Leviathan hath justly found fault with those who so understand that saying Nosce te ipsum As hereby either to countenance the barbarous State of Men in power towards their Inferiours or to encourage those of a low Degree to a sawcy Behaviour to their Betters But then whether he has been as happy in assigning the true meaning of it himself as he was in observing the salse Interpretation thereof in others may be justly doubted his Interpretation is this This says he teaches us that from the Similitudes of Thoughts and Passions of one Man to the Thoughts and Passions of another whosoever looks into himself and considers what he doth when he thinks reasons opines hopes fears c. and upon what Grounds he shall hereby read and know what are the Thoughts and Passions of all other Men upon the like Occasions Now this Explication of his seems liable to this Inconvenience that it makes each Man in particular the Rule and Measure of Humane Nature in general by attending to the Grounds and Reasons of his own Thoughts aed Passions to judge the very same of all others so that according to this Humane Nature must appear to the World according to the false Notions or vicious Affections of those who represent it according to the accidentally good or bad Dispositions of those who undertake to give an account of it Thus because the blood-shot Eye of one Man's mind represents all things in red Colours therefore must Cruelty be the immediate and universal Dictate of Nature 'T is true indeed in the very next Sentence he adds I say The Similitude of Passions which are the same in all Men Desire Fear Hope c. Not the Similitude of the Objects of the Passions which are the Things desiŕed fear'd hoped c. For these the Constitution individual and particular Education do so vary and they are so easie to be kept from our Knowledge that the Characters of Man's Heart are legible only to him who searcheth the Heart But how can we possibly gather the Similitude of other Men's Thoughts and Passions from our own without any relation they bear to their respective Objects for from the consideration of our Thoughts and Passions abstracted from their Objects we could only inser the Similitude of ours with other Men's meerly as bare Acts and Operations of the Soul that is that the Soul in its respective exercise of its Thoughts and Passions acts or suffers after the same manner in all Men but now this would be nothing to his purpose But surther when he says Whoever looks into himself and considers what he doth when he thinks opines hopes fears c. and upon what Grounds Now how can a Man consider upon what Grounds and Reasons he desires or fears without respect to the Objects of those several Passions for Men desire or fear either because the Things desir'd or fear'd are really good or bad for 'em or at least apprehended as such Nor can any just or full Account be given of our Passions abstracted from their Objects So that Mr. Hobbs by his seemingly distinct stating of the Question takes only the greater pains to blunder the whole Matter But to return This Knowledge of our selves includes in it these following Particulars 1. It includes the Knowledge of our selves as consisting of two distinct Principles of Soul and Body together with a right understanding of the Nature and Properties of both 2. A right understanding of the mutual Relations and respective Influences that each hath upon the other by vertue of their Union Hence are we taught not to mistake the brisker Motions of the Blood or a more slorid temper of Body for the Influences of the holy Spirit nor the more black melancholy temper of Mind sor a severe and religious Reservedness with some or for the Frowns of the Almighty or the Testimonies of the Divine Displeasure against us with others 3. It includes in it the true Knowledge of our Original Perfections and how far they are impair'd by the Fall both what God made us at first in the state of Innocence and what we have now made our selves by our Sins 4. The Knowledge of the right use of our Faculties as also a due consideration of the Ends for which God gave us such Souls and a due care of acting in Conformity thereunto 5. It consists in a just and due regard and reverend esteem of our Selves not such as is the result of Pride or the affectation of Popularity but in a true vertuous Care of doing nothing unworthy the Dignity of our Natures 6. It implies a due consideration of those Relations we stand in to God our Selves and Others so as that we may lead a fober righteous and holy life in this present World Now that which further speaks the Excellency of this Knowledge is That it transcends not the ordinary Capacities of a finite Understanding nor discourages us with the Difficulty much less with the Impossibility of the Thing the Knowledge of God so far as he has any ways made known himself to us and the Knowledge of our Selves in the utmost extent of it This God hath made our Duty and therefore hath not plac'd it out of the compass of those Powers and Faculties which he hath given us Not but that there are some Things in this lesser as well as in that greater World which are above our Knowledge viz. The Mode of the Union of our Soul and Body whether our Souls praeexist or no c. But these few Things which are unknowable ought not to discourage us in the search of those Things we may know especially in Things of a more practical Concernment only here we may consider That those Natural Mysteries of Humane Nature if I may so call 'em may be made use of to teach us Modesty and Submission of our Understandings in Things of a more Divine Concern Thus even Philosophers tell us That God on purpose constituted some unsolvable Difficulties in Nature to teach men not over-highly to value their own Understandings 2. This Knowledge of our Selves is founded upon surer Principles than any other Study Men commonly give themselves unto particularly than those two famous Mistresses of most Men's Courtship Philosophy and Philology as for Philosophy though I believe that it has arriv'd at as high a degree of Perfection in this Age as in any known Age of the World and it is to no purpose to talk of what might possibly be in those other of which we have no History no Records remaining yet it may be justly question'd Whether Truth it self was ever yet pull'd out of that Pit in which the Ancients plac'd it considering the several Hypotheses now extant in Philosophy each embrac'd with equal eagerness and as their respective Followers think with equal appearance of Reason And Philology that labours under these two Disadvantages that it is commonly founded upon no better Grounds than meer Conjecture and Probability so that it must be great
who thus suppose a Corporeal God do also suppose a Corporeal Soul Thus from the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature 3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship that seeing we consist of Soul and Body therefore must we offer both to God as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship First Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism Secondly By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves or at least think that we did so of that God whom we for ought they perceiv'd did so rudely worship But then on the other hand we must have a more especial regard to the Soul for without this all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body whether it enjoy'd any State of Praeexistence or was then first created when first put into the Body or if it did praeexist then in what manner whether in a pure separation from all matter or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle is not my design here to examine only 't is observable that in things of this Nature where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things there Men are usually determin'd to this or that side of the question by very accidental considerations as in this case of Praeexistence by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philosophy or by those previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable Nor Secondly shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political rather than of Natural Philosophy I shall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body being discouraged therefrom by the difficulties of the thing and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it Claubergius hath a discourse particularly de conjunctione Anime Corporis but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it I shall submit it to the judgment of those who will take the pains to peruse it His way is this The Soul says he is united to the Body by those mutual actions that pass betwixt 'em but more especially by those more confused operations of sense and by the less distinct perceptions of mind And in his 37th chap. he tells us that homo alius alio idem seipso diver so tempore magis minúsve homo censeri debet For according to him the denomination of a Man as such consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body which is more especially perform'd by the operations of Sense Now I see not why that especially should denominate us men wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties why such a one should not be counted as much yea more a Man than he that lives more by sense That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense is very true but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in these more confused operations the difficulty would perhaps still return Nor shall I here dispute whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame or of the more principal Parts of the Body doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station and launch into those other unknown Regions or whether besides this there be not also requir'd which seems as probable as immediate an act of God to take it out as there was to put it into the Body only we may observe that God both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us by laying violent hands upon our selves to separate those whom God hath thus strictly joyned together that whatever natural tye it is under as to the Body 't is certain it ought not to quit its Station without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand the one by ascribing too little to the Body and too much to the Soul the other by attributing too much to the Body and too little to the Soul in the Accounts they give of humane Nature The Stoicks would make Man so wholly rational that they will scarce allow him to be sensible and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature and the Epicureans on the contrary make all the most noble Actions of the Soul meerly subservient to the designs of such Pleasure as is really below the true happiness of the Soul By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body all those motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites so far as they are natural The Design therefore of the Stoicks to root these Passions out of Humane Nature is First impossible Secondly it would be prejudicial thereunto were it feisible for these when duly regulated become the subject matter of moral Vertue and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Vertue Among the many charges brought against Stoicism that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious and the most unanswerable it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of ones self as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man far above any thing that is called Mortal and in some respects equal to God himself As for Repentance they look upon that as a mean thing far below the height of their attainments Innocence indeed is better than Repentance but for them to pretend unto it argues a great deal of Pride founded upon a bad understanding of their own State But this description which they give of a Wise Man is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds but
Metaphor then it is meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. 2. Those who assert these Natural Notions do not suppose them super-induc'd or imprinted upon the Soul In esse completo but suppose them to be native Properties and Qualifications of the Soul as it is such as God first design'd to make it that is Rational and Religious Now it can be no meer Iargon to ascribe to a Subject its own natural and essential Properties such as are the very essential parts of its Constitution They do also suppose with Mr. Norris the ideal World or Idea's in the Divine Intellect which are the Archetypal Forms or Patterns of all Truth these they say are communicated to the Soul in a way and proportion suitable to such a being that is they are made either the natural Properties of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its Faculties in the right use and free exercise of 'em But the Author in the forementioned place tells us That he accounts for the mode of Humane Understà nding after a very different way viz. by the presentialness of the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ideal World to our Souls wherein we see and perceive all things So that denying all mental Impressions not only innate Notions but also those which according to Dr. Lock derive their Original from Sensation or Reslection he asserts all sensible moral and intellectual Objects are only seen and understood in the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus in his Book of Reason and Religion p. 85. This ideal World this Essence of God consider'd as variously exhibitive and representative of things is no other than the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second Person in the ever blessed Trinity this I think says he is highly agreeable to Reason for I know no Hypothesis that would so intelligibly make out the Eternal Generation of the Son of God Against this Opinion I shall briefly suggest these few Prejudices which whether they be real or only imaginary I shall leave to the Reader to judge 1. I grant that every good Christian so far as in him lies ought to defend against the Socinians the Mysteries of the Trinity from all palpable and down-right Contradictions But then it is question'd by some whether it be either modest or indeed possible to invent Hypotheses which may as the Authour speaks Intelligibly make out these Mysteries or whether the Eternal Generation of the Son of God may not as well remain as indeed it is an Incomprehensible Mystery as thus explain'd by making the ideal World and the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be one and the same thing 2lv Though the natural parturiency of the Authors own Mind p. 185. of his Reason and Religion did early pitch upon this Notion of seeing and knowing all things in God as easy and obvious even before he had consulted any Authors herein yet other Mens Capacities may be so dull as not easily to apprehend the manner of it even now after such an exact Elaboration 3. According to his Hypothesis there seems not a sufficient difference and distinction betwixt natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation seeing God must immediately apply himself to the Souls of Men in both and there is no natural ground or foundation in Man for one more than for the other 4. It seems not so becoming that profound veneration we ought to have of the Majesty of God thus to make the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were the Glass of every trivial perception of sensible objects 5. May not his Hypothesis of seeing and perceiving all things in God seem to discourage or lessen the diligent use of our Faculties in the search of Truth or may it not encourage Enthusiasm by giving Men occasion to think that the only way to Knowledge is fantastically to give themselves up to the Impressions of the Ideal World These things I here propound to Consideration though withal I think that it is more easy to oppose the particular manner of any Mans explaining humane Understanding than it is to lay down a true one of his own But lastly That which seems of the greatest consequence is that the Author dangerously forces some places of Scripture only to make 'em favour the peculiarity of his notion Thus Io. 1. 3. all things were made by him or according to him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 89. Reason and Religion and p. 90. Heb. 1. By him God is said to make the Worlds that is says he according to the eternal exemplars or platforms in this ideal World Now if the Arrians were justly blam'd for putting that interpretation upon those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thereby to signify an Instrumental Cause as if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was only an Instrument in the hand of God in creating the World how much more then ought this interpretation to be rejected which makes the second Person in the Trinity only an Exemplar or Platform according to which God made the World but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a Genitive Case in Scripture generally signifies the efficient Cause And however I believe he will no where in Scripture find it in that sense which he there puts upon it So that this ingenious Author seems not so successful in assigning his own particular way of humane Understanding as he was in confuting that of Dr. Lock 's And here I would further appeal to the considerate Reader whether this way of seeing and perceiving all things in the ideal World if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor whether it be not as meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant as the other Anima est abrasa tabula nihil est in intellectu quod non priùs erat in sensu These and such like Opinions seem to owe that general reception they meet withal rather to the Authority of their first Founder than to any strength of reason that would be found in 'em did they once undergo a severer Examination this Opinion seems to tye the Soul to its particular Seat or at most gives it leave only to go a begging to the Cinque-Ports of the Senses not only for all the Notices it receives from abroad but also for all the knowledge it enjoys at home That the Soul by the very Laws of Creation was at first dependant upon the Body and by the first transgression of the Divine Law is now more deeply immers'd in matter and a greater Slave thereto than it was by nature is certainly true but then the Image of God wherein Man was at first Created did first more especially respect the Soul 2. It consisted in the respective Endowments and Perfections of the Understanding and Will viz. in Knowledge and Righteousness And therefore 3. Not in a mere capacity or bare possibility of having this Pourtraicture drawn afterwards upon the Soul by the assistance of the outward Senses but in something at first actually existent in it self And supposing this to be the true state
of the Case before the Fall it is proportionably the same since for though the Fall did very much weaken our Facultics yet it did not wholly alter or invert the method of acquiring or retaining Knowledge There are indeed some who define an Idea to be nothing else but the similitude or representation of a thing made in the Brain which definition being so peculiarly appropriated to meer sense and fancy they cannot conceive any Idea or Conception to reside any where else and that we talk mystically and unintelligibly if we suppose any other Idea to which that definition doth not or cannot belong But tho' it may be justly question'd whether the mode of sensation be yet fully and clearly explicated viz. how the phancy can represent outward objects in proportionable similitudes to the superiour perceptive faculties seeing perhaps it would be very difficult to demonstrate that any thing besides motion can be communicated to the Seat of the Soul yet I shall at present grant that the Understanding doth make use of the Representations of the Phancy for the apprehending those things which were there first impress'd and thus I here suppose all material objects are apprehended by such sensible representations But now the Question is Whether the Understanding cannot frame right Notions or Apprehesions of those things which according to our modes of conception neither are nor can be represented by the Fancy Whether there be not some things knowable both moral and intellectual Objects relating both to Truth and Goodness which are not and cannot be the Objects of Sense So that whatever it is that terminates the Act of the Understanding that may be properly call'd an Idea Notion or Conception Nihil est intellectu quod non c. This cannot be universally true in that latitude wherein some would take it For Aristotle himself grants a Power of judging of drawing Consequences from particular Instances to the Understanding which doth not belong to the Sense and this Power I suppose will be granted to be something and indeed it is most probable that he did not extend that saying any further than as it relates only to sensible and material Objects One Argument commonly made use of to prove the Soul distinct from the Body doth also prove the Operations of Sense and Phancy distinct from those of the Understanding That Faculty of the Mind say they by which we reason and judge of Objects is so far from being a Body that it must withdraw it self from all bodily Representations when it sets it self to contemplate more speculative and sublime Truths for if the Soul should always frame its Notions according to the Notices of Sense this would only betray it into Errour but now when it abstracts from this and with Reason corrects what may be there justly deem'd amiss this evidently shews the distinction of these two Faculties and the superiority of the one above the other So that that opinion w ch makes the Soul so wholly to depend upon the representations of sense in all its operations seems to have a bad influence upon the belief of its immateriality or however upon the excellency of its way of acting by making it more subject to the Body than God and Nature ever made it Those therefore who either from the observation of the accidental bad use that some Men make of the distinction of these two Faculties or from the difficulty they themselves find in assigning the differences betwixt 'em are therefore enclin'd to believe that there is no difference at all These Men like unskilful Artists do rather cut then loose the knot and like those inconsiderate Men who from the difficulties and seeming irregularities of Providence or from their own inabilities or unwillingness to take the pains to solve 'em do take as they think this more compendious way to extricate themselves viz. to deny that there is any such thing as Providence in the World But it is here objected that the opinion which I here assert lays a Foundation for Fanaticism and Enthusiasm as it gives occasions for the Enthusiasts to think that those Men are too much immers'd in matter and too great Slaves to sense and fancy who do not presently apprehend their pretended illuminations and mysterious non-sense I shall here therefore briefly show wherein the nature of Enthusiasm doth properly consist and that this opinion which I here assert is no ways chargeable with giving any occasion or encouragement to it But 1. we may observe that God in the wise disposals of his Providence has many times plac'd truth upon the Confines of Errour nor is it any disparagement to it if sometimes by reason of this Vicinity it may accidentally give occasion to it This should rather teach us the true exercise of our Understandings to distinguish betwixt the false glosses and plausible appearances of Errour and the realities of Truth 2. I shall not here go about to recriminate for to asperse other Men's Opinions is not to vindicate our own for though they may be charg'd with as bad Consequences as those they cast upon ours yet this will not make our own innocent if they be in themselves obnoxious I might perhaps with as much or more reason charge Aristotle's Opinion Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius erat in sensu with giving countenance to Atheism as the contrary doth to Enthusiasm Dr. Cudworth's 5th Chap. Intellectual Systeme This being briesly premis'd I answer That according to the most rational account of Enthusiasm which founds it only in some irregular and turbulent Motions arising from the Body and acted more especially upon the Scene of Fancy according to this I do not see how the aforesaid Opinion hath any more influence upon Enthusiasm than it has upon any other Errours and false Opinions whatever Thus the Enthusiast together with most other erring persons do take their own mistaken Fancy and false Apprehensions for the Dictates of Reason and Understanding So that Enthusiasm seems rather sounded in the contrary Opinion in not distinguishing betwixt these two and the Enthusiast of all others seems the least chargeable with this Errour if it be one of distinguishing betwixt the Phantasins of Sense and Imagination and the Ideas of the Understanding for as such he scarcely acknowledges any higher Faculty in the Soul than that of Phancy So that that Opinion of distinguishing betwixt the Representations of Sense and the Idea's of the Understanding hath not any natural tendency to favour Enthusiasm unless we make it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first grand Foundation of all Errours and mistakes in general for almost all erring persons do tell those that differ from 'em that either they are not speculative enough rightly to apprehend their Notions or that they are too much prejudic'd with false Opinions readily to entertain them As an Appendix to this Chapter I shall add some short Reflections upon the 10th Chap. 3. lib. of P. Poiret's Cogitat rationales de Deo and
Cum igitur virtus res divina sit c. upon which the Commentator's words are Omnis rei cujuscunque sit summa excellentia quae à Deo esse putatur divina appellatur quo modo rudiore quâdam Minervâ intelligi potest quod hoc loco dicitur virtutem quae hominis est perfectio rem quandam esse divinam Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God either immediately or mediately but perhaps this was a way of Expression common to Plato with the Iews of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine so that all that was probably meant by this Phrase was only to express the excellency of the thing and the great Opinion he had of it or else that Divine Providence had some more particular concern in the disposing and inclining Men to it either by giving them a more happy Constitution of Body or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind or by affording more advantagious Circumstances of time and place yet so as that the most happy Occurrences do not necessitate Men to be Vertuous without their own Industry and Inclination nor the most Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault However if this be Plato's Opinion That Vertue is so from God that it cannot be gotten by Humane Industry in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence this Opinion is neither reasonable in it self nor is it sufficiently prov'd by that Argument made use of by Socrates for that purpose If says he Vertue was possible to be taught then would Good Men more especially teach their Sons that so they might inherit their Father's Vertues as well as Fortunes but the contrary frequently appears To this I Answer First That nothing can be prov'd from particular Instances seeing as many may be brought to the contrary where Vertue has been as it were propagated with the Family and we may furnish our selves even from our own Observation with Examples of the happy success of a Vertuous Education Secondly Vertuous Parents tho they may desire their Children may be such too yet many times such is their Tenderness and Indulgence to 'em that they do not make use of those Methods which are most proper thereunto which are commonly joyn'd with some degrees of Severity Thirdly Vertue though it may be taught and is capable of being learn'd yet is it a very conditional thing and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumstances together for the producing the effect and that which often defeats all the rest is the liberty of the Will which many Men use in opposition to all those Moral means which are otherwise sufficient in themselves and design'd by others to moderate their Passions and reduce 'em to Vertue Nor 2. Doth Vertue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars for if we consider the Nature of the Heavens and natural Causes and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will it will be impossible to conceive how any Sydereal Influences can any ways certainly or necessarily determine the Minds of Men. And the same Arguments that prove the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology in other respects do much more evince the folly of their pretences who go into Heaven to fetch down Vertue from thence when indeed it is nearer us even in our Mouths imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures I shall here give you Savanorola's Argument in a case much what to this purpose If says he the Christian Faith and Life proceed from the Stars then their Faith is either true or false if it be true then it cannot proceed from thence because it condemns that Opinion and asserts the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology if it be false and proceed from the Stars then it follows that the Stars incline Men to falshood and the falshood of the Effect will be no good reason why we should believe the truth of the Cause Whereby Men by the mere strength of Nature c. And thus Vertue is distinguished from Grace thus the Heathen Moralists have discours'd very well of Vertue in their Writings and given great Instances thereof in their Practices who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation And this Notion of it seems fitly to assign the just Limits betwixt the Gentile and the Christian Religion it deprives not the one of what it may justly challenge as its right it allows to men in the state of Nature some inclinations and abilities too to Vertue but yet that without supernatural assistance he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection it doth not so far depress humane nature Modices to make it perfectly stupid nor on the other hand doth it raise it to a pitch of Pelagianisin it grants Heathens to be Men and reminds Christians of their Original Sin and the present depravation of their Natures And though the Heathen Moralists do sometimes mention such a thing as afflatus divinus yet it cannot be in reason extended so far as to signify that which Christian Writers commonly understand by that expression To perform that which is most agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature Thus though vertue in the proper acceptation of it be distinguish'd from Grace as to the Principle from whence it flows the one proceeding from nature the other from a more divine original yet do they agree in their end and Friendly conspire together to carry on the same designs of Providence in the World viz. the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two sorts 1. Natural and original 2. Such as are the results of the divine benignity afterwards 1. Natural and Original and under this head I shall only consider the excellencies of the Soul in particular 1. As to the excellency of its nature and essence that it is a spiritual being and ray of Divinity now considering this natural preheminence of the Soul above the Body we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul when we make it only a Slave to the Body and only as it were the Bodies Purveyor to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof 2. As to its intellectual Endowments Man only of all this lower Creation is endowed with a power of reasoning now certainly God never gave us such excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects and debase 'em by unworthy Employments Phil. 4. 8. What soever things are true what soever things are just c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think on these things 3. As to its moral Endowments that is all those natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Vertue and Goodness that inward sense of Honesty that tactus quidam divinitat is as Iamblicus calls it now this also obliges us to be true to that inward sense of obligation that lies upon us 2. Such dignities as are the result of divine benignity afterwards and these I shall consider
Opinion of a God there would be no Idolatry nor Superstition But this Argument as it is deficient in other respects so also is it in respect of time for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Christ for the first four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World notwithstanding the force of this Argument For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate so much Power to himself And indeed Mr. Hobs had great reason to thank the Church of Rome for affording him so much Sophistical matter to stuff his Kingdom of Darkness withal Another Artifice by which Mr. Hobs would disparage a truth that he has a mind to oppose is with a Philosophical Gravity to feign an idle and ridiculous original to which judiciously to ascribe it thus he fancies that Aristotle from the consideration of this or such like Propositions Homo est animal from the Copula in this Proposition he took occasion first to assert separate Essences Celestial Intelligences and humane Souls Leviat Latin p. 320. Another instance he gives of the false interpretation of Scripture is the asserting the immortality of the Soul and its being really distinct from the Body but now one would scarce desire a better Argument for the proof thereof than the very Answers he gives to those places of Scripture which are commonly alledg'd for it so weak and frivolous many times are they Eccles. 12. 7. The Spirit returns to God that gave it which words says he may suffer this interpretation but then they must undergo a great deal of pain and have a great deal of Patience if they suffer it One great defect which seems to run through all Mr. Hobs his Interpretations of Scripture is this that he supposes himsels on the defensive part and that all that he had to do was only to invent some frivolous Evasion or put some forc'd Interpretation upon the place and then all was done whereas he ought positively to prove that that of his was the only true and genuine sense and meaning of the place both from the generally approv'd concurrent Testimonies of the best and purest Ages from the just and proper acceptation of the words by the best and most approved Authors from the general scope and design of the Context and from the natural tendency that his Sense and Interpretation has to promote those noble ends of Vertue and Piety in the World which God and Christ design'd to carry on by the Scriptures None of which things Mr. Hobs hath as much as attempted to do The Spirit returns to God that gave it that is says he God only knows whence it comes and whither it goes And I could wish that he had been true to his own Interpretation But then how comes he so positively to assert its Mortality at present and at what Periods it must return again to Life c. Another place he says which seems to make for the immortality of the Soul is Matt. 22. 32. Where our Saviour affirms Abraham Isaac and Iacob to be alive to which he answers That they were indeed alive but not actually but as by the promise of God they were sure of Eternal Life but he also tells us That the wicked are sure of eternal Death and thus why may not the wicked be as properly said to be dead even whiles they are alive by vertue of the threatning as the Righteous can be said to be alive by vertue of the promise even then when they are suppos'd not to be at all The sum of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion herein is this he supposes the Soul not to be any thing really distinct from the Body but that it is compos'd of the purer parts of the Spirits and by consequence it dies with the Body not that it is annihilated for matter in this sense is immortal that is not naturally capable of annihilation but that upon such grand indispositions of Body which is called Death the Soul is render'd uncapable of such agitations and such reactions in which the nature of a living Creature doth consist So that according to this Opinion a Man can no more properly be said either to be alive or dead than Quicksilver may for though it be not so Organized as Mans Body is though it hath neither heart nor brain to transmit Spirits to each other and though it has not the use of Speech yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours The greatest part of the rest of this Chapter is employ'd in confuting or exposing some Opinions of the Church of Rome yet we may observe that notwithstanding his severe handling that Church in some respects yet her Authority is then valued by him when she seems any ways to favour his Opinions thus he cites her Authority to confirm his assertion That Spirits are mere Phantasms because she in her Exorcisms calls 'em so I shall here only further observe how he hath transform'd all the Subjects of Satan into Phantasms in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkness and in the latter end thereof has allegoriz'd all the Officers and Ministers of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins That which gave the first occasion of employing my thoughts this way was those false Opinions concerning God those various modes of Theism which now prevail in the World which seem to be nothing but Epicurism and Hobbianism transform'd into other I know not whether I may say into better shapes Now if what I here write may but give occasion to some abler Pen more fully to examine and confute those fatal Principles and I hope it will rather than a good Cause should suffer by my ill management If these Papers I say have this good effect I shall not then need to make any other Apology but think my Pains very well bestow'd FINIS AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter I Would not there be thought in the least to favour that false and foolish that dangerous and destructive opinion of Theism an Opinion which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward and thus it seems a composition of the worst ingredients incident to humane Nature Pride Ignorance and Ingratitude of Pride as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature of Ignorance as not fully understanding the true state and condition of laps'd Mankind of Ingratitude as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace But Secondly besides these there are others who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man do yet so melt it down as it were below it self till it come to an equal temper with or very little exceed mere natural Religion 3. Others who in words acknowledge a God but denying the common Principles of all Religion the immortality of the Soul and a future State seem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of Epicurus As for the light of Nature which these Men so much Idolize I shall grant to it as much
motion and agitation of the particles how can any one secure himself or others that a saction of the dissenting Particles for Example or such a motion as causes dissent may not rise up when the nature of the thing requires the contrary assent and by this means erect a Babel in Man and bring all into confusion Further If Cogitation consist only in the various motion and disposition of the Atoms then Phaeton might possibly produce a greater and more undoubted Deity out of his flaming Chariot than that of his Father Phoebus If this Hypothesis be true then Ex quovis ligno fiat Mercurius and the Chair may be as infallible as he that sits in it and this perhaps might gratifie some Men in the World all other methods failing thus to solve Infallibility by mechanick Principles Pardon me if in a ferious argument I thus seem to trifle seeing those I have here to deal withal first taught me the way For herein they seem rather to give an Essay of their own extravagant Fancies than to perswade others that they themselves believe their own Assertions But to return These Men must either assert That there neither is nor can be any such thing as Spirit in the World or if there be that it is impossible for such a being to cogitate neither of which will they be ever able to prove As for the being of a Spirit they do indeed with as much strength of confidence as weakness of Reason tell us that the Notion thereof includes in it a Contradiction tho' this they do not as much as attempt to prove any other way than first by supposing a material Universe and that nothing but matter is contained in it But this is to beg not prove the Question But the Essences of things being unknown the Notion of a Spirit seems as obvious and intelligible as that of matter for we may as easily conceive of one thing to which we attribute cogitation as its immediate property as we do of another to which we ascribe extension and impenetrability And then supposing a Spirit Cogitation seems the natural result of such a being Tho' I do not here go about to explain the particular way and manner how Spirits think for it is hard to conceive how their own Native penetrability or the reduplication of themselves upon themselves does any ways explain the manner of Cogitation We must satisfy our selves with this which is as far as our most exact Searches will extend to That first and immediate properties are not demonstrable of their Subjects neither as to the things themselves nor as to the modes Indeed Sharron in his Book of Wisdom lib. 1. ch 7. tells us that Spirits and Devils according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Divines are corporeal Here he cites Tertullian Origen St. Basil Gregory c. The Names he mentions but not their Assertions or the Places where they say so But this being a general accusation we may as easily deny it as he assert it But as for those places which perhaps may seem to favour his assertion I doubt not but they may and have already receiv'd easy Solutions from one of these general considerations 1. That either they asserted the opinion of the Platonists who yet were no favourers of an universal corporeity viz. That Souls were never in a perfect State of Separation from all Body but had certain etherial Vehicles and so in that respect might partake in some Sense of a Corporeal Nature Or 2. He doth not rightly interpret those places of the Fathers where perhaps sometimes body or matter may be ascribed to the Soul or Angels but then by Body there is to be meant nothing but Substance or Essence So that their Sense was good and orthodox though their Expressions might be liable to exception and yet I think it is only Tertullian that expresses himself in that manner The said Sharron goes on and tells us That Whatever is Created being compared with God is gross corporeal material and only God incorporeal I would willingly here be so charitable as to think that such was his awful respect and veneration of the Divine Essence that he would not easily grant any thing else to partake of the same generical nature Far be it from me to speak any thing that may in the least derogate from the excellency of the Divine Essence only we may consider that it is no honour done to that to depress other things below that just Order wherein God has placed them This seems but a piece of Will-worship and something like the Opinion of those who think they cannot sufficiently magnifie God's love to some unless they absolutely damn all the rest thus also as if we could not sufficiently magnifie the Spirituality of the Divine Nature unless we dispose all other beings into the rank and Order of Corporeity 2. Though I do not assert this yet I would propound it to consideration whether it may not be possible for the nature of a Spirit to admit of degrees of excellence as to the very Essence and Substance thereof and not only in respect of its more accidental perfections yet so as that which we suppose of the lower order to be perfectly Spiritual and contain nothing of Corporeity in it and perhaps the Logicians meant this when they called God Super-Substantia But he says further if it appear That Spirits change their place the very change shows they are moveable divisible subject to time and the successions thereof c. Which are all qualities of a Body But here I would only ask Whether the existence of a Spirit be possible or whether God could have created such a being or no If he could then his argument proves nothing for supposing such a being it must move and be in a place just in such a manner as we now suppose Souls and Angels to be and move and the argument would have the same force if we either suppos'd or were on all sides assur'd of the actual being that it has now So that it either proves the impossibility of a Spirit or else nothing at all to the purpose this being only such an objection or such a difficulty as would lye against an acknowledged truth I should now Secondly show how from hence we justly infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature But I shall not need to spend any time herein for though there have been some who granting the immateriality of the Divine Nature have yet asserted the Corporeity of the Soul yet there never was any who granting the Soul to be immaterial ever asserted God to be Corporeal As for those who assert a material Universe and a Corporeal Deity they may perhaps nomine ponere but indeed they do re tollere Deum For a Corporeal Deity is inconsistent with the Notion we have of God uncapable of the Perfections we ascribe to him and unable to perform such actions as do properly belong to such a being But however those
not of any thing really extant in Nature These were their undoubted opinions and apprehensions herein but whether their own natural Pride of temper was the cause of these their extravagant opinions or whether some other false Scheme of Principles which they had entertain'd had in some sort betray'd 'em into this excess of self-conceit I shall not here determine Tho' perhaps the ignorance of a future state of Rewards and Punishments after this life joyn'd with their attempt to give an account of that great question which so much puzled the Heathen World Cur bonis malè malis bené This perhaps might in some measure oblige 'em being not fully assur'd of a future State to entertain such false opinions of Man's self-sufficiency so placing all things within his own power that he needed not to be beholden to any other assistance but from himself or to any future expectations to make him happy As for the calamities that befal Men here in this Life they no ways alter the case in reference to happiness or unhappiness for those they say only reach the Body which according to them has no nearer relation to the Soul than their Cloaths have to it Thus the Stoicks plac'd their happiness where some sort of Phanaticks among us place their Holiness meerly in the inward Man without any regard to the outward as if we could be either Happy or Holy without any respect at all to one of the essential Parts of our Constitution as if the inward Man of the one could be holy in the midst of all outward Debaucheries and the inward Man of the other happy in the midst of bodily torments Thus tho' we grant the Soul to be the Soveraign yet the Body may justly challenge the Liberty of the Subject The other Sect of Philosophers who have erred in the other extream is that of Epicurus who attributes too much to the Body But this may some say is too favourable an expression when as indeed he doth destroy both all Soul in Man and excludes God out of the World But my charge here doth not rise so high it is sufficient for my purpose what is generally granted by all that in the account he gives of Man the Body is too predominant and the indolency of the Body seems far to surpass the tranquillity of the mind For it cannot be made appear That Epicurus by his tranquillity meant that peace of Conscience and Serenity of Soul which is the result of a Vertuous and Holy Life but only that quiet of mind in opposition to the disturbance of business or those perplexities of mind which may arise either from Bodily Distempers or some secret fears and jealousies Now if that peace and comfort of a good Conscience in the sense before described be not meant by tranquillity of mind then tho' perhaps the word may sound well yet indeed it falls short of the true and real happiness of the Soul and rises little higher than the concerns of the Body We do naturally either make our selves in some measure like him whom we worship or we fancy him whom we worship like our selves Thus Epicurus placing the happiness of the Deity in an idle unconcern'd freedom from business did hence probably assert ours to consist in the same or else being first strongly perswaded of the excellency of the thing and being mightily pleased with the agreeableness thereof himself did thence ascribe it also to the Deity as that wherein all happiness both Humane and Divine did consist It is indeed unreasonable and uncharitable to urge the consequences of an opinion upon the Author when he does expressly deny those consequences to be his opinion yet I think that he that in words acknowledges a God and yet his Principles are such as are generally embrac'd by real Atheists such an one is not capable of any just Apology For there is not the same Reason of all consequences some are next and immediate others are distant and remote these of the last sort ought not to be urg'd upon the Author of the opinion but those of the former may That Epicurus did assert the Being of God and entertained great and honourable thoughts of his Nature is very certain as appears out of Diog. Laertius So that none so charge him with Atheism as if he did not in words acknowledge a God that which is here asserted is this that that opinion of God which flatters him with high and honourable thoughts concerning himself his own intrinsick excellencies his own happiness and immortality which yet are but irrespective Attributes such as bear no relation to us and in the mean time to assert that he no ways concerns himself at present nor will hereafter take any notice to punish or reward Humane Actions This notion of God lays no Obligation on a Man to holiness of Life or Obedience to that God whom in words he thus admires and is such a Notion of God as even an Atheist provided he be not a perfect Mad Man ought to assert both because perhaps it may some ways tend to still and quiet the clamours of natural Conscience and also as it is safe and customary in respect of those with whom he lives For we never yet heard of a Kingdom or Common-wealth of Atheists such as make it their business positively and openly to assert and defend the Opinion of Atheism But here 't is reply'd That whatever his Principles were in themselves or what ever bad use others might make of them yet that he for his part was a severe practiser of Vertue and Religion But it may be justly questioned whether the joynt belief of a Corporeal God and a mortal Soul had ever any good influence upon an holy Life But suppose Epicurus in general to be a very Vertuous and Pious Person and that those contrary imputations of Vice and Luxury were mere Scandals cast upon him by the Stoicks yet we must consider how far and upon what grounds and for what ends he thus led a vertuous life Now it doth not appear that it was any further than only in order to a pleasant Life and tho' 't is true that Religion and Vertue are the most proper means in order to this end yet it is not probable that he so understood his own principles nor indeed were they capable of being so understood For supposing that there lyes no obligation upon us to any duty any further than as it promotes a pleasant Life in that sense wherein he takes it it is easily conceivable how some degrees of Vice may consist with these Principles provided that they so partake of this days pleasure that they do not incapacitate themselves for those of to morrow And tho' he tells us that the Gods are delighted with the Vertues of Men yet this is but cold encouragement to the practice of the more difficult Duties of Religion seeing tho' they do so far take notice of Mens vertuous actions as therewith to delight themselves yet not so
Communications of Divine Grace to Christians now under the Gospel 2. Suppose that God always made use of these imaginary Representations in the Conveyance of his Will to the Prophets will it therefore follow ad prophetizandum non esse opus perfectiore mente sed vividiore imaginatione Will it therefore follow that they did tantùm per imaginationem percipere Will it therefore follow that they did non nisi ope imaginationis percipere Though God in the wise methods of his Providence did make use of second Causes will it therefore follow that the whole Causality must be ascribed to them Could the Fancy alone or the Fancy and Understanding together rightly judge of the sense and meaning of those Representations without the further assistance of Divine Illumination to assert either of these would argue him either a bad Philosopher or a worse Divine so that it would be hard to conceive how these imaginary Representations without a more immediate interpretation of their sense and meaning would be any thing better than idle shows and insignificant appearances CHAP. III. Of natural Notions of Truth and Goodness THere is nothing that affords us more noble or more useful matter whereon to exercise our Speculations than a serious Enquiry into the respective natures of Truth Goodness which are things of so great Excellency in themselves and of such near relation to us that it doth not become a Man a Philosopher or a Christian to be ignorant of either 'T is observ'd by some that Pilate immediately upon his propounding that Question to our Saviour What is Truth He went forth not staying sor an Answer yet Providence hath not left us in the dark in things of this nature we have the certain Guides of Reason and Revelation as much as God thought fit to impart to us sufficient to satisfy all sober though not over-curious Enquiries sufficient to all the ends and purposes of this humane State Truth indeed both natural and reveal'd hath ever since its first appearance in the World variously suffer'd by the Ignorance of some and the Malice of others by the contrary and eager pretences of opposite Parties by the weaknesses and follies of Men and by the power and subtlety of the Devil and especially by that universal deluge of Sin and Wickedness which both upon a natural and moral account is very prejudicial to the concerns of Truth both as Vice is naturally destructive of good Principles and also as wicked Men are ready to believe though never so false what they think would be their Interest to be true Thus if we consider the state of the Gentile World in the first Ages we shall there find a very bad face of things For not to speak of the grossness of popular Errours and the no less impious than false apprehensions of the generality of the common sort the most exact Enquiries of their Philosophers were often false but always mixt with a great deal of uncertainty in their Discourses having commonly a contrary Sect and Company of Men that whatever was asserted by one was many times with as much vigour and equal probability of reason contradicted by another So that a sober and serious Enquirer after Truth though he might have reason enough not to profess himself a Sceptick but to believe that there was such a thing as truth yet he might then see too much cause to despair of ever finding the certain way that led to it among so many By-paths of errour and uncertainty And even now in the Christian World the many errours in Opinions and the more fatal Heresies of wicked practices do sufficiently-testify that Truth doth not enjoy such an undisturb'd Empire as might have been hop'd and wish'd since Christ's appearance in the Flesh. Now among all these disadvantages under which Truth always labour'd and even still labours Providence hath more especially provided these two ways for the preservation of it 1. By natural inscription upon the minds of men 2. By after revelation for the further illustration and confirmation of it And these two are as it were the two Pillars that have preserved it both from the deluge of Sin and the violence of all other opposition 1. Natural Inscription I hope I shall not need to desire the Reader not to impose any such gross sense upon this word as is inconsistent with the nature of an Immaterial Soul I shall here therefore first briefly explain what I mean by truth of first Inscription or natural Notions For the Defendant has always leave to state his own Question and to declare in what sence he undertakes the defence of it this I the rather intimate because some Men will put such a Sense upon these words innate imprinted or impress'd frequently made use of in this Question as none that I know of go about to defend First I do not here assert the Opinion of the Platonists concerning innate Ideas in all its circumstances I do not here suppose the Soul to praexist nor do I make all the knowledge we have in this state to be nothing but reminiscence or recollection of what we knew in the other Secondly These natural Notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and Ideots without any assistance from the outward Senses or without the help of some previous Cultivation For thus reason it self which yet we say is natural to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires some supervenient assistances before it arrive at the true exercise of it self and it is as much as I here contend for if these notions be in the same sense connatural to the Soul as reason it self is But Thirdly The use of our Understandings being first suppos'd that is our faculties labouring of no natural defect nor depriv'd of those other advantages that God and Nature have made necessary thereunto then our Souls have a native power of finding or framing such Principles or Propositions the Truth or Knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense or observation thus knowing what is meant by a whole and what by a part hence naturally results the truth of this Proposition totum est majus sui parte without being any ways oblig'd to sense for it Of this nature are those universal Propositions the truth whereof doth not depend upon the actual Existence of any thing as quicquid agit est c. Now I suppose we may easily discern a difference betwixt the Truth of such Propositions as these and those others which are brought by some to vie with those natural Notions viz. White is not black Fellowness is not sweetness c. I shall here 1. enquire into the grounds and reasons upon which Dr. Parker late Bishop of Oxford in his account of the Platonick Philosophy asserts Experimental Observation to be the great Rule and Measure of Truth And first he blames the Platonick Theology for resolving Knowledge into its first
towards his Neighbour by observing the great Rule of doing as he would be done by such an one tho' never so ignorant in other things yet contributes his share to the common good c. There is no doubt but he doth but then may we not rather argue thus that since Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that one single Proposition as indeed having no explicit notion of it and yet do their Duties both towards God their Neighbours and themselves that therefore they have some other way of coming to the Knowledge of their Duty without resolving the Laws of Nature into their proper Causes as it is called Dr. Lock the Ingenious Author of the Essay of humane Vnderstanding has spent the First Part of his Book wholly against these innate Principles relating either to Speculation or Practice One great objection that he brings against 'em is this that Children and Ideots have no apprehension of 'em and therefore they cannot be any original Impressions upon the minds of Men because if they were they would soonest appear in such these being suppos'd now to be in puris naturalibus not tinctur'd with any adventitious prejudices of Art or Education and upon this account also there cannot be pleaded that universal consent that is pretended to be given to these original Notions or common Principles seeing thus perhaps one third part of Mankind do not assent to ' em In Answer hereto 1. I observe that those who make this objection as I before intimated will not give the Defendant leave to state his own Question and explain his own sense and meaning of it but will put such a sense upon these words innatâ—â—â—r natural as if a thing could not be thus natural or innate to the Soul unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the Face that they must necessarily assent thereto even before by the common course of nature they are capable of assenting to any thing whereas those who defend this Question make these â—â—â—â—â—â—l or innate notions more conditional things depending upon the Concurrence of several other circumstances in order to the Souls exerting of ' em Thus the Ingenious Mr. Tyrrell has well observ'd of Mr. Hobs that he only takes the measure of humane nature from those Passions which precede the use of reason and as they first and chiesly shew themselves in Children and Fools and Persons unexperienc'd where as according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers we suppose the truer nature of man ought rather to be taken from his utmost perfection viz. his reason c. p. 256. So here 't is thought that the truer judgment of these natural notions ought to be taken rather from the most perfect state of Man rather than as they either do or do not show themselves in Children and Ideots And whereas 't is asserted that these general Maxims are assented to as soon as propos'd and the terms rightly understood to this the Ingenious Author Dr. Lock replies that then there must be an infinite number of innate notions even those which no one ever yet pretended to be such as an Apple is not an Oyster black is not white c. Now these and such as these he says are more readily assented to than those quicquid agit est contradictories cannot be both true at once c. because Children and Fools will readily assent to the former but these latter require more attentive-thought and consideration for the understanding of ' em I shall not here mention that distinction which the Logicians perhaps would make use of in this Case of some things being more known in themselves and yet not so to us because I know not what credit now a-days may be given to Men of that old-fashion'd way of thinking But the Ingenious Author himself doth assert these three ways of acquiring Knowledge First By intuition thus we have the knowledge of our being p. 318. Man also knows by intuitive certainly that bare nothing cannot produce any real being p. 312. The second way of Knowledge is by Reason Thirdly By Sensation Now the Knowledge of these Universal Truths or general Maxims I conceive is by the first way rather by intuition than by reasoning or by the consent or dissent of the terms For these Propositions Cogito ergo sum or that upon which this depends quicquid agit est bare nothing cannot produce a real being the truth of these Propositions doth not so much depend upon any consideration of the terms but seems rather the summary result of the whole which that Author seems very well to express by intuition or intuitive certainly But then as to those other Propositions wherein we deny one Idea of another as a Man is not an Horse blue is nor yellow c. The truth of these depends upon the actual existence of Things and the consensus dissensus terminorum But Mr. Norris the ingenious Author of the Reflections upon the foresaid Essay of Humane Vnderstanding pag. 20. doth not allow any such Things as Mental Impressions or Characters upon the Mind what way soever they may pretend to come there So that though he agrees with Dr. Lock in denying all natural and innate Notions in the Mind of Man yet it is for other Reasons than those which Dr. Lock goes upon and upon a far different Hypothesis So that Mr. Norris his Reflections may be a sufficient Answer to Dr. Lock 's Opinion as it is defended by him shewing the invalidity of the Grounds and Reasons upon which he founds it though in the mean time he agrees with him in the conclusion in denying all Natural and Native Characters upon the Soul Which thing says he in the place above cited Of Mental Impressions or Characters written upon the Mind if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor I take to be meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. But here I humbly conceive that when we speak of Natural Notions or Native Impressions of Truth and Goodness made upon the Minds of Men though perhaps there may be something of Metaphor in it yet the sense and meaning of it is generally understood nor is there any danger lest any one should hence conclude the Soul to be made of White-paper and the Knowledge we find there to be written with Pen and Ink Heb. 10. 26. I will put my laws in their hearts and in or upon their minds will I write them That is says Dr. Taylor Duct Dubit p. 4. You shall be govern'd by the Law of natural and essential Equity and Reason by that Law which is put into every Man's Nature and besides this whatsoever else shall be super-induc'd shall be written in their Minds by the Spirit who shall write all the Laws of Christianity in the Tables of your Consciences Now I do not see any need of any such curious Remark either upon the Text or Comment that if this pretend to any thing more than Figure or
the Being of God should either through the shortness of his Meditations or the sublimeness of the Theory make use of an Argument not perfectly conclusive yet seeing the success of the Cause depends not upon it and seeing the Man perhaps has effected as much as he intended by it that is added his Mite to the former Treasury upon the whole matter it seems hard if such an one must be prosecuted as an Atheist or a Betrayer of the Cause of Religion Cicer. de Univers Si fortè de Deorum Naturâ ortuque Mundi disserentes minùs id quod habemus Animo consequimur c. hand sanè erit mirum contentique esse debebitis si probabilia dicentur aequum est enim meminisse me qui disseram hominem esse vos qui judicetis ut si probabilia dicentur nè quid ultra requiratis Among the many Arguments brought to prove the Being of God these two seem the most considerable First That comprehensive one which is drawn from the Being of the World whereby I understand not only the Divine Power of creating or producing something out of nothing but that admirable Wisdom also that appears in making it such as it is and in the proper subserviencies of things therein to their respective Ends That Argument further which is drawn not only from the Material but the Intellectual Universe not only from the structure of the Body but the Nature of the Soul Secondly That which is drawn from the Consent and universal Acknowledgment of all Nations As for that which seems Aristotle's Opinion That the World was from Eternity and yet that it was in Nature of an Effect in respect of God the Cause it will be impossible to free this Assertion either from a Contradiction or from an unworthy reflection upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature For if God as a Cause was in time antecedent to the World then it is a contradiction to say it was from Eternity If it did flow from God as an Emanative Effect as the Beams from the Sun then this destroys the chiefest Perfection of the Divine Nature viz. its Liberty And this seems one of the best Arguments to prove That the World neither was nor could be from Eternity and it will be very hard if once we give our Adversaries leave to suppose it to be Eternal by any other Argument to force 'em out of their Opinion For I do not see that it would be any absurdity to say That supposing the World to be Eternal there has been as many Years as Days that is an equal Infinite number of both all Infinites being Equal for Infinity can no more be exhausted by Years than Days if it could then it would not be what it is in its own nature inexhaustible But the truth is such is the nature of Infinite with respect to our Finite Capacity that the one is not a Competent Iudge of the other and when we enter into disputes of this nature we are often entangled with unanswerable difficulties on both sides But the Atheist tells us That all this visible Universe the Heavens the Earth and all Mankind at first were the lucky hits of blind Chance which after almost infinite successless Tryals going before did at last happen upon these admirable and excellent Structures particularly those of humane Bodies But here we must know that according to these Principles the same Chance which first made us must still continue us But then how comes it to pass that Chance is so regular and constant in its Productions since That whereas it is above ten thousand to one according to these Principles but that Mankind long ere this must have wholly ceased to have been or else nothing but Monsters have been produced instead hereof we see a very regular and orderly course of Nature generally observed This is as if a Man should be a thousand years in casting all sizes upon six Dice and then for a thousand years after to throw nothing else if we could suppose a Mans Life to last so long Whoever can believe such strange things as these ought never to blame any one for being over credulous As for that other Argument drawn from the consent of Mankind there are some who tell us That those natural Impressions of God upon the minds of Men upon which this universal consent is founded are mere imaginary things and that there is no need of 'em in our disputes against Atheism But these Men might do well to consider whether they do not too much oblige the Atheists and go too far towards the betraying the Cause of God and Religion in the World who willingly quit and give up that Argument which hath hitherto been managed with such good success by the best and wisest of Men in all Ages willingly I say to give it up gratis for I verily believe it can never be forc'd and wrested out of the hand of a Christian Philosopher who rightly understands it And why should we grant any thing to an Atheist which may tend to the advantage of his or the prejudice of our own Cause unless he necessarily force it from us by dint of Argument always provided that we readily acknowledge evident Truth whereever we find it First I conceive there neither is nor can be any Argument in a true and proper sense à priore to prove the Being of God that taken from the Idea is not such But it is an arguing from the effect to the Cause only the effect seems a more immediate one and such as bears a more particular resemblance to the Cause That somewhat was from Eternity is evidently demonstrable for if once there was nothing it was impossible for any thing ever to begin to be Now this something must be either Matter or Spirit a thinking or unthinking Being it cannot be an unthinking Being for then it would be impossible that there should be any such thing as Knowledge or Cogitation in the World which yet we are inwardly conscious to our selves of For as Dr. Lock Chap. 10. Book 4. hath well observ'd It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being as that nothing of it self should produce matter Now it must be either Man that was the first Eternal Being the Creator of all things or some other Being But though the Atheists are not the greatest Wits in the World yet we must not think 'em such very Atheists neither as to make mere Man to set up for a Sovereign Creator Thus we have an Idea or Conception of a Being infinitely more perfect than our selves and therefore we were not the Cause of our own Existence for if we had we should then have given our selves those Perfections which we find wanting in us and conceive in another Therefore we owe our Existence to and dependance upon that Being without us which enjoys all Perfections But now the Question is Whether the Idea be the Cause or occasion
a God then we can find out natural Arguments to prove it But when we are first taught and convinc'd by DivineRevelation That there is a God How do Arguments drawn from natural reason afterwards prove it So that indeed these Arguments will be little more than Illustrations or further Confirmations of a thing already believed because revealed But then he says in the same place Principia ostendi deberent ex quibus is qui nullam unquam Numinis mentionem vel suspicionem hausisset sponte in Numinis Naturae Conditoris agnitionem paulatim deduceretur Some Principles must be shown from whence he that never heard the least mention nor had the least suspicion of a Diety might be drawn to the knowledge of him To this I Answer First That according to the Principles of those Men whom he now opposes he cannot ordinarily suppose a Man without some suspicion at least of a Deity for this say they is born with him and he must not suppose his Adversaries Assertion to be false but prove it so Secondly Why may not that conviction of mind which is the result of our Faculties rightly reasoning hereupon inferring the Existence of a Supream Being together with that inward consciousness of our Obligations to him Why may not these be Principles sufficient to prove so far as is requisite for Nature to do it That there is a God and that to one who had not heard any other way that there was one But he seems to lay a great stress upon that of a Man's having or not having heard the least mention of a God before But if he suppose a Man so to have heard of a God by Divine Revelation as thereupon really to believe his Existence then those natural Arguments brought to prove the same may further confirm him in his belief but tho' he have heard mention made of a God and yet not believe that there is any such thing I do not understand how his bare hearing of him before will any ways make those reasons drawn from Nature the more effectual to convince him If Men of late have too frequently run into Atheism it was not any weakness they found in that Argument drawn from the Light of Nature to prove the Existence of a God so far as can in reason be expected from it that was the cause thereof but he seems to lay the fault there where indeed he ought not and ascribes it to the weak defence that some Men have made of a good Cause only thereby to magnifie and usher in his own new Notion with more pomp p. 247. He there grants that Men generally have some Notion or Idea of God but then Nullus alius modus inveniri potest quo mentes hominum occupavit quà m quòd ab ipso Deo per Revelationem vel Creationem sit insertus If by Creation he means that natural constitution of Soul whereby by the very Laws or Creation natural to such a Being this Notion of God was imprinted on it then his Assertion would be true but then he would herein contradict himself By Creation therefore he must mean only that Tradition of the Being of God derived down to all Mankind from the Creation and then we can easily assign another way how this Idea might possess the Minds of Men viz. that before mention'd natural Inscription In Chap. 9. Lib. 2. there his chief design is to prove that the Being of God is not knowable by the Light of Nature Now I humbly conceive that in that Dialogue which he fram'd betwixt Philalethes and Misalethes he did not equal justice to Truth in stating the Question so as to make Philalethes whose Province it ought to have been rather to defend than prove the Being of God the Opponent whereas he should in strictness rather have been Respondent for this advantage accrued to Misalethes by being on the Defensive part that meer Evasions might serve instead of solid Answers For it seems a more easie thing to defend an Errour than to oppose a Truth Though I speak not this as if Truth was not able not only to defend it self but to convince its Adversaries provided that reason would do it But I do not see why we should give that advantage to the Atheists as to give 'em leave to suppose us at once both out of our Reason and Religion too p. 264. Cùm verò omnes ex natur â petitas rationes quae pro utraque sententiâ proferri possunt invalidas esse c. Seeing he says he has proved all the natural Reasons brought either for or against the Being of God to be invalid and the Atheist he says has nothing else to relie on then the most natural consequence hereof will be That the Atheists must now hang in aequilibrio and profess themselves Scepticks and this is the utmost that he can pretend to have effected upon 'em p. 265. He tells us That that Notion of a God which so generally prevails in the World must be derived from God himself for si conficta esset c. if it were feigned then it would be necessary that in every Nation there should be some who first invented it and perswaded it upon others Quod p. 266. sanè impossibile est nisi homines qui de Deo nihil unquam audiverunt naturali dispositione ad illam opinionem maximè essent proclives where he grants That if there be such a natural Proclivity in the Minds of Men to believe a God then his Argument fails he therefore should have bent his utmost force to disprove this Natural Disposition or Proclivity to believe a God but the Argument he there brings will not do it 'T is only this that Rochfortius and some others relate That there are some Nations in America who cannot be perswaded that there is a God To this I Answer First That it will proportionably prove against himself and destroy the Universality of his own Tradition for it will follow hence either that God had not taken care to make known this Original Tradition to all Nations or that they which were the first Founders of these Nations had neglected to teach it to their Posterity or that in process of time both Parents and Children were grown so rude and barbarous as to forget it and indeed according to this Hypothesis it is a wonder that half of the Gentile World long e're this is not become mere Soldanians without any knowledge of God or any Principles of Morality nor can there be any good account given of those Moral Principles of Honesty according to this Traditionary way which were as generally believed among the Gentiles as the Being of a God and perhaps with a greater Unisormity Secondly We do not say that this Notion of God is so implanted in the Minds of Men or so connatural to our Faculties but that by carelesness and Inadvertency by Vice and Luxury by habitual Wickedness and Debauchery it may be in a great measure obliterated Others tell us That
the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things and from the Nature of Man that is from the consideration of his Soul and Body not supposing or including any such Natural Notices I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World Valeant quantùm valere possunt Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing and absolutely reject all the rest this I think is to give our Adversaries advantage over us Thus that Ingenious Gentleman Mr. Tyrrell in his late Book p. 197. tells us That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly and without difficulty to be read from the great Book of the Creation without any assistance from natural Impressions and he cites Rom. 1. 19 20. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Where he says The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind guided by things without us for the proof of a Deity But it doth not appear from hence that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds as the 20th doth to the outward Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is manifest in them I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes render'd inter but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept why should we look for another For the invisible things of him from the Creation By Creation here is neither meant the things created nor the Act of Creation but only it relates to the time thereof From the Creation that is ever since the Creation by which says Dr. Hammond it appears That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Doings or Actions here of the Works of Creation that is solely but of all things that from time to time to this inclusively have been done in the World by him and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines and Miracles and Actions of Christ the whole business of the Gospel Nay I may add that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mention'd Even his Eternal Power and Godhead 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World The other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature that it is neither a State of Equality nor a State of War I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan concerning Speech and the particular uses of it viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts and the improvement of Knowledge to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our selves and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another but now how can these Uses be applyed to that cross-grain'd state of Nature which he has describ'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence What place is there for Arts and Sciences What room for friendly counsel and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another where what counsel we give to others ought rather in reason to be suspected seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage Why should we desire or hope for the assistance of others seeing there we design nothing but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine Now Speech must be suppos'd in the State of Nature for without it he tells us there could be no entering into Societies no Compacts no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those who aspire to knowledge to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words and framing true Definitions in examining those of former Authors and either to correct 'em when deficient or to make new ones themselves Therefore he says in Geometry which is the most accurate Science Men begin with setling the significations of their words which setling of Significations they call Definitions and place 'em at the beginning of their work Now it had been well if Mr. Hobbs had practis'd his own rule and that in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy that is if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings Nature and had fix'd the Significations of those Expressions Naturally and by Nature Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive and into corrupt and depraved Nature Which he having no where done it has occasion'd a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto which if he had done in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies which were perhaps at first begun and afterwards continued by the want of it 'T is true he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words but yet has been so far from setling and fixing their Significations as he calls it that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty especially in those other places where they are mentioned singly without any intimation at all in what sense they are to be taken In his Preface to his Book de Cive where 't is objected that from his Principles it would follow that Men are wicked by Nature This he says does not follow for though Men by Nature that is from their first Birth as they are meer sensible Creatures c. Here Nature must signifie Man as he comes first into the World with respect meerly to his Animal Qualisications which he has in common with other Creatures In the same Preface forasmuch as God over-rules all Rulers by Nature that is by the dictates of Natural Reason here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher than the lower Faculties of the Soul Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another that is as Man here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent The Law of Nature he thus defines that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members as much as in us lies Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle
with that state of absolute independency before describ'd where every one hath a right to every thing and every Man an Enemy each to other So that this exception of particular Families doth indeed destroy his general Rule but then he interposes these two things 1. That these Families are small 2. Their Concord depends upon natural Lust. But first he grants Lev. Pag. 105. that a great Family if it be not part of a Common-wealth as to rights of Soveraignty is a little Monarchy but he will not grant the same priviledge to a little Family viz. unless it be of that power as not to be subdued without the hazard of War but the rights of governing is that wherein the nature and essence of any Government doth consist and not in strength and greatness now these proportionally are as much in a little Family as in a great one and we may with the same reason say that the Essence of a natural as well as of a Political Body doth consist in such a proportion of strength and greatness below which a Man cannot truly be call'd a Man 2. He says that the Concord of these Families depends upon natural Lust Solâ cupiditatum similitudine Lat. Translation But let the Concord depend upon what it will 't is not material the Government and Constitution of Families is not consistent with such a state of nature as M r Hobbs describes and here he might as well say That Bastards are not Men because they are gotten for the gratification of unlawful Lust for the different grounds or reasons or ends Men may have in making a thing do not alter the nature and essence of it when once made The Question here is not whether the Families be small or great or upon what their Concord doth depend but whether the notion and being of a Family doth not destroy his suppos'd state of Nature But how doth he prove that the Concord of those Families depends only on natural Lust as his English for War seems the more genuine result of Lust than Concord or on similitude of desires as his Latin Translation renders it for this he makes the great Cause of competition and contest when several desire and are not able to enjoy the same thing Thus similitude of desires must be sometimes the cause of War sometimes of Peace thus doth he at once out of the same Mouth blow both hot and cold What the meaning of the Author of the device was when he made two Pitchers floating upon the Waters with this Inscription Si collidimur frangimur I know not but it seems very applicable to Mr. Hobbs his methods of reasoning if they be consider'd singly they may perhaps bear some plausible shew of Argument but if they be compar'd with each other they will often be found as inconsistent with themselves as they are singly inconsistent with the truth But he tells us that in all times Kings and Princes because of their Independency are in continual Iealousies in a State and posture of Gladiators Here 't is observable how cunningly he joins those two words State and Posture seeming thereby to insinuate that Men could not be in a posture of Defence unless they were in a state of War for Kings to put themselves into a condition to repel injuries when violently offer'd is no more than what reason and Prudence dictates but this doth not infer Mr. Hobb's his State of War but rather the contrary when we see some Kingdoms able and yet not willing to oppress their Neighbours That Men may awfully do something in the time of War which is not lawful to do in the time of Peace is certainly true but then we mast not think that the same blast of the Trumpet that Proclaim'd the War did at the same time blow away all those airy Notions of just and unjust which according to him have no other being in Nature but what they receiv'd from humane Compacts Iustice and Injustice are none of the faculties either of the Body or Soul they are qualities that relate to Man in Society not in Solitude Further in this slate of Nature nothing can be unjust here Force and Fraud are two Cardinal Pertues that the practice and external exercise of Iustice and many other moral Duties doth suppose a Society or at least a state of Friendship that so Men may have proper objects of those respective Vertues is certainly true yet the reasons of their obligation are founded in the nature of each single Man and so may belong to a Man in Solitude for the reasons of Iustice and other Moral Vertues are not ultimately to be resolv'd into that natural support and advantage they bring to a Society and Common-wealth and that they cannot without great disadvantage be banished out of it but into that Conformity they bear to the Divine Nature and to the participation thereof in our selves God indeed in the wise and benign disposals of his Providence has twisted our duty and our interest together Goodness and Vertue have a natural tendency to make us as perfectly happy as 't is possible even in our civil and political Capacities but then they are not therefore only Vertues because profitable to the publick but upon some other higher grounds and reasons being Vertues they thus also as parts of Godliness become prositable to all things having the promise of the Life that now is and of that which is to come But why are Iustice and Injustice qualities that relate to Men only in Society and not in Solitude seeing these may as well be in a Man alone in the World as some of his Passions which also necessarily relate to their proper objects Mr. Hobbs some where approves of that definition which the Schools give of Iustice constans perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi so that according to this a Man may be just if he have a real and sincere desire to give every one his own though he have not where withal to do it Thus also why may not a Man be just and charitable though he want fit objects to exercise these Vertues upon for why should the want of the object more destroy the nature of the Vertue than the want of the subject matter or material part as in the former Case of the necessitous just Man There were some fatal Philosophers of old and some such there are still who make good and evil just and unjust mere factitious things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such as depend only upon the free and arbitrary determination of the Divine Will but then to make 'em to depend merely upon the pleasure of the Civil Magistrate this seems to be a peculiar flight proper only to Mr. Hobbs thus to make a God of his Leviathan This Opinion of his doth either suppose no God at all or such an one as doth not much concern himself in the Government of the World but leaves all to his Vicegerent here below obey
of the same Opinion in his Book de jure belli pacis where among his many perplex'd methods of arguing upon this subject yet this he seems positively to assert That civil Power had its Original from the Consent of the People not taking the least notice of any higher principle but yet he directly contradicts himself herein in his Epistle Dedicatory to Lewis the XIIIth King of France whether only in Compliment or no I know not where he tells him Quà m gloriosum hoc c. ut si quando te Deus ad suum Regnum vocaverit audacter possis dicere hunc ego à te gladium pro justitiae tutelâ accepi hunc ego tibi nullius temerè fusi sanguinis reum purum insontémque reddo Here he says that Lewis the XIIIth received the sword of Iustice from God which if he did it was more than ever any other King according to his Principles did before p. 80. de jure belli Notandum est primò homines non Dei praecepto sed sponte adductos experimento infirmitatis familiarum segregum adversus violentiam in societatem civilem coiisse unde ortum habet civilis potest as quam ideo humanam ordinationem Petrus vocat quanquam alibi divina Ordinatio vocatur quia hominum salubre institutum Deus probavit Deus autem humanam legem probans censetur probare at humanam humano more where we see that God was no farther concern'd in the constituting this civil Power but only by way of approbation of what Man had done before But here first he supposes it would be hard for him to prove That Men liv'd at first in separate Families without any common Power over them But 2. suppose they did the sense and experience of the Inconveniences that attended this way of living might be a motive or occasion of Mens looking out for help but I do not see how they are thus any more the radical Cause of Civil Power than the Patient is the Cause of his own Cure or of the Physician 's Skill only because he apply'd himself to him Nor is it here deny'd but that the People may in some cases determine the Person as in Elective Kingdoms And further suppose a mixt company of Men such as are neither Parents of Children nor Masters of Families such as have no relation or dependance upon one another suppose these by chance cast upon an uninhabited Coast they may frame themselves into any particular Form of Government such as they may reasonably believe to be most agreeable to their Circumstances and most subservient to the great Ends of all Government viz. Peace and Piety But yet notwithstanding the Power in this case is not originally from the People but as the Learned and Iudicious Dr. Donne has determined the Case God by a secret Compact made with Mankind in Nature doth infuse the Power as the Soul into the Body Politick as well as Natural thus duly prepar'd and as it were presented to God for that purpose by a prudent and regular Election and Determination they who would see this further explain'd and confirm'd may consult Dr. Donne's Pseudo-Martyrs Cap. 6. That which seems most liable to Exception in this Account is that secret Compact which God is here suppos'd to make with Mankind c. so that Learned Man is pleased to call it but I am not very sollicitous either about the name or the particular way and mode of conveying this Power only to make the thing appear the more reasonable We may consider that it would be very hard if at all possible for those who derive this Power merely from the consent of the People either to secure the Government at present or the Succession afterwards upon these Principles For since according to them Men are by Nature born free and consequently it may be questioned how far the Act of the Father in this case will oblige his Posterity Why may not the Children plead that they have as good right to vote and consent for themselves now as their Fathers had before and this would soon prove the utter Ruine of all Government But now since the Obligation that lies upon us is from an higher Principle this if any thing will keep Men in their due Obedience and this I conceive is very agreeable to the Doctrine laid down in Bishop Overall's Convocation-Book Here 't is further observable That the Patrons of that Opinion which founds Power originally in the People are like those of the Church of Rome in their Disputes about Infallibility Those we have here to deal with are sure that the Original of Power is in the People only they know not where to fix and where to find it whether in the Body of the People collectively taken or only in the Heads and Masters of Families or in the Men only in contradiction to Women and Children or in each particular Man singly as Mr. Hobbs asserts for he doth not suppose that when the People make a Migistrate that they confer any Power upon him which he had not before in his private Capacity only they covenant that they will not use their Power in opposition to his but let him alone to rule without a Rival Now the great incertainty these Men are in both in respect of Infallibility and the first and immediate Subject of this Power is a great presumption at least that there is no such as either in that way and manner wherein they assert them thus I conceive this way of stating the Question gives both to God the King and the People what is of right their due and if the People should challenge more than what is here given them I think it would be to their disadvantage As for those other three Particulars before-mentioned I shall refer the Reader to those respective Authors who treat of ' em But though civil Power be originally from God yet is it not founded in Grace which Opinion as it is now commonly stated is but the novel Invention of some brain-sick People of latter days founded upon the mistaken sence of some Prophecies of the old Testament and upon some forc'd Interpretatious of some Texts of the New and it has been further promoted by the fantastick Pride nnd Folly of those that entertain it first by fansying themselves Saints and then falsly applying all those Honours and Priviledges to themselves which they think are any where applyed to Saints in Scripture 1 Cor. 6. 2. Know ye not that the Saints shall judge the world hence they falsly conclude That those Kings who have not a just right or title to a Crown in Heaven ought to lay no claim to one on Earth and therefore those wicked of the World are to be rooted out only to make room for their Saintships But for the better understanding of that place we must know That Saints in Scripture frequently signifie no more than the called and faithful such as from Iudaism or Heathenism were converted