which their generation did not make them to be So strange and so different from the nature of bodies is the nature of the soule â—â— I will not be so prodigall of your lordships time or so abuse your patience as to apply my selfe here to answere a slight obiection that may be made from the petty apprehensions of some moderne Philosophers of the schooles who conceire that as well grosse bodies as the subâ—â—iler soule are stored with respects and consequently that according to what I haue said those bodies should be immateriall and spirits which being euident that they are not the soules being stored with like respects can not be an argument of her immateriality Thus when they explicate the nature of grauity for example they tell vs it is a quality whose nature is to haue a respect to the center of the world When they teach vs what the power of seeing in an eye is they tell vs as grauely as if they bettered our knowledge much That it is a quality whose nature is to haue a respect to the animals action of seeing When they explicate what it is to be in a place they tell vs it is an entity in the thing placed whose nature is to be a respect to the thing or to the nothing if you please when they will haue it be in Spatio imaginario that is called Place And the like empty imaginations by which they confound the common notions of thinges making all Praedicaments to be relations and affixing to them a surname of Transcendentall For such discourses are so wretched and so pittifull ones that I thinke a neglect is fitter for them here then in disputing against them to loose time which should be better spent Especially to your lordship whose sharpe eyes wiâ—â—l at the first sight looke through the inanity and vacuity of them THE V. CHAPTER The Immateriality of the soule proued out of her manner of knowing obiects without her THe third proofe of our soules spirituality I deduce from her manner of knowing the obiects that are out of her For the better explication of this point I will make vse of a corporeall example which howbeit it falleth farre short of the wonderfull operation of the soule in this particular yet it will conduce much to the illustration of it Be pleased to reduce into your remembrance my Lord how you and I comming one morning into a faire ladyes chamber I am sure you will not haue forgotten not be to seeke whom I meane we surprised her so attentiue vpon her looking glasse as if she had bin discoursing with the faire image that she contemplated there She was so pleased with gazing vpon that beautifull resemblance which her selfe made as for a while she scarce tooke notice of our being att each hand of her by which meanes we enjoied aswell as she the same pleasing sight till her ciuility making her turne from it towardes vs bereaued vs of that picture which our eyes must haue bin loosers to haue changed for any other obiect but the originall that shee then shewed vs And euen then looking vpon her face how louely soeuer it was our eyes could discerne no aduantage it had of the faire picture in the glasse so exactly was it drawne Now if we aske the vulgar Philosophers of the schooles how this so liuely and so like representation of this ladyes face was made in the glasse they will tell vs that the superficies or out side of that cristalline body was imbued or as it were tincted and dyed into the very substance of it with a certaine representatiue quality whose nature is to make it be like vnto the obiect or imbuing beauty opposed before it in such sort and as truly as the quality of whitenesse maketh a wall white or as quantity maketh a body become great Now because likenesse is defined to be an imperfect vnity betweene two obiects that are like one an other for likenesse is euer accompanyed with some vnlikenesse else they would be no longer like but the same we may safely say that as farre as the looking glasse agreeth by its likenesse without any disagreement to the obiect that it is like vnto so farre the glasse is the very obiect it selfe Hitherto I haue borrowed the assistance of the ordinary explication how Images are formed in looking glasses which how erroneous soeuer it may be in them yet being translated to our mindes it will find there the truth which was from thence wrongly translated to bodies For euen they as well as we do vse to say as Aristotle teacheth vs that thâ—â— soule â—â—s its obiects that is she is all thinges by knowledge For knowlege is not made in the soule by addition of seuerall new entities that ioyned to her do become the partes of a new compound But must necessarily be a true impression made in her that is herselfe new stamped And is as truly the very same thing with the soule it selfe as the figure left by a seale is the very waxe it selfe newly modifyed in which it is impressed And therefore it cannot be denyed but that the soule is truly the obiect she vnderstandeth as farre forth as the obiect is by her truly understood And accordingly we see that a person who hath a right vnderstanding of any thing doth make vse of that thing in such sort as is fitting and agreable to the nature of it applying to it what is requisite to be applyed and remoouing from it what is fitt to be remoued so taking the knowledge which he hath of the nature of that thing that is the thing it selfe as farre forth as he hath right knowledge of it for a principle by which to operate that is for his instrument or for a part of his power of working Now because this instrument this principle this knowledge by which â—â—he soule worketh when shee hath occasion to vse it is truely and really the knowing thing it selfe that is the soule it is cleare that by such knowledge the knowing thing is truely the thing knowne and the thing knowne is truely a part of the knowing thing If barely thus much would suffice without any further addition to denominate or affixe the attribute of knâ—â—wing vnto a thing wherein we find this performed we might with reason esteeme a looking glasse or any material sense of an animal which in like manner receiueth materiall impression from an outward obiect to know or to be a knowing thing But when we procede a degree further and examine what more then this is in a soule when shee knoweth any thing we shall find that whereas the first is nothing else but that a likenesse of an outward obiect is in the glasse or sence which receiueth it A man when he hath knowledge of an obiect doth know besides the likenesse of the obiect within him that the thing he knoweth is without him For example one who heareth a bell ring knoweth that the bell is not onely within himselfe by the
amounteth to as much as to be lyable to destruction since the diuision of the partes that do essentially compose any thing is the destruction of it And the origidall difference of bodies is that some are more subiect to such diuision that is are more easily diuided others with greater difficulty which resulteth meerely out of the partes being grosser or subtiler So that seeing the very essence of a body is to be a collection of such partes It is euident that what can not be performed by such partes is beyond the orbe of sole and meere bodies and cannot be atchieued by them It is trew that in all the first treatise which is of the nature of Bodies I haue neither established nor made any mention of this Principle but haue reserued it to the second where I make vse of what is settled in the former to discouer the nature of the soule And the reason why I haue done so is because the slight mocke-Philosophy of this Age not reaching to comprehend the true difference betweene a body and a spirit easily swalloweth spirituall qualities in bodies and as familiarly attributeth corporeall proprieties to spirits And therefore I was obliged to runne briefely ouer the nature of all bodies and to shew how all their operations euen the most refined ones and that sauour most of a spirituall nature may be performed by the meere disposition of grosse and subtile partes there by to preuent the obiections that might be made me from such corporeall actions as vulgar Philosophy dispatcheth like spirituall ones And I thought is not sufficient for a iuditious readers satisfaction to do this onely by bare casting a composition in the ayre as Monsieur des Cartes some others haue very ingeniously attempted to do but I haue endeauoured to strengthen the proofes rising from the force of discourse by accompanying them with such further obseruations as do clearely euince that whither or no I hitt right on all the particular lines that I trace out for the performance of those actions yet it can not be doubted but that their causes are comprised vnder those heads I haue there established and that the wayes by which they are brought to effect are not vnlike if not the very same to those that I haue pitched vpon This being the â—â—orke of the first treatise The second looketh into the operations of a rationall soule And hauing discouered their nature it sheweth that they can not be performed by the meere disposition and ordering of grosse and subtile partes of quantity or of a body and by consequence that they proceede from an immateriall and spirâ—â—tuall substance Now here vse is made of the former principle for it being made euident that nothing but corporeity and diuisibility is the cause of corruption and of subiecting the thinges where they reside to the seruitude of Mortality it followeth indefectibly that the spirituall substance which we call a soule can not be mortall and corruptible This is the whole scope and discourse of that booke out of which for the reasons I haue already touched I will here select onely three of the proofes contained in the latter treatise to shew that our soule is a spirit voyde of all quantity and materiality THE THIRD CHAPTER The Immateriality of the soule proved out of the Nature of vniuersall termes or Prâ—â—posiâ—â—ions THE first of them is drawne out of the nature of vniuersall termes or Propositions Logicians do define an Vniuersall terme or Notion To be that which being the same may be affâ—â—rmed of many Metaphysicians define it to be Somewhat that is the same in many But to speake more familiarly to common sense we may say That it is somewhat which is any of mâ—â—ny For when we say Peter is a man Iohn is a man and Paul is a man If Peter and man be not the same thing the saying is false And the like is of euery one of the other two to witt if Iohn or Paul be not a man Againe seeing that one man is not two men If when I say Peter is a man the thing which I say of Peter were the same thing which is Iohn Such my saying would also be false for Peter would be Peter and Iohn too by being the man which is both Peter and Iohn The notion therefore of Man which is truly reported both of Peter and of Iohn is not both Peter and Iohn but either Peter or Iohn And this is that which we call an vniuersall This being hitherto euident the demonstration proceedeth thus We see that the thing which we call Peter or Iohn doth gett by being in the soule to be a thing that is either Peter or Iohn But this condition or quality to be either this or that or to be a thing that is either this or that can not be had or gotten by the nature of a body or by the disposition of subtile and grosse partes Therefore the souleâ—â— in and by which it getteth this condition is of a different nature from Bodies If here any one should answere me that howsoeuer our wordes may seeme vnto him who shall sticke and criticise vpon them to import that there is a notion in our minde when we speake them correspondent to those wordes which notion is no one of the subiects it is affirmed of and yet is common to them all Neuerthelesse if he looke carefully into his minde he shall finde that in truth there is no nature of Vniuersality there For if he examine what picture he hath in his braine when he reflecteth vpon the notion of a man which he calleth an Vniversall he shall finde there the image of some particular and determinate man and no such thing as a man in common To such a person as should say thus I might reply that to endeauour satisfying him with a long discourse might seeme as ill placed paines as if I should go about to proue with learned arguments that there are such bodies in the world as men call fire water earth and the like For euery mans senses of seeing and feeling that are not depraued and corrupted do assure him that they are and that he continually is conuersant with them In like manner it is as euident to euery man who hath common sense and reason and who reflecteth vpon what passeth in his vnderstanding when he speaketh sucâ—â— propositions or considereth such termes as we haue euen now insisted vpon That indeed there is an Vniuersality in them And therefore if he be so vnhappy and short sighted as not to discerne in his owne minde that which common and continuall experience enforceth euery rationall man who looketh into the nature of vnderstanding and discourse to owne and confesse he should in speculations of this nature content himselfe with belieuing the multitudes of others who are capable of iudging of them as blind men ought to relye vpon those whose eyes are not vitiated in matter of colours and not hazard his actions and his aeternall wellfare which
which concerneth the true good And that although the â—â—urâ—â—ent of materiall spirits which was â—â—ont to foment this Iudgement be now gone yet the effect of their stroakes that very same effect which remained in her when soeuer she had truce from their actuall assaultes remaineth after death in the separated soule and if it be the stronger will of it selfe still presse her on to the same materiall good that the spirits which begott it recommended to her For by the stroke of death the soule looseth nothing of what she had purchased in the body But all that she had or rather that she was there is enlarged and heighthened by this second birth of hers And she becometh such a thing as the precedent moulding of her settled her in a capacity to proue like as the seuerall parcels of warme mudde vpon the bankes of Nilus do become such various liuing creatures by the last action of the enliuening sunne working vpon them as by their precedeâ—â—t dispositions and circumstances they were designed to be Adde to this that there is no formall opposition betweene two such Iudgements in a man Lett the one of them be for example that it is good for him to go to a feast to satisfy and please his appetite The other that it is better for him to go to the Church to pray And it is euident that the truth of this latter doth not contradict the truth of the other but both of them are consistent together If then he dyeth with his soule fraught with these two Iudgements death will leaue them both in his soule each of them stretched out â—â—n such sort as belongeth to a separated soule but still in such proportion as it found them in her â—â—hen it came to deliuer her out of her body So that if it found them â—â—n such a proportion that the Iudgement of good in going to a feast did clearely ouerbeare the Iudgement of good in going to the Church the desire of feasting in the next world will likewise ouerbeare in â—â—er the desire of that good for the obtaining whereof she was to go to â—â—he Church to pray And although â—â—ll the circumstances and possibility of going to a feast be taken â—â—way with the taking away of the body yet the desire of feasting which dependeth not of considerations to be made in the next world but onely of those which were made in the body remaineth as fresh and as quicke as it was when the Man settled his last Iudgement and resolution in this world Nor doth it import that a separated soule hath no tast to be pleased with meate or with drinke For as all her desires were framed in the body so are they such as belong to a whole complete man and not to a naked soule And therefore she desireth to be built vp againe an entire man and to wallow againe in such sensuall pleasures as then prouayled with her To which I may adde that although a separated soule haue not a tast to relish meate yet she hath a will to wish for it And this will is now to her of a like nature as to vs in this world the wish of Beaâ—â—iâ—â—de which dependeth of no other consideration nor is referred to any furtheâ—â— End But is of it selfe the last End as being desired for its owne sake and not vnder the reglement or to serue for obtaining of any thing else more desired then it Nor doth it preiâ—â—dice what I haue here determined to consider that a separated soule is a pure spirit deliuered from that impugner of Reason her flesh which vsed to draw her from her greater good For we must not vnderstandâ—â— her being a pure spirit to signify her being aâ—â— vntainted spirit for she is wholy defiled by her habitation in the body But she is called pure by negation of conjunction to any body which hindereth not but that she may haue in her substance the spirituall effects and contaminations of a corrupted body For whiles she and her body were but one thing both of them subsisting by one Existence the agents that wrought vpon her body did build and qualify her according to what she was to be when she was to be seuered from her body and to Exist by her selfe Now if these agents were peruerse ones they hammered out such effects in her as made her become a spirituall monster of many heads which are the reluctant and incompossible Principles that raigne in her each of them drawing and tearing her a different way from the rest as in the next Chapter I shall more amply declare And although she erreth not in prosecuting her iudgements and desires supposing the principles from whence they spring which are now naturall to her yet all her operations flowing out of those principles are strangely defectiue vgly and monstruous And the reason why her Iudgements and affections in this state of separation are naturall to her and vnalterable whereas before they were but accidentall is this Whilest she was in the body there was no thought or Iudgement so deepely settled in her but by reason of her bodies subiection to externe agents might be weakened by the much importunity of other thoughts occurring to her and pressing vpon her and by litle and litle might be worne away and forgotten And therefore her nature that was thus flexible and changeable in her Iudgements and desires resided purely in the common inclination to Good in abstract or in generall the which was common to all kindes of desires and so onely the desire of Good in generall was naturall to her All particular desires being but accidentall to her and such as might be remoued by extrinsecall causes and agents But when all this subiection of her to such agents by meanes of her body shall be remooued by death and that no causes shall afterwardes be able to worke vpon her and that she herselfe shall be nothing else but a Being or a substance left out of these impressions the stamping of which is now att an end Those desires which formerly were but accidentall are now become naturall to her And whatsoeuer she loueth for it selfe remaineth settled and riuetted in her as a supreme principle ouer which none other hath any authority or preualence and against which nothing can be vrged to infeeble it And in the meane time all other iudgements and desires that are lesse preualent then these do keepe their inferior rankes and beings without loosing ought of the clearenesse of euidence that accompanyeth them vntill an other change do come by the reioyning of her bodie to her By all which discourse it appeareth how a separated soule that is badly and vnequally built vp is free from error and falshood in her Iudgements though her misseplaced affections and the improportioned composure of her will do make her neglect her true good for inferior and vnworthy goods THE VIII CHAPTER Of the Misery of a disordered soule after it is separated from the body HAuing cleared as I conceiue
this great difficulty I shall apply my selfe to explicate in the best manner I am able the different states that the different courses and manners of liuing in this world do settle a separated soule in These may be comprised vnder two generall heads For there being in man two principles from which all his operations do spring Reason and sense his soule and his body It is evident that according as either of these swayeth and hath strongest influence into his actions his course of life is to receiue its denomination I will begin with taking a short suruay of a soule torne from the body of a man that spent his life in the pursuite and in the enioying of sensuall obiects It is already concluded that all the Iudgements and desires which a man contracteth in this life do remaine in the sepated soule in the same proportion and excesse ouer one an other as they were here It hath bin also shewed that notwithstanding such a soules desiring a particular and inferior good more strongly then she doth an vniuersall and superior one yet is she not carried by error or mistaking to preferre the inferior good before the superiour but seeth clearely the difference that in truth is betweene them and that the superior good is of its owne nature preferable to the other though by reason of the temper she is in she preferreth for her enioyment the other meaner good Next lett vs consider the great vehemence wherewith the desires of a separated foule are accompanyed Examples dayly occurre to vs of the great earnestnesse wherewith passionate men desire and prosecute the obiects that their hartes are sett vpon In such sort that neither difficulties nor dangers can diuert them from them And yet the greatest and violentest of these is not comparable to the least and weakest desire of a separated soule In her there is nothing that can retard any operation that she is about as in bodies there is vnto whom motion belongeth not but as they are moued by an other thing and therefore all that appertaineth to them in regard of motion is in a manner resistance to it or a repugnant yielding to what is too stong for them and consequently succession of time and conueniency of place and a mastering power in the agent that worketh vpon them are required to all corporeall motions and operations But a separated soule being as we haue formerly shewed an indiuisible substance and not measured by time nor comprehended by place and withall her selfe being the principle of her owne operations which are nothing else but her very being what she is It followeth that whatsoeuer she doth or desireth is with the whole energy of her Nature whoâ—â—e force and actiuity beareth such proportion to the strength of the greatest and most powerfull body that is as all time doth to an instant or as the whole extent of quantity doth to a point seeing that her actiuity were she to worke reacheth to all place and to the whole masse of corporeall magnitude in an indiuisible of time Now lett vs apply these three considerations to such a soule as we haue proposed for our first suruay Her wearing out her time in the body with continuall conuersation among sensuall obiects and through the loue of them her neglect of rationall and intellectuall goods will haue caused that after death her affections to them will preuaile ouer these latter Such affections can not be conceiued to be but of one or but of two or but of a few of those materiall obiects but of many and of different natures For the puddles of flesh and blood hauing this property that full draughtes of them do begett a satiety and loathing in in the persons that feede greedily vpon them their ouerburthened stomakes do seeke to please themselues by variety and do hope to find fresher and quicker delight in some new obiect Thus they trauell and wander as farre as they can in this labirinth of vanity One pleasure still succeeding an other Their thoughtes sometimes bent vpon richesse otherwhiles vpon power as often vpon honor and estimation from others sometimes vpon reuenge and peraduenture continually vpon the meaner obiects that in their seuerall kindes do affect their grosser senses All this variety of affections that requireth succession of time to be contracted and enioyed in the body will reside together all att once in the separated soule or rather she her selfe will be all of them Many of them will be incompatible with one an other yet she mustendure them all endure euery one of their drawing her a different way like those vnhappy monsters that some historians tell vs of which being composed of two or of more different animals vnited together by some part of their bodies common to them all they are att continuall debate among themselues one of them desiring to carry their whole loade one way or to busy themselues about one thing the other contesting against that But the incompossible affections of such a soule are yet more lamentable then can be represented by the sad conflict of such monsters for these latter are not in the same indiuisible place they are but neere one an other and they are not alwayes in opposition and att warres betweene themselues whereas the soules vnhappy desires do constitute and build vp her very substance which being indiuisible they lye alwayes together in the same indiuisible restlesse bed like snarling dogges like angry vipers and poysonous serpents perpetually biting and tearing one an other Nor can any of them be layed a sleepe for one single moment of time They are continually awake continually raging and continually deuouring one an other and consequently continually deuouring thebowels of that wretched soule that harboureth them Who in the middest of this torment and misery seeth clearely that it can neuer haue end as longas she hath being she being now no longer subiect to mutation that therefore she must remaine thus for all aeternity But this tearing her in pieces by incompossible desires is but part of the torment she sustayneth She is so vnhappy as to be incapable of enioying any one of those obiects she so extremely thirsteth after None of them can follow her into that region where she now dwelleth nor hath the meanes or instruments to conuerse with them were it possible as it is not that they could approch her and offer themselues to her Consider now how great an anguish endureth that man who hauing passionatly sett his hart vpon some beloued obiect is hindered from enioying it The proportion of his sorrow will be according to the proportion of his desire and to the actiuity of his nature We see how much the griefe of a quicke and smart person exceedeth the griefe of a dull and heauy one and particularly when it is for the priuation of the obiect that he prised most We haue dayly examples of men that dye for such losses How strangely excessiue then must the sorrow be of a separated
dependeth of his actions in this life vpon his owne soddaine and slight conceit in a matter whereof he hath no skill As they do who to iustify the strength of their wittes will not onely speake and argue but also liue as though they belieued there where no life for the soule after the bodies death But to be more indulgent to him then so I shall desire him to examine his instance and to consider that as when a square for example or a triangle delineated vpon paper is proposed vnto a Mathematician to looke vpon there by to discusse some Geometricall proposition though that square or triangle there drawne be a particular determinate one so and so formed of such and such precise dimentions in each line and angle and the like yet the figure that is in his head abstracteth from all those particular circumstances that accompanye either of these vpon the paper and agreeth to any square or to any triangle imaginable be their lines neuer so long or short or drawne with red inke or with blacke c. In the same manner that corporeall figure of a man which appeareth to our reflexion and resideth in our fantasy is not the notion of a man that we here meane and speake of But it is euident to any one who shall looke heedefully into his vnderstanding that from the particular picture of some one man which his fantasy representeth to him his vnderstanding hath gathered and framed a large notion of man in generall which is applicable and indifferent to euery particular indiuidualll man As is euident if we looke into our owne meaning and intention and consider what will satisfy vs as when for example I stand in neede of some one of my seruants to do some thing about me and therefore do call or ring a bell for some of them to come to me which soeuer of those that wayte without cometh in my turne is serued and I am satisfyed In like manner if a tenant is to pay me ten pounds It is allone to me whither he bringeth it in halfe crownes or in shillinges or in six pences And therefore it is euident that my intention aymeth no further then att a common notion and that I know so much Now my intention being regulated by my apprehension preceding it it is cleare that my apprehension is also of the like nature that is to say it is indifferent and common to any one in particular It may be further obiected That from the apprehending of a thing which is indifferent to many it can not be deduced that the apprehending nature is not corporeall but spirituall for when we looke vpon an obiect a farre off before we can distinguish enow particulars of it we are irresolute what it is whither for example it be a horse or an Oxe And yet no man will inferre out of such indifferency that the eye in which it is is a spirit and not a body To this I answere that the supposition is a false one there is no such indifferency in the eye as is intimated all that is there is precisely determinate For the whole obiect and euery part of it concurreth to the making of the picture in the eye and consequently there must needes be in the eye a representation of the whole and of euery minute part of it which is a complete determination of it Whence it appeareth that the indetermination we haue of the obiect is seated meerely in the vnderstanding which iudgeth it but imperfectly by reason of the weake though entire picture that the obiect hath imprinted in the eye And accordingly a painter that were to draw that obiect att that distance must comprise it within such lines as the eye receiueth from it But that which in this case is indistinct and indifferent is our knowledge which resideth in our minde For it not being able to determine by the figure that the eye sendeth to the fantasy whither it be of an Oxe or of a horse remaineth suspended with an indifferency to attribute it either to the one or to the other It may be further vrged that such indifferency of our soules thoughts is no argument of her being a spirit for if it were spirituall substances would be accompanyed with such indifferency the contrary whereofâ—â— is euident seeing that no Angell for example can be either Michael or Gabriell but is precisely such a one determinate Angell distinguished from all others To this I answere that I do not vrge such indifferency as a condition propper to spirits For in truth they are more determined then bodies by reason of their indiuisibility The which is seene in these very notions that are more determined then the bodies from whence they are drawne merely because they are in a spirituall subiect But by this indifferency in the vnderstanding springing from a determinate obiect and by such transformation there of corporeall natures to a quite different manner of being then they are in themselues I gather a different nature that is a spiriturll one in the subiect where they are thus transformed For that bodies can be in our minde as they are when we thinke of them notwithstanding such indifferency which accordeth not with their naâ—â—ure is an euident freeing of the minde from corporeall bondes Now that such a nature as this of indifferency to distinct and different thinges can neither be in it selfe corporeall nor be represented by bodies or by subtile and grosse partes variously disposed is so euident that it were a vaine labour to go about to prooue it The meere casting of our eyes vpon materiall thinges conuinceth it without needing further discourse We can not conceiue a chaire a knife a house a metall a plant an animall or any visible thing what soeuer to be in it selfe without an actual termination No Statue no picture no manufacture nor ought in the world excepting intellectuall expressions can be imagined to bee without its being conâ—â—ined in all determination to such other bodies as comprise enuiron besett it Whosoeuer can doubt of this is incapable of any euidence And consequently where we see an abstraction from all determination and such an indifferency as we speake of we may securely conclude that the subiect where it is made and where it resideth and whence it hath it is not of kinne to bodies but is immateriall and spirituall THE IV. CHAPTER The Immateriality of the soule proued out of the Natvre of Vnderstanding THE second proofe of our soule 's immateriality and spirituality I deriue from her manner of operation when she vnderstandeth any thing That which she then doth is to compare the thing by her vnderstood with some other and by the relation or respect that is betweene them she knoweth the nature of that thing which she so considereth or compareth So that we may conclude the particular prerogatiue of a soule is to haue or rather to be a power of comparing one thing to another And in truth if we looke well into
also all the causes that haue relation to one another Which in effect is the complexe of the whole world since all thinges in it haue one way or an other relation to one an other either neerer or further off As Maister White hath ingeniously and solidely shewed in the first of his dialogues of the world And this is the methode of acquiring all sciences by the vertue of syllogismes And this vast extent of knowledge will be the firmer and the stronger in her out of this regard that euery one of her knowledges will adde a confirmation and a verifying to euery particular that she knoweth For all thinges in nature hauing a perfect connexion with one an other whosoeuer knoweth truly the nature of any thing knoweth also the nature of all that hath reference to it either as cause or as effect or by any other regard that linketh them together And thus euery one of her multitude or rather infinity of knowledges riueteth faster each other of them euery one of them affording her a new reason why that is so like stones in an arch where euery stone is not onely a support to it selfe but also to all and to euery one of the other stones that compose the arch So that euery knowledge of hers hath a superproportion in a manner infinite beyond any thing she knew in the body And according to the strength of her knowledge is the strength of her other actions as of desiring or louing any thing that her knowledge informeth her to be good since they proceede immediatly from knowledge and are more or lesse vehement according as her knowledge decyphereth them more or lesse abounding with the nature of good Nor can she be deceiued by any appearance of truth that may plant an Error in her insteed of a true Iudgement which is euident not onely out of what we haue euen now said that euery one of her knowledges maketh good euery particular one in her but also more immediatly out of this that it is impossible for Contradictory Iudgements to dwell together in the soule since one of them is engrafted in her or rather is identifyed with her by the nature of Beeing and the other must consequently be excluded from her by not being as euen in in this life we can not iudge any thing att the same time to be and not to be And therefore since all that she knew in this world remaineth with her in the next and that out of the perfect ordering of that she deduceth the knowledge of all thinges else and so enioyeth the fulnesse of science in her and that all shee knoweth is alwayes present to her as being in truth her owne indiuisible nature substance and Being it followeth that no falshood which is a contradiction of some truth incorporated as I may say into her substance can haue admittance to her beliefe And if any were mistakingly harboured by her during her abode in the body which hindered her from completely ordering her notions and from deducing true consequences from them this her new condition of abundant light soone discouereth and cancelleth it THE VII CHAPTER The answere to an obiection BVT if error mistaking or falsehood can not harbour in a separated soule And that the fullnesse of knowledge be the periode and perfection of her nature It may att the first sight appeare impossible that any soule should faile of being happy For seeing that a Rationall creatures desiring of any thing dependeth of the Iudgement that he maketh of such a thinges being good for him It â—â—ould seeme that there is great Error in his knowledge and much mistaking in his Iudgement when he setteth his hart vpon desiring and longing after that which is most hurtfull and pernitious to him To answere this obiection I must entreate your lordship to looke into the nature of the will Which though in substanceâ—â—it be the same with the vnderstanding that is the soule her selfe according as she is ready to proceede to action yet as it is the origine of the soules desires and the impellent of her to action It requireth a particular consideration We may then determine the will in a Rationall creature to be a mastering and conquering Iudgement or resolution that fixeth peremptorily vpon what is to be done For it is cleare that it is nothing else but a Mans immediate disposition to worke or to do some thing And he is allwayes ready to proceede to action and doth proceede thereto vnlesse he be hindred as soone as his vnderstanding iudgeth and telleth him what is best to be done Next be pleased to consider how we find oftentimes by experience that after we haue iudged and determined by our reason and vnderstanding what is best and fittest for vs to do there reseth in our brestes a certaine materiall motion or tyde of spirits that beateth vs off from that resolution and disposeth vs an other way If it happen that this inundation of spirits do chance to ebbe backe againe and leaue the channell free for the calmer waters of reason to haue their course in we returne to our former temper and Iudgement But if a new flood of them do breake in vpon it too strong for it to resist then they carry the mans resolution to their side And according to the violence and repetition of their strokes that beate him off from his first Iudgement the resolution that is made by them is strong and vigourous For as ourvery Being and all our knowledges in this world are made by materiall actions So more and stronger knowledges and Iudgements are made by more and by stronger materiall actions And therefore if these currents and tydes of materiall spirits haue the force to make in a man strong impressions and iudgements of the good they propose and by a continued long beating vpon his vnderstanding do in manner confine it to what they propose they will in the end as it were blinde our reason and make vs thinke onely or atâ—â—least chiefly of the good and aduantage that they suggest They will sinke into the bottome of our soule and settle there the apprehensions of what they recommend And in comparison of those Apprehensions they will weakeâ—â— the truth we see making it a appeare to vs like a dreame or a thing in the ayre that concerneth vs notâ—â— Which in this case I may compare not improperly to oyle swimming vpon some heauier liquoâ—â— in a caske For that remaineth att the toppe without motion or actiuity whiles the water beneath runneth precipitously out att the spigot into the vessels that are sett to receiue it In like manner here truth remaineth without all efficacy whiles the contrary iudgements do flow impetuously into action Now when a man thus tempered cometh to dye and that so his compound cometh to be resolued into body and soule It is euident that in his soule there must remaine a great inequality betweene that Iudgement of hers which concerneth the materiall good and â—â—er other
may soone be resolued of his doubt if he reflect vpon the course of nature in wafting man kinde to his long home for doing so he will see how this life is a perpetuall progresse in bettering or designed to the bettering of the soule 's knowledge in the next life as being the end of humane nature and the onely thing that can giue it rest and satisfaction He will also see that as in the next life there is an infinite encrease of knowledge so must there be also an infinite encrease of the desire to see the cause of those infinite effects which we shall then see admire Experience telling vs that a cleare and lightsome vnderstanding is euer vnquiett and thirsting to see the cause of the effect he taketh content in And reason likewise abetting it by shewing how it is impossible to see an effect perfectly if one pierce not into the cause of it for vnlesse he do so he would not know why the effect is So that it is euident the whole course of nature driueth to promote and aduance in vs the desire of seeing the Vniuersall cause of the infinite effects that a separated soule shall see And consequently the desire of seeing God our creatour is planted and engrafted in man by the intention of nature What is so is impossible to be frustraneous and totally without effect but of necessity will be fulfilled in some For Nature is nothing else but the rules that the infinite wisedome and goodnesse of God hath alotted to all creatures And it would not agree with those attributes to prescribe any of them a periode vnto which none of their kinde should euer arriue Well may those he planteth in the Sphere of contigency miscarry in sundry indiuiduals since it is the nature of contingency that some should miscarry whiles others arriue to their periode But if all should miscarry and none succeede it would no longer be contingency but impossibility and it might be concluded that nature were vnduely moulded and the meanes to bring it to its end vnwisely ordered And in our case we might adde malice and cruelty to the imprudence since by the course of our nature we should be brought ineuitably to an eternity of misery by causing in vs a most vehement and most actife desire of knowing and seeing that which we must neuer attaine to see And the best men that haue most cultiuated their soules according to the prescriptions of nature would drinke deepest 〈◊〉 this bitter cuppe of gall and misery Therefore we may settle it for a firme and certaine truth that some soules shall arriue to see that is to know God the Vniuersall cause of all thinges as already I haue proued that all soules shall arriue to know all thinges else Lett vs now compare these two knowledges one with an other and examine which of them is the greater and the more excellent We are sure that God is an vnderstanding And consequently he knoweth what he is to do before he doth it Whence followeth that he being the cause and maker of all creatures he vnderstandeth and knoweth them all Therefore he that should haue that great register displayed to him to reade the contents of it would find all creatures comprehended in it And to know them there is so much nobler then to know them in themselues by how much nobler and excellenter they must necessarily be in that great vnity and identity which they haue in him then in their owne multiplicity and dispersion Vnto which we may adde the infinite excesse of thinges which he could but neuer will make ouer those he hath or shall haue made And then we can not doubt but that the knowledge of God must be farre beyond the knowledge of all creatures But when besides this knowing of all creatures in God we shall putt into the scale to it the knowledge of God in his owne nature and Essence the other scale wherein is the knowledge of creatures in themselues will not onely become light beyond all proportion but will vanish out of sight like a candle that though it giue light enough to make a whole chamber luminous in the night dissappeareth euen whiles it burneth if you sett it in the beames of the noone day sunne They who vnderstand Metaphysikes will contemplate how the nature of Existence is of a pitch incomparably aboue that of Essence For Essences are but possibilities dead notions till Existence come to enliuen and to actuate them After which they are still defectible For they carry alwayes with them a capacity of being diuided from their Existence which if it happen they presently fall backe to their inuisible Chaos But Existence can neuer fade The nature of it is to Be and consequently to exclude not Beeing It dwelleth in so high a region as nothing can arriue thither but whom It eleuateth vp to it selfe Here God hath his habitation But I correct my selfe this is improperly said as though God had his place among other thinges likewise ranked there He endureth no companion He filleth the whole region All of it belongeth to him singly He alone possesseth it all And therefore it followeth that a â—â—oule raised vp to the knowledge and sight of him must needes be infinitely more noble and more Excellent then an other that hath but the Essences of thinges drawne into her by the knowledge of them If then these two knowledges that of God and that of creatures could not agree together but that to acquire the one the other must be deserted There can be no doubt but that the knowledge of creatures ought to be abandonned for the sight of him For it is euident that the happinesse which a soule must necessarily enioy by seeing of him is as much beyond that happinesse which we haue formerly described resulting out of the vast knowledge which a soule hath in the next life as that knowledge exceedeth the tryfling knowledge mankinde enioyeth in this world But this is not the case These knowledges are not incompossible For it is the nature of knowledge to be so farre from ones hindering an other that there is none but of its nature induceth and perfecteth some other knowledge And accordingly the knowledge of Almighty God encreaseth the knowledge of creatures shewing vs why they are and solidating their knowledge vpon the vnshakable foundation of Gods knowledge And consequently the more that a soule shall know God the more firme and the more strong will be the knowledge she shall haue of creatures Neuerthelesse when we consider that God is an obiect whose admirablenesse is aequall to his owne vnderstanding that is exceeding ours beyond what it possible to be conceiued we must conclude that when a created vnderstanding enioyeth the knowledge and sight of him it can not choose but be so employed and taken vp by that sight as not withstanding the vehement desire which we haue shewed it hath to see it yet it hath not desire enough to cleaue and apply it selfe
world and the hopes of the next And this is the good that we expect from Religion whose scope is to raise and enflame the soules that are a wake and to rouse those that are a sleepe in the dalliance of this world to the esteeme and relishing of the happinesse they may enioy in the next THE XIII CHAPTER That religion hath not bin introduced into the world by one mans teaching an other Nor by Angels instructing of men But hath bin taught by God And that Christian Religion is the true one IT can not then be expected that Religion should be iutroduced among men by inuention or strength of witt It remaineth that it must be by discipline and by teaching Whereof seeing there are diuers kindes or rather diuers kindes of teachers our next enquiry shall be att whose handes we are to looke for it Our first position shall exclude one man's teaching an other For suppose that some one man should haue beaten out by long study the true way of attaining to happinesse which neuerthelesse out of the former discourse seemeth vnlikely if not impossible the way for him to deriue it to others must be either by demonstrating it to them by reason or by winning their beliefe to it because he assureth them of it But demonstration in a matter so high and so difficult can not be communicated to many very few being capable of the strength of such a proofe in much lower and easier subiects It can not then be deriued to the people by any other meanes then by their relying vpon him that should positiuely tell them what they are to belieue But vpon him they could not relye for he being but a man they can not be assured whither what he sayth be true or false either because he might be deceiued himselfe and so deliuer them a falshood for a truth Or else because there might be considerations for him to propose it to them for true although in his owne hartâ—â—lie knew or doubted it to be false As for example either his owne particular profit or glory might preuaile with him to do so or he might deceiue them for their benefit keeping them by that meanes vnder good lawes and to an obedience that should make them liue happily in this world And from the suspition of this latter euen the best man that can be imagined so he be no more but a man can not be free For if he want power to introduce among men that which he iudgeth best for them it may be doubted that he aymeâ—â—h att bringing about his designes by art and cunning according to the old parable of sowing the foxes skinne to the lyons to make it reach Now if all these difficulties happen in the case of one man's propagating to the multitude this science of Religion which he is supposed to haue beaten out by his owne industry learning They would be no whitte lesse but rather more when such 〈◊〉 and demonstrators should be many And without their being many it can not be conceiued how the generality of mankinde that is spread so wyde in place an of so long durance in time can be imbued with it Adde to this the much that halfe learned men and halfe wittes would obiect against Religion proposed by such as pretend to relye on it because they haue demonstration for it which would be farre more plausible to the vulgar of mankinde then all that can be said to solue those obiections considering the profoundenesse and subtility that can not chose but be in such a demonstration and the vngraspablenesse of the very Nature and Essence of a separated soule which is the necessary entrance into it So that such men would giue ouer their inquiry and attention before euer they aduance so farre as to weigh the reasons whither or no a soule can be without a body because they can not conceiue what such a soule is And yet this is the hinge fundamentall pointe of all Religion So that it can not be expected that if there were no more efficacious meanes then this to persuade mankinde they should by vertue of this onely dis-seise their harfs from the goods of this world to which the course of our nature gleweth them strongly and settle them vpon vnconceiuable ones in an other world from whence they haue not experience of any soule that hath come to assure them thereof and to informe them what kind of inhabitants they shall become there when they arriue to the possession of those goods We may then from this discourse conclude that for prudent men to receiue Religion in the way of beliefe they will expect to haue it built vpon a stronger rocke then humane credit The next stoppe aboue the degree of men is the Sphere of spirits or of Angels Among whom seeing there be good ones and bad ones lett vs begin with considering what we may expect in this case att the handes of these latter And lett vs suppose them to conuerse with men by giuing them Oracles as auncient stories do record of Apollo att Delphos or of Iupiter Hammon in Lybia and the like Can any thing they shall declare and reach be a sufficient ground of beliefe Surely if euer any such Oracle were animated with its ambitious soule as is pretended it is not reasonable to expect that the spirit of lying should alwayes speake truth And if he do not one single lye taketh away the credit of all the Religion that he should haue founded For if he can and sometimes do lye Whence may it be certaine that he doth not lye when he deliuereth such vnknowable thinges as those which concerne the state of the other world And consequently if mankinde had no better security then this the greateâ—â— and highest designe of nature woulâ—â— be loosely gimalled and more â—â—â—terring then euery meane trade But lett vs consider what security we may haue from good spirits If such should denounce Religion to vs it must be either in their owne names that they would speake or it must be in Gods as his Ambassadors If in their owne names what confidence can he to whom they speake haue that they may not be aswell of the tribe of lying spirits as of the blessed Angels If he aske them whither there be not such deceiuing ones who were once their companions and of the same nature as they and are since become wicked and malitious they will acknowledge there are And then what infallible markes can he haue to secure him that these he conferreth with may not be such though they stile themselues Angels of light And their very speaking in their owne names may iustly render them suspected for if they were such as they pretend to be that is out of danger of falling as their mates haue done by hauing perpetuall sight of the aeternall verity then their very being such would reasonably make a man expect that what they deliuer him of that verity and of the way to arriue to it should
lastly I vrged that since the men who liue in ages after his who taught them this science which we call Religion can not be conceiued to receiue it immediatly from hismouth They would fall backe to an inceâ—â—itude and distressed condition equall to the former if he had not settled as infallible a meanes to conuey entirely to them this science as in it selfe it is an infallible guide so bring them to Beatitude And thence I proceeded to â—â—stablish that rule wich keepeth vs Catholikes in vnity among our selues and in security that wee are in the right way This was the scope of our conference then which comprising so many so weighty and so difficult pointes that a few houres conuersation was too scanty a time to discusse them as they ought to be I promised to giue your lordship in writing a summary collection of some of the most important reflections I had made vpon them The doing whereof is the subiect of the following discourse THE FIRST CHAPTER Of mistaken demonstrations IN this course that I haue proposed to my selfe my first endeauour must be to prooue that the soule of man is immortall neither dying when the body dyeth nor being liable to corruption or destruction after it is seuered from the body either through defectible principles in it selfe or by the violence of any outward agent working vpon it I conceiue I haue fully performed this in a former treatise that I haue written vpon this subiect But I may resonably apprehend that the length of that and the heape of various arguments cumulated there one vpon another may not obtaine from a â—â—person so full of great employments as your lordship is that discussion which belongeth to euery one of them in particular to be secure of the consequence drawne out of them which requireth greater leisure then your actiue and solicitous charges do allow you And therefore I will here select some few of the chiefe of those which that treatise aboundeth with And will endeauour to make them as plaine as I can that the discerning of the demonstration which I conceiue is contained in them may not oblige you to labouring meditation and Metaphysicall abstractions in which no man can fly with a stronger wing then you when your leisure can allow you the time and quiett of minde that is necessary for such entertainements But may be obuious to you vpon such present reflection as the multitude of your present affaires can afford you My ayme and hope is to prooue this truth fully and euidently That is to say to make a firme demonstration of it against which no solide opposition can be produced to weaken it and by which a iuditious and subtile vnderstanding shall be fully appayed and quieted To know when that is done it will not be amisse before we enter into the substance of the question to consider in short the nature of a true demonstration that so we may be sure not to be deceiued by seeming proofes which how many or how plausible soeuer can but persuade opinion neuer force assurance Some there haue beene who haue thought that a multitude of reasons may haue the force to proue and conuince that which no one of them single can reach to do As particularly in our present case they produce for the soules immortality numerous testimonies of great men both such as haue beene eminent in naturall knowledge and such as are estimed for supernaturall illuminations and to these they adde their owne morall and naturall considerations for example that since it can not be doubted but that God is both wise and iust and consequently will reward or punish euery man according as he hath deserued or demerited and yet we see that such lottes do not alwayes betyde men in this life It followeth that there must be an other life after this here wherein men shall reape the haruest they haue sowne vpon the earth Againe That seing all creatures who haue soules do moue themselues and that no inanimate creature can do so It followeth that the soule is the vertue and principle by which an animal is mooued But if the soule can make an other thing mooue it selfe it cannot be doubted but that she hath in her selfe the power of mouing her owne selfe Now life consisting in a thing 's mouing it selfe it is cleare that what can do so hath within it selfe without the helpe of ought else a principle of liuing and consequently is not subiect to dying Afterall these and many more suche plausible arguments they conclude that howbeit neuer a one of them alone can be accounted a demonstration yet all of them in bulke haue the strength to conuince and quiett a rationall man I wil not here examine what force they may haue ouer the vnderstanding of a morall prudent person who in debates before him vseth to inquire no further then whether side is the more grauely and the more learnedly disputed But most certaine it is that if they come before a subtile Metaphysitian or a cunning Logitian they will fall mainely short Foâ—â— when such a one shall haue rigorously discussed each particular argument and shall haue found euery one of them to be deficient in some regard or other he will conclude that no more then many nothinges can euer be multiplyed so as to make somethings no otherwise can neuer so many apparent proofes which being but such are in truth no proofes euer arriue to constitute one reall proofe Others there are who fixing themselues vpon some one argument do not consider in it the materiall nature of it That is to say what connexion the medium on which they build their proofe hath with the effect or proposition that they conclude out of it but onely whither their argument be difficult to be solued or no As for example a person of great eminency and reputation for learning did vse to putt the following argument to proue that it was possible for Infinite to haue an actuall and reall being Namely There is no inconuenience that God almighty should produce att one instant as many Angels as he can produce in that instant Suppose then that he doth so Which if he do the multitude of them wil be greater then any determinate number whatsoeuer and consequently that multitude will be infinite Therefore an infinite multitude is not impossible This argument hath perplexed many great wits and learned men But if we looke strictly vpon it we may obserue how it it is not formed out of the notion of the subiect in question that is of infinite but out of the quality of God almighty and the Logicall notion of Possibility And so may be a hard argument but not a demonstration And will appeare to be a fallacy if one reflecteth that the notion of infinity may agree to a thing in potentia but not to a thing in Act And therefore it can not be supposed that God hath done or will do all that he can do According to which course if
in this question of the soules immortality they frame a subtile argument out of what is common to all formes or out of the nature common to all soules and withall discerne not how it may be vntyed They presently persuade themselues they haue demonstrated what they intended Nay though their discourse be drawne but out of the Logicall notions of contraries of antecedents and consequents or out of some parity betweene the subiect they treate of and some other they compare it to they â—â—traight flatter themselues with a conceit that they are arriued to science in that point Not considering that to know requireth that one be absolutly certaine that his proofe be a firme demonstration and not onely that it be such an implicated Gordian knotte as that neither he himselfe nor any others he hath yet mett with are able to vntie it but that truly and really of its owne nature it be impossible to be vntyed and solued And ordinarly they who ground their discourse vpon common and remote propositions as for example they who vse Lullies art do vnwarily slide ouer some vnsound steppe betweene the axiome they rely on and the conclusion they would inferre which they see not Whence it happeneth that such manner of arguing rather serueth for ostentation then to acquire true knowledge And as for such Logicall termes as we haue aboue mentioned it seldome happeneth but that they are lyable to some aequiuocation or other which quite enerueth the force of any proofe deriued from them Both these sortes of persons do erre in assenting too lightly to an apparent proofe and in taking that for a demonstration which in effect is none But a third sort there is who faile on the contrary side by conceiuing that a demonstration is neuer made as long as any thing can be vrged against the Conclusion prooued by it This ariseth from a great deficiency both of witt and of Iudgement Of iudgement because they are not able to discerne the euidence of a discourse in it selfe but are faine to looke into externall accidents to frame their opinion of it And of witt in that they obserue not how the force and subtility of mans witt is so great as to speake and that most ingeniously too in opposition of such thinges as are most manifest Zeno euen whiles he walked with him that he disputed with would be thought haue to demonstrated that it was impossible any thing could be moued in the world from one place to another Anaxagoras was as peremptory that snow was blacke We find ingenious Orations and whole bookes whose scopes are to extoll the greatest defects and blemishes of nature as baldnesse lamenesse blindnesse vnreasonablenesse and the like What can be more euident then that 2. and 2. do make 4 yet Aristotle telleth vs that 2. and 2. are are two distinct numbers and that 4. is but one number and consequently that 2. and 2. are not 4. And to conclude the Academikes or sceptikes haue laboured with much industry to take away all certainty He were a weake man that would retaine his assent from an euident conclusion as long as subtile or cauilling disputants do catch att ought to oppose against it But a iudicious person when he seeth a solide demonstration vpon any subiect is not att all shaken by any thorny difficulties that acute sophisters endeauour to implicate him in which though att the first sight they may a while perplexe him yet he is sure that with orderly reflection and due attention to euery ioint and progresse of their arguments they are to be vnfolded and displayed and the inconsequence of them to be made appeare THE SECOND CHAPTER Of the trew nature of demonstration THat then which importeth vs mainely not to erre in is in iduging when a perfect demonstration is produced The trew nature of such a proofe requireth that it make the reader or the hearer see euidently that the conclusion is directly so as the demonstrator auoucheth it to be and that it is impossible it should be otherwise Neither haue we reason to suspect that this can not be performed aswell in other sciences as in Geometry Seeing that there are definitions in all sciences as well as in it and that the termes of these definitions are linked together And therefore it is obuious that one conclusion maybe euidently and demonstratiuely drawne out of another This can not happen in a scientificall discourse vnlesse that which is taken to proone be either the cause or the effect of that which is proued But if there be any failure in either of these then the demonstration can not be a perfect one And though in substance it should not be deficient yet att the least it would be superproportioned on one side and not according to the strict rules of art which requireth that euery truth be proued by his proper cause As for example if Rationality of its owne nature and out of the force of Rationality be the cause of immortality It followeth euidently that whatsoeuer is Rationall is immortall And contrariwiâ—â—e if Immortality precisely by being such do make the subiect vnto which it belongeth to be Rationall It followheth that nothing can be immortall but it must also be Rationall So that if either of these be so he who considereth these two termes seeth clearely that of necessityâ—â— both of them must belong to what subiect soeuer he findeth either of them to reside in And why it is so and that it is impossible it should be otherwise But if a third thing or terme be cause of both or be the cause of the one and be caused by the other then the demonstration is mediate and as it were a double one As if immateriality be the adaequate cause both of rationality and of immortality it is euident that whatsoeuer is rationall is immortall But where the one side is superproportioned the proofe though in substance it be true yet is it not a proper and a perfect one As for example if one should proue any thing to belong to a man because he is a sensible creature the effect though it be in him yet is it not peculiar to him but common to all irrationall animals as well as to him Such were the considerations that I had when I composed the two treatises out of which I concluded the immortality of Mans soule For in them this is the scope of my discourse Corporeity and mortality are adaequate to one another the first as cause the second as effect But a Rationall soule is not corporeall Therefore not mortall The subsumption I made euident by shewing that all operations whatsoeuer among bodyes are performed by the disposure of grosse and subtile or of dense and rare partes and that what can not be effected by such is not the operation of a body For the nature of a body in as much as it is a body is nothing else but to be a thing capable of diuision or that hath a possibility of being made many which