into one and as it were to hold them fast united And this we say is done by the SOUL Now if the SOUL be corporeall let it be what Body you please yea though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtile parts what will you say holds that together as that knitteth the Bodie in One For as we declared before every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together yea the Bodie of this SOUL that knits together our visible BODIE if we should grant the same to be a corporeall SOUL and the next to that also infinitely it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together untill an incorporeall-essence were found out If they answer as the Stoicks doe that there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body That the motion tending outward effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body and that the motion tending inward is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof wee will then aske them seeing every motion doth proceed from some power what kinde of power it is which that motion hath in what consisteth it and what gives essence thereunto If this power bee a certaine matter which the Greekes call Hylen wee will use the same reasons against them which wee objected before If they say it is not matter but a materiall thing for matter and materiall things thus differ That which hath matter in it is called a materiall thing wee then aske them whether that which hath matter in it be likewise matter or void of matter If they say it is matter we demand how it can be both materiall and matter If they answer that it is not matter then they must grant it to be void of matter and if it be void of matter wee will easily prove it to be no Body because every body hath matter in it If they alleage that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them and that the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body hath in it also the three Dimensions and therefore must necessarily be a Body wee will then thus answer them It is true that all BODIE' 's have in them the three Dimensions but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY For place and Quality which in themselves have no Body have accidentally a Quantity if they bee in such things as have magnitude In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe is utterly void of the Dimensions but accidentally it hath Dimensions because the Body in which it is having in it the three Dimensions wee so conceive it together with the Body as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions We argue further and say thus Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe or from within If the motion bee from without it selfe it must then be void of life if it be from within it selfe it must be indued with life now it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life or without life one of which must necessarily be affirmed if the Soule bee a corporeall substance therefore the soule cannot be a corporeal Essence Againe the SOUL if it be nourished it is nourished by that which is void of Body for knowledge is the nourishment thereof but no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless therefore the SOUL cannot be a Body Xenocrates thus concluded this argument If said hee the SOUL be not nourished it cannot be a corporeal-substance because the Body of every living-creature must be nourished Thus much in generall in confutation of all those who generally affirm that the SOUL is a bodily thing Now we will treate particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood or Breath because when either Blood or Breath is taken away the living-creature dyeth Wee will not say as some well accounted of have written that part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth if the SOUL be the Blood for that were but a slender answer In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole the part remaining is the same with the whole Whether the water bee much or little it is every way perfect water In like maner gold silver and every other thing whose parts do not essentially differ from each other are still the same as is afore said And even so that part of blood which remaineth of what quantity soever may be called the SOUL aswell as the whole quantity if the blood be the SOUL We therfore will rather answer them thus If that be rightly accounted the SOUL upon whose taking away the death of the living creature ensues then should it needs bee that flegme and the two choller 's must be also the SOUL seeing if any one of these faileth it brings the living-creature to his death The like falleth out in the Liver in the Braine in the Heart in the Stomach the Reines the Entrails and in many other parts whereof if you bereave a living-creature it will immediatly perish Moreover there are many things without blood which have life in them neverthelesse as some smooth and gristly fishes some also of a softer kind to wit Sepiae Teuthides and Smyli as the Greekes call them and Lobsters Crabs Oysters and all shel-fish whether they have hard or soft shells Now if these things have a living-Soule in them as we know they have and yet are void of blood then it plainely followes that blood cannot bee the SOUL Against those who say that water is the Soule many things may bee said to disprove their opinion though water helps to quicken and nourish all things and though it bee as they say impossible to live without water Wee cannot live without nourishment and therefore if their assertion bee true wee may aswell affirme that all nourishment in generall and every particular nourishment is the SOUL And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water wee finde the contrary to bee probable for it is written of some Aegles and of Partridges that they live without drinke And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water very long whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire And yet neither is Aire the SOUL For there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire as all Insectae riveted creatures such as Bees Wasps and Ants as also all bloodlesse creatures all those which live in the waters and such as have no Lungs For none of those things that are without Lungs can breath Aire The proposition is true also if it be converted There is no creature having Lungs which doth not breath aire SECT 2. I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoick affirming the SOUL to bee corporeall are here confuted logically and by demonstration II. Chrysippus intending to
in death For if thereby the soul be divided from the body it is immediately as much without motion as a Workmans Tools when hee hath cast them aside This is manifest that MAN in some things participates with creatures void of life and that he is partaker also of life as those living-creatures be which are unreasonable and that he is indowed likewise with understanding as are Creatures reasonable With inanimate creatures Man partakes in this that he hath a Body and in his mixture of the foure Elements He agrees with Plants not onely in that which is afore-mentioned but in having also both a nourishing and a feeding-power His coherence with unreasonable Creatures over and above all the former particulars is in having a certaine voluntary motion appetite anger and a power enabling him to feele and breathe for all these are common both to Men and unreasonable creatures Furthermore he communicates with Intelligent incorporeall Natures in reasoning understanding judging and in pursuing vertue and a good life which is the chief end of all vertues These things considered MAN standeth in such a Being as comprehends the sensible and intelligible Nature In respect of his Bodily powers and of his Bodily substance which is subject unto sense hee agrees both with living-creatures and with things void of life In respect of his Reasonable part he communicates with Substances which are bodilesse or spirituall as hath been said before For GOD the Creator of all things hath seemed by little and little so to collect and knit together sundry differing natures that all created things should become ONE And indeed it will be a manifest proofe unto us that there is but One Creator of all things if we well consider how fitly he hath united the substance of individuall things by their particular parts and all the severall species thorowout the world by an excellent sympathie For as in every living creature hee hath joyned the parts insensible with such as have sense in them as bones fatt haire and other insensible parts to the flesh and sinewes which are sensible compounding the Living-creature both of sensible and insensible portions and declaring that all these together make but one living-creature Even so he hath joyned one to another every particular species which was created by ordering and compounding that agreement and disagreement which is in their natures In so much that things inanimate doe not greatly differ from Plants which have in them a vegitative and nourishing life neither are Plants wholy differing from sensible living creatures void of reason nor are those unreasonable creatures so alienated in all things from creatures indowed with reason as that they have no naturall allyance or similitude whereby they may be linked one to another For even in stones which are inanimate creatures not having in them for the most part so much as a vegitative life there is otherwise a certaine power making them to differ from each other even in their stony properties but the Loadstone seemeth very far to exceed the nature and vertue of other stones in that it both attracts Iron thereunto and also detaineth it being so attracted as if it would be nourished thereby Neither doth it exercise this vertue upō one peece of Iron alone but by that one peece linketh fast another and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contiguous thereunto yea Iron draweth Iron when it is touched by the Loadstone Moreover when the CREATOR passed from Plants to living-creatures he rushed not as we may say all at once into things whose nature is to remove from place to place and to such as are indowed with sense but he proceeded rather by degrees and by a naturall and most comely progression For the Shell-fishes called Pinnae and Vrticae are so made as if they were certain Plants having sense in them For he fastned them in the Sea with roots and covered them also with shells as with bark And as therein he made them to participate with Plants so he gave them likewise in some measure the feelingsense which is common to living-creatures They agree with Plants in being rooted and fixed and they communicate with living-creatures in their feeling In like manner the Sponge though it be rooted in the Rocks is of it self opened and contracted according as the passenger approcheth toward it or departeth frō it And therefore Wise men have anciently termed such things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in English Life-plants if by a new word I may so name that which is partly a living-creature and partly a Plant. After the Fishes called Pinnae he proceeded unto those which being unable to passe far from their station doe move onely to and fro within some certaine space such as are the most part of those which have shells and are called the bowels of the earth He went further and added in the like maner something to every thing in particular as to some things more senses and to some other more ability to remove themselves from place to place and came next to those unreasonable-creatures which are more-perfect Those I call more-perfect-creatures which have obtained all the senses and can also remove themselves to places far distant And when GOD passed from unreasonable-creatures to MAN a Creature indowed with Reason he did not perfect him in himself and as it were all at once but first ingraffed into some other living-creatures certain naturall wiles sleights and devises for the saving of themselves which make them seeme to be almost reasonable-creatures And having done all this he then brought forth MAN which is indeed the true Reasonable-Creature The same Order if it bee well considered will appeare in the Voice which from the noise of Horses Oxen is brought by little and little from one plaine simple sound unto the voices of Crowes and Nightingales whose voices consisting of many notes can imitate what they are taught and so by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate voice of MAN which is distinct and perfect Furthermore hee made the various expressions of the Tongue to depend upon the Minde and upon Reason ordaining the speech to publish forth the motions of the Minde And in this wise by a sweet Musicall proportion hee collecting all things together incorporated all into ONE aswell things Intelligible as things visible and made MAN as a meanes thereunto SECT 2. I. Why MAN was first made and why he hath in him somewhat of the Nature of all Creatures II. MAN is the Bounder between visible and Intellectuall things and becomes either an Earthly or Spirituall MAN according as he is inclined to Good or Evill A distinction between the Goods of the Mind and Body and betweene the life of MAN as he is Man and as he is meerly a living creature III. The opinion of the Hebrews touching the mortality and immortality of MAN THese things considered Moses in expressing the Creation of the World did very properly affirme that MAN was last made Not only
because all things being made for MAN it was most convenient that all such things ought first to bee provided which were necessarily pertinent to his use and that he who was to have the use of them should afterward be created But in respect both intellectuall and visible substances were created it seemed also convenient that One should be made by whom those two Natures should be so united together that the whole World might become ONE and be in it owne selfe so agreeable that the same might not bee at variance or estranged from it selfe Even to this end was MAN made such a living-creature as might joyne together both Natures and to summe up all in a word therein was manifested the admirable wisdome of the universall CREATOR Now MAN being placed as it were in the Bounds betweene the Reasonable-nature and that which is Irrationall if he incline to the Bodie setling the maine part of his affectioÌ„ upon corporal things he chuseth and embraceth the life of unreasonable-creatures and for that cause shall be numbred among them and be called as Saint Paul terms him An earthly MAN to whom it shall be thus said Earth thou art and to Earth thou shalt returne yea by this meanes he becomes as the Psalmist affirms like the Beast which hath no understanding But if he incline rather to the Reasonable part and contemning Bodily lusts and pleasures shall make choice to follow that blessed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN he shall then be accounted a Heavenly MAN according to that saying Such as the earth is such are they that are earthly such as the heavenly are such are they that are heavenly and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the Reasonable-Nature is to avoid and oppose Evill and love and follow that which is Good Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body of which sort the Vertues are and these have a relation unto the Soul in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body being joyned thereunto Some good things pertaine to the soul only by it self so that it should not need the help of the body as godlinesse and the Contemplation of the nature of things and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN and not onely in that he is a living creature do apply themselves to Vertue and Piety But we will anon shew distinctly what things pertain to Vertue and what to Piety when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body For seeing wee doe not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof it is not yet convenient for us to treat here of those things that are wrought by it The Hebrewes affirme that MAN was made from the beginning neither altogether mortall neither wholly immortall but as it were in a state betweene both those natures to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the bodie But if he did prefer such good things as pertaine to the soul he should then be honoured with Immortalitie For if GOD had made MAN absolutely mortall from the beginning he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended because it had beene a thing needlesse to make him mortall by condemnation who was mortall before And on the other side if he had made Man absolutely immortall hee would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment for nothing that is immortall needeth bodily nourishment Moreover it is not to be beleeved that God would so hastily have repented himself and made Him to be forthwith mortall who was created absolutely immortall For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sinned but according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning they remained immortall undergoing for their offences not the penalty of Death but of some other punishment It is better therefore either to be of the first mentioned opinion touching this matter or else thus to think that MAN was indeed created mortall but yet in such wise that if hee were perfected by a vertuous and pious progression he might become immortall that is to say he was made such a One as had in him a potentiall abilitie to become immortall SECT 3. I. Our Author sheweth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evill was forbidden that it was at first expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne Nature II. MAN by the Transgression attained that knowledge of himselfe which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortalitie III. The Elementarie câ—mposition and nourishment of Mans bodie The reasons also why it needed feeding clothing curing c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible and capable of Arts and Sciences c. IT being inexpedient rather then any way helpful for MAN to know his own nature before he came to his perfection GOD forbad him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill For there were and doubtlesse as yet there are very great vertues in Plants but at the first in respect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation their vertues being before the curse pure and void of all mixture had in them a strong operation and it is not therefore strange that there should be by Gods providence the taste of a certain Tree that should have a power given to ingender in our first parents the knowledge of their own nature The cause why God would not have MAN to know his owne nature before hee had attained to perfection was this lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things should as by the sequell we find it manifest labour only to supply the wants of his Body and utterly cast away the care of his Soul and for this cause did God forbid him to tast of the fruit of knowledge of good and evill By disobeying this Commandement MAN attained to the knowledge of Himself but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed For according to the words of Moses as soone as he had eaten He knew that he was naked and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakednesse whereas till then God kept him as it were in a Traunce and in such case that hee knew not himself When hee fell away from the state of growing to perfection hee fell also from his immortalitie which by the mercy of his Creator he shall recover againe at the last In the meane time it was granted him that hee should eat flesh whereas before his fall God willed him to bee content with such things only as grew out of the earth all which hee had provided for him in Paradise yea the first meanes of growing to perfection being become desperate it was permitted him to feed as hee would Now seeing Man consisteth of a Bodie as of
could the Lions finde power to seife the one nor the Viper to fasten upon the other These things considered who is able to commend sufficiently the nobility of this living-creature Behold he bindeth together in himself things mortall and immortall and knitteth up in One things reasonable and unreasonable In his owne nature hee beareth the image of all creatures and from thence is rightly called A little world He is a creature of whom God hath vouchsafed to take so much regard that all created-things both present and to come were for him created He is that creature also for whose sake GOD became MAN and who shaking off his corruption finisheth it in a never-ending immortality Yea he is that creature who being made after the image and likenesse of GOD raigneth above the heavens living and becomming cōversant with CHRIST the sonne of GOD who sitteth above all power and authority and no eloquence may worthily publish forth the manifold preheminences and advantages which are bestowed on this creature He passeth over the vast Seas he rangeth about the wide heavens by his contemplation and conceives the motions and the magnitudes of the stars He enjoyes the commodities both of sea and land He contemns the furie of wild-beasts the strength of the greatest fishes He is learned in every science and skilfull in Artificiall workings Hee communicates by writing with whomsoever he pleaseth though they be far distant and is nothing hindred therein by the absence of his Bodie He foretelleth things to come he ruleth all subdueth all and enjoyeth all things He talketh with Angels yea and with GOD himself He hath all the Creatures within his Dominion and keeps the Devils in subjectiō He searcheth out the nature of every thing and is diligently studious in the knowledge of GOD. He was borne to be the house and Temple of the Holy-ghost and he acquires the fruition of all these priviledges by Vertue and Piety But lest it may be thought of some that we proceed unskilfully in setting forth so largely the praises of Man whereas wee should rather have contented our selves to proceed with a Discourse touching the nature of MAN according to our first purpose wee will break off our speech in this place though we are not ignorant that by setting forth his preheminence and priviledges we have not improperly prosecuted our intention to declare the Nature of MAN And now seeing it is manifested unto us of how great nobility we are partakers and that we are a heavenly plant let us not deface or shame our Nature neither let it be truely said that we are unworthy of such gifts nor let us foolishly deprive our selves of so great Power and Glory and Blessednes by casting away the fruition of Ioyes that shall be everlasting for the seeming possession of imperfect pleasures which will endure but a while But let us preserve rather this nobility of ours by doing good by abstaining from evill works and by a good-zeal intent or purpose For to such endeavours if we seek it by prayer God alwaies lendeth his assisting hand Thus much concerning these matters And now seeing it is the received opinion that MAN consisteth of Body and Soul we will follow the same Division treating first of the Soul and therein passe by those questions which being over subtile and difficultly understood cannot be intelligibly expressed to many capacities CAP. 2. SECT 1. I. The severall and different Opinions of the Ancients concerning the SOVL as whether it be a Substance whether corporeall or incorporeall whether mortall or immortall c. II. The confutation of those who affirme in generall that the SOVL is a corporeall-substance III. Confutations of their particular Arguments who affirme that the SOVL is Bloud Water or Aire EXceeding great variance is discovered among the old Philosophers in their discourses of the SOUL insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter Democritus and Epicurus and the whole sect of the Stoicks doe peremptorily affirme that the SOVL is a Bodie and those very men who affirme the SOVL to be a Bodie dissent one from another in declaring the Essence of it The Stoicks affirm that it is a certain Blast hot and fiery Critias holds that it is bloud Hippon the Philosopher will have it to be water Democritus thinks it is fire and his opinion is that the round Formes of indivisible-bodies or Atomes being incorporated by ayre and fire do make up the Soul Heraclitus conceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certaine breathing out of the vapours from moist things and that the Soul which is in living-creatures doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves and from exhalations also within them and being of the same kind of which they themselves are Againe on the contrary part there are almost innumerable disagreements among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body or Bodily-substance Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance and immortall Some that it is without a Bodie and neither a substance nor immortall Thales who was the first of that opinion held that the SOUL was alwaies in motion and had that motion from it selfe Pythagoras thought that it was a NUMBER moving it selfe Plato affirmed that it was a substance to be conceived in mind that received motion from it self according to NUMBER and HARMONY Aristotle taught that it was the first continuall-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL having in it those Instrumentall parts wherein was possibility of life Dinarchus took it to be an Harmony of the foure Elements not a Harmony made of sounds but as it were a tunable temperature and agreement of hot cold moist dry things in the Bodie But it is without doubt that all the best of these doe agree in this that the SOUL is a substance Aristotle and Dinarchus excepted who affirme that it is no substance at all Besides all these some were of opiniō that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things which was by smal portions distributed to all particular things and then gathered into it self againe of which opinion were the Manichees and certain others Some likewise imagined the Soules were many and of differing sorts Some affirmed that there was both one universall and many particular SOULS and therefore it cannot be but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length seeing I am to disprove so many opinions Therefore to confute in generall all those together who affirme that the Soul is a corporeall essence it shall be sufficient to alledge that which hath been heretofore delivered to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist and by Amonius the Master of Plotinus who thus affirme All Bodies being by their proper nature mutable and such as may be utterly dispersed and divided into innumerable parts and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed have need of something to close them in to bring them together to knit them
maintaine the like opinion is here likewise answered and his Fallacies discovered III. A confutation of their Tenet also who affirme that the SOUL is an Harmony SEeing certaine reasons of some account are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoick and by Chrysippus to prove the SOUL a corporeall substance wee will here deliver somewhat in answer of them and it shall be the same which the Platonists have thereunto replyed heretofore Cleanthes composeth a syllogisme in this manner There is saith hee a likenesse betweene us and our parents not in respect of the Body onely but in regard also of the SOVL as in Passions Manners and Affections now it pertaineth to a body to have in it likenesse and unlikenesse and likenesse and unlikenesse cannot belong to things void of Bodie Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing It is here to be observed first that he proveth things universall by things particular which is not allowable by the Rules of Logick Next whereas he saith that likenesse and unlikenesse cannot pertaine to any thing void of bodie it is false For wee know that Numbers which have their side-numbers answering in proportion are like one to another as the side-numbers to sixe and to foure and twentie The side-numbers to sixe are two and three The side numbers to foure and twenty are foure and sixe Now there is like proportion of two in respect of four and of three in respect of sixe For they have a double proportion each in respect of other foure being twice as much as two and sixe twice as much as three Thus it appears that Nūbers are like unto Nūbers yet Numbers are no bodily thing Likewise Figures in Geometrie are like unto Figures so many of them as have both their corners equall their sides which inclose their equall-corners answering one another in proportion and even the Platonists themselves will confesse that such Figures are no Bodily-things Moreover as it is a propriety in the predicament of Quantity that a thing should be equall or unequall So also it is a propriety in the predicament of Quality that things should be like or unlike Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeall thing Therefore a thing incorporeall may be like unto another thing that is incorporeall Cleanthes thus frameth another Argument No Incorporeall thing saith he can suffer together with a thing corporeall neither can a bodily-thing suffer with such a thing as hath no body but things corporeall only may suffer one with another Now it is evident that if the body be diseased and wounded the SOVL suffereth grief with it The Bodie suffereth also with the SOVL for when the mind is afflicted by shame the Bodie blusheth and when the minde feareth the body looketh pale Therefore the SOVL is a corporeall thing One of his Assumptions is false and he taketh unto himself that which no man granteth For whereas he saith that no Incorporeal thing can suffer with a thing having a bodie what if this be true onely in the SOVL This is as if we should argue thus No living-creature moves the upper jaw But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw Therefore a Crocodile is no living-creature The major of this proposition is false because in saying No living-creature moves the upper-jaw hee taketh as granted that which is denied for behold the Crocodile both moveth his upper-jaw and is also a living-creature The like arguing useth he who saith that Nothing void of body suffereth together with a bodily-thing for he taketh unto himself in his negation that which lieth in question But if we should grant for argument sake that no Incorporeall-thing doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall yet that which is inferred thereupon is not fully confessed to wit that the Soul suffereth with the Body if it be sick or wounded For it is yet in controversie whether it be the Body onely that suffereth pain which having taken sense from the Soul leaves the same insensible of sufferings or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Bodie The former opinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men and therefore Cleanthes ought not to have made his propositions of things in question but of such onely as are quite out of doubt for in doing otherwise he in vaine laboureth to demonstrate that for which he contendeth And yet to make the fashood of his Assumption more evident it might be proved that some things void of body doe suffer together with such things as have body For Qualities being things-incorporeall doe suffer with corporeall-things when they are altered yea both in the corruption of the body and in the Generation of the same the Quality thereof suffers change and alteration therewith Chrysippus thus argueth Death is a separation of the Soul from the Bodie Now nothing void of body is separated from a body because a thing incorporeall cannot be touched or laid even along by a corporeall-thing But the Soul toucheth and is equally touched by the body and is also separated from the same Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence Among these propositions this is true that death is a separation of the soul from the body But this that a thing void of body cannot touch a body is false if it be generally spoken and true if it be affirmed of the soul It is false because a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth evenly touch a corporeall-essence and is also separated from the same as also whitenesse Yet in the Soul it is true by reason the Soul doth not so touch the Bodie For if the Soul should so touch the body it must needs follow that it must be laid as it were along by it And if that be so then it lieth along by the whole bodie that is by every part of the same which is impossible For how can a wholebody lie along by every part of another body Or if it should be that the Soul so touched the Bodie then the whole Creature should not have life For if it so touched the same it would indeed consequently follow that the Soul were a corporeall-essence but then the thing made alive should not have life in it throughout every part of the same And contrariwise if the whole living-creature hath life in it then the Soul neither touches the Bodie neither is it a bodily-thing But the whole living-creature hath life in it therefore neither doth the Soul touch it neither is the Soul a bodily-thing and being a thing void of body is neverthelesse separated from the bodie contrary to the proposition of Chrysippus It is manifest by what hath been hitherto said that the Soul is no corpreall-substance it now remaines that we prove the same to be a substance And because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmonie And Simmias contradicting Socrates affirmes the same comparing the Soul to an harmonie and the body to a Harp we will here set downe the same confutations of them which we finde in Plato's Dialogue called Phaedon One of them
is taken from what Plato had proved by things granted For he had demonstrated that when we doe learne we doe but call to minde things that were ingraffed formerly in us And therefore taking this unto him as a thing granted hee thereupon confirmes his Argument in this maner If saith hee the learning of things be nothing else but the recalling of them to minde then our soule had a being before it was in the forme of MAN Now if it were a Harmony it was not before the body but came after it when the body was harmoniously joyned together Such of necessity must the composition bee as the things are whereof the composition is made For composition is a certaine common joyning together of those things which are compounded having a harmony in the same and it cannot bee otherwise in reason but that the Harmony must follow and not precede those things whereof it is compounded These matters considered this saying That the SOUL is an Harmony is contrary to this other saying That the learning of things is the recordation of things But the opinion concerning recordation as is aforesaid is true even in their judgement who affirme the SOUL to bee an HARMONIE therefore the SOUL is not a Harmony according to their owne Principle Againe the SOUL is a part repugnant to the body and is in stead of a Ruler exercising a government over the same But Harmony neither exerciseth any government over the Body neither is any way repugnant thereunto therefore the SOUL is not an Harmony Moreover one Harmony may bee more or lesse Harmony then another according as it is slackned or stretched forth wee meane not to bee understood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony seeing it is impossible there should be intension and remission in the very nature thereof but wee meane Harmony as it consisteth in joyning together of the notes For if a shrill and a base-sound being matched together shall afterward bee made more slack there will bee a diversitie in the Harmony by reason of joyning together of the notes more or lesse reached forth though they retain the same nature in the greatnesse of the sounds But one SOUL is not more or lesse SOUL then another therefore the SOUL cannot be a Harmony Futhermore the SOUL in that it receives contraries succeeding one another is a substance and a subject But Harmony is a Quality and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing and the predicament of Quality is another therefore the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things It is indeed no absurdity to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it howsoever it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Harmony Because though the SOUL hath vertues in the same it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is vertue SECT 3. I. It is here declared that the SOUL is not as Galen implicitly affirmeth a Temperature in generall II. It is here proved also that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality III. And it is likewise demonstrated that the SOUL is rather governesse of the temperatures of the Body both ordering them and subduing the Vices which arise from the bodily-tempers GAlen hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL yea hee himselfe affirmeth plainly in his writings of demonstration that hee hath delivered nothing precisely of the same But it may bee collected by some of his expressions that he could be best pleased to affirme that the SOUL is a temperature For he saith that the diversitie of manners followes the temperature of the Body and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of Hippocrates Wherein if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh then doubtlesse hee beleeveth also that the SOUL is mortall not the whole SOUL but that onely which is irrationall for hee maketh a doubt concerning the reasonable soul as his words declare Now that the temperature of the Body cannot be the SOUL it may be made evident by these reasons First every body aswell that which hath life in it as that which is void of life is made of the temperature of the foure Elements for the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies And if the SOUL bee the temperature of the body there can be no body with out life For if the Soul be the temperature then every body hath life in it because every body hath his temperatures And if every Body hath life in it then there is no body void of life So consequently neither stone nor timber nor iron nor any other thing can be without life But he did not meane perhaps to affirme in generall that every temperature of the body was the SOUL but rather that some such or such a temperature Wee then demand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature and standeth instead of the SOUL For let him name what temperature soever hee can devise we will finde him out the like in things without life There are as hee himselfe hath declared in his Booke intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS nine temperatures eight distempered and one in good temper by which as he likewise affirmeth every man is tempered whose temperature keepeth a meane But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are composed every one according to the severall kinde thereof with a certaine intension and remission to the more and to the lesse Yea and all the nine temperatures are found also more or lesse in things void of life as he himselfe hath taught in his booke of simple-medicaments Moreover if the SOUL be a temperature then is the SOUL subject to alteration for the temperatures are altered according to the diversitie of Ages Seasons and Dyets And if the SOUL be altered then wee have not at all times the same SOUL but a Soule varied according to our temperatures sometime the soule of a Lion sometime of a Sheepe and sometime of other creatures which were absurdly affirmed Againe our temperature doth not oppose it selfe against any lusts of our bodies but rather helps to provoke them or effect them for it is that which stirreth up the desires But the SOUL bendeth it selfe against those desires therefore our temperature is not the SOUL Furthermore the temperature is a quality and a qualitie may be in the subject or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject Now if our temperature bee our soule it will then follow by the reason afore-mentioned that the soule may be separated from the body which is the subject thereof without the destruction of the same But this is universally knowne to be false therefore the SOUL can be neither temperature nor qualitie None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a living-creature into the contrary thereof and yet preserve the living-creature then in fire to change the nature of heat into coldnesse and yet still continue the fire But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary that such as Galen
is a bodie but in possibility have a possibility of life in it self Though in other things it is possible that a man should have somewhat which he never useth yet in the soul it is impossible For the soul doth not cease to worke even in them that are asleep but a man even in sleeping is nourished groweth and seeth visions and breathes which is the chiefest symptome of life It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live but it must needs have life actually in it For indeed it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul it is planted together with the Soul and it is in the bodie by participation If therefore any man shall affirme that Health answereth proportionably to Life we will reply that in saying so he tal keth not of the life of the SOUL but of the body and so useth a sophisticall reasoning For the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another but in the substance which is the forme that cannot be possible Because if the difference which is the Form should be altered the living creature would be altered also It is not therefore the substantiall forme which receiveth contraries but the substance which is the subject that is to say the bodily-substance And therefore also the Soul cannot be by any means the continued motion of the bodie but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe and incorporeall for that it receiveth contraries one after another as vice and vertue whereof the very Forme by it self is not capable Furthermore Aristotle saith that the Soul being a continued-motion unmoveable of it self is moved accidentally and that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing because we see by common experience that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us But though Beautie which is unmoveable in it self may move us as hee saith yet the Beautie so moving us is a thing by nature apt enough to be moved not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable Therefore if the body had any selfe-motion it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immoveable But it is impossible that a thing of it self immoveable should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain unto motion except it receive it from the soul seeing it cannot have any motion from it self It appeares therefore that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion hee shewed us not the first but the second For if he had moved that which of it self is not moved he had then made the first-motion But if otherwise he move that which is moved of it self hee discourseth how the second-motion commeth From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie If he say the Elements are moved of themselvess in regard some of them are naturally light some heavy It is not so For if levity weightinesse were kinds of motion then light and heavy things would never leave moving But they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place Therefore lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion but qualities of the Elements If it were granted that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion how can the Qualities of Reasoning of Judging and of holding Opinion be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse If they be not effects of these neither are they effects of the Elements and if not of the Elements then also not of the Bodies Beside if the soul be moved accidentally and the bodie of it self then should the bodie be moved of it self although it had no soul and if that were possible then it might be a living-creature without a soul But these things are absurd and absurd therefore is the former opinion Moreover it is likewise untruely affirmed that every thing which is moved naturally is moved also violently and that whatsoever is moved violently is moved by nature For the World being moved naturally is not moved violently Neither is it true that such things as are moved naturally doe rest naturally also For the World and the Sunne and the Moone are naturally moved and yet cannot rest naturally In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion they cannot rest naturally For Rest is the destruction of the Soul of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion It is herewith considerable also that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter viz. how the bodie whose nature is to be easily dispersed can be knit together if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance SECT 5. I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras nor as Xenocrates understands it II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul these words created or ingendred in the Bodie and the absurdity thereupon insuing III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation Providence c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules PYthagoras whose custome it was by a certaine kind of Comparison to liken God and all other things to NUMBERS defined the soul also to be a number moving it self Him Xenocrates imitated not as though the soul were number but for that it is in things numbred and in such as are multiplyed and for that it is the soul which discernes things and because likewise it putteth as it were upon every thing certaine formes and distinctions For it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another and shewes how they differ both by the diversity of their Formes and by the multitude of their number thereby causing things to be contained in number And therefore betweene the soul and numbers there is some affinity He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe And that it is not a number wee may thus prove Number is in the predicament of quantity But the soul is not in the predicament of quantity but in the predicament of substance Therfore the soul is not a number Yea though they would never so faine that number should bee a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding it will bee proved otherwise as it shall hereafter bee declared Againe the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another but so hath not number Therefore the SOUL is not a Number Againe a number is increased by putting more and more unto it but the Soul taketh no such increase Againe a number is either even or odd but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd Againe the SOUL hath motion of it selfe but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable Againe a number remaining one and the same in nature is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers But the Soul remaining one and the same in substance doth change his qualities altering from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to vertue therefore all these
particulars considered the SOVL is not a number These were the ancient Philosophers opinions concerning the SOUL But Eunomius defined it to be a SVBSTANCE void of body and created in the body agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle For he took these words a substance void of body out of Plato and these created in the body from Aristotle not considering though hee was otherwise very quick witted that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no meanes be united together For every thing that is engendred both bodily and in time is corruptible and mortall To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable For in describing the Creation of things subject unto sense hee did not therein deliver in expresse words that the nature of things intelligible were then made But some though othersome are not of their opinion insisting upon conjectures are of that minde Now if any man suppose that the SOUL was made after the body because it was put into the body after the same was fashioned he erreth wide from the truth For neither doth Moses say that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body neither doth any reason perswade thereunto Eunomius therefore might aswell have said that the Soul is mortall as doth Aristotle and the Stoicks as affirme it is engendred in the body For if he will say the soul is an incorporeall Essence hee should have refused to say that it was created in the body lest hee give men occasion to thinke the soule mortall and utterly void of Reason Beside it seemes by his opinion that the World is not yet replenished but is at this present as it were no more then halfe perfected and stands every day in want of some additions For there are every day added unto it at the least five times ten thousand intelligible substances And which is most unreasonable hee seemeth to beleeve that when the number of soules is finished then the whole world shall bee dissolved and the last not come to light before the day of the generall resurrection What can be more contrary to reason then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed assoone as it is fully furnished It were like the play-games of little children so to do For when they have made any workes or devises upon the sands they usually tread them out againe as soone as they have done them Now if any shall hereunto reply that the soules are now made by Providence and not by Creation and that there is no new substance brought into the world whensoever any body is replenished with a soule nor any other Essence but the same multiplyed by Providence which was before doubtlesse they know not the difference between Creation and Providence For it is the speciall worke of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living creatures by breeding them one of another I meane here all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter for the succession of such is preserved by the same providence by generating them of some other putrifaction But the chiefe operation of Creation is to make things of nothing If therfore the SOULS bee made one of another It will also follow that they are corruptible like those other creatures which are made successively one of another according to their kindes If contrariwise the SOULS be made of nothing then their making commeth by Creation and in so affirming we deny that place of Moses God ceased from all his workes But both of these opinions are absurd Therefore the Soules are not now made For that saving of the Scripture My Father worketh c. by the judgement even of Eunomius himselfe is to be understood not of the workes of Creation but of Providence Apollinarius held opinion that Soules were engendred one of another as Bodies are and that the SOUL proceeds by succession from the first Man unto all men descending from him according to the bodily succession therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have beene from the beginning as it were stored up and from those also who thinke they are daily created For in contradiction to these tenets they affirme that by them God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children And they further say that these words of Moses God ceased from all his works c. should be untrue if God continueth to create Souls In answer hereunto we have already shewed that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of another For therefore onely they generate and are generated that the race of corruptible things might be preserved And therefore Apollinarius must either deny the successive generation of Souls or by holding such a generation he must consequently at least necessarily affirme that the Soul is mortall Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adultery let us leave that unto the Divine Providence whereof we are ignorant But if we may presume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable permitteth such a bodie also to be furnished with a Soul as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Vrias SECT 6. I. The opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL and the absurdity and contradictions thereof II. The judgement of Plato touching one generall SOUL and many particular SOULS The office of the SOUL and the difference betweene things that live and Living-creatures is here also declared III. Of the Transmigration of SOULS according to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers NOw it followes that we examine the opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL For they say truely that the SOUL is a substance both immortall and incorporeall But they adde also that there is but one onely Soul for all things and that it is parted and as it were peecemeal distributed unto all particular bodies as well to bodies inanimate as to those which are indued with life They affirme likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort and some in a lesse measure Things indued with life in a larger proportion Things void of life in the lesse And heavenly things in the most abundant manner and that the particular soules are portions of that soul which is universall Now if they had affirmed the soul to have been so divided as that it had not been divided into parts but after some such sort as one voice is divided to the eares of many hearers the error had been the more tolerable But their opinion is that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts and which is most harsh they will have it to be accounted properly among the Elements and to be distributed together with the Elements in the making up of bodily-things and for the collecting of them againe into one when they are dissolved as
water is divided into certain portions and then mingled again all together They are of opinion likewise that after the dissolution of their bodies the pure soules being light doe ascend unto the light and that souls which have been defiled by the materiall substance in which they resided doe passe into the Elements and from the Elements depart againe into Plants and living-creatures And though they do thus mangle the substance of the soul by their fancies making it in effect both corporeall and subject to perturbations they say neverthelesse that it is immortall But in these things they contradict themselves For first they say that the souls which have been defiled doe returne back to the Elements and are mingled and tempered one with another and contrariwise in the passing of soules from body to body they say that punishments are inflicted on them according to their offences joyning and separating again the nature of them as occasion serves They hold likewise that when it is light shadowes are dispersed and when all is covered with clouds that the shadowes are gathered together which cannot possibly come to passe in an intelligible Nature For if a Man should grant that shadowes are dispersed and gathered againe we must then count shadowes among things subject unto sense Plato is of opinion that there is both one generall soul and many particular soules One soule for the whole world altogether and other soules for particular things In such manner that the whole world is indued with a proper soul of its owne even with that soul which belongeth unto the whole world and so also that particular things are indued with their proper soules even with the soul which is peculiar unto every one of them The soul saith hee which pertaineth to the Vniverse is stretched forth from the center of the Earth to the uttermost limits of the Heavens not as though he conceived such a stretching forth as is inclosed in Place but such an extension rather as is conceived in our understanding And hee saith that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole Globe and which holdeth in and bindeth together all such things as have bodily shape For as hath been already declared all corporeall substances have need of somewhat to hold them together and that is done by the SOUL which giveth unto every thing the forme For every thing that liveth hath a proper life of his owne and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corruption say the Platonists So long as it is held and knit together they terme it a Bodie and when it is dissolved they say it is corrupted or destroyed They affirme also that all things live but say not that all things are living-creatures For they distinguish Plants from things inanimate for that they increase and are nourished by a nourishing and vegitative power They distinguish the living-creatures void of reason from plants by sense And the rationall from the irrationall by reason Thus though they affirme generally that all things live yet they distinguish the nature of every living-thing Such things as are utterly void of a sensible life doe live say they an habituall life and are held together by the generall Soul of the World which keeps them in their proper Being and undissolved This they hold also to be the Soul which governs the world and that it sends into every particular thing such particular Souls as were before made for them by the CREATOR Yea and they say to that the Creator gave unto it certaine Lawes whereby it should order this whole world which Lawes they call DESTINIE and that the same Creator vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient power to supply such things as are necessary for Man whereof wee shall treat more at large in our discourse of Destinie All the Greek Philosophers who affirme the Soul to be immortall are of opinion that the SOUL passeth from bodie to bodie But they differ in setting down of what sort of souls they meane it Some understand it of one sort onely that is to say of the Reasonable-soul affirming that it passeth into Plants and into the bodies of irrationall-creatures Some of these think this transmigration was but at certaine appointed Revolutions of Time and some of them imagined the time to be casuall and uncertaine Some other understand it not of one sort of souls onely but of the Irrationall as well as of the Rationall and some again understand it of many sorts of soules even of so many as there are divers kinds of living-creatures The Schollers of Plato have been somewhat singular in this opinion For considering Plato said that the soules of such as were furious and angry and given to rapine were clothed with the bodies of Wolves and Lions and that their souls who spent their lives in wantonnesse tooke upon them the bodies of Asses and such like beasts Some understand him as though hee had meant Lions and Wolves Asses as the bare words doe signifie Some perceived that he spake figuratively and by the names of those beasts understood the conditions or qualities of those creatures For Cronius in his booke intituled Of the renewed generation for so he termes the transmigration of SOULS from Bodie to Body will have it understood of none but reasonable-Soules Yea and Theodorus one professing the doctrines of Plato in his book which affirmeth that one SOUL comprehends all the species is likewise of the same minde And so is Porphyrie SECT 7. I. The singular opinion of Iamblicus touching the Trāsmigration of Souls II. Every BODIE hath a SOUL convenient for the same III. The brute creatures doe nothing according to Reason but by-naturall instinct IV. The judgement of Galen concerning diversitie of Soules and a recapitulation of the severall things proved and disproved in this Chapter concluding the Soule to be both immortall and incorporeall BUt Iamblicus running a contrary race to these men sayes that wee must understand that the soul is of the same sort that the living-creature is and that there be divers kinds of SOULS He hath affirmed in his booke called MONOBIBLON that the changing of SOULS never hapneth from Men to unreasonable-creatures neither from unreasonable-creatures to Men but from beasts to beasts and from Men to Men. And in so saying he hath not only well guessed but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Plato's opinion As by many other of his Arguments may be shewed but especially by these that follow No one of the motions of reason saith he manifests it selfe in unreasonable creatures For neither Arts nor Learning nor Consultations nor Vertues nor any other thing belonging to an intelligible nature can bee found in them And therefore it is plaine that they have no part of the reasonable-Soul Though in Infants which are very young there is altogether an unreasonable-motion yet wee say they have a Reasonable-Soule because when they come to yeares they shew forth the workes of reason But in the unreasonable-creature which at no age
lifelesse-body there may bee a perfect union For the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtfull and it is much the more doubtfull it Man consist not of these two parts onely but of understanding also as a distinct thing which is the opinion of some But the greatest doubt of all ariseth in this respect that all those things which concurre unto the making of one essence are joyned all together in the making of that one seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing are usually so altered that they remaine not the same they were before as it shall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four Elements How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL remaine still a Bodie or how can the SOUL being incorporeall and having a substance of his owne be united with the BODIE and become a part of the Living-creature preserving still his owne proper substance without corruption and confusion It seemes to be no way else possible but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other either become altered one with the other or corrupted with each other as the Elements are or else to avoid those absurdities that they should not be truly united but be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe or at best be so mixed as wine and water But we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL that the Soul cannot be laid as it were along by the Bodie because if it should be so that part onely of the body should have life in it which joyneth neare unto the soule and that the part which the soule toucheth not should be without life Moreover wee cannot say that two sundry things placed one beside the other as two pieces of timber two iron wedges or such like are one and the same thing And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water wee know it corrupts both the one and the other for there doth remaine neither pure water nor pure wine after such a mixture Yet this mixture of wine and water is but as it were a laying of them one beside another though our senses be not able to apprehend the same because they are hindred from perceiving it by the thinnesse of the parts of those things which are mixed For the wine and water may be separated againe the one from the other by a sponge dipped in oyle or by paper either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine But indeed it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other those things which are exactly united If therefore the parts of MAN be neither united nor placed one beside the other nor mixed together as aforesaid what reason should move us to say that one Living creature is made of these two parts a Soul and a bodie It was the consideration hereof which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body but that he was a Soule having the use of the Body and to whom the Body served as a garment But even in affirming that he occasioned as much doubting for how can the Soul bee one with what is but his garment seeing a Coat is not all one with him that wears it But Amonius who was master to Plotinus thus dissolved this question even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable of them and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption when they bee united as those things do which are but laid along one by another It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together must of necessity suffer alterations by their union and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto because they are thereby changed into other Bodies as are the Elements making compound bodies or as nourishment being changed into blood or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh and other parts of the Bodie But things intelligible may bee united and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue For it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things to bee altered in substance but either it departeth away or is brought to nothing and so can admit no alteration The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted or brought to nothing for then it could not be immortall It is also life it selfe and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture For if it should be changed in the union it should be altered from being life any more and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto All these arguments considered it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered it followes necessarily therupon that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things so likewise the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other That they are neverthelesse perfectly united is manifested by this that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature For the whole man grieveth as one creature if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other to the SOUL or to the Body And it is as plaine that they remaine united without confusion in that the soule being separated after a sort from the Body when wee bee asleepe and leaving the body lying in maner of a dead Corps and only breathing into the same as it were certaine vapours of life least it should utterly perish doth worke by it selfe in dreames whilest the Body sleepeth foreseeing things to come and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligible The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things For even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things For being without body it separates it self from the whole body as things which are therewithall corrupted and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion And keeping it selfe one and alone changeth that wherein it abideth by the life which is contained in it selfe and yet is not changed by the same For as the Sun so soon as it appeareth changes the ayre into light so making it light some and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre that it is united with the same and yet not confoūded therewith Even so the soul being united with the Body remaines without confusion therwith differing in this onely that the Sunne being a Body and circumscribed within
operations of nature doe afterward belong unto destiny which being granted all that should bee in our power would be quite overthrowne But the matter is not at that point For as hath beene already declared every thing belonging unto the minde whether it be for practise or contemplation is all in our power Neither doe all things which are contained under providence belong to nature though every thing belonging to nature is governed by providence For many things wrought by providence are not the workes of nature as I have declared in discovering the murtherer neither is nature in all points the same with providence though it be as indeed it is a part of providence And therefore these men doe ascribe the providence over particular things both to nature and unto the minde SECT 2. I. Of their absurd opinion who affirme that GOD hath care of universall but not of particular things II. The error of the vulgar concerning blessednesse and of their causelesse and impious reprehension of GODS Providence III. Of the blasphemies which must consequently follow the deniall of GODS Providence over particular things THere be some who affirme that God so provides for the continuance of all things which hee hath created that nothing shall faile which hee hath made and that his providence extends to this thing alone without regarding particulars which are left by him to succeed as meer casualty shall bring them about Hereupon as they conceive it commeth to passe that so many injuries so many murthers and in briefe that so much wickednesse and oppression is increased among men yea thereupon it commeth say they to passe that some of them are punished some unpunished and that little or nothing is performed either according to right reason or the Canons of Law For how as they think can it be possible that God hath care of any thing when as neither law nor true judgement beareth sway but where the contrary hath rather the chief rule and where the best men are for the most part wronged oppressed and plunged into innumerable afflictions while Tyrants and wicked men are advanced to offices to powerfull dignities to riches and to all such things as are well esteemed of in this life But they who speake in this maner are not onely ignorant of many other things that are expressed in our discourse of providence but estranged also to the immortality of the soule For supposing the soule to bee mortall they shut up all things belonging unto man within the compasse of this life and judging perversly of those things which are good they imagine that such as abound in riches and beare great sway by the places of authority and vaunt of other such like temporall or materiall commodities are the only blessed and happy men But of the vertues of the minde which exceed by many degrees all bodily and externall things they make no account at all Howsoever those commodities are the best which belong unto the best things And in that respect vertue as far surpasseth riches and health and such like as the soule is more excellent then the body And therefore also vertue aswell alone as together with other things makes a man to be blessed Vertue with other things is considered according to a finite amplitude as a thing of two ells or the like but alone and by it selfe it is considerable according to an indefinite circumscription as a heape For if from a heape which is a thing having an indefinite circumscription you may take away two bushels which is a finite quantity two bushels is indeed taken from the heape yet that which is left continueth still to be an an heape In like maner if from vertue considered in its own indefinite amplitude you take away all the good things that are bodily or externall which are but finite things and leave the vertue onely which is an indefinite good the blessednesse remaineth still intire because vertue even of it selfe is perfectly sufficient to blessednesse And therefore every good man is blessed though no externall good be left him and every wicked man is miserable though he hath all those things hapned together which are called the goods of Fortune The multitude not knowing thus much doe think that they onely are blessed who have all things at will for their bodily delight and abound in riches and they can oft finde fault with providence which governeth our affaires not with respect unto those things onely which are apparent unto us but with regard unto those also which are according to the fore-knowledge of GOD. For GOD foreseeing that it would be expedient for him to bee poore who is now honest and good and that riches comming fast upō him would corrupt his minde doth keep him in that poverty which is most convenient for the chiefe good of that man And in regard God foresaw also that the rich man would be grievous to others in the want of riches by committing robberies murthers and other great outrages hee suffered him to enjoy riches Poverty hath been many times profitable also in making us to beare the losse of our children with more contentednesse and in preventing the vexations which might happen by wicked servants and perhaps their lives would have beene more bitter to us then their deaths if our children had lived to bee wicked or if wee should have had false and thee-vish servants We foreseeing nothing that is to come but beholding only the things present cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present Thus much wee have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GODS providence and against whom this part of Scripture may well be applyed Shall the clay say to the potter why hast thou made me thus For it is an arrogance to be abhorred that he who dares not finde fault with an earthly Law-giver should prescribe lawes to GOD and object against the workes of his providence But we will forbeare to meddle further with such extravagancies or to speake more properly with such impieties and proceed in disproving them who say that particular things are not governed by any providence and yet allow that universall and generall things are governed by a providence For no man can alleadge more then these three causes to prove that there is no providence of God over particular things Either it must bee because GOD knoweth not that it is good to take care for such things or because he will not or because he cannot But nothing is more estranged from that blessed Essence then ignorance and unskilfulnesse For It is knowledge and science and wisdome it selfe Nay there is none among men so ignorant if he be in his wits but knowes that if all particular things should be destroyed the generall things could not possibly consist seeing universall things are made up of particulars Yea all the particular things and the generall things are equall and converted destroyed and
preserved together If therfore particular things perish the universall will also perish And there is no reason why wee should imagine that all singular things could escape destruction if no care were taken of them from above Now whereas to avoid this objection they grant that GODS providence extendeth to this onely that individualls shall bee providently preserved so far forth as may conduce to the preservation of generall things they have said enough though they bee not aware thereof to prove that there is also some providence over individualls For as they themselves have said in effect GOD by preserving the species preserveth also the kindes SECT 3. I. Of the unreasonablenesse of their opinion who thinke that God despiseth to take care of particular things II. Of Gods undeniable ablenesse to governe individualls and of the capablenesse which particulars have of the divine providence III. Mans readinesse to call upon God in suddain extremities as it were by naturall instinct is an argument of providence SOme there be who although they confesse that GOD is not ignorant how to provide for particular things doe affirme that he will not assume the care of them Now every one that will not doe a thing either will not doe it because of sloth or else for that it is not comely for him so to doe No man will be so mad as to impute sloth to GOD For sloth is bred of these two pleasure and feare and every one that is slothfull is thereby drawn away by the love of some ease or pleasure or else discouraged by feare and to cōceive either of these to be in GOD were an impious absurdity If they that will not be so prophane to lay slothfulnesse to GODS charge shall say it is undecent for GOD and unworthy the majesty of so high a blessednesse to descend so low and unto such vile smal things or to be as it were prophaned by the absurdities and obscenities of those materiall things which depend upon the will of man and that therefore he will not take upon himselfe the government of such matters they not heeding it impute unto GOD in so saying two very faulty things pride and impurity For either the Creator despiseth to take on himselfe the government and administration of individualls through haughtiness which is most absurd to affirme or else through feare of being defiled as they speake And that is no lesse absurd then the other For if they know the nature of the Sunne-beams to be such that they can exhale naturally all moisture even from dung-hills when they shine upon them and that neither the Sunne nor his beames are any whit contaminated or defiled thereby but keepe neverthelesse their owne purity how can they conceive that GOD should be polluted by those things which are below Surely these cannot be the conjectures of men that have any knowledge of what is pertinent unto the nature of GOD. For the God-head is untouchable uncorruptible not possibly to be contaminated and above all alteration But pollution and such like things are the workes of change and betoken alteration And how can it bee counted other then most absurd that an artificer of what art soever and especially a Physitian taking care of generall things should heedlesly passe over things particular without caring to shew his art in them though things of the least consequence seeing hee cannot chuse but know that every part standeth in some stead unto the whole much more absurd were it for any man to be of opinion that God who is the Creator of all should be more unskilfull then an artificer and what else can be alleaged if he be willing but that hee cannot take the care of particulars And what can be affirmed more manifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD then to say he is weak and lacketh ability to doe well For two other causes GODS providence is by some judged not to be exercised in particular things The one is because the nature of God as they thinke serveth not thereunto the other is for that they conceive particular things to be incapable of his providence But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his providence they themselves who have denied it doe implicitly confesse when they affirme that his providence ruleth universall things especially seeing the inferiour things are not able to mount up unto such as are much above them whereas the power of those which are superiour descendeth even unto the lowest even to things insensible for their preservation yea all things depend upon the will of GOD and draw from thence their continuance and well-being And that the nature of individualls though infinitely multiplyed is capable of being governed by Providence it is plaine by those living creatures which are ordered by Rule and Authority For some of them as Bees and Ants and divers others which being assembled together are continued under certaine Captaines or guides whom they obediently follow But this is best perceived if we looke into the government of common-wealths and the conversation that is amongst men For it is plaine that it admits the administration and care both of Lawgivers and also of subordinate magistrates and how can that which is capable of such things be unfit to receive an orderly government from the providence of the Creator This also is no small argument that there is providence over particular things even that the knowledge thereof is naturally ingraffed in men which is evident when wee are brought to any great extremity for wee then slie immediately unto GOD by prayer as if without teaching it were naturally written in our hearts that help were to be sought of GOD. Nature except it have beene taught cannot of it selfe lead us unto that the doing whereof is not according to nature neither doth it move us to fly thither for assistance where none is to be had yet when any great affliction or feare suddenly oppresseth us we cry out unto GOD before we be aware and before we have had time to bethinke our selves what wee have to doe Now every naturall consequence is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction SECT 4. I. Of the occasion and grounds of their error who thought there was no Providence ruling individualls II. How men ought to behave themselves in the search of Gods providence which is beyond their comprehension III. Of Divine permission and the manifold species thereof THe occasions ground of their error who say there is no providence over particular things are these First they conceived the soule to bee mortall and that it perished with the body And secondly because these men could not comprehend by their understanding and reason how there should bee any providence ruling individualls But that the soule is not mortall and that all things pertaining unto man are not shut up within the compasse of this life it appeareth even to heathen men both by the opinions of the wisest among the Grecians who taught the transmigration of
soules from body to body as also by the places which they affirmed to bee allotted out unto the Soules departed according to their good or evill course in this life and by those punishments wherwith soules are as they hold punished by themselves for the offences they have committed For these things although they be erroneous in other circumstances and respects yet in this they are true and their authors do all agree therein that the soule remaineth after this life and shall come to Iudgement But if wee cannot attaine unto the reason of that governance which providence hath over particular things which indeed we cannot as is implyed by this text How unsearchable are thy judgements and thy wayes past finding out Let us not therupon conclude there is no such providence For no man ought to affirme there is neither sea not sand because he is ignorant of the limits of the Sea and of the number of the sands seeing by the same rule they might aswell say that there is neither man nor any other living-creature because they know not the number either of the men or of the living-creatures Particular things are to us infinite Things which are unto us infinite and also unknowne unto us and therefore though universalls may be oftentimes comprehended by our understanding yet individualls are not possibly comprehensible thereby There is in every man a double difference one in respect of other men and another in respect of himselfe yea there is in every man great differences and alterations even in respect of himselfe Every day as in the maner of his life in his actions or affaires in his necessities in his desires and in all things which doe happen or pertaine unto him It is not much otherwise with an irrationall-creature for according to the manifold necessities and occasions thereof it is very speedily caried hither and thither and soon altered againe as other opportunities require These things considered that Providence which is able to keep a continuall course with every one of those infinite and incomprehensible particulars which are so differing also so changeable and of so many fashions must needs be such a Providence as is agreeable to all and every one of those individualls and extended more infinitely then those things are whereunto it should reach And if this Providence must be so fit and so infinite in regard of the infinite difference of individualls no doubt but the reason and method of this Providence is as infinite and if it be infinite it cannot possibly bee comprehended by us And it becomes not us to deny that gracious providence which governes all things because our ignorance is unable to comprehend it For those things which wee suppose to be amisse are knowne well enough unto the wisdome of the Creator to be well ordered Because wee are ignorant of their occasions we causelesly judge many things to be imprudently done and that which chanceth unto us in other things by reason of our ignorance falleth out also in the workes of providence for we doe after the same sort cōceive of those things which belong to providence receiving by obscure likelihoods and by conjectures certaine formes or shadowes of the workes thereof by such things as we have seene Wee say therefore that some things are done by Gods permission and this permission is of many sorts For he sometime permits that even the just man shall fall into misery to declare unto others that vertue which is concealed as in Iob. Hee doth also permit some absurd things that by the act which appeareth to bee absurd some great and wonderfull matter may bee brought to passe as the salvation of men by the Crosse Hee permits likewise the blessed Saints to be afflicted for another end as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience and that the loftinesse of the minde might be abated as when S t. Paul was buffetted by Satan Sometimes also one man is rejected and left as desolate for a time that others considering his case might be instructed and amended thereby As in the example of Lazarus and the rich man for when we see any man afflicted our hearts are naturally touched therewith according as Menander hath very well expressed By seeing others feele the Rod We tremble with a fear of GOD. Otherwhile again one man is afflicted for the glory of another and neither for his owne sin nor the sinne of his Parents as he that was blind from his birth for the glorifying of the Son of man It is permitted also that some should be persecuted to be a pattern of constancy unto others and that when their glory is exalted others might be incouraged to suffer in the like case in hope of the glory to come and for the blessednesse which is expected after this life as in the Martyrs and in those who have yeelded up their lives for their Country for their kinred or for their masters SECT 5. I. One may otherwhile be afflicted for the good of another without infringing the Justice of divine Providence Why holy men suffer bitter deaths and persecutions II. Death or sufferings are no disadvātages to good men neither are the unlawfull actions of the wicked justifiable though Providence convert thē to good ends NOw if any one thinke it against reason that one man should be afflicted for the amendment of another let him know that this life is not the perfection of mans happinesse but a place of wrestlings and of striving for mastery in respect of Vertue And the greater the labours and sufferings are the more glorious Crown of Glory shall be obtained because the recompence of Rewards is according to the measure of Patience Saint Paul was contented to undergoe the manifold afflictions and tribulations which he suffered that he might obtain the greater and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour which he himself confesseth to be more then all our sufferings can merit and therefore the works of Providence are justly and very decently performed A man may the better allow this to be so and conceive that GOD governs all things so well and so fitly that the nature of each thing cannot more desire if he doe but propose unto himself the beleeving of these two things which are generally confessed among men namely that GOD onely is good and wise For in that he is Good it is agreeable unto his goodnesse to employ his providence over all things and in that he is wise he hath a regard to performe them wisely and exactly because if he used not his Providence he could not be good and if he did not use it well hee could not be wise He therefore that gives his minde to consider discreetly of these matters will not misesteem of any thing which is wrought by divine providence neither speak evill thereof without due examination but rather accept of all things as exceeding well performed and marvaile at their admirable decency and perfection though the ignorant multitude judge according to a false appearance For in conceiving otherwise wee bring upon our heads besides the guilt of blasphemy great blame for our sottish presumption Now in that wee say all things are done well wee justifie not the naughtinesse of men or of such evill works as are in our power to doe or leave undone but we speak it of the works of Providence which are not in our power For if any man object and say How falls it out that holy men are put cruelly to death without desert why if they were unjustly condemned did not Gods just providence hinder those murthers and if they deserved to be so put to death why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine To this we answer that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them and that they which were so slain were slain either for their desert or their profit Somtime deservingly for evills committed by them in secret and sometimes for their profit Gods providence thereby preventing either future sins or worse mischiefes to come and in those respects it was good for them that their life should be shortned Thus was it with Socrates and the Saints But they who slew these men did not slay them for any such cause neither was it lawfully done but out of the corruption of their owne minds and for gain and robbery For the Act is in mans power but what shall follow upon the Act as whether we shall be slain or no is not as he will neither is any death evill except for sinne onely as is manifest by the death of the Saints But wicked men although they die in their beds on a sudden and without pain doe neverthelesse die an evill death which brings them unto an evill buriall I meane to bee buried in their sinne yet whosoever killeth any man murtherously doth wickedly in so doing If hee killeth any one for that which deserveth death he is then to be accounted among hangmen and executioners If it be for the gaining of some profit by them that are slaine he is to be reputed among cruell and wicked murtherers The like may be said of them who murther their enemies or oppresse them by extreame servitude or use any manner of inhumane cruelty against them whom they have overcome They also are as little to be justified who seeke the inriching of themselves by extorting other mens goods for though it may be expedient for those from whom they were extorted that they should be deprived of them yet they which wrested away more then their owne were unjust in so so doing For they take them out of a covetous desire of those good and not for that it was expedient for them whō they dispossessed of such things Glory be to God FINIS
Beasts to Beasts and from men to men and in so saying hee hath not only conjectured very well of Platoes opinion but of the Truth it selfe By these last words Nemesius hath seemed to justifie the opinion both of Iamblicus Plato touching Transmigration of Soules Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus rather And in so saying hee hath not only well guessed but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Platoes opinion Let the learned judge whether the Greek words will not well enough beare this Version though not in a strict Grammaticall sense especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soule to be the same which is generally beleeved among Christians for my part till I see more cause to suspect the contrary I shall alway so conceive of it That which is mentioned by another concerning his opinion touching the Soules preexistence before the Bodie is not a matter of faith or so precisely decided as that he or we are for ought I know obliged to be peremptorily for it or against it and therefore I my self have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to encline or what to answer for him If any man can assure me whether part is without errour that will I embrace and I am perswaded so would Nemesius have done if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous in that point which if others beleeve of him as they have no just cause to the contrary no more needes to be spoken of this matter If any be offended that hee argues philosophically rather then by proofs of Scripture and citeth Moses not as a Divine Prophet but a Wiseman Let them consider that hee had such to contest withall as neither beleeved the Scriptures nor ascribed more unto Moses or any other then the Reasonablenesse of their affections seemed to deserve The alledging of Scripture therefore to such men had been to cast pearles to swine and more to the derision then to the honour of his cause This course was practiced by the Apostles themselves To the Iewes and beleeving Gentiles they brought the testimony of the Prophets but to Unbeleevers they cited their owne Poets or convinced them by Reason Had our Author argued with Christians the holy Scriptures onely should have been Judges of their Controversies For he himselfe saith Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient c. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures as wee Christians doe we must prove by Demonstration c. In these times there be many who though they deny not the letter of the Scriptures yet they doe as bad or worse rather for they deny the true sense of them and make interpretations according to their owne lusts and fancies To these also the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confesse their true meaning And some of these have so long and so violently professed against Reason as unusefull in the consideration of the Divine mysteries that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rationall dispute or to convince them by divine Authority till GOD shall forgive their deniall and abuse of his common graces upon true repentance for the same and restore the Vnderstanding which is worthily darkned by that sinne and for enlightning whereof this Treatise may perhaps become helpfull Other things might bee here declared to prevent prejudice and to shew forth the use and profitablenesse of this Booke but lest they make this Preface over-large I wil here conclude and commit all to Gods blessing Geo Wither PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis in quo nihil reperio sanae fidei aut bonis moribus contrarium THO WEEKES R. P. Episc Lond. Cap. domest NEMESIVS of the Nature of MAN CAP. 1. SECT 1. I. The Definition of MAN A quaere touching the Understanding and the opinions of Plotinus Apollinarius Aristotle Plato concerning the SOVL BODY of MAN II. MAN partaking in somewhat with every Creature is a medium knitting together the whole Creation a manifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things III. The Agreement and comely order of GOD'S Works of all which MAN is the true Epitome GOod men and of those not a few have defined Man to consist of an Vnderstanding Soul and a Body and so true is this Definition that it may seeme he could not otherwise be well defined Yet when wee terme him an Vnderstanding soul it may appeare doubtfull to some whether the Vnderstanding comming to the soul as one distinct thing comes to another did beget Vnderstanding in the Soul Or whether the Soul doth naturally contain in it self this understanding as the most excellent part thereof and as being the same to the Soul which the Eie is to the Body There be some and of this opinion is Plotinus who thinking the Soul to be one thing and the Body another doe therfore affirme that MAN is composed of these three a Soul a Body and Vnderstanding Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of Laodicea For having laid this as the Foundation of his own opinion he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork Others there are who divide not the Vnderstanding from the Soul in this manner but suppose rather that the Vnderstanding is a principall of the Soules essence Aristotle conjectures that a certain potentiall understanding was made together with MAN which might become actuall in time and that the understanding which commeth to us from without and whereby we acquire an actuall knowledge pertains not to the naturall Essence of the Soul but assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things By which means it comes to passe that very few or none but men addicted to the study of wisdome are thought capable of this Actuall understanding PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence that is to say joyntly of a Soul and a Body but rather that he is a soul using as it were Instrumentally such a Body and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only which is the most excellent part of Man he seeks to draw us to such a serious consideration of our selves and of the divine nature as might win us the better to pursue vertue godlinesse and such good things as are in the Soul or else by perswading that we are essentially nothing else but soul hee would peradventure allure us to renounce the desires of the Body as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN but chiefely belonging to him as he is a living creature and so by consequence appertaining to him as he is a Man in regard Man is a living-creature And it is indeed confessed not much otherwise of all men that the soul is far more to be esteemed then the body and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul as is evident