all their Modes because Stones are Substances or Beings and not Modifications of the Wax In like manner though God should Annihilate one half of some Bodies it would not follow that the other half should be Annihilated This last half is United with the other but it is not one with it Thus one half being Annihilated it follows indeed according to Reason that the other half has no longer any relation to it but it do's not follow that it ceases to be because as its Being is different it cannot be Annihilated by the Annihilation of the other Therefore it is clear that the Thought not being the Modification of Extension our Soul is not Annihilated though we should suppose that the Body were Annihilated by Death But there is no reason to believe that even the Body is Annihilated when it is destroy'd The parts which Compose it are dissipated into Vapours and reduc'd to Powder They are no longer seen nor are they any longer known this is true but it is no reason to conclude that they are no longer in Being for the Mind perceives them still Dividing a Grain of Mustard into Two into Four or Twenty parts it would be Annihilated to our sight because it would be no longer seen But it would not be Annihilated in it self nor yet to the Mind for the Mind would see it though it were divided into a Thousand or an Hundred Thousand Parts 'T is a common Notion among Men who consult their Reason more than their Senses that nothing can be Annihilated by the common force of Nature for as Naturally nothing can be made out of nothing neither can a Substance or Being become nothing Bodies may be corrupted if we may call the Alterations they are liable to Corruption but they cannot be Annihilated What is Round may become Square What is Flesh may become Earth Vapour and what you please for all sorts of Extensions are capable of all manner of Configurations But the Substance of what is Round and of what is Flesh cannot perish There are certain Laws Establish'd in Nature according to which Bodies change their Forms successively for those Successive Forms Compose the Beauty of the Universe and Create an Admiration in us for its Author But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihilation of any Being because Annihilation has nothing of Beauty or Good in it self and because the Author of Nature loves his Work Therefore Bodies may Alter but they cannot Perish But if relying on the Testimony of the Senses Men would maintain obstinately that the Reduction of Bodies is a real Annihilation by reason that the Parts into which they are reduc'd are Imperceptible Let them remember at least that Bodies can only be divided into those Imperceptible Parts because they are Extended But if the Mind is not Extended it will not be Divisible and if it be not Divisible it must be granted that in that Sense it will not be Corruptible But how could any Body imagin that the Mind were Extended and Divisible We may by a right Line cut a Square into two Triangles into two Paralelogrammes or long Squares into two Trapeza's But by what Line can it be conceiv'd that a Pleasure a Pain or a Desire can be Cut And what Figure would result of that Division Truly I cannot think that Imagination can be fruitful enough in false Idea's to satisfie it self upon that Subject The Mind then is not Extended consequently it is not Divisible It is not liable to the same Alterations as the Body Nevertheless it must be granted that it is not Immutable by its Nature If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures and of different Configurations the Mind is capable of an infinite number of different Idea's and different Modifications As after our Death the substance of our Flesh will be reduc'd to Earth to Vapours and to an infinite number of other Bodies without being Annihilated So our Souls without being again reduc'd to nothing will have Thoughts and Sentiments very different from those they had in Life It is also necessary while we are alive that our Body should be Compos'd of Flesh and Bones It is also necessary in order to Live that our Soul should have the Idea's and Sentiments it has in relation to the Body to which it is united But when the Soul shall be separated from its Body it will be at full Liberty to receive all sorts of Idea's and Modifications very different from those it has at present as our Body on its part will be capable of receiving all sorts of Figures and Configurations very different from those it is necessary it should have to be the Body of a Living Man What I have said does in my Opinion sufficiently show that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing so difficult to be apprehended What then is the reason that so many question it unless it be that they are unwilling to apply themselves as much as may be to examin the Reasons which prove it in order to be Convinc'd And why is it that they are unwilling to do it unless it be that their Will being uneasie and inconstant keeps their Understanding in a continual Agitation insomuch that it is not at leisure distinctly to perceive those very Idea's which are most present to it as those of Thought and of Extension Just like a Man agitated by some Passion turning his Eyes continually on all sides for the most part does not distinguish the nearest Objects and the most Expos'd to his Sight For indeed the Question about the Immortality of the Soul is one of the easiest Questions to resolve when without Consulting our Imagination we consider with some Attention of Mind the clear and distinct Idea of Extension and the Relation it can have to Thought If the Inconstancy and Levity of our Will does not permit our Understanding to penetrate into the Bottom of things which are present to it and which we are highly concern'd to know it is easie to judge that it will be more averse to let us meditate on those that are distant and which have no relation to us So that if we are very Ignorant of most of those things which it is very necessary for us to know we shall not have a great Insight into those which seem absolutely vain and useless to us It will not be necessary for me to endeavour to prove this by tedious Examples which have no considerable Truths in them for if we may be allow'd to be Ignorant of any thing it is of those things which are of no Use And I had rather not be believed than to make the Reader lose his Time in reading things that are wholly useless Though there are not many persons who apply themselves seriously to things absolutely Vain and Useless yet the number of them is but too great But there can never be too many of those who do not apply themselves to them and who despise them provided
that they do not help us to the Knowledge of Things but in respect to the preservation of our Body and not according to what they are in themselves is exactly true in this case since we have a more exact Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in proportion to their nearness and which we cou'd examine by the Senses than when they are so distant That the Relation they have to our Bodies ceases as when they are five or six hundred Paces from us if they are of an ordinary bigness and even nearer than that if they are less or in fine farther off if they are greater CHAP. X. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately Vnited IV. How Objects act upon Bodies V. How upon the Soul with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are Confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the preceding Chapters that the Judgments we form by these means of our Eyes about Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true yet we must confess they are not absolutely false they include at least this Truth That Extension Figure and Motion whatever they are are without us It 's true we often see things which are not and which never were and we ought not to conclude that a thing is without us from hence only that we see it without us there is no necessary connexion between an Idea that is presented to the Mind of Man and the Existence of a thing which this Idea represents That which happens to those who sleep or are delirious sufficiently proves this however we can ordinarily be assur'd that Extension Figures and Motions which we see are without us These are not meer imaginary things they are real and we are not deceiv'd if we believe they have a real Existence and which is independant of our Mind though it 's very * See the Explanations difficult to prove it It is then evident that the Judgments we make about the Extension Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth but the same cannot be said of those things that belong to Light Colours Sapors Odours and all other sensible Qualities for Truth is never to be found there as we have shown before We do not here distinguish Light from Colours because we believe they are not very different nor can be separately explain'd We shall be oblig'd to speak of other sensible Qualities in General at the same time that we treat of these two because they might be explain'd from the same Principles We ought to be very attentive to the things that follow for they are of the most important Consequence and much more useful than those things we have yet spoken of I suppose first Distinction of the Soul and Body that the Reader has made some Reflexion upon the two * I here cast Idea every thing that is the immediate Object of the Mind Idea's which are found in our Soul one which represents the Body to us and the other the Mind that he is able to distinguish them by the positive Attributes which they include in a word that he be well persuaded that Extention is different from Thought Or else I suppose him to have Read and Consider'd some Places of St. Augustin as the 10th Chapt. of the 10th Book of the Trinity the 4th and 14th Chap. of the Book of the Quantity of the Soul or the Meditations of Descartes especially that which respects the Distinction of the Soul and Body Or lastly the Sixth Discourse of M. de Cordemoy du discernement de l'ame du Corps I suppose also II. Explication of the Organs of the Senses that he knows the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses and that they are compos'd of small Branches which have their Original in the middle of the Brain whence they disperse themselves through all the Members of Sensation and that at last without any interruption terminate at the Extreme parts of the Body That whilst we are Awake or in Health one of their Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other is also mov'd because of their perpetual Intension just as an extended Cord cannot be mov'd in one part without communicating motion to another The Reader must also know that these little Strings or Branches may be affected after two ways either at the end which is at the extremity of the Body or at that which is in the Brain If these little Strings are shaken by the Action of External Bodies upon them and this Motion is not communicated to the Brain as it often happens in sleep then the Mind receives no new Sensation by that Action but if these Strings are mov'd in the Brain by the Course of the Animal Spirits or by some other Cause the Soul perceives something although the parts of these Strings which are out of the Brain and which are dispers'd through all the parts of our Bodies be in perfect rest as it often happens in sleep It is not amiss to observe here by the by III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Strings of the Organs of the Senses meet how Experience teaches us that we do sometimes feel pain in such parts of our Bodies as have been cut off because the Strings of the Brain which belong to those respective parts being shaken after the same manner as if they were effectually hurt the Soul feels a very real Pain in these Imaginary Parts Now all these things shew visibly that the Soul immediately resides in that part of the Brain where all the Organs of Sense meet I mean it perceives all the Changes which pass there by means of Objects which Cause or have been accustom'd to Cause them and perceives nothing that passes out of this part but by the interposition of the Fibres which terminate there This Position being well conceiv'd it will not be very difficult to shew how Sensation is made which must be explain'd by some Example When I thrust the Point of a Needle into my Hand IV. An Example how Objects affect Bodies this Point removes and separates the Fibres of the Flesh the Fibres are continued from this place to the Brain and when one sleeps they are extended enough not to be shaken unless those of the Brain be also shaken it follows then that the Extremities of these Fibres which are in the Brain are also moved If the Motion of the Fibres in my Hand is moderate that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so also and if the Motion is violent to break something upon my Hand it will be much stronger and more violent in the Brain Thus also if I come near the Fire the small parts of Wood which it continually in great number and with much violence disperses as may be prov'd by
Eye must be lengthned by pressing the sides closer together and on the contrary it must be compess'd if the Objects are too far off By this Experiment 't is plain that we ought to judge or be sensible of the Colours at the bottom of our Eyes after the same manner as we judge the Heat to be in our Hand if our Senses were given us to discover the truth and if we were guided by Reason in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senses But to be able to give a Reason for the variety of our Judgments upon sensible Qualities 't is necessary that we consider how strictly the Soul is united to the Body and that it is so sensualized since Original Sin that many things are attributed to it which belong to the Body and that it is now hardly to be distinguished from it so that it ascribes to it not only all its Sensations which we are speaking of but also the force of Imagining and even sometimes the power of Reasoning For there has been a great number of Philosophers that have been ignorant and foolish enough to believe that the Soul was only a more fine and subtile part of the Body If we read Tertullian we shall soon see too many proofs of what I say since we shall find him of the same Opinion with a great number of Authors whom he Cites It is true in the Book of the Soul he endeavours to prove that Faith Scripture and even particular Revelation oblige us to believe that the Soul is Corporeal I will not refute these Opinions because I have already supposed that we ought to have read fome of St. Augustin or Descartes Works which wou'd have sufficiently shewn the extravagancy of these Thoughts and also wou'd have confirm'd the Mind in the distinction betwixt Extention and Thought betwixt the Soul and Body The Soul is then so blind that she is ignorant of her self and does not see that her own Sensations belong to her II. An Explanation of the three kinds of the Sensations of the Soul To explain this we must distinguish three sorts of Sensations in the Soul some strong and lively others weak and languishing and some again in the medium between both The strong and lively Sensations are those which surprize the Mind and awaken it with some force because they are either very agreeable or very troublesome such as are Pain or Pleasure Heat or Cold and generally all such as are not only accompanied with Impressions in the Brain but also with some Motions of the Spirit such as are proper for the exciting the Passions as shall afterwards be explained The Weak and Languishing Sensations are those which very little affect the Soul and which are neither very agreeable nor very troublesome as a Moderate Light all Colours Ordinary Sounds which are very weak c. And the Medium between both I call those sort of Sensations which indifferently touch the Soul as a great Light a violent Sound c. Now it is to be observed that a Weak and Languishing Sensation may become indifferent and afterwards strong and lively For Example the Sensation that we have of Light is weak when the Light of a Flambeau is weak and languishing or very far from us and afterwards this Sensation may become indifferent if the Flambeau be brought near enough to us and at last it may become very strong and lively if the Flambeau be brought so near our Eyes that they be dazled with it or else when we look upon the Sun Thus the Sensation of Light may be strong weak or moderate according to its different degrees These are then the Judgments that our Soul makes of these three sorts of Sensations V. Errors which accompany our Sensations wherein we may perceive that it almost always blindly follows the sensible Impressions or Natural Judgments of our Senses and that it is pleased if we may so say in dispersing it self over all the Objects that it considers and by divesting it self to cloath them The first of these Sensations is so lively and moving that the Soul can scarce hinder it self from acknowledging that in some respect they belong to it so that it does not only judge them to be in the Object but also believes them to be in the Members of the Body which it considers as a part of it self Thus it judges that Cold and Heat are not only in the Ice and Fire but that they are also in its own Hands The Languishing Sensations so little affect the Soul that it does not believe them to belong to it nor that they are either within it self or the Body but only in the Objects 'T is for this reason that we take away Light and Colours from our Soul and Eyes thereby to adorn External Objects with them although Reason teaches us that they are not in the Idea we have of Matter And Experience shews us we ought to judge them in our Eyes as well as upon Objects since we see them as well there as in the Objects as I have proved by the Instance of an Oxe's Eye placed at the hole of a Window Now the Reason why all Men do not immediately see that Colours Odours Taste and all other Sensations are only Modifications of their Soul is because we have no clear Idea of our Soul For when we know any thing by the Idea which represents it we clearly know all the Modifications it can have All Men agree for Example that Roundness is a Modification of Extension by a clear Idea which represents it See Chap. 7. 2d part of the 3d Book Thus not knowing our Soul by its Idea as I shall explain hereafter but only by the Internal Sentiment we have thereof we know not by a simple Sight but only by Reasoning whether Whiteness Light Colours and other Weak and Languishing Sensations are not Modifications of our Soul but for the lively Sensations such as Pain and Pleasure we easily judge they are within us because we are very sensible that they affect us and have no need to know them by their Ideas to perceive they belong us As for Indifferent Sensations the Soul is very much perplexed with them for on the one hand it wou'd follow the Natural Judgments of the Senses and therefore it removes from it as much as possible these sort of Sensations to attribute them to the Objects but on the other side it cannot avoid feeling within self that they belong to it especially when these Sensations come near those that I call strong and lively so that 't is after this manner that it guides it self in the Judgment it makes of them if a Sensation affects it very much it concludes it to be in its own Body as well as in the Object and if it touches it but a little the Soul believes it only in the Object And if this Sensation is exactly in the Medium between the Strong and Weak then it knows not what to
of Dislike which for instance proceeds from the strong Imagination they have of the Dirt in what they Eat The reason of it is that when two Motions are made in the Brain at the same time the one is never excited after the other except it be after a considerable time Thus because the agreeable Sensation never comes without this other disgustful one and because we confound things that are produced at the same time we imagine that this Sensation that was formerly agreeable to us is now no longer so Yet if it is always the same it is necessary that it should always be agreeable So that if we imagine it is not agreeable 't is because it is join'd and confounded with another that causes more distaste than the other does of agreeableness There is more difficulty to prove that Colours and some other Sensations which I have called weak and languishing are not the same in all Men because all those Sensations so little affect the Soul that we cannot distinguish them so well as we can Tastes or other Sensations more strong and lively the one being more agreeable than the other and thus to discover the diversity of Sensations that are found in different Persons by the variety of their pleasure or dislike Reason which always shows that the other Sensations are not the same in different Persons tells us also that there will be a variety in the Sensations they have of Colours And indeed there is no doubt but there is much diversity in the Organs of Sight in different Persons as well as in those of the Ear or the Taste for there is no reason to suppose a perfect resemblance in the disposition of the Optic Nerve in all Men since there is an infinite variety in every thing in Nature and chiefly in those that are Material 't is therefore very probable that all Men see not the same Colours in the same Objects Yet I believe it never or very rarely happens that Persons see White or Black to be of any other Colour than we do altho' they do not see it equally White or Black But for mixt Colours as Red Yellow and Blue and chiefly such as are compounded of all three I believe there are few Persons who have perfectly the same Sensation of them For Instance there are some Persons who when they look upon cettain Bodies with one Eye take them to be Yellow and when they behold them with the other see them to be Green or Blue yet if we suppos'd these Persons Born blind of one Eye or with both their Eyes so dispos'd to see that Blue which we call Green they wou'd believe they saw Objects of the same colour as we see them because by Green or Blue they wou'd always have understood what they see Yellow or Red. We may further prove that all Men see not the same Objects of the same Colour because according to the observation of some the same Colours do not equally please all sorts of Persons and if these Sensations were the same they wou'd be equally agreeable to all Men but because very weighty doubts may be raised against the Answer I have given to the precedent Objection I do not believe it solid enough to insist upon it Indeed it is very seldom that we are as much more pleased with one Colour than another even as we are much more pleased with one Taste than another The reason is the Sensations of Colours are not given us to Judge whether or no Bodies are proper for our Nourishment that is distinguished by Pleasure and Pain which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil Objects in respect to their Colour are neither good nor bad to Eat If Objects appear agreeable or disagreeable to us in respect to their Colour their sight wou'd be always followed with the course of those Spirits which excite and accompany the Passions since the Soul cannot be touched without moving it and we shou'd often hate good Things and love bad so that we shou'd not long preserve our lives In fine the Sensations of Colours are only given us to distinguish Bodies from one another and therefore it does as well if we see Herbs Red as if we see them Green provided the Person that sees them Red or Green sees them always after the same manner But we have said enough of these Sensations let us now speak of Natural Judgments and the free Judgments which accompany them which is the fourth thing that we confound with the three others that we have already mention'd CHAP. XIV I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. Reasons of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments 'T IS easily foreseen I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them that we shall not meet with many Persons that will not be offended with this General Proposition that I here advance viz. That we have no Sensation of External Objects which include not one or many Judgments we know very well that the generality of the World do not believe that there is so much as one Judgment in our Sensations either true or false so that these Persons being surprized with the Novelty of this Proposition will say without doubt in themselves But how can it be I do not Judge this Wall to be white I see very well what it is Nor do I Judge Pain to be in my Hand I most certainly feel it to be there And who can doubt of things so certain if they do not feel Objects otherwise than I do Indeed their Inclinations for the Prejudices which they have imbib'd from their Infancy carries them much further and if they do not Reproach and Contemn those whom they believe to be perswaded of a contrary Opinion to their own without doubt they deserve to be placed in the Number of Moderate Persons But we must not here stay to Prophesie of the ill success of our Thoughts it will be more to the purpose to endeavour to produce them with the strongest Proofs and so clearly discover them that they may be no sooner well examin'd or attentively consider'd but they must be submitted to Since 't is necessary to prove that we have no Sensation of External Objects which does not include some false Judgment take it thus It seems Indisputable to me that our Souls do not fill those vast Spaces which are between us and the fixt Stars altho' it shou'd be granted that themselves are extended so likewise it is not reasonable to believe that our Souls are in the Firmament when they behold the fixt Stars there Nor is it Credible that they should go out of their Bodies a thousand Paces to see Houses at that distance It is therefore necessary that our Souls see Houses and Stars where they are not since it goes not out of the Body where it is and yet sees them out
said that we are accustom'd to attribute our own Sensations to Objects and that we judge Colours Odours Sapours and other Sensible Qualities to be in Objects that are Colour'd Odiferous c. We have discover'd that this is an Error we must now show that we make use of this Error as a Principle whence we draw our false Consequences which Consequences we also esteem as other Principles upon which we build our Reasonings In a word we must here explain in what order the Mind proceeds in searching out some special Truths where this false Principle viz. Our Sensations are in Objects is once so imbib'd that it looks upon it as indubitable But to render this more Sensible let us take some particular Body whose Nature we would enquire into and let us see for Example what a Man would do that should apply himself to know the Nature of Honey and Salt The first thing would be to consider their Colour Smell Taste and other Sensible Qualities what those of the Honey are and what those of the Salt in what they agree and in what they differ and what Relation they can have with the Qualities of other Bodies This being done I believe he would reason much after this manner supposing he believ'd it an incontestable Principle that Sensations were in Objects The Original differences that are attributed to Objects that these differences are in the Soul Whatever I perceive by tasting seeing and feeling this Hony and Salt are in this Hony and Salt Now 't is certain that what I perceive in this Hony differs essentially from what I perceive in this Salt the whiteness of the Salt does without doubt differ more from the Colour of the Hony than in the more or less and the sweetness of the Hony from the pungent taste of the Salt and consequently there must be an essential difference betwixt Hony and Salt since all that I am sensible of in both does not only differ as to the more or less but also essentially This would be the first step this Man would make for doubtless he cannot judge that Hony and Salt differ essentially but because there are some appearances in the one essentially different from the other I mean the Sensations that he has of Hony differ essentially from those of Salt since he only judges thereof by the Impressions they make upon the Senses he then looks upon this Consequence as a new Principle from whence he draws other conclusions after this manner Since then the Hony and Salt The Original of substantiâ—l Forms and other natural Bodies differ essentially from one another it follows that those are grosly deceiv'd who would perswade us that all the difference betwixt these Bodies consists only in the different Configuration of the Particles which compose them For since Figure is not essential to different Bodies let the Figure of those Particles which are imagin'd to be in the Hony be changed the Hony will remain still Hony altho' its parts shou'd receive the Figure of the Parts of Salt So that it 's necessary there shou'd be some substance which being join'd to the first common Matter of all different Bodies constitutes their essential difference from one another This is the second advance which this Man would make and this is the happy discovery of substantial Forms These are the fruitful substances which produce every thing in Nature altho' they only subsist in the Imagination of our Philosophers But let us see the Properties which he will liberally bestow upon this Entity of his Invention for no doubt but he will dispoil other Substances of their essential Properties to Cloath this Since then The Original of all other general Errors in the Physics of the Schools there are in every Natural Body two Substances which compose it one which is common to Hony Salt and other Bodies the other which makes Hony to be Hony Salt Salt and other Bodies to be what they are It follows that the first which is Matter having no contrariety and being indifferent to all Forms must rest without any force or action because it has no need of defending it self but for others which are substantial Forms they have need of being always accompanied with Qualities and Faculties to defend them they must always be upon their Guard for fear of being surprized they must perpetually look to their own Preservation extend their Empire over their Neighbouring Matter and push their Conquests as far as they can for if they were weak and actionless other Forms would surprize them and soon annihilate them they must then always fight and nourish these Antipathies and Irreconcileable Hatreds against other Hostile Forms which endeavour to destroy them If it happens that one Form shou'd take the Matter of another Form As if for Example the form of a Carcass seize the Body of a Dog this form must not be barely contented to annihilate the form of a Dog its hatred must also extend to the destruction of all those qualities which its Enemy had the hair of the Carcass must forthwith wax white with a whiteness of a new creation the Blood must be red after such a manner as we cannot suspect it to be counterfeit and the whole Body must be cover'd with qualities that are faithful to the new form and defend it according to the little power which the qualities of a dead Body have which must also be destroy'd in their turn But because they cannot always fight and because all things seek rest it 's certainly necessary that the Fire for instance have its Center whether it always tends by its lightness and natural Inclination that it may once be at rest and burn no more and that it may even lay by its heat which it only kept here below for its defence These are a few of the Consequences which result from this last Principle that there are Substantial Forms which we have made our Philosopher conclude with a little too much liberty for these are usually deliver'd with a graver Air. There are yet an Infinity of other Consequences which every Philosopher is continually making according to his Humour and Inclination according to the Fruitfulness or Barrenness of his Imagination for these are the only things which make them differ from one another We must not stop here to overthrow these Chimerical Substances other Persons have sufficiently examin'd them and shown that there are no such things in Nature and that they serve only to afford a very great number of ridiculous and even contradictory Consequences We are satisfy'd that we have discover'd their Original in the Mind of Man and to have show'd that they are all owing at this time to the common Prejudice That Sensations are in the Objects perceived For if what has been said be consider'd with little attention viz. That it 's necessary for the preservation of our Body to have Sensations that are essentially different altho' the Impressions which Objects make upon our Bodies differ
very little We shall clearly see that 't is a fault to imagine so great differences in the Objects of our Senses But I must here mention by the by that there 's nothing to be objected against these Terms Form and Essential difference Hony is certainly Hony by its form and 't is thus that it essentially differs from Salt but this form or this essential difference consists only in the different Configuration of its parts 't is this different Configuration which causes Hony to be Hony and Salt Salt And altho' its only accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Hony or Salt and so to have the form of Hony or Salt it may nevertheless be said that it is essential to Hony or Salt to be what they are to have such or such a Configuration of Parts Even as Sensations of Cold Heat Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul as a Soul but because it is by these Sensations that it 's said to be sensible of Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics IT has been sufficiently proved in my Opinion that this Prejudice Our Sensations are in Objects is a very fruitful Principle of Error in Physics it must now be shown from Reasons drawn from Morals that the same Prejudice join'd with this That Objects are the only and true Causes of our Sensations is also very dangerous There 's nothing so common in the World I. An Example drawn from Morals that our Senses only offer us false Goods as to see Men who are Wedded to Sensible Goods Some love Musick others good Eating and others are passionate for other things Now thus they reason to perswade themselves that all these Objects are Goods viz. All these agreeable Tastes which please us in Banquets these Sounds which affect the Ear and these other Pleasures which we perceive upon other occasions are certainly included in Sensible Objects or at least 't is these Objects that are the occasion of them or in sine we cannot have Sensations without them Now 't is impossible to doubt whether Pleasure be Good whether Pain be Evil we are inwardly convinc'd thereof and consequently the Objects of our Senses are very real Goods which we ought to enjoy that we may be happy This is the Reasoning that we ordinarily I shall explain in the last Book in what sense Objects work upon Bodies and inconsiderately make and this is that which inclines us to believe that our Sensations are in Objects that Objects have in themselves the power of making us Sensible that we look upon things as our Goods which are infinitely below us which can only act upon our Bodies by producing some Motions in their Fibres but can never act upon our Souls or make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if it is not the Soul which acts upon it self upon occasion of what passes in the Body nothing else but God can do it and if it is not the Soul which causes Pleasure or Pain according to the different shaking of the Fibres of its Body as it 's very likely it does not since it often perceives Pleasure and Pain without its consent I know no other Hand that is powerful enough to produce this Sensation in it but that of the Author of Nature Indeed there 's none but God that is our true Good II. That 't is God only who is our Good and that all Sensible Objects can't make us sensible of Pleasure 't is he only that can affect us with all these Pleasures we are capable of and who in his Knowledge and Love haâ—â— Decreed to excite them in us And these Pleasures which he hath link'd to the Motions which pass in our Body to make us careful of our own Preservation are very little very weak and very short altho' we are enslav'd to them in this State whereinto Sin has reduc'd us but the Pleasures which he will excite in his Elect in Heaven are infinitely greater since he made us to know and love him for according to the Order of Nature greater Goods affect us with greater Pleasure and since God is infinitely above all things the Pleasure of those that shall enjoy him will certainly surpass all Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors III. The Original of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoâ—es in reference to Good does sufficiently inform us of the falsness of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans about the Supream Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because they felt it as well in Vice as in Vertue and even more commonly in the first than the second they gave themselves up to all sorts of Voluptuousness Now the first Cause of their Error was that Judging falsely there was something agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the true Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being besides this convinc'd by an inward Sensation which they had in themselves that Pleasure was a Good for them or at least for the time they enjoy'd it they gave themselves up to the Government of all the Passions which they apprehended would not incommode them afterwards whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure which is felt in Sensible Things cannot be in these things as their true Causes nor after any other manner and consequently that Sensible Goods cannot be such in respect of our Soul They should also have consider'd the other Things which we have explain'd The Stoics on the contrary being perswaded that Sensible Pleasures were only in the Body and for the Body and that the Soul ought to have its particular Good placed its Happiness in Vertue Now this is the Origine of their Errors they believ'd that Sensible Pain and Pleasures were not in the Soul but only in the Body they made use of this false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain is not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of Sense are not good in themselves but that they are common to Men and Beasts And nevertheless it is easie to show that altho' the Epicureans and Stoics were deceiv'd in many things yet they were in the right in some for the happiness of the Happy consists in an accomplish'd Vertue I would say in the Knowledge and Love of God and is a very great Pleasure which continually attends them Let us then well remember that external Objects include nothing neither agreeable nor disagreeable that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures and that we have no reason either to fear or love them but that God only is to be fear'd and lov'd because he only is able to Punish or Reward us to make us Sensible of Pain or Pleasure In fine 't
Brain for that the Soul always represents to her self those things of which she has the largest and deepest Traces To these we may add other Examples more Compos'd A Distemper is a Novelty it makes such Havock as surprizes the World This imprints such deep Traces in the Brain that the Distemper is always present to the Mind Suppose this Disease for Example be call'd the Scurvy all Distempers will be the Scurvy The Scurvy is new therefore all Distempers shall be the Scurvy The Scurvy is attended with several Symptoms many of which are common to other Diseases That 's nothing to the purpose if it happen that the Sick Person has any one of those Symptoms he shall be sick of the Scurvy and they shall not so much as think of other Distempers that are accompanied with the same Symptoms they will expect that all the Accidents that they have known Scorbutic Persons labour under befal them also They shall prescribe the same Remedies and shall wonder why they do not work the same Effects as they have wrought in others An Author applies himself to one sort of Study upon which the Traces of the Subject of his Employment make so deep an Impression and irradiate so vigorously over all the Brain that many times they confound and deface the Traces of such things as are very different one from another There was one for Example who compil'd several Volumes upon the Cross this made him see Crosses where ever he came Nor was it without reason that Father Morin derides him for believing that a Medal represented a Cross when it represented quite another thing And by Vertue of such a sort of Imagination as this it was that Gilbert and several others after they had study'd the Loadstone and admir'd its Properties would needs apply to Magnetick Qualities a great Number of Natural Effects which have not the least Correspondence with them The Examples here cited are sufficient to prove that from this extraordinary easiness of the Imagination to represent to it self the Objects which are most familiar to it and the difficulty which it undergoes to imagine those which are new and unusual it come to pass that Men are always forming Idea's which may be call'd Mix'd and Impure and that the Mind never Judges of things but with reference to it self and its first Thoughts Thus the different Passions of Men their Inclinations their Conditions their Employments their Qualities their Studies in a word all their various Manners of Living producing very great differences in their Idea's And this it is that makes them fall into an Infinite number of Errors of which we shall discourse more at large hereafter This was it that made the Lord Chancellor Bacon utter these Judicious Expressions All Perceptions as well of the Sense as of the Mind are Ex analogia Hominis not ex analogia Vniversi estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inequalis ad radios rerum qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet camque destorquet inficit CHAP. III. Of the Mutual Connexion between the Idea's of the Mind and the Traces of the Brain and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces and between Idea's and Idea's AMong all Material Things there is none more worthy the serious Study of Men than the Structure of their Bodies and the Correspondence between all the Parts that Compose it and of all Spiritual Things there is none of which the Knowledge is more Necessary than that of the Soul and how it is Related indispensably to God and naturally to the Body 'T is not sufficient to perceive or know confusedly that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another and that they are attended by the Motion of the Animal Spirits that the Traces being stirred up in the Brain likewise stir up the Idea's in the Mind and that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits excite the Passions in the Will 'T is requisite therefore as much as may be to understand distinctly the cause of all those different Unions and chiefly the Effects which they are capable of producing We must understand the cause of them to the end we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is only able to act within us and to make us Happy or Miserable and it becomes us to understand the Effects because we should know our selves as much as in us lyes and other Men with whom we Converse For then we shall understand the ways and means of Conducting Governing and Preserving our selves in the most Happy and Perfect condition to which it is possible for us to attain according to the Order of Nature and the Rules of the Gospel and we shall be able to live with other Men when we know how to make use of them in our Necessities and assist them in their Miseries I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter a Subject of so vast and so large an Extent Nor do I pretend to it altogether in the whole Work There are many things of which I am Ignorant as yet and which I never hope to understand exactly there are other things which I believe I know but which I cannot for all that Explain For there is no Wit how mean soever it be that by Meditation cannot discover more Truths than the most Eloquent Man in the World can relate I. We are not to imagine Of the Union of the Soul with the Body as the greatest part of Philosophers do that the Soul becomes Corporeal when it is united with the Body and that the Body becomes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul The Soul is not diffus'd into all the Parts of the Body to give it Life and Motion as the Imagination fancies nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its union with the Soul as our deluding Senses would seem to convince us Every Substance remains what it is and as the Soul is not capable of Extension and Motion neither is the Body capable of Sensation and Inclinations All the Alliance of the Body and Soul which is known to us consists in a Natural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul with the Traces or Phantoms of the Brain and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Spirits So soon as the Soul receives some new Idea's it imprints new Traces in the Brain and so soon as the Objects produce new Traces the Soul receives new Idea's Not that it considers those Traces for it has no knowledge of them nor that those Traces include those Idea's because they have no Relation one with another Nor lastly that the Soul receives her Idea's from those Traces for as we shall show in another place it is not to be conceiv'd that the Soul can receive any thing from the Body or that it becomes more Knowing or more Enlightned by adverting to it as the Philosophers pretend who would have it that the Soul should perceive all Things per conversionem ad Phantasmata
body may be an Eye-witness of their Error But when Cato assures us that they who struck him never hurt him he asserts it or may assert it with so much Confidence and Gravity that a Man may justly question whether he be really the same as he appears to be And we may be inclin'd to think that his Soul is not to be shaken because his Body seems to be immovable For the outward Air of the Body is generally a mark of the inward disposition of the Mind So that a daring and undaunted Lyar perswades us sometimes to believe things incredible because their talking with so much Confidence is a Proof that affects the Senses and therefore a most effectual Argument that strongly convinces the generality of People Few there are therefore who look upon the Stoicks as Visionaries or as Audacious Lyars because we have no sensible Proof of that which lies reserv'd in their Breast and because the Air of the Face is a most sensible Proof that easily imposes upon us besides that our innate Vanity readily induces us to believe that Man is capable of that Grandeur and Independency to which he pretends Hence it is apparent that those Errors which abound in Seneca's Writings are of all others the most Pernicious and Contagious because they are a sort of Delicate Insinuating Errors proportion'd to the Vanity of Mankind and like to that wherein the Devil engag'd our first Parents They are likewise array'd with those Pompous and Magnificent Ornaments which make way for 'em into most Mens Minds They enter take possession stupifie and captivate 'em not with a Blindness that inclines those miserable Mortals to Humility a sensibleness of their own Ignorance and an acknowledgment of it before others but with a Haughty dazling Blindness and a Blindness accompanied with some false Glimmerings And when once Men are smitten with this blindness of Pride they presently rank themselves in the number of fine and great Wits Others also reckon 'em in the same Order and admire ' em So that there is nothing that can be thought more Contagious than this Blindness because the Vanity and Sensuality of Men the Corruption of their Senses and Passions dispose them to be known thereby and puts 'em also upon infecting others with it I believe then there is no Author more proper than Seneca to demonstrate how contagious the Imagination of some Men is who are call'd fine and great Wits and what a Command strong and vigorous Imaginations have over Weak and more Illiterate People not by the strength or evidence of their Arguments which are the productions of Wit but by a certain turn and liveliness of Expression which depends upon the Force of Imagination I know well that this Author is highly esteem'd in the World and that I shall be accus'd of more than ordinary rashness for having spoken of him as of a Man that had a Strong Imagination but little Judgment But it was chiefly by reason of this Esteem that I undertook to speak of him not out of Envy or any Morose Humour but because his great Reputation will excite many to consider more attentively those Errors of his which I have hinted We ought as much as in us lies to produce famous Examples for the confirmation of things that we assert when they are of Consequence and he that Criticizes upon a Book sometimes does it an honour However it be if I find fault with any thing in Seneca's Writings I am not single in that Opinion For not to speak of some Illustrious Persons in this Age 't is about 1600 years ago that a certain Judicious Author observ'd 1. In Philosophia parum diligens 2. Velles eum dixisse suo ingenio alieno judicio 3. Si aliqua Contempsisset c. consensu potius Eruditorum quam puerorum amore comprobaretur Quintil. l. 10. c. 1. 1. That there was little Exactness in his Philosophy 2. Little Judgment or Exactness in his Elocution 3. That his Reputation was more grounded upon the Imprudent Heat of Young Men than confirm'd by the consent of the Wise and Learned 'T is in vain to Encounter palpable Errors with Publick Writings because they are not Contagious 'T is ridiculous to admonish Men that Hypochondraical Persons are in some measure mad they know it well enough But if they for whom they have a high value mistake 't is necessary to bid 'em have a care of such for fear lest they adhere to their Errors Now it is manifest that Seneca's Spirit is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity Therefore since Pride according to the Scripture is the Original of Sin Initium peccati Superbia the Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the Gospel Nor can his Morals have any alliance with Christian Morals which are only true and solid 'T is certain that all Seneca's thoughts are neither false nor dangerous They who being endu'd with a found Wit have attain'd the Doctrine of Christian Morals may read him to good advantage Great Men have made a profitable use of him neither is it my intention to blame those who being willing to comply with the weakness of other Men who had so high an esteem for him have drawn Arguments from the Writings of that Author to defend the Morals of Jesus Christ and to engage the Enemies of the Gospel with their own Weapons There are some good things in the Alcoran and we find some true Prophecies in the Centuries of Nostra Damus We make use of the Alcoran to confound the Religion of the Turks and the Prophecies of Nestra Damus may be serviceable to convince some Whimsical Persons But it does not follow because there is something good in the Alcoran that the Alcoran is to be call'd a good Book as some true Explanations of Nostra Damus's Centuries will not make Nostra Damus a Right Prophet and they who make use of these Books to the ends aforesaid cannot be said to have a real Esteem for ' em It would be in vain for any Man to oppose what I have said concerning Seneca by bringing a great number of Passages out of that Author conformable to the solid Truths of the Gospel I agree that there are some such as there are also in the Alcoran and in other Impious Books And they would do me wrong to overwhelm me with the Authority of an infinite number of People that have made use of Seneca because we may sometimes make use of a Book which we believe to be impertinent provided they with whom we have to deal have not the same Opinion of the Author as we have To ruine all the Philosophy of the Stoicks there needs but only one thing sufficiently prov'd by Experience as also by what we have already said That we should be bound to our Body our Parents our Friends our Prince our Country by those ties that we neither can and which it would be a shame for us to endeavour to break Our Soul is united to our Body
determine any thing about the Number of Species of Beings which God has Created by the Idea's we have of them since it is absolutely possible that God may have Reasons to Conceal them from us which we do not know if it were only because those Beings having no Relation to us it would be useless for us to know them By the same reason as he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth of a Hand-worm because it is not very material for the preservation of our Body to have such a piercing Sight But though we think no body ought to Judge rashly that all Beings are Spirits or Bodies we think nevertheless that it is directly contrary to Reason that Philosophers in order to explain Natural Effects should use other Idea's than those that depend on Thought and Extension since indeed they are the only we have that are distinct or particular Nothing can be more unreasonable than to imagin an Infinity of Beings upon bare Idea's of Logick to impute an Infinity of Proprieties to them and thus to endeavour to explain things we do not understand by things which do not only conceive but which is not possible for us to conceive 'T is just as if the Blind having a mind to speak of Colours among themselves and to maintain a Thesis about them should in order thereunto make use of the Definitions which Philosophers give them and draw several Conclusions from the same For as those Blind could only give pleasant and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours because they could have no perfect Idea's of them and yet would argue about them upon General and Logical Idea's So Philosophers can never argue solidly upon the Effects of Nature when to that end they only make use of general Logical Idea's of Act Power Being Cause Principle Form Quality and the like It is absolutely necessary for them only to rely on distinct and particular Idea's of Thought and Extension and those they include as Figure Motion c. For it is in vain to pretend to understand Nature but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it and it is better never to meditate than upon Chimera's Nevertheless we cannot affirm that there are only Bodies and Spirits Beings that think and that are extended because we may be deceiv'd in it For though they are sufficient to Explain Nature and consequently we may conclude without fear of being deceiv'd that the Natural Things we have some knowledge of depend on Extension and Thought yet it is certainly possible that there may be others of which we have no Idea and of which we see no Effects Men therefore Judge rashly when they Judge as an Infallible Principle that all Substances are Bodies or Spirits But they also infer a rash Conclusion from thence when they conclude by the bare Testimony of Reason that God is a Spirit It is true that since we are Created after his Image and Likeness and that Holy Writ teaches us in several Places that God is a Spirit we ought to believe it and to call him so But Reason alone cannot teach it us That tells us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfect and that he is rather a Spirit than a Body since our Soul is more perfect than our Body But it does not assure us that there are no Beings besides more perfect than our Spirits and more above our Spirits than our Spirits are above our Bodies Now supposing that there were such Beings as it undeniably appears that it was in the power of God to Create such it is clear that they would participate more of the likeness of God than we do The same Reason teaches us that God would sooner have the Perfections of their Beings than ours which would only be Imperfections compar'd to them Therefore we must not Judge rashly that the word Spirit which we use to express what God is and what we are is an Equivocal Term which signifies the same things or things that are very like God is more above Created Spirits than those Spirits are above Bodies and we ought not so much to call God a Spirit to shew positively what he is as to signifie that he is not Material He is a Being infinitely Perfect no body can question it But as we must not imagin with the Anthropomorphites that he must have a Human Figure because it seems to be most perfect although we should suppose him Corporeal neither must we imagin that the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts And that his Spirit is like unto ours because we know nothing that is more perfect than our Spirit We must rather believe that as he possesses the Perfections of Matter without being Material since it is certain that Matter has a relation to some Perfections that are in God he also possesses the Perfections of Created Spirits without being a Spirit in the manner as we conceive Spirits That his Name is He that is that is the unlimited Being the All-Being the Infinite and Universal Being CHAP. X. Examples of some Physical Errors into which Men fall because they suppose that things which differ in their Nature Qualities Extension Duration and proportion are alike in all things WE have seen in the preceding Chapter that Men Judge rashly when they Judge that all Beings are only of two sorts Spirits or Bodies We will shew in the following that their Judgments are not only rash but also very false which are the principles of an infinite number of Errors when they Judge that Beings are not different in their Relations nor Manners because they have no Idea's of those differences It is most certain that the Mind of Man only looks for the relations of Things first those which the Objects it considers may have with it and in the next place those they have towards one another For the Mind of Man only seeks its Good and Truth In order to find its Good it carefully considers by Reason and by Taste or Sensation whether Objects have a Relation of agreement with it To discover the Truth it considers whether Objects have a Relation of Equality or of Likeness one with another or what is the exact measure of their Inequality For as Good is only the good of the Mind because it is convenient for it So Truth is only Truth by the Relation of Equality or of Likeness that is found between two or many things Whether between two or many Objects as between a Yard and Cloth for it is true that this Cloth holds out a Yard because there is an Equality between the Yard and the Cloth Whether between Two or many Idea's as between the two Idea's of Three and Three and that of Six for it is true that three and three are Six because there is an Equality between the two Idea's of Three and Three and that of Six Lastly Whether between Idea's and Things when the Idea's represent what the Things are For when I say that there is a Sun
Body for if he had he must have Examin'd the Configurations of the parts of some Fruit with all the parts of his own Body and the Relation resulting from both to be able to Judge whether in the heat of his Blood and a thousand other Dispositions of his Body this Fruit would be proper for his Nourishment 't is plain that his Mind was intirely imploy'd upon things that were unworthy its application and even unprositably enough because he was not long preserv'd after this manner If we consider then that the Mind of Adam was not Infinite we may safely say that he knew not all the Properties of Bodies that were about him since 't is manifest that they are Infinite and if it be granted which cannot reasonably be deny'd that his Mind was not made to Examine the Motions and Configurations of Matter but for the Contemplation of God no one can be displeas'd if we assert that it was biass'd and disorder'd in that time wherein all things should have been perfectly well order'd if he had been oblig'd to turn his Mind from the Consideration of the Perfection of his true Good to Examine the Nature of some Fruit for his Nourishment Adam then had the same Sensations as we have which suggested to him what was necessary for his Body without being diverted from God he was Sensible of Pleasures as we are and even of Pains or prepossess'd and indeliberate Aversions but these Pleasures and Pains could not Enslave him or render him Unhappy like us because that being Absolute Master of all the Motions which were excited in his Body he immediately put a stop to them if he only wish'd they might cease and certainly he always wish'd it in respect of Pain How happy had he been and we also if he had done the same in respect of Pleasure and if he had not voluntary strayed from the presence of his God by suffering his Mind to be taken up with the Beauty and expected Sweetness of the Forbidden Fruit or perhaps with a Presumptuous Joy that was excited in his Soul at the Consideration of his Natural Perfections But after he had Sin'd those Pleasures which before only modestly Accosted him and those Pains which without disturbing his Felicity only put him in mind that he might Fall and become Miserable were not any longer under his Command his Senses and Passions Revolted against him they became Irregular and made him like us a Slave to all Sensible Things Thus the Senses and Passions do not derive their Origination from Sin but only the Power they have of Tyrannizing over Sinners and this Power has not so much disorder'd the Senses as the Mind and Will of Men which ceasing to be so strictly united to God do not any longer receive that Light and Vigour by which they might preserve their Liberty and Happiness From these two ways of Explaining the Disorders of Sin we may easily gather A Remedy for that Disorder which Original Sin hath caused in the World and the foundation of Christian Morality that there are two things necessary for our Recovery The first is That we must lessen that Load we sink under and which drags towards Sensible Goods by continually Retrenching our Pleasures and Mortifying our Sensuality with Repentance and Circumcision of Heart The second is That we must beg the Assistance of God's Grace and that prepossess'd Delight which * See the Explanations Jesus Christ hath particularly Merited for us without which whatever we retrench from that first load will still oppress us and however small it is it will Infallibly draw into Sin and Disorder These two things are absolutely Necessary for us to begin and persevere in our Duty Reason as we have show'd does perfectly agree with the Gospel in this and from both we learn that Humility Self-denial and the Diminution of the Power of Sin are necessary Preparations for our Recovery by the Power of Grace and Re-union with God But in our present State tho' we are continually oblig'd to strive against our Senses yet we must not thence conclude that they are absolutely corrupted and deprav'd for if we consider that they are given us for the Preservation of our Bodies we shall find that they admirably well perform their Duty and conduct us after so just and faithful a manner for the end we receiv'd them that it seems very injurious so to accuse them of Corruption and Disorder they so readily inform the Soul by Pain and Pleasure by agreeable and disagreeable Sensations of what is necessary to be done or omitted for the Preservation of Life that we have little reason to say this order and exactness is the Consequence of Sin 'T is not our Serser but our all use of our Lâ—hertâ— that â—◠〈…〉 Our Senses then are not so deprav'd as is imagin'd but the inward Constitution of our Soul 't is our Liberty that is Corrupted 't is not our Senses but our Will that deceives us by its precipitate Judgments For Example when we see the Light 't is certain that we see it when we feel Warmth we are not deceiv'd if we believe we feel it whether before or after Sin but we are deceiv'd when we judge that the Heat we feel is out of the Soul that feels it as shall be Explained hereafter The Senses then do not deceive us if we make a good use of our Liberty and if we accustom not our selves upon their account to Judge of things with too much precipitation but since it is very difficult to refrain from it and we are as it were constrain'd thereto because of the strict Union between our Soul and Body I shall lay down a Method to conduct us in our use of them so as to avoid Error We must exactly observe this Rule A Rule to avoid Error in using our Senses Never to Judge by the Senses of things as they are in themselves but only of the Relation that they have between themselves for indeed they are not given us to know the Truth of Things in themselves but only for the Conservation of our Body But that we may be wholly deliver'd from that easiness and inclination we have of following our Senses in a Search after Truth we shall particularize in the following Chapters some of the chief and general Errors which we are liable to whence the Truth of what we have advanc'd will be more Evident CHAP. VI. I. Of the Errors of the Sight in respect of Extension consider'd in it self II. An Enumeration of these Errors as to Invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of the Sight concerning Relative Extension SIght is the first the most Noble and most Extensive of all the Senses if then they were given us for a Discovery of Truth this alone would assist us more than all the others together So that if we can destroy that Authority which our Eyes have over our Reason there 's little need of any thing else to undeceive us and to
Extension of Bodies in Relation to the Testimony of our Eyes let us imagine that God had created a Heaven and an Earth of a Portion of Matter as little as a Hand Ball and Men upon this Earth in the same Proportions with those in our Great World These little Men would see one another and the parts of their own Bodies as also the little Animals which would be capable of incommoding them or else their Eyes would be useless as to their Preservation Upon this Supposition it is Evident that these little Men would have Idea's as to the bigness of Bodies very different from those that we have of them since they would have Relation to their Little World which tho' as a Ball in respect of ours they would look upon as surrounded with infinite Spaces such as we imagine about ours Or if it may more easily be conceiv'd let us suppose that God had made a World infinitely greater than ours so that this New World should be in respect of ours as ours was in comparison of that which we suppos'd before Let us also suppose that God had observ'd the same Proportion in all the Parts of this New World as he had done in ours It 's manifest that the Men of this last World would be greater than is the Space betwixt our Earth and the most distant Stars that we see this being suppos'd if they had the same Idea of the Extension of Bodies as we have they could not distinguish even some parts of their own Body and would see some others of prodigious greatness So that 't is ridiculous to think that they would see things of the same bigness as we see them 'T is evident from these two Suppositions that the Men of the Great or Little World would have very different Notions about the greatness of Bodies to what we have supposing only that their Eyes gave them Idea's of the Objects that were about them proportionably in bigness to their own Bodies Now if these Men were much assur'd upon the Testimony of their own Eyes that Bodies were as big as they saw them it 's evident they would be deceiv'd and no body can doubt of it yet it 's certain they would have full as much reason as we to defend their Opinion let us therefore at least by the Example of this Error apprehend our selves to be very uncertain of the greatness of those Bodies that we see and that all we can know by sight is the proportion that they have to our Bodies In a word that our Eyes are not given us to Judge of the Truth of things but only to discern those things that may either Profit or Injure us But Men do not only trust their Eyes in Judging of Visible but also of Invisible Objects they even conclude that nothing exists which they see not thus arrogating to their Sight a certain infinite perspicacity 'T is this which hinders them from knowing the true Causes of many Natural Effects If they attribute them to certain Faculties and imaginary Qualities the common Reason is because they do not see the real ones which consist in the different Configurations of these Bodies For Example They see not the Particles of Air and Flame much less those of Light or of other Matter yet more Subtile and this inclines them to believe they do not exist or at least to judge they have neither Power nor Action they have recourse to occult Qualities or imaginary Faculties to explain all the effects whereof these imperceptible Particles are the Natural Cause They choose rather to have recourse to the Horrour of a Vacuum for explaining the Elevation of the Water in Pumps than to the Weight of the Air to the Qualities of the Moon for the Flux and Reflux of the Sea than to the pressure of the Air which environs the Earth to attractive Faculties in the Sun for the Elevation of Vapours than to the Simple Motion or Impulsion caus'd by the parts of Subtile Matter which are continually dispers'd by the Sun They look upon that as an Impertinent Opinion which has recourse to Flesh and Blood to solve the Motions of Animals their Habits or the Corporeal Memory of Man which is owning in part to this that they conceive the Brain to be very little and consequently insufficient to conserve the traces of an almost infinite number of things which are there they are willing to believe tho' they know not how to conceive it that Beasts have a certain Soul which is neither Body nor Mind as also that there are Qualities and Intentional Species to solve the Habits and Memory of Men and such other like things of which they have no particular Notion in their Minds It would take up too much time to enumerate the Errors which this prejudice begets in us almost all the Errors in Physicks are owing to it and whoever attentively considers it will be amaz'd thereat Altho' I 'm unwilling to insist much upon this head yet I can't but take notice of the Contempt which Men commonly have for Insects and other little Animals which are generated as they say out of Corrupted Matter this is an unjust Contempt which is founded only upon the Ignorance of the thing despis'd and the prejudices already mention'd There is nothing Contemptible in Nature all the Works of God are worthy our respect and admiration especially if we consider the admirable ways by which God makes and preserves them The least Flies are as perfect Animals as the biggest Creatures the proportion of their Members is as Just as those of the others and it even seems that God has given them more Ornaments to recompence the littleness of their Bodies they have Crowns Helmets and other Curiosities on their Heads which outdo the most Luxuriant Fancies of Men and I may confidently aver that they who have never seen any thing but with their naked Eye have never beheld any thing so fine so exact and even so magnificent in the Houses of the greatest Princes as what we discover with Microscopes upon the Head of a silly Fly It 's true these things are very small but yet the more surprizing because there are so many Beauties crouded in so small a Space and altho' they are very common yet they are not the less valuable nor less perfect in themselves on the contrary the Wisdom of God is more apparent who hath with so much Magnificence and Profusion perform'd almost an infinite number of Miracles in Creating them Nevertheless our Sight reaches not these Beauties but makes us despise the Works of God so worthy our admiration and because these Animals are little in comparison of our Bodies it makes us consider them as absolutely little and contemptible because of their smâ—llness as if Bodies could be little in themselves Let us then endeavour to distrust the Impressions of our Senses in Judging about the bigness of Bodies and when we say for Example that a Bird is little let us not absolutely
determine if it Judges by the Senses For Instance if one looks upon a Candle at a little distance the Soul judges that the Light is only in the Object but if the Candle is brought nearer it judges it to be not only in the Candle but also in the Eyes But if we draw back about a foot from it the Soul continues sometime without judging whether or no the Light is only in the Object never thinking as it ought to do that this Light is or can be only a Propriety or Modification of Matter and that it is only within it self because it does not think it necessary to make use of its Reason to discover the Truth of what appears therein but only of the Senses which never discovers it and are only given us for the preservation of our Bodies Now why the Soul makes no use of her Reason that is of her Understanding when she considers an Object which may be perceived by the Senses is because she is not affected by things that she perceives by the pure Understanding and that on the contrary she is most lively touch'd by Sensible things for the Soul applies it self much to what affects it much and neglects applying it self to things that do not touch it Thus she almost always conforms her free Judgments to the Natural Judgments of her Senses To be able to Judge rightly of Light and Colours as well as all other Sensible Qualities we must carefully distinguish the Sensation of Colour from the Motion of the Optic Nerve and by Reason discover that Motions and Impulsions are Proprieties of Bodies and that thus they may meet in Objects and in the Organs of our Senses but that Light and Colours which we see are Modifications of the Soul very different from others and of which also we have as different Idea's It is certain for instance that a Country Man sees Colours very plainly and distinguishes them from every thing that has no Colour It is also as certain that he perceives no Motion either in Coloured Objects or in the bottom of his Eyes and that therefore he concludes Colour is not Motion Likewise a Country man is as sensible of Heat and hath a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish it from all things which are not Heat and yet he does not think that 't is only because the Fibres of his Hands are moved he thinks the Heat therefore that he feels is not Motion since his Idea's of Heat and Motion are very different and he can have the one without the other For there is no reason to be given that a Square is not round but only because our Idea of a Square is different from that we have of a Circle and that we can think of the one without thinking of the other There 's only a little attention requisite to be able to know that 't is not necessary that the Cause which makes us feel such or such a thing contains it in it self Thus it is not needful that I have Light in my Hand that I might see it when I strike my Eyes nor is it necessary that there shou'd be Heat in the Fire to make me feel it when I hold my Hand to it or that any other Sensible Quality that I perceive shou'd be in the Object it is sufficient that they cause some Motion in the Fibres of my Flesh so that my Soul which is united thereto be Modified by some Sensation There is no Relation between Motions and Sensations it is true but there is none also between the Body and Mind and since Nature or the Will of our Creator has joined these two Substances together how opposite soever they are in their Nature it must not seem surprizing if their Modifications are Reciprocal it is necessary that they shou'd be so that they may together make an entire Being We must observe that our Senses being given us for the Preservation of our Bodies it is very proper that they shou'd incline us to make such Judgments as we do of Sensible Qualities It is much more advantageous to us to feel Pain and Heat as being in our Bodies than if we Judg'd them only to be in the Objects that cause them because that Pain and Heat being capable of prejudicing our Members it is fit we shou'd be advertiz'd when they are affected therewith so as to prevent their being hurt by them But it is not so with Colours they cannot easily hurt the bottom of the Eye where they meet together and it is of no use for us to know they are Painted there These Colours are only necessary to discover Objects more distinctly and that is the reason our Senses induce us to attribute them only to the Objects So the Judgments to which the impression of our Senses carry us are more Just if we consider them with relation to the Preservation of our Bodies but nevertheless they are various and very far from the Truth as has already been shown in part and will more evidently appear hereafter CHAP. XIII I. Of the Nature of Sensations II. That we know them better than we lelieve we do III. An Objection and Answer IV. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations V. That we deceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects VI. Objection and Answer THE third thing that is in each of our Sensations I. A Definition of Sensations or in what we feel for Example when we are near the Fire is a Modification of our Soul in relation to what passes in the Body to which it is united This Modification is agreeable when what passes in the Body is proper to assist the Circulation of the Blood and the other Functions of Life which is called by the Equivocal Term of Heat and this Modification is painful and perfectly different from the other when what passes in the Body is capable of incommoding and burning it that is when the Motions that are in the Body are capable of breaking any of its Fibres and this is generally called Pain or Burning and so of other Sensations but these are the common thoughts Men have upon this subject The first Error is that we unreasonably imagine we have no knowledge of our Sensations II. That we know our own Sensations better than we believe we do We see a great many Men every day who much concern themselves to know what Pleasure Pain and the other Sensations are they grant that they are only in the Soul and that they are but the Modifications of it 'T is true these sort of Men are very much to be admired at for being willing to learn what they cannot but know already for it is not possible that a Man shou'd be entirely ignorant what Pain is when he feels it A Person for Instance that burns his Hand distinguishes very well the Pain he feels from Light Colour Sound Taste Smell Pleasure and from all other Pain than what he feels He very well
distinguishes it from Admiration from Desire and Love from a Square a Circle and Motion in fine he discerns it very different from all things which are not this Pain that he feels Now if he had no knowledge of Pain I wou'd fain know how he can have any certainty that what he feels is none of these things We have some knowledge therefore of what we immediately feel when we see Colours or when we have any other Sensation and even 't is most certain that if we knew it not we cou'd know no sensible Object for 't is evident we cou'd not distinguish Water from Wine if we did not know that the Sensations we have of one of them is different from those we have of the other and so of all things we know by our Senses It is true that if I was pressed and required to explain what Pain Pleasure and Colour is c. I cou'd not do it as it ought to be done by Words but it follows not from thence that if I see Colour or burn my self I do not know at least after some manner what I actually feel Now the reason why all Sensations cannot be well explained by Words as all other things are is III. Objection and Answer because it depends upon the Will of Man to affix the Idea's of Things to such Names as they please they may call Heaven Ouranos Schamajim c. as the Greeks and Hebrews did but even those Men cannot at their pleasure affix their Sensations to Words or even to any other thing they see not Colours altho' they speak of them if they open not their Eyes They relish not Tastes if no change happens in the order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain In a word Sensations depend not upon Mans Will and it is only he who hath made them that preserves them in the mutual Correspondence that is between the Modifications of the Soul and those of the Body so that if any one shou'd desire me to represent to him Heat or Colour I cannot find Words for that but I must impress in the Organs of his Senses the Motions to which Nature unites these Sensations I must take him to the Fire and show him some Pictures This is the Reason why 't is impossible to give the Blind the least Knowledge of what we mean by Red Green Yellow c. For since we cannot make our selves be understood when he that hears us has not the same Idea's as we that speak It is manifest that Colours not being united to the sound of Words or to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear but to that of the Optic Nerve they cannot be represented to the Blind since their Optic Nerve cannot be shaken by coloured Objects We have then some Knowledge of our Sensations let us now see from whence it is that we seek yet to know them and believe our selves ignorant thereof this is without doubt the reason The Soul IV. Why it is we imagine we do not know our own Sensations since Original Sin is become as it were Corporeal by its inclination its love for Sensible Things continually diminishes the Union or Relation that it hath to Intelligible Things It is with great disgust that it conceives Things which do not produce some Sensations in it and it immediately ceases to consider them It does all that is in its power to produce some Images in its Brain which represent them and it is so much accustomed to this kind of Conception from our Infancy that it even thinks it cannot know what it cannot imagine Yet there are many things which not being Corporeal cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images as our Soul with all its Modifications But when our Soul wou'd represent to it self its own Nature and Sensations it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image thereof It seeks it self in all Corporeal Beings and takes it self sometimes for one and sometimes for another one while for Air and then again for Fire or for the Harmony of the parts of its Body Thus being willing to find it self amongst Bodies and imagining its own Modifications which are its Sensations to be the Modifications of Bodies we must not wonder if it Errs and is intirely Ignorant of it self What yet induces it further to be willing to imagine its Sensations is that it Judges them to be in the Objects and that they are even Modifications thereof and consequently that 't is something Corporeal and which can be Imagin'd It Judges therefore that the Nature of its Sensations consists only in the Motion that causes them or in some other Modification of a Body but when it finds that which is different from what it feels which is neither Corporeal nor can be represented by Corporeal Images this embarasses it and makes it believe that it does not know its own Sensations As for those who do not make these vain Efforts See the Explanations of the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part l. 3. to represent the Soul and its Modifications by Corporeal Images and yet are Solicitous to know the Nature of their Sensations they must consider that neither the Soul or its Modifications are to be known by the Idea's taking the word Idea in its true sense as I have determin'd and explain'd it in the Third Book but only by an inward Sensation So that when they desire the Soul and its Sensations to be explain'd by some Idea's they require what is impossible for all Mankind to give them since Man cannot Instruct us in giving us Idea's of Things but only in making us reflect upon those we already have The second Error we are subject to in respect to our Sensations is our attributing them to Objects as has already been explained in the 11th and 12th Chapters The third is V. That we dâ—ceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sâ—nsations of the same Objects our Judging that every one has the same Sensations of the same Objects For Example we believe all Mankind that sees the Sky takes it to be Blue and the Fields to be Green and all Visible Objects to be after the same manner as they appear to us and so of all other Sensible Qualities of the rest of our Senses Many persons will wonder that I shou'd bring such things in question as they have thought Indisputable yet I dare affirm they have never had any reason to Judge of them after the manner they have done and altho' I cannot Mathematically demonstrate to them that they are deceived yet I can demonstrate 't is by the greatest Chance in the World if they are not deceived Nay I have sufficient Reasons to be assur'd that they certainly are in an Error To know the Truth of what I advance we must remember what I have already proved viz. that there is a great difference between Sensations and the causes of them for from thence we may Judge that its possible absolutely speaking
that the same Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optic Nerve do not cause the same Sensations in different persons that is to see the same Colours and that such a Motion may happen which shall cause in one the Sensation of Green or Gray in another or even a new Sensation which no body before ever had It is certain that this may be and that Reason does not demonstrate the contrary to us yet 't is generally agreed that 't is not probable it should be so It is much more reasonable to believe that God acts always after the same manner in respect to the Union he hath created between our Souls and Bodies and that he hath tyed the same Idea's and the same Sensations to like Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain altho' in different Persons Let us take it for granted then as the same Motions of those Fibres which end in the middle of the Brain are accompanied with the same Sensations in all Men so if it happens that the same Objects produce not the same Motions in their Brain by consequence they do not excite the same Sensations in their Soul Now it appears indisputable to me that all Mens Organs of their Senses not being disposed after the same manner they cannot receive the same impressions from the same Objects For instance The blows a Porter hits himself over the sides to warm himself wou'd be sufficient to lame a great many Men The same blow wou'd produce many different Motions and by consequence as many different Sensations in a Man of a strong Constitution and in a Child or a Woman that is of a weak Constitution So that there not being two Persons in the World who we can be certain have the Organs of their Senses in a perfect conformity we cannot affirm that there is two Persons in the World who have exactly the same Sensations of the same Objects This is the Original of that strange variety which we meet with in the Inclinations of Men. There are some who love Musick extreamly and others who are insensible of it and even amongst those that delight in it some love one kind of Musick and others another according to the almost infinite diversity that is found in the Fibres of the Nerve of the Ear in the Blood and in the Spirits For instance how great a difference there is between the Musick of France that of Italy of Chinese and other places and by consequence between the Tastes that different People have of different kinds of Musick Nay it even happens that at different times by the same Consorts we receive different Impressions for if the Imagination is heated by a great quantity of agitated Spirits we are much more pleased with a bold and dissonant Musick than with one that is more sweet and more agreeable to mathematical Rules and Exactness This Experience proves and it is not very difficult to give a reason of it It is the same also of Odours he that loves to smell of the Flower of an Orange it may be cannot endure a Rose and the contrary There is likewise as much diversity in Tastes as in any other of the Sensations Sauces must be very different equally to please different Persons nay to please the same Person at different times One loves that which is sweet another that which is sowre one thinks Wine agreeable another hates it and the same Person who liked it when he was well thinks it bitter and unpleasant when he 's in a Fever and so of the rest of the Senses Yet all Men love Pleasure they all delight in agreeable Sensations and have all in respect to that the same Inclination they receive not then the same Sensations of the same Objects fince they love them not equally Thus what makes one Man say he loves that which is sweet is because the Sensation he has thereof is agreeable and that which causes another to say he does not love what is sweet is that indeed he has not the same Sensation as he that loves it And when he says he loves not that which is sweet he does not mean he does not love to have the same Sensation with the other but that he has it not So that he speaks improperly when he says he loves not that which is sweet he ought to say he does not love Sugar Hony c. that every one else thinks to be sweet and agreeable and that he has not the same Taste as others have because the Fibres of his Tongue are otherwise disposed This is a very Sensible Example Suppose that of twenty Persons there was one amongst them who had his Hands very cold and knew not the Words that are made use of to explain the Sensations of heat and cold and that on the contrary all the rest had their Hands extreamly hot If in Winter cold Water was carried to all of them to Wash in those whose Hands were very hot would immediately upon washing one after another say this Water is very cold I don't love it but when the other whose Hands were extreamly cold should come at last to wash his Hands he wou'd say on the contrary I don't know why you don't love cold Water for my part I take a great deal of pleasure in feeling the cold and washing my Hands in it From this Instance 't is very clear that when this last shou'd say I love cold it shou'd signifie nothing else but that he loves heat and feels it whereas the others feel the contrary And so when a Man says I love what is bitter and cannot abide sweet things it is only to be understood that he has not the same Sensations as those who say they love sweet Things and have an aversion for whatsoever is bitter It is then certain that a Sensation which is agreeable to one Person is also to all those who feel the same but that the same Objects cause not the same Sensation in all the World because of the different dispositions of the Organs of the Senses which is of the highest consequence to be observ'd both in respect to Philosophy and Morality 'T is true an Objection may here be rais'd but 't will be very easily solved viz. It sometimes happens that persons who extreamly love certain sorts of Food come afterwards to have an aversion for them either because in Eating they have found some Dirt in them or have been Sick because they have Eat to excess of them or else for some other reasons These same Persons say they no longer love the same Sensations that they loved formerly for they have them still when they Eat the same Food and yet they are not agreeable to them To answer to this Objection it must be observed that when those Persons taste any Food that they have so much aversion to they have two very different Sensations at the same time they have that of the Food they Eat according to the Objection and they have also another Sensation
of it self Now as the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul which are those only that it can see are not in the Heavens it from thence follows that all Men who see Stars in the Heavens and afterwards voluntarily Judging that they are there make two false Judgments whereof the one is Natural and the other Free One is a Judgment of the Senses or a Compounded Sensation according to which we ought not to Judge the other is a Free Judgment of the Will which we cannot hinder our selves from making and by conquence which we ought not to do if we would avoid Error But the reason that we believe that these Stars II. The Reasons of these false Judgments which we see immediately are out of the Soul and in the Firmament is because it is not in the power of the Soul to see them when it pleases for it cannot perceive them when the Motions to which the Idea's of these Objects are Naturally ty'd happen in its Brain Now because the Soul perceives not the Motions of its Organs but only its own Sensations and that it knows these same Sensations are not produced in it by its own power it is induced to Judge that they are without and in the cause which represents them to it and it hath so often made these kind of Judgments in the same time it perceived the Objects that it can scarcely hinder it self from making them It will be very necessary to explain the foundation of what I have said to shew the usefulness of this infinite number of little Beings that we call Species and Idea's which are as nothing and which represent all things that we create and destroy when we please and that our Ignorance hath made us imagine to render a Reason for things that we understand not We shou'd show the solidity of their Opinion who believe God is the true Father of Light who only Instructs all Men without whom the most simple Truths cou'd not be Intelligible and the Sun tho' never so bright wou'd not be so much as Visible to us who acknowledge no other Nature than the Will of God and who upon these Reflexions have confessed that the Idea's which represent the Creatures to us are only the Perfections of God which answer to these same Creatures and represent them to us It wou'd be requisite also to show the Nature of Idea's and then it wou'd be easie to speak more clearly of what I have mentioned but that it wou'd carry us too far In the third Book these things shall be more fully explained and order requires it shou'd be referred till then It suffices for the present that I bring a most Sensible and Indisputable Example wherein we shall find many Judgments confounded with one and the same Sensation I believe there is no body in the World who looks upon the Moon but sees it about a thousand Paces from himself and who thinks it not greater when it Rises or Sets than when it is very high above the Horizon and it may be also that we only believe we see it greater without thinking that we make any Judgment in its Sensation Yet it is Indisputable that if there was not some kind of Judgment included in the Sensation we shou'd not see the Moon in the distance it appears to be And besides it wou'd appear less to us when it rises than when it is got a great way above the Horizon since we see it great when it rises only because we believe it farther off by a Natural Judgment which I have spoken of in the 6th Chapter But besides our Natural Judgments which we may look upon as compounded Sensations there is almost in all our Sensations a free Judgment for Men not only determine by a Natural Judgment that Pain for instance is in their Hand but they also make a free Judgment thereof they not only feel it there but likewise believe it so and have so habituated themselves to form such Judgments that they find it very difficult to avoid it Yet these Judgments are very false in themselves altho' very useful for the preservation of Life for our Senses Instruct us only for our Bodies and all our free Judgments which are conformable to our Senses are very far from the Truth But that we may not leave all these things without giving some Means to discover the Reasons thereof we must know that there are two sorts of Beings such as our Soul sees immediately and others that it knows only through the Means of the first For Instance when I perceive the Sun rising I first perceive that which I see immediately and because I perceive that first Sun only by reason there is something without me which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and Brain I Judge that this first Sun which is in my Soul is without and that it Exists It may further happen that we see this first Sun which is intirely united to our Soul tho' the other be not upon the Horizon and even whether it exists or no so we may see this first Sun greater when the other rises than when it is very high and altho' it be true that this first Sun that we immediately see be greater than the other rises it follows not from thence that this other be greater for 't is not properly that which rises that we see since it is distant from us many Millions of Miles but it is that first that is truly greater and such as we see it because all things that we immediately see are always what we see them to be and we deceive our selves only because we Judge that what we immediately see is in the External Object which causes that Vision in us So when we see Light in seeing this first Sun which is immediately united to our Mind we do not deceive our selves in believing we see it it is not possible to doubt thereof But our Error is our Willing without any Reason nay against all Reason that this Light that we immediately see exists in the Sun which is without us 'T is also the same thing in respect to other Objects of our Senses III. Error is not in our Sensations but only in our Judgments If we observe carefully what has been said in the beginning and continuation of this Work we shall easily see that of all things that happen in each Sensation Error proceeds from the Judgments we make by which we think that our Sensations are in the Objects First it is not an Error to be ignorant that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their parts and that this Motion communicates it self to the Organs of our Senses which are the two first things to be observed in each Sensation for there is a great deal of difference between being ignorant of a thing and having a false Notion of it Secondly we deceive our selves not in the third which is properly Sensation when we feel Heat see Light Colours
admiration in his tenth Book of Confessions We shall not explain these things more fully because 't will be more proper for every one to examine them himself with some application of Mind because such things as we discover by this Method are always more agreeable and make a deeper impression on us than what we learn from others In order to explain Habits II Of the Habits it is necessary to know the manner how we believe the Soul moves those parts of the Bodies to which it is united According to all appearance there is always in certain places of the Brain be they where they will a great number of Animal Spirits much agitated by the heat of the Heart from whence they come and are ready to run into those places into which they find free passage All the Nerves end in the receptacle of these Spirits and the Soul hath the * I explain elsewhere in what this power consists power of determining their Motion and conducting them by these Nerves into all the Muscles of the Body these Spiriâ—s being entered there they swell them up and by consequence contract them Thus they move those parts to which the Muscles are united We shall not find it so difficult to be perswaded that the Soul moves the Body after the same manner already explained if we observe that when we have been a long time without Eating and are willing to give certain motions to our Bodies we cannot essect it and even feel it very troublesome to stand upon our feet But if we find the means to make any thing that is very spiritous run into our Heart as Wine or some other like Nourishment we are loon sensible that the body obeys with much more facility and moves it self after what manner we desire For this Experiment alone makes it seem very plain to me That the Soul could not give Motion to the Body through the defect of Animal Spirits and that 't is by their means that it hath recovered its Empire over it Now the infiations of the Muscles are so visible and so sensible in the agitation of our Arms and all the parts of our Body and it is so reasonable to believe that these Muscles cannot be blown up but because some body enters into them even as a Foot-ball cannot grow big and turgid except by the Admission of Air or some such like thing It seems I say that there can remain no doubt but that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain through the Nerves into the Muscles to blow them up and to produce there all the Motions that we can wish for a Muscle being full it is necessarily shorter then if it was empty so it draws and moves the part to which it is united as we may see more at large in D'Cartes Book of the Passions We don't give this Explanation as perfectly demonstrated in all its parts For to make it entirely evident there are still many things to be wish'd which 't is almost impossible to explain But it is also useful enough in our subject to know them for whether this Explanation be true or false it remains however equally useful to discover the Nature of Habits Because if the Soul does not move the Body after this manner it necessarily moves it some other way which is very like it from whence we may draw such consequences as we shall make use of But in order to the pursuing our Explanation it must be observed that the Spirits do not always find the ways so open and free by which they should pass and that makes us for example sometimes have so much difficulty in the moving our Fingers so quick as is necessary for the playing upon Msiucal Instruments or the Muscles that serve for pronounciation to pronounce the word of a strange tongue But by little and little the Animal Spirits by their continual course open and clear these passages so that in time one finds no longer resistance Now Habits consist in this facility that the Animal Spirits have to pass through the Members of our Bodies It is very casie according to this Explanation to resolve an infinite Number of questions which respect Habits As for Example why Children are more capable of acquiring new Habits then older Persons are Why it is so difficult to break our selves of long habits Why Men by much speaking have acquired so great a facility to it that they pronounce their words with an incredible swiftness and even without thinking thereof As it too often happens to those that say the Prayers which they have been accustomed to many years and yet to pronounce one word only many Muscles must move together in a certain time and order as those of the Tongue the Lips Throat and Diaphragme But one cannot with a little Meditation satisfie ones self about these questions and many others very curious and useful but it is not necessary to insist upon these things here It is visible from what has been said that there is much relation between the Memory and Habits and that in one sense the Memory may pass for a kind of Habit. For even as Corporeal Habits consist in the facility that the Spirits have acquired to pass through certain places of our Bodies so the Memory consists in the traces that the same Spirits have impressed on the Brain which are the causes of the facility we have in recalling things again to our Mind That if there were no perceptions that depended upon the Course of the Animal Spirits nor on these traces there would be no difference between the Memory and the other Habits It is not also more difficult to conceive that Beasts although without a Soul and incapable of any perception after their manner remember such things as have made an impression in their Brain then to conceive they are capable of acquiring different Habits See the Explanations upon Memory and Spiritual Hâ—bits And after what I have said of Habits I don't see much more difficulty in representing to our selves how the Members of their Bodies may by degrees acquire different Habits then in conceiving how a Machine first made is not so fitly disposed for Action as after it has been used for some time CHAP. VI. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages ALL the Parts of Living Bodies are in continual Motion both the Solid and Fluid parts the Flesh as well as the Blood there is only this difference between their Motions that that of the parts of the Blood is visible and sensible and that of the Fibres of our Flesh is wholly imperceptible There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits and the substance of the Brain that the Animal Spirits are very much agitated and very fluid and the substance of the Brain hath some Solidity and Consistence so that the Spirits divide themselves into little parts and in a few
its Extension and by little and little renders it both weak obscure and confus'd Now the greatest part of those who boast of knowing the Opinions of others never Study but after the second Manner and so the more Reading they have the more their Judgment becomes Feeble and Confus'd The Reason is because the Traces of their Brains are confounded one with another being very numerous and because Reason has not digested 'em in order which hinders the Mind from imagining and representing clearly to it self the Things which it stands in need of When the Mind goes about to open certain Traces meeting with others more familiar it never seeks another Passage For the Capaciousness of the Brain not being Infinite 't is impossible but the great number of Traces form'd irregularly must interfere one with another and cause a Confusion among the Idea's 'T is for this very Reason that Persons that have great Memories are incapable of judging such things as require much attention But that which is chiefly to be observed is this that the Knowledge they acquire who Read without Meditation are only to retain the Opinions of others In a word that all Sciences that depend upon the Memory are properly these kinds of Knowledge that puff Men up because they make a great noise and infuse a World of Vanity into those that possess them Thus they who are learned after that manner being usually full of Pride and Presumption pretend they have a Right to Judge of every thing tho' they are very uncapable which causes them to fall into a great number of Errors But this false Knowledge does more mischief still for these Persons fall not alone into Error they draw along with them almost all the Minds of the Vulgar sort and a very great Number of young People who believe all their Decisions as so many Articles of Faith These falsely Learned having often prevail'd over them with the weight of their profound Learning and having deafned them as well with extraordinary Opinions as with the Names of ancient and unknown Authors have gain'd so powerful an Authority over them that they respect and admire as Oracles whatever they utter and no less unadvisedly embrace all their Sentiments Persons also much much Ingenious and more Judicious who had never known them before or could not be inform'd by others what they are hearing them talk at such a rate and with so haughty so imperious and grave an Air would have much ado to refrain their respect and esteem for what they say because it is a difficult thing to forbear paying somewhat to Air and Deportment For as it often happens that a Man who is fierce and daring abuses others who are stronger but more prudent and moderate than himself so they who maintain Things which are neither true nor probable put their Adversaries to Silence by speaking after an imperious haughty and grave manner which surprizes them Now these People of whom we speak have a high Conceit of themselves and despise other Men as being fortify'd with a certain Air of Pride intermix'd with Gravity and a Counterfeit Modesty which prepossesses and wins those that hear them For it is to be observ'd that all the different Airs of Persons of different Conditions are only the Natural consequences of that Esteem which every Man has of himself in reference to others as it is easie to perceive if we never so little consider it Thus the Air of Fierceness and Brutality is that of a Man that magnifies himself and little values the Merit of others The Modest Air is that of a Man who has a low Conceit of himself a high Esteem for others The Grave Air is that of a Man who has a high Conceit of himself and greatly Ambitious of others Esteem And the Simple Air is that of one who has no great Conceit either of himself or of any body else So that all the different Airs which are almost Infinite are only the Effects which the different Degrees of Esteem that Men have of themselves or of those with whom they Converse naturally produce in our looks and over all the Exterior parts of our Bodies We have in the Fourth Chapter explain'd the Correspondence between the Nerves that raise the Passions within us and those which demonstrate them outwardly by the Air which they Imprint upon the Face CHAP. VI. That Studious Persons are usually prejudic'd in favour of some Author so that their Principal Aim is to know what he believ'd without minding what he ought to believe THere is another fault of great consequence whereinto great Students usually fall which is That they Dote upon some certain Author If there be any thing true and good in the Book they cry it up even to excess every thing is true the whole is good every thing in it is to be admir'd They please themselves with admiring what they understand not and they would have all the World admire it as well as themselves They assume Honour to themselves from the Praises which they give to those obscure Authors because thereby they perswade others that they understand them perfectly well and this affords them no small occasion of Vanity They value themselves above other Men because they believe they understand a Piece of Impertinency in an Old Author or in a Man that perhaps never understood himself How many Learned Men have Sweated to Illustrate some obscure Passages of the Ancient Philosophers and Poets and how many great Wits are there who make it their whole delight to Criticize upon a Word or the Sentiment of an Author But 't is convenient to bring some Instance for what I alledge The Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul is without all doubt a Question of great Importance The Philosophers are not to be blam'd for using all their endeavours to resolve it and tho' they compile large Volumes to prove tho' weakly enough a Truth that may be demonstrated in a few Words or in a few Pages at most yet they are excusable But who can refrain from laughing to see them put themselves to such a World of Trouble to decide what Aristotle thought of it 'T is in my Opinion a thing of little benefit to those that live now to know whether there were ever such a Man who was call'd Aristotle whether that Man ever wrote those Books which go under his Name whether he meant such or such a thing in such a part of his Works it can neither make a Man more Wise or more Happy But 't is of great Importance to know whether what he has said be true or false in it self 'T is to no purpose then to know what Aristotle believ'd touching the Immortality of the Soul tho' it be of great moment to know that the Soul is Immortal However we are not afraid to assert that several Learned Men have put themselves to more trouble to know the Opinion of Aristotle upon this subject than the Truth of the Thing in it self
since there are some who have compos'd whole Folio's on purpose to unfold what that Philosopher believ'd of it but never did so much to know what he ought to have believ'd of it But tho' so great a number of People have tir'd their Brains to resolve what was Aristotle's Opinion they labour'd all to no purpose since they cannot as yet agree about this trifling Question which shews that the Followers of Aristotle are very Unfortunate to have a Man so obscure to enlighten them and who himself affected obscurity as he testifies in a Letter which he wrote to Alexander The Opinion then of Aristotle touching the Immortality of the Soul has been at several times a very great Question and very considerable among Studious Persons but because it may not be thought that I talk at Random and without any Foundation I am oblig'd to recite in this place a passage out of La Cerda somewhat long and somewhat tedious wherein that Author has heap'd together as many different Authorities upon that subject as upon a Question of great moment His words are these that follow upon the second Chapter of Tertullian de Resurrectione Carnis Quaestio haec in scholis utrimque validis suspicionibus agitatur num animam immortalem mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseveraverunt Aristotelem posuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos Hi sunt è Graecis Latinis interpretibus Ammonius uterque Olympiodorus Philoponus Simplicius Avicenna uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. de examine vanitatis Cap. 9. Theodorus Metochytes Themistius S. Thomas 2. contra gentes cap. 79. Phys lect 12. praeterea 12. Metap lect 3. quodlib 10. qu. 5. art 1. Albertus tract 2. de anima cap. 20. Tract 3. cap. 13. Aegidius lib. 3. de anima ad cap. 4. Durandus in 2. dist 18. qu. 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes late Eugubinus l. 9. de perenni Philosophia cap. 18. quod pluris est discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus magistri mentem ore calamo novisse peritus qui poterat In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres nec infirmi Philosophi Justinus in sua Parainesi Origenes in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ut fertur Nazianz. in disp contra Eunom Nyssenus l. 2. de anima cap. 4. Theodoretus de curandis Graecorum affectibus l. 3. Galenus in historia Philosophicâ Pomponatius l. de immortalitate animae Simon Portius l. de mente humana Caietanus 3. de anima cap. 2. In eum sensum ut caducum animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aphodis auditore qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristotelicam mentem quamvis Eugubinus cap. 21. 22. eum excuset Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander mortalitatem nempe ex 12. Metaph. inde S. Thomas Theodorus Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt Porro Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo sed putasse in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque Nam cum hic adscribat Aristoteli mortalitatem animae tamen l. de anima c. 6. pro contrario opinione immortalitatis citat Eadem mente fuit Plutarchus pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in l. 5. de placitis Philosop Nam cap. 1. mortalitatem tribuit cap. 25. immortalitatem Ex Scholasticis etiam qui in neutram partem Aristotelem constantem judicant sed dubium ancipitem sunt Scotus in 4. dist 43. qu. 2. art 2. Harveus quodlib 1. qu. 11. 1. senten dist 1. qu. 1. Niphus in Opusculo de immortalitate animae cap. 1. recentes alii interpretes quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem sed scholii lex vetat ut autoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam We give ye all these Citations for true upon the Credit of the Commentator believing it would be loss of time to justifie them and because we have not all the Books from whence they were Extracted Nor do we add any new ones because we do not envy him the Honour of having well collected them and for that it would be still more loss of time had we a desire to do it tho' we should only for that purpose turn over the Indices of the Commentators upon Aristotle We see then by this passage of La Cerda that Studious Men who pass for able Scholars have put themselves to the Trouble to know what Aristotle believ'd of the Immortality of the Soul and that there were some of them that never scrupled to Write Books on purpose upon this subject among whom was Pomponatius For the principal Aim of that Author in his Book is to shew that Aristotle believ'd the Soul to be Mortal And perhaps there are some People who do not only enquire what Aristotle believ'd upon this subject but also look upon it as a Question of great Importance to know whether for Example Tertullian Plutarch or others believ'd or not that the Opinion of Aristotle was that the Soul was Mortal as we have great reason to believe of La Cerda himself if we consider the last part of the Passage which we have cited viz. Porro Tertullianum c. If it be not very Profitable to know what Aristotle thought concerning the Immortality of the Soul nor what Tertullian and Plutarch thought what Aristotle believ'd however the main of the Question about the Immortality or Mortality of the Soul is at least a Truth very necessary to be known But there are an infinite number of things the knowledge of which is very unnecessary and of which by consequence 't is to yet less purpose to know what the Ancients thought of them Nevertheless they put themselves to a World of trouble to guess at the Sentiments of Philosophers upon subjects of the like Nature We meet with Books full of these Inquisitions and these are the Trisles that have rais'd so many Wars among the Learned These vain and impertinent Questions these frivolous Genealogies of unprofitable Opinions are the Important subjects of the Criticisms of the Learned They imagine themselves the Absolute Masters of the Genealogical History of substantial Forms and the World is Ingrateful if it does not acknowledge their Merit How do these things display the Weakness and Vanity of Human Wit When Reason does not that regulates our Studies our Studies not only grow incapable of perfecting Reason but even darken corrupt and absolutely pervert it But 't is necessary here to observe that in Questions concerning Faith they are no way to blame who search what St. Austin for Example or any other Fathers of the Church have believ'd concerning those things as neither are they who enquire whither St. Austin believ'd what they believ'd who preceded him because we cannot attain to Matters of Faith but by Tradition Reason not being able to discover them The most Ancient Belief being the most true 't is requisite to know what was
true and solid Vertue and therefore he alone can bring us to true and solid Happiness But he neither promises nor bestows it in this Life 'T is in the other Life that we must hope for it from his Justice as the Reward of those Miseries which we suffer'd for Love of him We are not at present in possession of that Repose which nothing can trouble Neither does the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ afford us invincible strength it leaves us to the feeling of our own weakness that being convinc'd of our frailty we may understand that there is nothing in this World wherewith we may not be injur'd and that we may be enabled to bear those injuries which are offer'd us with that true Patience which arises from Christian Humility and Modesty not with a lofty haughty Patience that appear'd in the Constancy of proud Cato Cato took in good part a Box of the Ear that was given him he never reveng'd himself nor did he pardon it but he arrogantly deny'd that he had any injury done him He would have it believ'd that he was above those that struck him His Patience was nothing but Pride and Insolency It was injurious to those that affronted For by that same Stoical Patience did Cato shew that he look'd upon his Enemies as Beasts that are not worth the anger of a Wiseman and therefore he takes no notice of ' em 'T is this same Scorn of his Enemies and high Esteem of himself that Seneca calls greatness of Courage Majori animo says he of the injury done to Cato non agnovit quam ignovisset How madly does he confound Magnanimity with Pride and separate Patience from Humility to join it with insufferable Arrogancy But how delightfully does this same Madness flatter the Vanity of Man who always refuses to submit and debase himself And how dangerous is it especially for Christians to imbibe the Doctrine of a Master so Indiscreet and void of Judgment as Seneca but whose Imagination is so strong so vigorous and so impetuous that it dazles and like a Torrent hurries along with it People of weak Understanding and such as are prone to the Flatteries of Pleasure and Concupiscence Rather let Christians learn from their Master that the Wicked are they who are able to hurt 'em and that Good Men are sometimes liable to the Injuries of the Impious by the permission of Providence When one of the Officers belonging to the High-Priest smote Jesus Christ upon the Face He the Wisest of all the Wisest among Christians infinitely Wise and likewise as Powerful as he is Wise does not deny but that he was injur'd by the Officer however he was not angry he does not as Cato did revenge himself but he pardons as one that had suffer'd a real Injury He could have reveng'd himself and destroy'd his Enemies bu the suffer'd with an humble and modest Patience which was no way injurious to any body no not to the Miscreant that did him the Mischief Cato on the other side neither being able nor daring to take a real Revenge for the Injury he had receiv'd feigns at least an Imaginary Vengeance that flatters his own Vanity and Pride he raises himself in his own mind above the Clouds from thence he beholds poor Mortals as small as Flies and he contemns 'em as Infects uncapable of hurting him and unworthy of his Anger This is a Fiction becoming the Wise Cato From this Fiction arises that Magnanimity and Constancy of his Courage that resembles him to the Gods It is this that renders him invulnerable since it advances him above all the Strength and Maligâ—ity of other Men. Poor Cato who by thy Vertue think'st thy self superior to all other Mortals Thy Wisdom is but Madness and thy Magnanimity an Abomination in the sight of God whatever the Wise Men of the World thinks of it Sapieutia hujâ—s mundi est stultitia coram Deo Qâ—d homimbus altum est abominatio est ante Deum Luc. 16. There are Visionaries of several sorts some imagine themselves to be transform'd into Cocks and Hens others believe themselves to be Kings or Emperors others in imitation of the Deity arrogate an absolute Independency to themselves But though Men are always look'd upon as Madmen who believe themselves to be transform'd into Cocks or Kings yet are they not always number'd among the Frantick Visionaries who believe that their Vertue resembles 'em to God and Independent from all Authority and Command The Reason of it is that it is not enough to have Raving Thoughts to be counted a Madman they must be accounted Phrentick and Ridiculous by others For Madmen never pass for what they are among such as resemble themselves but only among Men of Sense and Wisdom as Wise-men are never look'd upon to be such by those that are Mad Men then acknowledge those to be Fools who conceit themselves to be turn'd into Cocks and Kings because all Men of Sense believe that it is not so easie for any Body to become a Cock or a King But Men in all Ages have thought they might be equal to the Gods Their Vanity has infus'd this Opinion into 'em as a thing probable enough They learn't it from their first Parents For without doubt our first Parents were of that Opinion when they obey'd the Devil who tempted 'em with a Promise that they should be like to God Eritis sicut Dii The most pure Intelligences endu'd with Celestial Precepts and Clear Understandings were so blinded by their own Pride that they thought they might throw off the Yoak of Divine Authority and seat themselves upon the Throne of God So that 't is no wonder if Men who are inferior to Angels in Purity and Understanding abandon themselves to the same Motions of their Vanity which blinds and seduces ' em If the Temptation of Grandeur and Independency be the strongest of all 't is because it seems to us as it did to our Forefathers more comformable to our Reason as well as to our Inclination for we are not always sensible of our own Weaknesses and Wants that cause us to stand in need of every thing Had the Serpent menac'd our first Parents by telling 'em That unless they eat of the Fruit which God had forbid 'em to eat they should be transform'd the one into a Cock the other into a Hen I question whether they would not have derided so foolish a Tempeation for we should have derided it our selves But the Devil judging of others by himself well knew that Ambition and desire of Independency were the Pâ—ind sides against which he was to plant his Batteries The Second Reason why we look upon those to be Madmen that believe themselves to be transform'd into Cocks and Kings and yet have not the same thoughts of those who believe that no Body can hurt 'em as being above all Pain is this because they who are Hypochondraical display their Mistakes visibly to all People so that every
Odours Sapours Sounds Colours c. the greatest part of Men do not think them to be Modifications of the Soul but on the contrary that they are dispersed upon Objects or at least they are in the Soul as the Idea of a Square or Circle that is They are united to the Soul but are not Modifications thereof They judge thus of them because they are not more affected by them as was shown in the Explanation of the Errors of the Senses We must therefore agree that we know not all the Modifications whereof our Soul is capable and besides those which it has by the Organs of the Senses it may have innumerable more which it has not yet try'd nor shall know till it be deliver'd from the Prison of its Body However we must confess that even as Matter is capable of infinite Configurations because of its Extension so it 's visible that the Soul would not be incapable of the Modifications of Pleasure Pain nor even of all others which are indifferent to it if it were incapable of Perception or Thought It is sufficient therefore to know that the Principle of all these Modifications is Thought and if any one will have it that there is any thing in the Soul antecedent to Thought I shall not dispute it but as I am certain that no one has any knowledge of his Soul but by Thought or by an internal Sentiment of whatever passes in his Mind so I am also assur'd that if any one will reason upon the Nature of the Soul he must consult this internal Sentiment which will always represent him to himself such as he is and he must not imagin against his own Conscience that the Soul is an invisible Fire a subtil Air a Harmony or other like thing CHAP. II. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing that relates to Infinity II. Its limitation is the Original of many Errors III. And chiefly of Heresies IV. We must submit our Minds to Faith WE discover at first sight I. The mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing which relates to infinity that the Human Mind is very much limited from whence two very important Consequences may be drawn The first That the Soul can have no perfect Knowledge of Infinity The second That it can't know distinctly many things at the same time For as a piece of Wax is not capable of having many different Figures at the same time so neither is the Soul capable of having the knowledge of many things at the same time Likewise a piece of Wax cannot be Square and Round at the same time but only part Square and part Round and so many more different Figures it shall have they will be so much the less perfect and distinct Thus the Soul cannot perceive many things at once and its Thoughts are so much the more confused as they are greater in Number If a piece of Wax should have a Thousand Sides and in each Side a different Figure it would be neither Square Round nor Oval and we could not say of what Figure it would be so it happens sometimes that we have so great a number of different Thoughts that we imagin we think nothing at all as happens to those that are in a Swound The Animal Spirits turning irregularly in the Brain stirs up so great a number of Traces that they do not sufficiently open any one of 'em to excite a particular or distinct Idea in the Mind so that these persons perceive so great a number things at once that they perceive nothing distinct which induces them to think they have perceived nothing at all There are some who sometimes Swound away for want of Animal Spirits but then the Soul having only thoughts of pure Intellection which leave no Traces in the Brain they remember nothing when they come to themselves again which makes them believe they thought of nothing I have said this by the by to shew those are mistaken who believe the Soul does not think always because it sometimes imagins that it thinks on nothing Every one that does but reflect a little upon their own Thoughts II. The limitation of the mind is the Original of many Errors have experience enough that the Mind cannot apply it self to many things at the same time and much more that it cannot penetrate into Infinity Yet I know not by what Caprice some persons who are not ignorant of this busie themselves more about the study of infinite Objects and such Questions as require an infinite Capacity of the Mind than about what better suits the Capacity of their own Minds and also why there are a great number of others that are desirous to know every thing and apply themselves to so many Sciences in the same time that it confounds them and makes them uncapable of knowing any Science truly How many Men are there who would comprehend the infinite Divisibility of Matter and how a little Grain of Sand contains as many parts as the whole World although much less in proportion How many Questions are formed upon these Subjects which are never resolved and upon many others which include any thing of Infinity which yet they would find a Solution of in their own Minds They apply themselves to it with all possible Attention But at last all they gain is this they are prejudic'd with some Extravagance and Error Is it not a pleasant thing to see some Men who deny the infinite Divisibility of Matter from hence only because they cannot comprehend it Although they very well comprehend the demonstrations that prove it and at the same time confess that the Human Mind cannot comprehend Infinity The Proofs which are brought for the infinite Divisibility of Matter are as Demonstrative as any thing else in Nature and these Men confess it when they seriously consider them however if we propose to them such Objections as they cannot Solve their Mind leaves that Evidence which just before they perceived and they begin to doubt of it they are strongly possest with the Objection they cannot Resolve and invent some frivolous distinction against the demonstrations of the Infinite Divisibility of Matter and at last they conclude they were deceiv'd as also the World with them and so embrace the contrary Opinion This they defend with Chimerical Atoms and other like Absurdities with which the Imagination always furnishes them Now the Original of all their Errors is this they are not inwardly convinc'd that the Mind of Man is Finite and that to be perswaded of the infinite Divisibility of Matter it is not necessary to Comprehend it because all Objections that cannot be resolv'd without Comprehending it are Objections which its impossible to Resolve If Mens Curiosity would be terminated by Questions of this Nature we should have no great reason to be concern'd for if some Men were prepossessed with such Errors they are Errors of little Consequence As for others they have not wholly lost their time in thinking of
Disposition of their Heart Those who begin their Conversion have commonly need of a prepossessed and an indeliberate Pleasure to free them from their Sensible Goods to which they are united by other preventing and indeliberate Pleasures Sadness and Remorse of Conscience is not enough and they do not yet taste any Joy But the Just can live by Faith and in Want and it 's even in this Condition that they deserve more because Men being reasonable God will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice rather than with a Love of Instinct and an indeliberate Love like that by which they love Sensible things without knowing them to be Good otherwise than by the Pleasure which they receive from them However the greatest part of Men have little Faith and being continually led to taste Pleasure they cannot long preserve their elective Love for God against a Natural Love for Sensible Goods if their Delight in Grace does not uphold them against the Efforts of Pleasure for a Delight in Grace begets preserves and increases Charity as Sensible Pleasures do Desire It is evident from what has been said V. Of Mens Ignorance That Men being never without some Passion or agreeable or disagreeable Sensations much of the Capacity and Extension of their Mind is taken up with them And when they are willing to employ the rest of their Capacity to examine some Truth they are often diverted by some new Sensations or by a Disgust which they find in this Exercise and by an Inconstancy of the Will which agitates and runs the Mind from one Object to another so that unless they have accustom'd themselves to overcome these Oppositions from their Youth as has been explain'd in the Second Part they will at last be incapable of penetrating into any thing that is a little Difficult or which requires a little Application We must then conclude That all Sciences especially those that include Questions very difficult to be resolv'd are full of an infinite Number of Errors and that we ought to suspect all those great Volumes which are every day composed upon Physicks Natural Philosophy and Morality and especially upon the particular Propositions of these Sciences which are much more compounded than general ones We ought even to judge that these Books are so much the more to be Contemned as they are better received by the generality of Men I mean those who are but little capable of Application and who know not how to make a good use of their Judgment because the Applause of the Vulgar in any difficult Matter is a certain Argument of the Falsity of that Opinion and that it is only maintained upon the delusive Notions of the Senses or some false Lights of the Imagination Yet it is not impossible but that a Man may of himself discover a greater Number of Truths which have been conceal'd from former Ages provided he does not want a good Judgment but lives in some retired place where nothing can divert him if he Seriously apply himself to an enquiry into Truth Wherefore those are very unreasonable who despise the Philosophy of Descartes without knowing it only for this reason because it appears impossible that one Man of himself should be able to discover the Truth in so Mysterious a Subject as that of Nature But if they knew the Manner how this Philosopher lived the Method he took in his Studies to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being diverted by any other Objects besides those whose Truth he would discover the Clearness of the Idea's upon which he establish'd his Philosophy and generally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients by new Discoveries I say If they consider these things they would doubtless receive a more reasonable Prejudice in favour of Descartes than of Antiquity which Authorizes Aristotle Plato and many others Yet I advise them not to stop at this Prejudice nor to believe that Descartes is a great Man and that his Philosophy is good because he may be advantageously spoke of Descartes was a Man subject to Error and mistakes like others There are none of his Works even not excepting his Geometry wherein there are not some Footsteps of the Weakness of the Humane Mind He must not therefore be believ'd upon his Word but be read with Precaution as he himself advises us to do examining if he was not deceiv'd and believing nothing of what he says but what Evidence and the Secret Reproaches of our Reason oblige us to believe for indeed the Mind knows nothing truly but what it sees evidently We have shown in the preceding Chapters that our Mind is not infinite but on the contrary that it had a very mean Capacity which is commonly filled with the Sensations of the Soul And lastly That the Mind receiving its Direction from the Will cannot firmly consider any Object without being soon diverted from it through its Inconstancy and Levity These things are certainly the most general Causes of our Errors and we might longer insist upon them here but what I have said is sufficient to discover the Weakness of the Humane Mind to Persons that are capable of any Attention In the Fourth and Fifth Book we shall treat more largely of the Errors which our Inclinations and Passions lead us into and of which we have already said something in this Chapter THE SECOND PART OF THE Pure Understanding Of the Nature of IDEA'S CHAP. I. I. What is meant by Idea's That they truly Exist and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen I Think every one will confess that we do not perceive External Objects by themselves We see the Sun the Stars and many Objects without us and it is not probable that the Soul should go out of the Body and walk as it were through the Heavens to Contemplate all those Objects there She does not then see them by themselves and as the immediate Object of Mind when it sees the Sun for instance it is not the Sun but something which is nearly united to our Soul and it is that which I call Idea So that here by this word Idea I mean only what is the immediate Object or the nearest the Mind when it perceives any thing It must be observed that to make the Mind perceive any Object it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Object should be actually present of which we can have no doubt but it is not requisite that there should be some external Object which resembles this Idea for it often happens that we perceive things which are not and which never had a being So that we often have in our Minds real Idea's of things which never were For instance when a Man imagins a Mountain of Gold it is absolutely necessary that the Idea of this Mountain should be really present to his Mind When a Mad Man a Man in a high Fever or a Man that is
that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them And 't is only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties and defend their active intellect So that this Foundation having no Solidity as shall soon be shewn it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure We are assur'd then that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images or Species which represent them for these reasons 1. From the impenetrability of Objects All Objects as the Sun Stars and all such as are near the Eyes cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures Wherefore Philosophers commonly say that these Species are Gross and Material in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies they cannot therefore be penetrated nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven which must be full of them Whence it 's easie to conclude they must be bruis'd and broken in moving every way and thus they cannot render Objects visible Moreover one may see from the same place or point a great number of Objects in the Heavens and on the Earth therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point But they are impenetrable since they are extended Therefore c. But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects and even Objects as large as the Sun Moon and the Heavens there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet which is against all appearance of Truth The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects however epposite may be communicatedwithout being weaken'd may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptricks it 's evident that the nearer any Object is the greater its Species ought to be since we see the Object 's greater But what is yet more difficult to conceive according to their Opinion is That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope or a Microscope the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before for 't is yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant The Third Reason is when we look upon a perfect Cube all the Species of its Sides are unequal nevertheless we see all the Sides equally Square So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture which cannot but emit like Species yet we see Circles and Squares This manifestly shews that it is not necessary that the Object beheld should emit Species like it self that it may be seen In fine it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be that a Body which does not sensibly diminish should always emit Species on every Side which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it and that with an inconceivable swiftness For an Object that was hidden in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides and what appears yet more strange is that Bodies in great Motion as Air and some others have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them as the more gross and quiescent Bodies such as the Earth Stones and generally all hard Bodies have But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion there would be no end a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections Those that we have brought are sufficient though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them they believe that 't is in this that Man is made after the Image of God and participates of his Power That even as God Created all things out of nothing and can reduce them to nothing again and then Create them anew so Man can Create and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having to represent Objects and of doing many other particular actions is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance as independance is commonly explain'd it is also a Chimerical Participation which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine They depend much more than they think upon the Goodness and Mercy of God But this is not a place to explain these things It 's enough if we endeavour to shew that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings since they have real Properties since they differ from one another and represent all different things Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual and very different from the Bodies which they represent But it seems reasonable to doubt whether Idea's by whose means we see Bodies are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly as we shall see hereafter Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please we shall be in danger of perswading our selves to make more Noble and Perfect Beings than the World which God hath Created However some do not reflect upon it because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing since it is not to be felt or else if they look upon it as a Being 't is a very mean contemptible one because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind But supposing it true that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings yet they are Beings and Spiritual Ones and Men not having the power of Believing it follows that they cannot produce them for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd is a true Creation and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion by saying that the production of Idea's presupposes something else but Creation
that is Because they shall be Happy Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just Virtuous and Perfect because they are in the Order that God has prescrib'd and Perfection consists in following him but they are not Happy because they Suffer A time will come when they will Suffer no more and then they will be Happy as well as Just and Perfect However I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life by the strength of their Hope and Faith which render those future Felicities as it were present to their Mind For it is certain that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively it draws it nearer to the Mind and gives it a taste thereof before-hand And thus it makes us Happy in some measure since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure which makes us Happy Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier since it is not true and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune We must tell them that those Pleasures are good in themselves and capable to make them Happy in some measure Nevertheless they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementioned but they cannot avoid them of themselves Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclination which they cannot overcome and those transitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid satisfie it in some measure Thus they are in a miserable Necessity of losing themselves unless they are assisted It is necessary to tell them these things that they may distinctly know their Weakness and the want they have of a Redeemer We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ and not like the Stoicks who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds They must continually be told that they must hate and despise themselves and not look for an Establishment or Happiness on Earth That they must daily carry their Cross or the Instrument of their suffering and that they must lose their Life at present in order to preserve it Eternally They must be taught that they are oblig'd to act contrary to their desire to make 'em sensible of their inability to good For Men wou'd be invincibly Happy and they cannot be actually so unless they do what they please Perhaps being convinced of their present Evils and knowing their future sufferings they may humble themselves on Earth Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven and seek a Mediatour be afraid of sensible Objects and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence And it may be they may thus obtain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace and without which there is no Power no Health nor no Salvation to be expected We are inwardly convinc'd that Pleasure is Good II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible Delights and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False for Pleasure is really Good We are Naturally Convinc'd that Pleasure is the Character of Good and that Natural Conviction is certainly true for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good and very Lovely But we are not convinc'd that either sensible Objects or our Souls themselves are capable of producing Pleasure in us for there is no reason to believe it and there are a Thousand against it Therefore sensible Objects are neither Good nor Lovely Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life we ought to use them But as they are not capable of Acting in us we ought not to Love them The Soul must only Love him that is Good who only is capable to make it Happier and more perfect Therefore it should only Love that which is above it since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below or equal to it But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect when it always attends it we fancy that they are Sensible Objects which act in us because at their approach we have new Sensations and because we do not see him that produces them really in us We taste a Fruit and we find a Sweetness we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit we conclude that it causes it and even that it contains it We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit we do not so much as think on him nor perhaps on our selves Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul we impute both the Cause and the Effect to that Fruit which we eat What I have said of Sensations which have a relation to the Body is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it as those which are found in pure Intelligences The Mind considers it self it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow It straight fancies that it is the sight of its Happiness which produces in it self that Sentiment of Joy because the said Sentiment always attends that sight It also imagines that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in it self that Sentiment of Grief since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight The real Cause of those Sentiments which is God alone does not appear before it It does not so much as think on God for he acts in us without our knowing it God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be that we may remain in it that our Disquiet may cease and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be so that we may not remain in it and that we might earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us For God pushes us continually toward Good when we are Sensible that we do not possess it and he fixes us powerfully upon it when we find that we possess it fully So that it seems evident to me that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief as well as the Sensible ones are no voluntary Productions of the Mind Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss and which disguises it self to our Mind under Sensible Appearances We must Adore it we must Love it but we must also Fear it for since it fills us with Pleasures it may also overwhelm us with Grief We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice by a Sensible Love by a Love worthy of God when
a general Being of an unlimited Being of an infinite Being is not a Fiction of the Mind It is not a Compounded Idea which includes any Contradiction nothing can be plainer though it Comprehends all that is and whatever may be Now that plain and natural Idea of Being or Infinity includes a necessary Existence for it is evident that Being I do not say such a Being has Existence in it self and that Being cannot actually not be Being since it is impossible and contradictory that Real Being should be without an Existence It may chance that Bodies may not be because Bodies are such Beings as participate of Being and depend on it But unlimited Being is necessary it is Independent it derives what it is from it self All that is proceeds from it If there is any thing it is since all proceeds from it But though there were nothing in particular it would be because it is of it self and we cannot conceive it clearly as not Being unless we look upon it as Being in particular or like such a Being and that we thus consider all other Idea's besides that of Being For those that do not see that God is commonly do not consider Being but such a Being and consequently a Being that may be and may not be Moreover that we may yet more distinctly apprehend this proof of the Existence of God and answer some Objections that might be made more clearly we must remember that when we see a Creature we do not see it in it self nor by it self for we only see it as it has been prov'd in the Third Book by the sight of some Perfections that are in God which represent it Thus we may see the Essence of that Creature without seeing its Existence we may see in God that which represents it without its Existing Therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea which represents it it not being necessary that it should be to the End it may be seen But the Case is very different in the insinitely perfect Being It can only be seen in it self for nothing that is Finite can represent Infinity So that we cannot see God unless he Exists It is impossible to see the Essence of a Being infinitely Perfect without seeing the Existence of it We cannot see it barely as a possible Being Nothing Comprehends it and if we think on it it must be But it is useless to propose these kind of Demonstrations to the common sort of Mankind These Demonstrations may be call'd Personal by reason that they do not generally convince all Men. We must use more sensible ones in order to Convince them and indeed they are not wanting For no Truth has more Proofs than that of the Existence of God This was only urg'd to shew that refin'd Truths making hardly any Impressions on our Senses are taken for Illusions and Chimera's whereas when gross palpable Truths affect the Senses forcing the Soul to consider them we are easily perswaded that they have a great deal of reality for since the Fall they make strong Impressions on our Mind 'T is for the same reason that there is no prospect to hope that the common part of Mankind will ever submit to this Demonstration to prove that Animals are not sensible viz. that being Innocent which all the World grants and I suppose it if they were capable of Sensation it would happen that under a God infinitely Just and Almighty an Innocent should suffer Grief which is a pain and the punishment of Sin Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom Sub justo Deo quisquam nisi mereatur miser esse non potest which St. Austin makes use of with a great deal of Reason against Julian to prove Original Sin and the Corruption of our Nature They Fancy that there is neither Force nor Solidity in this Axiom and in some others which prove that Beasts are not sensible because as we have already said those Axioms are refin'd and include nothing that is sensible or palpable or make any Impression upon our Senses The sensible Actions and Motions of Beasts towards the preservation of that Life are Reasons which though only probable affect us more and which consequently incline us much more powerfully to believe that they are sensible of Pain or Grief when they cry out being struck â—â—an that refin'd Reason of the pure Mind though most certain and evident in it self For it is certain that most Men have no other reason to believe that Animals have Souls I speak according to the Common Opinion which is that the Chicken is form'd from the Egg tho perhaps it only receives its Nutriment from it but the sensible Sight of all what Beasts do for the preservation of their Life That is apparent enough from this that most People do not imagin there is a Soul in an Egg although the Transformation of an Egg into a Chicken is infinitely more difficult than the bare preservation of the Chicken when it is absolutely form'd For as more Ingenuity is requi d to make a Watch out of a piece of Iron than to make it go when it is finish'd it would be more reasonable to admit a Soul in an Egg in order to Form a Chicken than to make that Chicken live when it is perfectly Form'd But Men do not see the admirable manner how a Chicken is Form'd as they always sensibly see in what manner they seek for those things that are necessary for their preservation Therefore they are not inclin'd to believe that there are Souls in Eggs by some sensible Impression of necessary Motions to Transform Eggs into Chickens but they allow Animals Souls by reason of the sensible Impression of the External Actions of those Animals for preservation of their Life although the reason I have here alledg'd is stronger to give Souls to Eggs than to Chickens The second Reason which is that Matter is incapable of feeling and of desiring is certainly demonstrative against those who say that Animals are sensible notwithstanding their Soul is Corporeal But Men will Eternally Confound and Intangle those Reasons rather than own a thing contrary to Proofs that are not only probable but very sensible and feeling And there is no way to convince them absolutely but in opposing sensible proofs to their sensible proofs and in shewing them visibly that all the parts of Animals are only Machinal and that they may move without a Soul by the meer Impression of Objects and by their peculiar Constitution as Monsieur Descartes has begun to do it in his Treatise of Man For all the most certain and evident reasons of the Understanding alone will never perswade them the contrary of the obscure Proofs they have by the Senses And we only expose our selves to the Laughter of Persons of a superficial Understanding that are not capable of much Attention when we undertake to convince them by Reasons above the common Level that Animals have no Feeling Therefore it behoves
of our Prince and even the new Discoveries of the new World seem to add something to our Subsistance Being united to all these things we rejoyce at their Grandeur and Extension we could even wish that this World had no Limits and that thought of some Philosophers that the Works of God have no Bounds does not only seem worthy of God but also very agreeable to Man who feels a Secret Joy at his being a part of Infinity because as little as he is in himself he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite by defusing himself into the Infinite Beings that are about him It is true that the Union which we have with all the Bodies that move in those great Spaces is not very strict and therefore it is not Sensible to most Men And there are some who matter the new Discoveries that are made in the Heavens so little that one might believe they are no-wise united to it by Nature if it were not known that it is either for want of Knowledge or because they are too much engag'd to other things The Soul though united to the Body it Animates does not always feel the Motions of it or if it does it does not always apply it self to them The Passion which moves it being sometimes greater than the Sensations which affects it it seems to be more powerfully engag'd to the Object of its Passion than to its own Body For it is principally by the Passions that the Soul defuses it self upon External Objects that it feels it is really united to every thing about it as it is chiefly by Sensation that it defuses it self in its own Body and is Sensible that it is united to all the Parts that Compose it But whereas one cannot conclude that the Soul of a Passionate Person is not united to his Body because he is prodigal of his Life and takes no Care for the Preservation of it So there is no reason to imagine that we are not naturally engag'd to all things because there are some for which we are not concern'd Would you for Example know whether Men are united to their Prince or their Country Seek out some who understand their Interest and have no particular Affairs to take up their Mind Then you will see how Earnest they are for News their Disquiet for Battles their Joy for Victories their Affliction in Defeats There you will clearly see that Men are strictly united to their Prince and their Country In like manner Would you know whether Men are united to China Japan or the Planets and fix'd Stars Seek out some or else imagine some whose Country and Family enjoy a profound Peace that have no particular Passions and that do not actually feel the Union that unites them to things that are nearer us than the Heavens and you will find that if they have any Knowledge of the Greatness and Nature of those Stars they will rejoyce at the Discovery of any of them they will consider them with Pleasure and if they are Ingenious they will willingly take the Trouble to observe and Calculate their Motions Those who are busied with Assairs seldom mind whether any Comet appears or whether there is an Eclipse But those who are not so closely united to the things that are near them are very fond of these sort of Events because there is nothing to which we are not united though we do not always feel it as we do not always feel that our Soul is united I do not say to our Arm or to our Hand but to our Heart and to our Brain The strongest Natural Union which God has put between us and his Works is that which united us with those Men we live with God has commanded us to Love them like our selves and that the Love of Choice by which we love them may be Firm and Constant he upholds and strengthens it continually by a Natural Love which he imprints in us In order thereunto he has laid upon us some Invisible Tyes which necessarily oblige us to Love them to watch their Preservation like our own to look upon them as necessary parts to the whole which we compose with them and without which we cannot Subsist There is nothing more Admirable than those Natural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclinations of the Minds of Men between the Motions of their Bodies and between these Inclinations and Motions All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can never be sufficiently admir'd and which can never be apprehended At the sight of any Pain which Surprises or that is felt for example we cry out that Cry which often comes out before we are aware of it by the Disposition of the Machine Infallibly strikes the Ears of those that are near enough to afford us the Assistance we stand in need of It penetrates through them and makes it self understood to People of all Nations and of all Qualities whatever for that Cry is of all Languages and of all Qualities as indeed it ought to be It moves the Brain and in a Moment changes the whole Disposition of the Body of those that are struck by it Morcover it makes them run to assist before they are aware of it But it is not long without acting upon the Mind and without obliging them to be willing to relieve them and of thinking of Means to secure those that have made that Natural Prayer provided always the said Prayer or rather this pressing Command be Just and according to the Rules of Society For an Indiscreet Cry made without a Cause or out of a vain Fear produces Indignation and Scorn in the Assistants instead of Compassion because in crying without a cause we abuse things establish'd by Nature for our Preservation That Indiscreet Cry naturally produces Aversion and the Desire of revenging the Abuse that has been offer'd to Nature I mean to the Order of things provided he that made it did it voluntarily But it ought only to produce the Passion of Laughter mix'd with some Compassion without Aversion and a Desire of Revenge when it proceeds from Fear that is from a false Appearance of a pressing Necessity which has induced any one to cry out For Laughter or Jest is necessary to repel their Fear and to correct them and Compassion is necessary to Succor them as Weak It is impossible to conceive any thing better order'd I do not pretend to explain by Example which are the Springs and the Relations which the Author of Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all Animals to maintain the Consent and Union which is necessary for their Preservation I only make some Reflections upon those Springs that People may think upon them and may carefully inquire not how those Springs move nor how their Motion is communicated by the Air by the Light and by all the little Bodies that surround us for that is almost Incomprehensible and is not necessary but at least to know what are the Effects of it One may