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A41688 The court of the gentiles. Part IV. Of reformed philosophie wherein Plato's moral and metaphysic or prime philosophie is reduced to an useful forme and method / by Theophilus Gale. Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678. 1677 (1677) Wing G142; ESTC R25438 525,579 570

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before Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the Soul is more ancient than althings sithat it is the principe of motion His designe is to demonstrate the Providence of God from the Soul of the Vniverse which moves agitates foments vivisies influenceth orders and governes althings And he demonstrates this Universal Spirit or Soul of the Universe to be more ancient than althings i. e. Eternal and Increate because it gave forme life and motion to althings Thence he addes in the same page 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore shal we not necessarily acknowlege that the Soul doth universally governe and inhabit in althings that are moved yea that it governes Heaven Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This Soul therefore actuates and impels by its motions althings that are contained in the Vniversitie of Nature namely of Heaven Earth Sea c. So pag. 898. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Sithat this Vniversal Soul moves the Sun Again he addes That the Soul of the Vniverse which is in that round splendid bodie of the Sun moves it every where as the Soul which is in our bodie leads it every where He gives us in these three pages several great Philosophemes to prove That God is the Soul of the Vniverse who actuates vivisies conserves and governes althings as our Souls do our Bodies Thus Proclus in Plat. Timae p. 93. explicates the Platonic Mundane Spirit After Amelius saith he Porphyrie thinking to agree with Plotimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. cals the Supermundane Soul the Opificer or Framer of the world The Spirit of God is called by these Platonistes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Supermundane Soul of the Vniverse as being elevated above the Universe yet animating actuating and influencing the whole and each part thereof Others terme him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Mundane Soul or the Soul inhabiting the Vniverse Al these Platonistes make the Universe to be as it were a great Animal and the Spirit of God to be the Soul that animates vegetates actuates and perfectes this Animal Thus Origen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. 2. c. 1. As our Bodie is made up of many members and contained by one Soul so do I conceive that the whole world is to be looked on as one huge great Animal which is contained as it were by one Soul the Virtue and Reason of God And so much seems to be intimated in Scripture Thus also the Pythagoreans held as we are assured by Minutius Foelix That God was the Soul diffused throughout the whole Vniverse from whom althings received Life Being and Motion So the Stoics said That the Divine Mind is diffused throughout al parts of the Vniverse as our Soul throughout our bodie as Laertius in Zeno. And that these Philosophemes touching the Spirit or Soul of the Vniverse must be understood of the Spirit of God and were so intended though imperfectly by the wiser Heathens we are assured by Cyprian Sermo de Spiritu Sancto p. 329. Edit Basil 1558. This Holy Spirit from the beginning of the World is said Gen. 1.2 to be superfused on the waters not as if he needed the material waters as a vehicle which he rather sustained and gave congruous motion and fixed limits to what comprehended the firmament The Eternal Virtue and Divinitie of this Spirit albeit the Ancient Philosophers those Inquisitors of the Universe could not find him out in his proper nature yet by their subtile conjectures they conceived him to be present with althings giving Life Motion Termes Stabilitie and Use to every thing This Life this Motion this Essence of things the Philosophers stiled THE SOUL OF THE WORLD conceiving that al Celostial Bodies I mean the Sun Moon and Stars yea the very Firmament was moved and governed by the virtue of this Soul and that the Waters Earth and Air were impregnated by the Seeds hereof Who if they had believed that this Spirit is both Lord and Creator and Vivificator and Nutritor of althings that are under him they might have had some convenient accesse to life But the Majestie of so great a Mysterie was hid from the wise and prudent of this world neither could the pride of human Ingenie concerne it self in such celestial secrets and penetrate the altitude of this superessential nature and albeit they understood that the Divinitie was the Creatrix and Gubernatrix of things yet they could no way distinguish what was the Trinitie of the Deitie or what was the Unitie or what the proprietie of persons This is the Spirit of Life whose Vivific heat doth animate foment advance and make fruitful althings See Philosoph General l. 1. c. 2. sect 3. § 3. and l. 3. c. 2. sect 1. § 4. 4. Albeit the Efficience and Concurrence of the Spirit in al Providential Operations be as to its manner of working Immediate Providential means used by the Spirit yet this hinders not but that ordinarily he makes use of means for the execution thereof not from any defect of his Divine Efficience but from the abundance of his Benignitie that so in and by the mediation of Instruments he might render his own Efficience more illustrious and conspicuous and leave some marque of honor on the means Whence oft times the Spirit of God useth the most unapt and unlikely means for the production of the most Noble Effects Yea oft God brings about the Issues of his Providence by contrary means which carry in them a seeming contradiction to what God intends By how much the more potent the virtue of any Agent is by so much the more doth it extend its operation unto things remote Now is not the virtue of Divine Providence most efficacious May it not then extend its efficience to means and effects most remote Doth it not belong to the Majestie Splendor and Dignitie of a Prince to have many Ministers of State under him for the execution of his Soverain Wil and Commands And doth it not in like manner appertain to the Majestie of God the Supreme Lord to have varietie of instruments and means for the execution of his Providence Al Providence according to its formal Idea includes two things Ordination and Execution The Ordination being an Act of Intelligence and Sapience belongs to the Supreme Ordinator who by how much the more judicious and prudent he is by so much the more capacious he is to order al means and affaires in subservience to his end and designe But the Execution requiring only Force and Power may as wel and oft more aptly be transacted by inferior Agents or Ministers invested with executive force in order thereto Thus in Divine Providence the Ordination and Disposition of al means the most wise God reserveth to himself as a Prerogative peculiar to his Imperial Crown but the execution he frequently commits to second causes and instruments furnishing them with executive Forces for the production of the effect and
irradiation Thence Augustine stiles Libertie the best disposition of Soul Similitude to God is the highest Libertie as to state so far as any is made virtuose so far he is made free The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is so intimate as that indeed they have one and the same beginning progresse and consummation By how much the more ample spiritual pure and perfect the Soul is by so much the more free it is and whence springs the Amplitude Spiritualitie Puritie and Perfection of the Soul but from virtuose habits Indeed Plato estimed nothing good but Virtue and moral Good whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That according to Plato Virtue only was good That Virtue is the most perfect state of the Soul and that which brings with it most moral Libertie is most evident because hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its first Cause and last End which is the top of moral Libertie For wherein consistes the perfection of moral Libertie but in its conformitie to its most perfect Exemplar which is the Divine Bonitie And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas Dispositio perfecti ad optimum The Disposition of a perfect Subject to the most perfect Exemplar and End Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it self so Aquinas Grace saith he in it self and according to its essence is more noble than the nature of the Soul because it is an expression or participation of the divine Bonitie and that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie That which belongs to God by nature belongs to us by Grace And Suarez saith That Grace is the Bond whereby man is conjoined to God his last end Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God by so much the more sublime free and perfect its state and condition is In sum Libertie of state consistes in a virtuose or graciose disposition of Soul whereby it is enabled to understand embrace and adhere to what is good in that manner and measure as it ought Take al the notions of true moral Libertie and they agree to none but the virtuose man 1. Virtue gives Deminion Libertie is defined by the Platonist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Principalitie or Dominion of Life also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a plenary power over althings Which the Stoics interpret 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-moving autoritie or power And whence ariseth this Dominion of the Soul over it self and other things but from virtuose habits Plato assures us That a virtuose temperate man is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 stronger than himself i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his sensitive part Again Repub. 9. he instructes us That he who is best is most happie and august or royal because he is able to governe himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he that is most wicked is most miserable because he is a Tyrant over himself May we account him a man fit to governe himself who is a slave to his unlawful passions and lusts The Orator defines Libertie a power of living as men list and who hath this power to live as he list but the virtuose man whose wil is conformed to the divine Wil Doth the voluptuose sensual man live as he list whose mind is distracted and torne in pieces by unbridled lusts as by so many wild Horses Can it be imagined that the ambitiose man lives as he list whose mind is stil on the rack of ambitiose designes Doth the avaricious man live as he list who the more he has the more he wants It 's most evident that no man lives as he list but the virtuose man who has a wil slexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expressed in sacred Philosophie Hos 11.12 So Hos 11.12 But Judah yet ruleth with God and is faithful with the Saints 1 Observe That Judah's ruling with God is opposed to that of Ephraim who ruled also but not with God as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himself on the ruines of Gods Worship by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel c. But Judah ruled with God and was faithful with the Saints 2 Judah rules with God i.e. by serving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himself and al lower things he lives as he lists because his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil. 2. Moral Libertie consistes in the moral Life Health Vigor Virtue gives life health vigor and force and Force of the Soul which also ariseth from virtuose Habits Al natural freedome supposeth a vital subject in which it inheres and so by a paritie of reason al moral spiritual Libertie supposeth a moral spiritual life and vital subject and indeed life renders every thing most beautiful active and perfect Whence by how much the more noble excellent and perfect the life of any thing is by so much the more raised noble and excellent is its state and al its operations Life is that which seasoneth every thing and every life draws to it things suitable to its nature so the spiritual divine virtuose life has Principes above human Nature more noble and excellent and herein consistes moral Libertie as to state Plato Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us That the health of the bodie consistes in the equal temperament of al humors c. So in the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue truly is a certain health pulchritude and good habitude of Soul but sin is the disease turpitude and infirmitie thereof Health according to Augustine and Jansenius consistes in the vigor force and strength of Nature and what makes the Soul more vigorous and strong than Virtue Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature but from its Spirits And are not virtuose Habits the Spirits of the Soul That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul Plato once and again assertes So in his Gorgias pag. 467. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Power is of good c. Also pag. 470. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be able to do much is to be good And in his Hippias pag. 375. he saith Righteousnesse is the vigor and power of the Soul for the more righteous the Soul is the more potent it is Divine Light and Virtue is the strongest thing in the World In the sensible World nothing is so strong as Light and in the rational World nothing so strong as Truth and Virtue Al the force and vigor of lust comes from impotence but Virtue is as a Pondus or weight on the Soul which strongly impels it to its last end What more potent than Love whereby the Soul adheres to its last end By how much the more spiritual and pure any facultie is by so much the stronger it is and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul Again the strength of every
〈◊〉 a select peculiar superexcellent people And Psal 16.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 16.3 Saints is interpreted inwhat follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 magnisicent eximious which shews that none are truly magnificent but virtuose holy persons Thence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 holy pure is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 veneration worship and this from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to worship which they also derive from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 azaz to honor That Sanctitie and Virtue is the Crown of al other Excellences is evident from Zach. 9.16 Zach. 9.16 For they shal be as the stones of a Crown lifted up as an Ensigne on his land i. e. God wil deliver his Saints out of their dangers and troubles as also lift them up to that honor which pretiose stones have in the Kings Diademe The word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both Separation and a Crown which notes here that every Saint is separated by God as a Jewel in his Crown Thence God termes them Mal. 3.17 My Jewels Which notes both separation and proprietie as also dignitie and excellence Indeed Sanctitie and Virtue is the Glorie and Crown of al other Excellences because it implies separation from al impurities and a comprehension of the highest perfections It raiseth things and persons otherwise commun and vulgar to the highest degree of excellene even to the Image of God which is the perfection of human Nature Thus Plato Leg. 4. pag. 716. largely demonstrates That conformitie to the divine Image is the highest perfection of human Nature Of which see Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 3. § 5. But more particularly That Virtue brings with it the highest Nobilitie Magnificence and excellence is evident from many Platonic Philosophemes Thus Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nobilitie is desined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Virtue of generose manners So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magnificence is pag. 412. defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Dignitie according to the most august or venerable right Reason i. e. according to Virtue For indeed al the ancient Philosophers made Honor and Nobilitie to be but the shadow and reward of Virtue A free man according to the Hebrews is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib which signifies also a Prince or Noble man one endowed with noble generose virtuose dispositions What more sublime and noble than Vitue Ut foelicitatis est quantum velis posse sic magnitudinis quantum possis velle Plin. ad Trajan Is not that a generose Soul that is wel-disposed and inclined to generose heroic deeds Is any Soul more great than he who can despise great mundane things for Virtues sake It is accounted by some a great piece of felicitie to be able to do what they wil but is it not a greater piece of libertie to wil what we ought which alone belongs to virtuose persons Is he not truly great who has a great measure of Virtue Hence among the Heroic Virtues there was found out an Apotheosis which was nothing else but an extension of Virtues and human conditions to a perfection not human Virtuose persons are the greatest men in the world they have the greatest Souls yea nothing is really great but what is good The best Nobilitie lies in the mind indued with Virtue what mind more great than that which is subject to the great God Who is greater than he who is least in his own eyes Is not such a Soul most great in divine favor It was a great Saying of Zeno the Stoic You are not therefore good because great but you are therefore great beause good 5. Moral Libertie as to state implies Splendor Beautie and Glorie The Splendor Beautie and Glorie of Virtue Plato makes Beautie to arise from the predominance of the forme over the mater which otherwise is distorme By the forme I understand the spirituose active Principe and so indeed it holds true of the Soul the Beautie whereof consistes in the predominance of virtuose habits which are as the spirits and forme of the Soul For look as the Soul which is the forme of a man gives life vigor perfection and beautie to the human bodie so proportionably virtuose habits give life vigor perfection and beautie to the human Soul Plato abounds much in this argument that Virtue is the Beautie of the Soul So in his Phaedrus pag. 279. O Friend Pan the Ape of the Messias give me to be beautiful within i.e. in my Soul Thence pag. 250. he saith The Beautie of divine Wisdome which is the Spirit of Virtue is so illustrious and amiable that if it were seen with eyes it would stir up wonderful Loves Al Beautie ariseth from Light spirits and proportion of parts and what gives Light Spirits and proportion to the Soul but Virtue Some define Beautie the fulgor or bland face of Goodnesse and doth not this speak Virtue most beautiful Cicero defines Beautie a due congruence with suavitic of color and what hath a more due congruence and sweet color than Virtue Among the Beauties of Nature nothing more beautiful than Light and O1 what a gloriose illustrious Light attends Virtue Is not divine Veritie the Spring of Virtue the most virgin unspotted gloriose affective Light Plato in his Philebus pag. 64. saith That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Idea or face of Good is composed of three things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beautie and Symmetrie and Truth Yea he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The very Images of things beautiful are beautiful And is not God most beautiful yea the first Beautie as before Chap. 2. § 2. And what is true Virtue but the gloriose Image of this first Beautie Must it not then be most beautiful Aristotle Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. assures us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Delphic Inscription That which is most just is most beantiful And Seneca Epist 115. addes If it were lawful to look into the mind of a good man O! what a beautiful face should we see How holy how resplendent a mind composed of a magnific and placid countenance yea saith he Virtue is so graciose and beautiful that it is natural even to wicked men to approve better things neither has any one so far banished the natural Law or put off humanitie as to espouse wickednesse for wickednesse sake So Plato and Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No man is voluntarily wicked for wickednesse sake Which shews that Virtue in it self is most amiable Greg. Nyssenus Hom. 2. in Cant. termes Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of the Beautie of the Soul flowing from God the supreme Beautie And Basil in Psal saith That Grace is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Beautie of the Soul Also Corysostome ad Theodor. Paraen 1. tels us That a deformed bodie cannot be made beautiful but a deformed Soul may be rendred such by Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. To render the Soul
with greater dexteritie facilitie and alacritie in acting than virtuose Principes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Alacrite is defined Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A manifestation of practic election and who manifest more free practic election than such as act virtuosely Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Customes are defined by Galen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded Natures and Arist Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome is akin to Nature whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome makes every thing sweet Now virtuose exercices frequently repeted breed a divine spiritual custome which is attended with divine suavitie and delight The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile dexterous and sweet Experience teacheth us that whatever is long customary turnes into our natures even diseases and poisons How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending virtuose acts Thence Heb. 5.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 5.14 Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar pleasant and sweet and therefore most free for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them than virtuose exercices O! what sweet inspirations what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices are not the most difficult services made facile hereby Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure and therefore of libertie in it And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation and the more raised and spiritual the operation is the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end for the nearer things come to their first Principes the more joyful and free they are and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious real solid pure spiritual strong self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights as Psal 119.14 16 20 35 3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie Virtuose Exercices most lively The more excellent and noble the life is the more free the acts are and the more virtuose the acts are the more of the divine life they carry in them Thus Plato Charmid pag. 171. Sin being banisht from the Soul and Rectitude presiding in every act it 's necessary that those who are thus disposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do act wel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that those who act wel do live happily The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act that so we may live blessedly Whereby he intimates that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To live wel is to act wel The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation which is most proper to it and unto which it is most naturally inclined and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur tantò perfectior est modus vivendi Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self by so much the more perfect it mode of living is and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves Plato tels us Phaedr pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By which he shews That it is proper to life to move it self by it self And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self but when it acts virtuosely And as al life consistes in action even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions A virtuose Soul as it has Principes of life above Nature so also actings for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is by so much the more excellent is the operation The life and motion of virtuose hearts is upward like that of fire which is of al the most noble active and free life Thence in facred Philosophie Life is frequently put for a noble comfortable free blessed condition of life Psal 34.12 13. consisting in virtuose exercices So Psal 34.12 What man is he that desireth life i. e. a blessed free sweet life And how may such a life be acquired That he tels you vers 13 14. Depart from evil and do good c. The like Psal 22.26 69.33 Psal 119.77 Eccles 6.8 1 Pet. 3.10 And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie namely because there is no true life but what is virtuose blessed and free So that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts by so much the more divine and free its life is 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection but also enlargement and libertie Thence Psal 119.96 the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample and why because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil which is most ample Whence the Soul by actual adherence to the divine Law rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie Thus Psal 119.165 Great peace have they who love thy law Or Psal 119.165 ample peace with libertie as to walking Thence it follows and nothing shal offend them Or they shal have no stumbling block ie They shal walke in the Kings high-way according to the royal Law of Libertie with al manner of libertie and boldnesse Liber ab infinito ad infinitum super infnitum
hath conceived mischief and brought forth a lie It 's spoken of Sauls mischievous yet abortive designes against David and it alludes to the pangs and torments of a woman in travel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies hard toilsome miserable labor such as poor slaves are tormented with The LXX render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in the Greek Glossary found at the end of Cyril is rendred dolor So in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies vexatious grief and torment as Rev. 16.10 11. 21.4 Hence the Greek word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an evil man received its derivation For every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 conceives and brings forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 miserable torments David's meaning here is Qui voluptari tradidere principia non ipsi voluptatem sed ipsos voluptas habet cujus aut inopia torquentur aut copia strangulantur Sen. That Saul had been long hatching mischievous designes ful of torment and anxietie and endeavored by much travel and sore labor like a woman in travel to bring them forth and accomplish them but he could bring forth nothing but a mere lie he was frustrated in al his mischievous contrivements Note here an elegant Allegorie in these termes Conceiveth travelleth and brought forth which argues the highest vexation travel and torment which Sinners labor under in al their mischievous designes as Jer. 4.31 Wicked men are as much tormented with the sin they love as with the fear of the punishment they hate al their labor is pain So Jer. 51.58 Habak 2.13 Sinners are said to labor in the fire Jer. 51.58 or for the fire i. e. 1 In vain without any profit as if any one should weave a thread over the fire which brings not only losse of labor but of materials also 2 To labor in the fire notes a dangerous tedious toilsome servile labor such as is proper to slaves What more tedious irkesome and fruitlesse than the drudgerie of sin Eccles 10.15 So Eccles 10.15 The labor of the foolish wearieth every one of them As in Nature it is not stormes without but vapors within the bowels of the earth raised up by subterraneous fires that cause Earthquakes and Tremblements so in the Soul it is not afflictions from without but the interne fire of lusts and sinful vapors that cause torments and tremblement in Conscience It 's better to be possessed of the Devil in the bodie than of lusts in the heart which always breed labor and pain No Sinner ever attains to what he aims at he would be somewhat else than what he is and these desires breed anxietie and torment 4 The servitude of Sin is of al most penal in that eternal punishment is annexed to and entailed thereon This is the top of al punishment that Sinners shal be turned into Hel with al their sins at their back Neither was this kind of punishment altogether hid from Plato for in his Gorg. pag. 522. we find this punishment thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a Soul to descend down to Hel laden with many sins is the most extreme of evils A great Philosopheme for a Pagan and that which argues his acquaintance with sacred Philosophie which more fully instructes us that sin is eternally punished in Hel because it makes a man eternally willing to sin The righteous God takes the same course in punishing sin as men take in the committing of it he sees men have an eternal love for and delight in sin and therefore they shal have an eternal punishment for sin As sinners lay up eternal treasures of sin so God layes up eternal treasures of wrath and punishment In fine what more just than that he who by sin acts eternally against the wil of God should suffer eternal torments against his own wil And can there be a more penal afflictive servitude than this § 8. Having explicated and demonstrated the servitude that attends Sin Al men borne servants of and dead in Sin it now only remains to demonstrate that al mankind are borne in this state of servitude It 's a Maxime in the Civil Law Just Institut l. 1. tit 4. That among Servants there is no difference so as one should be more a Servant than another though among Free-men there are many differences This holds true in moral servitude for among the Ilaves of sin there is no difference as to state because al are dead in sin and death as wel moral as natural admits no degrees al dead men are equally such without difference Whence the Civilians have another great Saying That a Servant is reputed dead whiles he lives Such are al the servants of sin who are really dead whiles they seem to live Lapsed man is under a miserable natural yet voluntary necessitie of sinning wherefore altogether uncapable of erecting himself to a state of virtue as before § 7. That al men by nature are dead in sin is an Hypothesis avouched not only in sacred but also in Platonic Philosophie Thus Plato in his Gorgias pag. 493. I heard this from the wise men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we are now dead and that our bodie is the sepulchre of our Soul By the wise men I presume he means the Barbarians specially the Egyptians and Hebrews from whom he received this Tradition That men are naturally dead in sin Thus Clemens Alexandrinus Strom. 5. pag. 419. In the Barbaric Philosophie they cal those dead who have fallen from their Dogmes and subjected their minds to lusts This Pythagoras expressed by the Symbol of a Coffin which he placed in the room of any expelled out of his Schole thereby to indigitate that he was dead Thence that other Symbol of Pythagoras Abstain from the dead i.e. from conversation with dead sinners which Symbol Grotius makes to be derived from the Hebraic Philosophie according to that of our Lord Mat. 8.22 Let the dead burie the dead Moreover Plato cals the life of men dead in sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a life without life Also he saith That mens Souls are in this life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a ferine or brutish nature Yea Aristotle Problem S. 10. Prob. 45. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nature doth althings that are wicked Among the primitive Christians nothing more commun than this Hypothesis That Virtue or Grace could not be educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature because al men by nature are dead in sins Thus Clemens Alexandr Strom. 2. proves against the sectators of Basilides and Valentinus those fore-runners of the Pelagians That faith is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the good effect of freewil nor yet the prerogative of Nature But to explicate and demonstrate how al men by nature are under this spiritual death and moral servitude of sin take the following Propositions 1. Prop. This Philosopheme That al men are by Nature dead in sin is not hyperbolic but metaphoric and real Plato speaking of the moral death of
the Soul he understands it in his darke way according to the mind of sacred Philosophie whence he borrowed this as other of the choisest of his Philosophemes Now in sacred Philosophie this moral death of the Soul is not hyperbolic but real albeit metaphorically expressed Psal 5.9 Rom. 3.13 Thus Psal 5.9 cited by Paul Rom. 3.13 Their throat is an open sepulchre What David ascribes to the throat Plato Gorg. 499. attributes to the whole bodie namely that it is but the sepulchre of the Soul Whence he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be by a Paronomasie derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sepulchre as before And Democritus said That the diseases of the Soul were the greatest which if men could open they should find there 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a sepulchre ful of evils David cals the throat an open sepulchre because 1 the heart or soul of al by nature lies morally dead and rotten in the bodie as in a sepulchre 2 The Soul lying dead in this sepulchre continually sends forth loathsome and noisome smels as if you draw nigh to an open sepulchre where dead bodies newly rotten lie buried you wil soon scent their noisome sumes 3 Mens mouths and throats are as it were the mouth of this sepulchre by which mens dead rotten hearts breathe forth their loathsome smels You may scent mens corrupt hearts in their words which passe through their throats those open sepulchres Again that men are borne naturally and morally dead in sin is wel illustrated Esa 1.4 Ah! Esa 1.4 sinful nation a people laden with iniquitie as with a mountain of lead But lest men should conceit that al this iniquitie comes only by custome and frequence of sinful acts he addes a seed of evil doers or maligne sinners This notes that men are borne sinners a sinful brood that sin is hereditarie and not only by custome Esa 57.4 Thus Esa 57.4 Children of transgression i. e. 1 borne in sin of sinful parents 2 Addicted to transgression given up to it for according to the Hebrew Idiome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a child being used with a Genitive Case of Appellatives is taken for such an one as is wholly addicted and devoted to such a thing Thence it follows a seed of falsehood i. e. a lumpe or masse of hypocrisie wholly composed and made up of iniquitie an adulterous brood Al sin is in the heart of man and the heart of man is in al sin albeit he be not always hurried into al acts of sin Hence Plato mentions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an innate and connate evil or vitiositie of nature commun to al as before § 2. of this Chapter And Seneca assures us That corrupt Nature has drunke in such deep draughts of iniquitie which are so far incorporated with its bowels as that you cannot get it out but by tearing out its very bowels Hence 2. Prop. There are no seeds of spiritual life No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature no active power or disposition to what is spiritually good in corrupt Nature Thence Cyril Alexandr termes Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above the Creation And Chrysostome in Gen. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Gift above Nature overcoming Nature it self Where there is a spiritual death there is a total privation without the least seed of active power for the production of a virtuose life Free-wil in corrupt nature is alive to do evil but dead as to the doing what is good it is mighty knowing and potent to do evil as Jer. 4.22 but every way ignorant and impotent as to doing what is good it can find legs to run away from God but none to run to him And if the person be dead can his acts or workes be alive May we expect a good thought or word or deed from such al their days so long as they continue in such a dead state of sin Is it possible for a dead corps to take up its coffin and grave upon its back and thence to arise and walke And is it not much more impossible for a dead Soul to dispose it self towards a virtuose life It is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie That there are no seeds of spiritual life in corrupt nature A human power is not sufficient to produce an act more than human The divine life and motion towards God must procede from God Mans sin and miserie come from his own free-wil but al Virtue and Beatitude from free Grace he that is not acted by divine Grace is necessarily acted by carnal lust corrupt nature is not only emty of but contrary to al good and therefore al workes done by it are dead workes because they procede from a dead nature and tend to death wherefore true moral Virtue cannot be extracted out of the power of Nature Thus Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's proper to human Nature in no wise to receive any heavenly gifts of Grace out of its own nature but to enrich it self with the gifts of God above Nature This Hypothesis albeit the Stoics and Aristoteleans contradict it is evidently deducible from Socrates and Plato's Philosophie Thus Plato Meno pag. 99. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue comes not by Nature neither from the Institutes of Learning but by divine Afflation or Inspiration without the concurse of the human mind in those in whom it 's produced It 's true the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Virtue might be taught because there were sparkes or seeds thereof in human Nature which might be drawen forth by good institution but this Socrates greatly opposed as that which was inconsistent with the depraved state of the Soul and divine concurse for the production of Virtue And sacred Philosophie is most positive in this that there are no seeds of spiritual life or virtue in man Psal 5.9 Thus Psal ● 9 Their inward part or the most sublime refined intimate part of the Soul is very wickednesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wickednesses pravities The Plural for the Singular and abstract for the concrete which denotes 1 an Vniversalitie both of the predicate and subject that al their inward parts were ful of sin and that al sin was in their inward parts 2 The perfection of Sin For abstracts specially in the Plural Number speak Essences and Spirits The Elixir and Spirits of Sin are in the inwards of corrupt Nature Hence 3. Prop. The inclination of corrupt Nature to evil Natural impotence to what is good and its impotence as to what is good is universal and total This naturally follows from what precedes for if the Soul be morally dead in sin without any seeds of spiritual life or moral virtue then it follows that its impotence to good is total for as in naturals death is a total privation of life there is not the least seed for the reduction of the life lost so in morals such
Plato Leg. 12. pag. 951. institutes a College for the inspection and conservation of Laws His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let him have recourse to their College which is constituted for the inspection of Laws Let this College consiste of Juniors and Seniors and daily at the break of day before the Sun rising let them convene First let there be of the Priests such as excel in the offices of Virtue then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Conservators of the Laws ten of those that excel in age and virtue c. The sum of al is this In as much as Laws without diligent conservation are apt to degenerate and fal under depravation from the unbridled lusts of men therefore there is need of certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Conservators of Laws to keep their Autoritie inviolable on which account Plato constituted this his sacred College 9. From what has been laid down of Laws in the general A Law what we may with facilitie forme a particular Idea of a Law which Definit Platon is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Law is a politic Decree of the Communitie constituted not for a certain time only This last clause is added to discriminate a Law from a Suffrage or Vote which is there thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Vote or Suffrage is a politic Decree constituted only for a certain time To speak more distinctly of a Law it includes two formal essential parts 1. It s Equitie Equitie and politic Constitution 1 Eqitio is as the Soul of the Law that which gives vital spirits and life to it and is one and the same immutable Reason which ought to diffuse it self throughout al Laws Whence a Law is defined by Pet. à Sancto Joseph The Ordination of Reason promulgated by him that hath the care of the Communitie for the commun Good Whence he proves That al Laws so far as they participate of right reason are derived from the eternal Law as also from natural Precepts By the Eternal Law they understand the Divine Decree or soverain pleasure of God whence the Reason and Equitie of al Laws both natural and politic receives its derivation Of this Equitie we have suffiiently discoursed in what immediately precedes 2. It s Constitution 2 Politic Constitution is that which draws down general equitie and applies it to this or that politic Societie according to the various exigences circumstances and reasons of State which are peculiar to that Societie or Republic for which the Laws are made 1 This politic Constitution is that which gives formal reason to politic Laws and renders them obligatorie to the Societie for which they are made Thence Definit Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Legislator is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Framer of Laws accordin gto which we ought to live in Republics 2 This politic Constitution is the measure of al Controversies Determinations and Civil Justice in any politic Bodie Whence Definite Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Disceptation whether things be done justly or not And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Bonitie of Laws is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the obedience of right Laws 3 This politic Constitution is that which gives Order to al Politie Thence Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a similitude of Office and Action of al those things that are compared among themselves or more briefly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Symmetrie or proportion of Societie i.e. when al that appertein to such a Societie consent to walke and live together by soem commun Law That politic Constitution or Law gives Beautie Perfection and Order to al politic Bodies we are assured by Plato in his Gorgias pag. 503 504. where he shews that althings both natural and artificial receive their perfection from Order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore an house having acquired order and ornament wil be good and commodous Whence he concludes That as health is the virtue and order of the bodie natural so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Legal and Law is the Order of the Soul as also of Bodies politic Politic Law and Order are intimely conjoined both as to Name and Thing As for Names whence had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order its origination but from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dath or as we may pronounce it tat Law Order Hence sprang 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with its Derivates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Law as wel as Order so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distribute orderly Order as wel as Law Neither do Law and Order agree in the reciprocation of Names only but also in their Natures Hence Plato oft useth them promiscuously one for the other and joins them together as exegetic each of other So ●eg 7. pag. 780. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For whatever in a Republic is comprehended under a certain Order and Law and by the conduct thereof is governed cannot but be conjoined with the greatest goods But on the contrary either when there is no Order or when things are il constituted there cannot but follow the greatest perturbation which pervertes that good Order and al that Vtilitie that floweth thence Wherein we have these observables 1 He useth Order and Law promiscuously for one and the same thing So Leg. 9. pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. In the next place we ought to choose Order and Law which propose what we are to consider and concernes the commun use of life 2 He saith that from this legal Order and its conduct the bonitie and perfection of things politic ariseth 3 that from the defect and want of this legal Order al perturbation confusion and evils in a politic bodie do arise More touching Order see § 1. § 6. Having explicated Legislation The several kinds of politic Administration which takes in the first part of Empire we now passe on to the second namely Administration or Jurisdiction which in Plato's Philosophie passeth under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Regiment or Governement from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arche a Prince Principatie or Governement Whence Lot is stiled by the Rabbines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince of the Judges So Rom. 8.38 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is taken for Principaties Definit Platon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Principatie is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The care or charge of the whole Which is a good Idea of politic Jurisdiction and Administration And that which we are herein to consider may be reduced to these two commun Heads 1 The several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration with their preferences 2 The Civil Magistrate who is the Administrator of politic Jurisdiction First as for the several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration they are reduced by Plato as
the supreme infinite Being than to be yoked with his Creature as a partial social coordinate cause 2 This also is inconsistent with the Subordination Dependence and Inferioritie of the second cause For al social partial causes are as such coordinate and equal the effect dependes on each but they depend not each on the other To make the second cause social and coordinate with the first what is it but to make it a first cause 3 This also is inconsistent with the prioritie and antecedence of Gods concurse for a partial causalitie is only simultaneous which has been already refuted 4 The sober Scholastic Divines have ever owned and approved a Totalitie of Divine concurse So Aquinas contra Gent. l. 3. cap. 70. It 's manifest saith he that the same effect is ascribed to the natural and second cause and to the Divine Efficace not as if it were partly from God and partly from the natural Agent but the whole effect is from both in a different mode as the same effect is attributed totally to the Instrument and yet totally to the principal cause The like Alvarez Disput 85. The Totalitie of Divine concurse as to the new Creature and Gratiose Effects is lively illustrated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie Thus Esa 43.7 Esa 43.7 Even every one that is called by my name for I have created him for my Glorie I have formed him yea I have made him Here Christ assumes to himself as the sole total principal Agent the Creation Formation and Consummation of the New Creature As in the old Creation God made first the rude Chaos out of nothing then out of the rude Chaos he formed the several species of the Universe and particularly the Bodie of Man out of the dust of the Earth which was Formation thence in the last place he breathed into Man a Rational Soul which gave Consummation to him So proportionably hereto Christ here assumes to himself a threefold concurse and each total in the framing of the New Creature he saith 1 I have created him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have educed or called him out of nothing as I did the first rude Chaos The new Creature is not educed out of the potence of corrupt Nature but out of nothing by Divine Omnipotence But if this be not enough to expresse the Totalitie of his efficacious Essicience he addes 2 I have formed him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This also is a terme whereby the formation of Creatures out of the first chaos is expressed The sense is I have not only given him some first lines a rude masse or shape of a new Creature but I have fashioned and formed him as I at first formed Adam out of a piece of Red Earth or Clay For so the word signifies to forme or shape a thing as the Potter doth his Clay to this or that forme And if al this wil not suffice to demonstrate that Christ is the total Creator and Formator of the New Creature he addes yet farther 3 Yea I have made him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. I have perfected and completed the whole worke I have made him such as I would have him conforme to mine eternal Idea concerning him he has no part wanting or misplaced not a finger or little toe defective he is a complete perfect new Creature and that by virtue of my Creation Formation and Consummation Thus the whole of the new Creature as wel as of the old is to be ascribed to Christ totally and solely as the Creator Fictor and Effector thereof And here we are also to note that it was usual with the Hebrews to expresse the workes of the interne new Creation under the symbol of the externe old Creation The Totalitie of the Divine concurse is also we expressed Esa 63.5 and Psal 94.17 5. Gods concurse particular not general only The concurse of God as the first cause is particular and proper not only general This Adjunct or mode of operation may seem novel but really it is not so Before we come to the demonstration of it we must premit some Distinctions and Limitations 1 We must distinguish between a general providence and general concurse we denie not but that Gods Providence as it extendes to althings universally may be termed general which yet doth no way induce or suppose a general concurse i. e. such as is alike commun to al effects and determinable thereby as the concurse of the Sun is determinable by the effects it workes on Such a general concurse is unworthy of the first cause who determines al effects but is determinable by none Bradwardine de Causd Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 668. undertakes to give us the origine of this general influxe or concurse which he makes to be from the Pagan Philosophers ' specially the Astrologers who asserted an emanation or irradiation of general influxes from celestial Bodies which they supposed to be Gods on al subjects or maters 2 We must distinguish between a particular cause and a particular concurse We do not affirme that God is a particular cause but an universal cause concurring in a particular manner to al second causes and their effects And here Heereboord Select Disputat Vol. 1. Disput 10 and 11. whiles he justly opposeth his Master Burgersdicius for denying Gods concurse to be particular he himself false into this easie mistake of making God a particular cause For the obviating of which as also for the taking away the foundation of al the objections urged against our Hypothesis we say that God is an Vniversal Cause and yet his concurse as to the mode of its operation is particular God is said to be an Vniversal Cause in regard of the extent of his causalitie as it extendes to al objects effects and second causes universally and yet his concurse is particular as it is not like that of the Sun determinable by its object but doth in a particular manner according to the exigence and condition of the subject determine the same These things being premissed we procede to demonstrate that the concurse of God is not general but particular as to its manner of working with al second causes 1 From the nature of a General concourse which is of it self indifferent but modified and determined by the mater it workes on So the influxe of the Sun is only general and indifferent because modified by the mater it workes on as it is evident by the colors in a Rain-bow as also by the opposite effects it has on the waxe and clay To suppose Gods concurse to be thus General and Indifferent is every way unworthy of the first cause which determines al second causes but is determined by none To assert that the concurse of God is in the power of the second cause or mater it workes on what is this but to suppose the second cause to be first and the first second 2 From the manifold imperfections that are hereby imposed on God For if
God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our last end because he alone is to be loved for himself He that loves any thing with God and not for God loves him not as he ought 2. Vnion The next part of Fruition is Possession of and Vnion with the Object beloved Al complete Fruition supposeth Possession and Vnion Frui est terminus desiderii Suar. for if the object be absent there can be only love of desire not perfect Fruition because to enjoy a thing is the terme of desire Plato in his Timaeus informes us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Beatitude consistes in nothing else but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to have a good Demon dwelling in himself c. whereby he understands God The like also in his Politicus pag. 309. he shews how the Soul being united to the first Beautie or chiefest Good it thereby becomes happie And Thales being asked What was most sweet answered 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to possesse meaning the chiefest Good This possession of the supreme Good which belongs to Fruition is wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art 37. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the virtue of possession and of worke is not the same For the virtue of possession is that it might be most estimed precious and dear Where by Possession he seems to mean Fruition as by worke Vse So Aristotle Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. speaking of Rich men their Fruition of riches as their last end saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They receive a great impression from the possession of riches for they are so affected as if they enjoyed al good i. e. possessing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefest good and so have their spirits formed by yea transformed into them for althings are fashioned and framed into the image and idea of those good things which they possesse and enjoy as their last end Fruition breeds first imitation of or likenesse unto and then union with what we enjoy Neither doth Fruition import possession only but also union with its last end i. e. moral and objective union at least if not physic and real for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we possesse Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefest Good is most intimate firme and inviolable For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firme than that of bodies among themselves or with Spirits The senses in extracting pleasures out of sensible good are conversant only about the externe accidents Moreover the pleasures taken in by the senses come not in altogether but gradually and by parcels therefore the union of object and subject is more remote and partial only But the Soul in the Fruition of the chiefest sweetest good being spiritual and of the same nature with its object has a more complete reception thereof and intimate union therewith whence the pleasures that attend the same are of al the most spiritual pure intense and permanent as hereafter 3. Al Fruition importes Communion with our chiefest Good Communion Frui ex vi nominis est capere fructum à re Suar. For to enjoy a thing according to the origination of the word among the Latines is to participate of the fruits thereof And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefest Good without communion therewith Indeed al union at least with the supreme Good is in order to communion which doth formalise yea consummate the Souls Beatitude in its most perfect state It is not the possession of any good can make them happy that have it unlesse they enjoy what they possesse This is lively illustrated by Plato in his Phaedo pag. 80 c. This Phaedo coming to Socrates at the time when he was ready to die Socrates philosophiseth even to admiration on the Souls immortal state after death and its felicitie in communion with the chiefest Good His words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the Soul being a thing invisible departs to such a place as is most generous pure and invisible namely to the state of the dead where it enjoys God the most wise and choicest Good where if God wil my Soul must immediately go Thence he addes pag. 81. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like it self I say that divine immortal and wise Being Where when it arrives doth it not evade altogether happy being freed from Error Ignorance Terrors wild Loves and other human Infirmities and as we say of those who are initiated in Sacreds spend the rest of its time in communion with God This he makes to be the state of pure Souls separated whereas impure polluted Souls passe unto their place of punishment as he in what follows demonstrates This Communion with God Plato Contemplation Tim. 90. makes to consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in giving the Soul its proper food and motions which he chiefly placeth 1 in the Contemplation of God This he more fully explicates Conviv pag. 211. where he makes The Contemplation of the first Beautie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. that divine sincere uniforme simple pure incontaminate perfect Beautie to be the most ravishing spectacle and that which makes us perfectly happie Acts of Contemplation on God are most tranquille pleasant congenial to the Soul uniforme self-sufficient and permanent Thus Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 179. Art 1. Every thing manifestes its life by that operation which is most proper to it and whereunto it is chiefly inclined Now in as much as Contemplation is the proper act of man whereunto he is most inclined and wherein he delights most it follows that herein the main of his life consistes To contemplate the first cause and last end of althings how delicious and agreable is it Contemplation binds the mind to its object and thence insensibly transformes it thereinto Is it not sweet to the eye to contemplate light And is not the last end the prime light of the Soul Doth not the contemplation of our last end give us a divine light to improve al other objects we converse with And are not althings hereby turned into God Doth not the Contemplation of God as our choicest Good enable us to live in God and to him 2 But yet together with Contemplation there must be divine Love and Complacence Love which is another part of the Souls communion with its last end Contemplation brings in the chiefest Good into the Soul but divine Love carries out the Soul to it by adherence to and delight in it The amorous Soul living in God by love dies in it self How many artifices doth divine Love use for the enjoyment of its choicest Good As man lost God by loving the Creature more than God so by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God and satisfaction in him Love to God settles the Soul in one point out of which it needs not stir to find Felicitie
Dulcius est amare quàm amari Sen. A Soul thus inspired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it The Stoic thinkes it sweeter to love than to be beloved Certainly divine Love is most unitive and perfective it has a violence and pain which is most sweet and delicious The Soul by loving its last end possesseth enjoys and lives in it Have not althings a desire of union and communion with what they love And the more vehement our love is if it be of the chiefest good the sweeter our fruition thereof is This love gains strength by opposition it makes the most difficult service sweet The only limits this victorious divine Love proposeth to it self is to have no limits Where ever the Soul turnes it cannot but feel dolors if it acquiesce not in God but so far as it adheres to God it feels no pain Augustine that great Doctor of Love to God comprised al Christian Morals in Love which is the plenitude of the Law and our best Instructor in every Dutie It is a luminous fire that discovers things most secret and penetrates things most profound it is an incomparable Antidote against human corruption Whence also Augustine termed al Virtue but the order of Love and its admirable efficace is seen in this that it doth lift the heart above al things create and yet at the same time depresse it at the lowest centre of self-nothingnesse Al the labors of this Love are ful of divine suavities and carrie their rewards in them Afflictions blunt not its edge cast it into an ocean of miserie and it swims above al it estimates its miserie only by the losse and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its last end Mediocritie which in other things is estimed Vertue is a Vice in Love to God which admits no excesse These and such like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God as our last end This Communion with God the Romans in their manner and according to their obscure sentiments expressed by their Lectisternia or Beds placed in their Temples whereon they conceited they feasted and had communion with their Gods Of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 3. cap. 17. § 6. Lastly Delectation and Joy Fruition of the choicest Good carries with it satisfying Pleasures Suavities and Delights No one properly enjoys a thing who hath not some joy in the Fruition thereof Frui est cum gaudio frui August The Quietation Delectation and Satisfaction which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its last end is greatly illustrated by Plato in his Philebus where he treats professedly of this subject So pag. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that being young having tasted thereof like one overjoyed as if he had found a treasure of wisdome leaping for joy and as it were under a divine Enthusiasme or rapture he moves every discourse chearfully and orderly This Transport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our last end Thence Phileb pag. 40. he thus distinguisheth between true and false pleasures There are in the minds of wicked men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 painted pleasures but such as are altogether false Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore wicked men for the most part are glutted with false pleasures but virtuose men with such as are sincere and genuine Wicked mens pleasures are sucked from some dirtie terrene goods and therefore only imaginarie and spurious but the virtuose mans pleasures are formed out of the chiefest good and therefore genuine and satisfying But to philosophise more distinctly of that Delectation Joy and Pleasure which attends the fruition of the chiefest Good we shal examine and inquire into 1 The Causes 2 The proper Adjuncts 3 The Effects thereof and that according to Plato's Philosophemes 1. 1. The Causes of Delectation Three things are essentially requisite to the constitution of true Delectation and Joy 1 A sweet Good 2 Possession of that Good 1 A sweet Good 3 Actions consequent to that possession 1 There must be a sweet Good out of which al true pleasure is formed and by how much the more sweet and pleasant the good is by so much the more perfect is the delight Satisfying joy is formed out of nothing but the most amiable best good This Plato frequently inculcates Thus Phaedr pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefest Good he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whom when it shal see and instil the desire of him into it self it shal then break al bounds of modestie and having got libertie of breathing it shal cease to be exagitated by pricking dolors This most sweet pleasure it enjoys in the presence of its sweetest good so that it can never depart from its embraces neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved Such infinite pleasure flows from the presence of the sweetest Good Perfect Joy cannot forme it self out of any inferior good it springs only from the best sweetest good which infuseth its divine suavities into the Soul What but the first essential universal Soul-satisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights 2 Another Spring of Delectation is Possession 2 Possession which as it is essential to al Fruition so in a particular manner to Joy that attends the same for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves and by how much the sweeter the object beloved is and the possession more intimate by so much the greater is the delight Generatio voluptatis ex copulatione finiti infiniti Thence it is a great Philosopheme with Plato That true Joy issueth from the copulation of finite and infinite i. e. to speak nakedly from the Vnion of the Soul with God This Plato according to his allegoric mode expresseth Conviv 206. Al men saith he in their manner conceive and are pregnant and when they have gone their time Nature desires to bring forth Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beautie or sweetest Good it is affected with joy hilaritie and pleasure and brings forth and generates but on the contrary when it adheres to what is base and fordid it is contracted by sorrow and grief and thence being not able to bring forth it is tormented with pains and dolors By which he describes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God and to inferior Goods upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-ravishing pleasures but upon adherence to base worldly good no true pleasure follows but vexatious dolors and torments This pleasure that follows on adherence to and possession of God is wel expressed by David Psal 25.13 Psal 25.13 His Soul shal dwel at ease Heb. loge in goodnesse When God dwels in the Soul it then doth loge in goodnesse or dwel at ease where there is want there can be no perfect
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
most regular and best state of a rational Creature Whether Virtue be a Power Affection Habit or merely Act has been disputed among the ancient Philosophers Gratia non est habitus propriè sed habitudo sive sanitas mentis Aq. 1.2 Quaest. 100. Art 3. as wel as Schole-Divines But the communly received opinion is that it is an Habit or as Aquinas expresseth it an Habitude of the Soul That Virtue is an Habit Aristotle largely demonstrates Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 3. An Habit properly is of a middle nature between a Power and an Act which gives the power an accidental facilitie of acting 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a power Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is of it self effective or operative but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Habit is desined pag. 414. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a disposition of the Soul whereby we are said to be so or so qualified for acting So that every Habit is in order of nature at least if not of time before the Act but subsequent to the Power For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object Subject Mode of existing in their Subject and Acts. For the forme of the Act follows the forme of the Agent and such as the Habit is in relation to its object such is the Agent Hence by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is by so much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation Whence Virtue is a supernatural Habitude Habit or active Forme whereby the Soul is elevated to supernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Completive of Nature This indeed might be evinced out of Plato's Definition of Virtue drawen into forme by Serranus Meno pag. 68. Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power the best worke and aiming at the best end So that al Virtue requires not only the best mater or object but also the best end And indeed such as the habitual aptitude or disposition of the Soul is such wil the end be as Aristotle Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of every action is such as the habit is as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts Again lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such as every man is such is his action and speech and such is his life i.e. such as a mans habitual frame of Spirit is such is his end acts and life Al habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul whereby it is strongly bent and inclined towards objects ends and acts suitable thereto Al habitual Vertues are one and the same in regard of principe and seed though different as to their proper objects and acts The same habitual Entitie as it facilitates to know God is called Divine Knowlege but as it facilitates to love God it 's called Divine Love and so in the other virtuose Habits That Supernaturalitie is a Mode intrinsecally and essentially included in al virtuose Habits is evident because human Nature specially as now corrupted cannot reach an end or act supernatural For if a natural power should have any activitie in respect of a supernatural act and object it may by a paritie of reason by degrees attain to the highest supernatural objects and acts as Alvarez de Auxil Disp 65. demonstrates Of the nature of Supernaturalitie and how it is intrinsecally and essentially included in the substance of al graciose Habits see Choquetius de Grat. l. 1. Disp 7. 12. Also Thomas Hurtado Praecursor Theologus de Supernaturalitate Entis Disp 1. Controvers 1 c. § 2. Moral Libertie as to state in virtuose Habits From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows that al moral Libertie ariseth from those virtuose habits the Soul is clothed with and agreable exercices flowing therefrom What Natural Libertie is has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. Sect. 3. § 11. How much moral Libertie differs from natural may easily be discerned by any that impartially considers the same The later indeed is essential to and inseparable from man as man and al human acts but the former is proper to man as virtuose as wil sufficiently appear by what follows Every man is so far morally free as he is near to God Althings aim at Unitie God who is the supreme Unitie convertes althings to himself and every thing is so far free and perfect as it comes near to God The human Soul has a twofold approche to God 1 by Similitude 2 by actual real Vnion and Fruition 1 The more like the Soul is to God the more one it is with him and free al similitude is a kind of Unitie and whence springs the Souls similitude to God but from virtuose habits 2 The Soul has actual real union with and fruition of God by virtuose exercices Hence ariseth a twofold moral Libertie 1 As to State 2 As to Exercice in that state The former depends on habitual Virtue the later on virtuose exercices Of each in their order Moral Libertie as to state consistes in virtuose dispositions of Soul whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God Thus the spurious Dionysius Eccles Hier. cap. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Seing the Divine Nativitie or Regeneration is a certain Divine state certainly he that has not attained to that divine state shal never know much lesse do the things delivered by God Whence also he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The principal progresse of divine dilection in the sacred observation of divine Commands consistes in the most ineffable framing of our divine state This Athanasius Dialog 1. contr Macedon termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The participation of sanctitie by Grace And the supposed Ignatius ad Magn. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the forment of Grace i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul And Greg. Nyssenus stiles this State of Virtue or Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transelementation or Restauration of the Principes of the divine life or of the Soul whereby it is made like to God and capable of adhering to him Whence Damascene Orthodox Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man as invested with the Image of God God made man a little world in the greater another Angel an Inspector of the visible Creature and Disciple of the intellectual King of those things that are on earth both terrene and celeste temporal and immortal and that which is supreme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by accesse to God to be deified but to be deified not by transalition into the Divine Essence but by participation of the divine
beautiful although it be fallen into extreme turpitude to reduce it to the most excellent pulchritude and so to make it amiable and desirable c. In sum what is Beautie but the splendor and lustre of those perfections which are loged in any subject And thence is not God the first Beautie because most perfect And are not althings so far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodnesse For what is al created Beautie but a ray of the Divine Beautie And among created Beauties doth any thing more ressemble the Divine Beautie than true Virtue ' Plato in his Phaedrus pag. 250. saith That Justie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our imperfect state have little Light and Beautie but in the future state 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 then we shal contemplate the most perfect Beautie c. And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now Beautie of things divine has gained this dignitie that it is the most illustrious and amiable of althings § 3. Having explicated and demonstrated moral Libertie as to state we now descend to consider it as to its Exercice Moral Libertie as to Exercice in virtuose Acts. which consistes in virtuose Acts. For it is a good Theoreme in Philosophie That the second Act follows the first such as the state is such are the Exercices in that state As in natural and civil Libertie such as the state is such are the Exercices in that state if a man be sui juris a free man he may act as such in that Corporation wherein he is free Thus in moral Libertie such as are free as to state by having their Souls clothed with virtuose habits they wil exert and put sorth virtuose Exercices in that state So that moral Libertie as to Exercice is nothing else but a libertie to act according to that dignitie of state they are invested with Now for the more ful explication and demonstration of moral Libertie as to Exercice we are 1 To explicate what it is and 2 To demonstrate that it is the supreme Libertie of a rational Creature As for the explication of moral Libertie as to Exercice we may comprehend it in the following Propositions 1. Moral Libertie as to Exercice consistes in the spiritual affectionate permanent Contemplation of the first beautie or Truth To contemplate the first Truth The Contemplation of the first Truth as wel according to sacred as Platonic Philosophie is one of the supreme parts of moral Libertie as to Exercice Contemplation according to the Platonist is the Exercice of the mind on things intelligible and what more intelligible than the first Truth Thence Plate in his Phaedrus pag. 247. tels us That the mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beholding for some while the first Being and satiating it self in the contemplation of Truth and giving up it self thereto is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasure As sight is of al the most noble sense and most quick in apprehension so contemplation or the sight of the first Beautie and Truth is one of the highest Exercices of moral Libertie that which brings in most tranquillitie satisfaction and pleasure to the mind Of al Contemplations there is none so powerful so sweet so free as the contemplation of the first Cause and last End As God is infinitely better than al Creatures so the contemplation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of al the Creatures That the contemplation of the first Being is one of the highest Acts of moral Libertie is most manifest because 1 Contemplation is the highest Act of the Soul and therefore when placed on the supreme Being and highest Object must needs bring the highest Libertie and Perfection with it Joh. 17.3 2 The mind of man when rectified has a flagrant ardent desire to contemplate the first Beautie and Truth Aristotle assures us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That those who are conversant in the inquisition of truth have been sweetest manner of life How sweet and free is it then to contemplate the first Truth 3 The contemplation of the first Being gives a wise emprovement of al other Beings and Objects which occur This spiritualiseth and draws out the Elixir of al objects providences persons and things we converse with 4 The contemplation of the first Beautie is that which most assimilates the Soul thereto If there were a beautiful Picture which persons by looking on should gradually be made like unto who would not gaze thereon And is not the first Beautie such which makes al those as spiritually contemplate thereon beautiful and free Joh. 1.14 Joh. 1.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We have diligently and attentively beheld his glorie as on a Theatre The Human Nature is that gloriose Theatre on which the Deitie descends and offers himself to our contemplation and O! what a gloriose contemplation is this to behold the Deitie in the golden Arke of Humanitie How is the Soul hereby transformed into the same gloriose Image as 2 Cor. 3.18 4 Spiritual contemplationof the first Being gives possession therefo Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation and doth not the first Truth become one with the Mind by lively affectionate contemplation thereof 5 Contemplation of the first Beautie is most influential on the divine Life and therefore a main Spring of Moral Libertie Is not this a great Source of Divine Wisdome Are not contemplative persons in things natural and moral the wisest of men And is not this most true in things moral and divine Was it not a great Saying of that great Divine The greatest Musers are the best Artists and doth not this hold most true here yea doth not the Psalmist assure us Psal 39.3 Psal 39.3 That whiles the heart museth the fire of divine affection burneth Doth not contemplation on the first Beautie fortifie the heart against every tentation tune it for every service and sweeten every crosse Is it not both food and physic to the Soul the life of our life yea universally useful in every state and condition 2. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the last End and chiefest Good Adherence to the last End and chiefest Good What the last End and chiefest Good is with the proper Characters of each we have § 1. of this Chapter fully discussed our present worke is to explicate what moral Libertie the Soul acquires by adhering thereto The last End possesseth the greatest Amplitude Universalitie and Libertie imaginable as to al means it is as an infinite Ocean an immense universal Principe that conteins al Morals in its bosome althings receive bounds and limits from their last end but this receives bounds and limits from nothing Now the last end enjoying such an infinite Amplitude and Libertie it necessarily follows that the more intimately and firmely the Soul adheres to it the more libertie as to exercice it is possessed of Thence Plato Leg. 4. pag. 715.
to me and my Church as Tarnovius § 4. Having explicated what moral Libertie as to Exercice is we are now to demonstrate Moral Libertie of Exercice the highest that this is the supreme Libertie that a rational Creature is capable of 1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are the more morally free they are It s Order for al moral freedome denotes order and reference to our last End and are not virtuose Acts most ordinate and regular Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 504. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law whence men are made regular and orderly which belongs to Justice and Temperance i. e. al Acts are so far regular as they partake of Justice and Temperance which give order and harmonie to al our Exercices Justice and Temperance according to Plato are universal cardinal Virtues which regulate and dispose al human Acts according to the best order wherein their freedome chiefly consistes Whence Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Chorus of Virtues wherein al move in the most regular orderly manner Yea he affirmes That the whole life of man should consiste of Harmonie Order and Vniformitie And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informes us That a life composed of Contemplatives and Actives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is most musical and harmonious i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Symphonie or Concent and musical Ryme so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule Words to Thoughts and Actions to Words and herein consistes the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order and Libertie of human Exercices So again in his Laches pag. 188. he assures us Non est hujus animus in recto cujus acta discordant Omnia facta dictáque tua inter se congruant ac respondeant sibi una forma percussa sint Virtus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi Sen. Epist. That is the best Music when words and life concord or agree among themselves as also to the Rule Virtuose Exercices consiste in all equal tenor of life agreable to it self and to the Law which is always attended with a good order and libertie It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian mentioned in his Life pag. 133. That his life was singularly composed of active and contemplative he always yielding to God what he could to his Prince what he ought and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law but that of charitie Again pag. 175. That which made him most admired was the coupling together of Virtues and with conditions that are not usually met in one and the same subject as Knowlege and Humilitie Prudence with Meeknesse Retirednesse and Officiousnesse Seriousnesse and Pleasantnesse Argutenesse without offence Brevitie and Perspicuitie Sweetnesse and Soliditie So great was the concent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts and the more of order the more of libertie Now virtuose Acts are of al most regular and orderly because they are measured by the exactest Rule and directly tend to the last End which is the first Principe in Morals Thus in sacred Philosophie Gal. 6.16 Gal. 6.16 And as many as walke according to this rule peace be unto them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground also the white Line in the Grecian Race And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies so to walke as to keep an exact order not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race And what is the privilege of those who thus walke Peace be to them i.e. moral Libertie and Tranquillitie 2. The Libertie of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its Spontaneitie Connaturalitie Facilitie and Suavitie Virtuose Exercies most spontaneous and sweet For al Libertie consistes in an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-motion and by how much the more spontaneous connatural facile and sweet the self-motion is by so much the more free it is judged to be And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous spiritually connatural and sweet than such as are virtuose Plato in his Lysis assures us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is most proper to our nature and what is better than virtuose acts are they not then most proper or connatural Thence Definit Platon pag. 411. Temperance is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-motion according to nature i.e. connatural or agreable to rectified human Nature And Plato in his Timaeus tels us That the best motion of the Soul is in it self because this is most akin to rational Nature And when doth the Soul move more in it self than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end Is not the last end the best part of our selves Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it doth it not move most in it self It 's a great Notion among the Platonists That Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most proper and congenial to man but sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most aliene and repugnant And Bradwardine strongly demonstrates That to adhere to God as our first Cause and last End is the most natural act of a rectified Soul and is it not then most free Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper O! then how free are virtuose Acts The Platonist instructes us That to a good man God is a Law but to the wicked Lust is a Law Now if God be a Law to a good man then al his motions toward God are most free There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law Repugnanti non volenti necessitas est In volente necessitas non est Sen. and therefore he most freely obeys it for al obey what they love as Plato assures us Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Libertie so that he obeys it not out of force but choice for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force cannot touch love There is a service of Love which is most free by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is by virtuose acts subjected to God by so much the more free it is for the very act of love as terminated on the Creator is formal moral Libertie as Jansenius acutely demonstrates August Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercices are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul but also most facile sweet and delicious Plato Timae pag. 81. tels us Whatever is repugnant to Nature is most irkesome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet Now that virtuose acts are most agreable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated What can furnish us
〈◊〉 here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent but the employing using or occupying the same for it is a good Rule among Grammarians That Verbes which primarily signifie to have or possesse oft denote the using of what we have So here Hath notes to use occupie or traffic with what we have To such it shal be given and he shal have more abundance i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent be it natural or supernatural with much more in the same kind If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations he shal receive more in that kind if true moral supernatural Virtues his stock shal encrease in its kind Whence it follows But whosoever hath not i. e. employes not by exercice from him shal be taken away even that he hath i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither Yea virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper Heb. 12.11 12. Thus Heb. 12.11 Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous but grievous but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exercised as in the Gymnade whence it follows v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension firmitude strength It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor whereof the hand is the instrument Thence he addes and the feeble knees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the paralytic knees such as are as it were struck with a Palsie and therefore unapt for motion This later clause seems to refer to the Race which required the exercice of the knees as labor that of the hands 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in virtuose exercices because herein consistes formal Beatitude Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations Thus Plato in his Conviv pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consiste in contemplating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the most sincere uniforme divine Beautie c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus pag. 250. So Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude the exercice of the rational Soul according to the best and most perfect Virtue in the most perfect life And Cap. 8. he addes That to act wel and live wel makes man happy And the demonstration hereof is most evident For 1 Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes and therefore their perfection for every Forme Power or Habit is ordained to its act as to its perfection Whence Basil termes Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 completive or perfective of Nature Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues that formal Beatitude cannot consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in use and exercice For a man may possesse the chiefest good and have habitual likenesse thereto and yet not formally happy as virtuose men asleep 2 The more Virtue is in exercice the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act without the least habit or passive power either physic or metaphysic and therefore the more actuose Virtue is the more like it is to God 3 Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul as before Chap. 1. § 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie Yea we are herein assured that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude even in this life This seems the import of that Exhortation 1 Tim. 6.12 1 Tim. 6.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exercise thy self in that famose contest of Faith Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games specially that of the Race wherein they contended for a Crown Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lay hold of eternal life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 9.24 Phil. 3.12 in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race who when they came to the end thereof laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal Thus Christians by virtuose exercices lay hold on eternal life as the Crown at the end of their Race Thus he speaks of himself 2 Tim. 4.7 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 4.7 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest The double Article addes a great Emphase and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude Sin a Transgression of the Law Sin as to its formal reason privative The causes of Sin 1 Mans defectibilitie 2 The Vitiositie of human Nature 3 Practic Error 4 Self-love Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful The moral Servitude of Sin as 1 Repugnant to human Nature 2 Repugnant each to other 3 The Disease of the Soul 4 Defilement 5 Shame and Reproche 6 Tyrannie 7 Penurie 8 Captivitie 9 Folie and Madnesse 10 It makes men Brutes The Adjuncts of this Servitude It is 1 Voluntary 2 Necessary 3 Infinite 4 Most penal Sin the worst punishment Other punishments of Sin It brings 1 Fear and shame 2 Instabilitie 3 Anxietie 4 Eternal punishment Al naturally Slaves of Sin No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature Natural impotence to what is good No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie § 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good Virtue and Libertie we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil and that Servitude which attends it It 's a good Notion of Aristotle Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parallel opposites illustrate each other So in his Ethics l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary Which holds true here in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law Doth al moral Good consiste in conformitie to the moral divine Law What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law as 1 Joh. 3.4 That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie Thence Definit Platon pag. 416. 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
and Law But is it so with thee Art thou not fallen into a miserable bondage Doth not thy fear thy running away and endeavor to hide thy self discover thy guilt and servitude 3 It is a sarcastic biting upbraiding question Where art thou O! how is it with thee now Adam Hast thou not brought thy self to a sine passe Where is the Deitie thou affectedst Plato seems to give frequent hints and intimations of this Fal of Man and the servitude that attends it So in his Phaedrus pag. 245. he compares the Soul in its innocent state to a winged Chariot that slies aloft but in its lapsed state he makes it to have lost its wings and to be imprisoned in the bodie And the Platonists generally complain of the Souls servitude in the bodie as a punishment of some former sin Which makes Steuch Eugubinus and others to thinke that Plato knew more of the Fal than he would discover which he disguised under that Hypothesis of the Preexistence of Souls So Eusebius Praep. Evang. lib. 12. cap. 11. pag. 584. thinkes that Plato in his Symposium expressed the Fal allegorically under the Symbol of Porus of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 5. § 1-6 2 Sin puls down and is repugnant to human Nature Sin strips off the Image of God as it divestes men of the Image of God Thus in sacred Philosophie Gen. 3.7 Gen. 3.7.22 And they knew that they were naked i.e. they perceived themselves divested of the image of God Thence v. 22. God said Behold man is become like one of us i.e. Ironically most unlike unto us a sad spectacle a prodigiose monster unlike the Creature made by us It alludes to the words of Satan v. 5. And ye shal be as Gods It is said Gen. 5.1 That Adam was created in the likenesse of God But v. 3. it 's added That he begat a son in his own likenesse i.e. sinful as he was This deprivation of the image of God is wel expressed by Paul Rom. 3.23 Rom. 3.23 For al have sinned and come short of the glorie of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are deprived spoiled divested of the glorie of God This may be taken 1 Actively Al have come short of the gloriose image of God and conformitie to his Law which Adam was at first invested with 2 Passively as to future Glorie The former sense seems primarily intended here Adams Soul was silled with the gloriose image of God but ah alas how has sin defaced and dissigured the Soul how far short doth it now come of that gloriose Image This Fal of man from the Image of God Plato was not altogether a stranger unto for in his Critias he saith that anciently there flourished in our first Parents 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a divine nature which rendred them happy but human custome or sin prevailing an inundation of evils followed 3 Sin brings down human Nature and is repugnant thereto Sin is enmitie against God in that it infuseth a Principe of confusion enmitie and rebellion against God The perfection of human Nature consistes in an intimate adherence and subjection to God but sin puts a law of enmitie and rebellion into the heart Rom. 8.7 Rom. 8.7 The carnal mind is enmitie against God i.e. a complexe or systeme of al manner of enmitie yea nothing but enmitie enmitie in the highest-degree for abstractes speak formes and essences Greg. Nazianzen in Apolog. makes three Species of the carnal minds Rebellion and Reluctance against Grace 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a servile departure from God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a contentiose aversion and obstinate reluctation against God 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a stupor in sin when men rush into sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a bare face The carnal mind is the greatest enemie God has Al sin in corrupt nature is a kind of Antipathie against God that which puts men upon al acts of rebellion against and aversation from him Hos 4.12 A spirit of fornication Hos 4.12 16. i.e. of Idolatrie which is spiritual fornication 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Spirit denotes a vehement fervor flame or impetus of lust such as carries with it the highest impetuositie effort and force For the Hebrews cal al the extraordinary motions or perturbations of the mind Spirit Thence it follows from under God i.e. from under his Power Empire and Dominion From under hath the force of a privation and denotes their aversion from God Thence he addes v. 16. For Israel slideth back as a back-sliding heifer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as a rebellious contumacious refractary heifer such as thinketh her self free casts off the yoke from her neck and is impatient of subjection as Deut. 32.15 The meaning is that Israel like a lascivious refractary Heifer had cast off al regard to divine Commands and wandred up and down according to her own lusts Thence follows her punishment answerable to her sin The Lord wil feed her in a large place She affects a wandring vagrant licentious course of life and she shal have it The Lord wil feed her in a large place or barren desert not in a fruitful place When Churches or people wander from God he wil feed them in a desert of affliction as Hos 2.14 Such is the state of those that wander from God Sacred Philosophie and the Greek Fathers expresse this enmitie of the carnal mind against God by such expressions as these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to resist God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to resist the Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to affect to overcome the power of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make void or repel Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to deride God And what greater bondage can there be than for a rational Creature to turne his back on God and flie from his chiefest good Doth not this pul down and impoverish human Nature Thence Plato in his Politicus tels us That after the Golden Age i.e. the state of Innocence had its period sin brought into the world a deluge 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of confusion and disorder c. 4 Sin is most repugnant to human Nature Sin strips men of Humanitie in that it strips men of the right use of their Reason Wil Affections yea of their comfortable Being and Humanitie Plato in his Theaetetus assures us That the excellence of man consistes in his Ressemblance unto God but so far as he fals short thereof he fals under 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothingnesse and Inhumanitie Sin reduceth human Nature to a kind of Inhumanitie and Nothingnesse in that it spoils it of the right use of its rational Being and operations For man having an intrinsec relation unto God as his first efficient and last End he so far enjoys his Being as he doth adhere to God he that bids farewel to or departs from God bids farewel to and departs from himself as to al right use
more they have the more they want the encrease of what they lust after makes them poorer as to real comfort and satisfaction therein Sin indeed makes men most poor in that it deprives them of God who is the best riches O! what a poor shiftlesse forlorne miserable thing or rather nothing is Sin 8. Sin captivates the Soul Sin the fetters of the Soul puts chains and fetters on it which is a great piece of servitude Al lusts do contract pinion and bind up the Soul which is in it self most ample and extensive Thus Plato in his Phaedo pag. 83. saith The mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is bound or fettered by sensual lusts And he subjoins the reason Because every pleasure and every dolor of the mind being as it were armed with a nail doth fasten it to the bodie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and makes it corporeous or sensual like the bodie Wherein he gives us a lively symbolic image how the Soul by sensual lusts becomes glued and chained to the bodie yea transformed thereinto Every Idol lusted after captivates the heart so many lusts so many chains yea every repeted act of sin brings the Soul under new fetters and bonds the longer such go on in ways of sin the greater slaves they are It 's true some mens chains are lined with pleasures or gilded over with terrene richesse but yet that addes not to their libertie yea the greatest natures and most noble dispositions if sinful have the greatest chains for by how much the more free such conceit they are or affect to be by so much the more they are intangled in their lusts as Esa 44.20 Such as feed on any Idol are chained thereto neither is it possible for them to deliver their own Souls Thus Hos 4.17 Ephraim is joined to Idols 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bound glued chained It alludes to the conjunction of unclean persons whereby they become as it were one flesh as 1 Cor. 6.16 Israel was chained to her Idols by indissoluble bonds of false Worship and it was impossible to pul her thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Idols from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies grief straits trouble Idols do greatly straiten torment and vexe sinners and yet they cannot part with them Plato Repub. 9. pag. 579. tels us That sinners are shut up in the prison of their own lusts and fettered by their irregular desires Yea indeed every sinner is chained to the worst of Idols himself and fettered by his own lusts This we find exemplified in Simon Magus Act. 8.9 giving out that himself was some great one i.e. potent in miracles Act. 8.9.23 one that could do great feats Ambitiose self was that unhappy Centre unto which he was chained And it is worthy our serious observation to consider how this Idol chains and fetters his heart even by and under a profession of Religion The case stood thus Simon perceiving the Apostles to outshine him in doing miracles he has a mind to turne Christian thereby to gain the same power they were invested with as v. 19. Give me also this power Peter smelling out his ambitiose ranke hypocrisie tels him in plain termes v. 23. I perceive thou art in the gal of bitternesse and bond of iniquitie This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bond of iniquitie signifies 1 a Covenant or compact with iniquitie such as is between Servants and Masters or those who are in some deep conspiracie And so the sense is he was stil a sworne slave of iniquitie one bound to sin by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie 2 It is used by the LXX to expresse the bands of iniquitie or a chain such as prisoners are kept in Esa 58.6 3 It denotes the binding up of many things together Thus was Simons heart bound up by the chains of many sins And we find something like to this in Plato's Cratylus pag. 415. where he saith That the vitiositie of the mind appears much in sloth and he thence concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore sloth indicates that the bond or chain of the Soul is most potent and tenacious 9. Sin is the greatest servitude in that it makes men sots fools Sin folie and madnesse and mad men it deprives of the use of reason Thus Plato Protagor pag. 332. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not they who act irregularly act foolishly and madly So in his Phaedrus pag. 231. he makes inordinate love a kind of madnesse Also in his Timaeus pag. 86. he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ignorance specially of the supreme Being and Truth to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the disease and madnesse of the Soul And the reason is evident because the proper office and use of Reason is to unite the mind to its object Truth and so by consequence to that Truth primarily which is first and most intelligible in it self namely God in the contemplation of whom the minds perfection consistes But now sin disunites the mind from God and fils it with ignorance folie and madnesse Hence the knowlege of the wicked is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nocturnal knowlege because it neither illuminates nor directs nor delights them which are the three main offices of knowlege Thus our Lord the first Light and Truth assures us Mat. 6.23 That the very light and knowlege of wicked men though never so much cultivated and elevated by acquired notions or commun illuminations of the Spirit is but darknesse yea the blackest darknesse Stobaeus also informes us That according to Plato nothing was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ridiculous or absurd but sin And Grotius tels us That Plato conjoined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Luk. 23.41 so that nothing is indeed absurd but sin Hence frequently in sacred Philosophie sinners are said to be without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an heart i.e. practic judgement or conscience rightly informed as Jer. 5.21 and in the Proverbs oft Yea wicked men are stiled Psal 5 5. as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad men Thence it is said of the Prodigal Luk. 15.17 When he came to himself i.e. to an awakened conscience and sound mind which denotes that so long as he lived in sin he was not himself but like a mad man And indeed the more wit men have if under the power of sin the greater mad men fools and slaves they are because their wit doth but serve to entangle them in their lusts their reason doth but fortifie their minds with arguments and cavils against the means of their libertie 10. Sin Sin when prevalent makes men Bestes when in its dominion and prevalence transformes men into mere Brutes which is the worst of servitude Plato stiles sensual affections the brutish part of a man which when they prevail transforme him into a beste For whatever the heart of man doth vehemently adhere unto it receives a stampe and character from yea is transformed thereinto if the Soul strongly adhere to God it has
as are dead in sin are under an universal privation of spiritual life and total impotence to what is spiritually good This Hypothesis may be demonstrated 1 From the universal ignorance of the natural mind Plato discourseth accurately of this Theme as we have in what precedes § 3. mentioned but more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. Yea so great and soverain is the natural ignorance of the mind that those very commun notions of knowlege loged therein are not to be estimed as some cal them the fragments of the Image of God but rather effects of divine Bountie vouchsafed his lapsed Creature upon the Intercession of the Mediator who illuminates every man that comes into the world as Joh. 1.9 That al true knowlege of things divine is the effect of divine illumination has been generally confest by Platonists as wel as Divines Thence Clemens Alexandr cals Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a supernatural contemplation So Chrysostome cals divine Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which instructes and illustrates the mind Grace from above not from human Nature 2 From the formal Idea and nature of moral or spiritual good which consistes in a conformitie to the moral Law and that not only as to its mater but also as to its end and manner now it is impossible for corrupt nature by its own power to reach a supernatural end or conforme to the moral Law 3 From the disproportion and incapacitie of the subject The natural power of the Wil as now vitiated has no connatural capacitie next power or formal capacitie for the production of what is spiritually good Alas what proportion is there between a carnal mind and spiritual objects And can an object be received into the mind unlesse there be some proportion Is not every thing received according to the nature and disposition of the recipient Can then a carnal mind have any other than carnal notions of things spiritual as a spiritual mind has spiritual notions of things carnal See 1 Cor. 2.14 Joh. 6.44 8.43 12.39 40. So also for the corrupt wil it cannot possibly have any connatural virtue next power or formal capacitie for the production of any virtuose Act. Is it possible that a natural power should have any causal connexion with or connaturalitie unto a supernatural act or effect 4 Should we suppose corrupt Nature to have any moral power for the production of Virtue would not this subvert the whole Oeconomie and Dispensation of efficacious Grace For 1 Thence the whole efficace of Grace would be measured and specificated according to the complexion of Free-wil and so variated according to its diversitie 2 Whence also the last differential reason whereby Grace is differenced from Nature must be resolved into Nature 3 Natural Free-wil would from this Hypothesis be of it self and nextly flexible to spiritual good and so Virtue not the gift of God Aristotle himself who was a good Friend to corrupt Nature confesseth al good to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God 5 From sacred Philosophie Jer. 13.33 Thus Jer. 13.23 Can the Ethiopian change his skin c. Consider 1 That this is a proverbial speech touching the vain attemts of such as endeavor to bring about things impossible Hence that commun Proverb To wash a Black-moor relating to such as attemt things impossible 2 The manner of expressing it is very emphatic for such rhetoric interrogations carrie in them more vehement logic negations Then he addes or the Leopard his spots Then may ye also do good who are accustomed to do evil And that this impotence is total and universal on al mankind is evident from that other Proverb Ezech. 16.44 As is the mother such is the daughter Ezech. 16.44 i. e. This contagion runs in the bloud it is an hereditary disease commun to al mankind Hence sinners are said to be borne in sin Psal 51.5 and to be in sin Exod. 32.22 1 Joh. 5.19 The whole world is said to be in sin i. e. immersed and plunged thereinto What this impotence to sin is and how far natural we have explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 5. § 1. 4. Prop. Man under the servitude of Sin cannot dispose or prepare himself for the reception of Virtue Thus Greg. Nyss or de Scopo Christ Man cannot prepare himself for Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The force of human virtue is not of it self sufficient to elevate Souls void of Grace to a forme of divine life unlesse God build the house c. That there can be no disposition though never so remote unto true moral Virtue from the alone facultie of Nature is evident because nothing can dispose it self to a condition above its nature by its own force unlesse it be influenced by a superior Agent A man in the state of corrupt nature cannot by al his own forces natural or moral 1 overcome any one tentation or 2 mortifie any one lust or 3 attain any one good thought inclination or desire or 4 remove the Remora or bar in his heart against conversion or 5 by doing what in him lieth lay any obligation on God to give grace I know it is a Position maintained by some That such as improve their natural abilities to their utmost power shal thereby obtain supernatural Grace But for answer hereto 1 It 's certain that none ever did or wil improve to the utmost their natural abilities 2 Or if men should improve their natural forces to the utmost what obligation is there on God to give to such supernatural Grace Is God obliged by any law or promise to give grace upon the performance of such an act or condition which is in it self sinful and hath nothing of true moral virtue in it And have we not already sufficiently proved that there can be no true moral virtue but by supernatural Grace That there is no law or obligation on God to give supernatural Grace to natural emprovements is wel demonstrated by Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 37. pag. 316. Yea doth it not implie a contradiction in the Adject that man should make a right use of his natural abilities or prepare himself for the reception of supernatural Grace Is it not also a sacrilegious Hypothesis to suppose that God should fetch the commun rule of his giving or not giving grace from mans dignitie or indignitie Corrupt nature wants not only an active power to do good but also an immediate passive power to receive good thence it can't dispose it self to virtue which is above its natural capacitie Is not al true virtue above the whole sphere of corrupt nature The Greek Fathers such as were more orthodoxe acknowleged That the preparation to Grace was from Grace whence it was by them termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the direction of the way also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the preparation of the wil likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the attraction of
to contemplate the first Truth So in his Phaedrus pag. 247. he assures us That the contemplation of God with a pure mind furnisheth us with al other convenient cogitations for the Soul contemplating that which truely is and acquiescing in this contemplation is thereby nourished and recreated with the highest pleasures and then having acquired the genuine Sapience or Science of that which essentially is and immutably such being as it were fested with these delices it again enters into the interior parts of Heaven and returnes home Wherein he gives us a lively description of those satisfactorie pleasures and delights which attend the contemplation of God Thus in the Scholes they usually determine That a contemplative life is more excellent than an active and they ground their determination on the preference that our Lord gives to Marie Luke 10.42 Luke 10.42 And their reasons are such as these because a contemplative life is 1 more tranquille and serene 2 more desirable for it self 3 more permanent and lasting 4 more self-sufficient and satisfactorie 5 more delicious and sweet 6 more agreable to mans more noble part the Soul 7 more divine and beatific Which being understood of the contemplation of God holds most true provided that this contemplation be rightly qualified namely that it be real pure spiritual lively distinct firme solid affective effective and influential on the divine life CHAP. II. Of Atheisme and the Existence of a Deitie The Origine of Atheisme 1 from Polytheisme 2 from vain Philosophie and carnal Politie 3 from the carnal Mind Pride c. Three sorts of Atheisme practic Atheisme worst The pestiferous Influences and punishment of Atheisme The Existence of the Deitie demonstrated from 1 Vniversal Consent 2 A first Cause against the Eternitie of Mater c. 3 A first Mover 4 The Order of the Vniverse 5 The innate Idea of a Deitie in the Soul 6 Practic Arguments from 1 Conscience 2 Religion 3 The politic World 4 The Atheists enmitie against a Deitie § 1. HAving given some summary general Idea of Metaphysic That there is a God we now descend to its principal Object namely God who may be considered either in regard of his Being or Operations As for the Being of God the first thing to be undertaken is the demonstration that there is a God Plato abounds with many pregnant and cogent Arguments to demonstrate the Existence of God against the Atheists of his Age. We shal reduce the whole to the following particulars First Plato explicates the original roots of Atheisme The Origine of Atheisme which began to spring up in his days with its prodigiose nature and pestiferous maligne influences 1. He expounds to us some of the principal roots of Atheisme Thus de Legib. 12. pag. 967. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are some who thinke that they who are much conversant in the studies of these Arts and Sciences namely Astronomie and other cognate necessary Disciplines become Atheists from an apprehension that things are made and governed by the necessities of certain natural Causes and not by the force and providence of the divine Wil. In which Platonic Philosopheme there are these Propositions worthy of our contemplation 1 That there was an opinion abroad that the Mathematics and other Sciences made many Atheists 2 That Philosophie abused made men Atheists by resolving al the Products Events and Phenomena of the natural and politic World into natural Causes not the divine Wil and Providence 3 That these Atheistic infusions and persuasions sprang not really from Philosophie but the abuse thereof These Platonic notions we shal endeavor more fully to explicate in the following Propositions 1. Atheisme 1. from Polytheisme Atheisme was not the first-borne of corrupt Nature but was ushered into the World by Polytheisme it s elder Brother and nursed up by vain Philosophie and carnal Policie So long as the Deitie maintained an awe and reverence towards it self in the consciences of men by a sense of its prodigiose operations in creating and governing the World Atheisme found no place in Nature We hear little of it til the beginning of the Roman Monarchie at which time God withdrew the sensible experiments and prodigiose effects of his Omnipotence which had so long preserved the old World from Atheisme But beginning now to governe the World more by wisdome without those miraculose operations before vouchsafed to the infant-world the effects of his power were not so sensible whence the brutish sensual World began to cal in question the very existence and providence of God and that from the many ridiculous Deities which were idolised by men For Polytheisme gave a great advance to Atheisme To multiplie the Divinitie is to destroy it he that has power to believe many Gods is very capable of falling into Atheisme to believe there is no God The corrupt mind of man observing bright impresses and characters of the Deitie in the workes of his hands began very early to worship the Creature instead of the Creator Rom. 1 19-23 Hence sprang up first Zabaisme or planetary Deities and then Hellenisme or Polytheisme a multiplicitie of al manner of Gods which laid a foundation for Atheisme For he that is inclined to believe a pluralitie of Gods may easily be induced to believe there is no God So intimate is the cognation and connexion between Polytheisme and Atheisme As the Atheist believes there is no God so the Polytheist or superstitiose person wishes there were none for al superstition has a legal fear wrapped up in its bowels which strikes at the very Being of the Deitie But albeit Polytheisme opened the dore to Atheisme yet it was hatcht nursed up and maintained by vain Philosophie and carnal Policie as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. § 4. 2. 2. From vain Philosophie and carnal Policie Philosophie abused makes men Atheists by resolving al the Phenomena of Nature and States into natural Causes exclusively as to the Divine Wil and Providence This lies evident in Plato's Philosopheme before cited Who makes mention 1 of Astronomie and other parts of Mathematics as influential on Atheisme For the Pagan Astronomers then as many judicial Astrologers now held that there was a natural subordination of al inferior Causes and Effects to the Stars whence they reduced al natural effects yea many politic to abstract formes and figures to some insensible Influences or fatal Necessitie Again Mathematicians inuring themselves to ocular sensible Demonstrations expect the same in divine maters a bare Testimonie though never so divine signifies little or nothing with them whence they disbelieve every divine Mysterie which fals not under certain rational Demonstration Witnesse the great Leviathan of our Age and Nation for so he is pleased to title his Book who has not been ashamed to make public profession of his Atheisme and disbelief of althings which admit not of sensible Demonstration 2 Physiologie or natural Philosophie as also Medicine
and observe its regular Fluxes and Refluxes c. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth and inquire into the origine of Stones both preciose and commun mineral Juices and Metals Lastly if we destil Plants or anatomise Animals what an incomparable Harmonie Order and Perfection shal we find in each of these both in reference each to other and to the whole Universe This is wel done by Plato in his Timaus pag. 28 c. whence he concludes That there must be an infinitely wise Mind who frames al these things into such an admirable order agreable to his own eternal Ideas Thus also Joan. Damascenus Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who in his own nature is invisible is made visible by his operations we know by the admirable constitution and gubernation of the Vniverse Wherein he demonstrates the invisible Essence and Existence of God from his visible operations and workes as Rom. 1.20 § 5. 5. Gods Existence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie from the Microcosme or Man specially his Soul and those innate Ideas of a Deitie loged there Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God one which we before mentioned touching the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is the most ancient and divine of althings made I say of those things whose motion admits generation but so as that it hath obtained an everlasting essence for it self There are two parts in this Argument which demonstrate the existence of a Deitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the Soul 2 Its Immortalitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the existence of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him who formerly denied there was a God prove that we speak not truth in giving the Soul the first place or let him believe us and so for the future order his life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he dout not of a Deitie But let us consider whether to those that thinke there is no God we have not abundantly proved there is a God So in his Phaedo p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the divine Being whereunto it is like This Platonic Argument may be thus improved Is there not a connate Idea of a Deitie impressed and stamped on the very nature of the Soul Doth not its immaterial spirital impassible nature speak its physic cognation with some supreme Spirit that first conferred that spirital Being on it Has not the Soul a physic Amplitude yea infinite Capacitie albeit only remote and passive of contemplating some first Truth and loving some chiefest good Has not the mind an universal empire and dominion over al objects to compound things most opposite and divide things most intimately conjoined to descend from the highest cause to the lowest effect and then to ascend from the lowest effect to the highest cause Has not the Wil an infinite thirst after good yea is never satisfied without the fruition of some supreme infinite good And do not these infinite capacities albeit only natural remote and passive implie some infinite object adequate thereto Was there ever a facultie or power in Nature without an object suited thereto Cicero tels us de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature her self has impressed a notion of a Deitie on the minds of al. As if he had said according to Plato's mind Has not God stamped an Idea of himself on human Nature May we not as wel abandon our very Beings our selves as abandon the notices and characters of a Deitie engraven on our Beings Doth not every human Soul carrie the signature and marque of his Creator impressed on it self Is there not an impresse and Idea of a Deitie incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and constitution of the Soul And albeit man by sin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker yet has he not secured his claim to man by his marque and physic Idea stamped on the Soul of man The Ideas and Characters of a Deitie are more clearly and lively stamped on the Souls of men than upon any part of the sensible World 2 As for the Immortalitie of the Soul doth not this also implie an eternal object answerable thereto Thus Plato in his Symposium pag. 207. informes us That man who is mortal as to his terrene part seekes to be immortal as to his more noble part And if the Soul seekes to be immortal must there not be an immortal eternal infinite good in the fruition of which it seeks immortal Beatitude Of this see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. sect 10. § 5. § 6. The Existence of God demonstrated by practic Arguments 1. From Conscience Plato has given us some practic and moral Demonstrations of a Deitie As 1 some moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impressed on Conscience with affections of fear and shame on the commission of sin Plato in his Minos pag. 317. makes mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a royal Law of Nature some notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature These notions the Stoics terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Aristotelians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun and innate notions Among which they reckon up such as these That there is a God that this God was the Maker and is the Conservator and Rector of the Vniverse that he is infinitely wise just good c. That he is to be worshipped that virtue is to be embraced vice avoided c. These commun notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul And indeed sacred Philosophie assures us that there are such commun notices of good and evil naturally engraven on mens consciences as Rom. 2.14 15. which yet are improved by the workes of Providence as Act. 14.17 where rain and fruitful seasons are said to be Gods witnesse Now al Notions of good and evil clearly demonstrate the existence of a Deitie for the distinction of good and evil as to man refers to some principe above him were there no supreme Rector and Judge to reward good and punish evil the very notions of good and evil would vanish into smoke and vapor What can be good if there be not some Being originally and infinitely good to which it refers and by whole Law it is measured Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil should exist in mens minds if there were not a supreme Rector to give Laws for the measure thereof If man had not some supreme Lord to give Laws to him how could he be guilty of any moral transgression Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence Who can charge any man with doing il unlesse he break the Law of some Superior What could be just or unjust if there were not a supreme
fluent Time to mount up above the differences of Time to the contemplation of Eternitie which is without mutabilitie of succession And then he gives us an ingenuous confession that this was his great error when young and infected wih Pelagian infusions I saith he when I was young and ignorant of the Scriptures and the power of God being blinded with this ignorance or rather borne blind and deceived with a false imagination I conceited that the Divine Knowlege and Wil was changed and otherwise disposed by the vicissitudes of Times as human Knowlege and Wil. As to such as supersicially read the Scriptures it may seem that God is this or that way variously affected as men are And this ignorance I judge to be the cause why some others like to me thinke that God is otherwise and otherwise disposed intrinsecally c. Therefore to cure these ignorances and errors about Eternitie we may consider the following Propositions 1. Eternitie not to be measured by Time Prop. Eternitie cannot be measured by any differences or Laws of Time This Proposition is laid down in expresse termes by Plato Tim. pag. 37. where he largely demonstrates That no differences of Time either future or past can be attributed to Eternitie as before It 's true he tels us That God made time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a certain mobile Image of immobile Eternitie yet so as that none of its differences can properly be ascribed thereto So Parmen pag. 141. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The one God no way participates of time as before So Philo Judaeus de Mundo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lo Eternitie there is nothing past nothing future c. Thus Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end but God only is ever existent yea rather about ever for he is not under time but above time And whereas it is said That the Eternitie of God is oft in Scripture described by differences of time we answer That these are but metaphoric modes of speech wherein the Spirit of God condescending to our narrow capacities describes the eternal infinite duration of God by the differences of time yet so as that he expressely declares that they do not properly agree to God but are only assumed as symbolic Images of Gods Eternitie which is Plato's own phrase And Bradwardine l. 2. c. 51. gives us the reason of this Translation The cause of this Transumtion is because we have not a word which properly signifies the stable mansion of Eternitie wherefore we are forced to transfer by way of similitude our temporal words according to certain temporal differences to Eternitie and Gods coeternal intrinsec Acts. That neither God nor any intrinsec Act of God can be properly measured by time or any difference thereof is evident because Time and al its differences are a variable mutable and divisible measure but the Eternal God and al his immanent Acts invariable immutable and indivisible In Eternitie there is no divisibilitie no majoritie or minoritie no prioritie or posterioritie no accession recession or succession no successive difference of time but one indivisible simple permanent instant Thus Suarez Metaph Disp 50. Sect. 3. pag. 639. proves That what is eternal cannot as to its own nature admit the differences of past and future albeit by reason of our imperfection we so speak of it sometimes How far time and its differences may be comprehended by Eternitie we shal explicate in what follows 4. Prop. 2. Prop. Eternitie is an interminable Duration Eternitie without beginning or end without beginning or end In Eternitie and al eternal Acts neither first or last can be properly assigned This interminable duration of Eternitie is lively illustrated in sacred Philosophie by al those descriptions of God which make him to be the first and the last as Esa 41 4. 44.6 48.12 Rev. 1.8 11. He being the First Being and so without beginning and the Last as having no end Thus the Stoics held that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is incorruptible and ingenerable i. e. without beginning and end as Lacertius in Zeno. 1 That the Eternitie of God is without Beginning is evident by many Philosophemes of Plato As Phaedrus pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A first Principe has no beginning but it gives beginning to althings So in his Parmenides pag. 141. he proves That the one God had no beginning c. as before Thus Thales in Laertius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is the most ancient of Beings because without beginning 2 That the Eternitie of God shal have no end Plato assertes in his Phaedo pag. 106. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But God saith Socrates the very Idea or Essence of life as I judge and if any thing be immortal it is evident to al that he cannot cease to be He makes the Soul to be immortal also but the Immortalitie of God who is the original Idea and Essence of life to be of a more transcendent Nature Thus in his Timaeus he distinguisheth between the Eternitie or Immortalitie of Angels and the human Soul which have no end and the Eternitie of God which is absolute without beginning and end The Eternitie of God he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primary absolute and independent as to al causalitie and therefore not communicable to the Creature but the Eternitie that belongs to the Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to a participation of Being i. e. dependent on the pleasure of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as that of Angels and the human Soul which shal have no end albeit they had beginning The best of Creatures have but an half-Eternitie albeit they have no end yet they had a beginning They may be to everlasting but are not from everlasting as God is Psal 90.2 Besides the Eternitie of Creatures is not intrinsecal from a necessitie of Being but dependent on the pleasure of God 3. Eternitie most simple and uniforme Prop. Eternitie is a measure most simple uniforme absolutely indivisible without the least composition or succession 1 When we cal Eternitie a Measure it must not be understood formally either as to God or the Creature because every measure formally considered speakes relation to the thing measured but if the Creature never had been God had been eternal Neither can a measure formally considered be applied to God because a measure is ever distinguished from the thing measured but Eternitie is not distinguished from God Therefore when we cal Eternitie a Measure it must be understood metaphorically and according to our manner of speech 2 We say Eternitie is a simple uniforme measure i. e. without al parts divisibilitie or succession The Antithesis to this Thesis is maintained by Vorstius and the Socinians contrary to the Dictates both of sacred and Platonic Philosophie Thus Plato Tim. pag. 37. assures us That the parts of time IT WAS and IT IS agree not to
and influence whence they consecrated the Laurel to Apollo which signified with them the heat and influence of the Sun the Laurel being a Plant as they say hot and alwaies green Such a soverain efficace did the Grecian Philosophers ascribe unto the Sun in regard of its influence not only on Plants but also on animal Bodies and therefore it is deservedly made by Plato a symbolic image of Gods efficacious Concurse on al create Beings and Operations Thus in sacred Philosophie we find Christ as the first cause of al Grace compared to the Sun and his gracious influxe to the beams of the Sun So Mal. 4.2 Mal. 4.2 But unto you that fear my Name shal the Sun of righteousnesse arise with healing in his wings and ye shal go forth and grow up as calves of the stal Christ here as the first original Spring of al Grace and compared to the Sun whence he is said to arise with healing in his wings i. e. his Beams for the Beams of the Sun are its wings whereby it conveighs an healing prolific influence to althings that have life The Sun indeed vouchsafeth warme efficacious influences to al natural bodies both vegetable and animal it has an universal prolific influence on al sublunarie bodies Thence it 's said Psal 19.6 Psal 19.6 And there is nothing hid from the heat thereof i. e. it s warme benigne influxe reacheth as some conceive unto al natural effects even to the very Minerals and Metals But certain it is that Vegetables and Plants are greatly influenced by the Sun Job 8.16 Hence that Job 8.16 He is green before the Sun Whence is the beautie of Roses the delicious suavities of Fruits the medicinal virtues of Herbes the nourishment of Corne the fatnesse of Olives the cordial and heart-reviving influences of Grapes but from the Sun So for the animal life are not al Insects produced by the Sun Yea doth not the health strength vivacitie and comforts of mans bodie receive much influence from the efficacious beams of the Sun as Job 30.28 Eccles 11.7 Is not then the Sun both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie made an apt Symbol to represent the efficacious Concurse of God as the first cause of althings but more specially of supernatural effects O! what Soul-reviving influences are there in the warme beams of Divine concurse What universal inexhaustible infinite treasures of Divine light and heat are there in the Sun of Righteousnesse Are not his beams the light of life as Joh. 8.12 Psal 84.11 Such is the efficace of Divine concurse There is moreover a great emphase and elegance in that phrase Mal. 4.2 And ye shal go forth and grow up as calves of the stal i.e. as weak feeble Calves which in the winter by reason of the cold are kept in the stal at spring when they go forth and sport themselves under the warme healing beams of the Sun how greatly do they grow and thrive so the sick infirme friends of Christ when they lie under the warme refreshing corroborating influences of his medicinal Grace Yea this efficacious soverain Grace doth not only cure infirme consumtive Souls but also give life to dead Souls Thus Esa 9.2 The people that walked in darkenesse have seen a great light Esa 9.2 they that dwel in the land of the shadow of death upon them hath the light shined 1 This Prophecie refers to our Lords first Preaching among those that inhabited the land of Zabulon and Nephthali mentioned v. 1. and so applied Mat. 4.14 15 16. who were indeed at the coming of our Lord under very black Egyptian darkenesse whence they are said to walke in darkenesse 2 They are said to dwel in the land of the shadow of death 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they that dwel denotes a fixed immobile state not only of such as travel or passe throwo a countrie but of inhabitants Then 2 we have the place of their habitation the land of the shadow of death 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the shadow of death whereby we may understand either a deadly shade such as by the dampe thereof strikes dead which is very frequent in some darke cavernes of the Earth or else by the shadow of death we may understand the Grave which is the darke shadowy habitation of the dead as Job 10.21 the Grave is stiled the land of darkenesse and the shadow of death And look as dead men are loged in the darke shadowy Grave so were these dead Souls in the land of Zabulon and Nephthali loged in the Grave of sin under the darke deadly shade thereof which implies a total privation of spiritual light and life Now 3 on these dead Souls dwelling in the Grave of sin the light shined i. e. Christ the Sun of Righteousnesse arose with healing under his wings or warme beams of efficacious Grace Yea how oft doth this omnipotent heart quickening Grace picke out the worst of sinners as fit mater to exert its soverain efficace on Esa 19.18 Thus Esa 19.18 In that day i. e. when the Sun of Righteousnesse shal arise on Egypt with healing under his wings shal five cities in the land of Egypt speake the language of Canaan i. e. be converted to God and swear to the Lord of Hostes i. e. bind themselves inviorably to Christ by an Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie one shal be called the Citre of Destruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render the Citie of Destruction is rendred by Grotius Gataker and other Critics the Citie of the Sun called by the Grecians who possessed it Heliopolis which the Hebrews expressed by Bethsenes the house of the Sun i. e. consecrated to the Sun their principal God which was with al manner of idolatric Rites worshipped in this Citie For Herodotus assures us that this Citie Heliopolis was one of the sixe unto which the Egyptians used at some solemne times to repair out of al parts to celebrate the Worship of the Sun because here was their renowned Temple of the Sun as also Mnevis one of their sacred Buls which they worshipped as God of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. § 9. Now this Heliopolis so much addicted to and immersed in Idolatrie is made one of the principal objects on which the Sun of Righteousnesse should arise with healing under his wings or beams of efficacious medicinal Grace So v. 22. And the Lord shal smite Egypt he shal smite and heal it and they shal returne even unto the Lord c. What! shal Egypt yea the most idolatrous Citie of Egypt Heliopolis be healed by the soverain Grace of the Sun of Righteousnesse O! what a potent demonstration is this of the omnipotent efficace of medicinal Grace May not this Argument be further promoved by a reflexion on these Britannic Iles and their prodigiose Idolatrie when the Sun of Righteousnesse at first arose on them with healing under his wings of Evangelic medicinal Grace But for the more ful explication
Word or Second Person in the Trinitie who made althings as John 1 1-4 and whereof the Platonistes in the Schole of Alexandria who succeded Ammonius had great notices as before in the Platonic Trinitie C. 6. § 4. 3. But yet the immediate Efficience of Divine Providence is in a more peculiar manner both by Sacred and Platonic Philosophie The Spirit the immediate efficient of Providence ascribed to the Spirit of God For the clearing whereof we are to consider that albeit al Divine Operations are usually ascribed to God absolutely because the same Divine Nature is the individed principe of al yet sithat as to the manner of subsisting there is some Distinction Relation and Order between the three Persons hence the Divine Operations are in Sacred Philosophie distinctly assigned to each person and eminently to some one And in as much as the Order of Operation among the distinct persons dependes on the Order of their Subsistence thence the Conclusive and perfective Efficience in al the great Divine Operations is assigned to the Spirit of God as peculiar to him according to the mode of his subsistence in the Trinitie Thus in the Creation the completive and perfective efficience of althings is ascribed to the Spirit So in the Fomentation and Formation of althings out of the rude Chaos it 's said Gen. 1.2 The spirit of God moved on the face of the waters i. e. in order to the Eduction and Efformation of althings for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly notes the fomentation and gentle motion of an Hen communicating vital heat to its egges and it 's applied Deut. 32.11 to the motion of an Eagle over its young ones for their protection and perfection This efficience of althings is wel expressed Psal 33.6 Psal 33.6 By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made and al the Host of them by the breath of his mouth By the Word of the Lord we may understand 1 The Creative Efficience of the Divine Wil as before § 1. or 2 Christ by whom althings were made as Joh. 1.3 Thence it follows by the Breath of his mouth whereby we must understand the Spirit of God who is called the Breath of his mouth to note the manner of his procession which is in a way of Spiration as the Scripture assures us Job 26.13 Thus Job 26.13 By his Spirit he hath garnished the Heavens Or according to the Hebrew His spirit hath garnished or adorned beautified the Heavens i. e. decked them with those eye-pleasing gloriose lights Psal 8.3 Hence Psal 8.3 the Sun Moon and Stars are said to be the worke of Gods fingers i. e. curiosely wrought by the Spirit of God For by the finger or fingers of God the spirit of God is in a more peculiar manner denoted as is evident by comparing Mat. 12.28 with Luk 11.20 where the spirit of God in Matthew is called the finger of God by Luke as Owen On the spirit B. 1. C. 4. Neither did the Spirit 's efficience extend only to the production of the Inanimate and Animal world but also to Man and his more noble part the Soul as Job assures us Job 33.4 The spirit of God hath made me and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life Answerable to Gen. 2.7 And as the first Efformation and Perfection of althings in the Creation is ascribed to the Spirit of God so the Sustentation Conservation and Gubernation of althings in the course of Divine Providence is in a peculiar manner assigned to the same Spirit Thus Ps 104.27 Psal 104 27-30 These wait al upon thee that thou mayest give them their meat in due season 28. Thou openest thine hand they are filled with good 29. Thou hidest thy face they are troubled thou takest away their breath they die and returne to their dust Thou hidest thy face i. e. withdrawest the providential influence of thy Spirit and althings returne to dust the Earth it self the commun Mother of al corporeous Creatures seems to be dead ' til the spring come and althings receive a new face Thence it follows v. 30. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit they are created and thou renewest the face of the earth Thou sendest forth thy Spirit whose office it is to conserve foment actuate and to give vivific heat life and influence to althings Whence it follows they are Created This Creation is not to be taken strictly of the Eduction of things out of nothing as at first no nor principally of the production of new individuals though this be included in the Spirits Providential Efficience but of the Spirits fomenting vivifying and renewing things under a kind of natural death or decay Thence it follows and thou renewest the face of the Earth i. e. Whereas the Earth in the winter season is as it were dead the Trees and other Plants divested of their verdure flourishing beautie leaves fruits yea the very juice and radical moisture is retired unto the root so that the whole seems dead And as for Animals and Brutes the greatest number of those we cal Infects are either really or seemingly dead being without motion and as for the more perfect Brutes they are likewise under a kind of partial death yea the human bodie also in the more cold Northerne Climate Yet when the Spring comes the Spirit of God that Supreme Increate Vniversal Spirit making use of the warme benigne influences of the Sun together with subterraneous fire that great create mundane Spirit reneweth the face of the Earth i. e. puts new vital Spirits and vivific heat into al parts of the Universe both inanimate and animate ' specially Plants and Animals so that there is a new face or verdure flourishing Beautie Vivacitie Activitie and Fructification in things Thus according to Sacred Philosophie the Spirit of God is said to be that Vniversal Spirit by whose Providential Efficience and Concurrence al Creatures are conserved sustained actuated propagated animated fomented disposed and governed to their proper ends and usages And we find Philosophemes not a little conformable hereto in Platonic Philosophie What Plato's Contemplations were concerning 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Soul of the World we have before examined Part. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. § 5. We shal now treat of the same Vniversal Spirit or Spirit of the Vniverse as to his Providential Influence and Concurrence Plato in his Cratylus p. 396. cals this Mundane Soul or Vniversal Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zena Jupiter from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zen to animate or vivifie and he gives this reason of the Origination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is no other cause of life to us Men and other Animants than that Prince and King of althings Whence he addes Rightly therefore is God honored with this name because it demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God is he by whom Life is communicated to al Animals This notion of the Mundane Soul answers to Job 33.4 and Psal 104.30 of which
2 The Heirs of Salvation shal at last day be made conformable to and equal with the Holy Angels and together with them shal praise serve and enjoy God in al manner of intime communion unto al eternitie Luk. 20.36 For they are equal to the Angels Thus some interpret Zech. 3.7 And I wil give thee places to walk Zech. 3.7 or walks among those that stand by i. e. the Holy Angels that minister before God This may include Service both in the Church Militant on Earth as also the Church Triumphant in Heaven for Angels stand by and minister in both How potent promt and agile the holy Angels are to execute every Wil of God is wel expressed by Damascene Orthod Fid. L. 2. C. 3. The Angels saith he are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Angels are potent and promt to fulfil the Divine Wil and are by the agilitie of their nature found every where present as the Divine beck commandes them So much for the Gubernation of the Holy Angels § 4. Divine Gubernation extendes it self not only to the good Angles but also to the Evil. Satan by Gods providential permission Gods Gubernation as to Evil Angels is the God of the wicked world who rules in the Children of disobedience 1. Satan is the Prince of this World Joh. 12.31 1 He is not a Lawful Prince but Vsurper he usurpes Christs Crown and intrudes himself on his Throne He affectes a Deitie to be God over the noblest part in Man his Mind as 2 Cor. 4.4 2 He is not an Absolute Prince but limited his Power is much narrower than his Wil and Malice He can do nothing but by Divine Permission and Gubernation 3 He is not a Free Prince but Vassal confined by Chains of Providential Gubernation Jude 6. 4 The main of his Kingdome consistes in the Free Election of wicked men Evil men electively put the Crown on his Head and bow the knee before him His Crown is supported by the voluntary subjection of wicked men Ephes 2.2 Ephes 2.2 According to the Prince Arbitrio Principis i. e. according to the Soverain pleasure of the Prince of the power of the Air 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here notes his Dominion and Soveraintie in the Air i. e. in this inferior part of the Universe The Spirit that now worketh 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes his working with efficacitie in the Children of Disobedience i. e. Such as are addicted and have given up themselves to the disobedience of God but obedience unto Satan such as are his voluntary slaves 5 Satan is a Magnificent Prince having Legions and vast Armies under his command Eph. 6.12 Rev. 12.6 7. 6 He is a Prince of great Wisdome Experience and Subtiltie to deceive al that listen to him His Prudence as a Spirit is vast and his Experience of more than 6000 years greatly addes thereto 2 Cor. 2.11 So 2 Cor. 2.11 Lest Satan should get an advantage of us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lest we should be over-reached or circumvented by Satan It answers to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily to have more than we ought thence to cheat defraude c. The Metaphor seems taken from avaricious Merchants who take al occasions to circumvent Thence he addes For we are not ignorant of his devices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 answering to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes here Stratagemes Machinations Plots Fallacies c. which he termes Ephes 6.11 Ephes 6.11 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wiles of Satan 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Chrysost is artificially to circumvent to cheat by rules of Art by a compendiose method to reduce persons or things under our power So that Satan it seems has got the art and method of deluding and cheating souls Whence he is stiled Joh. 8.44 The Grand Old Lyer 2 Tim. 2.26 or Cheater We read also 2 Tim. 2.26 of the snare of the Devil whereby he takes men captive at his wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a military word and signifies to take alive from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So 2 Chron. 25.12 Satan has such a snare as he can thereby take sinners captive alive and at his pleasure 7 As he is a Prince of Power and Prudence so also of great malice and rage against the good of Souls 1 Pet. 5.8 Thus 1 Pet. 5.8 he is termed a Roaring Lion which notes his rage seeking whom he may devour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 drink up at a draught Yea so great is his Rage against the good of Souls that he counts it a torment to be curbed or hindered in the execution of his malitiose designes as Matt. 8.29 Mat. 8.29 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to torment us O! what a torment is it to him to see a Soul delivered out of his snare Hence 2. Satan being the Prince and God of this World has Satan's Power to temte by providential permission a great power to temte and draw men unto sin 1 Satan as to us is not a mere Creator of his own Tentations but he takes the mater from those whom he temtes or from some circumstances that environ them Satan is oft the Father but Sin the Mother of Tentation 2 Satan cannot reach the human Soul or any Act thereof immediately The heart of Man is a privie Chamber into which none can enter but the King of Kings The thoughts and inclinations of the Soul have a covering over them which none can take off but he that made the Soul Satan may cast in Fire bals or send in Messengers and Letters by the mediation of the Phantasie but he cannot enter into the heart directly nor compel it to sin 3 Satan by Gods permission can worke curiously and efficaciously on the Organs of the Bodie Spirits Bloud and other Humors as Melancholie c. which are united to the Soul and have no smal indirect influence thereon 4 Though Satan cannot worke immediately on the heart yet he can worke immediately on the corporeous sensitive Soul particularly on the phantasie by making impressions thereon and forming such Ideas there as may affect the mind Satan may temte and persuade to Sin not only Morally by false suggestions and Images offered but also in some sense Physically by impressing and fixing those Images on the phantasie and coloring them over with the apparence of good 5 Satan has a very great and intime accesse unto the spirits of men not only as he is a Spirit but also as he is an unclean Spirit and his Kingdome a Kingdome of darknesse Hence he is said Luke 22.3 Luk 22.3 to enter into Judas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes an intime accesse into Judas as into his proper house He had been casting in darts into Judas's heart before as John 13.2 The Devil having now put into the heart of Judas to betray him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Devil having now injected or cast in this Tentation into his heart to betray his Lord. Now