likewise there is necessity in nature and reason that he that hath thus deserved it must unavoidably suffer it And on the other side we say no man by his innocency can deserve to be punished i. e. no man's innocency makes him by vertue of that obnoxious to punishment but yet we add that notwithstanding his innocency the circumstances may be such that he may be justly punished and in that sense deservedly So that the Question is strangely mistaken when it is thus put Whether an innocent person considered as such may be justly punished for no one asserts that or is bound to do it but the true question is whether a person notwithstanding his innocency may not by some act of his own will oblige himself to undergo that punishment which otherwise he did not deserve which punishment in that case is just and agreeable to reason And this is that which we assert and plead for So that innocency here is not considered any other ways than whether that alone makes it an unlawfull punishment which otherwise would be lawfull i. e. whether the Magistrate in such cases where substitution is admittable by the Laws of Nations as in the cases we are now upon be bound to regard any more than that the obligation to punishment now lies upon the person who by his own act hath substituted himself in the others room and if he proceeds upon this his action is justifiable and agreeable to reason If it be said that the substitution is unjust unless the substituted person hath before-hand deserved to be punished it is easily answered that this makes not the matter at all clearer for either the person is punished for the former fault and then there is no substitution or if he be punished by way of substitution then there is no regard at all had to his former fault and so it is all one as if he were perfectly innocent VI. And by this Crellius his answer to the instances both in Scripture and elsewhere concerning Childrens being punished for their Parents faults will appear to be insufficient viz. That God doth never punish them for their Parents faults beyond the desert of their own sins and therefore no argument can be drawn from thence that God may punish an innocent person for the sins of others because he hath punished some for what they were innocent For the force of the argument doth not lie in the supposition of their innocency as to the ground of punishment in general for we do not deny but that they may deserve to be punished for their own faults but the argument lies in this whether their own guilt were then considered as the reason of punishment when God did punish them for their fathers faults And whether they by their own sins did deserve to be punished not only with the punishment due to their own miscarriages but with the punishment due to their fathers too If not then some persons are justly punished who have not deserved that punishment they undergo if they did deserve it then one person may deserve to be punished for anothers sins If it be said as it is by Crellius that his own sins make him capable of punishment and God by occasion of others sins doth execute that punishment which he might not have done for his own I answer we are not enquiring into the bare capacity of punishing but into the reason of it was the reason of punishment his own or his fathers sins If his own then he was punished only for his own sins if his fathers then the punishment may be just which is inflicted without consideration of proper desert of it for no man say they can deserve to be punished but for his own sins But it 's said that the sins of Fathers are only an impulsive cause for God to punish the Children according to the desert of their own sins which he might otherwise have forborn to punish Then the sins of the Fathers are no reason why the Children should be punished but their own sins are the reason and their Fathers the bare occasion of being punished for them But in Scripture the reason of punishment is drawn from the Fathers sins and not from the Childrens For then the words would have run thus if the Children sin and deserve punishment by their own iniquities then I will take occasion from their Fathers sins to visit their own iniquities upon them Whereas the words referr to the Fathers sins as the reason of the Childrens punishment So in the words of the Law wherein the reason of punishment ought to be most expresly assigned it is not I will certainly punish the Children if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers but I will visit the sins of the Fathers upon the Children unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me If it were only because of imitation of the Fathers sins by the Children there could be no reason for the limitation to the third and fourth Generation for then the reason of punishment would be as long as the imitation continued whether to the fourth or tenth Generation And as Alphonsus à Castro observes If the reason of punishment were the imitation of their Fathers sins then the Children were not punished for their Fathers sins but for their own for that imitation was a sin of their own and not of their Fathers Besides if the proper reason of punishment were the sins of the Children and the Fathers sins only the occasion of it then where it is mentioned that Children are punished for their Parents sins the Childrens sins should have been particularly expressed as the proper cause of the punishment But no other reason is assigned in the Law but the sins of the Fathers no other cause mentioned of Canaan's punishment but his Father's sin nor of the punishment of the people in David's time but his own sin Lo I have sinned and I have done wickedly but these sheep what have they done Which is no hyperbolical expression but the assigning the proper cause of that judgment to have been his own sin as the whole Chapter declares Nor of the hanging up of Saul's sons by the Gibeonites but that Saul their Father had plotted their destruction And in an instance more remarkable than any of those which Crellius answers viz. the punishment of the people of Iudah for the sins of Manasses in the time of Iosias when a through Reformation was designed among them the Prince being very good and all the places of Idolatry destroyed such a Passover kept as had not been kept before in the time of any King in Israel yet it then follows Notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath wherewith his anger was kindled against Iudah because of all the provocations wherewith Manasses had provoked him withal Who can say here that the sins of Manasseh were only the occasion of God punishing the people in the time of
Iosias for their own sins when their sins were much less in the time of Iosias than in any time mentioned before after their lapse into Idolatry Nay it is expresly said That Iosiah took away all the abominations out of all the countries that pertained to the Children of Israel and made all that were present in Israel to serve even to serve the Lord their God And all his days they departed not from following the Lord God of their Fathers To say that thâ—s was done in hypocrisie and bare outward compliance is to speak without book and if the reason of so severe punishments had been their hypocrisie that ought to have been mentioned but not only here but afterwards it is said that the reason of God's destroying Iudah was for the sins of Manasseh viz. his Idolatries and Murther which it is said the Lord will not pardon And if he would not pardon then he did punish for those sins not barely as the occasion but as the meritorious cause of that punishment What shall we say then Did the people in Iosiah's time deserve to be punished for the sins of Manasseh Grandfather to Iosiah Or was God so highly provoked with those sins that although he did not punish Manasseh himself upon his repentance yet he would let the world see how much he abhâ—rred them by punishing those sins upon the people afterwards although according to the usual proportion of sins and punishments the sins of the people in that age did not exceed the sins of other ages as much as the punishments they suffered did exceed the punishments of other ages which is necessary according to Crellius his Doctrine for if God never punisheth by occasion of their Fathers sins the Children beyond the desert of their own sins then it is necessary that where judgments are remarkably greater the sins must be so too the contrary to which is plain in this instance By which we see that it is not contrary to the Justice of God in punishing to make the punishment of some on the account of others sins to exceed the desert of their own measuring that desert not in a way common to all sin but when the desert of some sins is compared with the desert of others For it is of this latter we speak of and of the method which God useth in punishing sin here for the demonstration of his hatred of it according to which the greatest punishments must suppose the greatest sins either of their own or others which they suffer for VII But hath not God declared That he will never punish the Children for the Fathers sins for the soul that sinneth it shall die the son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father c. To which I answer These words are to be considered as an answer to a complaint made by the Iews soon after their going into Captivity which they imputed to God's severity in punishing them for their Fathers sins Now the complaint was either true or false if it were true then though this was looked upon as great severity in God yet it was no injustice in him for though God may act severely he cannot act unjustly If it was false then the answer had been an absolute denial of it as a thing repugnant to the Justice of God Which we do not find here but that God saith unto them v. 3. Ye shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverb in Israel if the thing had been plainly unjust which they complained of he would have told them they never had occasion to use it But we find the Prophets telling them before-hand that they should suffer for their Fathers sins Ier. 15.3 4. where he threatens them with destruction and banishment because of the sins of Manasseh in Ierusalem and in the beginning of the captivity they complain of this Lam. 5.7 Our Fathers have sinned and are not and we have born their iniquities And Ier. 31.28 God saith by the Prophet that he had watched over them to pluck up and to pull down and to destroy and to afflict but that he would watch over them to build and to plant and in those days they shall say no more the Fathers have eaten sowre grapes and the Childrens teeth are set on edge but every one shall die for his own iniquity Which place is exactly parallel with this in Ezekiel and gives us a clear account of it which is that now indeed God had dealt very severely with them by making them suffer beyond what in the ordinary course of his providence their sins had deserved but he punished them not only for their own sins but the sins of their Fathers But lest they should think they should be utterly consumed for their iniquities and be no longer a people enjoying the Land which God had promised them he tells them by the Prophets though they had smarted so much by reason of their Fathers sins this severity should not always continue upon them but that God would visit them with his kindness again and would plant them in their own Land then they should see no reason to continue this Proverb among them for they would then find Though their Fathers had eaten sowre grapes their teeth should not be always set on edge with it And if we observe it the occasion of the Proverb was concerning the Land of Israel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 supra terra Israel as the Chaldee Paraphrast renders it more agreeable to the Hebrew than the other Versions do So that the Land of Israel was the occasion of the Proverb by their being banished out of it for their Fathers sins Now God tells them they should have no more occasion to use this Proverb concerning the Land of Israel for they notwithstanding their Fathers sins should return into their own Land And even during the continuance of their captivity they should not undergo such great severities for the future but they should find their condition much more tolerable than they imagined only if any were guilty of greater sins than others they should themselves suffer for their own faults but he would not punish the whole Nation for them or their own Posterity This I take to be the genuine meaning of this place and I the rather embrace it because I find such insuperable difficulties in other interpretations that are given of it For to say as our Adversaries do That what God saith should not be for the future was repugnant to his nature and justice ever to do is to charge God plainly with injustice in what he had done For the Prophets told them they should suffer for the sins of their Fathers Which sufferings were the ground of their complaint now and the answer here given must relate to the occasion of the complaint for God saith They should not have occasion to use that Proverb Wherein is implyed they should not have the same reason to complain which they had then I demand then
use of the Concession of Crellius That God hath prefixed some ends to himself in the Government of mankind which being supposed it is necessary that impenitent sinners should be punished What these ends of God are he before tells us when he enquires into the ends of Divine punishments which he makes to be security for the future by mens avoiding sins and a kind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or pleasure which God takes in the destruction of his implacable enemies and the asserting and vindicating his own right by punishing and shewing men thereby with what care and fear they ought to serve him and so attains the ends of punishment proposed by Lactantius and manifestation of the Divine Honour and Majesty which hath been violated by the sins of men All these we accept of with this caution That the delight which God takes in the punishing his implacable enemies be not understood of any pleasure in their misery as such by way of meer revenge but as it tends to the vindication of his Right and Honour and Majesty which is an end suitable to the Divine Nature but the other cannot in it self have the notion of an end for an end doth suppose something desirable for it self which surely the miseries of others cannot have to us much less to the Divine Nature And that place which Crellius insists on to prove the contrary Deut. 28.63 The Lord will rejoyce over you to destroy you imports no more than the satisfaction God takes in the execution of his Justice when it makes most for his honour as certainly it doth in the punishment of his greatest enemies And this is to be understood in a sense agreeable to those other places where God is said not to delight in the death of sinners which doth not as Crellius would have it meerly express God's benignity and mercy but such an agreeableness of the exercise of those attributes to God's nature that he neither doth nor can delight in the miseries of his creatures in themselves but as they are subservient to the ends of his Government and yet such is his kindness in that respect too that he useth all means agreeable thereto to make them avoid being miserable to advance his own glory And I cannot but wonder that Grotius who had asserted the contrary in his Book of Satisfaction should in his Books De Iure belli ac pacis assert That when God punisheth wicked men he doth it for no other end but that he might punish them For which he makes use of no other arguments than those which Crellius had objected against him viz. The delight God takes in punishing and the judgments of the life to come when no amendment can be expected the former hath been already answered the latter is objected by Crellius against him when he makes the ends of punishment merely to respect the community which cannot be asserted of the punishments of another Life which must chiefly respect the vindication of God's glory in the punishment of unreclaimable sinners And this we do not deny to be a just punishment since our Adversaries themselves as well as we make it necessary But we are not to understand that the end of Divine punishments doth so respect the community as though God himself were to be excluded out of it for we are so to understand it as made up of God as the Governour and mankind as the persons governed whatever then tends to the vindication of the rights of God's Honour and Sovereignty tends to the good of the whole because the manifestation of that end is so great an end of the whole XII But withal though we assert in the life to come the ends of punishment not to be the reclaiming of sinners who had never undergone them unless they had been unreclaimable yet a vast difference must be made between the ends of punishments in that and in this present state For the other is the Reserve when nothing else will do and therefore was not primarily intended but the proper ends of punishment as a part of Government are to be taken from the design of them in this life And here we assert that God's end in punishing is the advancing his Honour not by the meer miseries of his creatures but that men by beholding his severity against sin should break off the practice of it that they may escape the punishments of the future state So that the ends of punishment here are quite of another kind from those of another life for those are inflicted because persons have been unreclaimable by either the mercies or punishments of this life but these are intended that men should so far take notice of this severity of God as to avoid the sins which will expose them to the wrath to come And from hence it follows That whatsoever sufferings do answer all these ends of Divine punishments and are inflicted on the account of sin have the proper notion of punishments in them and God may accept of the undergoing them as a full satisfaction to his Law if they be such as tend to break men off from sin and assert God's right and vindicate his Honour to the world which are the ends assigned by Crellius and will be of great consequence to us in the following Discourse CHAP. II. I. The particular state of the Controversie concerning the sufferings of Christ. The Concessions of our Adversaries II. The debate reduced to two heads The first concerning Christâ—s sufferings being a punishment for sin entred upon In what sense Crellius acknowledgeth the sins of men to have been the impulsive cause of the death of Christ. III. The sufferings of Christ proved to be a punishment from Scripture The importance of the phrase of bearing sins IV. Of the Scape-Goats bearing the sins of the people into the Wilderness V. Grotius his sense of 1 Pet. 2.24 vindicated against Crellius and himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 never used for the taking away a thing by the destruction of it VI. Crellius his sense examined VII Isa. 53.11 vindicated The argument from Matt. 8.17 answered Grotius constant to himself in his notes on that place VIII Isa. 53.5 6 7. cleared IX Whether Christ's death be a proper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whether that doth imply that it was a punishment of sin How far the punishments of Children for their Fathers faults are exemplary among men The distinction of calamities and punishments holds not here X. That God's hatred of sin could not be seen in the sufferings of Christ unless they were a punishment of sin proved against Crellius XI Grotius his Arguments from Christ being made sin and a curse for us defended The liberty our Adversaries take in changing the sense of Words XII The particles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being joyned to sins and relating to sufferings do imply those sufferings to be a punishment for sin According to their way of interpreting Scripture it had been impossible for our doctrine to
have something of Vindicta in it and therefore be a proper punishment The truth is our Adversaries allow themselves in speaking things most repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of punishments that they may justifie their own hypothesis For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the greatest blessings were ever promised them and instead of enjoying them to endure the miseries and hardships of forty years travels in a barren wilderness must not be thought a punishment and only because occasioned by their Parents sins But whatever is inflicted on the account of sin and with a design to shew God's severity against it and thereby to deter others from the practice of it hath the proper notion of punishment in it and all these things did concurr in this instance besides the general sense of mankind in the matter of their punishment which was such that supposing them preserved in their liberty could not have been imagined greater And therefore Vatablus whom Socinus and Crellius highly commend thus renders those words dabunt poenas pro fornicationibus vestris quibus defecistis à Deo vestro they shall suffer the punishment of your fornications And that bearing the sins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the punishment of them methinks they should not so earnestly deny who contend that to be the meaning of the words in Ezekiel The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father viz. that he shall not bear the punishment of his Fathers sins Where in bearing iniquity with a respect to their Parents sins by their own confession must be taken for the proper punishment for otherwise they do not deny but Children notwithstanding that sentence may undergo much affliction on the occasion of their Parents sins IV. But Socinus further objects that bearing sins doth not imply the punishment of them because the Scape-Goat under the Law is said to bear upon him the iniquities of the people and yet could not be said to be punished for them To which Grotius answers that Socinus takes it for granted without reason that the Scape-Goat could not be said to be punished for the sins of the people for punishment in general may fall upon beasts for the sins of men Gen. 9.5 Exod. 21.28 Lev. 20.15 Gen. 8.21 and Socinus hath no cause to say that the Scape-Goat was not slain for the Iewish Interpreters do all agree that he was and however the sending him into the Wilderness was intended as a punishment and most probably by an unnatural death To which Crellius replies That in the general he denies not but punishment may fall upon beasts as well as men but that he might shew himself true to his principle that one cannot be punished for anothers faults he falls into a very pleasant discourse That the Beasts are not said to be punished for mens sins but for their own and therefore when it is said before the flood that all flesh had corrupted his way he will by no means have it understood only of men but that the sins of the beasts at that time were greater than ordinary as well as mens But he hath not told us what they were whether by eating some forbidden herbs or entring into conspiracies against mankind their lawful Sovereigns or unlawful mixtures and therefore we have yet reason to believe that when God saith the ground was cursed for man's sake that the beasts were punished for mans sin And if all flesh must comprehend beasts in this place why shall not all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord take in the beasts there too for Vatablus parallels this place with the other But if saith Crellius any shall contend that some beasts at least were innocent then he saith that those though they were destroyed by the flood yet did not suffer punishment but only a calamity by occasion of the sins of men I wonder he did not rather say that the innocent beasts were taken into the Ark for the propagation of a better kind afterwards But by this solemn distinction of calamities and punishments there is nothing so miserable that either men or beasts can undergo but when it serves their turn it shall be only a calamity and no punishment though it be said to be on purpose to shew God's severity against the sins of the world And this excellent notion of the beasts being punished for their own sins is improved by him to the vindication of the Scape-Goat from being punished because then saith he the most wicked and corrupt Goat should have been made choice of As though all the design of that great day of expiation had been only to call the Children of Israel together with great solemnity to let them see how a poor Goat must be punished for breaking the Laws which we do not know were ever made for them I had thought our Adversaries had maintained that the Sacrifices on the day of expiation at least had represented and typified the Sacrifice which was to be offered up by Christ and so Socinus and Crellius elsewhere contend he needed not therefore have troubled himself concerning the sins of the Goat when it is expresly said That the sins of the people were put on the head of the Goat Whatever then the punishment were it was on the account of the sins of the people and not his own But Crellius urgeth against Grotius that if the Scape-Goat had been punished for the expiation of the sins of the people that should have been particularly expressed in Scripiure whereas nothing is said there at all of it and that the throwing down the Scape-Goat from the top of the rock was no part of the Primitive Institution but one of the superstitions taken up by the Iews in after-times because of the Ominousness of the return of it and although we should suppose which is not probable that it should die by famine in the Wilderness yet this was not the death for expiation which was to be by the shedding of blood To this therefore I answer 1. I do not insist on the customs of the later Jews to prove from thence any punishment designed by the primitive institution For I shall easily yield that many superstitions obtained among them aftewards about the Scape-Goat as the stories of the red list turning white upon the head of it the booths and the causey made on purpose and several other things mentioned in the Rabbinical Writers do manifest But yet it seems very probable from the Text it self that the Scape-Goat was not carried into the Wilderness at large but to a steep mountain there For although we have commonly render'd Azazel by the Scape-Goat yet according to the best of the Jewish writers as P. Fagius tells us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth not come from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Goat and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abiit but is the name of a Mountain very steep and rocky near Mount Sinai and therefore
Do not these words imply That God would not do for the future with them what he had done before if not the proper answer had been a plain denial and not a promise for the future he would not if they do then either God properly punished them for the sins of their Fathers and then God must be unjust in doing so or it was just with God to do it and so this place instead of overthrowing will prove that some may be justly punished beyond the desert of their own sins or else God did only take occasion by their Fathers sins to punish them according to the desert of their own iniquities But then they had no cause to complain that they were punished for any more than their own iniquities and withal then God doth oblige himself by his promise here never to punish men for the future by the occasion of others sins which is not only contrary to their own Doctrine but to what is plainly seen afterwards in the punishment of the Iews for their Fathers sins mentioned by our Saviour after this And if this be a certain rule of equity which God here saith that he would never vary from then the punishing of some on the occasion of others sins would be as unjust as our Adversaries suppose the punishing any beyond the desert of their own sins to be But is it not implyed that Gods ways would be unequal if he ever did otherwise than he there said he would do No it is not if by equal he meant just for his ways never were or can be so unequal but here if it be taken with a respect to the main dispute of the Chapter no more is implied in them but that they judged amiss concerning God's actions and that they were just when they thought them not to be so or if at least they thought his ways very severe though just God by remitting of this severity would shew that he was not only just but kind and so they would find his ways equal that is always agreeable to themselves and ending in kindness to them though they hitherto were so severe towards them in their banishment and captivity Or if they be taken with a respect to the immediate occasion of them both Ezek. 18. 33. They do not relate to this dispute about Childrens suffering for their Fathers sins but to another which was concerning a righteous mans sinning and dying in his sins and a wicked mans repenting and living in his righteousness which were directly contrary to the common opinion of the Iews to this day which is that God will judge men according to the greatest number of their actions good or bad as appears by Maimonides and others Now they thought it a very hard case for a man who had been righteous the far greatest part of his time if he did at last commit iniquity that his former righteousness should signifie nothing but he must die in his iniquity To this therefore God answers that it was only the inequality of their own ways which made them think God's ways in doing so unequal This then doth not make it unequal for God either to punish men upon the occasion or by the desert of other mens sins supposing such a conjunction between them as there is in the same body of people to those who went before them And Crellius himself grants That Socinus never intended to prove that one mans suffering for anothers sins was unjust in it self from this place no not though we take it in the strictest sense for one suffering in the stead of another VIII Having thus far declared how far it is agreeable to God's Justice to punish any persons either by reason of his dominion or the conjunction of persons for the sins of others and consequently whether any punishment may be undergone justly beyond the proper desert of their own sins I now return to the consent of Mankind in it on supposition either of a near conjunction or a valid consent which must make up the want of dominion in men without it And the question still proceeds upon the supposition of those things that there be a proper dominion in men over that which they part with for others sakes and that they do it by their free consent and then we justifie it not to be repugnant to the principles of Reason and Justice for any to suffer beyond the desert of their own actions And Crellius his saying that such a punishment is true punishment but not just is no answer at all to the consent of Nations that it is so And therefore finding this answer insufficient he relies upon another viz. That it was never received by the consent of Nations that one man should suffer in the stead of another so as the guilty should be freed by the others suffering For he saith neither Socinus nor he do deny that one man may be punished for anothers sins but that which they deny is that ever the innocent were punished so as the guilty were freed by it and so he answers in the case of Hostages and Sureties their punishment did never excuse the offenders themselves And to this purpose he saith Socinus his argument doth hold good that tho' one mans money may become anothers yet one mans sufferings cannot become anothers For saith he if it could then it would be all one who suffered as it is who pays the money due And then the offender must be presently released as the Debtor is upon payment of the debt This is the substance of what is said by him upon this Argument To which I reply 1. That this gives up the matter in dispute at present between us for the present question is Whether it be unjust for any one to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions Yes saith Crellius it is in case he suffers so as that the guilty be freed by his sufferings But we are not enquiring Whether it be just for another person to be freed for a mans suffering for him but whether it be just for that man to suffer by his own consent more than his own actions without that consent deserved The release of another person by vertue of his sufferings is a matter of another consideration Doth the freeing or not freeing of another by suffering add any thing to the desert of suffering He that being wholly innocent and doth suffer on the account of anothers fault doth he not suffer as undeservedly though another be not freed as if he were As in the case of Hostages or Sureties doth it make them at all the more guilty because the persons they are concerned for will be punished notwithstanding if they come under the power of those who exacted the punishment upon them who suffered for them Nay is not their desert of punishment so much the less in as much as the guilty are still bound to answer for their own offences If we could suppose the guilty to be freed by
meant meritorious or such upon supposition of which he ought to die for elsewhere he makes Christ to die for the cause or by the occasion of our sins which is the same that Crellius means by an impulsive or procatartick cause Which he thus explains we are now to suppose a decree of God not only to give salvation to Mankind but to give us a firm hope of it in this present state now our sins by deserving eternal punishment do hinder the effect of that decree upon us and therefore they were an impulsive cause of the death of Christ by which it was effected that this decree should obtain notwithstanding our sins But we are not to understand as tho' this were done by any expiation of the guilt of sin by the death of Christ but this effect is hindred by three things by taking away their sins by assuring men that their former sins and present infirmities upon their sincere obedience shall not be imputed to them and that the effect of that decree shall obtain all which saith he is effected morte Christi interveniente the death of Christ intervening but not as the procuring cause So that after all these words he means no more by making our sins an impulsive cause of the death of Christ but that the death of Christ was an argument to confirm to us the truth of his Doctrine which doctrine of his doth give us assurance of these things and that our sins when they are said to be the impulsive cause are not to be considered with a respect to their guilt but to that distrust of God which our sins do raise in us which distrust is in truth according to this sense of Crellius the impulsive cause and not the sins which were the cause or occasion of it For that was it which the doctrine was designed to remove and our sins only as the caâ—â—es of that But if it be said that he speaks not only of the distrust but of the punishment of sin as an impediment which must be removed too and therefore may be called an impulsive cause we are to consider that the removal of this is not attributed to the death of Christ but to the leaving of our sins by the belief of his Doctrine therefore the punishment of our sins cannot unless in a very remote sense be said to be an impulsive cause of that which for all that we can observe by Crellius might as well have been done without it if â—ny other way could be thought suffiâ—â—ent to confirm his Doctrine and Christ without dying might have had power to save all them that obey him But we understand not an impulsive cause in so remote a sense as though our sins were a meer occasion of Christs dying because the death of Christ was one argument among many others to believe his Doctrine the belief of which would make men leave their sins but we contend for a nearer and more proper sense viz. that the death of Christ was primarily intended for the expiation of our sins with a respect to God and not to us and therefore our sins as an impulsive cause are to be considered as they are so displeasing to God that it was necessary for the Vindication of God's Honour and the deterring the world from sin that no less a Sacrifice of Atonement should be offered than the blood of the Son of God So that we understand an impulsive cause here in the sense that the sins of the people were under the Law the cause of the offering up those Sacrifices which were appointed for the expiation of them And as in those Sacrifices there were two things to be considered viz. the mactation and the oblation of them the former as a punishment by a substitution of them in place of the persons who had offended the latter as the proper Sacrifice of Atonement although the mactation it self considered with the design of it was a Sacrificial act too So we consider the sufferings of Christ with a two-fold respect either as to our sins as the impulsive cause of them so they are to be considered as a punishment or as to God with a design to expiate the guilt of them so they are a Sacrifice of Atonement The first consideration is that we are now upon and upon which the present debate depends for if the sufferings of Christ be to be taken under the notion of punishment then our Adversaries grant that our sins must be an impulsive cause of them in another sense than they understand it For the clearing of this I shall prove these two things 1. That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of Scripture which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to sin but this 2. That this Account of the sufferings of Christ is no ways repugnant to the Iustice of God III. That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of Scripture which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to our sins but that they are to be considered as a punishment for them Such are those which speak of Christ bearing our sins of our iniquities being laid upon him of his making himself an offering for sin and being made sin and a curse for us and of his dying for our sins All which I shall so far consider as to vindicate them from all the exceptions which Socinus and Crellius have offered against them 1. Those which speak of Christ's bearing our sins As to which we shall consider First The importance of the phrase in general of bearing sin and then the circumstances of the particular places in dispute For the importance of the phrase Socinus acknowledges that it generally signifies bearing the punishment of sin in Scripture but that sometimes it signifies taking away The same is confessed by Crellius but he saith it doth not always signifie bearing proper punishment but it is enough says he that one bears something burdensome on the occasion of others sins and so Christ by undergoing his sufferings by occasion of sins may be said to bear our sins And for this sense he quotes Numb 14.33 And your Children shall wander in the Wilderness forty years and bear your whoredoms until your carcasses be wasted in the Wilderness Whereby saith he it is not meant that God would punish the Children of the Israelites but that by the occasion of their parents sins they should undergo that trouble in wandring in the Wilderness and being deprived of the possession of the promised Land But could Crellius think that any thing else could have been imagined setting aside a total destruction a greater instance of God's severity than that was to the Children of Israel all their circumstances being considered Is it not said that God did swear in his wrath they should not enter into his rest Surely then the debarring them so long of that rest was an instance of God's wrath and so according to his own principles must
probably called by the later Jews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name of a Rock and to this purpose it is observable that where we render it and let him go for a Scape-Goat into the Wilderness in the Hebrew it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to send him to Azazel in the Wilderness as the joyning the preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth import and the Arabick Version wherever Azazel is mentioned renders it by Mount Azaz and the Chaldee and Syriack to Azazel so that from hence a carrying the Scape-Goat to a certain place may be inferred but I see no foundation in the Text for the throwing it down from the rock when it was there and therefore I cannot think but that if the punishment intended did lie in that it would have been expresly mentioned in the solemnities of that day which had so great an influence on the expiation of the sins of the people 2. I answer that the Scape-Goat was to denote rather the effect of the expiation than the manner of obtaining it For the proper expiation was by the shedding ef blood as the Apostle tells us and thence the live Goat was not to have the sins of the people to bear away into the desart till the High-Priest had made an end of reconciling the Holy Place and the Tabernacle of the Congregation and the Altar and by the sprinkling of the blood of the other Goat which was the sin-offering for the people which being done he was to bring the live Goat and to lay his hands upon the head of it and confess over it all the iniquities of the Children of Israel and all their transgressions in all their sins putting them upon the head of the Goat and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the Wilderness and so the Goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited and he shall let go the Goat in the Wilderness So that the former Goat noted the way of expiation by the shedding of blood and the latter the effect of it viz. that the sins of the people were declared to be expiated by the sending the Goat charged with their sins into a desart place and that their sins would not appear in the presence of God against them any more than they expected that the Goat which was sent into the Wilderness should return among them Which was the reason that afterwards they took so much care that it should not by causing it to be thrown off from a steep rock which was no sooner done but notice was given of it very suddenly by the sounding of horns all over the Land But the force of Socinus his argument from the Scape-Goat's bearing the sins of the people that therefore that phrase doth not always imply the bearing of punishment is taken off by Crellius himself who tells us that the Scape-Goat is not said to bear the sins of the people in the Wilderness but only that it carried the sins of the people into the Wilderness which is a phrase of another importance from that we are now discoursing of As will now further appear from the places where it is spoken of concerning our Saviour which we now come particularly to examine V. The first place insisted on by Grotius with a respect to Christ is 1 Pet. 2.24 Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree which saith Crellius is so far from proving that Christ did bear the punishment of our sins that it doth not imply any sufferings that he underwent on the occasion of them He grants that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth signifie to carry up but withall he saith it signifies to take away because that which is taken up is taken away from the place where it was Besides he observes that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth answer to the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath made to ascend which is frequently rendred by it in the LXX and sometime by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but that Hebrew word doth often signifie to take away where it is rendred in the Greek by one of those two words 2 Sam. 21.13 Iosh. 24.32 Psal. 102.25 Ezra 1.11 To which I answer 1. That the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in this place must not be taken from every sense the word is ever used for but in that which the words out of which these are taken do imply and in Isa. 53.11 it doth not answer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word which by the confession of all is never properly used for taking away but for bearing of a burden and is used with a respect to the punishment of sin Lament 5.7 Our fathers have sinned and are not and we have born their iniquities where the same word is used so that the signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here must depend upon that in Isaiah of which more afterward 2. Granting that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth answer sometimes to the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet it makes nothing to Crellius his purpose unless he can prove that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth ever signifie the taking away a thing by the destruction of it for where it answers to that word it is either for the offering up of a Sacrifice in which sense 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is very frequently used as is confessed by Crellius and in that sense it is no prejudice at all to our cause for then it must be granted that Christ upon the Cross is to be considered as a sacrifice for the sins of men and so our sins were laid upon him as they were supposed to be on the Sacrifices under the Law in order to the expiation of them by the shedding their blood and if our Adversaries would acknowledge this the difference would not be so great between us or else it is used for the removal of a thing from one place to another the thing it self still remaining in being as 2 Sam. 21.13 And he made Saul's bones to ascend 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he took them away saith Crellius true but it is such a taking away as is a bare removal the thing still remaining the same is to be said of Ioseph's bones Iosh. 24.32 which are all the places where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used and although 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be sometimes taken in another sense as Psal. 102.25 yet nothing can be more unreasonable than such a way of arguing as this is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Crellius signifies taking away we demand his proof of it is it that the word signifies so much of it self No that he grants it doth not Is it that it is frequently used in the Greek Version to render a word that properly doth signifie so No nor that neither But how is it then Crellius tells us that it sometimes answers to a word that signifies to make to
Law and Gospel together that St Paul doth not mean as Crellius would have it that Christ by his death did confirm the New Covenant and so take away the obligation of the Law for to what end was the curse mentioned for that What did the accursedness of his death add to the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine and when was ever the curse taken for the continuance of the Law of Moses but that Christ by the efficacy of his death as a punishment for sin hath redeemed all that believe and obey him from the curse deserved by their sins whether inforced by the Law of Moses or the Law written in their hearts which tells the consciences of sinners that such who violate the Laws of God are worthy of death and therefore under the curse of the Law XII We come now to the force of the particles which being joyned with our sins as referring to the death of Christ do imply that his death is to be considered as a punishment of sin Not that we insist on the force of those particles 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as though of themselves they did imply this for we know they are of various significations according to the nature of the matter they are joyned with but that these being joyned with sins and suffering together do signifie that those sufferings are the punishment of those sins Thus it is said of Christ that he dyed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for our sins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he suffered once 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he gave himself 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he offered a Sacrifice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To which Crellius replies That if the force of these particles not being joyned with sufferings may be taken for the final and not for the impulsive cause they may retain the same sense when joyned with sufferings if those sufferings may be designed in order to an end but if it should be granted that those phrases being joyned with sufferings do always imply a meritorious cause yet it doth not follow it should be here so understood because the matter will not bear it To this a short answer will at present serve for It is not possible a meritorious cause can be expressed more emphatically than by these words being joyned to sufferings so that we have as clear a testimony from these expressions as words can give and by the same arts by which these may be avoided any other might so that it had not been possible for our Doctrine to have been expressed in such a manner but such kind of answers might have been given as our Adversaries now give If it had been said in the plainest terms that Christ's death was a punishment for our sins they would as easily have avoided the force of them as they do of these they would have told us the Apostles delighted in an Antanaclasis and had expressed things different from the natural use of the words by them and though punishment were sometimes used properly yet here it must be used only metaphorically because the matter would bear no other sense And therefore I commend the ingenuity of Socinus after all the pains he had taken to enervate the force of those places which are brought against his Doctrine he tells us plainly That if our Doctrine were not only once but frequently mentioned in Scripture yet he would not therefore believe the thing to be so as we suppose For saith he seeing the thing it self cannot be I take the least inconvenient interpretation of the words and draw forth such a sense from them as is most consistent with itself and the tenor of the Scripture But for all his talking of the tenor of the Scripture by the same reason he interprets one place upon these terms he will do many and so the tenor of the Scripture shall be never against him and by this we find that the main strength of our Adversaries is not pretended to lie in the Scriptures all the care they have of them is only to reconcile them if possible with their hypothesis for they do not deny but that the natural force of the words doth imply what we contend for but because they say the Doctrine we assert is inconsistent with reason therefore all their design is to find out any other possible meaning which they therefore assert to be true because more agreeable to the common reason of mankind This therefore is enough for our present purpose that if it had been the design of Scripture to have expressed our sense it could not have done it in plainer expressions than it hath done that no expressions could have been used but the same arts of our Adversaries might have been used to take off their force which they have used to those we now urge against them and that setting aside the possibility of the thing the Scripture doth very fairly deliver the Doctrine we contend for or supposing in point of reason there may be arguments enough to make it appear possible there are Scriptures enough to make it appear true CHAP. III. I. The words of Scripture being at last acknowledged by our Adversaries to make for us the only pretence remaining is that our Doctrine is repugnant to reason The debate managed upon point of reason The grand difficulty enquired into and manifested by our Adversaries concessions not to lie in the greatness of Christ's sufferings or that our sins were the impulsive cause of them or that it is impossible that one should be punished for anothers faults or in all cases unjust II. The cases wherein Crellius allows it instanced From whence it is proved that he yields the main cause III. The arguments propounded whereby he attempts to prove it unjust for Christ to be punished for our sins Crellius his principles of the justice of punishments examined Of the relation between desert and punishment IV. That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions V. An answer to Crellius his Objections What it is to suffer undeservedly Crellius his mistake in the state of the question VI. The instances of Scripture considered In what sense Children are punished for their Parents sins VII Ezek. 18.20 explained at large VIII Whether the guilty being freed from the sufferings of an innocent person makes that punishment unjust or no Crellius his shifts and evasions in this matter discovered Why among men the offenders are not freed in criminal matters though the sureties be punished The release of the party depends on the terms of the sureties suffering therefore deliverance not ipso facto No necessity of such a translation in criminal as is in pecuniary matters I. HAving gained so considerable concessions from our Adversaries concerning the places of Scripture we come now to debate the matter in point of reason And if there appear to be nothing repugnant in the nature of the thing or
actions For which purpose Grotius objected against Socinus who appealed to the consent of Nations about one being punished for anothers fault That the Heathens did agree that Children might be punished for their Parents faults and People for their Princes and that corporal punishment might be born by one for another did appear by the Persians punishing the whole family for the fault of one The Macedonians the near kindred in the case of Treason some Cities of Greece destroying the Children of Tyrants together with them in all which the mere conjunction was supposed a sufficient reason without consent but in case of consent he saith They all agreed in the Justice of some being punished for the faults of others Thence the right of killing hostages among the most civilized nations and of sureties being punished in capital matters if the guilty appear not who were thence called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who were bound to answer body for body In which cases the punishment did extend beyond the desert of the person who suffered it for no other reason is assigned of these sufferings besides the conjunction of the person or his consent but no antecedent guilt is supposed as necessary to make the punishment just We are now to consider what Crellius doth answer to this 1. As to their acknowledgments of God's punishing Children for their Parents faults he gives the same answer which he doth to the examples recorded in Scripture to that purpose That either they were punished for the sins of others but their own sins deserved the punishment or that the Parents were punished in the Children but the Children were not properly punished 2. As to punishments among men he answers two things 1. That such persons were truly punished but not justly for he acknowledges That in such a case it is a proper punishment and that it is enough in order to that that any fault be charged upon a person whether his own or anothers whether true or false on the account of which he is supposed worthy to be punished And that such a conjunction is sufficient for cruel angry or imprudent men for where-ever there is a place saith he for anger there is likewise for punishment So that he confesseth there may be a true punishment and that which answers all the reason and ends of punishment assigned by him where there is no desert at all of it in the person who undergoes it But then he adds that this is an unjust punishment to which I reply That then the reason of punishment assigned by Crellius before is insufficient for if this answers all the ends of punishments assigned by him and yet be unjust then it necessarily follows that those ends of punishment are consistent with the greatest injustice For he before made punishment to have a natural respect to anger and makes the ordinary end of punishment to be a satisfaction of the desire of revenge in men yet now grants that these may be in an unjust punishment Neither can it be said that he considered punishment only naturally and not morally for he tells us that this is the nature of divine punishments which are therefore just because designed for these ends but in case there be no supposal of a fault at all then he denies that it is a punishment but only an affliction and an exercise of dominion So that according to him where-ever there is a proper punishment it must be just when ever God doth punish men and the only difference between God and man supposable in this case is that we have assurance God will never use his dominion unjustly but that men do so when they make one to suffer for anothers fault notwithstanding a consent and conjunction between the man that committed the fault and the person that suffers for him But this is begging the thing in question for we are debating whether it be an unlawful exercise of power or no for we have this presumption that it is not unlawful because it may answer all the ends of punishments and what way can we better judge whether a punishment be just or no than by that V. But we are to consider that we do not here take the person we speak of abstractly as an innocent person for then there is no question but anger and punishment of one as such is unjust but of an innocent person as supposed under an obligation by his own consent to suffer for another And in this case we assert since according to Crellius the natural and proper ends of punishments may be obtained and the consent of the person takes away the wrong done to him in the matter of his sufferings so far as he hath power over himself that such a punishment is not unjust For if it be it must suppose some injury to be done but in this case let them assign where the injury lies it cannot be to the publick if the ends of punishments may be obtained by such a suffering of one for another by a valid consent of the suffering party it cannot be to the person in whose room the other suffers for what injury is that to escape punishment by anothers suffering it cannot be to the suffering person supposing that to be true which the Heathens still supposed viz. that every man had a power over his own life If it be said still that the injustice lies in this that such a one suffers undeservedly and therefore unjustly I answer if be meant by undeservedly without sufficient cause or reason of punishment then we deny that such a one doth suffer undeservedly Immerito in the Greek Glosses is rendred by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Merito by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and in Cicero jure merito are most commonly joyned together So that where there is a right to punish and sufficient reason for it such a one doth not suffer immerito i. e. undeservedly If it be said that such a one is not dignus poena that implies no more than the other for dignus or as the Ancients writ it dicnus comes from the Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 jus as Vossius tells us ut dignus sit cui tribui aliquid aequum est so that where there is an equity in the thing there is a dignity in the person or he may be said to be worthy to undergo it But doth not this lay open the greatest innocency to as great a desert of sufferings as the highest guilt By no means For we make a lyableness to punishment the natural consequent of guilt and he that hath committed a fault cannot but deserve to be punished so that no sufferings of others can take away the natural consequence of a bad action which is a desert of punishment So that as we say a wicked action cannot but deserve to be punished i. e. there is an agreeableness in reason and nature that he who hath done ill should suffer ill so we say