Selected quad for the lemma: sense_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
sense_n	wont_a	word_n	write_v	26	3	4.9588	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A42813	Essays on several important subjects in philosophy and religion by Joseph Glanvill ...	Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680.	1676 (1676)	Wing G809; ESTC R22979	236,661	346

their impressions therefore the Fallacies and Deceits are imputed to their misinformations This I premise to prevent a Philosophical mistake but shall retain the common way of speaking and call those the errors of the Senses That these very frequently misreport things to us we are assured even from themselves a straight stick seems crooked in the Water and a square Towre round at a distance All things are Yellow to those that have the Jaundice and all Meats are bitter to the disaffected Palate To which vulgar Instances it will presently be answer'd that the Senses in those cases are not in their just circumstances but want the fit medium due distance and sound disposition which we know very well and learn there was somewhat amiss because our Senses represent those things otherwise at othertimes we see the stick is straight when it is out of the Water and the Tower is square when we are near it Objects have other Colours and Meats other tastes when the Body and its Senses are in their usual temper In such cases Sense rectifies its own mistakes and many times one the errors of another but if it did not do so we should have been alwayes deceived even in those Instances and there is no doubt but that there are many other like deceptions in which we have no contrary evidence from them to disabuse us not in the matters of common Life but in things of remoter speculation which this state seems not to be made for The Senses must have their due medium and distance and temper if any of these are amiss they represent their Objects otherwise to us than they are Now these we may suppose they generally have in the necessary matters of Life if not to report things to us as they are in themselves yet to give them us so as may be for our accommodation and advantage But how are we assur'd that they are thus rightly disposed in reference to things of Speculative Knowledg What medium what distance what temper is necessary to convey Objects to us just so as they are in the realities of Nature I observ'd before that our Senses are short imperfect and uncommensurate to the vastness and profundity of things and therefore cannot receive the just Images of them and yet we judg all things according to those confused and imperfect Idaeas which must needs lead us into infinite errors and mistakes If I would play the Sceptick here I might add That no one can be sure that any Objects appear in the same manner to the Senses of other men as they do to his Yea it may seem probable that they do not For though the Images Motions or whatever else is the cause of Sence may be alike as from them yet the representations may be much varied according to the nature and quality of the recipient we find things look otherwise to us through an Optick Tube then they do when we view them at a distance with our naked eyes the same Object appears red when we look at it through a Glass of that Colour but green when we behold it through one of such a Tincture Things seem otherwise when the Eye is distorted then they do when it is in its natural ordinary posture and some extraordinary alterations in the Brain double that to us which is but a single Object Colours are different according to different Lights and Positions as 't is in the necks of Doves and folds of Scarlet Thus difference in circumstances alters the sensation and why may we not suppose as much diversity in the Senses of several men as there is in those accidents in the perceptions of one There is difference in the Organs of Sense and more in the temper and configuration of the inward parts of the Brain by which motions are convey'd to the seat of Sense in the Nerves Humours and Spirits in respect of tenuity liquidity aptitude for motion and divers other circumstances of their nature from which it seems that great diversity doth arise in the manner of receiving the Images and consequently in the perceptions of their Objects So then though every man knows how things appear to himself yet what impressions they make upon the so different Senses of another he only knows certainly that is conscious to them And though all men agree to call the impression they feel from such or such an Object by the same name yet no one can assuredly tell but that the Sentiment may be different It may be one man hath the impression of Green from that which in another begets the Sense of Yellow and yet they both call it Green because from their infancy they were wont to join that word to that Sentiment which such an Object produc'd in their particular Sense though in several men it were a very divers one This I know some will think hard to be understood but I cannot help that Those that Consider will find it to be very plain and therefore I shall spend no more words about it The Sum is Our Senses are good Judges of Appearances as they concern us but how things are in themselves and how they are to others it should seem we cannot certainly learn from them And therefore when we determine that they are and must be according to the representations of our individual Senses we are very often grosly deceiv'd in such sentences to which yet we are exceeding prone and few but the most exercised minds can avoid them Of this I 'le give a great Instance or two 1. It is almost universally believ'd at least by the vulgar that the Earth rests on the Centre of the World and those ancient Philosophers have been extreamly hooted at and derided that have taught the contrary doctrine For my part I shall affirm nothing of the main question but this I say That the common inducement to believe it stands still viz the Testimony of Sense is no argument of it And whether the opinion of Pythagoras Copernicus Des-Cartes Galilaeo and almost all late Philosophers of the motion of the Earth be true or false the belief of its Rest as far as it ariseth from the presum'd evidence of Sence is an error That there is some common motion that makes the day and night and the varieties of seasons is very plain and sensible but whether the Earth or the Sun be the Body mov'd none of our Senses can determine To Sense the Sun stands still also and no Eye can perceive its Actual motion For though we find that in a little time it hath chang'd its Position and respect to us yet whether that change be caus'd by its translation from us or ours from it the Sense can never tell and yet from this and this only the greatest part of mankind believes its motion On the other side The standing still of the Earth is concluded the same way and yet though it did move it would appear fixt to us as now it doth since we are carried with it in a regular

deduce some Corollaries that may be of use for the better understanding of the whole Matter 1. Reason is certain and infallible This follows from the state I gave of the Nature and Notion of Reason in the beginning It consists in First Principles and the Conclusions that are raised from them and the Observations of Sense Now first Principles are certain or nothing can be so for every possible Conclusion must be drawn from those or by their help and every Article of Faith supposeth them And for the Propositions that arise from those certain Principles they are certain likewise For nothing can follow from Truth but Truth in the longest Series of Deduction If Error creep in there is ill consequence in the case And the sort of Conclusions that arise from the Observations of Sense if the Sense be rightly circumstantiated and the Inference rightly made are certain also For if our Senses in all their due Circumstances deceive us All is a delusion and we are sure of nothing But we know that first Principles are certain and that our Senses do not deceive us because God that bestowed them upon us is True and Good and we are as much assured that whatever we duly conclude from either of them is certain because whatever is drawn from any Principle was virtually contained in it 2. I infer That Reason is in a sense the Word of God viz. That which he hath written upon our Minds and Hearts as Scripture is that which is written in a Book The former is the Word whereby he hath spoken to all Mankind the latter is that whereby he hath declared his Will to the Church and his peculiar People Reason is that Candle of the Lord of which Solomon speaks Prov. 20. 27. That Light whereby Christ hath enlightned every one that cometh into the World John 1. 9. And that Law whereby the Consciences of the Heathen either accuse or excuse one another Rom. 2. 15. So that Hierocles spoke well when he said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be perswaded by God and right Reason is one and the same thing And Luther called Philosophy within its own bounds The Truth of God 3. The belief of our Reason is an Exercise of Faith and Faith is an Act of Reason The former part is clear from the last Particular and we believe our Reasons because we have them from God who cannot mistake and will not deceive So that relying on them in things clearly perceived is trust in God's veracity and goodness and that is an exercise of Faith Thus Luke 12. The not belief of Reason that suggests from God's clothing the Lillies that He will provide for us is made by our Saviour a defect of Faith Vers. 28. O ye of little Faith And for the other part that Faith is an Act of Reason that is evident also For 'T is the highest Reason to believe in God revealing 4. No Principle of Reason contradicts any Articles of Faith This follows upon the whole Faith befriends Reason and Reason serves Religion and therefore they cannot clash They are both certain both the Truths of God and one Truth doth not interfere with another 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Truth agrees with all things that are Whatsoever contradicts Faith is opposite to Reason for 't is a Fundamental Principle of that That God is to be believed Indeed sometimes there is a seeming contradiction between them But then either something is taken for Faith that is but Phansie or something for Reason that is but Sophistry or the supposed contradiction is an Error and Mistake 5. When any thing is pretended from Reason against any Article of Faith we ought not to cut the Knot by denying Reason but endeavour to unite it by answering the Argument and 't is certain it may be fairly answered For all Hereticks argue either from false Principles or fallaciously conclude from true ones So that our Faith is to be defended not by declaiming against Reason in such a case which strengthens the Enemy and to the great prejudice of Religion allows Reason on his side But we must endeavour to defend it either by discovering the falshood of the Principles he useth in the name of Reason or the ill Consequence which he calls Proof 6. When any thing is offered us for an Article of Faith that seems to contradict Reason we ought to see that there be good cause to believe that this is divinely revealed and in the sense propounded If it be we may be assured from the former Aphorisms that the Contradiction is but an Appearance and it may be discovered to be so But if the Contradiction be real This can be no Article of Revelation or the Revelation hath not this sense For God cannot be the Author of Contradictions and we have seen that Reason as well as Faith is his I mean the Principles of Natural Truth as well as those of Revelation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 faith Aristotle Truth is throughout contrary to falshood and what is true in Divinity cannot be false in Reason 'T is said indeed in the Talmud If two Rabbins differ in Contradictories yet both have their Opinions from Moses and from God But we are not obliged to such an irrational kind of Faith And ought not to receive any thing as an Article of it in a sense that palpably contradicts Reason no more than we may receive any sense that contradicts the direct Scriptures Faith and Reason accord as well as the Old Testament and the New and the Analogy of Reason is to be heeded also because even that is Divine and Sacred 7. There is nothing that God hath revealed to oblige our Faith but he hath given us reason to believe that he hath revealed it For though the thing be never so clearly told me if I have not reason to think that God is the Revealer of what is so declared I am not bound to believe it except there be evidence in the thing it self For 't is not Faith but vain credulity to believe every thing that pretends to be from God So that we ought to ask our selves a Reason why we believe the Scripture to be the Revelation of God's Will and ought not to assent to any sense put upon it till we have ground to think that that sense is his mind I say we must have ground either from our particular Reasons or the Authority of the Church otherwise our Faith is vain Credulity and not Faith in God 8. A Man may hold an erroneous Opinion from a mistaken sense of Scripture and deny what is the truth of the Proposition and what is the right meaning of the Text and yet not err in Faith For Faith is a belief of God revealing And if God have not so revealed this or that as to give us certain ground to believe this to be his sense he hath not sufficiently revealed it to oblige our Faith So that though I deny such or such a sense while I believe