is impossible that he should have any inclination so pure as to have no mixture of any passion Thus the love of Truth Justice and of God himself is always accompanied with some Traces of the Brain which renders this knowledge more lively but commonly more confused It is true that very often we do not discover that our Imagination is a little employed at the same time we conceive an Abstracted Truth The reason is because these Truths have no Images or Traces instituted by Nature to represent them and all Traces which stir them up have no other relation to them but that of Mans Will or chance which has so placed them For Arithmeticians and even Algebraists who only consider Abstracted Things often make use of their Imaginations to keep their Minds fixt upon these Idea's Cyphers Alphabetical Letters and other Figures which they see or imagine are always joined to these Ideas although the Traces which are formed by these Characters have no relation to them and so can make them neither false nor confused And thus by a regulated use of Figures and Letters they discover the most difficult Truths which otherwise it would be impossible to find out The Idea's of things which can only be perceived by the pure Understanding may then be connected to the Traces of the Brain and the fight of Objects that we love hate and fear by a Natural Inclination may be accompanied with the motion of the Spirits It is plain that the thought of Eternity the fear of Hell the hopes or an Eternal Happiness although they be Objects that strike not the Senses yet may excite violent Passions in us So that we may say we are united after a sensible manner not only to all things that relate to the preservation of Life but also to Spiritual things to which the Mind is immediately united by it self It even happens very often that Faith Charity and Self-love make this union to Spiritual things stronger than that whereby we are joined to all sensible things The Souls of true Martyrs are more united to God than to their Bodies and those who die to maintain the truth of a false Religion sufficiently shew that the fear of Hell has more power over them than the fear of death has There is often so much heat and prejudice on both sides in Religious Wars and in the defence of Superstitions that we cannot doubt but there is some Passions in them and such a one as is stronger and much more constant than any other because it is built upon an appearance of Reason as well in those that are deceived as in others We are then by our Passions united to what ever appears to us to be a good or evil to the Mind as well as to what ever seems to be so to the Body There is nothing which we can discover to have any relation to us which is not capable of affecting us and amongst all the things that we know there is none that has not some relation to us We have always some interest even in the most abstracted Truths when we know them because at least there is that relation of knowledge between them and our Minds They are ours if I may so say by our knowledge We feel that they hurt us when we dispute them and if they hurt us it is certain that they agitate and disquiet us Thus the Passions have so vast a dominion and extension that it is impossible to conceive any thing in respect to them whereof we could be certain although all Men were exempt from their empire But let us now see what their Nature is and endeavour to discover all things they comprehend CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the changes that happen to the Body and Soul by means of the Passions WE may distinguish seven things in each of our Passions except in Admiration which also is but an imperfect Passion The first is the Judgment the Mind makes of an Object or rather the confused and distinct view of the relation this Object has to us The second is a new determination of the motion of the Will towards this Object supposing it be or appears to be a good Before this view the Natural Motion of the Soul either was intermixed viz. carried towards good in general or it was otherwise determined by the knowledge of some other particular Object But in that moment the Mind perceived the relation this new Object had to it this general Motion of the Will is forthwith determined conformably to what the Mind perceives The Soul draws near to this Object by its love that it may taste it and discover its good by the sensation of sweetness which the Author of Nature gives it as a Natural Recompence for its inclining to good It judged that this Object was a good by an abstracted Reason which affected it not but it remains convinced by the efficacy of Sensation and the more lively this Sensation is the stronger it unites to the good it seems to produce But if this particular Object be considered as evil or as capable of depriving us of any good no new determination happens to the Motion of our Will but only an augmentation of Motion towards the good opposite to this Object which appears an evil which augmentation is so much the greater as the appearing Evil is more to be feared For indeed we hate only because we love and an External Evil is judged as such only because it deprives us of some good Thus Evil being considered as the privation of Good to fly Evil is but to fly the privation of Good which is the same thing as to incline towards good There happens no new determination then in the natural motion of the Will at the meeting with an Object which displeases us but only a sensation of pain disgust or bitterness that the Author of Nature has imprinted in the Soul as a natural pain because it is deprived of good Reason alone would not be sufficient to carry us to it there must also be stir it up Before Sin sensation was no pain but only a warning because as I have already said Adam might when he would stop the motion of the Animal Spirits which would cause pain so that if he felt pain 't was because he willed it as a good or rather he felt it not because he would not feel it So that in all the Passions all the motions of the Soul towards good are only motions of love But because we are touched by divers Sensations according to the different circumstances which accompany the prospect of the good and motion of the Soul towards it we confound the Sensations with the emotions of the Soul and we imagine as many different motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations Now we must here observe that Pain is a real and true Evil and that it is no more the privation of Pleasure than Pleasure is the privation of Pain for there is a
of producing certain Motions and that that Power for instance they have to move their Tongue several ways occasions an infinite number of Evils But then it is evident that this Power is absolutely necessary to maintain Society to ease one another in the wants of this present Life and to be Instructed in that Religion which gives the hopes of that Redeemer for whose sake the World subsists If we carefully examine those Motions which we produce in our selves and in what part of our Body we can produce them we shall find clearly that God has left us no more Power over our Body than what is necessary to preserve our Life and maintain Civil Society For instance the Beating of the Heart the Dilatation of the Diaphragme the Peristaltick Motion of the Bowels the Circulation of the Spirits and Blood and divers Motions of the Nerves in our Passions are produced in us without staying for Orders from the Soul As they must needs be partly the same on the same Occasions nothing obliges God to submit them now to the Will of Men But whereas the Motions of the Muscles which serve to stir the Tongue the Arms and Legs must change every moment according to the almost infinite diversity of the Good or Ill Objects which surround us it was necessary those Motions should depend on the Will of Men. We must observe that God always Acts by the most simple Means and that the Laws of Nature must be general and therefore having given us the Power to move our Arm and Tongue he must not take away that Power from us to strike a Man unjustly or to Calumniate him For if our Natural Faculties did depend on our Designs there would be no Uniformity nor certain Rule in the Laws of Nature which nevertheless must be very plain and general to be suitable to the Wisdom of God and conformable to Order Insomuch that God in pursuance of his Decrees chooses rather to perform the Materiality of Sin as the Divines say or to serve the Injustice of Men as one of his Prophets says than by changing his Will to put a stop to the disorder of Sinners But he reserves his Vengeance for the unworthy treatment he meets with until he may be allow'd to do it without acting against the Immutability of his Degrees that is when Death having corrupted the Body of the Voluptuous God will lye no longer under the necessity he has impos'd upon himself of giving them Sensations and Thoughts relating thereunto Objection against the Eleventh and Twelfth Articles ORiginal Sin does not only make Man a Slave to his Body and subject to the motions of Concupiscence but likewise fills him with Spiritual Vices The Childs Body is not only corrupted before Baptism but its very Soul and all its Faculties are infected by Sin Though the Rebellion of the Body is the chief cause of some gross Vices as Intemperance and Incontinency yet it does not occasion Vices that are purely Spiritual such as Pride and Envy So that Original Sin is something very different from the Concupiscence wherewith we are Born and is probably the privation of Grace or of Original Justice Answer I own that Children are depriv'd of Original Righteousness and I prove it when I show they are not born Just and that God hates them For in my Opinion it is impossible to give a clearer Idea of Justicâ— and of Righteousness than in saying that the Will is upright when it loves God and that it is irregular when it is turn'd towards the Body But if by Original Justice or Grace you mean certain or unknown Qualifications like unto those which 'tis said God had infus'd into the Soul of the first Man to adorn it and to render it agreeable in his sight it is also evident that the privation of this Justice is not Original Sin for properly speaking that Privation cannot be transmitted If Children have nor those Qualifications it is because God does not give 'em to them And if God does not give 'em it is because they are unworthy of it 'T is then that unworthiness which is transmitted and which is the cause of the privation of Original Justice Therefore 't is that unworthiness which properly speaking is Original Sin Now this unworthiness which consists as I have shown in this that the Inclinations of Children are actually corrupted that their Heart is turn'd towards Bodies and Loves them this I say is really in them It is not the Imputation of their Fathers Sin they are actually in disorder So those that are justify'd by Jesus Christ of which Adam was the Figure are not justify'd by Imputation They are actually restor'd into Order by an inward Justice different from that of Jesus Christ tho' it is only he that has merited it for them The Soul has but two Natural or Essential Relations the one to God the other to its Body Now it is evident that the Relation or Union it has with God can neither corrupt it or make it vicious Therefore it is only so in the moment of its Creation by the Relation it has to its Body So that it is necessary to say either that Pride and the other Vices which are call'd Spiritual may be Communicated by the Body or that Children are not liable to them at the moment of their Birth I say at the moment of their Birth for I do not deny but those ill habits are easily acquir'd Yet pure Intelligences have no other relation then to God and that in the moment of their Creation they were subject to no Vice yet they are fallen into Disorder but 't is only by their having made an ill use of their Liberty and Children have made no use of it for Original Sin is not free But I am of Opinion that those are mistaken who fancy the Rebellion of the Body only occasions gross Vices as Intemperance and Incontinency and not those which are call'd Spiritual as Pride and Envy And I am perswaded that there is such a Correspondence between the dispositions of our Brain and those of our Soul that perhaps the Soul has no ill habit but what derives its Principle from the Body Saint Paul in divers places calls Law Wisdom Desires and the Works of the Flesh whatever is contrary to the Law of the Spirit he does not mention Spiritual Vices He places among the Works of the Flesh Idolatry Heresies Dissentions and many other Vices which are call'd Spiritual According to his Doctrine we follow the motions of the Flesh in being guilty of Vain-glory Gal. c. 5. Passion and Envy Finally it appears by the Expressions of that Apostle that all Sins proceed from the Flesh not that the Flesh commits them or that the Spirit of Man without Grace or the Spirit of Jesus Christ does that which is good but because the Flesh acts upon the Mind of Man in such a manner that it does no Evil which the Flesh does not sollicit Rom. c. 7. St. Paul
that are but a little enlightened may sometimes destroy our Soul as unexpert Physicians may our Body As I don 't throughly explain the Rules which might be given in respect of the choice and use that should be made of Guides and Physicians I desire my Sentiments may be equitably interpreted and that it may not be imagined that I would hinder any from seeking necessary assistance from others I know that a particular Blessing attends our submission to the Opinions of the Wise and Understanding and I am willing to believe this General Rule Let us dye according to the received Laws of Phisics to the generality of Men they are safer than any other that I could establish for the Preservation of Life But because it is alwayes profitable to examine our selves and consult the Gospel to hearken to Jesus Christ whether he speaks immediately to our Mind and Heart or by Faith declares himself to our Ears or Eyes I believe I might say what I have said for our Guides themselves deceive us when they speak contrary to what Faith and Reason teach us And as it is to give Honour to God by believing his Works to have that which is necessary for their preservation I thought I should make Men sensible that the Machine of their Body is contrived after so admirable a manner that of it self it discovers more easily what is necessary for its Preservation than by Science or even the Experience of the most able Physicians AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Fifth Book That Love is different from Peasure and Joy THE Mind commonly confounds things which are very different when they happen at the same time and are not contrary to one another Of which I have given many Instances in this Work because 't is therein that our Errors chiefly consist in respect to what passes in our selves As we have no clear Idea of what constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind nor of the Modifications it is capable of it often happens that we confound things absolutely different if they happen within us but at the same time since we easily confound what we do not know by a clear and distinct Idea It is not only impossible clearly to discover wherein the difference of such things consists as pass within us but it is also difficult to discern whether there is any difference between them For to effect this we must look into our selves not to consider what is voluntarily done in reference to Good and Evil but to make an abstracted Reflection upon our selves which cannot be performed without much Distraction and Pains We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body is different from its Motion And although we know by Experience that a Bowl upon a Plane cannot be pushed without being moved and then Roundness and Motion are found together however we don't confound them one with the other because we know both Motion and Figure by very distinct and clear Ideas But 't is not so with Pleasure and Love for we commonly confound them Our Mind if we may so say becomes movable by Pleasure as a Ball does by its Roundness and because it is never without an impression towards good it is immediately put in motion towards the Object which causes or seems to cause this Pleasure So that this motion of Love happening to the Soul at the same time it feels this Pleasure it is enough to make it confound its Pleasure with its Love because it has not so clear an Idea either of its Pleasure or its Love as it has of Figure and Motion Wherefore some Persons will believe that Pleasure and Love are not different and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions But to make it plainly appear that Pleasure and Love are very different I shall distinguish two sorts of Pleasures one of which precedes Reason as agreeable Sensations which we commonly call Pleasures of the Body and the other sort neither precede Reason nor the Senses and are generally called the Pleasures of the Soul Such as Joy which is excited in us in consequence of a clear Knowledge or a confused Sensation which we have that some good is or will happen to us For instance A Man tasting of a Fruit which he knows not finds some Pleasure in eating it if this Fruit be good for his Nourishment This is a preventing Pleasure for since he feels it before he knows whether this Fruit is good or nor it is evident that this Pleasure prevents his Reason An Huntsman when hungry expecting or actually finding something to eat actually feels Joy Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge he has of his present or future good It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and precedes Reason that there is neither of them but differs from Love For that Pleasure which precedes Reason certainly precedes Love since it precedes all knowledge which in some degree or other is always supposed by Love And on the contrary Joy or Pleasure which supposes Knowledge also supposes Love since Joy supposes the confused Sensation or clear Knowledge that we do or shall possess what we love and if we possessed a thing we had no love for we should receive no Joy by it Thus Pleasure is very different from Love since the Pleasure which precedes Reason precedes and causes Love and the Pleasure which follows Reason necessarily supposes Love as an Effect supposes the Cause Otherwise if Pleasure and Love were the same thing there would never be Pleasure without Love nor Love without Pleasure for a thing cannot be without it self Yet a Christian loves his Enemy and a Child well educated loves his Father how unreasonable and unkind soever he may be The sight of their Duty the fear of God and love of Order and Justice makes them love not only without Pleasure but even with a kind of Horrour such Persons as are not agreeable to them I confess they sometimes feel Pleasure or Joy when they think they do their Duty or when they hope to be recompensed according to their Merit But besides that this Pleasure visibly differs very much from the Love they have to their Father or Enemy although it be perhaps the Motive of it it often happens that 't is not even this Motive which makes them act it is sometimes only an abstracted view of Order or notion of Fear which preserves their Love We may even in one sense say they have a Love for these Persons at the time they think not of them For Love remains in us during the diversions of our thoughts and whilst we sleep but Pleasure seems to me to subsist no longer in the Soul than whilst it is sensible of it Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delight it cannot be maintained that Pleasure and Love is the same thing As Pleasure and Pain are two direct contraries If Pleasure were the same thing with Love
designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are
the Resolution I have made and which I have declared at the End of the Preface of the Second Volume of the Search after Truth viz. That I would not Answer all those who should Attacque me without understanding me or whose Discourse gave me any reason to believe that something else besides the Love of Truth was the Motive of their Writing as for others I shall endeavour to satisfie them I am unwilling to disturb others or break my own Repose by contentious Books and Treatises that are wholly useless to a Search after Truth and which serve only to violate Charity and scandalize ones Neighbour and if I now write it is because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be made suspected and because I would be clearly understood that no one ought to treat me as an Heretic upon Consequences which he can draw from the Principles I have Established It is not that I think any Heresie nor even any Error may be drawn from the Book of a Search after Truth I am ready to Answer with Charity and respect all those who shall do me the Honour to Criticise upon me without passion and I shall be always ready to follow Truth as soon as it shall be discovered to me I disavow all Principles which may conclude any Error but I pretend that those persons cannot be justly treated as Heretics who even opinionatively maintain such Principles from which Divines may draw impious Consequences provided the Defenders of these Principles disavow these Consequences for if this were true every one might be treated as an Heretic These are my following Proofs which are drawn even from what passes for Reasonable in the Common Opinions of Philosophers and this not to render them odious Or ridiculous but that I may prove what I design from Universally-received Opinions which Peripatetics insist so much upon that they continually insult over their Adversaries The First Proof Peripatetics and almost all Men believe That Beasts have Souls and these Souls are more Noble than the Bodies they Animate 'T is an Opinion Received at all Times and in all Nations That a Dog suffers pain when he is beaten that he is capable of the Motions of the Passions Fear Desire Envy Hatred Joy Sorrow and that he knows and loves his Master yet from this Opinion may be drawn such Consequences as are directly repugnant to what Faith teaches us The First Consequence contrary to Faith That God is unjust Beasts suffer pain and some are more unhappy than others Now they have never made an ill use of their Liberty for they never had any Then God is unjust who punishes them who makes them unhappy and unequally unhappy although they are equally innocent Then is this Principle false That under a Just God nothing can he miserable without having deserved it A Principle which nevertheless St. Augustine makes use of against the Pelagians to prove Original Sin Moreover there is this difference betwixt Men and Beasts That Men after Death may be happy which recompences the pains they endure in this Life But Beasts lose all at Death they have been unhappy and innocent and no Recompense attends them Thus an innocent Man may suffer in order to Merit and yet God be Just But if a Beast suffers God is unjust Perhaps it may be said That God may do whatever he pleases with a Beast provided he observes the Rules of Justice in respect of Man but if an Angel thought that God could not punish him without having deserved it and yet might do what he pleased with Man should we approve of this Thought Certainly God is Just to all his Creatures and is the most vile are capable of being miserable they must needs be capable of becoming criminal Second Consequence repugnant to Faith That God Wills Disorder and that Nature is not Corrupted The Soul of a Dog is a Substance more Noble than the Body it Animates for according to St. * De Quantit Animae ch 31 32 c. lib. 4. de Anima ejus Origine ch 13. and elsewhere Augustine it is a Spiritual Substance more Noble than the most Noble Bodies Besides Reason shows us That Bodies can neither Know nor Love that Pleasure Pain Joy Sadness and other Passions cannot be Modifications of Bodies 'T is believed That Dogs know and love their Masters that they are susceptible of the Passions of Fear Desire Joy Sadness and many others The Soul of Dogs is not then a Body but a Substance more Noble than Bodies Now the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body it has no other End or Felicity than the Enjoyment of Bodies Then the Nature of Man is not Corrupted and Concupiscence is no Disorder God might make Man for the Enjoyment of Bodies he might subject him to the Motions of Cupiscence c. Perhaps it may yet be said That the Soul of Beasts is made for Man but this is a weak Subterfuge For it 's indifferent to me whether my Dog or Horse has or has not a Soul 'T is not the Soul of a Horse which carries or draws me 't is his Body 'T is not the Soul of a Chicken which Nourishes me but its Flesh Now God could and consequently ought to create Horses who should do all Things we have need of without a Soul if it be true That he has made them only for our use Moreover the Soul of a Horse is better than the Noblest Bodies therefore God ought not to create it for the Body of Man Lastly God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon Swallows are but of little use to Man they might have fed upon Grain like other Birds Why then must there be an infinite Number of Souls annihilated to preserve the Bodies of these Birds since the Soul of a Fly is worth more than the Body of the most perfect Animals If then we are assured that Beasts have Souls that is Substances that are more Noble than Bodies we take away from God his Wisdom and make him Act irregularly we destroy Original Sin and consequently overthrow Religion by taking away the Necessity of a Mediator The Third Consequence contrary to Faith The Soul of Man is Mortal or at least the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body Now it is Annihilated then Substances may naturally be Annihilated Then although the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed Thus one may demonstrate by Reason That the Soul of Man is Immortal But if we grant as a most Certain Truth That no Substance can be naturally Annihilated the Soul of Beasts will Subsist after Death and since they are made for Bodies the least we can infer is That they pass from one Body into another that they may not be useless in Nature This is a Consequence which appears more Reasonable Now we believe That God
is Just and Wise that He loves not Disorder that Nature is Corrupted that the Soul of Man is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed 't is not a Substance distinct from their Bodies Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may represent him as criminal and all Mankind besides because they believe that Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if from his own way of Arguing we should accuse him of Impiety because he maintains Opinions from whence we deduce That God is not Just Wise Powerful Sentiments which overthrow Religion which oppose Original Sin which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should treat him as unjust and cruel for making innocent Souls suffer and even Annihilating them for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner they are innocent 'T is only to nourish his Body that he kills Bodies and Annihilates their Souls which are of more value than bodies Again If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal this Cruelty however unjust it is might perhaps be pardonable but how many Substances wholly innocent does he Annihilate only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies where the Inhabitants build * Linsch ch 37. Hospitals for Beasts where the Philosophers and many of the best Sort of Men are so charitable even in respect to Flies that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways in which they pass would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body nor distinct from it and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice whereof these People would accuse him if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom This Example might be sufficient to show That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles even when they disavow these Consequences But be it as it will I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn than these of Monsieur de la Ville The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous if they treated Monsieur de la Ville and other persons who are not of their Opinion as Impious and Heretical 'T is only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith and the Church has not obliged us and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles will not oblige us to believe That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies that they know not their Masters that they neither Fear Desire nor suffer any thing Because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths The Second Proof Almost all Men are perswaded that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us That Nourishments act in us and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life and that all Sensible Objects have a Vertue which is proper to them by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power and to fear him only 'T is a Common Notion according to which all Men act That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain to make us Happy or Unhappy This is a supposed Principle we ought therefore to love and fear them This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners It is evident by Reason and the first of Gods Commandments that all the Motions of our Soul whether Love or Fear Desire or Joy should tend towards God and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that would devour us But we ought to love and fear God only All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone We ought to love him with all our Power This is an indispensible Law We can neither love nor fear what is below us without being disordered and corrupted To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to do them honour To love Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the Heat of the Sun as if it were the true Cause thereof nay even to love ones Father Protectour Friend as if they were capable of doing as good this is to give them that honour which is due to God only We must not love any one in this sense 'T is permitted and we ought to love our Neighbour by wishing or procuring for him as a Natural or Occasional Cause whatever may conduce to his Happiness but not otherwise We must love our Brethren not as capable of doing us good but as of enjoying with us the true Good These Truths appear evident to me but Men strangely obscure them when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers pretend that Creatures can do nothing if God did not concur to their Action and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause We ought neither to fear nor love them but God only on whom all things depend This Explication shows Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville that 't is a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining at the expence of Religion Aristotles Opinions and the Prejudices of their Senses if by examining their Heart I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching Mens Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality by the Consequences
necessity of sending Dragoons into the Monasteries and Societies and to an infinite number of honest Men to cause them to abjure the Errours of the Cartesian Philosophy So true is it that Devotees do not always see the fatal Consequences of an Advice which impetuous Zeal dictates to those that are in Authority Monsieur Regis well known by the Philosophy he has Published having undertaken to oppose some Sentiments of F. Malebranch this Father neglected at first to Answer his new Adversary but when Monsieur Regis would have drawn an advantage from the silence of a Man who plainly perceived himself unfairly attack'd Father Malbranche published the last Year a short Answer to Monsieur Regis The name of Monsieur Arnaud was made use of in this Contestation which occasioned him to appear again upon the stage In the Journal des Scavans at Paris he Printed two Letters addrest to F. Malebranch who soon answered him and gave two Letters to the Journalist that were also Printed Monsieur Cousin left off his Correspondence with Monsieur Arnaud and refused to put in his Journal other Letters which M. Arnaud had written a little before his Death we shall doubtless see them in his Posthumous works for it is not probable that they will rob the Publick of the Remains of so great a man We shall be gainers thereby two wayes F. Malbranche will break that silence which he seems to have condemned himself to and we shall have new Explanations upon some important Difficult ties which M. Arnaud may have found in the VVorks of so hard an Adversary I have but one thing more to say of F. Malebranch It is that his Heart agrees perfectly with his Vnderstanding There is as much Vprightness in the one as Justness in the other He is a Christian Philosopher who acts as he thinks Never did any Man more perfectly regulate his Manners and Actions upon the Principles of his Philosophy Being perswaded that God is the only cause which acts truly upon our Body and in our Soul F. Malebranch accustoms himself upon every Sensation upon every Perception to elevate himself always towards the Supreme Being to humble himself in his Presence and to praise him continually VVith what assurance does not he as often as it 's possible approach to the Throne of Grace of the Eternal High Priest who continually intercedes for us VVith what fervour does he not beg to be admitted as a Living Stone in the Structure of the Mysterious Temple which this Divine Architect builds up to the Glory of his Father He is in a continual watchfulness and attention over himself to divert the Impressions which sensible Objects may make upon his Body and to stop whatever is capable of exciting the Passions He is the most sober and temperate Man in the World And if F. Malebranch so exactly observes his Duties towards God and himself he is not less regular in those which respect his Neighbour He is tender and compassionate to the unhappy courteous and affable to all the VVorld preventing and sincere in respect of his Friends good and indulgent to all those who injure him Being perswaded that the Love of his Neighbour ought to have for its principal end that Eternal Society to which we are called by the Gospel He endeavours to inspire all those who come near him with Sentiments of Piety and Religion to procure as much as he can their Eternal Happiness which he earnestly desires day and night In a word F. Malebranch has drawn his own Pourtraiture in his Treatise of Morality To compose the greatest part of which he had no need of long and new Reflexions upon the Duties of Man He hath told us without thinking of it what he exactly practiced after he had applied himself to the regulation of his Manners upon the Truths he had so attentively Meditated and so happily Explained A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK V. of the Passions CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Original of the Passions in general THE Mind of Man has two essential or necessary relations which are very different the one to God and the other to its Body as it is a pure Spirit it is essentially united to the Word of God to the Eternal Wisdom and Truth for 't is only by this Union that it is capable of thinking as has been shewn in the 3d Book as an humane Spirit it has an essential relation to its Body and because of this union it is sensible and imagines as has been explained in the First and Second Books I call that sense or imagination of the Mind when the Body is the natural or occasional cause of its thoughts and that understanding when it acts of it self or rather when God acts in it or when his light enlightens it after many different manners independantly of any thing whatever that passes in its Body 'T is the same in respect of the humane Will as a Will it essentially depends upon the Love which God bears to himself upon the Eternal Law in a word upon the Will of God 'T is only because God loves himself that we love any thing and if God did not love himself or if he did not continually imprint upon the Soul of Man a Love like to his I mean that motion of Love which we receive for good in general we should love nothing we should will nothing and consequently we should be without any will since the will is nothing else but the impression of Nature which carries towards good in general as we have often said before Book I. Ch. I. and elsewhere But the Will as it is an humane Will essentially depends upon the Body for 't is only from the motions of the Blood and Spirits that it perceives it self agitated with all sensible Emotions I therefore give the name of Natural Inclinations to all the motions of the Soul which are common to us with pure Intelligences and some of those in which the Body has a great share but whereof it is only indirectly the Cause and the End as I have explained in the preceding Book and here I design by the word Passions all the Emotions which the Soul naturally feels by means of the extraordinary Motions of the Animal Spirits and Blood These are the sensible Emotions which shall be the Subject of this Book Although the Passions are inseparable from the Inclinations and Men were no farther capable of sensible love or hatred than as they are capable of the mental yet I thought it would not be amiss to treat distinctly of 'em to avoid confusion Those that consider the Passions are much more strong and lively than the Natural Inclinations for other Objects and which are always produced from other Causes will acknowledge that 't is not without reason that I have separated things that are inseparable in their nature Men are only capable of Sensations and Imaginations as they are capable of pure Intellections the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind however
no one has opposed a distinct Treatise of these two Faculties of the Soul although they are naturally inseparable In fine the Senses and Imagination don't differ any more from the pure Understanding than the Passions do from the Inclinations so that we must distinguish these two last Faculties as it has been usual to do with the three first that we may be better able to discern what the Soul receives from its Author by means of the Body from that which it has from him independant of the Body The only inconvenience that will naturally result from the distinction of these two things thus naturally united will be as it happens upon like occasions a necessity of repeating some things which have been already said Man is one although composed of many parts and the union of these parts is so strict that it can't be touch'd in one place without affecting the whole all his Faculties have such a mutual dependance upon one another and are so subordinate that 't is impossible to explain any one of 'em without speaking something of the other Thus by endeavouring to avoid confusion I am obliged 10 repetition but 't is better to repeat than confound because my business is to write as clear as I can and in this necessity of repetition I can only endeavour so to repeat as not to be troublesom to my Reader The Passions of the Soul are Impressions of the Author of Nature which incline us to love out Body and whatever may be useful to its preservation as the Natural Inclinations are the Impressions of the same Author which chiefly incline us to love him as the Soverain Good The natural or occasional Cause of these Impressions is the motion of the Animal Spirits to beget and cherish an agreeable disposition to the Object which is perceived so that the Mind and Body are mutually assistant on this occasion For 't is the Order of God that the Motions of our Body which are proper to execute the Order of our Will should follow it and that the Motions of our Body which are mechanically excited in us at the sight of any Object should be accompanied with a passion of our Soul which inclines us to will that which appears useful to the Body 't is this continual impression of the Will of God upon us which so strictly unites us to a portion of Matter and if this impression of his Will should but cease for one moment we should from that moment be freed from the dependance we have upon all the changes which happen to our Body I can't comprehend how some persons imagine that there is an absolutely necessary connection between the Motions of the Spirit and Blood and the Emotions of the Soul some little particles of Choler are violently mov'd in the Brain therefore the Soul must necessarily be agitated with some Passion and this Passion must rather be Anger than Love What relation can be conceived betwixt the Idea of an Enemies Imperfection a Passion of Contempt or Hatred and betwixt the Corporeal Motion of some Particles of Blood which beat against some parts of the Brain How can a Man perswade himself of such a dependance and that the Union or Alliance of two things so different and incompatible as Mind and Matter can be caused and preserved after any other manner than by the continual and Almighty and Omnipotent Will of the Author of Nature Those who think that Bodies do necessarily and of themselves communicate Motion in the moment of their Concourse think something like truth for indeed this prejudice has some foundation Bodies seem to have an essential relation to Bodies but the Mind and Body are two kinds of Beings so opposite that those who think the Emotions of the Soul do necessarily follow the Motions of the Spirits and Blood think something that has not the least appearance of truth certainly 't is only our own Consciousness of the Union of those two Beings and our Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures which makes us imagine another Cause of the Union of our Soul and Body besides the Will of God It is difficult to determine whether this relation or connexion of the thoughts of Mans Mind with the Motion of his Body is the Punishment of Sin or the Gift of Nature and some Persons believe it would be rashness to decide either way 't is well known that Man before Sin was no Slave but absolate Master of his Passions and by his Will did easily stay the agitation of the Blood which caused them But I should be hardly perswaded that the Body did not sollicite the Soul of the first Man to an enquiry after things which were proper for the preservation of his Life or that Adam before his Fall was insensible that Fruits were agreeable to his sight and pleasant to his taste especially if I may believe the Scripture and that this so just so marvellous an Oeconomy of his Senses and Passions for the preservation of his Body was a Corruption of Nature rather than the first Institution Doubtless Nature is now corrupted the Body acts with too much power upon the Mind instead of submissively representing to it its necessities it tyrannizes over it and ravishes it from God to whom it ought to be inseparably united and continually prompts it to a pursuit of such sensible things as may be proper for its conservation the Mind is become as it were immaterial and earthy by Sin that relation and Essential Union which it has with God is lost I mean God has withdrawn himself from it as much as possible without destroying or annihilating it Innumerable disorders have followed the absence or estrangement of him who kept it in order and without making a longer enumeration of our Miseries Man is by the fall throughly corrupted in all his parts But this fall has not destroyed the Work of God that which God gave to the first Man is always sound in him the immutable Will of God which constitutes the Nature of every thing was not changed by the levity and inconstancy of Adam s Will every thing that God did Will he yet Wills and because his Will is efficacious he effects whatever he Wills Mans Sin was indeed the occasion that the Divine Will did not constitute the Order of Grace but Grace is not contrary to Nature the one destroys not the other Because God fights not against himself he never repents and his Wisdom having no limits his Works will have no end The Will of God which constitutes the Order of Grace is joined to that Will which effects the Order of Nature not to change it but to repair it There are only two General Wills in God and whatever is well regulated in the World depends upon one of these The Passions are very well ordered if they are only considered in order to the Bodies preservation although they sometimes deceive us in few and particular Cases which the Universal Cause has not
air of my Face and firm posture of all the rest of my Body that my Philosophy makes me invulnerable Their Pride maintains their Courage but it does not hinder them from effectively suffering Pain with some inquietude nor prevent them from being Miserable Thus the union they have with their Body is not destroyed nor their pain dissipated but the union they have with other Men fortified by the desire of their esteem in some measure resists this other union they have with their own Bodies The sensible sight of those who look upon them and to whom they are united stays the course of the spirits which accompany pain and effaces the air that would be imprinted on their Countenance for if no body looked upon them this air of Constancy and freedom of Mind would immediately vanish Thus the Stoics only in some measure resist the union that they have with their Bodies by becoming greater Slaves to other Men to whom they are united by the passion of glory 'T is then a certain truth that all Men are united to all sensible things both by Nature and Concupiscence we sufficiently discover it by Experience although Reason seems to oppose it and almost all the actions of Men are sensible and demonstrative proofs of it Though this union is common to all Men yet it is not of an equal extension and power in all for it follows the knowledge of the Mind we may say we are not actually united to unknown Objects a Countryman in his Cottage does not interest himself in the glory of his Prince or Country but only in that of his own or Neighbouring Villages because his knowledge extends no farther The union we have to such sensible Objects as we have seen is stronger than that we have to those we have imagined and which we have only heard of 'T is by Sensation that we unite our selves more strictly to sensible things for Sensation produces much greater Traces in the Brain and excites a much more violent motion in the Spirits than the Imagination only This union is not so strong in those who continually oppose it that they may adhere to the goods of the Mind as in others who follow the motions of their Passions and permit themselves to be subjected to them for desire augments and fortifies this union In fine different Employs different Conditions as well as different Dispositions of Mind make a considerable difference in the sensible Union that Men have with Earthly Goods The great are united to many more things than others their slavery is farther extended A General of an Army is united to all his Soldiers because they all reverence him This slavery often creates valour and the desire of being esteemed of all those who look upon him often obliges him to sacrifice other more sensible and more reasonable desires to it It is the same with those that are in power or that are popular 'T is vanity often which animates their vertue because the love of glory is commonly stronger than the love of truth I speak here of the love of glory not as a simple inclination but as a passion because indeed this love may be sensible and it is often accompanied with very lively and violent emotions of the spirits Different Ages and Sexes are also the chief causes of the Passions of Men. Children do not love the same things as the adult and aged do or at least not with so much force and constancy Women are united only to their Family and Neighbourhood but Men to their whole Country 'T is their part to defend it they choose great Places Honours and Commands There is so great a variety in the Employments and Affairs of Men that it is impossible to express it The disposition of the Mind of a Married Man is not the same with one that is a Batchelor the care of his Family does often wholly take up his thoughts Monks have neither a Mind nor a Heart inclined like other Men nor even like other Ecclesiasticks they are united to fewer things but they are more strongly united to them We may thus speak in general of the different Conditions of Men but we cannot explain the little sensible engagements which are almost all of them different in each particular Person for it often enough happens that Men have particular engagements entirely opposite to those they ought to have in reference to their Condition But although we may in general terms express the different Characters of the Mind the different Inclinations of Men and Women old and young rich and poor learned and ignorant and in short of the different Sexes Ages and Employment Yet these things are too well known to those who live in the World and who reflect upon what they see to swell this Volume with them We need but open our Eyes to be agreeably and solidly instructed in these things For those who choose rather to read them in Greek than to learn them by any reflexion upon what passes before their Eyes I refer them to the Second Book of Aristotles Rhetorick which I believe is the best Piece of that Philosopher's because few things are there said that can deceive us thô he seldom proves what he advances It is then evident that this sensible Union of the Mind of Men with whatever has any relation to the preservation of their lives or the Society whereof they consider themselves as Members is different in different Persons since it is most extensive in those that have most knowledge are most noble have the highest Employments and greatest Imaginations and and that it is more strict and stronger in those who are most Sensible have the most lively Imagination and who most blindly follow the motions of their Passions It is very useful often to reflect upon the almost infinite Manners whereby Men are tied to sensible Objects and one of the best ways to become very knowing in these things is to study and observe our selves 'T is by the experience of what we feel in our selves that we are instructed in the knowledge of all the inclinations of other Men and of the Passions they are subject to But if to these Experiments we add the knowledge of their particular Engagements and that of the Judgments proper to each of the Passions of which we shall afterwards speak it may be we shall not have so much difficulty to guess at the greatest part of their Actions as Astronomers have to predict Eclipses For although Men are free it is very rare that they make a good use of their liberty against their natural inclinations and violent passions Before we end this Chapter we must farther remark that it is one of the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body that all the Inclinations of the Soul even of those it has for the goods that have no relation to the Body are accompanied with the emotions of the Animal Spirits which make these Inclinations sensible because Man not being a pure Spirit it
difference between not feeling Pleasure or being deprived of the sensation of it and actually suffering Pain so that all Evil is not such precisely because it deprives us of good but only as I have shewn the Evil which is External and which is not a manner of being that is in us Nevertheless as by Goods and Evils we generally mean things Good and Evil and not the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain which are rather Natural Marks whereby the Soul distinguishes Good from Evil it seems that we may say without equivocation that Evil is only a privation of Good and that the Natural motion of the Soul which drives us from Evil is the same with that which inclines us to Good For all Natural Motion being an impression of the Author of Nature who acts only for himself and can only incline us towards himself The true Motion of the Soul is always an essential love of good and but an accidenttal aversion to evil It is true that Pain may be considered as an Evil and in this sense the Motions of the Passions that it excites is not real for we do not will Pain and if we will positively that Pain should not be it is because we would positively preserve or perfect our Being The third thing that we may observe in every Passion is the Sensation which accompanies them for the Sensation of Love Aversion Desire Joy Sorrow are always different in different Passions The fourth is a new determination of the course of the Spirits and Blood towards the External parts of the Body and towards the Internal ones before the sight of the Object that moves the Passion the Animal Spirits were dispersed through all the Body to preserve all the parts of it in general but at the presence of this new Object the whole Oeconomy is troubled the greatest past of the Spirits are pushed into the Muscles of the Arms Legs Face and all the External parts of the Body to put them in a proper disposition for the Passion that Rules and to give it the necessary posture and motion for the acquisition of good or to fly the evil that presents it self but if its own Forces are not sufficient to answer its occasions these same Spirits are so distributed that they Mechanically make it utter certain words and cries which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body such an Air as is capable of agitating others with the same Passion it self is moved with For as Men and Animals are united together by the Eyes and Ears when any one of them is agitated he necessarily moves all those that look upon him and hear him and naturally makes an impression upon their imagination which interests them in his preservation As for the rest of the Animal Spirits they violently descend into the Lungs Liver Spleen and the rest of the Bowels to demand Contributions from all those parts and hasten them in a little time to furnish necessary Spirits to preserve the Body in the extraordinary action it must be in The fifth is the sensible emotion of the Soul which feels it self agitated by the unexpected overflowing of the Spirits This always accompanies the motion of the Spirits so that it interests it self in whatever affects the Body even as the motion of the Spirits are excited in the Body as soon as the Soul is carried toward any Object the Soul and Body being mutually united their motions are reciprocal The sixth are the different Sensations of Love Aversion Joy Sorrow Desire caused not by the intellectual fight of good or evil as those we have already spoke of but by the different shakings that the Animal Spirits cause in the Brain The seventh is a certain Sensation of Joy or rather of inward Complacency which stops the Soul in its passion and assures it that 't is in the condition that is proper for it in relation to the Object it considers This internal Complacency generally accompanies all the Passions those which proceed from the prospect of an Evil as well as those that proceed from the prospect of a Good Sorrow as well as Joy 'T is this Complacency that renders all our Passions agreeable and which inclines us to consent and abandon our selves to them In short 't is this Complacency that must be overcome by the delight of Grace the joy of Faith and Reason For as the joy of the Mind always results from the certain or evident knowledge that we are in the best estate we can be in relation to the things we perceive so the Complacency of the Passions is a Natural Consequence of the confused Sensations we have that we are in the best condition we can be in relation to the things we feel Now by the joy of the Mind and delights of Grace we must conquer the false Complacency of our Passions which makes us slaves to sensible goods All these things we have spoke of occur in every Passion when they are excited by confused Sensations and that the Mind perceives neither the good nor evil which can cause them for then 't is plain the three first things are not concerned in them We likewise see that all those things are not free that they are in us without our consent and even against it since the Fall and that there is only the consent of our Will which truly depends upon us But it seems necessary to explain all these things more at large and to render them more sensible by some Examples Let us suppose then that a Man has actually received some affront or that being naturally of a very lively and quick imagination he has been agitated by some accident as a disease a melancholy retirement or the like and imagines to himself in his Closet that such a Person who does not so much as think upon him is willing and prepared to hurt him The sensible prospect or imagination of the relation which is betwixt the actions of his Enemy and his own Designs will be the first cause of his Passion It is not even absolutely necessary that this Man should receive or imagine he received some affront for the motion of his Will to receive some new determination It is enough that he think it in his Mind only without the Body's having any part in it But as this new determination wou'd not be a determination of Passion but a pure inclination very weak and languishing we shou'd suppose that this Man actually suffers some great opposition in his designs or that he strongly imagines that he shall do so rather than make another supposition wherein the Senses and Imagination have little or no share The second thing we may consider in the Passion of this Man is an increase of the motion of his Will towards the good the possession whereof his real or imaginary Enemy would hinder him and the increase is so much the greater as the opposition that would be made appears stronger to him He first hates his Enemy only because he loves
this good and his hatred is so much the greater as his love is stronger because the motion of his Will in his hatred is here in effect only a motion of love the motion of the Soul towards good not differing from that whereby we fly the privation of it as has been already said The third thing is the Sensation proper to the Passion and in this it is a Sensation of Hatred The motion of Hatred is the same as that of Love but the Sensation of Hatred is quite different from that of Love which every one may know by his own experience Motions are actions of the Will but Sensations are modifications of the Mind The Motions of the Will are the Natural Causes of the Sensations of the Mind and these Sensations of the Mind in their turn maintain the Motions of the Will in their determination The Sensation of Hatred is in this Man a Natural Consequence of the Motions of his Will which is excited at the sight of Evil and this Motion is afterwards maintained by the Sensation it causes What we have said of this Man might even happen although he should have no Body But because he is composed of two parts naturally united the Motions of his Mind communicate themselves to his Body and those of his Body to his Mind Thus the new determination or the increase of the Motions of his Will naturally produces a new determination in the Motion of the Animal Spirits which always differs in all the Passions although the Motion of the Soul be generally the same The Spirits then are forcibly pushed into the Arms Legs and Face to give the Body a disposition necessary for the Passion and to disperse over the Face the Air a Man ought to have when we offend him in relation to all the circumstances of the Injury he receives and the quality or power of him that does and of him that suffers the Affront And this diffusion of the Spirits is so much the stronger more abundant and quicker as the good is greater the opposition stronger and the Brain more sensibly affected If then the Person of whom we speak should only receive some injury in his imagination or if he receives a real one but flight and such as can make no considerable shaking in the Brain the diffusion of the Animal Spirits will be weak and languishing and perhaps insufficient to change the common and natural disposition of the Body But if the injury be great and his imagination be heated it will cause a great shaking in his Brain and the Spirits would he diffused with so much force that in a moment they would create in his Body the air and gesture of the ruling Passion If it is strong enough to overcome his air would be threatning and fierce If it is weak and cannot resist the evil that oppresses him his air would be humble and submissive His Complaints and Tears would naturally excite in the Standers-by and even in his Enemy motions of Pity and from thence they would draw the relief that could be hoped for from his own power It is true that the Spectators and Enemy of this Miserable Person have the Spirits and Fibres of their Brain already agitated I with a violent motion contrary to that which produces Compassion in the Soul the Complaints of this Man would but exasperate their Rage and so his Misfortune would be inevitable should he always continue in the same air and gesture But Nature has well provided in this case for at the sight of the near loss of a great good it naturally forms upon the Face such lively and surprizing Characters of Rage and Despair as to disarm the most Barbarous Enemies and make them become like Statues The terrible and unexpected fight of the Lineaments of Death drawn by the Hand of Nature upon the Face of a Miserable Wretch stops in the Enemy who is affected with it the Motion of the Spirits and Blood which carried him to Revenge and in that moment of favour and attention Nature draws a-new a humble and submissive air upon the Face of this unfortunate Man who begins to hope because of the change of his Enemy's Countenance whose Animal Spirits receive a new determination they were not capable of a moment before so that he Mechanically enters into the motions of Compassion which naturally incline his Soul to Charity and Mercy A Passionate Man cannot without a great abundance of Spirits either produce or preserve in his Brain an Image of his misfortune lively enough or a commotion strong enough to give the Body a forced and extraordinary gesture the Nerves which answer to the inward part of his Body receive at the sight of any evil the necessary shocks and agitations that cause the humours that are fit to produce the Spirits which the passion requires to run into all the Vessels that have communication with the heart For the Animal Spirits being dispersed through the Nerves which go to the Liver Spleen Pancreas and generally to all the Bowels they agitate and shake them and by their agitation press forth the humors that these parts preserve for the Exigencies of the Machine But if these humors always flowed after the same manner into the heart if they there received at divers times a like fermentation and if the Spirits which are formed therein equally ascended into the Brain we shou'd not see such hasty changes in the motions of the Passions The sight of a Magistrate for instance wou'd not in a moment stop the transports of of a furious Man who is persuing his revenge and his face heated with Blood and Spirits wou'd not all of a sudden become pale and languid through the apprehension of some punishment Thus to hinder these humors that are mixt with the Blood from entring after the same manner into the Heart there are Nerves which environ them at their passage which by being contracted or dilated by the impression that the sight of the Object and power of the Imagination produce in the Spirits shut up or open the way to those humors And to hinder the same from receiving a like agitation and fermentation in the heart at divers times there are also Nerves that cause the Palpitations which being not equally agitated in the different motions of the Spirits do not push the Blood with the same force into the Arteries Other Nerves dispersed through the Lungs distribute the Air to the heart by contracting and dilating the branches of the Trachea which serve for respiration and after this manner regulate the fermentation of the Blood in relation to the circumstances of the Passion which rules And in fine to regulate the course of the Spirits with the greatest exactness and speed there are Nerves which environ the Arteries as well those which go to the Brain as those which conduct the Blood to all other parts of the Body So that the shaking of the Brain which accompanies the unexpected sight of some Circumstance because
of which it is proper to change all the motions of the Passion suddenly determine the course of the Animal Spirits to the Nerves which encompass these Arteries that by their contraction they may shut up the passage whereby the Blood ascends into the Brain and by their dilating lay open that which disperses it self through all the other parts of the Body These Arteries which carry the Blood to the Brain being free and all those which disperse it through the rest of the Body being strongly tied by these Nerves the Head will be filled with Blood and the Face coloured with it But any circumstance changing the shaking of the Brain which caused this disposition in these Nerves the Arteries that were contracted are unloosed and the others on the contrary are strongly contracted Thus the Head is void of Blood a paleness diffused over the Face and the little Blood which goes out of the Heart and which the Nerves we spoke of admit into it to maintain life descend mostly into the lower part of the Body the Brain is defective of Animal Spirits and all the rest of the Body is seized with a weakness and trembling To explain and particularly prove what we have already said it would be necessary to give a general knowledge of Physics and a particular one of Human Bodies But these two Sciences are also too imperfect to be treated of with all the exactness I could wish besides if I should push this matter farther it would soon carry me from my subject and therefore I shall only give a general and gross Idea of the Passions and am satisfied provided this Idea be not false These Shakings of the Brain and Motions of the Blood and Spirits are the fourth thing that is found in each of our Passions and they produce the fifth which is the sensible Emotion of the Soul In the same time that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain into the rest of the Body there to produce the Motions that 's proper to maintain the Passion the Soul is carried towards the good that it perceives and that so much the more violently as the Spirits go out of the Brain with the more force because it is the same shaking of the Brain which acts the Soul and Animal Spirits The Motion of the Soul towards good is so much the greater as the sight of good is more sensible and the Motion of the Spirits which proceed from the Brain to disperse themselves into the rest of the Body is so much the more violent as the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain caused by the impression of the Object or Imagination is stronger so this same shaking of the Brain rendring the sight of the good more sensible it is necessary that the Emotions of the Soul in the Passions should augment in the same proportion as the Motion of the Spirits do These Emotions of the Soul differ not from those which immediately follow the intellectual sight of the good we have spoke of They are only stronger and more lively because of the union of the Soul and Body and the sensibility of the sight which produces them The sixth thing which occurs is the Sensation of Passion the Sensation of Love Aversion Desire Joy Sorrow c. This Sensation is not different from that we have already spoke of it is only more quick because the Body hath a great share in it But it is always followed with a certain Sensation of Sweetness which renders all our Passions agreeable to us and is the last thing observed in every one of our Passions as has been already said The cause of this last Sensation is thus At the sight of the Object of the Passion or any new Circumstance some of the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Head to the extream parts of the Body to put it into the gesture the Passion requires and others forcibly descend into the Heart Lungs and Bowels from thence to draw necessary assistances which has already been explained Now it never happens that the Body is in the condition it ought to be but the Soul receives much satisfaction from it whereas if the Body is in an estate contrary to its good and preservation the Soul suffers much pain Thus when we follow the Motions of our Passions and stop not the course of the Spirits which the sight of the Object of the Passion causes in our Body to put it in the condition it ought to be in relation to this Object The Soul will by the Laws of Nature receive this Sensation of delight and inward satisfaction because the Body is in the state it ought to be in On the contrary when the Soul following the Rules of Reason stops the course of the Spirits and resists these Passions it suffers pain proportionably to the evil which might from thence happen to the Body For even as the reflexion that the Soul makes upon it self is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses when doing its duty and submitting to the order of God it would discover that in a proper condition or abandoning it self to its Passions it is touched with remorse which teaches it that 't is in an ill disposition Thus the course of the Spirits excited by the good of the Body is accompanied with a sensible Joy or Sorrow and afterwards with a Spiritual one according as the course of the Animal spirits is hindered or favoured by the Will But there is this remarkable difference between the Intellectual Joy that accompanies the clear knowledge of the good estate of the Soul and the sensible Pleasure which accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body that the Intellectual Joy is solid without remorse and as immutable as the truth which causes it whereas sensible Joy is generally accompanied with Sorrow of the Mind or remorse of Conscience whence it is unquiet and as inconstant as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood which causes it In fine the first is almost always accompanied with a great Joy of the Senses when it is a consequence of the knowledge of a great good that the Soul possesses and the other is seldom accompanied with any Joy of the Mind although it be a consequence of a great good which only happens to the Body if it is contrary to the good of the Soul It is therefore true that without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST the satisfaction the Soul tastes in abandoning it self to its Passions is more agreeable than that it feels in following the Rules of Reason and it is this Satisfaction which is the cause of all the Disorders that have followed Original Sin and it would make us all Slaves to our Passions if the Son of God did not deliver us from their servitude by the delights of his Grace For indeed what I have said on the behalf of the Joy of the Mind against the Joy of the Senses is
only true amongst Christians and was absolutely false in the Mouth of Seneca and Epicurus and in short of all the Philosophers who appeared the most reasonable because the Yoke of JESVS CHRIST is only sweet to those that belong to him and his Burthen only seems light to us when his Grace supports us under it CHAP. IV. That the Pleasures and Motions of the Passions engage us in Errors at the sight of Good and therefore we ought continually to resist them With the manner how to oppose Libertinism WHatsoever we have already in general explained about the qualities and effect of the Passions shews them not to be free they take up their residence in our Breasts without our leave and there is nothing but the consent of our Will which absolutely depends upon us The prospect of Good is naturally followed with a Motion and Sensation of Love a Shaking of the Brain and Motion of the Spirits a new Emotion of the Soul which increases the first Motion of Love and a new Sensation of the Soul which augments the first Sensation of Love and in fine a Sensation of Complacency which recompences the Soul for the Bodies being in a state convenient for it All these things pass in the Soul and Body Naturally and Mechanically that is without their having any part in it since our consent only truly depends upon us This Consent must also be regulated preserved and kept free notwithstanding all the endeavours of our Passions to the contrary 'T is to God alone that it must submit its liberty yielding only to the Voice of the Author of Nature Internal Evidence and to the secret reproaches of Reason We should never consent but when we clearly see we should make an ill use of our liberty if we refused it And this is the chief Rule that must be observed to avoid Error 'T is God only who evidently shews us that we must submit to what ever he requires to him alone therefore we must wholly devote our selves There is no Evidence in the Alurements and Caresses the Frights and Menaces we receive from our Passions They are only confused and obscure Sensations to which we must never give ear We must stay till these false lights of the Passions are dissipated and wait for a purer light to guide us till God himself speaks to us We must enter into our selves and there enquire for him that never leaves us but continually instructs us He speaks low but his Voice is distinct he illuminates but little yet his light is pure Rather his Voice is as strong as 't is distinct and his Light as bright and active as 't is pure But our Passions keep us always out of our selves and by their noise and darkness hinder us from being instructed by his Voice and illuminated by his Light He even speaks to those who ask nothing of him and those whose Passions have put them at the greatest distance from him do nevertheless now and then hear some of his Words But they are such Words as are strong threatning and terrible and pierce more than a two edged Sword which penetrates the most secret Recesses of the Soul and discerns the thoughts and motions of the Heart Heb. 4.12 13. For all things are open before his Eyes and he cannot behold the irregularity of Sinners without making them inwardly to feel his severe Reproaches We ought therefore to enter into our selves to approach near him to desire him to inform us of what we would know to hearken to and obey him For if we always give ear to him we should never be deceiv'd and by continually Obeying him we should free our selves from the miseries and inconstancies of our Passions to which Sin has subjected us We must not think with some pretended Wits whom the pride of their Passions have reduced to the condition of Beasts and who having so long contemned the Law of God seem at last to know no other than that of their infamous Passions We ought not I say like those Men that are guided merely by Flesh and Blood to imagine that in following the motions of our Passions and secret desires of our own Hearts we shou'd follow God and obey the voice of the Author of Nature for this would be the utmost blindness and according to St. Paul Rom. 1. the temporal punishment for Impiety and Idolatry that is the punishment of the greatest Crimes Indeed this punishment is so much the greater as that instead of appeasing the wrath of God as all other temporal ones do it continually exasperates and encreases it until the terrible day wherein his just anger shall triumph over all Sinners Their Arguments however want not probability and seeming very agreeable to common Sense they are favoured by the Passions and could never be destroy'd by all the Philosophy of Zeno. We must love good say they and pleasure is the character that Nature has united to it and by this character we can never be deceived since it proceeds from God who has affixed it thereto that we might distinguish it from evil We must also fly evil continue they and pain is the character that Nature has united to that nor can we be deceiv'd by it since God has instituted it that thereby we might discern it from good We taste Pleasure when we abandon our selves to our Passions and feel Pain and Bitterness in resisting them Therefore the Author of Nature would have us give up our selves to our Passions and never resist them since the Pleasure and Pain he makes us feel in these occurrences are certain proofs of his Will in respect to them To follow God therefore is to persue the desires of our own Hearts and to obey him is to conform our selves to the instinct of Nature which enclines us to satisfie our Senses and Passions After this manner they confirm themselves in their impious Opinions and by this means endeavour to stifle the secret reproaches of their Reason and for the punishment of their Crimes God permits them to be dazled with these false lights which blind instead of enlightning them but with such a blindness as they are insensible of and wish not to be delivered from God gives them over to a reprobate Sense abandons them to the desires of their Hearts to shameful Passions and Actions unworthy of Man as the Scripture tells us that after being as it were fatned by their Debauches they may to all Eternity become the victims of his Wrath. But we will solve the difficulty they propose which the Sect of Zeno not being able to do have denied that Pleasure was good or Pain an evil But this was too rash an attempt and unbecoming Philosophers and I dont believe it ever made those change their Opinion who experimentally found that a great Pain was a great Misery Since therefore Zeno and all the Heathen Philosophy could not resolve this difficulty offered by the Epicureans therefore we must have recourse to a more solid and
enlightened Philosophy 'T is true that Pleasure is good and Pain an evil and that Pleasure and Pain by the Author of Nature have been affixed to the use of certain things to make us capable of judging whether they are good or bad That we must choose the good fly the evil and generally follow the motions of our Passions All this is true but it only relates to the Body to preserve which and long to continue a Life like to that of Beasts we must suffer our selves to be governed by our Passions and Desires The Senses and Passions were only given us for the good of the Body sensible Pleasure is the character which Nature has joined to the use of certain things that without taking the pains to examine them by Reason we might employ 'em for the preservation of the Body but not that we should love them for we ought to love nothing but what Reason most certainly discovers to us to be our good We are Rational Beings and God who is our chief Good requires not of us a blind Love a Love of Instinct or one that is forced but a Love of Choice of Knowledge and such a one as subjects our Mind and Hearts to him He induces us to love him by discovering to us by the light that accompanies the delection of his Grace that he is our Soveraign Good but inclines us to the good of the Body only by instinct and a confused sensation of Pleasure because the good of the Body deserves neither the application of the Mind nor exercise of our Reason But farther our Body is not our selves 't is something that belongs to us without which absolutely speaking we may exist The Good of the Body therefore is not properly our good for Bodies can be only the good of Bodies which we may make use of for the good of our Body but we must not unite our selves to them Our Soul has likewise a Good peculiar to her self viz. that good only that is superiour to her who alone preserves and produces in her the sensations of Pain and Pleasure For in fine all the objects of our Senses are of themselves uncapable of making us perceive them and 't is God alone that can teach us they are present by the sensation he gives us of them which is a Truth the Heathen Philosophers could never comprehend We may and I confess ought to love what is capable of making us feel Pleasure And 't is for that reason we must love none but God because 't is only he who can act in our Souls since sensible objects can only move the Organs of our Senses But perhaps it may be answered by some what matters it from whence these agreeable Sensations come we will enjoy them Ingrateful as they are not to acknowledge the hand that so kindly bestows these Goods They would have a just God give unjust Rewards and recompense them for the Crimes they commit against him at the very time they commit them They would make use of his immutable Will which is the Order and Law of Nature to force undeserved favours from him For by a criminal Artifice they produce such motions in their Bodies which obliges him to make them taste all sorts of Pleasures But Death will corrupt this Body and God whom they have made subservient to their unjust Desires will make them submit to his just Anger and will mock them in his turn 'T is true 't is a very hard thing that the possession of the Goods of the Body should be attended with Pleasure and that that of the Goods of the Soul should often be tied to Pain and Sorrow We may look upon it as a great irregularity because Pleasure being the character of Good as Pain is that of Evil we ought infinitely to take more delight in the love of God than in the use of sensible things since God is the true or rather the only Good of the Mind This will certainly happen one day and 't is very probable 't was so before the Fall at least 't is certain before Sin entered into the World we felt no pain in the exercise of our Duty But God has withdrawn himself from us ever since the Fall of Adam he is no longer our Good by Nature but only by Grace for now we naturally find no satisfaction in loving him and he rather diverts us from then enclines us to love him If we follow him he repulses us if we run after him he smites us if we are constant in our persuit he still treats us ill and makes us suffer very lively and sensible Griefs But when being weary with walking in the hard and painful Paths of Virtue without being incouraged by the relish of Good or assisted by any Nourishment we begin to feed upon sensible things to which he unites us by the taste of Pleasure as if he would reward us for turning aside from him to follow those perishing Goods In short since the first Sin it seems as if God were not pleased that we should love or think upon him or that we should look upon him as our only and chief Good It is only through the Grace of JESVS CHRIST that we are now sensible that God is our Good since 't is by his Grace that we take any pleasure and satisfaction in the love of God Thus the Soul neither discovering her own Good by a clear view or by sensation without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST she takes the Good of the Body for her own She loves it and is more strictly united to it by her Will than she was by the first Institution of Nature For the Good of the Body being the only one left that we are now sensible of it necessarily acts the more powerfully upon Man affects his Brain more livelily and consequently the Soul must feel and imagine it after a more sensible manner And the Animal Spirits being more violently agitated the Will must needs love it with more Ardour and Pleasure Before Sin the Soul was able to efface out of the Brain an over lively image of sensible good and cause the pleasure that attended this image to vanish The Body being thus submitted to the Mind the Soul could in an instant put a stop to the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain and emotion of the Spirits only by the consideration of its Duty But now it remains no longer in its power nor do these traces of the Imagination and motions of the Spirits any longer depend upon it and therefore by a necessary consequence Pleasure which by the order of Nature is affixed to these traces and motions is become the only Master of the Heart Man cannot long resist this Pleasure by his own strength 't is Grace only that can entirely overcome it because none but God as the Author of Grace can overcome himself as the Author of Nature or rather can appease himself as the Revenger of Adam's Disobedience See the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian
enjoy any corporeal thing and that it can unite it self to no object but by its knowledge and love God only being above us can recompence or punish us with Sensations of Pleasure or Pain which can instruct more and in short act in us These truths altho' very evident to attentive Minds are not so powerful to convince us as the deceitful Experience of a sensible impression When we consider any thing as part of our selves or look upon our selves as part of this thing which we judge is good for us to be united to we have a love for it and this love is so much the greater as the thing which we take to be united to us appears a more considerable part of the whole which we compose with it Now there are two sorts of Proofs which perswade us that a thing is part of our selves the instinct of Sensation and evidence of Reason By the instinct of Sensation I am perswaded that my Soul is united to my Body or that my Body makes up part of my Being yet I have no full evidence of it since 't is not by the light of Reason that I conclude it but by the Pain or Pleasure I feel when Objects strike my Senses If I prick my hand I suffer pain therefore I conclude my hand to be a part of my Self but if my Cloaths are torn I suffer nothing therefore determine they do not belong to my Being My Hair is cut without pain but cannot be pluck'd off without it This perplexes the Philosophers and they know not how to decide it but their indetermination shews the wisest Judge rather by the instinct of Sensation than light of Reason that such things are or are not a part of themselves For if they concluded from Evidence and Reason they wou'd soon discover that the Mind and Body are Beings of different Species and that the Mind cannot be united to the Body of it self that 't is only through the union we have with God that the Soul is wounded when the Body is struck Therefore 't is only by the instinct of Sensation that we look upon our Bodies and all the sensible things we are united to as parts of our selves I mean as part of what thinks and feels within us because what is not cannot be discover'd by the evidence of Reason since evidence discovers nothing but Truth And on the contrary 't is by the light of Reason that we discover the relation we have with intellectual things By a clear view of the Mind we discover that we are united to God after a more strict and essential manner than we are to our Bodies That without him we are nothing can neither do nor know will nor feel any thing That he is our All and if we may so speak that we make but one whole with him whereof we are an infinitely small part The light of Reason discovers a thousand Motives to us that wou'd induce us to love God only and contemn the Body as unworthy of our love but we are hot naturally sensible of our union with God nor by the instinct of Sensation but only through the Grace of our SAVIOVR perswaded that he is our All which Grace causes such a Spiritual Sensation in some Persons as it assists them in conquering that contrary Sensation which unites them to the Body For God as he is the Author of Nature inclines our Minds to love him by an enlightened knowledge and not one of instinct And very probable 't is since the Fall that he as Author of Grace has added Instinct to Illumination because our light is now so much diminished that it is incapable of carrying us to God besides its being continually weakened and made ineffectual by contrary Pleasure and Instinct We by the light of the Mind then discover that we are united both to God and the Intellectual World he includes and by Sensation are convinced that we are united to our Bodies and by them to the Material and Sensible World which God has created But as our Sensations are more lively moving frequent and even more lasting than our Illuminations so we cannot think it strange that our Sensations shou'd agitate us and stir up our love to all Sensible Things and that our light dissipates and vanishes without producing in us any Zeal for the Truth It is true there are many Men who are perswaded that God is their true Good love him as their All and who ardently desire to encrease and strengthen the union they have with him but few evidently perceive that to know and consider the Truth is to unite themselves to God with all their Natural power that 't is a kind of enjoying of him to meditate on the true Idea's of things and that this abstracted view of certain general and immutable Truths which determine all particular ones are the flights of a Mind which quits the Body to be united to God Metaphysics Speculative Mathematics and all Universal Sciences which regulate and include particular ones as the Universal Being comprehends all particular Beings seem Chimerical to most Men even to the Religious as well as to those who do not love God So that I dare hardly say that by enquiring into these Sciences the Mind applies it self to God after the most pure and perfect manner it is naturally capable of and that 't is by a prospect of the Intellectual World which is the Object of these Sciences that God has created and still knows this Sensible World from whence Bodies receive their life as Spirits live from the other Those who only follow the impression of their Senses and Motions of their Passions are incapable of relishing truth because it does not flatter them And good Men who continually oppose their Passions when they present false goods to them do not always resist them when they obscure the truth or make it contemptible to them because Persons may be Pious without extraordinary Judgments To make us acceptable to God 't is not requisite for us exactly to know that our Senses Imaginations and Passions always represent things otherwise to us than they are for indeed it does not appear that JESVS CHRIST or his Apostles designed to undeceive us of several Errors that D'cartes has since discovered to us upon this matter There is a great deal of difference between Faith and Knowledge the Gospel and Philosophy The most ignorant are capable of Faith but few are able to understand Evident Truths Faith represents God as the Creator of Heaven and Earth to the most Simple which is enough to induce them to love and serve him but Reason considers God not only in his Works because she knows he existed before he was a Creator and therefore endeavours to Contemplate him in himself or in the great and vast Idea of an infinitely perfect Being which is included in him The Son of God who is the Wisdom of the Father or the Eternal Truth was made Man and became sensible to discover himself
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
the Brain as well as those which excite the chief Idea of the Object of the Passion as those that relate to it We must not therefore wonder if Men carry their Hatred or Love so far and perform such Capricious and Surprizing Actions There is a particular Reason of all these Effects although we do not know them because their accessory Ideas are not always like ours we cannot discover them Thus there is always some cause or other for those actions which appear most ridiculous and extravagant CHAP. VII Of the Passions in particular and first of Admiration and its ill Effects WHatever I have hitherto said of the Passions is general but it will not be very difficult to draw particular Inferences from thence It is only requisite to make some reflexion upon what passes within our selves and the actions of others for us to discover more of these sort of Truths at one view than we could explain in a considerable time Yet there are so few Persons who think of retiring into themselves and make any endeavour to that end that to excite them to it and stir up their attention it will be necessary to descend to particulars When we hit or strike our selves it seems as if we were almost insensible but if we are only touched by others we receive Sensations lively enough to stir up our Attention In short we never tickle our selves or so much as think of it and it may be we could not do it if we had a mind to it 'T is almost for the same reason that the Soul neglects to enquire into and examine it self it is immediately displeased with this sort of enquiry and is commonly incapable of discovering or perceiving what belongs to it except when excited or stirred up by others Thus to assist some Persons in the knowing of themselves it is necessary to relate some of the particular Effects of the Passions that by affecting them therewith we may make them sensible of all the parts their Soul are composed of Those who will read what follows must nevertheless be advertized that they will not always be sensible that I touch them nor will they always find themselves subject to the Passions and Errors I shall speak of because all particular Passions are not always the same in all Men. 'T is true indeed all Men have the same Natural inclinations which have no relation to the Body when their Bodies are perfectly well disposed But the different temperaments of Bodies and their frequent changes cause a great deal of variety in particular Passions And if to the diversity of the Body's constitution we add that which proceeds from Objects which likewise makes very different impressions upon all those who have neither the same Employs nor manner of living it is evident that such a Person may feel himself strongly affected in some place of his Soul by certain things who will yet absolutely remain insensible of many others Thus we should often be deceived if we judged of what others feel by what passes in our selves I am not afraid of being mistaken when I affirm that all Men would be happy for I am absolutely assured that the Chinese and Tartars Angels Devils and even all Spirits whatever have an inclination for felicity I know likewise that God will never produce any Spirit without this desire Yet is it not experience that has taught it me I never saw either Chinese or Tartar nor is it the inward testimony of my Conscience for that only teaches me I would be happy my self But 't is God alone who can inwardly convince me that all other Men Angels and Devils have a desire to be happy and 't is he only who can assure me that he will never give a Being to any Spirit who will be indifferent in respect to it For who is there besides himself that can positively assure me of what he does and even of what he thinks And as he can never deceive me so I cannot doubt of what he teaches me I am therefore certain that all Men would be happy because this inclination is natural and depends not upon the Body But it is very different in particular Passions For though I should extreamly love Musick Dancing Hunting Sweetmeats or Luxurious Dishes c. I could conclude nothing certain from thence concerning the Passions of other Men. Pleasure doubtless is sweet and agreeable to all Men but every one does not find it in the same Object The love of pleasure is a Natural inclination depends not on the Body and is therefore general to all Men. But the inclination for Music Dancing and Hunting is not general because the disposition of the Body on which it depends being different in all Men whatsoever Passions depend upon it are not always the same General Passions as Desire Joy Sorrow c. keep the mean between Natural inclinations and particular Passions They are general as well as the Inclinations but not equally strong because that which produces and maintains them is not always it self equally active There is also a great deal of variety in the degrees whereby the Animal Spirits are agitated in their plenty and fineness and in the relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and these Spirits Thus it often happens that we don 't at all affect some Persons when we speak of particular Passions but if we chance to touch them they are violently moved But with general Passions and Inclinations it is quite contrary we are always affected when they are mentioned yet after such a weak and languishing manner that we scarcely perceive it I speak these things to prevent any Persons judging whether I am deceived by the Sensation only which he has received of what I have already or shall afterwards say for I would have every one judge by considering the Nature of the Passsions I treat of If I proposed the treating of every particular Passion or to distinguish them by all the Objects which excite them it 's plain I should never conclude and should only repeat the same thing The first is evident because the Objects of our Passions are infinite and the last also since we must always treat of the same Subject The particular Passions for Poetry History Mathematics Hunting and Dancing are only one and the same general Passion for for instance the Passions of Desire or Joy or for whatever pleases differ not although the peculiar Pleasures which excite them do We must not therefore multiply the number of the Passions according to the number of Objects which are infinite but only by the chief relations they may have in respect to us And after this manner we shall discover as will further appear upon our Explanation that Love and Hatred are the Mother Passions Which produce no other general Passions but Desire Joy and Sorrow and that particular Passions are composed only of these three first and are so much the more compounded as the chief Idea of Good or Evil which excites them
is accompanied with a greater number of Accessory Ideas or that the Good or Evil are more Circumstantiated in respect to us If we remember what has been said of the connexion of Ideas and that in all great Passions the Animal Spirits being extreamly agitated stir up in the Brain all the Traces which have any relation with the Object which affects us we shall find that there are an infinite number of different Passions which have no particular name and which we can no way explain but must confess they are inexplicable If the Original Passions which compose the rest were not capable of more or less we should have no difficulty in determining the number of all the Passions but the number of those Passions which are produced by the complication of others must necessarily be infinite because the same Passion having infinite degrees it may by joining it self with others be infinitely complicated So that perhaps two Men were never moved by the same Passion if by the same Passion we understand the collecting together of all equal Motions and like Sensations which at the presence of any Object is stirred up in us But as the more or less do not alter the Species so we may say that the number of Passions is not infinite because the Circumstances which accompany the Good or Evil may be limited But let us explain our Passions in particular When we see any thing the first time or when we have many time seen it attended with certain Circumstances we are surprized and admire at it if we afterwards see it appear in another manner Thus a new Idea or a new Connexion of old Ideas begets in us an imperfect Passion which is the first of all and which I name Admiration I call this Passion imperfect because it is neither excited by the Idea nor Sensation of Good The Brain being then shaken in certain places which never were before affected or after a manner that is perfectly new the Soul is sensibly touched with it and consequently strongly applies it self to whatever it finds new in that object for the same reason as a simple tickling at the Soles of the Feet excites a most lively and moving Sensation in the Soul rather through the novelty than the force of the impression There is yet other Reasons for the Souls applying it self to Novelties but I have explained them where I spoke of Natural Inclinations We here consider the Soul in relation to the Body and according to this relation 't is the emotion of the Spirits which is the Natural Cause of its application to new things In Admiration strictly taken we consider things only as they are in themselves or according to their appearances and not as they relate to us or as they are good or bad And therefore the Spirits diffuse not themselves through the Muscles to give a proper disposition to the Body to pursue good or avoid evil nor agitate the Nerves which goes to the Heart and to the rest of the Bowels to hasten or delay the fermentation and motion of the Blood as it happens in the rest of the Passions All the Spirits go towards the Brain there to trace a lively and distinct image of the surprizing object that the Soul may consider and know it again But the rest of the Body continues in the same posture and as if it were immoveable For there being no emotion in the Soul there is also no motion in the Body If what we admire appears great the admiration is always followed with Esteem and sometimes with Veneration But on the contrary it is always accompanied with Contempt and sometimes Disdain when it appears little The Idea of Greatness produces a great motion of Spirits in the Brain and the trace that represents it is preserved a long time A great motion of Spirits likewise excites the Idea of Greatness in the Soul and strongly fixes the Mind on the consideration of this Idea But the Idea of Littleness creates in the Brain but an inconsiderable motion of the Spirits and the trace which represents it does not continue long Also when the Spirits are but little moved they cause in the Soul an Idea of Meanness and stays the Mind but a very little in the consideration of this Idea These things deserve to be well observed When we consider our selves or any thing which is united to us our Admiration is always attended with some Passion which moves us But this agitation is only in the Soul and in the Spirits which go to the Heart because there being no good that it makes us seek after nor evil that it makes us shun the Spirits are not dispersed through the Muscles to dispose the Body to any action The thoughts of the perfection of our Being or of any thing belonging to it naturally produces Pride the esteem of our Selves contempt of others Joy and some other Passions The prospect of Grandeur produces Haughtiness that of Power Generosity or Boldness and the sight of any other advantagious quality naturally produces some other Passion which will be always a kind of Pride On the contrary the foresight of some Imperfection of our Being or of any thing which belongs to it will naturally produce Humility contempt of our selves respect for others sorrow and some other Passions The prospect of Poverty creates meanness of Spirit that of weakness Timerousness and thus the sight of any disadvantageous quality naturally produces a Passion which will be a kind of Humility But this Humility as well as that Pride is properly neither a Virtue nor a Vice They are both of 'em only Passions or involuntary Motions which are nevertheless very useful to civil Society and even absolutely necessary in some occurrences for the preservation of the Life or Goods of those who are actuacted by them It is necessary for instance to be humble and timerous and even outwardly to testifie the disposition of our Minds by a respectful and modest Air when we are in the presence of a Person of Quality or of a proud and powerful Man For 't is commonly advantagious for the Good of the Body that the imagination should submit at the sight of sensible Grandeur and that it should give it external Marks of its Humility and inward Veneration But this is Naturally and Mechanically performed without the Will 's having any share in it and often even notwithstanding all its Resistance Even Bruits themselves have need of it as Dogs to prevail with those they live with have their Machine composed after such a manner that they assume such an Air as they ought to have in relation to those about 'em as is absolutely necessary for their preservation And if Birds or any other Animals have not a fit disposition of Body to give 'em this Air 't is because they have no occasion to asswage those the effects of whose Anger they can avoid by flight and without whose help they can preserve their lives It cannot be too much considered
Prophets of Old affirm the Truth has spoken to them tho' it has not than to give Ear to the Truth it self For above this four thousand years the Pride of Man has without opposition put off lies and falshoods which have been respectfully received and even preserved as Holy and Divine Traditions It seems as if the God of Truth was no longer with them they neither consult nor meditate on him any longer but cover their idleness and neglect with the deceitful appearance of an holy Humility Indeed of our selves we cannot discover the Truth but we may all times do it by the assistance of him who enlightens us altho' we never can do it by the help of all the Men in the World Those even who are best acquainted with it cannot discover it to us if we do not our selves inquire of him who has inform'd them and if he answer not our attention as he has answered theirs We must not therefore receive any thing upon the credit of Man for they are all Liers but because he who cannot deceive us has spoken to us we ought continually to beg his Instruction We must not believe those who speaking to the Ear instruct only the Body or at most act upon the Imagination but we must attentively hearken and faithfully believe him who speaks to the Mind instructs the Reason and who penetrating into the most secret recesses of the inward Man is capable of enlightening and fortifying it against the outward and sensible Man which continually endeavours to seduce and abuse us I so often repeat these things because I think them most worthy of a serious reflexion 'T is God alone that we must Honour since there is none but ha who is able to give us knowledge or make us capable of Pleasure There is sometimes to be observed in the Animal Spirits and the rest of the Body a certain disposition which inclines us to Hunting Dancing Running and to all Exercises in general wherein the strength and agility of the Body are most conspicuous This disposition is commonly in Young men and chiefly in those whose Bodies are not perfectly form'd Children cannot stay long in one place but are always in action when they follow their humour For as their Muscles are not yet strong nor perfectly finish'd God the Author of Nature regulates the pleasures of the Soul in relation to the good of the Body so as to make them find pleasure in these Exercises which help to fortify and confirm the strength of their Bodies Thus whilst the Flesh and Fibres of the Nerves are still soft the little passages through which the Animal Spirits must necessarily flow to produce all sorts of motions are kept open and preserv'd the humours have no time to settle and all Obstructions and causes of Putrefaction are prevented The confused Sensation which Young men have of the disposition of their Bodies make them please themselves in the thoughts of their strength and activity They admire themselves when they know how to measure their motions or are able to make any uncommon ones and even wish to be in company of such persons as may behold and admire them Thus by little and little they strengthen their inclination for all bodily Exercises which is one of the chief causes of the Ignorance and Brutality of Men For besides the time that is lost in these Exercises the little use Men make of their Minds is the cause that the chief part of the Brain whose flexibility produces a strength and vivacity of Mind becomes wholly untractable and the Animal Spirits are not easily dispersed through the Brain after such a manner as to make them capable of thinking of whatever they please This is the reason that most part of the Nobility and such as are trained up to the War are incapable of applying themselves to any thing they argue upon things according to the Proverb A Word and a Blow And if we say any thing to them they have not a mind to hear instead of thinking what answer ought to be made their Animal Spirits insensibly flow into the Muscles by whose assistance they lift up their Arms and answer without any reflexion by a blow or some threatning gesture because their Spirits being agitated by the words they hear they are carried to those places which are most open through habit and exercise and the knowledge they have of the strength of their Bodies confirms them in these insolent behaviours And observing the respectful Air of those who hear them they are puft up with a foolish confidence which makes them utter many fierce and brutish impertinencies believing at the same time that they have spoke many fine things because the fear and prudence of others was favourable to them It is not possible to apply our selves to any Study or actually to make a profession of any Science without it we can be neither Authors nor Doctors without remembring what we are But this alone often naturally produces in the Mind of good men so many Defects that 't would be very advantageous for them if they were without those honourable Titles As they imagine them to be their chief Perfections they always think on them with Pleasure discover them to others with all possible Artifice and even pretend they have given them a right to judge of all things without examination If any Person has Courage enough to oppose them they soon Craftily and with a sweet and obliging Air insinuate what they are and the right they have to decide all things But if afterwards any is so bold as to resist them and they want an answer they will then openly say what they think of themselves and those who oppose them All inward Sensation of any advantage that we possess naturally encreases our Courage A Soldier well Armed and Mounted who wants neither Blood nor Spirits is ready to undertake any thing The disposition he finds himself in makes him bold and daring It is the same with a Learned Man when he believes himself so and when the vanity of his Heart has corrupted his Mind he becomes if we may say so bold and confident against the Truth Sometimes he rashly opposes it without knowing it and sometimes betrays it after he has discovered it and confiding in his false Learning he is always ready to maintain the Negative or Affirmative according as the Spirit of Contradiction possesses him It is very different with those who boast not of their Learning they are not decisive It is rare that they speak if they have not something to say Nay it often happens that they are silent when they ought to speak they have not that reputation nor those external marks of Learning which perswade them to speak they know not what These may safely hold their Tongues but Pretenders to Sciences are affraid to continue silent for they know well they shall be despised if they hold their Tongues although they have nothing material to say and on the contrary they
will not always be condemned although they say only impertinent things provided they speak them after a Scientific manner What makes men capable of thinking makes them fit to discover Truth but 't is neither Honour Riches nor Dignities nor false Learning that can give them this capacity it proceeds from their Nature They are made to think because they are made for Truth Even Health it self is not sufficient to make them think well all that it can do is not to be so great an impediment as Sickness is Our Body in some manner assists us by Sense and Imagination but it does not help our Conception For although without help of the Body we might by meditation oppose out Idea's to the continual Efforts of the Senses and Passions which perplex and efface them because we can only at present overcome the Body by the Body Yet it is plain that the Body cannot illuminate the Mind nor produce the Light of Understanding in it for every Idea which discovers the Truth comes from Truth it self What the Soul receives by the Body is only for the Body it self and when it persues those Phantoms it discovers nothing but Illusions and Chimera's I mean it does not see things as they are in themselves but only as they relate to the Body If the Idea of our own greatness or littleness is often an occasion of our Error the Idea we have of external things and what has any relation to us causes not a lest dangerous impression We have just said that the Idea of greatness is always attended with a great Motion of Spirits and that a great Motion of Spirits is always accompanied with an Idea of greatness and that on the contray the Idea of littleness is always attended with a weak motion of Spirits and that a weak Motion of the Spirits is always accompanied with an Idea of littleness From this Principle 't is easie to conclude that such things as produce a great Motion of to the Spirits in us must naturally appear to us to have more Greatness that is more Power more Reality and more Perfection than others for by Greatness I mean all these things and many such like So that Sensible Things must appear to us greater and more solid than those which cannot be felt if we judge of them by the Motion of the Spirits and not by the pure Idea of Truth A great House a magnificent Train fine Furniture Offices Honours Riches c. appear to have more greatness and reality in them than Virtue and Justice do When we compare Virtue with Riches by a clear view of the Mind then Virtue gains the preference but when we make use of our Eyes and Imaginations and judge of these things only by the emotion of the Spirits that they excite in us we undoubtedly prefer Riches to Virtue 'T is from this Principle that we have so mean an Opinion of Spiritual things which do not affect the Senses That the Idea's of our Minds are less Noble than the Objects they represent That there is less reality and substance in Air than in Metals in Water than in Ice That the spaces betwixt Earth and Heaven are avoid or else that the Bodies which fill it have not so much reality and solidity as the Sun and Stars have In fine if we fall into an infinite number of Errors about the Nature and Perfection of every thing 't is because we argue upon this false Principle A great motion of Spirits and consequently a strong Passion always accompanies a sensible Idea of greatness and a small motion of Spirits and a weak Passion likewise attends a sensible Idea of littleness We apply our selves much and bestow a great deal of our time in the Study of whatever may excite a sensible Idea of greatness and neglect what gives us a sensible Idea of littleness Those great Bodies for instance which move about us have always made an impression upon us we at first adored them because of the sensible Idea we had of their greatness and brightness Some bolder Genii have examined their Motions and in all Ages the Stars have been the Object either of the Study or Veneration of many Men. We may even say that the fear of these imaginary influences which at this day terrify Astrologers and some weak Persons is a kind of adoration that a depraved Imagination pays to the Idea of greatness which represents these Coelestial Bodies The Body of Man on the contrary tho' infinitely more admirable and worthy our application than whatever can be known of Jupiter and Saturn with all the rest of the Planets is almost unknown to us The sensible Idea of the dissected parts of the flesh hath nothing great in it and even causes disgust and horror so that 't is but a few years since Ingenious persons look'd upon Anatomy as a Science which merited their application Kings and Princes have been Astronomers and proud of that Title The grandeur of the Stars seemed to agree well with the greatness of their Dignities but I don't believe they thought it any honour to understand Anatomy and to be able to dissect a Heart or a Brain well It is the same with many other Sciences Rare and extraordinary things produce greater and more sensible Motions in the Spirits than those which we see every day we admire them and consequently affix some Idea of greatness to them and thus they excite in the Spirits Passions of esteem and veneration 'T is this which overturns the Reason of many Men for some are so curious and respectful for every thing of Antiquity what comes from far or is rare and extraordinary that their Minds become Slaves to it because the Mind dares make no Judgment upon what it respects Truth I grant is in no great danger because some Men wholly employ themselves about Medals Arms the Dress of the Ancients the Chinese or Barbarians It is not absolutely useless to know the Map of Old Rome or the Roads from Tomquin to Nanquin altho' it be more useful to know those we shall have more occasion to Travel In fine we have nothing to object against the knowledge of the true History of the War of the Greeks with the Persians or of the Tartars with the Chinese or that persons shou'd have an extraordinary inclination for Thucidides and Xenophon or for any other that pleases them But we cannot suffer that Reason shou'd be so subjected to the admiration of Antiquity that we must be forbidden to make use of our Understanding to examine the Opinions of the Ancients and that those who discover and show the falseness of them shou'd pass for presumptious and rash Persons There has been Truths in all Ages if Aristotle has discovered some of them further discoveries may be also made to this day The Opinions of this Author must be proved by good Reasons for if Aristotle's Sentiments were solid in his time they will be so now 'T is a pure illusion to pretend to
viz. Joy Desire and Sorrow For we have Joy when a Good is present or an Evil past We feel Sorrow when Good is past and Evil present and are agitated with Desire when Good and Evil are to come The Passions which regard Good are particular determinations of the motion which God gives us towards Good in general and therefore their object is real But others who have not God for the cause of their motion terminate only in nothingness CHAP. X. Of the Passions in particular the manner of explaining them in general and of discovering the Errors of which they are the cause IF we consider how compound the Passions are we shall plainly discover that their number cannot be determined and that there are many more of them than we have terms to express The Passions do not only draw their differences from the various Combinations of the three first for then there wou'd be but a few of them but their difference proceeds likewise from the different Perceptions and different Judgments which cause or accompany them The different Judgments which the Soul makes of Good and Evil cause different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently create such Sensations in the Soul as are not absolutely alike Thus they are the cause as we have observed of the difference between certain Passions whose emotions resemble each other However the emotion of the Soul being the chief thing which occurs in each of our Passions it is much better to refer them all to the three Original ones in which these emotions are very different than to treat of them confusedly and without order in relation to the different perceptions that we may have of the Good and Evil which causes them for we may have so many different perceptions of Objects in relation to time to our selves to what belongs to us in relation to Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or the choice of our Will that it is absolutely impossible to make an exact enumeration of them When the Soul perceives a Good which she may enjoy we may perhaps say she hopes for it altho' she desires it not But it is plain this Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment So that 't is the emotion which accompanies the Idea of Good the possession of which we judge to be possible which makes this Hope to be a true Passion When Hope is changed into Security 't is still the same thing it is not a Passion only because of the emotion of Joy which is then mixt with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being likely to fail of it is a Passion only because the foresight of Good agitates us In short when Hope diminishes and Despair succeeds it it is also plain that this Despair is a Passion only because of the emotion of Sorrow which is then mixt with this Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being able to happen is not a Passion except this Judgment agitates us But because the Soul never considers Good or Evil without some emotion and even without some change happen in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment which produces this Passion because we confound whatsoever passes in the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil for the words Hope Fear Rashness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Regret in short the Names we commonly give to all the other Passions are short expressions whereby we can expalain in particular whatever the Passions include By the word Passion we understand the view of the relation that any thing has with us the emotion and sensation of the Soul the shaking of the Brain and motion of the Spirits a new emotion and new sensation of the Soul and in fine a sensation of Complacency which always attends the Passions and makes them agreeable All these things we mean by it But sometimes by the Name of Passion we only understand either the Judgment that excites it or the emotion of the Soul or the motion of the Spirits and Blood or something else which attends the emotion of the Soul To abridge Idea's and their expressions is a very useful thing in the knowledge of Truth yet it is often the cause of some great Error when these Idea's are abridged through Popular Custom for we must never abridge our Idea's but when we have made them clear and distinct by a great application of Mind and not as we commonly do by the Passions and all sensible Things when once we have made them famillar by Sensations and the meer action of the Imagination which deceives the Mind There is a great deal of difference between the pure Idea's of the Mind and the sensations or emotions of the Soul The pure Idea's of the Mind are clear and distinct but difficultly made familiar whereas on the contrary the sensations and emotions of the Soul are very famillar but impossible to be discern'd clearly and distinctly Numbers extension and their Properties we clearly know but before we have made them sensible by some Characters which express them 't is difficult to present them for whatever is abstracted affects us not Sensations and the emotions of the Soul on the contrary are easily represented to the Mind altho' we only know them after a very confused and imperfect manner and all the terms which excite them strongly agitate the Soul and render it attentive From whence it happens that we often imagine we very well apprehend such Discourses as are absolutely incomprehensible and when we read certain descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we perswade our selves that we understand them perfectly because we are livelily touched with them for all the words we read agitate the Soul We have no sooner pronounced the words Shame Despair Impudence but it as soon stirs up in our Minds a certain confused Idea and obscure Sensation which strongly applies us and because this Sensation is very familiar and represented to us without any trouble or effort of the Mind we perswade our selves that it is clear and distinct Yet these words are the Names of compounded Passions and consequently the abridged expressions that vulgar Custom has made of many confused and obscure Idea's As we are obliged to make use of such terms as are approved by Custom so we must not be surprised to find obscurity and sometimes a kind of contradiction in our words And if we reflected that the sensations and emotions of the Soul which answered to the terms we make use of in the like Discourses are not perfectly the same in all Men because of their difference dispositions of Mind we shou'd not so easily condemn others when they are not of our Opinions I don't say this so much to prevent the Objections which may be made against me as to make the Nature of the Passions be
Truth ought to be very careful to shun as much as possible all strong Sensations as a great Noise too brisk a Light Pleasure Pain c. and continually to stir up the Purity of their Imagination and prevent its making in their Brain such deep Traces as continually disquiet and dissipate the Mind And above all to put a Stop to the Motions of their Passions which cause such powerful Impressions in the Body and Soul that 't is generally impossible the Mind shou'd think of any thing else For although the pure Idea's of Truth are always present to us we cannot consider them when the Capacity we have of thinking is filled with these Modifications which possess us However as it is impossible that the Soul shou'd exist without Passion Sensation or any other particular Modification We must make a Virtue of Necessity and even draw from these Modifications some Helps to render us more attentive Yet must we make use of much Artifice and Circumspection in the applying these Helps to gain some Advantage from them The need we have of them must be well examined and we must only make use of 'em so far as the Necessity of rendring our selves attentive constrains us to CHAP. III. Of the use that may be made of the Passions and Senses to preserve the Attention of the Mind THE Passions which it is necessary for us to make use of to excite us to an Enquiry after Truth are those that give us Strength and Courage enough to surmount all the Trouble we may meet with in endeavouring to render our selves attentive some of which are good and some bad of which the good are a Desire to find the Truth to acquire a sufficient Knowledge to conduct our selves to render us useful to our Neighbour and some others of the like Nature But the bad or dangerous ones are such as a desire to acquire Reputation to make some Establishment of our Fortune to raise our selves above our Neighbours and some others that are yet more irregular of which it is not necessary to speak In the unhappy Estate we now are in it often happens that the most unreasonable Passions do most powerfully excite us to search after the Truth and give us a more agreeable Satisfaction for all the Pains we take in our Pursuit than the most just and reasonable Passions do Vanity for instance excites us much more than the Love of Truth and we every Day see some continually applying themselves to Study when they find Persons to whom they may relate what they have learnt but who intirely abandon their Studies when they have not an Opportunity to discover their Acquirements The confused Prospect of some Glory they gain when they put off their Opinons maintains their Courage in the most barren and tiresome Studies But if by Chance or Necessity of their Affairs they find themselves far distant from their little flock of Admirers their Ardour is soon cooled and even the most solid Studies cannot attract them Disgust Wearisomness and Chagriu seizes them and they quit all Vanity triumphs over their natural Laziness but Laziness in its turn triumphs over the Love of Truth for Vanity sometimes resists Idleness but Idleness is generally victorious over the Love of Truth Yet the Passion for Gloty may be subservient to a good End since we may make use of it for the Glory of God and the Profit of others Some Persons may be permitted on several Occasions to make use of this Passion as an Help to make the Mind more attentive but we must take great Care to use it only when those reasonable Passions we have already mentioned are not sufficient and when our Duty obliges us to apply our selves to such Subjects as we are discouraged from First because this Passion is very dangerous in respect of the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly engages us in unprofitable Studies which have a more tempting Appearance than either Usefulness or Truth in them In fine because this Passion is very difficult to be moderated we are often abused by it and while we believe our Mind is illuminated by it we often strengthen our Concupiscence which not only corrupts the Heart but disperses such a Darkness through the Mind as is morally impossible to be dissipated We ought to consider that this Passion is insensibly encreased fortified and established in the Heart of Man and that when it is too violent instead of assisting the Mind in a Search after Truth it strangely blinds it and makes it believe things even as it wishes them to be Without doubt we shou'd not have met with so many false Inventions and imaginary Discoveries if Men had not suffered their Brains to be disordered by their Zeal of appearing Inventers For the firm and obstinate Perswasion many Men have had that they have found for instance the perpetual Motion the squaring of the Circle and Duplication of the Cube by common Geometry has apparently proceeded from the great Desire they had of appearing to have effected what many Persons had unsuccessfully attempted It is therefore better to excite those Passions in us which are so much the more useful in the Search after Truth as they are more strong and in the Excess of which there is least to be feared as the Desires of making a good use of our Wit of delivering our selves from Prejudices and Errors of acquiring so much Wisdom as will enable us to conduct our selves through whatsoever Condition we are in and other the like Passions which engage us not in unuseful Studies nor incline us to make too precipitate Judgments When we begin to taste the Pleasure that is found in the Exercise of the Mind discover the Advantage that recurs from it destroy those violent Passions and disdainfully reject those sensible Pleasures which whilst we imprudently permit them to tyrannize over our Reason we have no need of any other Passions than those we have before mentioned to make us attentive upon whatsoever Subject we wou'd consider But the Generality of Mankind are not in this Condition They have no good Relish of any thing but only what touches the Senses Their Imagination is corrupted with an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which only stir up false Idea's For they are united to every thing that falls under the Senses and Imagination and judge always according to the Impression they have received from them in Relation to themselves Pride Debauchery Engagements unquiet Desires to raise their Fortune so commonly obscure the Discovery of Truth in the Men of this World that it stifles in them the Sentiments of Piety because they separate them from God who only can enlighten us as he only can govern us For we cannot encrease our Union with sensible things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truths Since in the same Time we cannot be so strictly united to things that are so different and opposite Those therefore who have a pure and chaste Imagination I mean
sensible It would be unnecessary here to give he Reasons that I had for it Since they would only serve to justifie the order that I have kept in what I have said which is not essential I have neither spoke of Arithmetick nor Algebra since the Numeral Figures and Letters of the Alphabet which are used in these Sciences are not so useful to increase the Attention as the Capacity of the Mind as shall be explained in the following Chapter These are the General Helps which may make the Mind more attentive I know no other except it be the will of being so which I do not treat of because it is supposed that all those who Study are willing to give Attention to what they Study Nevertheless there are many others which are peculiar to certain persons as some sort of Drinks certain Meats certain Places and certain Dispositions of Body with some other helps of which every one ought to be instructnd by his own Experience The Condition of our Imagination ought to be observed after Eating and we must consider what things they are that maintain or dissipate the Attention of the Mind What more general might be said is That the moderate use of such Food as creates many Animal Spirits is very fit to increase the Attention of th Mind and Strength of the Imagination in those who have them Weak and Languishing CHAP. V. Of the Means to increase the Extension and Capacity of the Mind That Arithmetick and Algebra are absolutely necessary to this end IT ought not immediately to be imagined that we can truly increase the Extension and Capacity of the Mind The Soul of Man is if we may so say a determined Quantity or Portion of Thought which hath limits that cannot be exceeded The Soul cannot become more Extensive or Capacious than it is It is not swelled nor enlarged after the same manner as we see Liquors and Metals are In fine It never Perceives more in one time than in another It is true this seems contrary to Experience for often we think upon many Objects and as oft but upon one only and we often say likewise that we think upon nothing at all Yet if we consider that Thought is to the Soul what Extension is to the Body we shall plainly discover that as a Body cannot be truly more extended at one time than another so if we conceive aright neither can the Soul think more at one time than another Whether it perceives many Objects or but one or even in the time that we say we think on nothing at all But the reason why we imagine we think more at one time than another is because we do not sufficiently distinguish between confused and distinct Perceptions without doubt there is more Thought required or the Capacity of Thinking is more fitted to perceive many things distinctly at once than to perceive but one only But there is not more Thought requisite to perceive many things confusedly than to perceive one distinctly So there is no more Thought in the Soul when it thinks of many things than when it thinks of but one since when it thinks of but one only it always perceives it much more clearly than when it applies it self to many For it must be observed that a pure simple Perception sometimes includes as much Thought or fills as much the Capacity that the Mind hath of Thinking as a Judgment nay even a compounded reasoning Since Experience teaches us That a lively clear and evident Perception but of one thing only imploys and takes up the Mind as much as a compounded Reasoning or an obscure and confused Perception of several Relations between many things For even as there is as much or more Sensation in the sensible view of an Object that I hold near my Eyes and carefully examine as in the prospect of a whole Field that I look upon negligently and without Attention so that the clearness o the Sensation that I have of the Object which is near my Eyes recompences the Extension of the confused Sensation I have of many things that I see without Attention in a Field Thus the Prospect the Mind has of one Object only is sometimes so lively and distinct that it includes as much or even more Thought than a Prospect of the Relations which are between many things It is true at certain times it seems to us that we think of but one thing and nevertheless we have some difficulty to comprehend it well and at other times we comprehend both this thing and many others with great Facility From thence we imagine that the Soul hath more Extension or a greater Capability of Thinking at one time than another but it is plain we deceive our selves The Reason why at certain times we have some Difficulty to conceive the most easie things is not because the Thought of the Soul or its Capacity of Thinking is diminished but because this Capacity is filled either by some lively Sensation of Pain or Pleasure or by a great number of weak and obscure Sensations which cause a kind of Vapor and which for the most part proceeds from a confused Sensation of a great number of Things A piece of Wax is capable of a very distinct Figure yet it cannot receive two but then one will confound the other for it cannot be entirely round and square at the same time indeed if it received a Million none of them would be distinct Now if this piece of Wax was capable of knowing its Figures it could not know by what Figure it must be determined if the number of them were too great It is the same with our Soul when a great number of Modifications fill its Capacity it cannot perceive them distinctly because it sees them not separately this makes it think it perceives nothing at all It cannot say that it is sensible Pain Pleasure Light Sound Taste it is none of all these and yet it is all these that it perceives But although we should suppose the Soul not to be subjected to the confused and irregular Motions of the Animal Spirits or so disingaged from the Body that its Thoughts should not depend upon whatsoever passed in it it might then happen that we should more easily comprehend certain things in one time than in another and yet the Capacity of the Soul be neither diminished nor increased The general Idea of Infinity is inseparable from the Mind and it wholly takes up its Capacity when it thinks not of some particular thing For when we say we think of nothing it does not follow that we do not think of this general Idea but simply that we do not think of any thing in particular Certainly if our Mind was not filled with this Idea we could not think of all sorts of things as we do for indeed we cannot think of those things that we have no knowledge of And if this Idea was no more present to the Mind when it seems to us that we think
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
only upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses since this Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all just and solid Arguments only breeds Confusion in their Discourses It is not possible to expose the Fantasticalness and Extravagances of the Explanations that Aristotle gives of all sorts of Matters when the Subjects he treats of are simple and easie his Errors are simple and very easily discovered but when he pretends to explain compounded things and such as depend upon many Causes his Errors are at least as compounded as the Subjects he treats on and it is impossible to take them in Pieces so as to discover them all to others This great Genius which they pretend has done so well in his Rules for Definitions did not so much as know what things were necessary to be defined Because putting no Distinction between a clear and distinct knowledge and a Sensible one he imagined he was able to know and explain things to others which he had no distinct Idea of himself Definitions must explain both the Nature of Things and the Terms which compose them and stir up in the Mind distinct and clear Idea's of them But 't is impossible after this manner to define the Sensible Qualities of Heat Cold Colour Taste c. when we confound the Cause with the Effect and the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation which accompanies it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which we know not by clear Idea's but only by an inward Sensation as I have explained in the third Book it is impossible to affix Words to Idea's we have not As we have clear and distinct Idea's of a Circle a Square a Triangle and so distinctly know the Nature of them we may give good Definitions thereof We can even deduce the Idea's we have of these Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by Terms to which these Idea's are affixed but we cannot define either Heat or Cold being only Sensible Qualities for we know them neither distinctly nor by Idea but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation Nor must we define Heat which is external by any Effects For if we substitute in its Place the Definition that we shall give it we shall soon see that this Definition will only deceive us If for instance we define Heat to be what assembles things of the same kind without saying any thing more we may in following this Definition take such things for Heat as have no Relation to it We may say that the Loadstone assembles the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because it is hot that a Pigeon eats Hemp-Seed and leaves other Grain because she is hot That a Covetous Man separates his Gold from his Silver because he is hot In fine there is no Extravagancy that this Definition will not engage us in if we were stupid enough to follow it This Definition then does not explain the Nature of Heat nor can we make use of it to deduce all its Properties since if we keep precisely to its Terms we conclude Impertinences and if we put it in the Place of the thing defined we shall have a strange Piece of Nonsence Yet if we carefully distinguish Heat from the Cause of it although we cannot define it since it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea we may define the Cause of it since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But Care must be had that Heat taken for such a Motion does not always cause the Sensation of Heat in us For Water for instance is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and 't is apparent that Fish feel it warm at least warmer than Ice whose Parts are more in Rest but it is cold in relation to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Bodies For what hath less Motion than another Body is in some manner in rest in respect to that Body So that 't is not in Relation to the Motion of the Fibres of our Bodies that we must define the Cause of Heat or the Motion which excites it We must if we can define this Motion absolutely and in it self and then the Definitions we shall give may serve to discover the Nature and Properties of Heat I do not think my self obliged to examine the Philosophy of Aristotle any further and to unravel the extreamly confused and perplext Errors of this Author It seems to me that I have already shewn that he does not prove his four Elements and that he defines them ill That his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not the Nature of them and that all second Qualities are not compounded of them And lastly although we should grant him that all Bodies were composed of four Elements as second Qualities of the first his whole System would be useless in a Search after Truth since his Idea's are not clear enough always to preserve Evidence in our Ratiotinations If 't is doubted that I have not related the true Opinions of Aristotle it may easily be seen by examining the Books he has writ of the Heavens of Generation and Corruption for 't is from them that I have taken almost all that I have said I had no Design to relate any thing of his Eight Books of Physicks because there is some learned Men who pretend that 't is only a Discourse of Logick And 't is very probable since we find there many indetermined and trifling Words As Atistotle often contradicts himself and as we may maintain almost any manner of Opinion from some Passages taken out of him I doubt not but we may prove by Aristotle even some Opinions contrary to those I have attributed to him but I am not afraid of it it is sufficient that I have the Book by me I cited him from to prove what I have said Nay I shall not give my self any great Trouble to examine whether these Books are Aristotle's or not I take them as for such and as they are commonly received For we ought not to disquiet our selves to know the true Genealogy of things for which we have no Esteem CHAP. VI. Some general Advices which are necessary to conduct us regularly in a Search after Truth and in a Choice of the Sciences THAT it may not be said I only destroy without establishing any thing certain and indisputable in this Work It will be proper to shew in a few Words the Order we ought to keep in our Studies to avoid being deceived and that I even note some most necessary Truths and Sciences in which we may meet with such Evidence as we cannot hinder our selves from consenting to them without suffering the secret Reproaches of our Reason I shall not explain these Truths and Sciences at large because 't is already done I do not pretend to make a new Impression of other Persons Works but content my self with referring to them I will only shew the Order we ought to
keep in our Studies always to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions Of all our Discoveries the first is the Existence of our Souls all our Thoughts are undoubted Proofs of it for there is nothing more evident than whatever actually thinks is actually something But if it is easie to know the Existence of our Souls it is not so easie to know the Essence and Nature of them If we would know what it is we must above all things take great care not to confound it with the things it is united to If we doubt if we will if we reason we must only believe that the Soul is a thing which doubts wills reasons and nothing more provided we have no Proof of its having any other Properties For we know our Souls only by the Internal Sensation we have of them We must not take our Soul for our Body nor for the Blood nor Animal Spirits nor for Fire nor an infinite number of other things for which Philosophers have taken it We must believe of the Soul only what we cannot hinder our selves from believing of it and what we are fully convinced of by the internal Sensation we have of our selves for otherwise we should be deceived Thus we may know by a simple Prospect or an internal Sensation what can be known of the Soul without being obliged to make such Arguments as may be Erroneous For when we reason the Memory Acts and where we make use of our Memory we may be deceived perhaps there is some Ill Genius on which we depend in our Discoveries and which diverts it self in deceiving us If for instance I suppose a God who took pleasure in seducing me I am well perswaded he could not deceive me in any simple Discoveries as in those whereby I know that I am or of what I think or that twice 2 are 4. For although I should really suppose such a God and as powerful a one as I can feign to my self I find that in this extravagant Supposition I could not doubt that I was or that twice 2 were equal to 4 because I perceived these things by a simple view without the use of my Memory But when I argue not seeing evidently the Principles of my Reasonings and only remember that I have evidently seen them If this deceiving Deity joyns this Memory to false Principles as he might do if he would I should only reason falsly like those that make long Computations imagining they remember well how they have known that 9 times 9 makes 72 or that 21 is a prime Number or some such-like Error from whence they draw false Conclusions Thus it is necessary to know God and to know that he is no Deceiver if we will be fully convinced that the most certain Sciences as Arithmetick and Geometry are true Sciences for without that their Evidence is not full and we may still refuse our Assent And it is further necessary to know by a simple View and not by Reasoning that God is no Deceiver since that may always be false if we suppose God to deceive us All common Proofs of the Existence and Perfections of God taken from the Existence and Perfections of his Creatures have this Defect it seems That they convince not the Mind by a simple View All these Proofs are Reasonings which are convincing in themselves But being Reasonings they are not convincing if we suppose an ill Genius which deceives us They sufficiently prove that there is a Power Superior to us for even this Extravagant Supposition establisheth it But they do not fully convince that there is a God or an Infinitely Perfect Being So in these Reasonings the Conclusion is more evident than the Principles It is more plain that there is a Power Superior to us than that there is a World since there is no Supposition that can hinder us from demonstrating this Superior Power whereas supposing an ill Genius which delights to deceive us it is impossible to prove there is a World For we might always conceive that this Ill Genius would give us Sensations of things which existed not As our Dreams and certain Sicknesses make us see things that never were and make us even effectively feel Pain in our Imaginary Members which we have lost or which we never had But the Proofs of the Existence and Perfections of God taken from the Idea we have of Infinity are Proofs from a simple View We see that there is a God as soon as we behold Infinity because necessary Existence is included in the Idea of Infinity and there is nothing but Infinity to which we can give the Idea we have of an Infinite Being We see also that God is no Deceiver because knowing that he is infinitely Perfect and that Infinity wants no Perfection we see clearly that he will not seduce us and even that he cannot since he is not capable of willing it So that there is a God and a True God who cannot deceive us although he does not always enlighten us and though we often deceive our selves when we think he enlightens us All these Truths are seen at one view by an attentive Mind although we seem here to use a train of Arguments to shew them to others We may suppose them as undoubted Principles upon which we may reason for having first discovered that God is not pleased with deceiving us we may then be permitted to reason It is evident that the Certainty of Faith also depends upon this Principle That there is a God which is not capable of deceiving us For the Existence of God and Infallibility of the Divine Authority are rather Natural Knowledges and Notions common to Minds that are capable of a Serious Attention than Articles of Faith Although it be a particular Gift of God to have a Mind capable of a sufficient Attention to apprehend and be willing to apprehend these Truths as we ought From this Principle That God is no Deceiver we may also conclude That we certainly have a Body to which we are united after a very particular manner and that we are surrounded with many others For we are Internally convinced of their Existence by the continual Sensations that God produces in us and which we cannot correct by Reason without hurting our Faith although we may by Reason correct the Sensations which represent them to us with certain Qualities and Perfections which they have not So that we ought not to believe them such as we see them or imagine them but only that they Exist and are such as we conceive them by our Reason But that we may reason orderly we ought not yet to examine whether or no we have a Body and if there are any others about us or whether we have only Sensations of Bodies which Exist not These Questions include too great Difficulties and it is not perhaps so necessary to resolve them to perfect our Knowledge as we may imagine nor even to have an exact Knowledge of Physicks Morality and some other Sciences
they mean and all the Diffiulty there is to resolve this trifling Question proceeds from their not having conceived it clearly and not thinking that Fishermen as well as others sometimes look in their Cloaths for certain little Animals which they throw away as soon as they have taken them and still carry with them what they cannot catch Sometimes also there are not all the necessary Conditions in a Question for the answering it and that makes it at least as difficult as when unuseful ones are added For instance in this to make a Man immoveable without binding or hurting him or rather having put a Man's little Finger in his own Ear by this Posture to make him so immoveable that he cannot stir from the Place where he is put until his little Finger is taken from his Ear again This at first appears impossible and it is so indeed for we can walk very well although our little Finger be in our Ear. But here is a Condition wanting which would remove all Difficulty if it was expressed viz. That he must be made to embrace some Pillar or something like it with that Arm whereof the Finger is in his Ear for then he cannot get from the Place without taking his Finger from his Ear. It is not added as a Condition of a Question that there is yet some other thing to do on purpose that the Mind should not seek for it nor discover it But those who undertake to resolve these sort of Questions must make all necessary Demands to clear the Point wherein the Difficulty of the Question consists These Arbitrary Questions seem to be trifling and so indeed they are in one Sence for we learn nothing by resolving them Yet are they not so different from Natural Questions as perhaps we may think them to be we must do very nigh the same things to resolve both For if the Craft and Malice of Men make Arbitrary Questions perplexing and difficult to resolve Natural Effects are also in themselves incompassed with Obscurity and Darkness And these Darknesses must be dispersed by the Attention of the Mind and Experiments which are kind of Demands that we make to the Author of Nature even as we take away Equivocal and useless Circumstances from Arbitrary Questions by Attention of the Mind and by the proper Demands we make to those who propose them But let us explain these things Methodically and in a more Serious and Instructive Manner There is a great Number of Questions which seem very difficult because we understand them not and which therefore want an Explication Yet which ought rather to pass for Axioms than true Questions for it seems to me that we ought not to place in the Number of Questions certain undoubted Propositions whose Terms we conceive We demand for instance as a Question difficult to be resolved whether or no the Soul is immortal because those that make the Question or that pretend to resolve it do not clearly conceive the Terms of it As the Words Soul and Immortal signifie different things and know not how they are understood so they cannot resolve whether it is Immortal or not For they neither know precisely what they demand nor what they seek By this Word Soul we may understand a Substance which thinks wills feels c. we may take the Soul for the Circulation of the Blood and Configuration of the Parts of the Body or we may take it for the Blood and Animal Spirits So by this Word Immortal we mean what cannot perish by the ordinary Power of Nature or else what can never change or what can neither corrupt nor dissipate like a Vapour or Smoke Thus suppose we take the Words Soul and Immortal in some one of these Significations the least Attention of Mind will make us able to judge whether it is Immortal or not For first 't is plain that the Soul taken in the first Sense viz. for a Substance which thinks is Immortal if we also take Immortal in the first Sense for what cannot perish by the common Power of Nature for 't is not even conceivable that any Substance can become nothing we must have Recourse to the extraordinary Power of God to conceive it possible Secondly the Soul is immortal if we take Immortal in the third Sense for what cannot corrupt nor resolve into a Vapour or Smoke for 't is evident that what cannot be divided into an infinite Number of Parts cannot corrupt or be resolved into a Vapour Thirdly the Soul is not Immortal if we take Immortal in the second Sense for what cannot change For we have sufficient convincing Proofs of the Variations of our Soul That sometimes it feels Pain sometimes Pleasure sometimes it wills certain things and then again ceases to will them as being united to the Body it cannot be separated from them c. If we take the Word Soul in any other Signification 't will be very easie to see whether it is Immortal or not by taking the Word Immortal in a fixed and certain Sense so that what makes these Questions difficult is because we conceive them not distinctly and the Terms which express them are Equivocal so that they have rather need of Explanation than Proof It is true some Persons are stupid enough and others sufficiently Imaginative to take the Soul always for a certain Configuration of the Parts of the Brain arid Motion of the Spirits and it is certainly impossible to prove to these sort of Men that the Soul is Imortal and cannot perish For on the contrary 't is evident that the Soul taken in the Sense they understand it is Mortal so that 't is not a Question difficult to resolve but a Proposition difficult to make Men understand which have not the same Idea's of it as we have and who do all they can not to have them and to blind themselves When it is asked if the Soul is Immortal or any other Question whatever we must immediately take away the Equivocal Terms and know in what Sense they are taken that we may be able distinctly to conceive the Condition of the Question And if those that propose it know not what they mean we must require them to form some distinct Notions and determine them If we ask them and find their Idea's agree not with ours it will be useless to answer them For what Answer can we make to a Man who for instance imagines that a Desire is only the Motion of some Spirits and a Thought is nothing else but a Trace or an Image that Objects or Spirits have produced in the Brain and that all the reasoning of Men consist merely in the different Situation of some little Parts which are diversely disposed in the Head To answer him that the Soul taken in the Sense he means it is Immortal is to deceive him or make our selves ridiculous to him But to answer him it is Immortal would be in one Sense to confirm him in an Error of the greatest
Consequence We must therefore not answer him at all but only endeavour to make him re-enter into himself that he may receive the same Idea's as we do of him who is only capable of enlightening him 'T is also a Question which appears difficult enough to resolve viz. Whether Beasts have a Soul or not Yet when we take away the Equivocation it seems no longer difficult and the Generality of those Men who think they have do not know the Opinions of those who think they have not We may take the Soul for something Corporeal diffused through the whole Body which gives it Life and Motion or else for something Spiritual Those who say Animals have no Soul understand it in the Second Sense for no Man ever denied but that there was in Animals something Corporeal which was the Principle of their Life and Motion since they cannot even deny it to Watches Those on the contrary who affirm Animals have Souls mean it in the first Sense for there are few who believe Animals have a Spiritual and indivisible Soul so that the Peripateticks and Cartesians do both believe that Beasts have a Soul viz. a Corporeal Principle of their Motion and both of them believe they have none viz. That they have nothing in them Spiritual and indivisible Thus the Difference that is between the Peripateticks and Cartesians is not in that the first believe Beasts have Souls and the last believe it not But only in that the first think Animals capable of feeling Pain Pleasure seeing Colours hearing Sounds and generally of having all the Sensations and Passions that we have and the last doubt it The Cartesians distinguish the Word Sensation to take away the Equivocation of it For instance they say that when we are too near the Fire the Particles of Wood strike against the Hand and shake the Fibres that this shaking is communicated to the Brain that it determines the Animal Spirits which are there contained to diffuse themselves through the External Parts of the Body in a proper manner to make them retire They agree that all these things or the like may meet in Animals and that they certainly meet there because these are the Properties of Bodies and the Peripateticks grant this The Cartesians further say that in Man the shaking of the Fibres of his Brain is accompanied with a Sensation of Heat and that the Course of the Animal Spirits to the Heart or Bowels is followed with the Passion of Hatred or Aversion But deny that these Sensations or Passions of the Soul is in Beasts The Peripateticks on the contrary affirm that Beasts feel Heat as well as we that like us they have an Aversion for whatever incommodes them and generally that they are capable of all the Sensations and Passions that we are The Cartesians do not think that Beasts feel Pain or Pleasure or that they love or hate any thing because they admit nothing but what is material in Beasts and they do not believe that Sensations or Passions are Properties of Matter whatever it may be Some Peripateticks on the contrary think that Matter is capable of Sensation and Passion when it is as they say Subtilized that Beasts may feel by the means of Animal Spirits viz. by the means of a Matter extreamly fine and delicate and that even the Soul is not capable of Sensation and Passion but only as it is united to this Matter Thus to resolve the Question whether Beasts have a Soul we must re-enter into our selves and consider the Idea we have of Matter with all the Attention we are capable of And if we conceive that Matter Figured after such manner as Square Round Oval c. is capable of Pain Pleasure Heat and Cold Colour Smells Sound c. we may affirm that the Souls of Beasts how material soever they are may be capable of Sensation If we conceive it not we must not assert it is for we must only affirm what we conceive So if we conceive that Matter agitated up and down in a Circular Spiral Parabolick Eliptick Line c. be capable of Love Hatred Joy Sorrow c. we may say that Beasts have the same Passions with us If we see it not we must not say it at least without confessing we speak what we do not know But I think it may be affirmed that we never believe any Motion of Matter can be capable of Love or Joy provided we think Seriously of it So that to resolve this Question if Beasts feel we need only take away the Equivocation as Cartesians do for this way we reduce it to a Simple Question that an indifferent Attention of Mind will suffice to resolve it It is true that St. Austin supposing according to the common Prejudice that Beasts have Souls or at least I have not read in his Works that he ever Seriously examined it or called it in Question and perceiving well the Contradiction of saying that a Soul or Substance that thinks feels desires c. should be Material he believed that the Souls of Beasts were certainly Spiritual and Indivisible He has proved by evident Reasons L 4. de anima ejus origine c. 23. l. 5. de quantitate animae and elsewhere that all Souls that is whatever feels imagines fears doubts desires c. are necessarily Spiritual but I have not observed that he had any Reason to say that Beasts had Souls He does not give himself the Trouble to prove it because 't is very probable that in his Time there was hardly any one that doubted of it Now there are some who endeavour wholly to deliver themselves from their Prejudices and who call all Opinions in Question that are not maintained upon clear and demonstrative Reasons who begin to doubt whether Animals have a Soul capable of the same Sensations and Passions as ours but they always find many prejudiced Defenders who pretend to prove that Beasts feel will think and reason as we do although in a much more imperfect manner Dogs say they know their Masters they love them suffer patiently the Blows they receive from them because they judge it advantageous for them not to abandon them But for Strangers they hate them so violently that they cannot so much as suffer themselves to be caressed by them All Animals have a Love for their Young Ones and those Birds that make their Nests in the Extreme Branches of a Tree make it plainly appear that they fear certain Animals that would devour them They think these Branches are too weak to bear their Enemies and yet strong enough to support their Little Ones and Nests too There is amongst the Spiders and the most vile Insects something that looks like an Intelligence which Animates them For we cannot forbear admiring the Conduct of an Animal which although blind finds a means to catch others in its Snares that have both Eyes and Wings and are bold enough to attack the greatest Animal that is It is true that all the
Actions of Beasts shew that there is an Intelligence for whatever is regular declares it a Watch even shews it It is impossible that Chance should compose its Wheels there must be an Intelligence which has regulated its Motions We plant a Seed in an inverse Order the Roots which are upwards sink of themselves into the Earth and the Germ which was turn'd towards the Earth also turns again to come forth and this testifies an Intelligence This Plant is joynted at convenient Distances to fortifie it self it covers its Grain with a Skin to preserve it if encompasses it with Prickles which defends it This shews an Intelligence In fine all that we see Plants do as well as Animals certainly denotes an Intelligence All true Cartesians grant it But they all distinguish for they take away as much as possible the Equivocation of Terms The Motions of Beasts and Plants shew an Intelligence but this Intelligence is not of Matter it is distinct from Beasts as that which disposes the Wheels of a Watch is distinct from the Watch. For indeed this Intelligence appears infinitely wise infinitely powerful and the same which has formed us in our Mothers Belly and given us Growth to which we could not by all the Efforts of our Minds and will add one Cubit Thus in Animals there is neither Intelligence nor Soul as we commonly understand it They eat without Pleasure cry without Pain and grow without Knowledge They fear nothing they know nothing and they act after such a manner as intelligently shews that it is God who made them that preserves them he has so formed their Bodies that they Machinally and without Fear shun whatsoever would destroy them otherwise we must grant that there is more Understanding in the least Animal or even in one Grain than in the Wisest Man For it is certain there is more different Parts and more regular Motions produced in them than we are capable of knowing But as Men are accustomed to confound all things and to imagine that their Soul produces in their Bodies almost all the Motions and Changes that happen to it They falsly affix to the Word Soul the Idea of producing and preserving Bodies Thus they think their Soul produces in them whatsoever is absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life although it know not even how the Body it Animates is composed They judge it necessary that there should be a Soul in Beasts to produce all the Motions and Changes which happen to them because they are like to what is performed in our Bodies For Beasts are begotten nourished fortified as out Bodies are They Drink Eat Sleep like us because we are wholly like Beasts in our Bodies and all the difference there is between us and them is That we have a Soul and they have not But the Soul we have does not form our Bodies it digests not our Food it gives neither Motion nor Heat to our Blood It Feels Wills and Reasons and animates the Body in this respect It has Sensations and Passions which have relation to it It is not that 't is diffused through all our Members that it communicates Sensation and Life to it for our Body can receive nothing of what occurs in our Mind It is then plain That the reason why we cannot resolve many Questions is because we distinguish nor and even forget to distinguish the different things that the same word may signifie Sometimes indeed we may think of distinguishing but then often we do it so ill that instead of taking away the Equivocation of Terms by the Distinctions we give them we make them become more obscure For instance If it be demanded whether the Body sees how it sees and after what manner the reasonable Soul animates the Animal Spirits the Blood and other living Humours if the Teeth Hair and Nails are animated c. we distinguish the words to live and be animated in living or being animated with a rational Soul or a Sensitive or a Vegetative one but this distinction does only confound the state of the Question for these words themselves have need of an Explanation and it may be even that the two last Vegetative and Sensitive Soul are inexplicable and incomprehensible after the manner we commonly understand them But if we would joyn any clear and distinct Idea to the word Life we may say that the Life of the Soul is the Knowledge of Truth and Love of God or rather that its Thought is its Life And that the Life of the Body consists in the Circulation of the Blood and just Temperament of Humours or rather that the Life of the Body is the Motion of its Parts proper for its Preservation And then the Idea's applied to the word Life being clear it will also be evident 1. That the Soul cannot communicate its Life to the Body for it cannot make it Think 2. That it cannot give it the Life by which it is nourished grows c. since it cannot so much as know how it must digest what it eats 3. It can make it feel any thing since Matter is incapable of Sensation c. Thus we may without Pain resolve all other Questions that can be put upon this Subject provided the Terms whereby they are expressed stir up clear Idea's And it is impossible to resolve them if the Idea's of the Terms which express them are confused and obscure Yet is it not always absolutely necessary to have Idea's which perfectly represent the things whose Relations we would examine It often suffices to have an imperfect or weak Knowledge of them because sometimes we do not enquire after an exact Knowledge of their Relations as I shall here explain There are Truths or Relations of two sorts some exactly known and others that are but imperfectly discovered We exactly know the Relation between such a Square and such a Triangle but we do not perfectly know the Relation between Paris and Orleance we know that a Square is equal to a Triangle or double or treble to it c. but we only know that Paris is greater than Orleance without knowing how much Moreover Between imperfect Knowledges there are an infinite number of Degrees and even all these Knowledges are only imperfect in relation to the more perfect ones For instance We perfectly know that Paris is greater than the Royal Place and that Knowledge is not imperfect but in relation to an exact Knowledge according to which we should justly know how much Paris is bigger than the place it includes Thus there are Questions of many sorts 1. There are some in which we seek the perfect Knowledge of all exact Relations that two or many things have between themselves 2. There are some in which we enquire after the perfect Knowledge of some exact Relation between two or many things 3. There are some in which we seek a perfect Knowledge of some Relation that is very near exact which is between two or more things 4. And some wherein we
striking Body rebounds more because the Elasticity is stronger If the striking is very small and the stricken very great and heavy the striking will rebound still more because of the Weight and great Quantity of Air which encompasses the stricken that resists this Motion In fine if the Force of the Hardness is either diminished or encreased by the Colum of Air which answers to the stricken the striking which rebounds would continue in Rest after Percussion Or on the contrary the striking which would continue in Rest after the Percussion may rebound All that is to be done then is to compare the Hardness of Bodies which meet and the Air which the impuls'd Body must agitate anew in the Time of Percussion that it may move to foresee very near what must happen in the Percussion of different Bodies I always suppose an equal Swiftness in the meeting for the Air resists a great Motion more than it does a small one and there is as much Motion in a Body half as little again as another when it goes as fast again as this other Thus the stricken being pushed twice as swift again it may be considered as having a Colum of Air twice as great to impel it But we must also observe that in the Moment that one Body shocks another the Parts of these same Bodies have two contrary Motions For those that are foremost have an Inclination to turn because of the Shock at the same Time that those that are behind incline to advance because of the first Motion and 't is this Countermotion that flattens soft Bodies and even makes certain hard Bodies break Now when Bodies are very hard this counterblow which shakes their Parts and causes a kind of trembling in them as appears by the Sound they make always produces some Change in the Communication of Motion which is very difficult to be discovered for many Reasons and it seems to me very useless to examine it in particular If one would think upon all these things I believe he might easily answer some Difficulties that may still remain upon this Subject But if I thought what I have said was not sufficient to shew that Rest has no Power to resist Motion and that the Rules of the Communication of Motion given by Descartes are in Part false I would here prove that according co his Supposition 't would be impossible to move in the Air and that what makes the Circulation of Motion in fluid Bodies to be possible without recurring to a Void is that the first Element being easily divided after many different Manners the rest of its Parts would have no Power to resist Motion THE CONCLUSION OF THE Three Last Books IT seems to me that I have in the fourth and fifth Book sufficiently shown that the Natural Inclinations and Passions of Men make them often fall into Error because they incline them more to precipitate Judgments than to examine things carefully In the fourth Book I have shown that the Inclination for Good in general is the cause of the Wills inquietude That the Inquietude of the Will puts the Mind into a continual Agitation And that a Mind that is always agitated is wholly incapable of discovering Truths that are but a little intricate That the Love of new and extraordinary things often prejudice us in favour of them and whatever bears the Character of Infinity is capable of dazling our Imagination and seducing us I have explained how the Inclination we have for Greatness Honours and Independance insensibly engage us into false Learning or into the Study of all these vain and useless Sciences which flatter our secret Pride because they make us be admir'd by the Vulgar I have shew'd that our Inclinations for Pleasure continually turn the Mind from the Contemplation of abstracted Truths which are the most Simple and most Fruitful and permit it not to consider any thing with sufficient Attention and Disinterest to be able to judge well of it That Pleasures being the Modes of the Souls Existences they necessarily divide the Capacity of the Mind and a Mind divided cannot fully comprehend whatever has any thing of Extension In fine I have shewn that the Relation and Natural Union we have with all those we live with is the occasion of many Errors that we are subject to and communicate to others as others communicate those to us wherein they fall themselves In the fifth Book I have endeavoured to give some Idea of our Passions I have I think sufficiently shewn that they are established to unite us to all sensible things to assist with a Disposition which is proper for the Preservation of our Life And that as our Senses unite us to our Body and diffuse our Soul if I may so say into all the parts which compose it so our Emotions make us as it were go out of our selves to be diffused through all things that are about us And lastly That they continually represent things to us not as they are in themselves to form true Judgments but according to the Relation they have to us to form Judgments that are useful for the Preservation of our Being and of those with whom we are naturally or voluntarily united After having attempted to discover our Errors in their Causes and to deliver the Mind from the Prejudices to which it is subject I thought it was time to prepare it for an Enquiry after Truth Thus I have in the sixth Book explained the means which seem to me the most Natural to increase the Attention and Capacity of the Mind by shewing the use that we may make of our Senses Passions and Imagination to give it all the Force and Penetration whereof it is capable Afterwards I have established certain Rules that are necessary to be observed in the Discovery of any Truth whatever it be I have explained them by many Instances to make them more sensible and have made choice of those which appeared the most useful to me or which included the most pregnant and general Truths that they may be read with more Application and made more Sensible and Familiar If may be by this Essay of Method we shall discover the Necessity there is of reasoning upon clear and eviden Idea's and such as we are inwardly convinced that all Nations agree in and never pass to Compound things before we have sufficiently examined the Simple ones upon which those depend And if we consider that Aristotle and his Followers have not observed the Rules I have explained as we ought to be convinced by the Proofs I have brought of it and by a Knowledge of the Opinions of the most Zealous Defenders of this Philosopher perhaps we shall condemn his Doctrine notwithstanding all the Impressions which perswade some who suffer themselves to be entangled by words they understand not But if we observe the manner of Descartes's Philosophy we cannot doubt of Solidity for I have sufficiently shewn that he reasons only upon clear and evident Idea's and
God only because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil For they cannot hate Good considered as such So that 't is by the same motion of love that God imprints on them to Good that they Hate him Now they judge that God is not Good because they make not that use as they ought of their liberty Not being convinced by an undoubted evidence that God is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently Hate him We must distinguish two things in Hatred the Sensation of the Soul and motion of the Will The Sensation cannot be bad For 't is a modification of the Soul which Morally speaking has neither Good nor Ill in it For the motion it is not ill neither since it is not distinct from that of Love For external Evil being only a privation of Good it is evident that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to incline towards Good So that whatever there is of real and positive in the Hatred even of God hath nothing bad in it And the Sinner cannot hate God but by making an abominable abuse of the action that God continually gives him to induce him to love himself God causes whatever we have that is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence This Explanation relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence As the difficulties that are raised about Concupiscence have much relation to those things I have explained it will be proper for me here to show that God is not the Author of Concupiscence altho' he performs all things in us and 't is only he who produces even sensible Pleasures in us It seems undoubted to me that we ought to grant for the Reasons I have given in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that following the Natural Laws of the union of the Soul and Body Man even before Sin was carried by a foresight of Pleasure to the use of sensible Goods and that every time that certain traces were formed in the chief part of his Brain certain thoughts were produced in his Mind Now these Laws were very just for the Reasons brought in the same Chapter This supposed as before the Fall all things were perfectly well regulated so Man had necessarily a power over his Body that he cou'd hinder the formation of these traces when he wou'd for order requires that the Mind shou'd govern the Body Now this power of Mans Mind over his Body consisted strictly in that according to his desires and different applicacations he could stop the communication of the Motions which were produced in his Body by those Objects that were about him over which his Will had not an immediate and direct power as it had over his own Body I dont see how we can conceive that after any other manner he coud hinder the traces from being formed in his Brain Thus the Will of God or general Law of Nature which is the true cause of the communication of Motion wou'd on certain occasions depend upon Adams Will for God had this respect for him that he produced not new Motions in his Body if he consented not to them or at least in the chief part of it to which the Soul is immediately united Such was the Institution of Nature before Sin Order requires it so and consequently he whose Will is ever conformable to Order Now this Will continuing always the same the Sin of the first Man has overturn'd the Order of Nature because the first Man having Sinned Order woud not permit him absolutely to rule over any thing In the Objection of the 7th Article of the Explanation of the 7th Cap. of the 2d l. I explain what I speak here in general of the loss that Man sustain'd as to the power he had over his Body It is not just that the Sinner shoud suspend the communication of Motions that the Will of God shou'd be accommodated to his and that in favour of him there shoud be exceptions in the Law of Nature So that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends upon his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions in consequence of his most Just Law who united both parts of which he is composed Thus formal Concupiscence as well as formal Sin is nothing real It is in Man only the loss of that power he had of suspending the communication of Motions on certain occasions We must not admit in God a positive Will of producing it This loss that Man has sustained is not a Natural consequence of the Will of God which is ever conformable to order and always the same 't is a consequence of Sin which has made Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence and Justice So that we must say that God is not the cause of Concupiscence but only Sin Yet whatever is real and positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence is performed by God Aug. against the two Epistles of the Pel. l. 1. cap. 15 c. for God effects whatever is done but that is no Evil 'T is by the General Law of Nature 't is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce certain Motions in the Body of Man and that these Motions excite certain Sensations in the Soul useful for the preservation of the Body or propagation of the Species who dares then say that these things are not good in themselves I know very well that we say Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures we say it but do we know it Can we think that Sin which is nothing shou'd actually produce something Can we conceive nothing to be a Cause However we say it but it may be the reason is because we will not take pains enough to think seriously upon what we say or else it is because we will begin an Explication which is contrary to what we have heard persons say who it may be spoke with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Understanding Sin is the cause of Concupiscence but it is not the cause of Pleasure as Free-will is the cause of Sin without being the cause of the Natural Motion of the Soul The pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its motion or love and there is nothing good that God does not The rebellion of the Body and malignity of Pleasure proceeds from Sin as the inclination of the Soul to or its acquiescence in a particular good comes from the Sinner But these are only privations and nothings that the Creature is capable of All Pleasure is good and even in some manner makes him happy that enjoys it at least whilest he enjoys it But we may say that Pleasure is Evil because instead of raising the Mind to him that causes it it happens through the errour of our Mind and corruption of our Heart that it
abases it towards sensible Objects which seem to cause it It is Evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently deserve to be punish'd rather than rewarded to oblige God in pursuance of his Primitive Will to recompence us with agreeable Sensations In a word for I will not repeat here what I have already said it is Evil because God now forbids it since it alienates the Mind from him for whom it was made and preserv'd for that which God ordain'd to preserve the Righteous Man in his Innocence now establishes the Wicked Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely ordain'd as the easiest and most obvious expedient to teach Man without diverting his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the Bodies about him these Sensations I say at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fix him on Objects incapable of acting and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he occasionally enjoys from them THE SECOND EXPLANATION OF THE First Chapter of the First Book Where I say That the Will cannot differently determine the Impession it has towards good but by Commanding the Understanding to represent some particular Object to it WE must not imagine that the Will commands the Understanding otherwise than by its desire and motions for the Will has no other Action Neither must we believe that the Understanding obeys the Will in producing in it self the Ideas of those things which the Soul desires For the Understanding does not Act It only receives the Light or the Ideas of Objects by the necessary union it has with him who includes all Beings after an intelligible manner as we have explained it in the Third Book See the Explanation of the 6th Chapter of the 2d Part of the 3d Book This then is the whole Mystery Man participates of the Soveraign Reason and Truth discovers it self to him proportionally as he applies himself to it and prays it The desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer which is always granted for it is a Natural Law that the Ideas should be so much the more present to the Mind as the Will desires them with the more fervency Thus provided the Capacity we have of thinking or our Understanding be not filled with the Confus'd Sensations we receive by means of what passes in our Body we never desire to think on any Object but the Idea of the said Object is immediately present to us and as experience it self teaches us the said Idea is the more present and clear according as our desire is stronger and that the confused Sensations we receive by the Body are weaker and less sensible as I have already observ'd in the preceding Remark Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to present some particular Object to it I only meant that the Soul which would consider that Object with attention draws near unto it by its desire because this desire pursuant to the efficacious Will of God which is the inviolable Law of Nature is the cause of the presence and clearness of the Idea which represents that Object I could not express my self otherwise nor explain my self as I do now since I had not as yet proved that God alone is the Author of our Ideas and that our particular Wills are the Occasional Causes of it I spoke according to the common Opinion and I have often been forced so to do because all things cannot be said at one and the same time Readers must have Equity and trust for some time in order to be satisfied for none but Geometricians can always pay in ready Coin AN EXPLANATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER Where I say That it is no Wonder we have no Evidence of the Mysteries of Faith since we have not so much as Ideas of them VVHen I say that we have no Ideas of the Mysteries of Faith Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur De Trinitate B. 7. Ch. 4. Cum quoeritur quid tres Magnâ prorsus inopiâ humanum laborat eloquium Dictum est tamen tres Personae non ut illud diceretur sed non taceretur In the same place B. 5. Ch. 9. it is visible by what precedes and what follows that I speak of the clear Ideas which produce Light and Evidence and by which we have a Comprehension of the Object if I may so speak I grant for Instance that a Peasant could never believe that the Son of God was made Man or that there are Three Persons in the Godhead unless he had some Idea of the union of the Word with our Humanity and some notion of Person But if those Ideas were clear we might by applying our selves to them perfectly apprehend those Mysteries and explain them to others they would no longer be ineffable Mysteries The Word Person according to St. Augustin has been spoken of the Father of the Son and of the Holy Ghost not so much clearly to explain what they are as not to be silent upon a Mystery which we are oblig'd to speak of I say here that we have no Ideas of our Misteries as I have said elsewhere that we have no Ideas of our Soul because the Idea we have of our Soul is not clear no more than that of our Mysteries Thus this Word Idea is Equivocal I have sometimes taken it for whatever represents to the Mind any Object whether clearly or confusedly I have taken it yet more generally for whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind But I have also taken it for that which represents things to the Mind in so clear a manner that a Man may discover at first fight whether such or such Modifications belong to them Therefore I said sometimes that we had an Idea of the Soul and sometimes I have denied it It is difficult and often tiresom and disagreeable to keep too rigorous an exactness in our Expressions since it is sufficient to make our selves understood When an Author only contradicts himself in the Mind of those who Criticise upon him and who are desirous he should contradict himself he needs not much value it and if he should undertake by a tedious Explanation to solve whatever the malice or ignorance of some Persons might urge against him he would not only make an ill Book but moreover the Readers would be displeased at his Answers to his Objections that would be contrary to a certain Equity which all Men pretend to For Men hate to be suspected either of Malice or Ignorance and commonly Men are not allowed to answer weak and malicious Objections until they are actually made whereby the Readers are secured against the reproach which such Answers seem to charge those with who exact them AN EXPLANATION OF These Words of the First Chapter This being granted we must say that Adam was not induced to the Love of God
God than of Bodies and when they look within themselves they discover more clearly certain Wills of God according to which he preserves all Beings than those of their best Friends or of those whom they have study'd all their life For that Union of their Mind with God and of their Will with his I mean with the Eternal Law or with the Immutable Order is an immediate direct and necessary Union and the union they have with sensible Objects being only Establish'd for the preservation of their Health and Life it only makes them know those Objects according to the relation they have to that design It is this immediate and direct Union which is only known says St. Augustin by those whose Mind is purified which enlightens us in the most secret recesses of our Reason and exhorts and moves us in the most inward part of our Heart 'T is this which teaches us what God Thinks and even what God Wills that is his Eternal Truths and Laws for no body can question our knowing some of them evidently But the union we have with our best Friends does not teach us evidently either what they think or what they will We think we know it perfectly but we are commonly mistaken when we only know it because they tell it us The Union we have by our Senses with Bodies which surround us cannot inform us neither For the relation of the Senses is never absolutely true nay it is often false in all respects according as I have explained it in this Book And therefore I say that it is more difficult than Men think to prove positively that there are Bodies notwithstanding our Senses assure us there are because Reason does not assure us of it so positively as we imagine and because it is necessary to consult it with great application to be satisfied in it But as Men are more sensible than reasonable and hearken more willingly to the Testimony of their Senses than to that of internal Truth they have always consulted their Eyes to assure themselves of the Existence of Matter without giving themselves the trouble to consult their Reason And therefore they are surprised when they are told that it is difficult to demonstrate it They think it is sufficient to open their Eyes to see that there are Bodies and in case there is any fear of being deluded they think it sufficient to draw near and to touch them after which they can hardly conceive there can be any reason to doubt of their Existence But our Eyes represent Colours to us upon the surface of Bodies and Light in the Air and in the Sun Our Ears convey Sounds to us as being dispers'd thrô the Air and Bodies which reverberate the Eccho And if we credit the Relation of the other Senses Heat will be in Fire Sweetness in Sugar Odor in Musk and all sensible qualities in the Bodies which seem to exhale or to disperse them Nevertheless it is certain by the Reasons I have alledg'd in the first Book of The Search after Truth That all those Qualifications are not out of the Soul which feels them at least it is not evident that they are in the Bodies which surround us Why then should we conclude on the bare Relation of the Senses which deceive us on all occasions that there are indeed external Bodies and even that these Bodies are like unto those we see I mean those which are the immediate Object of our Soul when we look upon any with the Eyes of our Body Certainly this is not without its difficulty what ever men may say of it Moreover if we may assure our selves of the exiistence of any Body by the bare Relation of our Senses it is particularly of that to which our Soul is immediately united The most lively Sensation and that which seems to have the most necessary Relation to any Body actually existing is Pain Nevertheless it happens often that those who have lost an Arm feel violent Pains in it even long after its Amputation They are very sensible that they have lost it when they consult their Memory or look upon their Body but the sensation of Pain deceives them And if as it sometimes comes to pass one should suppose their absolutely losing the Remembrance of what they have been and their retaining no other Sense but that by which they feel a Pain in their imaginary Arm certainly they could never persuade themselves that they have not an Arm in which they feel such cruel Pains There have been Men who fancied they had Horns upon their heads others who believed themselves to be Butter or Glass or that their Body was not form'd like other Men that it was like that of a Cock of a Woolf of an Ox. It will be urg'd that they were mad and I grant it But their Soul might be mistaken in those things and consequently all Men may fall into the like Errors if they judge of things according to the Relation of their Senses For it is observable that those Mad-men really behold themselves as they fancy they are The Error is not precisely in the Sentiment they have but in the Judgment they form for if they did say barely that they feel or behold themselves like a Cock they would not be deceived They are only deceived in believing that their Body is like unto that which they feel I mean to that which is the immediate Object of their Mind when they consider themselves Thus those who believe they are such as they really are are no more judicious than Mad-men in the judgment they form of themselves if they only judge barely according to the Relation of their Senses It is not by Reason but good Fortune they are not deceiv'd But at the bottom how can we be certain whether those who are called Mad-men are really so Might not one say that they only seem to be mad because they have particular Sentiments For it is evident that a Man is look'd upon as a Mad-man not because he sees that which is not but because he sees the contrary of what others see whether others are deceived or not A Peasant's eyes for instance are disposed in such a manner that he sees the Moon such as she really is or such only as she is seen We partly see those things when we behold the Moon through a Telescope or perhaps as she will be seen at some time or other with Prospectives of a new Invention He looks upon her with Admiration and cries out to his companions What huge Mountains do I see what deep Valleys what Seas what Lakes what Gulphs what Rocks Do you not see many Seas towards the East and that there is hardly any thing but Lands and Mountains towards the West and South Do you not behold a Mountain on that very side much higher than any of those we have ever seen and do you not admire a perfect black Sea or a horrid Whirl pool in the centre of that Planet What will
his Companions answer to such Exclamations and what will they think of him That he is a Mad-man who has been distemper'd by the malignant Influences of the Planet which he admires and considers He is alone of that opinion and that is sufficient Thus to be mad in the opinion of others it is not necessary to be so effectively it is sufficient to think or to see things otherwise than they do For should all Men fancy themselves to be Cocks he that should think himself to be what he really is would certainly be lookt upon as a Mad-man But perhaps some will ask whether Men have a Bill at the end of their Nose and a Cock's-comb upon their head I suppose not But I know nothing of it when I only judge by my Senses and know not how to make that use of them which I ought to do let me feel my Face and my Head never so much I only feel my Body and those which surround me with hands of which I neither know the length nor figure I do not so much as know certainly that I have hands I only know it while I think I stir them There are certain Motions in a certain part of my Brain which according to the general opinion is the Seat of common Sense but perhaps I want that very part which people speak so much of and which is so little known at least I do not feel it in my self though I feel my hands So that I have yet more reason to believe I have hands than that little Glandula pinealis which Men still daily dispute about But in fine I neither know the figure not the motions of that little Gland and yet I am told That that only can instruct me in the figure and motion of my Body and of those which surround me What then are we oblig'd to think of all this That it is not the Body which instructs Reason That the part to which the Soul is immediately united is neither visible nor intelligible of it self That neither our Body nor those that are about it can be the immediate Object of our Mind That we cannot learn from our Brain whether it actually exists and much less whether there are Bodies that surround us That for that Reason we are oblig'd to acknowledge that there is some superiour Intelligence which alone is capable of acting in us and which may act after such a manner in us as truly to represent external Bodies to us without giving us the least Idea of our Brain though the Motions which are produced in our Brain are an occasion for it to discover those Bodies to us For in fine we see with eyes whose figure we know not how the Bodies which surround us are figured And though the Colours which appear upon Objects are not more lively than those which are painted upon the Optick Nerve we do not in the least see these even while we admire the beauty of the others But after all what obligation lyes on that Intelligence to shew us Bodies when our Brain has certain motions or what necessity is there of external Bodies to excite motions in our Brain Do not Sleep Passions and Folly produce those motions without the help of those external Bodies Is it evident that Bodies which cannot move each other n = * See the 3d Chap. of the 2d part of the 6 Book and the Explanation on the said Chapter should communicate to those they meet a moving force which they have not in themselves Yet allowing that Bodies move themselves and those they hit against shall not he who gives a Being to all things be able of him self to excite in our Brain those motions to which the Ideas of our Mind are affix'd In fine where is the Contradiction That our Brain being without new motions our Soul should nevertheless have new Ideas since it is certain that the motions of the Brain do not produce the Ideas of the Soul that we have not so much as a knowledge of those Motions and that God only can represent our Ideas to us n = †See the 6. Chap. of the 2. part of the 3. Book and the Explanation on the said Chapter as I have prov'd elsewhere Therefore it is absolutely necessary to be positively assured of the Existence of external Bodies to know God who gives us the Sensation of them and to know That as he is infinitely perfect he cannot deceive us For if the Intelligence which gives us the Ideas of all things would as it were divert it self in representing Bodies to us as actually existent though there were none it is evident that it would not be difficult for it so to do It is for those Reasons or the like that Descartes who was desirous to establish his Philosophy upon a true Foundation has not thought fit to suppose that there are Bodies nor to prove it by sensible Demonstrations though they appear very convincing to the common sort of Men. Apparently he knew as well as we do that it was enough to open our Eyes to see Bodies and that we might draw near unto them and feel them to be certain whether our Eyes did not deceive us in their Testimony He was sufficiently acquainted with the Genius of Men to be sensible that the like Proofs would not be rejected But he neither matter'd sensible Probabilities nor the vain Applauses of Men. He preferr'd Truth though despis'd to the Glory of a Reputation without Merit and chose rather to be thought ridiculous by Men of mean Parts and make such Doubts as seem'd extravagant to them rather than to assert things which he did not judge to be certain and undeniable But though Descartes has given the strongest Proofs that Reason alone can furnish for the Existence of Bodies though it is evident that God is no Deceiver and indeed we might say that he did actually deceive us if we deciev'd our selves by making a due use of our Sense and other Faculties whereof he is the Author Yet we may say that the Existence of Matter is not as yet perfectly demonstrated For in fine in point of Philosophy we must believe nothing but what Evidence obliges us to believe We must make as much use of Liberty as we can Our Judgments must have no farther Extent than our Perceptions Therefore let us only judge that we see Bodies when we see them really and that these visible or intelligible Bodies do actually exist But why should we judge positively that there is a material World without like unto the intelligible World which we see It may be urg'd perhaps That we see those Bodies without us and even at a great distance from that which we animate and therefore we may judge that they are without us without extending our Judgments beyond our Perceptions Bus what of that Do not we see the Light without us and in the Sun though it is not there Nevertheless I grant that those Bodies which we see without us are
not consist in that the Animal Spirits which are necessary for the Motion of the Fingers have more action or force in them than in other Men but that the ways through which the Spirits slide are more slippery and smoother through the habit of Exercise as I have explain'd in this Chapter Nevertheless I grant that all the Uses of Memory and of the other Habits are not necessary to those who being perfectly united to God find in his Light all sorts of Idea's and in his Will all the facility to act that they can desire AN EXPLANATION OF THE Seventh Chapter of the Second Book The Summary of the Proofs and Explanations I have given about Original Sin with Answers to the Objections that seem'd most weighty to me TO answer those difficulties regularly which may arise in the Mind about Original Sin and the manner how it is transmitted from Father to Son I think it will be necessary to give in few words what I have said upon that Subject in several parts of the Search after Truth These then are my principal Proofs I have dispos'd them in a peculiar manner to make them the more sensible to those who will consider them I. God Wills Order in his Works he Wills what we conceive clearly to be consonant to Order And that which we conceive to be clearly contrary to Order God Wills it not This Truth is evident to all those who can consider with a fix'd and pure Sight the infinitely perfect Being Nothing can trouble or shake them in that and they clearly see that all the difficulties which can be form'd against this Principle only proceeds from the ignorance we have of those things which it would be necessary to know in order to resolve them II. God has no other end but himself in his Operations Order requires it III. God makes and preserves the Mind of Man that it might be imploy'd about him that it should know and love him for God is the end of his own Works Order requires it so God cannot Will that we should love that which is not lovely or rather God cannot Will that what is least lovely should be most belov'd Therefore it is evident that Nature is corrupted and in disorder since the Mind loves Bodies which are not lovely and often loves them more than God Original Sin or the depravation of Nature therefore requires no proof for every one sufficiently finds within himself a Law which captivates and disorders him and a Law which is not establish'd by God since it is contrary to the Order which regulates his Will IV. Nevertheless Man was admonish'd before his Fall by preingaging Sensations and not by a clear knowledge whether he was to unite himself to external Bodies or to separate from them Order requires it It is a disorder for the Mind to be oblig'd to apply it self to Bodies it may be united to them but it is not made for them Therefore it ought to know God and be sensible of Bodies Moreover as Bodies are incapable of being its good the Mind could not easily unite it self to them if it only knew them as they are without finding that in them which is not there Therefore false Good must be discern'd by a preingaging Sensation to be belov'd by a love of Instinct and the real good must be known by a clear knowledge to be belov'd by a free and reasonable love In fine God makes and preserves Man that he may know and love him therefore the capacity of his Mind must not be fill'd nor even divided against his Will by the knowledge of the Infinite Figures and Configurations of Bodies which surround him nor of that which he animates However in order to know by a clear knowledge whether such a Fruit at such a time is fit for the nourishment of the Body we must apparently know so many Things and form so many Ratiocinations that the most extended Mind would be wholly taken up by it V. But tho' the first Man had notice by preingaging Sensations whether he was or was not to make use of external Bodies yet he was not agitated by Involuntary or Rebel Motions yea he blotted out of his Mind the Idea's of sensible Objects when he pleas'd whether he us'd or us'd them not for so Order requires The Mind may be united to the Body but it must have no dependance on it it must command it Moreover all the love God puts in us must centre in him for God produces nothing in us but for himself Finally Bodies are not lovely they are below that which is in us capable of loving Therefore in the first Institution of Nature Bodies could not turn our Mind towards them or incline it to consider or love them as its Goods VI. External Bodies never act in our Soul but when they produce some Motions in our Body and when those Motions communicate themselves to the principal part of the Brain for it is according to the alterations which happen in that part of the Brain that the Soul changes it self and finds it self agitated by sensible Objects I have sufficiently prov'd it and Experience demonstrates it This being granted it is clear by the precedent Article that the first Man when he pleas'd stopp'd the motions communicated to his Body or at least those which were communicated to the principal part of his Brain Order would have it so and consequently he whose Will is always consonant to Order and can do nothing against Order altho ' it be Almighty Thus Man had the power on some occasions to suspend the Natural Law of the Communication of Motions since he had no Concupiscence and felt no involuntary and rebellious Motions in himself VII But the first Man by Sin has lost that power Order Wills it so for it were not reasonable that in favour of a Sinner and a Rebel there should be any exceptions in the General Law of the Communication of Motions besides those which are absolutely necessary for the preservation of our Life and Civil Society Therefore the Body of Man being continually shaken by the Action of sensible Objects and his Soul being agitated by all the Motions of the principal part of the Brain it is a dependant upon the Body to which it had only been united and which it did command before the Fall VIII Let us now see how Adam was capable of Sinning It is natural to love Pleasure and to relish it and that was not forbidden to Adam It is the same of Joy we may lawfully rejoyce at the sight of our natural Perfections that is not ill in it self Man was made to be happy and Pleasure and Joy actually makes us Happy and Contented The first Man then enjoy'd Pleasure in the use of sensible Goods he also rejoyc'd at the sight of his Perfections for we cannot consider our selves as being happy or perfect without rejoycing thereat For tho' he knew that God was his Good he did nor feel it as I have prov'd in
several places Therefore the Joy he could find in his Duty was not very sensible which being suppos'd as the first Man had not an infinite Capacity of Mind his Pleasure or his Joy lessen'd the clear sight of his Mind which made him sensible that God was his Good and that he ought to love him only For Pleasure is in the Soul and modifies it So that it fills the Capacity we have of thinking proportionably as it affects us and acts in us This is what we learn by Experience that is by the inward Sensation we have of our selves Therefore we may conceive that the first Man having by degrees suffer'd the Capacity of his Mind to be divided or fill'd up by the lively Sensation of a presumptuous Joy or perhaps by some love or sensible Pleasure the presence of God and the remembrance of his Duty were blotted out of his Mind by his having neglected couragiously to follow his light in search of his real Good Having thus divided his Mind he was capable of falling for his principal Grace and Power was his Light and the clear knowledge of his Duty since then he did not want those preingaging delectations which we now stand in need of to resist Concupiscence IX And we must observe that neither the preingaging Sensations which Adam felt in the use of the Goods of the Body nor the Joy which he found in considering his Happiness or Perfection are the real causes of his Fall for he was sensible that God only was capable to make him feel Pleasure or Joy Therefore he ought to have lov'd him only since we ought to love nothing but the real cause of our Happiness As nothing did disturb the Knowledge and Light of the first Man while he was willing to preserve it pure he could and ought to have obliterated out of his Mind whatever Sensations did divide it and put it into the least danger to forget or lose the sight of him who enlighten'd and satisfy'd it It was his Duty to remember that if God did not make him feel him as good but only know him as such it was that he might the sooner deserve his reward by the continual use of his Liberty Supposing then that Adam and Eve Sinn'd and that in consequence of their Sin they have felt in themselves involuntary and rebellious motions I say it was necessary their Children should be Born Sinners and liable like them to the motions of Concupiscence These are my Reasons X. I have prov'd at large in the Chapter that occasioned this Discourse that there is such a communication between the Mothers Brain and her Childs that all the Motions and Traces which are made in the Mothers Brain are excited in the Childs Therefore as the Childs Soul is united to its Body in the first moment it is created because it is the conformation of the Body which obliges God pursuant of his General Will to give it a Soul to inform it It is evident that at the very Instant the Soul is created it has corrupt inclinations and is inclin'd towards the Body since from that very moment it has the inclinations which answer to the motions that are actually in the Brain to which it is united XI But whereas it is a disorder that the Mind should incline to Bodies and love them the Child is a Sinner and in disorder as soon as it is created God who loves Order hates it in that condition Nevertheless its Sin is not free 't is its Mother who has conceiv'd it in Iniquity upon the account of the communication which is Establish'd by the Order of Nature between the Brain of the Mother and that of the Child XII Now the said communication is very good in its Institution for several Reasons 1. Because it is useful and perhaps necessary towards the conformation of the Foetus 2. Because the Child might thereby have some commerce with its Parents for it was reasonable it should know from whom it deriv'd the Body it animates Finally the said communication was the only means by which the Child could know what pass'd without and what it ought to think of it Having a Body it was reasonable it should have thoughts that had a relation to it and that it should not be depriv'd of the sight of the Works of God amongst which it liv'd It is very probable that there are many other Reasons for the said communication besides those I have related but these are sufficient to justify it and to vindicate the Conduct of him whose Will is necessarily conformable to Order XIII However it is not Just the Child should receive the Trace of sensible Objects forcibly And if the Soul of Children was created but one moment before its being united to their Bodies if it were but one moment in a state of Innocence or Order it would of Right and by the necessity of the Eternal Order or Law have a power to suspend the said Communication just as the first Man before his Fall had a power to stop whenever he pleas'd the Motions which were excited in him for Order requires the Body should obey the Mind But as the Souls of Children never were agreeable to God there was no reason that God should change the Law of the Communication of Motions in their behalf therefore 't is Just that Children should be Born Sinners and in disorder And the cause of their Sin is not the Order of Nature that Order is Just but it is the Sin of those from whom they derive their Being In this sense it is not Just that a Father who is a Sinner should get Children more perfect than himself nor that they should have a power over their Body which their Mother has not over hers XIV I grant that after Adam's Fall which corrupts and overthrows all things God might in making some alterations in the Order of Nature have remedy'd the disorder which the said Fall had caus'd But God does not change his Will thus he Wills nothing but what is Just What he Wills once he Wills it ever he does not correct himself he does not repent he Wills constantly his Eternal Decrees do not depend on the inconstancy of a Man's Will it it not Just they should be submitted to it XV. But if it be allowable to penetrate into the Councels of God and to say what we think upon the Motives which he may have had to Establish the Order I have above-mentioned and to permit the Fall of the first Man I am of Opinion that it is impossible to have Sentiments more worthy of the greatness of God and more consonant to Religion and Reason than to believe that Gods principal end in his external Operations is the Incarnation of his Son See the 9th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation That God establish'd the Order of Nature and permitted the disorder which has happen'd in it to favour that great Work That he permitted all Men to be subjected to Sin that no
Man might Glory in himself and that he leaves even Concupiscence in the most holy and most perfect that they may have no vain Satisfaction in themselves For when we consider the Perfection of our Being Aug. in Tul. lib. 6. c. 9. it is difficult to despise our selves unless at the same time we see and love Soveraign Good in the presence of which all our Perfection and Grandeur vanishes in a moment I own that Concupiscence may prove the Subject of our Merit and that it is reasonable the Mind should for a time follow Order difficultly to deserve to be Eternally submitted to it with pleasure I grant that it may be upon this account that God has permitted Concupiscence after having foreseen Sin But Concupiscence not being absolutely necessary to our Meriting if God permitted it it was because Man might be able to do no good without the assistance which Jesus Christ has merited for us and that he might have no reason to Glory in his own power for it is plain that Man cannot sight against and overcome himself unless he be animated by Jesus Christ who as the Head of the Faithful inspires them with such Sensations as are directly opposite to the Concupiscence they derive from the first Man XVI Supposing then that Children are Born with Concupiscence it is evident that they are really Sinners since their heart is set upon Bodies as much as it is capable There is as yet but one love in their Will and that love is irregular So there is nothing in them that God can love since God cannot love disorder XVII But when they have been Regenerated in Jesus Christ that is when their Heart has been turn'd towards God either by an actual motion of love or by an inward disposition like unto that which remains after an Act of Loving God then Concupiscence is no longer a Sin in them for it inhabits no longer alone in the Heart it has no longer any dominion there The habitual Love which remains in them by the Grace of Baptism in Jesus Christ is freeer or stronger than that which is in them by the Concupiscence they have in Adam They are like the Just who in their Sleep follow the Motions of Lust yet lose not the Grace of Baptism for they do not freely consent to these Motions XVIII And it should not be thought strange if I believe it possible for Children while they are Baptizing to love God with a free Love For since the second Adam is contrary to the first why should he not at the time of Regeneration deliver Children out of the servitude of their Bodies to which they are only subjected by the first Adam so that being enlightned and excited by a lively and effectual Grace to love God they may love him with a free and reasonable love without being hindered by the first Adam It is not observable some may urge that their Bodies ceases one moment from acting over their Mind But should Men wonder at their not seeing that which is not visible That Act of Love may be produced in one Instant And whereas that Act may be formed in the Soul without making any Traces in the Brain we need not wonder if even those who are come to Men's estate when they are Baptiz'd do not always remember it for we have no remembrance of those things of which the Brain keeps no traces XIX St. Paul teaches us that the Old Man or Concupiscence is Crucified with Jesus Christ and that we are dead and buried with him by Baptism It is not that we are then delivered from the warring of the Body against the Mind and that Concupiscence is as it were dead that moment It is true it revives but having been destroy'd and thereby left the Children in a state of loving God it can no longer harm them though it revives in them For when there are two Loves in the Heart the one Natural and the other Free Order wills that only that should be regarded which is free And if Children loved God in Baptism by an Act no wise free loving Bodies afterwards by several Acts of the same kind God perhaps could not according to Order have more regard to one only Act than to many which are all natural and constrained Or rather if those contrary Loves were equal in force he must have regard to the last by the same reason that when there have been successively in a Heart two free Loves contrary to one another God ever has regard to the last since Grace is lost by one Mortal Sin XX. However it cannot be denied that God may without suspending the Dominion of the Body over the Childs Mind make it Just or turn its Will towards him by infusing into its Soul a disposition like unto that which remains after an Actual motion of Love towards God But that way of proceeding does not perhaps appear so natural as the other for we do not conceive clearly what those dispositions may be which would remain Indeed we need not wonder at it for having no clear Idea of the Soul as I have proved elsewhere * See the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part of the said Book with its Explanation we must not wonder if we do not know all the Modifications it is capable of But the Mind cannot be fully satisfied with things it does not conceive clearly In my Opinion it requires an extraordinary Miracle to give those dispositions to the Soul without a preceding Act. Surely it cannot be done by the most simple means Whereas the second Adam producing for a moment in the Mind of the Child which is Baptis'd the contrary of what the first did produce there before it is sufficient to regenerate it that God should act in it by the usual means according to which he sanctifies the Adult for the Child not having at that moment any sensations or motions to divide its capacity of thinking and willing nothing hinders it from knowing and loving its real Good I say no more because it is not necessary to know precisely how the regeneration of Children is perform'd provided we admit a real regeneration in them or an inward and real Justification caused by the Acts or at least by the habits of Faith Hope and Charity If I propose an Explanation so contrary to received Prejudices it is to satisfie even those who will not admit spiritual habits and to prove to them the possibility of Children's Regeneration for Imputation seems to me to include a down right contradiction since God cannot repute as just and actually love Creatures who are actually in disorder the he may for the love of his Son design to restore them to order and love them when they are restor'd OBJECTIONS Against the Proofs and Explanations of Original Sin Objection against the First Article GOD Wills Order it is True but it is his Will which makes it It does not suppose it Whatever God Wills is in Order from this only reason that
he should have known exactly the disposition of all the parts of the Body and of those he made use of I have given Reasons for it in this Article and elsewhere A giving of Names is rather a sign of Authority in the Scripture than of a perfect Knowledge As the Lord of Heaven had made Adam Lord of the Earth he was willing Adam should give the Animals Names as he himself had done to the Stars Omnibus eis nomina vocat Ps 47. It is evident that Sounds or Words neither have nor naturally can have a Relation to the things they signifie whatever the Divine Plato and mysterious Pythagoras say about it One might perhaps explain the Nature of a Horse or of an Ox in a whole Book but a Word is not a Book And it is ridiculous to imagine that Monosyllables as Sus which in Hebrew signifies a Horse and Schor which signifies an Ox should represent the Nature of those Animals Nevertheless it is very likely that those are the Names which Adam has given them for we find them in the Book of Genesis Cap. 49.17 32.5 And the Author of Genesis assures us moreover That the Names which Adam gave to the Animals are the very same which were used in his time for I do not see that he could mean any thing else by these words Omne quod vocavit Adam animae viventis ipsum est nomen ejus But I grant that Adam gave Names to Animals which had some Relation to their Nature and submit to the learned Etymologies which an Author of this Age gives us about them I grant that Adam might call Domestick Animals Behemoth because they keep silence the Ram Ajil because he is strong the Goat Sair because he is hairy the Hog Chazir because he has little eyes and the Ass Chamor because there are many red ones in the East But I think it enough only to open ones eyes to know whether the Goat is hairy the Ass red and whether the Hog has little eyes Adam calls Beir and Behemah what we call a Brute or a great Domestick Animal because those Beasts are mute and stupid What is to be concluded from thence that he perfectly understood their Nature That is not evident I should rather fear that Men would conclude from thence That Adam being simple enough to interrogate an Ox as the largest of all Domestick Animals and being surpris'd at his not being able to answer him he despis'd him and in contempt called him by the name of Beir and of Behemah Second Objection against the Fourth Article THere are pre-engaging Sensations which are troublesome and uneasie Adam was just and innocent therefore he could not be affected with them He must needs be guided on all occasions by Reason and Knowledge and not by pre-engaging Sensations like to those we have at present Answer I own that there are Pre-engaging Sensations which are disagreeable and painful But they were never uneasy to the first Man because that as soon as ever they began to assault he would no longer be affected by them and as soon as ever he had that he was no longer affected by them Those Sensations only respectively gave him notice of what he was to do or not to do They did not disturb his Felicity they only made him sensible that God could punish him and make him miserable if he should prove unfaithful to him To persuade our selves that the first Man was never surpris'd by any sensible Grief we need only consider two things First that Grief is very inconsiderable when the Motions to which it is annext are very weak since it is always proportion'd to the strength of the Motions which are communicated to the principal part of the Brain Secondly that it is the nature of Motion always to include a succession of time and that it cannot be violent at the first instant it is communicated This being suppos'd it is plain that the first Man was never surpris'd by any violent Grief that was capable of making him unhappy For it was in his power to stop the Motions which occasion'd it Therefore if it was in his power to stop them at the very instant they began their Action certainly he did not fail to do it since he desir'd to be happy and that Aversion is naturally joyn'd with the sense of Pain Thus Adam never felt any violent Pain But I think we are not oblig'd to say that he never felt any inconsiderable uneasiness like unto that which we feel when we taste green Fruit which we thought to be ripe His Felicity would have been very tender if it could have been disturb'd by so small a matter For Delicacy is a sign of Weakness and Pleasure and Joy have but little Solidity in them when the least thing dissipates and annihilates them Pain or Grief never disturb Happiness effectually unless it is involuntary and when it subsists in us against our Wills Jesus Christ was happy even upon the Cross though he felt great Pains because he suffer'd nothing but what he was willing to suffer Therefore as Adam suffer'd nothing against his Will no body can say that we make him unhappy before his Fall because we suppose here that he was warned by pre-engaging Sensations but such as were respectful and submissive of what it was fit for him to avoid for the preservation of his Life Objection against the Fifth Article ADam felt pre-engaging Pleasures which are involuntary Motions Therefore Adam was agitated by involuntary Motions Answer I answer That Adam's Sensations did precede his Reason I have prov'd it in the Fourth Article But I deny that they did pre-engage his Will or that they excited any involuntary Motions in the same For Adam was willingly warn'd by his Sensations of what he ought to do for the Preservation of his Life but he never would suffer himself to be agitated against his Will for that is contradictory Also whenever he had a mind to apply himself to the Contemplation of Truth without the least Distraction of Mind his Senses and Passions kept a perfect Silence Order requires it and it is an absolute Consequence of the Power he had over his Body See the Explanation upon the 3d Chapter of the 5 Book I answer in the second place That it is not true that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion and Love Pleasure and Love are manners of the Soul's Existence But Pleasure has no necessary Relation to the Object which seems to occasion it and Love has a necessary Relation to Good Pleasure is to the Soul what Figure is to the Body and Motion is to the Body what Love is to the Soul Now the Motion of a Body is very different from its Figure I grant that the Soul which is continually mov'd towards Good advances as it were more easily towards it when induc'd thereto by Pleasure than when it suffers Pain as a Body which is push'd forward rouls more
easily when it has a Spherical Figure than when it has a Cubical one But the Figure of a Body is different from its Motion and it may be Spherical and stand still It is true Spirits are not like Bodies they can feel no Pleasure without being in Motion because God who only makes and preserves them for himself moves them continually towards Good But this does not prove that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion for two things though different may always meet together Finally I answer That though Pleasure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul that which the first Man felt in the use of the Goods of the Body did not incline him to love those Bodies Pleasure inclines the Soul towards the Object which occasions it I grant it But it is not the Fruit which we eat with Pleasure which occasions that Pleasure in us Bodies cannot act in the Soul and make it in any measure happy God only can do that 'T is through Error we fancy that Bodies have that in them which we feel by their means Adam was not so stupid before his Fall as to imagine that Bodies occasion'd his Pleasure Therefore the Motion which accompanied his Pleasures did not move him towards Bodies If Pleasure contributed towards the Fall of the first Man it was not by causing that in him which it now causes in us It is only the taking up or dividing the Capacity he had to think it blotted or diminished in his Mind the Presence of his real Good or of his Duty Objection against the Sixth Article WHat likelihood is there that the immutable Will of God should have depended on the Will of Man and that in favour of Adam Exceptions should have been made in the general Law of the Communication of Motions Answer At least it is not evident that there can be no such Exceptions But it is plain that immutable Order requires that the Body should be subject to the Mind and it were contradictory to believe that God neither loves nor wills Order In the Explanation which relates to the Nature of Ideas I shall explain more particularly what Order is and why God loves it necessarily For God necessarily loves his Son Therefore it was was necessary before the fall of the first Man that Exceptions should be made in his Favour in the general Law of the Communication of Motions This perhaps may seem abstruse but here is something that is more sensible Man though a Sinner has the Power to move and stop his Arm whenever he pleases Therefore according to the different Volitions of Man the Animal Spirits are determin'd to produce or stop some Motions in his Body which certainly cannot be done by the general Law of the Communication of Motions Thus the Will of God being still at this very time subject to ours why might it not have been subject to Adam's If for the advantage of the Body and for the sake of Civil Society God stops the Communication of Motions in Sinners why should he not have stopt it in favour of a Just Man for the Good of his Soul and for the Preservation of the Union and Society he had with him for God had only made Man for himself As God will have no Society with Sinners he has taken from them after the Fall the power they had to leave as it were the Body to unite themselves to him But he has left them the Power to stop or change the Communication of Motions in reference to the preservation of Life and Civil Society because he was unwilling to destroy his own Work having even before he had form'd it designed according to St. Paul to restore it and reform it in Jesus Christ Objection against the Seventh Article MAN still conveys his Body at this time where he will he moves as he pleases all the parts of it the motion of which is necessary for the prosecution and avoiding of sensible Good and Evils And consequently he stops or changes every moment the Natural Communication of Motions not only in things of small Consequence but also in things which are of no use for Life or Civil Society and even in Crimes which ruine Society shorten Life and dishonour God in all respects God Wills Order I grant it But does Order require that the Laws of Motion should be violated for Evil and remain inviolable on the account of Good Why should not Man have the Power to stop the Motions which sensible Objects produce in his Body since those Motions hinder him from doing good from drawing near to God again and from returning to his Duty and still have the Power to do so much evil with his Tongue his Arm and with the other parts of the Body the Motions of which depend upon his Will Answer To answer this Objection we must consider that Man having sinn'd was to return to his Original Nothingness For being no longer in order nor in a possibility to return to it he ought to cease to exist God loves nothing but Order See the 5th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation a Sinner is not in Order Therefore God does not love him Sinners then cannot subsist since Creatures only subsist because God will have them to be and God will not have them to be unless he loves them Neither can a Sinner restore himself to Order because he cannot justifie himself and whatever he can suffer cannot attone for his Offence Therefore he ought to be reduced to nothing again But whereas it is unreasonable to think that God should make a Work to annihilate it or to put it yet into a worse condition it is evident that God would not have made Man nor permitted his fall which he had foreseen had he not had in view his Sons Incarnation in whom all things subsist and by whom the Universe receives a Beauty Perfection and Greatness worthy the Wisdom and Power of its Author We may then consider that Man after his Sin is without a Restorer but under expectation of one If we consider him without a Restorer we see clearly that he can have no Society with God that he cannot have the least power in himself to draw near unto God again that God must needs repulse and use him ill when he pretends to leave the Body to unite himself to him That is to say that Man after Sin must lose the power of freeing himself from sensible Impressions and Motions of Concupiscence Moreover he ought to be annihilated for the reasons abovesaid But he expects a Restorer and if we consider him under that expectation it is plain he must subsist together with his Posterity out of which the said Restorer is to come and therefore it is necessary that Man after his fall should still retain the power of moving diversly all those parts of his Body whose motions may be useful towards his preservation It is true Men continually abuse that Power they have
speaks thus about it in the Epistle to the Romans I delight in the Law of God after the inward Man But I see another Law in my Members warring against the Law of my Mind and bringing me into captivity to the Law of Sin which is in the Members of my Body And afterwards So then with the Mind I my self serve the Law of God but with the Flesh the Law of Sin He speaks after the same manner in several other places of his Epistles so that Concupiscence or the Rebellion of the Body does not only incline us to those Vices which are carnal or unseemly but even to those that are thought to be Spiritual I will endeavour to prove it after a sensible manner When any Person is in company to my seeming it is certain that Traces are machinally form'd in his Brains and Motions are excited in his Animal Spirits which beget Wicked thoughts and inclinations in his Soul Our thoughts at those times are not naturally conformable to Truth nor our inclinations to Order They arise in us for the good of the Body and of the present Life because they are excited by the Body therefore they make us lose the presence of God and the thoughts of our Duty and only tend to make other Men respect us as being worthy of their Affection and Esteem So that this secret Pride which is stirr'd up on those occasions is a Spiritual Vice of which the Rebellion of the Body is the Principle For Instance If the Persons before whom we are are Honourable the Pomp of their Grandeur dazles and humbles us As the Traces which their presence excites in our Brains are sometimes very great and their Motions very lively they shine as it were throughout our Body they diffuse through our Face and sensibly discover Respect and Fear there together with our most conceal'd Sentiments In the next place these Traces by these sensible Expressions of our inward Motions affect the Person who looks upon us they inspire him with Sentiments of Mildness and Civility by the Traces which our respectful or timerous Air produce machinally in his Brains which reflecting on his Face conceal that Majesty which appear'd there before and give the rest of his Body a Posture which composes our Trouble and re-assures us So that after many repercussions of those sensible Expressions our Air and Deportment are settled at last in the state which this Honourable Person desires Now as all the Motions of the Animal Spirits are attended by the Motion of the Soul and as the Traces of the Brain are followed by the Thoughts of the Mind it is evident that being now deprived of the Power to obliterate those Traces and to stop those Motions we find our selves sollicited by the presence of the Person who is above us to enter into his sentiments and desires and to apply our selves wholly to him as he is inclined to make his application to us though after a different manner And this is the Reason that the Conversation of the World revives and strengthens the desire of Pride as dishonest Commerce Feasting and the injoyment of Sensual Pleasures increase Carnal Desires the Moral of which deserves our observation 'T is very necessary there should be Traces in the Brain to represent a Man continually to himself that he may take care of his Person and that there should be others to form and maintain Society since Men were not made to live alone But Man having lost the Power to obliterate those Traces at pleasure and when it might be convenient they sollicit him continually to evil As he cannot help representing himself to himself he is continually excited to motions of Pride and Vanity to despise others and to attribute all things to himself and whereas he is not master of the Traces which sollicit him to maintain Society with others he is agitated as it were against his Will by motions of Complaisance Flattery Jealousie and the like Inclinations Thus all the Vices which are called Spiritual proceed from the Flesh as well as Incontinency and Intemperance There are not only dispositions in our Brain which excite Sensation and Motions in us in relation to the Propagation of the Species and the Preservation of Life there are perhaps yet a greater number of them which stir up Thoughts and Passions in us in reference to Society to our particular advancements and those of our Friends We are Naturally united to all the Bodies which surround us and by those Bodies to all things that have any relation to us Now we cannot be united to them but by certain Dispositions which are in our Brain Therefore not having the Power to hinder the Action of those Natural Dispositions our Union is changed into a Dependance and we become subject to all manner or Vices through our Body We are not pure Intelligence All the Dispositions of our Soul produce some Dispositions in our Body as the Dispositions of our Body excite the like Dispositions in our Soul It is not that the Soul cannot absolutely receive any thing but by the Body But because so long as it is united to it it can receive no alteration in its Modifications without the Body 's also receiving some It is true that it may be Inlightned or receive new Ideas without the necessity of the Body's having any share in them But it is because pure Ideas are no Modifications of the Soul as I have prov'd it elsewhere I do not speak of sensible Ideas here for those Ideas include a Sensation and all Sensations are Manners of the Souls Existence Second Objection Against the Eleventh and Twelfth Article If Original Sin is Transmitted upon the Account of the Communication Between the Brain of the Mother and that of her Child Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit c. Rom. 5. it is the Mother who is the Cause of that Sin and the Father has no share in it Nevertheless St. Paul teaches us that by Man Sin came into the World He does not so much as mention the Woman Therefore c. ANSWER David assures us that his Mother conceived him in Iniquity And the Son of Syrach says that Sin proceeds from the Woman In Iniquitatibus conceptus sum in peccatis concepit me mater mea Ps 10. and that it is through her we are all liable to Death Neither of them spake of the Man St. Paul on the contrary says that it is by Man Sin was introduced into the World He speaks not of the Woman How must we reconcile those Testimonies and which of the Two ought we to Justifie if it were necessary to Justifie either A muliere initium factum est peccati per illam omnes morimur Ecch 25.23 Luc. 2.48 In Discourse we never attribute any thing to the Woman in which she has no share and which is only the Man's But we often attribute that to the Man which is proper to the Woman because
the Husband is her Head and Master We see that the Evangelists and even the Blessed Virgin calls Joseph the Father of Jesus Christ when she says unto her Son Thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing Ecce pater tuus Ego dolentes quaerebamus Therefore since the Holy Scripture assures us that it is by the Woman we are all liable to Death and to Sin it is absolutely necessary to believe it Nor can it be thrown upon Man But though it assure us in other places that by Man Sin came into the World there is not the same necessity to believe it since that may be attributed to the Man which belongs to the Woman And if we were obliged by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman it would be mote reasonable to excuse the Man than the Woman However I am of opinion that the Passages I have quoted ought to be explained in the Literal sense and that we ought to conclude That both the Man and the Woman are the Real Causes of Sin each in their way The Woman because Sin is Communicated by her as it is by her that Man begets Children And Man because his Sin has occasion'd Concupiscence as his Action is the Cause of the Impregnation of the Woman or of the Communication which is between the Woman and her Child 'T is certain that it is the Man who impregnates the Woman and consequently he is the Cause of the Communication which is between her Body and the Childs since that Communication is the Principle of its Life The said Communication does not only give to the Bodies of Children the Dispositions of their Mothers it also gives to their Minds the Dispositions of her Mind Therefore we may say with St. Paul That By Man Sin was introduced into the World and nevertheless upon the account of that Communication we may also say that Sin proceeds from the Woman that it is by her we are all lyable to Death and that our Mother has conceived us in Iniquity as it is said in other places of the Scripture Perhaps it may be urged That though Man had not sinned the Woman would have had sinful Children for having sinned her self she had lost the Power God had given her over her Body And therefore though the Man had remained Just she would have Corrupted the Brain and consequently the Mind of her Child upon the account of the Communication she had with it Certainly this does not appear lively For Man whilst Righteous knowing what he does cannot give the Woman that miserable Fruitfulness of conceiving sinful Children If he remains Righteous he will have no Children but for God and sinful Children can never be acceptable to God for I do not suppose a Mediator in this place However I grant that in this case the Marriage might not have been dissolved and that the Man might have known his Wife But it is certain the Body of the Woman did belong to her Husband since it was taken out of his and was of the same Flesh Duo in carne una It is also certain that the Children belong as much to the Father as to the Mother This being granted we can never imagine that the Woman after her Sin would have lost the power she had over her Body unless her Husband had sinned as well as her self for had the Woman been deprived of that power her Husband remaining in Innocence there would have been this disorder in the Universe That a Just Man should have had a Corrupt Body and Sinful Children Now it is contrary to Order or rather it is contradictory that a Just God should punish the Man when he is in perfect Innocence Therefore Eve feels no Involuntary and Rebel Motions immediately after her Sin She is not as yet ashamed to see her self naked She does not hide her self On the contrary she draws near to her Husband though naked as well as her self Her Eyes are not as yet opened She is as before the absolute Mistress of her Body Order required that immediately after her sin her Soul should have been disturbed by the Rebellion of her Body and by the shame of her own and Husband's Nakedness For it was not reasonable that God should any longer suspend the Laws of the Communication of Motions in favour of her as I have said in the Seventh Article But whereas her Body belongs to her Husband and her Husband is still Innocent she is not punished in that Body That punishment is deferred until he has himself eaten of the Fruit which she presented to him Then it was they both felt the Rebellion of their Bodies they perceived they were naked and that shame obliged them to cover themselves with Fig-Leaves Therefore we must say That Adam is really the Cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence since it is his sin that has deprived his Wife as well as himself of the power they had over their Bodies and that it is for want of this power the Woman produces Traces in her Brain and in the Brain of her Child which corrupt the Soul from the very moment it is created OBJECTION Against the Twelfth Article Those speak by guess who say that the Communication of the Mothers Brain with that of her Child is necessary or useful towards the Conformation of the Foetus For there is no such Communication between the Brain of a Hen and her Chickens and yet the Chickens are perfectly well form'd ANSWER I Answer that in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication by the use I make of it to Explain the Generation of Monsters and certain Marks and Natural Apprehensions For it is evident that a Man who falls into a swoon at the sight of a snake because his Mother was frightned by one while she bore him can only have this Weakness because the Traces were formerly form'd in his Brain like unto those which open themselves when he sees a snake and that the said Traces have been attended with the like accident Therefore I guess not for I do not presume to determine wherein the said Communication does precisely consist I might say it proceeds from the Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Mothers Womb and by the Nerves with which that part is probably fill'd And yet I should no more guess in this than a Man who never having seen the Machines of the * Samaritan Fountain upon Pont Neuf in Paris should affirm that there are Wheels and Pumps in it to draw up the Water However I am of opinion it is sometimes lawful to guess provided we do not pretend to set up for Prophets or speak with too much assurance I fancy Men may be allowed to say what they think provided they do not aim at Infalibility or injustly impose upon Mens Minds with a discisive behaviour or by the help of some Terms of Art We do not alwayes guess in saying things that are not seen and are contrary
have the power to hinder at pleasure the effect of the communication they have with their Mothers Moreover they would be adle to excite in their Brain the Traces they had received from the same reason as we imagine whatever we please when our Sensations are not too lively This being supposed it is evident that the Mother being attentive to her Child might discover by a kind of repercussion whether or no it would receive the impression she should excite in it and also the other things she should think on For as the Mother would not be able to move the Fibres of her Brain without making an impression thereby on the Childs neither could the Child receive the said impression without the Mothers having notice of it by some slight impression provided she became very attentive to it by the power she should have to make all other noise cease but that which her Child should excite in her Therefore we must conclude that the Child and irs Mother would have had some commerce together before the Fall or deny the relation of the Brain of the one to the Brain of the other or the power of the Soul over the Body as I have before established This appears evident though the imagination is startled at it and prejudice opposes it 'T is true that at first that commerce would only have been in such things as are lyable to our senses and imagination Children being only related to their Mothers by their Bodies it is not absolutely necessary they should receive any Ideas from them but those of sensible Objects For their Soul being strictly united to God if we consider them without sin they receive immediately from him all the Ideas which have no relation to the Body But whereas it is possible in time to find the most abstracted Ideas to sensible things which have no relation to them the commerce of Mothers with their Children would probably have soon extended it self to the most spiritual things had they endeavoured to entertain themselves upon those matters I am extreamly sensible that what I say here will not appear very reasonable to the generality of men and that even those who impugn Prejudices and the continual Effort of sensible Impressions will be surprized at the novelty of this Thought But if we reflect seriously upon the manner how a Master instructs his Disciple if we consider how many different means he is obliged to make use of to discover to him the Ideas he himself has of things the comparisons he makes of them the judgments he gives about them and the other dispositions of his mind in relation to them we shall find that Mothers have a far greater facility to discover their thoughts and inward dispositions to their Children than Masters to their Disciples provided we only suppose that the Traces of the Mothers Brain are imprinted on that of their Children Which is evident by what I have said For in fine it is plain that voice and all external signs we use to express our thoughts to others have only the effect we desire because they imprint on the Brain of those who hearken to us the same Traces and excite the same Emotions of the Spirits which accompany our Ideas and inward disposition in relation to them OBJECTION Against the Seventeenth Article and the following ones It is presumptuous to say that Children are Justified in Baptism by Actual motions of their Will towards God We ought not to give way to new Opinions that only serve to make a Noise ANSWER I grant we must not say positively that Children are Justified by formal Acts of their Will I believe no man knows any thing about it and we must affirm nothing positively but what we know But whereas there are but too many of those who believe the Justification of Children is only external and by imputation because say they they are incapable of forming any Act of Love towards God I believe it necessary to make them sensible that their Opinion only proceeds from Prejudice For the Prejudices of Men in relation to Children are such that they commonly imagine they do not think in their Mothers Womb and in their first Years and moreover that they are incapable of thinking Men fancy they have not as yet the Ideas of things in themselves that they are inspired into them by their Masters in Discourse and that if they have any inclinations they are not of the same nature with ours and that they cannot lead them to soveraign Good The generality of men do not apprehend distinctly that the Soul of children is like that of persons advanced in years that is does not fortify and perfect it selt like the Body and that if it were delivered for one moment from the impression which the Body makes upon it and moved by the Delectation of Grace it would be more inlightened and more pure in that moment than that of the greatest Saints who always fight against some concupiscence in their mind and heart Concupiscence is commonly look'd upon as if it were natural Men do not always think that it is a consequence of sin Therefore they judge unawares that the Stupidity of children is a necessary consequence of the Weakness of their Body of their Youth and even of the incapacity of their Mind Now this Judgment or Prejudice represents it self continually to the mind and pre-ingages it in such a manner as to hinder it from examining the thing in it self So those who have spoken of Baptism in former Ages have not explained the Regeneration of children by Actual motions of their Heart Not because strong Reasons induced them to judge that it was impossible for it does not appear by their Works that they have so much as examined it But rather because they have supposed it so and have hardly had any thoughts to doubt it or perhaps because they were unwilling to give an Explication which would have opposed Prejudices at a time when people were not so solicitous to lay them aside as they are at present But if we consider the necessity there is of giving a more exact Explanation for Instance than St. Augustine does in some passages which favours * B. 1. de Nupt. C. 25 26 27 in Jul. B. 6 c. 19. elsewhere Imputation though in other places he speak after a manner which does not favour it †Ep. 23. Lib. de peccatorum meritis C. 19. alibi If we consider that Imputation is very convenient that it seems to have been received in this case by some Ancient and very Orthodox * Innocent 3. In 3. De Baptismo ejus effectu Capite Majoris Et in Conc. Viennensi Generati 15. under Clement V. Divines and moreover that it is absolutely necessary for those who deny though without any convincing Proofs the Habits of the Soul whom it would be good to satisfie if possible In fine if we will have a regard to natural Equity which forbids
act of God as I have already show'd but also because we know those things after a very perfect manner and also we should know them after an infinitely perfect manner were the capacity we have of thinking infinite since nothing is wanting in the Idea which represents them We ought also to conclude that it is in our selves we see whatever we know by Sensation Not that we can produce any new Modification in our selves or that the Sensations or Modifications of our Soul can represent objects by whose means God excites them in us but because our Sensations which are not distinct from us and consequently can never represent any thing that is distinct from us may nevertheless represent the existence of Beings or make us judge that they do exist For God exciting our Sensation in us at the presence of Objects by an action which is no wise sensible we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which represents its Essence but also the Sensation which makes us judge of its Existence for there is alwayes a pure Idea and a confused Sensation in the knowledge we have of the Existence of Beings if we except that of God and our Soul I except the Existence of God for that is known by a pure Idea without Sensation his Existence not depending on a Cause and being included in the Idea of the necessary Being as the equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of the Circle I also except the Existence of our own Soul because we know by an Internal Sensation that we think will and feel and that we have no clear Idea of our Soul as I have sufficiently explained in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book and elsewhere These are part of the Reasons that may be added to those I had already given to prove that God only inlightens us and that the immediate and direct object of our clear and evident Knowledge is an immutable and necessary Nature Men commonly make some Objections against this Opinion I shall now indeavour to resolve them Against what has been said That God only Inlightens us and that we see all things in Him FIRST OBJECTION Our Soul thinks because it is its Nature God in Creating it has given it the Faculty of Thinking there needs no more Or if there is any thing more required let us rely on what Experience teaches us about our Senses We find enough by Experience that they occasion our Ideas 'T is ill Philosophizing against Experience ANSWER I wonder that the Cartesians who have so much and yet so reasonable an aversion against the general Expressions of Nature and Faculty so freely use them on this occasion They will not allow Men to say that Fire burns by its Nature and that it turns certain Bodies into Glass by a Natural Faculty And yet some of them are not afraid of saying that the Mind of Man produces in it self the Ideas of all things by its Nature and because it has the Faculty of Thinking But yet they must give me liberty to say that these Expressions are no more significant in their Mouths than in those of the Peripatetics I am sensible the Soul is capable of Thinking but I know also that Extension is capable of Figures The Soul is capable of volition as well as Matter is of motion But as it is false that Matter though capable of Figure and Motion has in it self a Power a Faculty a Nature by which it can move it self or assume sometimes a round Figure and sometimes a square one so that the Soul is Naturally and Essentially capable of Knowledge and of Volition yet it is false that it has Faculties by which it can produce its Ideas in its self or its tendency towards good There is a great difference between being Movable and Moving Matter of its Nature is moveable and capable of Figures Besides it cannot subsist without Figure But it moves not it self it gives not it self a Figure it has no Faculty for all that The Mind by its Nature is capable of Motion and Ideas I grant it But it moves not it self it inlightens not it self God does all in Spirits as well as in Bodies Can we say that God makes all the alterations which happen in Matter See the first Illustration and that he makes not those which happen in the Mind Do we give that unto God which belongs to him in abandoning the last of all Beings to his Disposition Is he not equally the Master of all things Is he not the Creator the Preserver the only true Mover of Spirits as well as Bodies Certainly he makes all things Substances Accidents Beings manners of Beings We take away his Knowledge by putting bounds to his Action But if Men will needs have it that Creatures have such Faculties is are commonly conceived that we must say that Natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Author of their Motion and Rest as Aristotle and his followers say This overthrows all my Ideas But yet I would rather allow it than say that the Mind inlightens it self Let Men say the Soul has that power of differently moving the Members of their Body and to communicate Sensation and Life to them Let them say if they please that it gives Heat to the Blood Motion to the Spirits and to the rest of the Body its Magnitude Disposition and Figure But let them never say that the Mind gives it self its Motion and Light If God does not all at least let us allow him to do that which is greatest and most perfect in the World And if Creatures do something let them move their Bodies and let them order them as they please but let them not act upon Minds Let us say that Bodies move one another after having moved themselves Or rather let us not pretend to understand the different dispositions of Matter that little concerns us But we ought not to suffer our Minds to be ignorant from whom they receive the Light which lightens them Let them know from whom they receive that which can make them happier and more perfect Let them know their dependance according to its utmost extent and that whatever they have actually they receive it from God every moment For as a great Saint sayes upon another Subject It is a very criminal Pride to make use of those things which God gives us as if they were Naturally ours Above all things let us not imagine that the Senses instruct our Reason that the Body directs the Mind and that the Soul receives that from the Body which it has not it self It were better to fancy our selves independant than to think we have a real dependance on the Body It is better to be our own Master than to seek out a Master among the Creatures that is less valuable than we But it is much better yet to submit to the Eternal Truth which assures us in the Gospel that he is our only Master than to give
credit to the testimony of our Senses or of some Men who dare speak to us as our Masters Experience whatever Men may say does not countenance Prejudices For our Senses as well as our Masters according to the Flesh are only occasional causes of the instruction which the Eternal Wisdom gives us in the most secret part of our Reason But whereas that Wisdom teaches us by an operation which is no wise sensible we fancy that it is our Eyes or the Worlds of those who strike the Air at our Ears which produce that Light or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us 'T is for that Reason as I have said elsewhere that Jesus Christ was not only satisfied with instructing us after an intelligible manner by his Divinity he thought fit also to instruct us after a sensible one by his Humanity He would show us that he was our Master in all things And because we cannot easily look within our selves to consult him as Eternal Truth Immutable Order and Intelligible Light he has made Truth sensible by his Words Order lovely by his Example Light visible by a Body which diminishes the splendour of it and yet we are still so ingrateful so injust so stupid and sensless as to look not only upon other Men as our Masters contrary to his express prohibition but perhaps even upon the most despicable and vile Bodies SECOND OBJECTION The Soul being more perfect than Bodies why should it not contain that in it self which represents them Why should not the Idea of Extension be one of its Modifications God only acts in it and modifies it We grant it But why should it see Bodies in God if it can see them in its own substance It is not material it is true But God though a pure Spirit sees Bodies in himself Why then should not the Soul see them in beholding it self though it be Spiritual ANSWER Do we not see that there is this difference between God and the Soul of Man that God is an Unlimited Universal and Infinite Being and that the Soul is a particular Species of Being 'T is one of the Properties of Infinity to be at once one and all things composed as it were of an Infinity of Perfections and so simple that every Perfection it possesses includes all others without any real distinction for as every Divine Perfection is Infinite it constitutes the whole Divine Being But the Soul being a Limited Being it cannot have Extension in it self without becoming Material Therefore God includes in himself all Bodies after an intelligible manner He sees their Essences or Ideas in his Wisdom and their Existence in his Love or in his Will It is necessary to say so since God made Bodies and knows what he has made even before any thing was made But the Soul cannot see that within it self which it does not include Moreover it cannot clearly see that which it does include it can only feel it confusedly But to explain this The Soul does not include intelligible Extension as one of its manners of Being because Extension is not a manner of Being it is really a Being We conceive Extension alone or without thinking on any thing else but we cannot conceive manners of Being without perceiving the Subject or Being whereof they are the manners We perceive that Extension without thinking on our Mind besides we cannot conceive Extension can be a Modification of ones Mind Extension being limited makes some figure and the limits of the Mind cannot be figured Extension having parts may be divided at least in some sense and we see nothing in the Soul that is divisible Therefore Extension which we see is not a manner pf the Minds Being and therefore cannot see it in it self How is it possible to see in one kind of Being all sorts of Beings and in one particular and finite Being a Triangle in general and an infinite number of Triangles For in fine the Soul perceives a Triangle or a Circle in general though it implyes a contradiction that the Soul could have a Modification in general The Sensations of Colour which the Soul ascribes to Figures make them particular because none of the Modifications of a particular Being can be general Certainly we may affirm what we conceive clearly We clearly conceive that Extension which we see is a thing distinct from us Therefore we may say that Extension is no Modification of our Being and it is really something that is distinct from us For we must observe that the Sun for instance which we see is not that which we behold The Sun and whatever is in the material World is not visible in it self I have proved it elsewhere The Soul cannot see the Sun to which it is immediately united Now we clearly see and plainly feel that the Sun is something distinct from us Therefore we speak against our Knowledge and our Conscience when we say that the Soul sees all Bodies which surround it in its own Modifications Pleasure Pain Taste Heat Colour all our Sensations and Passions are Modifications of our Soul But though they are so do we know them clearly Can we compare Heat with Taste Odour with Colour Can we distinguish the affinity there is between Red and Green and even between Green and Green It is not so with Figures we compare them one with another we exactly know their proportions we precisely perceive that the Square of the Diagonal of a Square is double to that Square What affinity can there be between those intelligible Figures which are very clear Ideas and the Modifications of our Soul which are only confused Sensations And why should we pretend that those intelligible Figures cannot be perceived by the Soul unless they are Modifications of it since the Soul knows nothing of what happens to it by clear Ideas but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation as I have proved elsewhere and shall prove it again in the following Explanation If we could only see the Figure of Bodies in our selves they would on the contrary be unintelligible to us for we know not our selves We are only darkness to our selves and must look out of our selves to see our selves and we shall never know what we are until we consider our selves in him who is our Light and in whom all things become Light For it is only in God that the most material Beings are perfectly intelligible but out of him the most Spiritual Substances become absolutely invisible The Idea of Extension which we see in God is very clear But as we do not see the Idea of our Soul in God we feel indeed that we are and what we actually have But it is impossible for us to discover what we are or any of the Modifications whereof we are capable THIRD OBJECTION There is nothing in God that is moveable there is nothing in him that is Figured if there be a Sun in the intelligible World that Sun is always equal to it self and the visible Sun appears
greater when it is near the Horizon than when it is at a great distance from it Therefore it is not that intelligible Sun we see it is the same with other Creatures Therefore we see not the Works of God in God ANSWER To Answer all this it 's enough to consider only That God includes in himself an infinity intelligible Extension for God knows Extension since he has made it and he can only know it in himself Therefore as the Mind can perceive part of that intelligible Extension which God includes 't is certain it may perceive all Figures in God for all finite intelligible Extension is necessarily an intelligible Figure since Figure is only the Expression of Extension Moreover this Figure of intelligible and general Extension becomes sensible and particular by Colour or some other sensible Quality which the Soul fixes to it for the Soul commonly bestows its Sensation upon the Idea which strikes it lively Therefore it is not necessary there should be sensible Bodies in God or Figures in intelligible Extensions to see them in God or to make God see them though he only beholds himself If we conceive also that a Figure of intelligible Extension made sensible by Colour is taken successively from the different parts of this infinite Extension Or if we conceive that a Figure of intelligible Extension may turn upon its Center or successively approach to another we perceive the Motion of a sensible or intelligible Figure without any Motion in intelligible Extension For God sees not the Motion of Bodies in his Substance or in the Idea he has of it himself but only by the knowledge he has of his Will in relation to them Moreover He only sees their Existence that way because it is his Will only which gives a Being to all things The Will of God changes nothing in his Substance It moves it not Intelligible Extension is immoveable in all respects even intelligibly But though we only see this intelligible Extension it seems moveable to us by reason of the sensation of Colour or of the confused image which remains after the sensation which we affix successively to diverse parts of intelligible Extension which gives us an Idea when we see or imagine the Motion of some Bodies One may easily apprehend by what I have now said why we may see the Sun sometimes larger and sometimes smaller though it be always the same in relation to God For to do this we need only see sometimes a greater part of intelligible Extension and sometimes a lesser and have a more lively sensation of Light to affix to that part of Extension Now as the parts of intelligible Extension are all of the same nature they may all represent any Body whatever You must not imagine that the intelligible World has such an Affinity with the material and sensible one as that for instance there should be an intelligible Sun a Horse a Tree destin'd to represent to us a Sun a Horse a Tree And that all those who see the Sun do of necessity see this pretended intelligible Sun As all intelligible Extensions may be conceived circular or have the intelligible Figure of a Horse or a Tree any intelligible Extension may serve to represent a Sun a Horse a Tree and consequently be a Sun a Horse a Tree of the intelligible World and even become a visible and sensible Sun Horse or Tree if the Soul have any sensation occasioned by Bodies to affix to these Ideas Therefore when I said That we see different Bodies by the knowledge we have of the Perfections of God which represent them I did not mean directly that there are certain particular Ideas in God which represent every Body in particular and that we see such an Idea when we see such a Body For it is certain we could not see that Body sometimes large and sometimes small sometimes round and sometimes square if we saw it by a particular Idea which would be always the same But I say that we see all things in God by the application that God makes of intelligible Extent to our Mind after a thousand different ways and thus intelligible Extension contains in it self all Perfections or rather all the Differences of Bodies by means of the different Sensations which the Soul bestows on the Ideas it has upon the account of those very Bodies I have spoken after another manner But the World may conclude that it was only to make some of my Proofs the stronger and more sensible and we must not judge by what I have said now that those Proofs are no longer valid I would here give the Reasons of the different wayes I have used to explain my self if I thought it necessary I dare not ingage my self to inlarge further upon this Subject for fear of saying things that are too abstruse or extraordinary Or rather because I would not venture to say things which I do not know and which I am not capable of discovering there are only some Passages of Scripture which seem to be contrary to what I have established here which I shall endeavour to explain OBJECTION St. John in his Gospel and in the first of his Epistles sayes That no Body has ever seen God Ch. 1.18 Ch. 4.12 DEVM nemo vidit unquam unigenitus qui est in sinu patris ipse enarravit ANSWER I Answer We do not properly see God in seeing Creatures in him We do not see his Essence in seeing the Essences of Creatures in his substance As we see not Glass in barely seeing in it the Objects it represents Not but that we may say with St. Paul St. Augustine To the Corinth chap. 13. St. Gregory and several other Fathers of the Church that we see God even in this Life though after a very imperfect manner These are St. Gregories Words in his Morals upon Job B. 31. chap. 20. A luce incorruptibili caligo nos nostrae Corruptionis obscurat cumque videri aliquatenus potest tamen videri Lux ipsa sicuti est non potest quam longe sit indicat Quam si mens non cerneret * Nec quia longe esset videret Si autem perfectè jam cerneret profecto hanc quasiper caliginem non videret Igitur quia nec omnino cernitur nec rursum omnino non cernitur rectè dictum est quia à longe Deus videtur Though St. Gregory to explain this Passage of Job Oculi ejus a longe prospiciunt sayes That in this Life we only see God at a distance it is not because God is not present But it is because the Clouds of our Concupiscence hide him from us Caligo nos nostrae corruptionis obscurat for in other Places he with St. Augustine compares the Light of God which is God himself to the Light of the Sun which surrounds us and which we see not when we are blind or shut our Eyes because its Brightness dazzles us In sole Oculos clausos tenemus St.
according to Saint Paul see God confusedly as in a Glass but we cannot see him Face to Face Non videbit me homo vivet Nevertheless we may see him ex parte that is confusedly and imperfectly We must nor imagine that Life is equal in all Living Men nor that it consists in an indivisible Point Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem Nunc cognosco ex parte 1 Cor. 15. The Dominion of the Body over the Mind which hinders us from uniting our selves to God by the Knowledge of Truth is capable of more and less The Soul is not equally united to the Body it animates by its Sensations in all Men nor to those towards which it inclines by its Passions and there are some who mortifie the Concupiscence of Pleasure and Pride in themselves to that degree that they hardly any longer have any relation to their Bodies or to the World Thus they are as if they were Dead Saint Paul gives us a great Example of this He chastized his Body and reduced it into subjection and he had humbled and lessened himself to that degree that he thought no more on the World nor the World on him For the World was Dead and Crucified to him as he was Dead and Crucified to the World And 't is for that Reason sayes Saint Gregory that he was so sensible of Truth and so well disposed to receive the Divine Lights that are in his Epistles which as bright as they are only strike those who like him mortifie their Senses and Passions For as he sayes himself The carnal and sensible Man cannot apprehend spiritual things Animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei stultitia enim est illi 1 Cor. 2.14 because the Wisdom of the World the Taste of the Age Wit Niceness Vivacity the Beauty of Imagination by which we live to the World and the World lives in us Ad Moysen dicitur non videbit me homo vivet ae si apertè diceretur Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui Mundo carnaliter vivit St. Greg. upon the 28th Chapter of Job communicates to our Mind a sad stupidity and insensibility in respect to all Truths which we cannot perfectly understand without silencing our Senses and Passions Therefore we must wish for Death which unites us to God or at least the Image of that Death which is the mysterious Sleep during which all our External Senses being stupified we may listen to the Voice of inward Truth which is only heard in the silence of Night when Darkness conceals sensible Objects from us and the World is as it were Dead in relation to us 'T is thus sayes St. Gregory That the Spouse had hearkened to the Voice of her Beloved in her Sleep at if she had said I sleep but my Heart wakes I sleep outwardly but my Heart wakes within me because having no Life nor Sensation in reference to visible Objects I become extreamly sensible to the Voice of inward Truth which speaks to me in the most secret part of my Reason Hinc est quod sponsa in Canticis Canticorum sponsi vocem quasi per somnium audieret quae dicebat Ego dormio Cor meum vigilat Ac si diceret dum exteriores sensus ab hujus vitae sollicitudinibus sopio vacante mente vivacius interna cognosco Foris dormio sed intus Cor vigilat quia dum exteriora quasi non sentio interiora solerter apprehendo Bene ergo Eliu ait quod per Somnium loquitur Deus Morals of St. Gregory upon the 33th Chapter of Job AN EXPLANATION OF THE Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book In which I prove That we have no clear Idea of the Nature or Modifications of our Soul I Have said in some places and also think I have sufficiently proved it in the Third Book of the Search after Truth that we have no clear Idea of our Soul but only a Conscience or Internal Sensation and for that reason we know it far more Imperfectly than Extension That appear'd so evident to me that I did not think there was any necessity to prove it more at large But the Authority of Des Cartes who says positively That the Nature of the Mind is better known than that of all other things Answer to the fifth Objection against the second Meditation towards the end has prejudiced some of his Disciples so far that what I have written about it has had no other effect with them than to make me pass for a weak Man and one that is incapable of reaching and keeping firmly to abstracted Truths which are improper to beget and preserve the attention of those who consider them I own that I am very weak sensible and heavy and that my Mind depends on my Body in so many respects that I cannot express them I know it I feel it and I endeavour continually to increase that knowledge I have of my self For if we cannot prevent our being miserable it is necessary at least to know it and to feel it since we must at least humble our selves at the sight of our inward Miseries and acknowledge the need we have to be delivered from this Body of Death which disperses Trouble and Confusion throughout all the Faculties of the Soul Nevertheless the Question in hand is so much proportioned to the Mind that I see not why a great application is required to resolve it And this is the reason I did not inlarge upon it For I think I may presume to say that the Ignorance of most Men in relation to their Soul its distinction from the Body its Spirituality its Immortality and its other properties sufficiently prove that we have no clear or distinct Idea of it We may say we have a clear Idea of the Body because we need only to consult the Idea which presents it to discover the modifications whereof it is capable We see clearly that it may be round square at rest or in motion We easily conceive that a Square may be divided into two Triangles two Parallelograms two Trapezias When any one asks us whether any thing belongs or belongs not to Extension we never hesitate upon an Answer because the Idea of Extension being clear we easily at first sight see what it contains and what it excludes But I find not that we have any Idea of our Mind by which we may discover in consulting it the modifications whereof it is capable Had we never felt Pleasure or Pain we should not be able to know whether the Soul were or were not capable of feeling them If a Man had never eaten Melon suffered Pain seen Red or Blue he might consult the pretended Idea of his Soul long enough and never have distinctly discovered from thence whether it were capable or not of such sensations and such modifications I say further although he actually felt Pain or saw Colour he
could not by a simple view discover if those qualities belonged to the Soul We imagine that Pain is in the Body and that is the reason we suffer it and that Colour is diffused through the surface of Objects although we very clearly conceive that these Objects are distinct from the Soul To be well assured whether sensible qualities are or are not modifications of the Mind we never consult this pretended Idea of the Soul But on the contrary the Cartesians themselves consult the Idea of Extension and argue after this manner Heat Pain and Colour cannot be the modifications of Extension for Extension is only capable of different Figures and different Motions And there is but two kinds of Beings that of Spirits and that of Bodies therefore Pain Heat Colour and all other sensible qualities belong to the Mind Since we are obliged to consult the Idea we have of Extension to discover whether or no sensible qualities are modifications of the Soul is it not evident that we have no clear Idea of the Soul Else we should never bethink our selves of going so far about When a Philosopher would discover whether Roundness belongs to Extension does he consult the Idea of his Soul or any other Idea than that of Extension Does he not clearly see in the Idea of Extension it self that Roundness is a modification of it And would it not be extravagant if he should argue after this manner to explain it that there is only two kinds of Beings that of Spirits and that of Bodies but Roundness is not a modification of a Spirit therefore 't is a modification of a Body We discover then by one simple view without reasoning by a bare application of the Mind to the Idea of Extension that Roundness and all other Figures whatever are modifications which belong to the Body and that Pleasure Pain Heat and all other sensible qualities are not modifications thereof No Question can be proposed about what does or does not belong to Extension which cannot be answered easily quickly and boldly by the consideration only of the Idea which represents it All Men are agreed upon what ought to be received about this subject For those who say that Matter can think don't imagine it has this faculty because it is extended since they acknowledge that Extension taken precisely as such cannot think But we are not so well agreed about what we ought to believe of the Soul and its modifications There are some who think Pain Heat or Colour does not so much as appertain to it 'T would seem very ridiculous amongst some Cartesians to say the Soul actually becomes Blew Red or Yellow or receives a tincture of the Colours of the Rainbow whilest it contemplates thereon There are many persons who doubt and still more who don't believe that the Soul becomes actually stinking when we smell Carrion and that the taste of Sugar Pepper and Salt are properties belonging to it Where is then the clear Idea of the Soul that the Cartesians may consult it and agree all upon the subject where Colours Taste Odours c. ought to center Yet if the Cartesians were agreed upon this point we could not conclude from thence that they would have a clear Idea of the Soul for if they should at last grant that 't is that which is actually Green or Red when we see Green or Red yet would it be only by long and tedious reasonings that they could conclude it They would never discover it by a simple view nor ever find it by consulting the pretended Idea of the Soul but rather by considering that of the Body They only affirm that sensible qualities appertain to the Soul because they belong not to Extension whereof they have a clear Idea nor could they ever otherwise convince those of it who having weak Minds are incapable of complicated Perceptions or Arguments or rather those who cannot stay long on the clear Idea of the Body but confound all things There will be always Peasants Women and Children and perhaps even some Learned Men who will doubt of it But Women and Children Learned and Ignorant the most Ingenious and most Stupid plainly see by the Idea they have of Extension that 't is capable of all manner of Figures And as clearly apprehend that Extension is not capable of Pain Taste Smell nor any Sensation when they faithfully and with application consult only the Idea which represents it for the Idea which represents Extension includes no sensible quality It is true they may doubt whether Bodies are or are not capable of Sensation or of receiving any sensible quality But then by the Body they mean something else besides Extension and have no clear Idea of the Body taken in this sense But when Des Cartes or the Cartesians to whom I speak affirm that they know the Soul better than the Body only understand Extension by the Body then how can they maintain that we have a clearer knowledge of the Nature of the Soul than we have of the Body since the Idea of Body or Extension is so clear that all the World agrees on what it includes and that of the Soul so confused that the Cartesians themselves every day dispute whether the modifications of Colour belong to it We know say these Philosophers according to Des Cartes the nature of a substance so much the more distinctly as we know more of its Attributes Now there is nothing whereof we know so many Attributes as of our Mind because as many as we discover in any thing else we may place to the account of the Mind since it knows them And therefore its Nature is more known than that of any other thing But who is there that don't see a great deal of difference betwixt knowing by a clear Idea and knowing by Conscience When I know that 2 times 2 are 4 I know it very clearly but I don 't clearly know what it is in me that knows it It is true I feel that I know it by Conscience or inward Sensation but I have not so clear an Idea of it as I have of Numbers whose relations I can clearly discover I can reckon three properties in my Mind that of knowing that 2 times 2 are 4 that of knowing that 3 times 3 are 9 and that of knowing that 4 times 4 are 16. And if you will these three properties shall be different from one another and thus I could count an infinite number of properties in my self but I deny that we clearly know the Nature of things which we cannot thus reckon We may say that we have the clear idea of a Being and are acquainted with its Nature when we can compare it with others of which we also have a clear Idea or at least when we can compare the modifications whereof it is capable amongst themselves We have clear Ideas of Numbers and the parts of Extension because we can compare these things together As we may compare 2 with 4 4 with 16
and each number with any other so we may compare a Square with a Triangle a Circle with an Ellipsis a Square and a Triangle with any other Square and Triangle and by this means clearly discover the relations which these Figures and Numbers have to one another But we cannot compare our Mind with other Beings to discover clearly any relation of them nor can we so much as compare its modifications together We can never clearly discover the relations between Pleasure and Pain Heat and Colour or to speak only of the modifications of the same kind we cannot exactly determine the relations between Green and Red Yellow and Purple nor even between Purple and Purple We see plainly that one is darker or brighter than the other yet do we not evidently know either how much or what it is to be darker or brighter We have therefore no clear Idea of the Soul or its modifications and although I see or feel Colours Tasts Odours I may say as I have before that I know them not by a clear Idea since I cannot clearly discover their relations 'T is true I can discover the exact relation between Sounds as for instance that the Octave is double a fifth as 3 to 2 a fourth as 4 to 3. but I cannot know these proportions by the sensations I have of ' em If I know the Octave is double 't is because I have learnt by experience that the same string sounds an Octave when having struck it whole we strike it again after having divided it into two equal parts or that I know the number of vibrations is double in equal times or something of the like nature and this because the tremblings of the air the vibration of the string and even the string it self are such things as we may compare by clear Ideas and that we distinctly know the relations between the string and its parts as also between the swiftness of different vibrations But we cannot compare Sounds amongst themselves or as they are sensible Qualities and Modifications of the Soul nor this way are their proportions or relations to be discovered And although Musicians very well distinguish the different concords 't is not because they distinguish the proportions of them by clear Ideas They judge of different Sounds only by the Ear Reason has nothing to do in it But we cannot say that the Ear judges by a clear Idea or otherwise than by sensation Musicians therefore have no clear Idea of Sounds as they are Sensations and Modifications of the Soul and consequently we conceive neither the Soul nor its Modifications by a clear Idea but only by Conscience or inward Sensation Nay what is more we do not so much as know wherein consist those Dispositions of the Soul which make it more ready to act and represent Objects to it self we cannot so much as discover in what these Dispositions can consist Nor can we by Reason possitively affirm whether the Soul alone separated from the Body or considered without relation to the Body is capable of Habits and Memory But how could we be ignorant of these things if the Nature of the Soul were better known to us than that of the Body Without any difficulty we perceive wherein consists the facility that the Animal Spirits have to flow into the Nerves they have been many times in or at least we easily discover that whilst the Conduits of the Nerves are enlarged and their Fibres recumbent after a certain manner the Spirits can easily insinuate themselves But what can we conceive to be capable of encreasing the facility the Soul has to act or think For my part I confess I am wholly ignorant of it nor can I instruct my self in it although I have a very lively sensation of the facility whereby it excites certain thoughts in me And if I had no particular Reasons which inclined me to believe that I really have such Dispositions although I know them not in me I should conclude that there was neither Habit nor Spiritual Memory in my Soul But in fine since we have any doubt about it it is a certain mark we are not so well acquainted with it as is pretended for Doubts can never attend Evidence and clear Ideas It is certain that the most understanding Man does not evidently know Eccl. 9.1 whether he deserves Love or Hatred as the Wise-man speaks Sed neque meipsum judico Nihil enim mihi conscius sum sed non in hoc justificatus sum qui autem judicat me Dominus est 1 Cor. 4.4 John 13.37 The inward sensation we have of our selves can give us no assurance of it St. Paul says indeed his Conscience reproached him with nothing yet for all that he does not say he is justified On the contrary he affirms that justifies him not and that he durst not judge himself because he who judges is the Lord. But as we have a clear Idea of Order if we had as clear a one of the Soul by the inward sensation we have of our selves we should evidently know if it were conformable to order we should discover whether we were righteous or not and even exactly discern all its inward dispositions to good or evil whenever we had any sensation of them And if we could know our selves as we are we should not be so subject to presumption 'T is also very probable that then St. Peter would not have said to his Master whom he so soon after denied Why can I not follow thee now I will lay down my life for thy sake Animam meam pro te ponam For having an inward sensation of his Power and Good Will he would have been able evidently to have seen whether he had had a sufficient Strength and Courage in himself to have overcome death or rather the insults of a silly Maid and two or three other Servants If the Nature of the Soul is more known than that of any thing else and the Idea we have of it as clear as that we have of the Body I only demand what is the reason that so many Men confound them together Is it possible to confound two clear Ideas which are entirely different Let us do Justice to all the World Those who are not of our Opinion are as rational as we they have the same Idea of things and partake of the same Reason Why therefore do they confound what we distinguish Do they ever on other occasions confound such Things as they have clear Ideas of Have they ever confounded two different Numbers Or ever taken a Square for a Circle And yet the Soul differs more from the Body than a Square does from a Circle for they are two Substances which agree in nothings and still they confound them The reason must be then because there is some difficulty in discovering their difference and which cannot be done by a simple view but some Arguments must be used to prove that the one is not the other Wherefore the
Idea of Extension must be consulted with application and we must discover that it is not a Modification of Body but the Body it self since it is represented to us as a Thing subsisting and the principle of whatever we clearly conceive in Bodies And that as the Modifications of Body is not capable of having any relations to sensible Qualities so it is necessary that the Subject of these Qualities or rather the Being whereof these Qualities are Modifications should be very different from Body The like Arguments are necessary to be urged to prevent the confounding our Souls with our Bodies But if we had as clear an Idea of the Soul as we have of the Body certainly we need not be at all this trouble to distinguish them since we should discover their essential difference by one simple view and with as much facility as we perceive the difference between a Square and a Circle I shall not stand to prove more at large that we have no clear Ideas either of the Soul or its Modifications for what ever way we consider our selves we sufficiently discover it Nor had I added this to what I have already said of it in the Search after Truth but that some Cartesians objected against it If this does not satisfie them I shall expect that they discover to me this clear Idea which I have not been able to find in my self although I have done what I could to discover it AN EXPLANATION OF THE Eighth Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book Of Loose and General Terms which signifie nothing how they are distinguished from others TO comprehend what has been said in some places how such as explain Things by Logical and General Terms give no Reason of them we need only to consider that whatever is may be reduced to Being or Manner of Being whatever Term signifies neither of these signifies nothing at all and whatever Term signifies neither of them distinctly and particularly signifies nothing distinct this seems to me very clear and evident but what is so in it self is not so to every one Words are a sort of Coin wherwith Men pay themselves and others all Terms that offend not the Ear are currant and there is so little Truth in the Business of the World that those who speak or hear it have commonly no respect to it The Gift of Speech is the greatest Talent and the Language of the Imagination is the surest Means and a Memory filled with Unintelligible Terms will always appear advantagiously whatever Cartesians may say of it When Men shall love Truth only they will be cautious what they say carefully examine their Intentions and scornfully reject Empty Terms closely adhering to clear Ideas But when will this come to pass Then only when their dependance upon the Body is broke when their necessary relation to sensible Objects ceases when they shall no longer corrupt one another but faithfully consult their Master who instructs them inwardly but this is not to be expected in this life Yet all are not equally indifferent for Truth some speak without reflection hear without distinction and attend on that only which affects them others industriously labour to inform themselves and convince others of the Truth 'T is to these chiefly that I address my self for it was at their Requests I began these Remarks I say then Whatever is whether it actually exists or not and consequently whatever is intelligible is either Being or a Manner of Being By Being I intend something that is absolute or that may be conceived alone independent of any thing else by Manner of Being I mean something relative or what cannot be conceived alone Now there are two Manners of Being one consists in the relation of the parts of any Whole to some part of the same Whole the other in the relation of one Thing to another which are not parts of the same Whole An Instance of the first is Roundness in Wax which consists in the Equality of distance that all the Superficial parts have in respect to that at the Center The Motion or Situation of the Wax is an Instance of the second which consists in the relation which the Wax has to the Bodies that are about it By Motion I mean not a Moving Power for 't is evident that Power neither is nor can be a Manner of a Bodies Existence for let it be Modified how it will we cannot conceive it as a Moving Power Whatever then is intelligible is either Being or a Manner of Being for it is certain that every Expression that signifies neither of these signifies nothing at all and every Term that signifies not this or that particular Being or Manner of Being is obscure and confused danglam And therefore whatever we say to one another is unconceivable if we have no distinct Idea of Being or Manner of Being which respectively answer to the Terms made use of However I confess we may and ought sometimes to use such Words as do not excite distinct Ideas We may because 't is not always necessary to put the Definition instead of the Thing defined and because we may sometimes profitably use abridg'd Expressions though in themselves confused We must as when we are obliged to speak of such Things whereof we have no distinct Idea and which we conceive not by an inward sensation as of the Soul and her Modifications only we ought to be careful that we use not obscure and equivocal Terms we having clear ones or even any which may excite false Ideas in those we speak to For Instance It is more intelligible to say that God created the World by his Will than his Power This last Word is a Logical Term which stirs up no distinct and particular Idea but leaves us at liberty to imagine that the Power of God may be distinct from the Efficacy of his Will We speak more intelligibly when we say God pardons Sinners through Jesus Christ than by absolutely saying He forgives them through his Clemency and Mercy These Terms are equivocal and may occasion us to think that the Mercy of God may be contrary to his Justice that Sin may go unpunisht and that the Satisfaction of Jesus Christ is not necessary c. Men often make use of loose and Indefinite Terms when they speak of the Divine Perfections which is not blameable since Philosophical Rigour is not always necessary but by a criminal Stupidity and Negligence they abuse these General Expressions and draw so many false Consequences from them that though they all have the same Idea of God and confider him as an infinitely perfect Being yet there was scarcely any Imperfection that was not attributed to him in the Times of Idolatry and Men often spoke of him after a very unworthy manner for want of comparing their Expressions with the Ideas they had of him or rather with himself But 't is chiefly in Phisics that these Loose and General Terms are abused which stir up no distinct Idea either
God makes him will and continually inclines him towards Good and gives him all the Ideas and Sensations which determine him I also acknowledge that Man of himself commits sin But I deny that in that he does any thing for Sin Error and even Concupiscence are nothing Which Point I have sufficiently cleared in the First Explanation Man wills but his Determinations are weak in themselves they produce nothing nor hinder God from doing all Things for it is even he who causes our Wills in us by the impression he gives us towards God Man of himself is only capable of Errour and Sin which are nothing There is a great deal of difference between our Minds and the Bodies which are about us Our Mind in one sense wills Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium peccatum Conc. Araus 2. Can. 22. acts and determines I grant it Of which we are convinced by the inward sensation we have of our selves To deny our Liberty would be to take from us future rewards and punishments for without Liberty there is neither good nor bad Actions So that then Religion would be an Illusion and a Fancy But that Bodies have any power to Act is what we do not clearly see but appears incomprehensible and is also what we deny when we reject Second Causes Even the Mind does not act so much as we imagine I know that I Will and Will freely I have no reason to doubt of it which is stronger than that inward sensation I have of my self I likewise don't deny this But I deny that my Will is the True Cause of the Motion of my Arm the Ideas of my Mind and other Things which attend my Determinations for I see no relation between Things which differ so much On the contrary I clearly discover that there can be no relation between the Will I have to move my Arm According to the sense discussed in the Chapter upon which this Explanation is made and between the Agitation of some little Bodies of which I neither know the Motion nor Figure which make choice of certain Nervous passages amongst a Million of others I know not to cause that Motion in me which I wish by an infinite Number of Motions I wish not I deny that my Will produces my Ideas in me for I do not so much as see how it could produce them For since my Will cannot Act or Will without knowing it supposes my Ideas but does not make them Nay I do not so much as precisely know what an Idea is I cannot tell whether they are produced out of nothing or become nothing again as soon as we cease to behold them I speak according to the Opinion of some persons I produce they will tell me my Ideas by the Faculty God hath given me of Thinking And move my Arm because of the Union God has placed between my Mind and Body But Faculty and Vnion are Logical Terms rambling and indeterminate Words There is no Being whatever nor Manner of Being which is either a Faculty or an Vnion Therefore these Terms must be explained If they will say That the Union of my Mind with my Body consists in Gods Willing that when I wish my Arm should be moved the Animal Spirits are then dispersed into the Muscles of it to move it according to my desire I clearly understand this Explanation and receive it But it is the same Thing which I maintain For if my Will determine that of God it is evident my Arm will be moved not by my Will which is impotent in it self but by that of Gods which can never fail of its effect I always mean a true and efficacious power But if it be said That the Union of my Mind with my Body consists in Gods having given me the power to move my Arm as he has given my Body the power of feeling pleasure and pain that I might be assiduous about my Body and interest my self in its preservation Certainly by this we should suppose the Matter in dispute and make a Circle on 't We have no clear Idea of this power that the Soul has over the Body nor of that the Body has over the Soul Nor very well know what we say when we positively affirm it Prejudice first gave rise to this Opinion we believed it from Infants as soon as we were capable of sensation But the Understanding Reason and Reflection have no share in it as sufficiently appears by what I have said in the Search after Truth But they will say I know by the inward sensation of my Action that I truly have this power So that I shall not be deceived in believing it To which I Answer When we move our Arm we have an inward sensation of the Actual Will whereby we move it and are not mistaken when we believe we have this Will And further We have an inward sensation of a certain Effort which accompanies this Will and we ought likewise to believe that we make this Effort In short I mean that we have an inward sensation that the Arm is moved in the very instant of the Effort Which supposed I consent to what is said That the Motion of the Arm is performed in the same instant we feel this Endeavour or that we have a practical Will to move it It appears evident to me that the mind does not so much as know by inward sensation or Conscience the Motion of the Arm which it animates It knowes by Conscience only what it feels or thinks We know the sense we have of the Motion of our Arm by inward Sensation or Conscience But Conscience does not inform us of the Motion of our Arm or the pain we suffer in it any more than the Colours we see upon Objects Or if this will not be granted I say that inward sensation is not infallible for Errour is often found in Complex Sensation as has been shewed in the First Booke of the Search after Truth But I deny that this Effort which is only a Modification or Sensation of the Soul given us to make us apprehend our Weakness and which affords us but an obscure and weak discovery of our power should be capable of moving or determining the Animal Spirits I deny that there is any relation between our Thoughts and the Motions of Matter or that the Soul has the least knowledge of the Animal Spirits it makes use of to move the Body it Animates In fine although the Soul should exactly know the Animal Spirits and should be capable of Moving them or determining their Motion I deny that with all this advantage it could be capable of making choice of those Nervous Canals of which she is wholly ignorant so as to impel the Spirits into them that thereby the Body might be moved with that quickness exactness and strength as we observe in those who are least acquainted with the Structure of their Bodies For even supposing our Wills were truly the Moving power of
Bodies although it appears incomprehensible how could we conceive that the Soul could move the Body The Arm for Instance is only moved by means of the dilatation or contraction of some of the Muscles which compose it And that the Motion which the Soul impresses on the Spirits that are in the Brain may be communicated to those in the Nerves and these to others which are in the Muscles of the Arms it 's requisite that the Determinations of the Soul should be multiplied or changed in proportion to the almost infinite Occurrences or Shocks which would be made by the little Bodies which constitute the Spirits But this cannot be conceived without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Wills at the least Motion of the Body since to move it an infinite number of communications of Motions are necessary For the Soul being but a particular Cause and which cannot exactly know either the greatness or number of an infinite Variety of little Bodies which mutually strike each other when the Spirits are dispersed into the Muscles it could neither establish a general Law for the communication of the Motions of these Spirits nor exactly follow it if it were established So that it is plain the Soul could not move its Arm although it had the power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits These Things are too clear for us to stand any longer upon them It is the same thing with our Faculty of Thinking By inward sensation we know that we would think on something and make some effort to that end and that in the instant of our Desire and Endeavour the Idea of this Thing presents it self to the Mind But we do not discover by inward sensation that our Will or Endeavour produces our Idea nor does Reason tell us it can do it It is through Prejudice that we are perswaded that our Desires cause our Ideas whilst we prove an hundred times a day that the latter follows or attends the former As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them and as we do not feel any thing else but our Desires which precede the presence of our Ideas we think there can be no other Cause of them But if we observe the Matter more closely we shall discover we have no power in our selves to produce them For neither Reason nor the inward sensation we have of our selves give us any information of it I do not think I am obliged to relate all the other Proofs that are made use of by these Defenders of the Efficacy of Second Causes because they appear so weak that it might be imagined I only intended to render them ridiculous and if I should answer them seriously I should become ridiculous my self An Author for Instance asserts very seriously in favour of his Opinion That Created Beings are True Material Formal Final Causes and why then should they not also be Efficient or Efficacious Causes I believe I should not very well satisfie the World if in Answer to the Demand of this Author I should stay to explain so gross an Equivocation and show the difference between an Efficacious Cause and that which some Philosophers have been pleased to call a Material one So that I shall omit some of the like Proofs to come to those they have taken from the Holy Scripture The Seventh Proof Those who maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes commonly bring the following passages to support their Opinion Let the Earth bring forth Grass Gen. 1. Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creatures that hath life and Fowl that may fly c. Therefore the Earth and the Water have from the Word of God received Power to produce Plants and Animals After which God commands the Fowls and the Fish to multiply Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Waters in the Seas and let Fowl multiply in the Earth Therefore he has given them Power to beget their like JESVS CHRIST in the Fourth Chapter of St. Mark sayes That the Seed which falls on good ground shall bring forth an hundred fold and that the Earth bringeth forth fruits of her self first the blade then the ear and afterwards the full corn Lastly it is also written in the Book of Wisdom That the Fire had as it were forgotten the Power it had of burning in favour of the People of God 'T is therefore confirmed by the Old and New Testament that Second Causes have a Power to act ANSWER I Answer That in the Holy Scripture there is also many passages which attribute to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes of which these are some Ego sum Dominus faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram NVLLVS mecum Isa 44.24 Manus tuae fecerunt me plasmaverunt me TOTVM in circuitu Job 10.8 Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed enim Mundi Creator qui hominis formavit nativitatem c. Mac. l. 2. c. 7.22 23. Cum ipse DEVS dat omnibus vitam inspirationem omnia Acts 17.25 Producens foenum jumentis herbam servituti hominum ut educas panem de terrâ Psal 103. 48. There is an infinite number of the like passages but these may suffice When an Author seems to contradict himself and Natural Equity or some stronger Reason obliges us to reconcile him to himself It seems to me that we have an infallible Rule to discover his true Opinion since we need but observe when he speaks according to his own Understanding and when in compliance with the common Opinion When a Man speaks like the rest of the World it is not alwayes a certain sign he is of their Opinion But when he speaks positively contrary to what we are accustomed to say although he should say it but once we have a great deal of Reason to believe 't is what he thinks provided we know he speaks seriously and having first well considered it For instance An Author speaking of the Properties of Animals if he should in an hundred places say that Beasts feel that Dogs know their Master love and fear him and should only in two or three places say Beasts are insensible and Dogs uncapable of knowing loving or fearing any thing How shall we reconcile this Author who appears to contradict himself Must we not collect all the passages for and against it and judge of his Opinion by the greatest number If so I don't believe there is any Man to whom for example we may attribute this Opinion that Animals have no Souls For the Cartesians themselves often say that a Dog feels when he is beaten and 't is very rarely that they deny him feeling And although I have incountered an infinite number of prejudices in this Book we may draw many passages from thence whereby if this Rule I have explained be received we may prove that I have established them all and even that I hold the Opinion of the Efficacy of
Wills of Spirits For First According to the General Laws of the Communication of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible ones by their divers Motions produce all these various Effects the Cause of which does not appear to us Secondly According to the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body when Bodies which are about us Act upon ours they produce in our Souls an infinite variety of Sensations Ideas and Passions Thirdly Our Mind produces by its Wills a great many different Ideas in it self For it is our Wills which apply and modifie our Minds as Natural Causes whose Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has Established Lastly When our Mind Acts upon our Body many Changes are therein produced by vertue of the Laws of its Union with it And by the means of our Body it also produces in those about it a great Number of Changes by vertue of the Laws of the Communication of Motions Thus all Natural Effects have no other Natural or Occasional Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Wills of Spirits which will easily be granted by any who will use but a little application supposing he is not already prepossessed by such as know not what they say who instantly imagine Beings which they have no clear Idea of and pretend to explain Things they understand not by what is absolutely incomprehensible So that God executing by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will whatever the Motions of Bodies or Determinations of Spirits perform as Natural or Occasional Causes it 's plain God does every Thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that Creatures of themselves have any Efficacious Action but because the Power of God is in some sort communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has Established in their favour This is all that I can say to reconcile my Thoughts with the Opinion of those Divines who maintain the necessity of immediate Concourse and that God does All in all Things by the same Action as that of the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I believe their Opinions are indesensible every way and chiefly that of Durandus See Durand in 2. Dist 1. Qu. 5. Dist 37. de Genesi ad Litteram l. 5. c. 20. and some Ancients whom St. Austin refutes who absolutely denyed the necessity of Concourse and would have Second Causes do every Thing by a Power which God had given them at the Creation For although this Opinion be less perplexed than that of the other Divines yet it appears to me so opposite to Scripture and conformable to Prejudices to say no more that I believe it cannot be maintained I confess that the Schoolmen In 4. Sent. Dist 1. q. De aliaco ibid. who say the immediate Concourse of God is the same Action as that of the Creatures do not absolutely understand it according to my Explanation And except Biel and Cardinal D' Ailly all those I have read think that the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I determined with my self not to say any thing but what I conceive clearly and always take that Side which best agrees with Religion I believe it will not be taken amiss if I forsake an Opinion which to many persons appears so much the more intricate as they endeavour more assiduously to apprehend it And since I have established another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Holiness of Religion and Christian Morality 'T is a Truth I have already proved in the Chapter upon which I make these Reflection but it will be very proper for me to offer yet something more fully to Justifie what I have already said upon the present Question Reason and Religion convinces us than God would be loved and rever'd by his Creatures Loved as good and Rever'd as powerful Which is a Truth we cannot doubt of without impiety and folly To love God as he requires and deserves to be loved we must according to the First Command both of the Law and Gospel and even of Reason as I have elsewhere shown do it with all our strength or according to the utmost Capacity we have of Loving It is not enough to prefer him to all Things but we must also love him in all Things Else is not our Love so perfect as it ought to be l. 4. ch 1. nor do we give to God all the Love he has impressed upon us and that only for himself since all his Actions center in himself Likewise to render to God all the Reverence due to him it is not enough to adore him as the Soveraign Power and fear him more than any of his Creatures We must also fear and adore him in all his Creatures and all our Actions must tend towards him for Honour and Glory are due only to him Which is what God has commanded us in these Words Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo ex tota anima tua Deut. 6. ex tota fortitudine tua And in these Dominum Deum tuum timebis illi soli servies Thus the Philosophy which teaches us That the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that God only is strong and powerful enough not only to Act in our Souls but also to give the least Motion to Matter This Philosophy I say agrees perfectly with Religion the design of which is to unite us to God after the strictest manner We commonly love such Things only as are capable of doing us some good This Philosophy therefore only Authorises the Love of God and absolutely condemns the Love of every Thing else We ought to fear Nothing but what is able to do us some Evil This Philosophy therefore only permits us to fear God and positively forbids our fearing any Thing else So that it Justifies all the Motions of the Soul which are Just and Reasonable and condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion For this Philosophy will never Justifie the Love of Riches the Desire of Greatness nor the Extravagance of Debauchery since the Love of the Body appears mad and ridiculous to the Principles established by this Philosophy 'T is an Undoubted Truth a Natural Opinion and even a common Notion that we ought to love the Cause of our Pleasure and love it in proportion to the Felicity it does or can make us enjoy It is not only Just but it is also very Necessary that the Cause of our Happiness should be the Object of our Love Thus following the Principles of this Philosophy we ought only to love God for it tells us that He alone is the True Cause of our Happiness that the Bodies which are about us cannot Act upon that which we Animate consequently much less upon our Minds 'T is not the Sun which enlightens us
wrote about Idolatry In the Days of Enos Men fell into strange Delusions R. Moses Maimonides and the Wise Men of that Time perfectly lost their Sense and Reason Enos himself was in the Number of those deceived Persons These were their Errours Since God said they has created the Stars and the Heavens to govern the World has placed them on high surrounded them with brightness and glory and employes them to exexecute his Orders it is just that we should honour them and pay reverence and homage to them 'T is the Will of our God that we should honour those whom he has raised and exalted in Glory even as a Prince requires we should honour his Ministers in his presence because the Honour we give to them redounds to himself After they had once received this Notion they began to build Temples in honour of the Stars to offer Sacrifices and Praises to them and even prostrate themselves before them thinking thereby to gain the favour of him who created them And this was the original of Idolatry It is so Natural and Just to have Sentiments of Acknowledgment in proportion to the Benefits we receive See Vossius l. 2. de Idolatria that almost all the World have adored the Sun Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii nullam belluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent consecraverant Cic. l. 1. de Natura Deorum because they all thought he was the cause of the Happiness they injoyed And if the Egyptians have adored not only the Sun the Moon and the River Nilus because its overflowings caused the fruitfulness of their Country but also the vilest Animals 't was as Cicero relates because of some benefit they received from them So that as we cannot and indeed ought not to banish out of Mens Minds the inclination they Naturally have for the true Causes of their Happiness it is evident that there is at least some danger in maintaining the Efficacy of Second Causes although we joyn thereto the necessity of an immediate concourse which has I know not what of incomprehensible in it and which comes in as an after-game to justifie our Prejudices and Aristotles Philosophy But there is no danger in speaking only what we know and atributing Power and Efficacy to God alone since we see nothing but his Wills which have an absolute necessary and indispensable connection with Natural Effects I confess that Men are now knowing enough to avoid the gross Errors of the Heathens and Idolaters But I am not afraid to say that our Mind is disposed or rather that our Heart is often inclined like that of the Heathens and that there will alwayes be some kind of Idolatry in the World until the day that Jesus Christ shall again deliver up his Kingdom to God his Father having first destroyed all Empire Power and Dominion that God may be all in all Quorum Deus venter est Phil. 13.9 Omnis fornicator aut immundus aut avarus quod est idolorum servitus Eph. 5.5 In spiritu veritate oportet adorare John 4.24 For is it not a kind of Idolatry to make a God of our Belly as St. Paul speaks Is it not to idolize the God of Riches continually to labour after Worldly Possessions Is this to render to God the Worship due to him to adore him in Spirit and Truth to have our Hearts filled with some sensible Beauty and our Minds dazled with the brightness of some imaginary Grandeur Men believing they receive from the Bodies which are about them the Pleasures they injoy by their use they unite themselves to them with all the Powers of their Soul And thus the principal of their disorder proceeds from the sensible conviction they have of the Efficacy of Second Causes 'T is Reason only that tells them there is none but God acts in them But besides that Reason speaks so low that they can scarcely hear it and the Senses which oppose it cry so loud that it stupifies them they are still confirmed in their Prejudices by Arguments which are so much the more dangerous as they bear external Characters and sensible Marks of Truth The Philosophers and chiefly the Christian Philophers ought continually to oppose Prejudices or the Judgments of the Senses and especially such dangerous ones as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes And yet I know not from what Principle there are some Persons whom I extreamly honour and that with reason who endeavour to confirm this Prejudice and even to make this Doctrine pass for superstitious and extravagant which is so holy pure and solid and maintains that God alone is the true cause of every thing They will not have us love and fear God in all things but love and fear all things in relation to God We ought say they to love the Creatures because they are good to love and respect our Father render honour to our Prince and Superiour since God commands it I don't deny it but I deny that we must love the Creatures as our goods although they be good or perfect in themselves I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters For we must neither serve our Master obey our Father or Prince with any other design but to serve God and obey him This is what St. Paul sayes who became all things to all Men and complyed in all things for the Salvation of those to whom he Preached Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore tremore in simplicitate cordis vestri SICVT CHRISTO Non ad oculum servientes quasi omnibus placentes sed ut servi Christi facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo cum bona voluntate servientes SICVT DOMINI ET NON HOMINIBVS And in another Epistle Non ad oculum servientes quasi hominibus placentes sed in simplicitate cordis DEVM TIMENTES Quodcumque facitis ex animo operamini SICVT DOMINO ET NON HOMINIBVS We must therefore obey our Father serve our Prince and render honour to our Superiours AS VNTO GOD AND NOT VNTO MAN Sicut Domini non Hominibus This is clear and can never have any bad consequences Superiours would alwayes be more honoured and better served But I believe I may say that a Master who would be honoured and served as having in himself another Power than that of God must be a Devil and that those who served him under that Notion would be Idolaters for I can't but believe that all Honour and Love that tend not towards God are kinds of Idolatry SOLI DEO HONOR ET GLORIA AN EXPLANATION Of what I have said in the Fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method and elsewhere That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most Simple Wayes IT seems to some Persons to be too rash a Conjecture or an abusing of indeterminate and general Terms to say That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most simple wayes in
which I have drawn Should I be very Reasonable thus to be willing to condemn all Men as impious because of the Consequences which I might draw from their Principles Certainly Monsieur de la Ville would say my Consequences were not fairly deduced and I say the same thing of his But to destroy all these Consequences I need only explain his Equivocations which I shall sometime or other do as I see it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the Common Opinion about the Efficaciousness of Second Causes See the Explanation about Second Causes in Vol. 2. of the Search after Truth And by what kind of Concourse will he render to God all that is due to him Will he show clearly that one and the same Action is wholly of God and wholly of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same Effect Will he prove that Spirits ought neither to love nor fear Bodies although Bodies have a true Power of acting upon them And will he from hence convince many whose Mind and Heart is wholly possest with Sensible Objects because they judge these Objects are capable of making them happy or miserable Let him confess then that if it were permitted to treat as Impious and Heretical all those who maintain such Principles from which Impious and Heretical Consequence may be deduced that then no one can be secure from having his Faith suspected The Third Proof The Consequence of a Principle proposed by Monsieur de la Ville as matter of Faith That the Essence of Bodies consists not in Extension This Negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrable and direct Proof of the Souls being a substance distinct from the Body and consequently Immortal When this Truth is received which I think I have demonstrated after many others and which Monsieur de la Ville attacks nevertheless as a Principle contrary to the decisions of the Church That the Essence of Matter consists in Extension in length breadth and depth It is not difficult to prove That the Soul or that which is capable of thinking is a distinct substance from the Body For 't is manifest the Extension of any matter conceived as divisible or movable can never reason will nor even perceive so that that in us which thinks is a substance distinct from our Body Actual Knowledges Wills and Sensations are actually manners of the existence of some substance Now all divisions that happen to Extension can produce nothing but Figures as all Motions relations of distance Extension is incapable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are manners of some substances existence which is not Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body and this being asserted we prove likewise that it is Immortal No Substance is ever annihilated by the common Power of Nature for as Nature cannot produce something out of nothing so it cannot reduce any thing that is to nothing Manners of Being may be annihilated Roundness in a Body may be destroyed for what is Round may become Square but this Roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance 't is only a relation of inequality in the distance which is between the parts that terminate this Body and that which is at the Center Thus the relations changing Roundness is no more but the substance cannot be annihilated Now by the Reasons above the Soul is not a manner of the Bodies existence it is therefore Immortal and although the Body be dissolved into a thousand parts of different Nature and the Construction of the Organs be broken the Soul consists not in this Construction nor in any other Modification of Matter It 's evident then that a dissolution and even an annihilation of the substance of Mans Body if the annihilation were real could not annihilate the substance of our Soul But there is yet another Proof of the Souls Immortality built upon the same Principle Although a Body cannot be reduced to nothing because it is a substance it may nevertheless dye and suffer a dissolution of all its parts for Extension is divisible Now the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension it cannot be divided One can divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as one may divide a Square into two or four Triangles Then the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently Immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something else besides Extension how will he convince Libertines that 't is neither Material nor Mortal They will maintain to him that this something in which the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that that is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denyes it they will show him that 't is unreasonable since according to his Principle a Body being something else besides Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and therefore cannot know whether this unknown thing is not capable of thinking Will he pretend to convince them by maintaining as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have parts without Extension Certainly they will not believe him upon his word for finding so much difficulty in conceiving parts without Extension as indivisible Atomes and Circles without two Semi-Circles they must have more deference for him than he himself has for the Word of God For Monsieur de la Ville in the last Part of his Book pretends That even God cannot oblige us to believe things that are contradictory such as are the parts of Body without any actual Extension But Libertines will not be wanting on their part for probable Reasons to confound the Soul with the Body Experience they will say teaches us That a Body is capable of feeling thinking and reasoning That 't is the Body which feels Pleasure and Pain That 't is the Brain which thinks and reasons The weight of the Body depresses the Mind Folly is a true Distemper and those who have most Wisdom lose it when that part of the Brain in which it resides grows infirm The Essences of Beings are unknown to us we cannot by Reason discover of what they are capable so that Reason wills we should consult Experience and Experience confounds the Soul with the Body and teaches us that it is capable of thinking Thus Libertines will reason And indeed those who tell us we know not the Essenees of Beings and who quarrel with Philosophers for demonstrating that Extension is not the Manner of Being but the very Essence of Matter ought to think upon the mischievous Consequences that are deducible from their Principles and not go about to overthrow all the demonstration we have brought about the distinction that is between the Soul and Body For in fine the distinction
Jesus Christ or the Word of God of his Divinity does not yet so throughly darken the Mind as to hide from it this Truth that God Wills Order Thus whether the Wills of God make Order or suppose it we clearly see when we examine our selves that the God whom we worship cannot do that which evidently appears contrary to Order So that Order willing our Time or duration of Being should be for him who preserves us that all the Motion of our Heart should continually tend towards him who continually impresses it upon us that all the Powers of our Soul should only labour for him by vertue of whom they act God cannot dispense with the Commandment which he gave us by Moses in the Law and which he repeated by his Son in the Gospel Mark 12.30 Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart with all thy soul with all thy mind and with all thy strength But because Order wills that every righteous Person should be happy and every Sinner unhappy that every Action conformable to Order and every Motion of love towards God be recompenced and on the contrary it is evident that every one who will be happy must continually tend towards God and with horrour reject every thing that would stop his Course or diminish his Motion towards his True Good 'T is not necessary that for this he consult a Spiritual Guide for when God speaks Men should be silent and when we are absolutely certain that our Senses and Passions have no part in the Answers which we hear inwardly we must alwayes hearken respectively to these Answers and submit to them Would we know whether we should go to a Ball or a Play Whether we may in Conscience spend a great part of the day at Gaming or unprofitable Entertainments Whether certain Businesses Studies Employments are conformable to our Obligations Let us enter into our Selves let us silence our Passions and Senses and see the Light of God if we can for his sake do such an Action Let us interrogate him who is the Way the Truth and the Life to know if the Way we follow does not lead to Death and whether God being essentially Just and necessarily obliged to punish every Thing that is contrary to Order and to recompence every Thing that is conformable thereto we have reason to believe we go to encrease or assure our felicity by the Action we are about If it be our Love to God that carries us to the Ball let us go thither if we should play to gain Heaven let us play Day and Night if we have in sight the Glory of God in our Employ let us encrease it let us do all Things with Joy for our Recompence will be great in Heaven But if after having carefully examined our Essential Obligations we discover clearly That neither our Being nor duration are of us that we do an Injustice which God cannot but punish when we endeavour to spend our Time in vain If our Master and Lord Jesus Christ who has purchased us by his Blood reproaches our Infidelity and Ingratitude after a very clear and intelligible manner for living after the Flesh and the World for leading a Soft and Voluptuous Life and for following Opinion and Custom let us obey his voice and not harden our Hearts let us not seek for Guides that soften these Reproaches embolden us against these Menaces and who obscure this Light with agreeable Clouds which hurt and penetrate our very Soul When the blind lead the blind they both fall into the ditch sayes the Gospel but if the Blind Man who suffers himself to be lead fall with him that leads him if God does hot excuse him will he excuse him who sees clearly and yet suffers himself to be lead by the Blind because this Blind Person leads him agreeably and entertains him in the way according to his inclinations These voluntary Blind ought to know that God who never deceives does sometimes permit these Seducers to punish corrupted Hearts who seek Seducers that Blindness is a punishment of Sin although 't is often the Cause thereof and that 't is just that he who would not hearken to Eternal Wisdom which only speaks to him for his good should leave him at length to be corrupted by Men who deceive so much the more dangerously as they flatter him more agreeably It is true 't is difficult to enter into ones self to silence ones Senses and Passions and to discern whether 't is God or our Body who speaks to us for we often take the Proofs of Sensation for evident Reasons and then 't is necessary to consult Guides but 't is not alwayes necessary to consult them For we see our Duty on many occasions with the utmost evidence and certainty and then it is even dangerous to consult them if it be not done with an entire Sincerity and a Spirit of Humility and Obedience for these Dispositions oblige God not to permit us to be deceived or at least in no very dangerous manner When 't is necessary to consult a Guide we must choose one who understands Religion who reverences the Gospel and who knows Man We must take care that the Converse of the World has not corrupted him that Friendship has not made him too Complaisant so that he may either fear or hope any thing from us We must choose one among a thousand sayes St. Theresia who as she relates of her self had like to have been lost by the defect of an ignorant Guide The World is full of Deceivers I say Religious Deceivers as well as others Those who love us seduce us through Complaisance those who are below us flatter us through Respect or Fear those who are above us consider not our Necessities either through Contempt or Negligence Besides all Men counsel us according to the relation we give them of what passes in us and we are never wanting to flatter our selves for we insensibly cover our Sore when we are ashamed of it We often deceive those who direct us that we may deceive our selves for we suppose our selves safe when we follow them They guide us whither we have a mind to go and we endeavour to perswade our selves in spight of our Light and the secret reproaches of our Reason that 't is our Obedience which determines us We deceive our selves and God permits it but we never deceive him who examines our Hearts and though we shut our Ears as much as we can against the voice of inward Truth we sufficiently feel by the reproaches of this soveraign Truth which leaves us to our selves that it inlightens our darkness and discovers all the subtleties of self-love 'T is therefore evident that we must consult our Reason for the Health of our Soul as our Senses for that of our Body and when Reason answers not clearly we must necessarily have recourse to Guides as we would to Physicians when our Senses fail us but this must be done with discretion for Guides