserve our life by a suitable Nourishment I say again I suppose it thus for I onely speak in relation to Grace which God gives us doubtless for our Conversion so that it is plain that God does not dispence it to men by particular wills since it often renders us more culpable and more criminal and God cannot have such a fatal Design God therefore does not give us a grateful sentiment by particular wills when we eat poison'd fruit But since poison'd fruits excite in our brain motions like unto those which good fruits produce there God gives us the same sentiments by the general Laws which unite the soul to the body to the end that she may take care of its preservation In like manner God does not give to those who have lost an arm sentiments of grief relating to this arm but by a general will for it is useless to the body of this man for his soul to suffer grief in relation to an arm which he has not The same may be said of the motions which are produced in the body of a Man which commits any crime In short supposing we are obliged to think that God sends rain upon the Earth to make it Fruitful we cannot think that he distributes it by particular wills since it rains upon the Sands and the Sea as well as upon Cultivated ground and it often rains so much upon sound Land that the Corn thereby is spoiled and Mens labours made useless Thus it is certain that the rain which is useless and hurtful to the Fruits of the Earth are the necessary consequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions which God hath established to produce in the World the best effects supposing that which I here repeat that God intended not that the rain should make the Earth to become barren VIII In short when any thing happens which is very singular there 's reason to think that it is not produced by a general will nevertheless it is impossible to be assur'd thereof For Example * Supposing there was any Reason for the Author 's high Esteem of that Ceremony the Example serves his Purpose well enough In a Procession of the H. Sacrament it rains upon the Company but not upon the Altar-Cloath or those that carry it there is reason to think that this happens by a particular will of the universal cause Nevertheless we cannot be certain thereof since an occasional intelligent cause may have this particular design and thus determine the efficacy of the general Law to execute it IX When the marks which preceed are not sufficient ground for judging whether any effect be or be not produced by a general will yet we ought to think that it is produced by a general will if it be evident that an occasional cause is established for such like effects For example it rains to very good purpose in a Field we don't inquire whether it rains upon the High-ways We know not whether it be hurtful to the neighbouring grounds or no we also suppose that it does nothing but good and that the circumstances which accompany it are altogether agreeable to the design for which God would have it rain Nevertheless I say that we ought to suppose this rain produced by a general will if we know that God has established an occasional cause for such like effects For we ought not without necessity to have recourse unto Miracles We should suppose that God acts by the most simple ways and tho the owner of the Field ought to give thanks to God for this favour yet it ought not to be imagined that God has vouchsafed it to him after a Miraculous manner by a particular will The Master of the Field is bound to give thanks to God for the good which he has received since God foresaw and intended the good effect of this rain when he established the general Laws whereof it is a necessary consequence On the contrary if rain be sometimes hurtful to our Lands since God did not establish the Laws which make it rain to render them unfruitful a great drought being enough to make them barren it is plain that we ought to thank God and adore the wisdom of his providence even then when we do not feel the effects of the Laws which he hath appointed for our benefit X. In short tho we should not be assured by the circumstances
of J. C. John 1.17 abundant Graces because says he the Law was given by Moses but true Grace by Jesus Christ. For in truth the Graces which were before J. C. ought not to be compared to those which he distributed after his triumph If they were miraculous it must be thought they were very rare Even the Grace of the Apostles before the Holy Spirit was given to them was not to be compared with those which they received when the Soveraign Priest of good things to come being entred by his Blood into the Holy of Holies by the strength of his Prayers obtain'd and by the dignity of his Person sent the Holy Spirit to animate and sanctifie his Church The strange Blindness of the Jews their gross and carnal Sentiments their frequent relapses into Idolatry after so many Miracles do sufficiently shew they had scarce any love for true goods and the fearfulness of the Apostles before they received the Holy Spirit is a sensible mark of their weakness Thus Grace in this time was very rare because as yet our Nature was not made in J. C. the occasional cause of our Graces as yet J. C. was not fully consecrated a Priest according to the Order of Melchisedech and his Father had not yet given him that immortal and glorious Life Heb. 5.5 10. Heb. 7.16 17. which is the particular character of his Priesthood For it was necessary that J. C. should enter into the Heavens and receive the glory and power of being the occasional cause of all goods before he sent the Spirit according to the words of St. John John 7.39 John 16.7 The Spirit was not yet given because J. C. was not yet glorified And according to these words of Christ himself It is expedient for you that I go For if I go not the Comforter will not come But if I go I will send him unto you Now it is not to be imagined that J. C. considered as God is the Head of the Church He has obtain'd this honour as Man the Head and the Members ought to be of the same nature It is as Man that J. C. interceeds for Men it is as Man that he has received of God soveraign power over his Church For since God does not interceed at all he as God has not received that Name which is above every Name he is equal to the Father and absolute Master of all things by right of his birth These Truths are evident and J. C. himself assures us of them John 5.22 to 27. since he says that his Father gave him power to judge Men because he was the Son of Man Thus we must not think that those Expressions of Scripture which teach us that J. C. is the Author of Grace ought to be understood of J. C. considered according to his Divine Person For if this was so I confess I should not have demonstrated that he is the occasional cause of it he would have been only the true cause thereof But since it is certain that the three Persons of the Trinity are equally the true causes of Grace seeing all the outward Operations of God are common to the three Persons my Arguments cannot be denied since the Holy Scripture says of the Son and not of the Father nor of the Spirit that he is the Head of the Church and that under this character he communicates Life to all the Members which compose it Object II. XIV It is God who gives to the Soul of J. C. all Thoughts and Motions which it has in the formation of his Mystical Body So that if on one hand the Wills of J. C. as natural and occasional Causes determine the efficacy of God's general Will on the other hand it is God himself who determines the divers Wills of J. C. Thus it comes to the same thing for assuredly the Wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of his Father Answer I confess that the particular wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of the Father but this is not because the Father has particular wills which answer to those of the Son and determine them This is only because the wills of the Son are always conformable to Order in general which is necessarily the rule of the divine wills and of those which love God For to love Order is is to love God it is to will what God wills it is to be Just Wise Regular in his love The Soul of J. C. would form to the Glory of his Father the most Sacred Magnificent and Perfect Temple that can be Order requires this for nothing can be made too great for God All the divers desires of this Soul ever intent upon the Execution of its design come also to it from God or the Word to which it is united But the occasional causes of all these thoughts most certainly are its divers desires for it thinks on what it will Now these divers desires are sometimes altogether free probably the thoughts which excite these desires do not always invincibly determine the Soul of J. C. to form and resolve to execute them It is equally advantagious to the design of Jesus Christ whether it be Peter or John who does that which the regularity of his work requires It is true that the soul of Jesus Christ is not indifferent as to what respects the glory of his Father or that which Order necessarily requires but it is altogether free in every thing else nothing out of God invincibly determines its love Thus it ought not to be wonder'd if it have particular wills tho there are no such wills in God which determine those of the soul of Jesus Christ But I grant that the wills of Jesus Christ are not free I grant that his knowledge determines him to will and always to will after a certain manner in the construction of his Church But it must be Eternal Wisdom to which his soul is united which determines these wills if it is not necessary for this end to suppose particular wills in God It must be observ'd that the wills of the soul of J. C. are particular or have not any occasional cause which determines their efficacy no not the will of God For the soul of J. C. not having an infinite capacity of thinking his knowledge and consequently his wills are limited Thus 't is necessary that his wills be particular since they change according to his divers thoughts and applications For it seems to me that the soul of J. C. otherwise employ'd in contemplating the beauties and tasting the infinite sweetness of the true good ought not according to the rule of Order to think at the same time upon all the Ornaments which it designs to bestow upon his Church and the different means of executing each of his intentions J. C. desiting to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father he desires also to adorn it with infinite beauties and that by such means as are most
these Miracles but by general wills for if they had been performed by particular wills the Angels could not have wrought them by a power which God gave them of conducting his people Thus St. Michael and his Angels were to the Jews that which J.C. is to the Christians The Angels gave the old Law J.C. is the Angel of the new Law as the Prophet Malachy calls him Chap. III. 1. The new Convenant promises true goods therefore the Mediator of this Covenant must be the occasional or distributive cause of that Grace which gives a right to the possession of these goods But the Old Covenant promised only Temporal goods because the Angel the Minister of the Law could only bestow these goods All that relates to Eternity both goods and evils ought to be reserved to J.C. The Angels who are pure Spirits ought according to Order to have power over Bodies inferiour substances and by them upon the minds of Men For since sin the Soul depends upon the Body they may prepare for Grace as in St. John and remove the occasions of falling Lastly the Angel or rather the Arch-Angel St. Michael represented J.C. as the Old Law represents the New the Synagogue the Church Temporal goods Eternal Thus it appears that to prove the New Covenant more excellent than the Old St. Paul was obliged to prove as he has done in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews that J.C. who is the Minister thereof is infinitely exalted above the Angels It must therefore be granted from the arguments which I have drawn from the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect from a thousand a thousand experiences that God executes his designs by general Laws But it is not easie to demonstrate that God acts upon such and such occasions by particular wills tho the H. Scripture which accommodates its self to our weakness represents God sometimes as a Man and often makes him act like Men. For tho all that which I have said of Angels should be absolutely false I might nevertheless suppose and should even have all reason to believe that God wrought the Miracles of the Old Law by certain general Laws tho I had no knowledge of them for we ought not to reject a truth clearly known because of some objections which may be drawn from our ignorance of many things Thus God forms and preserves the purely material World by the Laws of the communication of motions and makes the Bodies themselves the occasional causes which determine these Laws for 't is the striking of bodies upon one another which determine their efficacy A Body is never moved but when another strikes upon it and a Body is always moved when it is struck upon God preserves the life of Men and likewise Civil Society by the general Laws of the Union of Soul and Body and makes something in these two substances the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of these Laws Mine Arm is moved according to my desires my Soul suffers pain when a Thorn pricks me God builds up his great Work by the general Laws of Grace according to which he would save all Men in his Son and because all Men are born sinners God draws the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of his general Laws only from J.C. who is the Head which influences his Members the Mediator betwixt God and Men the Sovereign Priest of good things the true Solomon who has received Wisdom without measure to make a Work whereof the Jewish Temple was but the figure how Magnificent soever it was To Conclude God governed the Jews by general Laws the efficacy of which was determined by the Action of St. Michael and his Angels In truth intelligent Beings are necessary to conduct Men to reward and punish them that by the Laws of the communication of motions the Hail knocks down the Fruit which the Rain had made to grow this is not properly a disorder Bodies are not capable of good or evil of happiness or misery But to adjust Rewards and Merits one with another intelligent Beings are necessary In a word God has established all Powers second Causes visible and invisible Hierarchies immediately by himself or by the mediation of other powers that he may execute his designs by general Laws whose efficacy is determined by the action of these same Powers For he acts not like the Kings of the Earth who give out their Orders and do nothing else God in general doth all that which second causes do Matter has not in it self any moving virtue upon which depends its efficacy and there is no necessary connexion betwixt the wills of spirits and the effects which they produce God doth all but he acts by Creatures because he was pleased to communicate his power to them that he might accomplish his work by ways most worthy of himself Thus has God done all things with Wisdom I say with Wisdom for an infinite Wisdom is requisite to understand all the consequences of general Laws to rank and combine them one with another after the exactest manner and foresee that from thence would proceed a work worthy of himself 'T is an evidence of limited understandings to be able to do nothing but by compounded ways But a God who knows all things ought not to disturb the simplicity of his ways an immutable Being must always be uniform in his conduct a General Cause ought to act by particular wills God's Conduct must carry in it the Character of his Attributes if the immutable and necessary order of Justice do not oblige him to change For Order is an inviolable Law in respect of God himself He invincibly loves it and will always prefer it to the Arbitrary Laws by which he executes his Designs THE END THE Author's Idea of Providence SEcond causes of what nature soever have no proper efficacy of their own But All their power is communicated unto them by God in consequence of those general Laws which he has establish't Now All Philosophers and Divines agree that God governs the World and takes care of all things by second causes Therefore The Providence of God is Executed by general Laws Nevertheless his Providence is not blind and subject to chance For by his infinite Wisdom he knows the consequences of all possible general Laws And As Searcher of Hearts He foresees all the future determinations of free causes Therefore He proportions the means with the end free Causes as well as necessary with the effects which he intends they shall produce Therefore He combines Nature with Morality and with Divinity after the wisest manner that can be So that the effects of the combination and connection of causes may be most worthy of his Wisdom Goodness and other Attributes for God wills in particular all the good effects which he produces by general ways Nevertheless the immutable Order of Justice which God owes to himself and his own attributes requires or permits that he should sometimes act by particular wills But
ordinarily it is then only and in those circumstances when one only Miracle i. e. an effect which cannot be the consequence of natural Laws doth happily adjust a great many events and the most that can be For his prescience being infinite he doth not work two Miracles when one will suffice So that in the Divine Providence there is nothing that is not Divine or which doth not bear the character of the Divine Attributes for God acts according to what he is He is wise his foreknowledge is infinite Now to establish general Laws and to foresee that from thence a work will arise worthy of these Laws is a mark of such a Wisdom as hath no bounds and to act by particular wills is to act as Men who can foresee nothing Therefore God acts by general Laws God is the Searcher of Hearts Now to make use of free Causes for the execution of his designs without determining these Causes after an invincible manner is to be the Searcher of Hearts and it is not necessary to have this quality for the execution of his designs if he did determine causes after an invincible manner Therefore God ordinarily leaves J.C. Angels and Men to act according to their natures He doth not communicate to them his power that he may destroy their liberty He gives them part in the glory of his work and thereby augments his own For leaving them to act according to their natures and nevertheless executing by them designs worthy of himself he makes it admirably appear that he is Searcher of Hearts Nevertheless the limitation of Angels the malice of Devils and both these qualities in good and evil Men and many other reasons may oblige God to act sometimes by particular wills For a limited spirit tho perfectly united to Order cannot foresee the connection of free causes which is necessary to bring the work of God to its perfection So that where Order permits God must determine Angels by particular wills and make even the sins of Men and the malice of Devils to enter into the order of his Providence And proportionably the same must be said of Jesus Christ considered as Man and Head of the Church and as Architect of the Eternal Temple God is immutable now immutability in his Conduct imports immutability in his nature to change Conduct every moment is a mark of inconstancy So that God must follow general Laws with respect to this attribute if none of his other attributes do otherwise require that he cease to observe it For God acts not but for himself but for that love which he bears unto himself but to Honour his attributes both by the Divinity of his ways and the Perfection of his work In a word the immutable Order of Justice which he owes to himself and his own perfections is a Law with which he never can dispence Thus experience teaches us that God governs the purely Corporeal World by the general Laws of the communications of motions By these it is that he makes the admirable Vicissitude of Night and Day Summer and Winter Rain and Fair weather By them also it is that he covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers that he gives to Animals and Plants their growth and nourishment Experience also teaches us that God governs Men by the general Laws of Union of Soul and Body For by these Laws he doth not only unite the Soul to the Body for the conservation of Life but thereby he also diffuses it as I may say over all his works and so makes it admire the beauties thereof It is by these that he forms Societies and makes as I may say but one body of all People It is by them that he teaches Men the truths of Religion and Morality And Lastly by them it is that he makes Christians absolves Penitents Sanctifies the Elect and makes them merit all those degrees of glory which makes up the beauty of the Heavenly Jerusalem When I say that it is by them he doth all this it is easily perceived that I mean they are subservient thereunto in the Order of Divine Providence For it is cheifly by the general Laws which give power to J.C. and the Angels that GOD doth build his Church Further Faith teaches us that it is by general Laws that God punishes and rewards men since Angels who are the distributers of Temporal goods have no efficacy of their own It is by them that God provides for the necessities of his Elect and resists the pernicious use which Wicked Men and Devils make of that Power which they have to tempt and afflict us in consequence also of certain general Laws But all Powers are submitted to that which J.C. has in consequence of the general Laws of the Order of Grace for at present the Angels themselves who command others for there is a certain subordination among them according to the most probable and received opinion are submitted to J.C. their Head and Lord. It is under him that they labour in the building of his Temple They do not now as under the Law proportion Rewards to Merits For the treasures of Grace are opened by the entrance of J.C. into the Sanctuary For it is true that by afflictions the Saints are purified So that it is better that J.C. give unto Men true goods than that Angels should deliver them from their miseries for if good Men were not afflicted in this World J.C. could not give them the form they must necessarily have to be placed in his building Lastly further yet it is by general Laws that God exercises his Providence over his Church that is to say by the Laws which make the Order of Grace Laws which give unto J.C. as Man Sovereign power in Heaven and in Earth It is by J. C that God hath established the different orders which do externally govern his Church 'T is by him that he spreads abroad inward Grace in Souls It is by him that he sanctifies his chosen people that he will govern them in Heaven and recompence them according to their deserts It is by him that he will judge the Devils and the Damned and condemn them to that fire whose eternal efficacy shall only be the effect of general Laws which shall be observed for ever more By him I say enlightned to this end by eternal wisdom and also subsisting in this wisdom by him being advertised by a revelation whose Laws are unknown of all that which Order requires that he should know and of all that he desires to know of what passes in the World to bring his work to its perfection by him lastly acting by practical desires by prayers by endeavours or actions of an infinite merit but of a limited virtue and proportionable to a finite and a stinted work but by him perfectly free absolutely Master of his desires and actions submitted only to immurable Order the inviolable rule of his will as well as of his Fathers and if I be not deceived very rarely determined after
an invincible manner by particular and practical wills to the end that he may leave to him more of the glory of his work and make the infinite Wisdom of his Father shine more brightly as he is the Searcher of Hearts that glorious attribute which no spirit can comprehend Now if God acts by general Laws it is visible that we ought to ascribe unto occasional causes to the limitation the dispositions and sometimes the malice of Creatures all those mischievous effects which Piety and the Idea we have of a good wise and just God oblige us to say that he rather permits than has any design to effect For example if a Woman brings forth a Monster or a dead Child or if she lets her Child fall and kills it carrying it to the Church to make it a Christian it is because God observes the general Laws which he hath prescribed We ought to ascribe this dismal effect to natural or occasional causes Super defectum causarum secundarum says St. Thomas God hath permitted this evil since there is none but he can be the true cause of it it may be said in some sence that he hath not done it because it is not for such like effects but for better that he hath established natural Laws and if he follow these Laws it is because he owes this to himself that his Conduct may be uniform and carry the character of his Attributes This is not in the least to blaspheme against the Divine Power as some ignorantly object but it is rather to blaspheme against the Divine Wisdom and Goodness of God to maintain that he wills directly and positively these dismal effects A Man whose Arm is cut off feels grief in his Arm We all of us sleeping have a thousand thoughts in relation to objects which are not at all before us This is because God always acts in consequence of his Laws and gives to the Soul the same thoughts and the same sentiments when there are the same motions in the brain whether we have an Arm or no whether objects are present or absent The DEVIL tempts just Men the wicked solicite good Men to evil Thieves and Soldiers Pillage and Massacre the innocent as well as the guilty God permits this this therefore ought to be attributed to the malignity of occasional causes For tho God doth often from thence draw great advantages by the Grace of J.C. since injustice it self enters into the order of his providence Ordinat peccata says St. Augustine yet these sad effects considered in themselves are unworthy of his goodness There is nothing but good which he wills positively and directly And if he makes use of the injustice of Men to speak as Scripture doth it is because it becomes him to obey his own Laws which were not at first established for such effects In short the greatest number of Men are damned and yet God would save all for he would and can hinder them from offending him God wills the conversion of sinners and certainly he can give them such grace that they shall infallibly be converted Whence is it then that sinners dye in their sin Infants without Baptism whole nations in the ignorance of truths necessary to their Salvation should we rather maintain that God would not save all meerly because of these things Or rather should we not in general seek out the reason in that which he owes to himself to his wisdom and his other attributes Is it not visible or at least is it not a sentiment agreeable with Piety that those ruful effects ought to be attributed to the simplicity in a word to the divinity of his ways and limitation of occasional causes For seeing that God acts by general Laws since he makes use of his Creatures in bringing about his purposes and that he doth not communicate to them his Power but by the establishment of his Laws it is clear that all this proceeds from the nature and action of occasional causes But why has not God established other general Laws or given to the finite action of J.C. an infinite Virtue The Reason is he ought not because his Wisdom exacts from him that he do great works by the most simple ways and that he proportion the action of causes to the beauty of the works And I fear not to say that the Eternal Temple which is the great design of God and the end of all his works is the most beautiful that can be produced by ways so simple and so wise as those are which God makes use of to effect it For I am certain that God loves Men that he would save all and therefore if he doth not so it is because he loves all things in proportion to their amiableness it is because he loves his Wisdom more than his Work 'T is because he does more honour to his attributes by the divinity of his ways than the Perfection of his Creatures In a word 't is because he has the Reason of his Conduct in himself for there is nothing out of God which can hinder him from executing his will And if he should have a will absolutely to save all Men without having respect to the simplicity of his ways 't is certain that he would save all because it is certain that there is an infinite number of means to execute all his designs and that likewise he can execute them by the absolute efficacy of his will without the help of his Creatures I thought my self obliged to represent in few words the Idea which I have of the Divine Providence to the end that it may be easily judged whether it is not more worthy of the Wisdom of God more agreeable to all that experience teaches more useful to answer the Objections of the Libertines better fitted to make us love God and unite us to J.C. our Head and Lastly more according to the Scripture taking it in its full meaning than that humane providence which supposes that God acts always by particular wills and would only save the lesser part of mankind and this simply and precisely because his will is so Objections against the foregoing Discourse With the Author's Answers Objection I. THat cannot evidently be seen in the Idea of GOD which has no necessary relation to him Now there is onely an Arbitrary and not any necessary relation betwixt God and the observation of the general Rules of nature This is one of the Author's Principles Therefore it is not evident that the general cause ought not to produce its effect by particular Wills Now according to this Author we ought not to believe any thing that he says if evidence doth not oblige us thereunto Therefore we may stop here This overturns his new System Answer 'T is true I have said that the general Laws by which God executes his designs are Arbitrary and this is true in two senses First Because God might have produc't nothing For the World is not a necessary Emanation of the Divinity Secondly
be blasted and will it for very good reasons We must know the designs of Men to understand whether they forsake them and want constancy and firmness of mind or not For they may have a design to do at different times things quite opposite to one another But who knoweth the designs of God This would be a very fit Principle to justifie the Reproach which Pagans cast out against Christians That their God shews himself to be inconstant by abolishing the ancient Sacrifices which he himself had appointed This appears by Marcellinus's Letter to St. Augustin where he acquaints this Father That the Change of the first Sacrifices was one of the things which stuck most with Volusianus Maxime says he quia ista varietas inconstantiae Deum possit arguere This Objection would have been a convincing Reason against the Christian Religion if it be true that it is always a mark of inconstancy to unmake at one time what is made at another Answer I do not say that to unmake at one time what is made at another is not always a mark of inconstancy Nay in respect of God this I say is never a mark thereof The reason is because God doth not ordinarily act by particular wills For I maintain that God doth not by such wills make a Straw for example turn a 1000 times about but only by the Wind in consequence of the natural Laws which are his general Wills I endeavour by the uniformity of God's Conduct and the simplicity of his Ways to reconcile infinite Contradictions which we meet with in his Work and thereby I silence the Manichees and Philosophers who judge of God by themselves those attributing to a blind Nature and these to a malevolent God those natural Effects which contradict one another The Lions eat the Wolves and the Wolves the Sheep and the Sheep the Grass which God makes to grow and all this because the Laws of Nature tho simple and always exactly observed are fruitful enough to cover the Earth with Flowers and Fruits and furnish to the Sheep and an infinite number of other Animals their food to the end that they themselves may be nourishment to those which are their Superiours either by strength or cunning I omit other Reasons not proper to my Subject All this I say again is done in consequence of general Laws insomuch that all these Effects which contradict one another do not imply any contradiction in the Cause which produces them because this Cause doth not act and ought not to act by particular wills Nevertheless I have said and do say it again that to make and unmake and make again the same things a thousand times in a day is a sufficient sign of inconstancy and if otherwise we did not know that there is no defect in God we should naturally be inclined to think there is If my Principle should be rejected That God acts not by particular Wills but in consequence of general Laws I maintain that the ways of God ought to bear the Character of his Attributes and that his practical Wills should be the same till the work for which they were appointed be atchieved the same I say with respect to his immutability if the justice which he owes to his other Attributes doth not oblige him to change But I never said that God could not undo that to morrow which he doth to day without giving Men occasion to accuse him of inconstancy because the same general Laws do produce an infinite number of different Effects in the World The Night the Day the Seasons of the Year every thing says St. Augustine is subject to change but the Laws which God observes in the course of his Providence change not Haec omnia mutantur nec mutatur Divinae Providentiae ratio qua fit ut ist a mutentur The ways of God that is his practical wills are always the same there has been no essential change in the general Laws since their first establishment the Bodies which strike upon one another are reflected now as they were four thousand Years ago the Laws of union of the Soul and Body and those of the union of the Mind with universal Reason are still the same now they were in Adam's time the sin of the first Man has only deprived us of the power which he had of suspending the action of these first Laws by that strict union which he then had with universal Reason in consequence of other Laws which still subsist and make our wills the occasional causes of the Ideas which are presented to our minds Lastly The Laws by which God has given unto good and bad Angels the power to act upon bodies and by them upon our minds are still the same in the main tho the bad ones cannot make use of this power as they would by reason of the resistance of our tutelary Angels and for other reasons little understood Thus I am of the opinion that the ways of God always carry in them the character of his immutability and that he never changes any thing in them till his work shall be finished if the Law of Order requires not that they should have the Character of some other of his Attributes Once more I never said that what God makes unmakes and makes again implies any change in his Conduct since according to my opinion all these effects are the consequences of the simplicity and fruitfulness of his ways I only maintain that if God should act by particular wills what he doth would signifie inconstancy in his designs since there are things which he makes unmakes and makes again an hundred times in a day without any apparent profit or necessity for surely it is a mark of inconstancy to undo that which one has done to make it again what it was before And 't is in my thoughts to speak of God very much after the manner of Men and very unworthily of his Attributes to ascribe unto him as many particular Designs or practical Wills as there are little Straws which are whirl'd about with the Wind or Leafs and Fruits which the Rain nourishes and the Frost destroys for experience teaches us that these Effects are only the Consequences of the Natural Laws which God hath established to make the World as perfect as it can be acting as becomes himself The Objection which the Pagans made by asking Whether the God of the Christians was not the same with him of the Old Testament and if so why he had abolished his ancient Sacrifices This Objection I say touches me the least of any one so far is it according to my Principle from being a convincing Reason of the falseness of Religion for tho the ways of God be always the same the effects thereof may and ought to be different according to different times God gave to Angels the power of governing the Nations especially the Jews in consequence of general Laws which are his ways So that it is rather the Laws of Angels which