account of the Divine Attributes by Essence and a Mode is this in his own Words Ibid. The constant unanimously received Doctrine of Divines School-men and Metaphysitians in their Discourses upon God Can a Reader unacquainted with these Debates believe that by the constant unanimously received Doctrine of Divines School-men and Metaphysitians we are to understand the single Aninmadverter alone and yet that is the truth So p. 51. l. 3. he with the same confidence and something else tells us That all Divines hitherto have looked upon and professedly treated of the Divine Nature and Attributes as different and distinct from one another still considering the first as the Subject and the other as the Adjuncts of it What must we say when a Person shall set up for a Critick in the most mysterious Article of our Religion and himself understands not the first Elements of Divinity Did any Divine before himself compound God of Subject and Adjunct Did any Divine before himself assert that Holiness Goodness Truth Knowledge Eternity c. were Adjuncts in God Does he know what an Adjunct is Quod alicui preter essentiam adjungitur something added conjoyned to the Essence of a Being Do not all Divines teach That the Divine Attributes may be predicated in abstracto of God God is his Wisdom his Power his Goodness but a Subject cannot be so predicated of its Adjunct But I am ashamed of confuting so weak a Notion yet our Animadverter has the Face to say That without this Notion it is impossible to discourse intelligibly of the Divine Attributes Ibid. p. 217. P. 223 Qu. 3. n. 27. What is the Substance or Nature of God I answer It is a Being existing of and by it self Incorporeal Infinite Eternal Omniscient Omnipotent c. The Animadverter triumphs over this and some other questions the Reverend Dean had made as easie and trifling for that is the natural Sense of calling them not so very formidable c. But I conceive that he mistook the Reverend Dean's Mind in asking this question which probably was What Notion we can frame in our Minds of the Substance of God of an infinite immaterial Substance However I shall wave that and tell him That he has extremely failed in the answer of this easie Question First When he tells us that the Nature of God is a Being God is properly called a Being but his Nature ought to be stiled an Essence and not a Being when we speak properly and according to the formal Conception of things Secondly To be a Being existing of it self is not of the Nature or Essence of God otherwise the Son and Holy Spirit are not each of them God for certainly neither the Son nor Holy Spirit exist of themselves to be a Being existing of it self is a personal property of the Father alone Thirdly Existing by it self is but an explication of being an Hypostasis or Suppositum which indeed agrees to Father Son and Holy Ghost but yet by the Consent of sober Divines is not esteemed an essential Predication and consequently ought not to be put into the Definition of God Fourthly Incorporeal Infinite c. are Attributes that is according to the Animadverter Adjuncts to the Essence or Nature of God how come they therefore to make up part of the Definition of the Nature of God But I am tired and have reason to believe my Reader so with the observation of the Animadverter's Mistakes and therefore I have omitted very many I did observe and doubtless a more attentive Reader would find many which escaped my notice The Animadverter in this Book has concern'd himself chiefly with three Articles Christ's Satisfaction His Incarnation and the Doctrine of the Trinity and I do not find upon the strictest Search that he understands any one of them Concerning the last of these Articles the Reader cannot have a clearer Proof than by Examination of the Animadverter's eighth Chapter wherein he professedly endeavours to lay down the positive Faith of the Church concerning this Article CHAP. VII I judge it neither improper nor unusefull to represent what the Church has hitherto held and taught concerning this important Article of the Trinity p. 240. l. 2. n. 1. as I find it in Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern Make room for this mighty Man keep silence and learn what Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern have taught in this important Article Goliath himself was not more compleatly armed Cap-a-pee but Goliath wanted little David's Sling he came not in the name of the Lord. And it seems this great Opiniator has forgot his Bible behind him quite forgot Christ and his twelve Apostles in the Crowd of Fathers and School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern Shall I need to remind this great Critick that if Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern have determined I will not say against but without a sufficient Foundation of Scripture their determination is no rule of a Protestant's Faith Article 8. Our Church receives the Creeds themselves because they may be proved by most certain Warrants of Holy Scripture I acknowledge it a great Confirmation of my Faith as to this Article that Councils and Fathers have explained the Scriptures in the same Sense in which I believe them The Ecclesiastical Phrases and Forms of Speech are very usefull to detect aequivocating Hereticks or as they speak in short what the Scriptures deliver in several places or as they are Arguments ad homines to those who acknowledge their Authority p. 240. l. 14. n. 2. Now the commonly received Doctrine of the Church and Schools concerning the Blessed Trinity so far as I can judge but still with the humblest Submission to the Judgment of the Church of England in the Case is this That the Christian Religion having laid this sure Foundation that there is but one God and that there is nothing i. e. no positive real Being strictly and properly so called in God but what is God and lastly That there can be no Composition in the Deity with any such positive real Being distinct from the Deity it self and yet the Church finding in Scripture mention of three to whom distinctly the God-head does belong it has by warrant of the same Scripture Heb. 1.3 expressed these three by the Name of Persons and stated their Personalities upon three distinct Modes of Subsistence allotted to one and the same God-head and these also distinguished from one another by three distinct Relations First The Complement is very high to the Church of England that he will submit the Faith which he finds in Councils Confessions Fathers School-men and other Church-writers both ancient and modern to the Judgment of the Church of England but whom does the Animadverter mean by the Church of England this is his Character of the Churchmen the Clergy of the Church of England in
THE DOCTRINE OF THE Fathers and Schools CONSIDER'D Concerning the ARTICLES of A TRINITY of Divine Persons AND The UNITY of GOD. In ANSWER to the Animadversions on the Dean of St. Paul's Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed TRINITY IN Defence of those Sacred ARTICLES Against the Objections of the SOCINIANS and the Misrepresentations of the ANIMADVERTER PART the First By J. B. A. M. Presbyter of the Church of England LONDON Printed for W. Rogers at the Sun against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleetstreet M.DC.XCV A Preface to the READER Concerning TRITHEISM Charg'd c. HAsty Births commonly are imperfect If so I have reason to fear the Imperfections of the following Papers which come out without the Second and most Essential Part concerning the Vnity of God My distance from the Press denies me the Priviledge of Correcting one single Sheet with my own Eyes or indeed of comparing them since their Printing with my own Copy Since the Printing of more than half the following Papers a Second Part of the Animadversions came to my hands under this Title viz. Tritheism charged upon Dr. Sherlock 's New Notion of the Trinity c. By the Contents I presently saw that the Animadverter had resumed the Debate I first consulted those Places which I judged most nearly to concern me and since read over the whole I was sorrowful that the Press was so far gone and in so much haste to finish by the end of this Term that I could not add an Appendix to those few things which the Animadverter has added However I was on the other hand pleased that as yet I found no reason to recant one sentence of what I had advanced in my Answer to the Animadversions The Debate betwixt the Reverend Dean and the Animadverter as the Animadverter often states it is concerning the Truth of these Three Articles 1st Whether Self-Consciousness be the formal reason of Personality in Finite and Infinite Persons 2dly Whether Mutual-Consciousness be the formal reason of Vnity of Nature in the Divine Persons 3dly Whether the Three Divine Persons may in an Orthodox Sense be stiled Three Infinite Minds The Animadverter resolves these Three Enquiries in the Negative and charges the Affirmative upon the Reverend Dean I agree with the Animadverter that the two former ought to be resolved Negatively I further declare my opinion That the Reverend Dean never intended the Affirmative Solution of those Questions in a strict and rigorous sense of the Terms so that I am not directly concerned in that part of the Dispute Though in my Passage I could not forbear noting 1st That this Assertion of the Animadverter's See chap. 3. n. 2. viz. That Self-Consciousness is a Personal Act does in its just consequence infer That the Divine Persons are Three Absolute Persons Three Absolute Beings nay according to his Principles that they have Three Absolute Omnisciencies or Divine Natures and consequently are Three Infinite Spirits in an higher sense than ever the Reverend Dean intended and this Consequence I still challenge him to clear that Assertion from if he can See chap. 3. n. 3 4. Secondly That the same Argument which himself calls a Demonstration against what he supposed the Reverend Dean's Assertion viz. That Self-Consciousness could not be the formal reason of Personality because it was a Personal Act was equally strong against his own Hypothesis viz. That Generation was the formal reason of Personality in the Person of the Father and this still stands unanswered and upon the Animadverter's Principles is I am satisfied unanswerable See chap. 2. n. 4 c. Thirdly I discuss at large that Philosophical Question Whether the Soul is a Person which I affirm and leave him at his leisure to overthrow if he can As for that weak Objection Tritheism c. p. 150. That then the Soul may be said to be Incarnate let me tell him that this is an Heretical Arian Sense of this Term Incarnate as if the WORD assumed only a Body and not a Human Soul this Term Incarnate signifies both Fourthly Ibid. chap. 2. n. 4 c. I vindicate the Sacred Article of the Incarnation from the Socinian Objections of the Animadverter which in terminis he brings against the Personality of the Soul only but in reality overthrow the Personality of the WORD had they been of any force Fifthly I explain that Subtilty of the Schools See chap. 3. n. 3 4. concerning the Relativeness of the Divine Persons and shew the Animadverter's Mistakes in this Article the Novelty of this Opinion not asserted as I verily believe by any one single Ecclesiastical Writer for more than a Thousand Years after Christ and give as I am fully satisfied unanswerable Arguments against the Truth of it Sixthly I enquire into that Question See chap. 3. n. 5. Why the Divine Persons are Three and no more and give a just Solution of it from Revelation Seventhly See chap. 3. n. 6. c. I discuss that Important and Fundamental Enquiry in this Mystery viz. What it is which determines the Singularity or Plurality of the Predication of any Attribute concerning the Divine Persons Where I first give the Predications themselves which are to be solved A very necessary matter to be known by all who pretend to give us an Hypothesis to solve the Sacred Mystery of the Trinity To do otherwise is to make a Key for a Lock by the Key-hole only Such a Key is a mere shew 't is Ten thousand to one that it never fits the Wards Secondly I consider the Answers of the Schools and shew their Insufficiency Lastly I endeavour to give the true Solution my self It is very weak to make an Outcry about a single Phrase how unusual soever to charge it in the Title of a Book with the odious name of Tritheism and in a Preface to the Two Vniversities with Paganism with being a New Christianity Determine the General Question first and this latter concerning the Phrase of Three Infinite Minds will be solved of course Chap. 3. n. 2. See chap. 6. n. 20. If Self-Consciousness be a Personal Act if the Term Deus be a terminus communis Both which the Animadverter has affirmed in express Terms then I do here aver and engage to make good against the Animadverter that according to his own Principles he cannot avoid the Charge of Tritheism but he must at the same time clear that expression of the Reverend Dean of Three Infinite Minds from the same severe and unjust Charge For so I am not afraid to call it The Three Divine Persons may be orthodoxly stiled Three Infinite Minds or Spirits I plead not for the Use but the Orthodoxness of the Phrase and this I prove Chap. 4. n. 4. First From the Adjective Form allowed by the Schools viz. Tres Infinitam Spiritualem naturam habentes Ibid. Secondly From the Authority of the Learned Genebrard to whom this Proposition Tres sunt
by which the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we shall hardly find a fitter than to say that it exists in it as an Adjunct in the Subject For it is certain that it does not exist in it as a Part in the Whole since by this means the Second Person in the Trinity must till his Incarnation have wanted one part of his person But I shall not be positive in the application of this term here This Sacred Article of the Incarnation of the Son of God deserves a particular Treatise by it self However I could not in the Interim forbear to vindicate it from those Misrepresentations the Animadverter has unwittingly I charitably presume put upon it The Animadverter did not understand or not consider the relation of an Adjunct to a Subject or he would never have made this Application in reference to the Hypostatic Union of the Humane Nature of Christ to the Person of the WORD Where a Substance is an Adjunct the Adjunct is predicated of the Subject more Accidentis after the nature of an Accident This the predicament of Habitus might have informed the Animadverter We say not that a man is his Cloaths but that a man is cloath'd so that if the Humane Nature of Christ be barely an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD we could not say that the WORD was or became Man but only that he was externally cloathed with Humanity Secondly The Animadverter confutes himself when he tells us That the Humane Nature of Christ exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A substantial Adjunct can never exist in its Subject but only an accidental Adjunct as a Quality c. If the Humane Nature exists in the Person of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it must in some sense be a part of the Person of the WORD Thirdly Nor is there any Absurdity in acknowledging the Humane Nature to be a part of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nay very learned persons have not scrupled to call the Person of the WORD a Part of Christ taking that term Part in a large sense and abstracting from the imperfections which are included in the common acceptation of it The Person of the WORD is not an imperfect Part nor the Humane Nature a Part in such Sense that the Person of the WORD wants such Part to complete it In an Hypostatical Composition the Inferior Nature is in some Analogy a Co-part in other respects an Adjunct and of necessity imperfect but to be the superior Nature in such Composition infers no Imperfection But of this more hereafter One and the same undivided Existence P. 34. lin 28. N. 11. as well as one and the same Essence or Nature belongs to all the Three Persons equally whereas yet every Person has his own distinct Subsistence by himself There is not a more intricate Dispute amongst the Schoolmen than this which the Animadverter argues from as a Principle To assert above one singular Existence in the Trinity thô the Sacred Scriptures expresly multiply this Attribute I and the Father are One these Three are One was to give up the Hypothesis of the Schools of the singularity of the common Divine Nature But the Schoolmen were at a loss Probabilius tamen ac verius existimamus illam substantiam singularem quae communis est tribus personis ut sic subsistentem esse ex se essentialiter habereque unam subsistentiam absolutam essentialem tribus personis communem haec enim sententia communiter recepta est à Theologis utriusque Scholae D. Thomae Scoti ab aliis etiam Suarez Metaph Disp 34. Sect. 1. N. 3. when they came to enquire into the Modus of this singular Existence There are but two Modes of a substantial singular Existence incomplete which belongs to a substantial Part complete which belongs to a Suppositum Complete Existence is but another Phrase for Subsistence and so there will be but One undivided Subsistence of the whole Three Persons and this the whole Party of the Thomists and Scotists affirm and call it an absolute essential Subsistence so little did the Animadverter understand these Disputes The acute Petavius could not here keep pace with the Schoolmen all Antiquity knew nothing of this Essential Subsistence he embraces the former and attributes one singular incomplete Existence to the Divine Nature Now certainly this Learned Person strained very hard to ascribe something incomplete to the Divine Nature I will give the Reader his own words Petav. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 12. Sect. 13. p. 421. Non enim de tali Existentia hîc agimus quoe perfecta completae substantioe propria sit sed quoe formis imperfectis Rebus ex quibus quasi componitur quippiam congruit P. 35. lin 11. N 12. Now whatsoever Being or Nature this Mode of Subsistence does belong to that is properly called a Suppositum And the consequence of this is That as Subsistence makes a Thing or Being a Suppositum so Suppositality makes it incommunicable This is worse Heresy to the Schoolmen than the phrase of three infinite Minds They acknowledge this in finite Beings or Natures but affirm the quite contrary in the Divine Nature Not the Absolute Essential Subsistence renders the Divine Nature a Suppositum but the Divine Relation whether it be Paternity Filiation or Procession according to the Schoolmen constitutes the Divine Nature a Person or Persons Secondly Not the Subsistence with a relation renders the Divine Nature incommunicable but only the Divine Person incommunicable Subsistence in finite Beings renders that particular Nature as well as Person incommunicable but in the Divine Nature only the Person P. 35. lin 30. N. 13. So that as a Suppositum is substantia singularis completa per se subsistens so the Ratio intellectiva being added to this makes it a Person which is a farther perfection of Suppositality I only ask the Animadverter Whether he acknowledges three Suppositums in the Trinity And whether the Objection of three Substances is not as strong against that Confession from this Definition of a Suppositum as himself brings against the phrase of three infinite Minds 2dly Ratio intellectiva is a farther perfection of a Suppositum but not of Suppositality A Beast as truly as perfectly subsists by its self as a Man Rationality is a Perfection a Mode taking that term in a large sense of Animality but not a Perfection or Mode of Subsistence If it be here asked P. 36. lin 3. N. 14. Whether Subsistence or Suppositality added to bare Nature does not make a Composition I answer That in created finite Persons it does but not in uncreated and infinite And the reason is because tho all Composition implies Union yet all Union is not therefore Composition but something higher and transcendental So that in the Divine Persons of the Trinity the Divine Nature and Personal Subsistence coalesce into one
Incarn Q. 2. Disp 6. sect 4. p. 194. Ibid. p. 193. Alii Patres licet non apertè utantur nomine compositionis aliis tamen quoe perinde esse videntur utuntur ut adunationis copulationis ex duobus conjunctionis c. Illa vero particula ex planè designat compositionem The phrase of the Hypostatick Union is most opposite to the Heresy of Eutyches who believed that there was not an Union of Two Natures but a Confusion of One of them But the phrase of the Hypostatick Composition is most opposite to the Nestorian Heresy who asserted a kind of Hypostatic Union that is an Union of Two Persons and denied that Christ God and Man was One Person compounded of Two Natures The Animadverter shews his skill in this Controversy to oppose these two phrases and to condemn that phrase of an Hypostatick Composition which the Church has received As great an Opiniator as the Animadverter is I believe he will scarce have the confidence to say that he can teach these great Fathers of the Church how to speak in this Mystery I promise faithfully to attend him when ever he begins The Soul being a Part cannot possibly be a Person P. 75. lin 4. N. 5. Forasmuch as a Part is an incomplete Being and therefore in the very nature of it being designed for the completion of something else must subsist in and by the subsistence of the Whole But a Person imports the most complete Degree and Mode of Being as subsisting wholly by it self and not in or by any other either as a subject of inherence or dependence so that it is a direct Contradiction to the very definition and nature of the thing for the same Being to be a Part and a Person too And consequently that which makes the Soul a Part does irrefragably prove it not to be a Person I answer That to be a Part and a Person in a simple Person in a Person consisting of one Nature I confess to be contradictious and impossible 2dly To be the inferior part in a compounded Person to be in any Actions an Instrument a Principium quo as the Body in the mixt Actions of Sense is to the Soul is contradictory to the Notion of a Person A Person as such is the Principium quod of all the Actions which proceed from it but to be the superior Part in such Composition is very compatible with the Personality of such superior Nature For such superior Nature may very well retain its own proper Mode of Subsistence if we explain Personality with the Schools such a superior Nature retains all the Perfections all the natural Perfections of a whole and complete Being is a Principium quod not only of its own natural Actions but of the mixt Actions of the whole compounded Hypostasis Such a superior Nature may be a Person and at the same time in a large acceptation of the term a Part that is a Part as Aristotle defines that term Arist 4. Met. cap. 25. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that into which any thing is divided or of which that consists which we call a Whole in which sense of the term Part the Learned Petavius is not afraid to call the Divine Nature of the WORD a Part laxius sumpto partis vocabulo Petav. lib. 3. de Trin. cap. 3. sect 12. p. 232. I must pass over the Animadverter's boldness in determining That a Part subsists by the subsistence of the Whole which is very near asserting an Hypostatical Union of every substantial part Others who embrace these Scholastical Subtleties chuse rather to assert That a Part subsists by a partial subsistence and that the subsistence of the Whole is compounded of the subsistence of the Parts So when the Animadverter tells us that a Person does not subsist in any other as a subject of dependence I must crave his pardon for I thought before that every Creature had subsisted in God as a subject on whom we depended that in him we live and move and have our Being P. 75. lin 16. N. 6. If the Soul in the composition of a man's Person were an entire Person it self and as such concurred with the Body towards the constitution of the Man then a Man would be an imperfect accidental and not a perfect natural compound He would be that which Philosophy calls Vnum per Accidens that is a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce into one Mutatis mutandis this is the Great Socinian Objection against the Incarnation of the Son of God That Infinite and Finite cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One that God and Man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the name of the most unnatural compound and mixture The same Answer will satisfy both Objections To confound the two Natures of God and Man or of Soul and Body would confessedly make the most unnatural compound and mixture But we maintain an Union in both Cases and not a Confusion The Divine Nature retains all the Perfections of a Divine Person in the Composition and the Human Nature by the Composition loses none of the natural perfections of the Human Nature It cannot indeed properly be called by the metaphysical name of a suppositum as becoming an Instrument a principium quo to the superior Divine Nature but then thereby it becomes capable of being an Instrument in the noblest Acts of the Mediatorial Office which subsisting by it self it was uncapable of So the Soul in the Constitution of Man retains all the Perfections of a separate intellectual suppositum nor did any Philosoper ever assert that an Human Body was more imperfect than a Stone notwithstanding this latter is a suppositum and the former not The Human Body by the Composition is an Instrument a Principium quo to the Soul an Instrument in the mixt Actions of Sense which of it self it was uncapable of And if a Stone could speak it would never complain if God should miraculously change it into an Human Body notwithstanding the compleatness of a suppositum and the incompleatness of an Inferior Nature in an Hypostatick Composition Secondly The Animadverter mistakes that which Philosophers call Vnum per Accidens for that is when two Beings which differ toto Genere as Substance and Accident are united Such an Union say they is accidental and consequently the Compositum not Vnum per se but Vnum per Accidens Or when two Compleat Beings are united as in all Artificial Works where each part is a distinct suppositum which is more properly called Aggregatum per Accidens But the Divine and Human Nature the Soul and Body differ not toto Genere each are Substances and so are capable of a substantial Union which suffices to denominate the Compositum Vnum per se and not Vnum per Accidens Again The Divine Nature is and remains compleat in the Composition the Humane Nature subsists ad modum partis in the nature of a part of an Instrument in the
Composition So is the Soul compleat and the Human Body the Instrument or incompleat in the constitution of Man so that according to the strictest Rules of Philosophy both the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Man are Vnum per se not Vnum per Accidens Thirdly As little can I allow the Animadverter that every Vnum per Accidens must be an unnatural Compound According to these Philosophers a Learned Man a Pious Man is Vnum per Accidens ought we therefore to avoid Piety and Learning that we may not become an unnatural Compound Fourthly The Union of a Subject and its Adjunct is according to all Philosophers an accidental Union the Adjunct as I observed before predicated of the Subject more Accidentis This Objection therefore falls strongest upon his own Head who denied the Human Nature of Christ to be a part of Christ and affirmed That it was an Adjunct to the Person of the WORD Cap. 1. N. 10 which is in consequence to affirm that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is Vnum per Accidens P. 76. lin 4. N. 7. If the Soul in a state of Separation from the Body be a Person then it is either the same Person which the Man himself was while he was living and in the Body or it is another Person But to assert either of them is extreamly absurd and therefore equally absurd that the Soul in such a State should be a Person c. This also is a Socinian Objection The Animadverter may be satisfied That no wise Man will chuse the later part of the Disjunction viz. that the Soul in a state of Separation is a different Person from the Man himself or that the WORD before the Incarnation is a different Person from Christ God and Man or the WORD incarnated For the Objection is equal against both Articles as by a small variation of the immediate following words will appear And first it is absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of Soul and Body as a Man is and a simple uncompounded Person as the Soul if a Person at all must needs be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several Parts compounding it And a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if a Man while alive be one Person and his Soul after Death be a Person too it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Person with the Man And first it is absurd to affirm it to be the same Person For a Person compounded of the Divine and Human Nature as Christ is and a simple uncompounded Person as the WORD is acknowledged to be can never be numerically one and the same For that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound as such including in it several Parts and a simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if Christ God and Man be one Person and the WORD before his Incarnation be a Person too it is impossible for the Word before the Incarnation to be one and the same Person with Christ God and Man Now thanks be to God this formidable Objection of the Socinians and the Animadverter is founded upon a mistake in Philosophy viz. That those things which differ from one another as Simple and Compound differ as two things whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other There may be a thousand instances brought to confute this pretended Axiom A Man learned is the same Man with himself before he was learned and yet in the Confession of all Philosophers A Man and a Man learned differ as Simple and Compound A Man learned is an accidental Compositum an Vnum per Accidens So a Man cloathed is the same Man with himself naked and yet a Man cloathed and a Man naked differ as Simple and Compound A Soul in a state of Separation is the same Soul with the Soul cloathed with an Human Body I am ashamed to be obliged to prove so plain a Conclusion In an Hypostatical Union the inferior Nature is so far an Adjunct to the superior Nature that what the WORD was before the Incarnation or the Soul before its cloathing with a Body the same each remains after the Union or Conjunction It is in some sense a Part otherwise the Union could not be substantial but accidental The WORD could with no more propriety be said to be a Man than a Man may be denominated an evil Angel because he is possessed of such Had the Divine and Human Nature of Christ been confounded or the Soul and Body of Man so mixt as to have denominated the Compositum of a different Nature from the component Parts then the WORD and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 could not be one Person nor the Soul and the Man the same Person But we maintain an Hypostatical Union and not a confusion of Substance or Nature That which has obscured the Analogy betwixt the Union of the two Natures in the One Person of Christ and of the Soul and Body in Man is for that in this latter instance Custom has prevailed with us to say That an Human Person has but one viz. an human Nature Whereas an Human Person properly consists of two unconfounded Natures the Nature of the Soul and Body are not confounded in the Hypostatical Composition of Man The Learned Damascen Vide Damasc lib. 3 de Ortho fide cap. 3. if I remember aright gives the reason of this form of Speech Because we see many distinct Persons possess the same common Nature whence we say That two or more Human Persons are of one and the same nature As also That if the Holy Spirit had been incarnated equally with the WORD we might have said that the WORD incarnate is of the same nature with the Holy Ghost incarnate To conclude All Philosophers assert That a totum differs only ratione from all its parts united if therefore it be possible for the superior part in an Hypostatick Union to retain all the Natural Perfections of a suppositum in the composition and for an inferior part to be united to the superior without confusion of its Nature and yet not as a distinct suppositum but as an instrumentum or principium quo to the superior part It will then evidently follow That the whole compositum is but one suppositum but one Person and the very same Person which the superior part was before the composition and that a simple and compounded Person is in such instance not two Persons but one and the same Person differing not really but modally from himself by such difference by which a Learned Man differs from himself before he was Learned And here I
suppose some will object P. 78. lin 1. N. 8. That the Soul in a state of separation is not properly a Part for as much as it exists not in any Compound nor goes to the composition of it To which I answer That an actual inexistence in a Compound is not the only Condition which makes the thing a part but its essential relation to a Compound which relation is founded partly upon its original designation and partly upon its natural aptitude to be an ingredient in the constitution of a Compound This Objection lies very obvious That the Soul in a state of separation is a Person as subsisting by it self neither being a part in any Whole nor an adjunct to any Subject Animad c. p. 34. which is his own Definition of subsistence or personality The Animadverter answers That the Soul is then a part notwithstanding it exists in no whole Now in Logicks totum and pars whole and part are Relatives and mutually infer one another There can no more then be a Part without an actual Whole than a Son without a Father Adam was originally designed by God to be a Father and had a natural aptitude to become such What then Will the Animadverter or any one else affirm That he was a Father before he had a Son as the Animadverter here tells us That the Soul in a state of separation is a part tho there is no whole to which such part can belong However Secondly I confess that there is more of truth in this Answer than I believe the Animadverter was aware of viz. That when to be a Part and a Person are opposed as Contradictions We do not take this Term Part in a nice Logical sense of the Term but in a Physical sense for an incomplete Being which naturally requires to be compleated perfected by some other Co-part And thus his own Answer will be strongly retorted against himself viz. That an actual Inexistence in a Compound is not that which absolutely denies any thing to be a Person but its existing incompleatly in the Composition its Existence ad modum adjuncti instrumenti vel principii quo to some superior nature Now in this sense the WORD is not a Part the WORD is not perfected compleated by the Composition The Soul of Man is indeed compleated perfected in its Operations by the Composition is capable of the actions of sense by the Composition but yet the Soul is not perfected in its Metaphysical Suppositality the Soul is not less a principium quod of its own actions in the Composition than in a state of Separation N. 9. Thirdly This Socinian Objection falls as heavy upon the Socinians and the Animadverter in the instance of a Human Person Both will confess that the Soul is a Part and Man a Whole From whence in the Animadverter's words I argue A Whole compounded of Soul and Body as Man is and a Simple uncompounded Part as the Soul is can never be numerically one and the same Being for that differing from one another as Simple and Compound they differ as two Beings whereof one implies a Contradiction and Negation of the other A Compound Being as such including in it several Parts compounding it and a Simple Being utterly excluding all Parts and Composition So that if a Man while alive be one Being and his Soul after Death be a Being too it is impossible for the Soul to be one and the same Being with the Man And from these Premises I can also add P. 77. lin 1. That wheresoever there are two distinct Beings we do and must by all the Rules of Grammar and Logick say that one of them is not the other and where one is not the other we cannot in Truth or Justice say that one ought to account for what was done or not done by the other c. Let the Animadverter answer this and he answers himself A Simple and Compounded Person may as well be the same Person as a Simple and Compounded Being be the same Being These two differ modally and not really And now to return from the Mystery of the Incarnation N. 10. to that of the Sacred Trinity and to the Question the Animadverter is considering as preparatory to it viz. What is the Formal Reason of Personality in Finite Created Persons This is I confess a very proper Enquiry but there is another as proper that is unfortunately omitted by most who treat of this Sacred Mystery viz. Not what that is which strictly and formally denominates any Finite Being a Suppositum or Person but What that is which denominates it this particular Person These are two Questions What strictly and properly denominates Adam a Person And what that is which denominates him the singular Person of Adam To be a Human Person is a common indefinite universal Attribute but to be the Person of Adam is proper to the first Man That which strictly and properly denominates Adam a Person is a Mode of Subsistence totale Attributum the being a compleat Whole as the Fathers often speak That which denominates Adam the particular Person of Adam is unknown to us that which the Schoolmen call Haecceity cannot be defined Ancients and Moderns supply the place of the Individuating difference by a Collection of Accidents says Porphyry by the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Personal Properties say the Ancient Fathers It is says the Author of Expositio Fidei the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Adam to be immediately formed by the hands of God to be the Husband of Eve the First Man the Father of Cain Abel Seth c. Again since the Formal Cause of any thing denominates that thing Res omnes communiter denominavi a suis formis sicut album ab albedine homo ab humanitate quare omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae Ut si dicam iste est indutus vestimento iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae formalis quamvis non sit forma Aquin. 1. Par. Q. 37. Art 2. of which it is the Formal Cause hence from what any thing is denominated that thing is conceived by us in the similitude of a Formal Cause nay and often so stiled In which sense * Porphyr Introd ad Arist Organon cap. 2. Porphyry says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Singulars or Individuals are so called for that each is constituted by certain Properties the Collection of which is in no other Individual Not that a Property or Proprium is a Form or Differentia but because it supplies the place of such in the imperfect description of Individuals To apply this to the Divine Persons 't is a double Enquiry What denominates the Father a Person and what denominates him the Person of the Father Subsistence totale Attributum denominates the Father a Person which is a common Attribute to Father Son and Holy Ghost Paternity to be unbegotten to send his Son c.
plead those Sacred words of their Law I am the Lord thy God Thou shalt have no other Gods before me That all their Doctors for the space of two thousand Years interpreted those words in their Natural sense viz. as spoke of one Divine Person What shall we say to this Objection Did God suffer the wisest of the Heathen Philosophers the most Pious Persons of the Jewish Religion to believe an Heresie of him for so many Ages Did God speak of himself in the most Sacred part of the Law in such words which Naturally lead to Heresie For I and me Naturally lead to the belief of one Person speaking This is the great Objection with which the Socinians flourish An Answer to which would be of more worth than a thousand such Books of Inadversions as the Socinian Considerer calls these Animadversions Considerations on the Explications c p. 23. For my own part I cannot be so fond of the Subtilties of the Schools as for the sake of them to confess so harsh a Conclusion I do most firmly believe that the Faith of a Trinity of Divine Persons and the Article of the Unity of God as it was believed by the wisest of the Heathens and the Jewish Church are by no means inconsistent The whole Truth was not revealed to the Jewish Church or at least so very obscurely that very few of them understood it But yet I verily believe that what was revealed was a most Sacred truth I believe that the God whom the Heathen Philosophers by the Light of Nature worshipped was one Divine Person I believe that the same one Divine Person spake of Himself in those Sacred words of the Law I am the Lord thy God c. I also believe that this One Divine Person was the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ Nor does this contradict that common Article of the Christian Faith viz. That God is Three Persons as the Socinians vainly pretend and some others unwarily grant them God is not three Persons as he is Just or Good or Holy as if three Persons were Essentially included in the Divine Nature For then no one single Person could by himself be God then there could not be a Son of God or a Spirit of God When God is said to be three Persons the term God is taken in a Logical sense equivalent in Predication to a terminus communis or a Species and signifies that the Divine Nature subsists in three Persons that this term God is truly predicable of three distinct Persons But a further disquisition of this Difficulty belongs to my Second Part. The Animadvertor accuses the Reverend Dean of giving a scurvy stroke at the Trinity p. 135. lin 7. n. 19. p. 89. where he the Reverend Dean affirms that the Expression of the one true God and the only true God cannot properly be attributed to the Son nor Holy Ghost Ibid. l. 19. and consequently if he asserts that these terms cannot with equal Propriety be attributed to and predicated of the Son and Holy Ghost we have him both Arian and Macedonian together in this Assertion First The Reverend Dean never asserted that the Son or Holy Ghost could not properly be called the one God or only true God only that they could not so properly be stiled so as the Father The Fathers of the Nicene Council indeed of the whole Eastern Church did expresly appropriate the Title of One God to the Father and God of God to the Son by which Opposition it appears that by One God in the first Article of the Creed they meant a God of himself which is a Personal Attribute and peculiar to the Father Our Saviour appropriates this Title of Only true God to the Person of the Father Hilary lib. 3. de Trin. and St. Hilary who was never hitherto esteemed either an Arian or Macedonian expresly asserts this to be Debitum Honorem Patri St. Paul has patronized this Appropriation Ephes 4.6 To us there is one God and Father Now for my part I had rather be esteemed an Heretick Arian and Macedonian with my Saviour St. Paul St. Hilary all the Oriental Fathers than Orthodox with the Animadvertor and Bellarmin I do assure him that I am neither afraid of him nor the Socinians I crave no Favour at either of their Hands for this Profession of my Faith That the Title of one God only true God is a Proper Personal Prerogative of the Father alone p. 138. lin 21. n. 20. And as for the Father's being the Fountain of the Deity I hope he looks upon the Expression only as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native sense for fear the Consequences of it may engage him too far to be able to make an handsome Retreat which I assure him if he does not take heed they certainly will Oratio contra gregales Sabellii propè initium Athanasius tells us that we might rightly call the Father the only God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he only is unbegotten and he only is the Fountain of the Deity This learned Father has hitherto been esteemed the very Test of Orthodoxy in this Mystery The Reverend Dean's Notion and Phrase is borrowed from him who would not have thought himself safe under so Venerable a Name But alas the World is strangely altered Athanasius himself must come to School to the Animadvertor to learn how to speak I hope he that poor Novice Athanasius looks on the Expression as Metaphorical and such as ought not to be stretched to the utmost of its Native sense I hope also that I may be allowed to vindicate this Phrase of that great Light of the Church from the Exceptions of a bold Animadvertor May I in the Name of Athanasius enquire of this great Critick which of these two words Fountain or Deity are to be interpreted Metaphorically That of Fountain is plainly Metaphorical Athanasius was never so weak as to believe that the Deity was a River of Waters and the Father the Fountain of it If the Animadvertor means that this term Deity is Metaphorical I must require his Proof and not his Affirmation Again neither Athanasius nor any of the Ancient Fathers ever intended by this Phrase that the Father is the Fountain of the Deity that he was the positive Fountain of the Divinity in his own Person any more than Philosophers and Divines mean that God was the cause of Himself when they say that God is of Himself Athanasius added to avoid the suspicion of such an absurd sense that he was unbegotten as well as the Fountain of the Deity What then is the fault of this Phrase of Athanasius Why alas poor Athanasius was unacquainted with the subtilties of the Schools He said plainly and bluntly that the Father was the Fountain of the Deity whereas he ought to have said Animadv c. p. 191. lin 10. That he was the Fountain of the two other Divine Persons To say
not God of God To be God of God and also not God of God are contradictious and therefore can never be verified of one and the same Subject of one and the same God in concreto of one and the same God in Person Nor is this any Blasphemous stuff it only proves that one sense of the term God is equipollent with a Divine Person in the words of Genebrard before quoted Chap. 4. n. 4. Vocabulum Deus aliquando sumitur Hypostaticè ac ultrò citróque commeat cum Divina persona sive Hypostasi ut cum in Niceno Symbolo legitur Deum de Deo c. It is the Faith and has been the Language of the Church before the Nicene Council that Deus est Trinus in Personis that God is Three in Persons And this is the just and easie Answer to that dreadful Objection of the Socinians that three Divine Persons infer three Gods as three Angelical Persons infer three Angels viz. That if by three Gods the Socinians mean that there are three Divine Persons that there are tres Deitatem habentes that Deus est trinus in personis in these senses in the term God we acknowledge and embrace the Conclusion as an Article of our Faith and despise the weak Sophistry of their Objection which only equivocates in the term God Ask a Socinian what he means by God in that Phrase of three Gods He will readily Answer that he means a Divine Person and consequently this Formidable Objection amounts to no more than this That three Divine Persons are three Divine Persons Therefore c. Just so does the Animadvertor deal with the Reverend Dean He declares that he takes God and Infinite Mind to be equipollent and I will assure him that none will deny that three Infinite Minds are three Infinite Minds And so the Reverend Dean is eternally confuted or rather the Animadvertor ought to be ashamed of so weak a Sophism If the Animadvertor or any Socinian will deal like a Scholar and not like a Sophister let either of them produce those Arguments which deny a Plurality of Gods and shew that they are equally strong against the Faith of three Infinite Minds or three Divine Persons and they shall not fail of an Answer by God's assistance as soon as I can finish it but this more properly belongs to my Second Part. It is a meer begging of the Question to say that this term God is not capable of Multiplication when it signifies equipollently with a Divine Person or any other equivalent Phrase as an Infinite Mind or the like p. 160. lin 3. n. 3. It is one and the same Wisdom which is both ingenita and genita though as it is one it is not the other The Animadvertor p. 156. lin 9. had declared it to be very true that the Son is a begotten Mind and Wisdom and in the same place denies That the Eternal Mind or Wisdom begetting and the Eternal Mind or Wisdom begotten are two distinct Minds but only one and the same Mind or Wisdom under these two distinct Modifications of Begetting and being Begot In this place the Animadvertor advances one step higher and tells us that unbegotten Wisdom and begotten Wisdom are not two Wisdoms but only one Wisdom under two several Modifications as also that Father Son and Holy Spirit are one Infinite Spirit under three distinct Modalities Now say I if this be a fair Solution of this difficulty it is impossible for the wisest Person to be certain that he can count two For ought any one then can tell the Reverend Dean and the Animadvertor may not be two Persons but only one Person under two Modifications The highest Proof that can be brought in such Enquiry is that Contradictions may be verified concerning the Reverend Dean and the Animadvertor that what the one is the other is not Now there cannot be a plainer fuller Contradiction than to be begotten and to be unbegotten Again this Answer undermines the Faith of the Catholick Chuch the Faith of three Divine Persons The Sabellianist asserts that Father Son and Holy Ghost are not three Persons but one Person under three distinct Modalities which Modifications diversifie and distinguish the Person they belong to but not multiply him The same Person is both the Father and the Son but as he is one he is not the other Now the allowed Proof of a Plurality of Divine Persons is from the contradictory Predicates which may be verified of Father Son and Holy Ghost in the words of the Athanasian Creed The Father is made of none neither created nor begotten the Son is of the Father alone not made not created but begotten The Holy Ghost is of the Father and Son neither made nor created nor begotten but proceeding If this be a good Argumument to prove a Plurality of Divine Persons I desire to know why an unbegotten and begotten Wisdom are not equally two Wisdoms The Moderns who follow the Schoolmen say indeed the same thing with the Animadvertor that it is one and the same singular Wisdom which is both unbegotten and begotten that is one Wisdom under two distinct Modifications But then they understand themselves better than to say That it is very true that the Son is a begotten Wisdom They say that Begotten Wisdom is to be understood in an improper sense and consequently that the Contradiction is only in words and not in reality According to the Schoolmen the Son is unbegotten Wisdom The Wisdom of the Son is equally unbegotten with the Wisdom of the Father and that Proposition the Son is begotten Wisdom is only true according to them sensu reduplicativo viz. That the Son who is begotten is also Wisdom Now certainly unbegotten is a very improper sense of being begotten The Phrase of Begotten Wisdom was used without scruple by the Ancients and though Lombard and the bold Lateran Council condemned this Phrase Hand over Head yet the more Prudent Persons of the Romish Church thought it more elegible to allow the Phrase in complyance with Antiquity and strive to evade it by a stretched Interpretation by a sensus reduplicativus The Animadvertor has here borrowed the words of the Shoolmen but without understanding their meaning Nay it is very observable that the Animadvertor who here in p. 156. tells us That it is very true that there is a begotten Mind or Wisdom is of a quite different Opinion p. 159. lin 18. viz. That this cannot be said in Truth and Propriety of speech For God cannot properly be said to beget Wisdom c. I leave him at his leisure to reconcile these two places His the Reverend Dean's Allegation is this p. 166. lin 4. n. 4. That it is usual with the Fathers to represent the three Persons in the Blessed Trinity as distinct as Peter James and John The Animadvertor Answers That the term as distinct is ambiguous For it may either signifie 1. as Real or 2. as Great a distinction As
second Substance So says Thomas Aquinas in his own quotation Anim. p. 272. Hoc nomen Hypostasis apud Graecos significat tantum substantiam particularem quoe est substantia prima sed Latini utuntur nomine substantioe tam pro primâ quam pro secundà P. 249. lin 24. n. 13. The word Subsistentia being by them looked upon as barbarous and not in use St. Augustin manifestly derived Substantia from Subsistere St. August lib. 7. de Tr. cap. 4. and in that Sense translated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet argued against the Plurality of the Phrase Nam si hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere ita non erant dicendoe tres substantioe ut non dicuntur tres essentioe Si autem aliud est Deo esse aliud subsistere sicut aliud Deo esse aliud Patrem esse vel Dominum esse relativè ergo subsistet sicut relativè gignet relativè dominatur Ita substantia non erit substantia quia relativum erit Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus absurdum est autem ut substantia relativè dicatur omnis res ad seipsum subsistet quanto magis Deus Nothing is more evident than that St. Augustin thought relativè subsistere to be a great Absurdity which is his Objection against the Phrase of three Hypostases and also three Persons that they signified absolutely Ibid. cap. 6. yet the Animadverter has the Confidence to quote St. Augustin p. 267. As stating the divine Personalities upon Relation for founding Personality in and upon something relative Nor on the other side P. 249. lin 29. n. 14. would the Greeks acquiesce in a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nor admit of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for fear of falling thereby into the contrary Error of Sabellius I doubt not that the Sabellian Heresy was the cause why the Greeks were not content with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for they did not refuse to admit of the Phrase but thought it alone insufficient but required afterwards either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Addition of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Vide Pet. lib. 4. de Trin. cap. 2. S. 9. N. 15. I. that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are three kinds of Sabellianism The first is the most common the confounding the Persons of the Blessed Trinity which was otherwise called the Patri-passian Heresy which asserts That Father Son and Holy Ghost are only three Names or three Offices of one Person and consequently that the Father suffered this is properly the Heresy of Noetus and not of Sabellius Sabellius Petav. lib. 1. de Trin. cap. 6. S. 5. says Epiphanius expresly denied the Father to suffer However the Latin Fathers scarce knew any other Species of Sabellianism which with Submission I conceive to be one cause why they are less accurate in treating of this Mystery than the Greek Fathers II. A second Species of Sabellianism is the Contraction of the Trinity to the single Person of the Father acknowledging the Father to be a true proper Person asserting the Word or Son to be not strictly and formally the Person of the Father but an Attribute of the Father His personal Wisdom in the same Analogy as Wisdom is an habit of Man in like manner asserting the Holy Spirit to be the personal Power of the Father This Sabellius himself embraced and explained the Trinity by the Similitude of the Body of the Sun its Light or Ray and its Heat The first Epiphan Hoer 62. he resembled to the Father the second to the Son the third to the Holy Ghost this the ancient Fathers called Judaism that is such a Trinity which a Jew would own and by the same reason it may be stiled a Socinian Trinity No Socinian in this Sense will scruple a Father Vide Sti. Basilii Ep. 64. a Word and an Holy Spirit A third Species of Sabellianism is the compounding the Divine Persons which is contrary to a Confusion of them this asserts a real distinction betwixt the Divine Persons but then it makes Father Son and Holy Ghost to be as three parts of some whole Petav. Addenda ad Tom. 2. de Trin. p. 866. So Petavius varius à seipso discrepans videtur Sabellius fuisse ut interdum personas tres quasi partes alicujus totius esse diceret ut ex Epiphanii loco colligitur Petavius undoubtly alludes to that other Similitude of the Trinity mentioned by Epiphanius Epiphan Haer. 62. That the Trinity was by Sabellius sometimes compared to the Body Soul and Spirit in one Man These three are but one Hypostasis These three are Co-essential Parts of one Man which possibly moved Sabellius to invent this Hypothesis to have an evasion to assert in some Sense an Homoousian Trinity Vide Pet. lib. 1. de Tr. cap. 6. S. 3. This kind of Sabellianism was by some of the Fathers called Atheism This Hypothesis in reality ungodding Father Son and Holy Ghost Not the Body alone or the Soul alone or the Spirit alone but all three conjoyntly are one Man so not the Father alone or Son alone or Holy Ghost alone but all three conjoyntly are God whereas the Catholick Faith is that each distinct Person is God The Father is God the Father the Son is God of God the Holy Spirit is in the Language of the Church God the Holy Ghost See both these kinds of Sabellianism condemned by Athanasius in his Oration contra gregales Sabellii Now the Phrase of three Hypostases is contrary to all the Forms of the Sabellian Heresy Of the first there is no doubt the second is as plain to be an Hypostasis and to be an Attribute are inconsistent and contradictory So also to be an incompleat Part a component Part and an Hypostasis are inconsistent It is essential to an Hypostasis to have totale attributum to be a compleat and perfect whole so the Words of the first Article of the Augustan Confession quoted by the Animadverter p. 278. Et utuntur nomine personae ea significatione qua usi sunt scriptores Ecclesiastici ut significet non partem aut qualitatem sed quod propriè subsistet That which properly subsists can neither be as a Part of any Whole nor as a Quality or Attribute of any Being The Scripture says the Reverend Dean of St. Paul s Im sure represents Father Son and Holy Ghost Vindication of Trinity p. 66. as three intelligent Beings not as three Powers or Faculties of the same Being which is downright Sabellianism The very Dreggs of Sabellianism as I take it worse than Sabellianism for as the Reverend Dean adds Faculties are not Persons no nor one Person neither A Million of Faculties and Attributes will not make one Person A Million of Qualities will never make one Substance and a Person is a Substance
and a compleat Substance too Again a Million of Qualities Attributes Faculties can never make one God so that if Father Son and Holy Ghost signify three Faculties three Attributes three Modes not only each single Person is ungodded but the whole Trinity conjoyntly cannot be God The Sabellians acknowledge the Divine Persons to be Deum unum the Catholicks Deum unum trinum but this opinion neither unum nec trinum And hence we may see with what Prudence the Church chose the Phrase of three Hypostases and what danger there would be to change it with a late Reverend Author for three Somewhats P. 247. lin 2. n. 16. Which three Persons superadd to this Divine Nature or Deity three different Modes of Subsistence founding so many different Relations Three human Persons add to the common universal human Nature three different Modes of Subsistence according to the Schoolmen and the Animadverter What then would the Animadverter take this Answer for a Solution of this question what three human Persons are The same reply may justly be made to himself This is the difficulty what in the Deity the ternary number can belong to which a Divine Person is not as the Animadverter has mistaken it what in the Deity the ternary number can belong to which a Divine Person has The Schoolmen answer that the ternary number belongs to an infinite relative Substance I agree with them that a Divine Person is an infinite Substance or which I like better as freer from Ambiguity an infinite substantial Being and that this may be multiplied as well as Divine Person with the Trinity N. 17. The design of the Animadverter in quoting so many places of the ancient Fathers is very vain to prove a Conclusion which none denies that the three Personalities are in some Sense or other three Modes of Subsistence However in respect of the Greek Fathers I have formerly observed that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does not signify a Mode of Subsistence nor 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Subsistence in the Abstract but a subsistent Person or Being in concreto Ruffinus believed Trinitatem in rebus ac subsistentiis N. 18. Anim. p. 268. and not with the Animadverter Trinitatem in modis ac subsistentiis Subsistentia to the Ancients signified concretely the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Boetius of all the Latin Fathers of those times seems most acquainted with the Writings of the Greeks and therefore most expresly determins for the Universality of the common Divine Essence N. 19. he defines a Person in common to God Angels and Men to be rationabilis naturoe individuam substantiam he uses Subsistentia afterwards which shews he looked upon the terms as equivalent Secondly He gives us these remarkable words of the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Boetius thus translates Id est essentioe in solis universalibus quidem esse possunt in solis verò individuis particularibus substant Quo circa cum ipsoe substantioe in universalibus quidem sunt in particularibus verò capiant substantiam jure substantias particulariter subsistentes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 groeci appellaverunt These words are capable of no Evasion that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was in Universals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Individuals and Particulars that the Greeks whose very words he quotes understood it in this Sense and by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 understood Substantias particulariter subsistentes and this jure not impropriè not by a Fetch as Thomas Aquinas Anim. c. p. 272. afterwards Secundum quod Divina verbis humanis significari contingit This Caution is necessary to reconcile the Subtleties of the Schools and the Faith of three Hypostases But Boetius had no need of any such Caution and therefore he used it not and it is the more remarkable that these words I have quoted out of Boetius are in that very Book of two Natures in the one Person of Christ which the Animadverter quotes so that either the Animadverter never read Boetius or read him at a very careless rate N. 20. Peter Lombard is express against the Relativeness of this Term Lib. 1. Sent. Dist 23. n. 1. Person Est unum nomen c. Persona quod secundum substantiam dicitur de singulis Personis pluraliter non singulariter in summa accipitur c. and Dist 25. That this Term Persona is to be taken in one Sense when we say that the Father is a Person the Son is a Person c. and in a different Sense when we say that Father Son and Holy Ghost are three Persons in this last Phrase it only signifies three Personalities in the former a proper Person Now this to me is a betraying of the Catholick Faith a Confession that we ought not to say three Persons if we speak properly if we understand this Term Person in the same Sense in which we say that the Father c. is a Person N. 21. P. 273. The Animadverter quotes these words of Thomas Aquinas Hoc nomen persona in divinis significat relationem per modum rei subsistentis sic hoc nomen Hypostasis I wish our great Critick had translated these words I take this to be the meaning of them viz. That this Name Person in the Trinity signifies a relation conceived by us after the Nature of a Substance and not after the Nature of a Mode which the Animadverter has all along with so much confidence pretended I cannot define Substance better than by res subsistens N. 22. P. 275. lin 9. Only I think fit to remark this That whereas I have alledged some of the Schoolmen and particularly Durandus Thomas and Suarez expressing the Divine Personalities by Relations as well as by Hypostases or Subsistences as they do in both these mean but one and the same thing viz. a Relative Subsistence or a subsisting Relation c. If the Animadverter means that a Relative Subsistence and a subsisting Relation are according to the Schoolmen materially identically the same thing it is no News The Schoolmen hold that the Relation and the Divine Essence in each single Person are thus identically the same each single Person being God that is a pure simple Act. But if he means that they are formally the same it is manifest that he understands neither of the Phrases nor what the Schoolmen meant by them Subsistence which himself very justly calls p. 97. Self-subsistence is an absolute Attribute and can no more be relative than Self-Consciousness By a relative Subsistence the Schoolmen mean that the Relation in each single Person modifies the one common absolute essential Subsistence and renders it incommunicable which of it self as being infinite it was not But a Divine Person being as Ruffinus observed Hoc ipsum quod extat subsistit and consequently the Divine Persons being three Somewhats subsisting three Hypostases in concreto and not three Personalities with Peter Lombard Thomas Aquinas