Porswasion 'T is plain there 's no certainty in resting on their Testimony and that 't is imprudent to rely on them So that we must say one of these two things either that the Senses do never deceive no not in the Eucharist or if that they do deceive in the Eucharist they may always deceive and that their report is never certain And so much the more seeing there was never any occasion wherein one has more reason to perswade ones self That our senses do not deceive us than in this 'T is not only one of our senses which shews us the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine as it happens in infinite occasions where the single testimony of one of these Faculties suffices to make us strongly believe things But all the Senses wherewith Nature has provided us Not the Senses of one or two particular Persons as yours or mine but those of all Men in the World not excepting one These Senses make not their Reports of a strange and foreign Matter but of one of the most ordinary and familiar things they are conversant about So that if they may be deceived herein they may be deceiv'd in every thing else for I know not in what occasion they may be certain if not in this I do in effect acknowledg it somtimes happens our Senses do deceive us whether through defect of the Organ which is out of order or through the failure of the Medium which is not simple and uniform or by reason of the distance or disproportion of the Object But this hinders me not from saying you cannot alledg me any Example which shews us these Faculties abuse us in Circumstances like those which are to be found in the report they make of the Eucharist and wherein not only none of those different Springs of our aforemention'd Errors have any place but wherein a Man may use all imaginable precautions to assure himself he is not mistaken For in fine let not a Man content himself with the bare looking on and viewing the Symbols of this Sacrament but use all his other Senses and those of all the Men in the world Let a Man apply himself thereto with all possible attention make all tryals and proofs which he can yet still will his Senses hold the same Language ever saying 't is Bread and Wine So that if they may deceive us in such an occasion as this we have nothing left to oppose the Academics who have been at such pains to shew these Faculties are not to be trusted In effect this Proof would be in a different manner convincing than that which these Philosophers were wont to use They tell us all Objects appear yellow to Ichterical People and all Meats bitter to those whose Tongues are full of Bile that a Stick half plung'd into the Water seems either broken or crooked though it be streight and entire That a square Spire appears round to those who look on it at a distance But 't is clear all this proves nothing against those who grant That our Senses deceive us when the Organ is out of order when the Medium is not simple when the Object is not placed at a just distance and who only pretend the report of these Faculties is faithful out of the cafe mark'd by these Exceptions and some others such like But if it were not in the Eucharist where 't is clear one cannot apply either this Exception or any other the cause of these Faculties would be absolutely desperate and we should have nothing left to defend it Yet there must be something that is weighty produced in its favour for were it otherwise the Proofs of Christian Religion would be of no solidity And this is as you see my third Proposition and if I prove it as strongly as I have proved the two former I need add nothing to the Conclusion of my Argument to make you acknowledg what I just now offered That your Transubstantiation do's absolutely overthrow our strongest Arguments against Infidelity In the mean time this Proposition is so evident that I don't believe there 's a Disputant in the World obstinate enough to contend it with me First the Proofs of our Religion are drawn from the Matters of Fact you mention'd Yesterday and from the assurance which those who delivered them to us had of their reality Those that attested them knew them only by the means of their Senses not from Arguments or Reasonings for they saw them with their own Eyes and by consequence if their Eyes and other Organs of their Senses might be therein deceived they had in proper speaking no certainty of them and if they had no certainty we are to blame in making account of their Testimony For example We believe Jesus Christ is risen because the Apostles have highly attested this Matter of Fact and that we have just occasion to believe they were strongly persuaded of the truth of what they said But what perswasion could they have of this if the Senses are not to be trusted And in effect ask them how they knew their Master is risen They will only alledg the testimony of their Senses They will tell you their Eyes have seen him their Ears have heard him speak their Hands have touched him But if both Eyes Hands yea and Ears if all their Senses are deceivers who can assure us they did not cheat the Apostles who will assure us that these Holy Men have effectually seen touch'd and heard what they imagin'd they saw touch'd and heard The same I say of the Proofs of the Jewish Religion the truth of which is one of the principal Foundations of the Christian Faith. What is the strongest Proof of this Holy Religion Is it not that which is taken from the Prodigy which Moses shew'd to the Jews when he brought it to them from God But what certainty can there be of all these Prodigies if the Senses of those who have been Witnesses of them may have been deceived How could they persuade themselves of the reality of them had they only for a Foundation of their Persuasion the uncertain report of some Faculties liable to infinite Errors and Delusions Were they not very silly People to expose themselves to so many dangers on so slight grounds And are not we also very credulous to build our Faith on the Persuasion which these People had of these Facts This Faith I say whereby we steer our Lives and on which we advance so many fine Hopes and magnificent Pretensions This is not all both one and the other of these Proofs do moreover suppose in another manner the certitude of the Senses Which is That 't is only the Senses which instruct in the Testimony which these Faculties have given whether to the Ancient Jews or the Apostles and which both one and the other have given to the Truth For in fine how can we know that neither the Jews nor the Apostles did attest all these Facts but by means of their Senses Imagine a Man
the Witness I must acknowledg to you there 's no more in all this but an Humane Faith Opinion and Probability and I must moreover acknowledg that this is not a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith. But it oft happens That besides this Persuasion which we have of ther Probity and Sincerity of the Witness or from other Reasons which we have to believe his Veracity even these Reasons may be so strong as to drive away all Doubts and inspire us with an entire certainty For Example You and I have never been at Rome we cannot know there 's a City bears that Name but from the Testimony of those that have seen it Yet this Testimony is so circumstanc'd that a Man must be a Fool or believe others are such to reject it In effect there are so many People which assure us of it those that affirm it have so little interest to deceive us we see so many things happen which shew that all the World is persuaded of it That there are few Truths we less doubt of than this And this is that we call Moral Certitude which excludes all Doubt and which according to Mr. Huet is no less than that of Metaphysical or Mathematical Demonstrations And this comes very near what one may say of the Testimony of those who witness the Matters of Fact above mentioned This Testimony was not given by one or two Persons but by several at divers times and in different places All these Witnesses may have been perfectly instructed in the Facts which they attest seeing they might have seen them with their own Eyes They had no worldly Interest in saying what they did It was on the contrary much their interest to conceal or deny it A thousand such-like Circumstances do shew that they spake what they thought all which added together will not permit a Man to doubt of the truth of their Testimony So that we have something more than a bare Opinion for we have a perfect Certitude By what I can perceive said I you are not of the Humour of a great number of your Divines who seem to delight themselves in extenuating the force nad clearness of these Proofs You know there are some (d) Durand in 3 dist 24. quest 3. who affirm they are only probalbe Others assure us (e) Du Val in 22. pag. 41. That their Evidence is not so great but that there are other things which have as full conviction and yet are false Some say they be obscure Reasons and which do not convince the Mind that they constrain not an assent and therefore the Will must determine the Mind which these Arguments leave at full liberty I do not only said he to me not approve all this but I do not think 't is sufferable You are in the right said I and I am glad to find you of this Opinion Not but that what your Divines affirm gives me great advantage against your Proofs But besides that I can acquit my self without them I am far from preferring so small an Interest to that of the Glory of Christianity which partly consists in the force and validity of the Arguguments which establish the Divinity of it Let us then esteem these Reasons more than probable and as having that degree of evidence which begets a moral Certainty excluding all doubtfulness and which perswadeth not only that the Matter is as we believe it but moreover that it cannot be otherwise and that 't is morally impossible it should not be This being supposed do you believe these Proofs have the highest degree of this Evidence I in effect suppose That the moral Evidence consists not in an indivisible Point It receives several degrees yea insinite ones It arises from the concourse of Circumstances which give weight to the Testimony on which it is grounded and as these Circumstnaces may be compacted and diversified into a thousand different shapes there may be in them a thousand different degrees of this Evidence So that though it be morally evident there be two Cities in Italy one of which is called Rome and the other Viterbe yet we are more certain of the existence of the first than of that of the second because we have more Relations of the one than of the other It 's morally evident that Alexander Cesar and Henry IV have been than that the first conquer'd Darius and the second the Gauls and that the third dissipated the League Yet we are more certain of the latter of these Facts than of the second and of the second more than of the first Believe then that the Facts whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity are as evident as that there is a City called Rome First of all said he to me I think we are not obliged to make the same judgment of all these Facts some of them being more evident than others and consequently one cannot say of all of them without exception that they are as unquestionable as the Existence of Rome but yet I think we may say it of some of them Supposing said I one might say it of all of them You will at least grant that is as much as can be said of them and that it is more evident that whatever you have offered is true than it is That there 's in Italy a City known under the name of Rome This is said he a thing which I am far from denying and which no Body ever did or will deny There is even one of our Divines who has said the same in so many words (g) Martinon de side Disp 10. Sect. 8. Num. 60. and I am perswaded that all the rest would have said the same had they the occasion Let me said I offer you another Question and then I will conclude Do you think that the highest degree of moral Evidence is higher than the highest degree of the Evidence of Sense Do you believe for Example that 't is more evident to you and I that there 's a City called Rome than 't is at present evident to us that it's day I am far from thinking so repli'd he The moral Evidence is grounded on the certainty of Sense and if our Senses may deceive us the moral Evidence is a mere Chimera How for Example can I know there is such a Town called Rome if those who have seen it and on whose Word I rely may be deceived themselves It must then be granted That the moral Evidence is never greater than that of Sense I add 't is far less the Reason is That if we will build on the Deposition of a Witness we should not only be sure he knows what he says we should also know that he says what he thinks and disguises not his Sentiments Seeing then we are never so sure of what others think as of what we think our selves so we are never so certain that others have seen what they affirm as we are certain we see what we behold It 's then plain That I am more assured of
obtain what I demand I shall be willing it should be in the manner you please whether it be the Senses or the rational Faculty or what other Faculty you will which makes us distinguish the Substances all this is indifferent to me provided you grant me That 't is the same Faculty which discerns that which makes us become Christians This being granted 't will be undeniable that this Faculty cannot be accused of deceiving us in what she tells us of the Eucharist without taking from it whatever it has of Certainty and Authority in the Facts which serve for a Foundation to Faith. Here 's then my second Proof perfectly reestablish'd I shall now do the same thing for the first I drew it hence That the Certainty of the Senses being incomparably greater than that we call Moral should it be granted that Transubstantiation was one of the Doctrines which Christianity obliges us to believe the Objections which might be made against this Holy Religion would have more strength than the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it because that in effect these Proofs have only a moral Evidence whereas the Objections which may be offered against this Holy Religion might have the Evidence of all the Senses which clearly witness against Transubstantiation You do not grant me this last Proposition you affirm 't is not the Senses but Reason which says the Eucharist is Bread and Wine because you pretend there 's only this last Faculty in a condition to discern the Substances and that should the Senses give some Indication they would do it in a manner equally doubtful and indirect I have already declared my unwillingness to enter into all these Discussions for whatever the Faculty is which makes us discern whether the Substances in general or that of the Eucharist in particular it 's sufficient it is a natural Faculty In this Supposition I thus reestablish my first Proof The certainty which accompanies the Functions of the natural Faculty which makes us discern one Substance from another is greater than that we call Moral If then this Faculty tells us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine as it must be granted it does one may offer against Transubstantiation and consequently against Christianity allowing Transubstantiation to be one of its Doctrines one may I say offer against it a greater certitude than that of the Proofs which establish the Divinity of it whereby 't will be more rational to reject than embrace it This Consequence is necessary and whatever past in our first Conference does invincibly prove it So that I only need to establish the Principle whence I draw it viz. That the certainty whereby we commonly discern the Substances from one another is greater than that we call Moral And this is all you can desire of me and if I convince you I expect from your justice no further contentions about it It 's then easy to make you acknowledg this Be pleased then to consider that when we are only morally assured of a thing the certainty we have of it is not comparable to that which those have on whose Testimony it 's believed For Example I am only morally assured of Cesar's Victories and Alexander's Conquest But the Souldiers which serv'd under these two Captains and were in their Armies and shared with them in their Labours these Souldiers I say were far more certain of them than I am yea more than the Historians themselves to whom they related them and on whose Testimony I believe them I am only morally certain of the being of the Cities of Jerusalem Rome and Constantinople having never been in those Places But those that have been and lived there those are far more certain of it than I can be because in effect they have seen these Cities with their own eyes You gave me the Reason of this in our first Conference tho indeed you made the Application of it to the certainty of the Senses But it not being the Application which makes the solidity of it 't will be still as strong whatever use is made of it You tell me we know the things of which we have that which we call a moral certainty only because they are attested to us by Persons whom we have no cause to suspect and who tells us they have seen them with their own Eyes But tho these Persons be not in any sort suspected by us we are far from being so assured of the truth of their Testimony as we are from the Reports of our Senses it 's impossible for us to doubt we see what we do see but it 's not impossible for us to doubt whether others have seen what they tell us We see in this respect the bottom of our own Hearts but we see not all that passes in the Hearts of others We have great Reasons to believe they do not deceive us but these Reasons have not the evidence which accompanies this inward sense of our own Actions which is commonly called Conscience You made me observe in the second place that our Senses do not attest to us the truth of things of which we have no other Certitude than that we call Moral whereas we may easily have a Moral Certainty of most things which are attested to us by our proper Senses My Senses for example do not inform me there 's a City call'd Rome wherefore I have no other than a moral Certainty of it But I do not only know by my own Senses there is a City call'd Paris I know it moreover by those of others who see and have seen it a thousand times so that I have a double Certainty of the being of this Town the moral one and that of Sense By consequence as two is more than one so that Certainty which is merely Moral is necessarily inferior to that of the Senses Suppose we now they are not our Senses but some other Faculty which makes us immediatly discern things yet this will not hinder us from saying still That those who are assured of the Existence of any thing by the reports of this Faculty whatever it be have greater certainty of it than those who know it only from the Testimony of those who have informed themselves by themselves and from the exercise of their own proper Faculties So that take it how we will it is clear that when we are assured only morally of a thing we are much less than those on the Testimony of whom it is believed Or to speak better it is plain that the moral Certainty do's still suppose another greater in those whose Authority is its Prop and Foundation If I then shew you one may have this kind of Certitude term'd moral touching Substances which are no longer or are now in distant parts and where we have never been but I do not say enough if I shew you we may have the highest degree of this kind of certainty shall I not hereby convince you That the moral Certainty is always inferior to that which attends
use them And therefore I must ingenuously confess to you That you cannot touch me in a more tender place But I must affirm at the same time you have undertaken what you will never be able to prove That Transubstantiation overthrows the Arguments of Mr. Huet even those which seem most likely to convert Unbelievers I do not doubt replied I but to make it plain to you and I am willing you should make no account of my Arguments if you your self do not find they carry along with them the clearest Evidence But if you please let me hear first which are the Arguments Mr. Huet has made use of for those are they which be in question between us The Proofs said he are certain undeniable historical Matters of Fact and which are moreover of such a nature That they cannot be true if Christian Religion be not of God and the Matters of Fact be these That long before our Saviour's Time the Jews had certain Books which they esteem'd Sacred and which they believed were written by Men inspired of God. That these Books have come down to us without alteration and that we have them such as they were before our Lord's Incarnation That they contain divers Prophecies which promise a Deliverer to the Jewish Nation whom they mention under the name of Messias distinctly denoting his Birth his actions his Death and Resurrection and in general the most remarkable Passages of his Life That under the Empire of Tiberius there appeared in Judea a Man called Jesus who said he was this Messias That there was seen in his Person whatever the Writings of the Prophets had foretold should be observable in the Messias That he moreover wrought several Miracles to prove his Mission That having been crucified by the Jews he after three days rose again and was carried up into Heaven To which we may add that after his Ascension his Apostles proclaimed his Resurrection throughout all the World and confirmed it by various and infinite Miracles That this Testimony which they gave drew on them a thousand cruel Persecutions and engaged them into the necessity of undergoing Poverty Contempt Imprisonments and the most cruel Punishments the World could inflict on them yet all this was not able to make them alter their course That their Preaching perswaded an infinite number of People of all Nations and especially great numbers of the Jews That the Church which they founded by this means suffered an uninterrupted Persecution for the space of 300 Years and yet daily encreased and spread it self over the whole World. 'T is true that Mr. Huet has not insisted on the last of these Facts but besides that they be of the same Order as the preceding I believe 't is fit they should be added as being of great use for the establishing of the Truth of Christian Religion In a word if both one and the other be true 't is not possible but the Christian Faith must come from God and he that denies so necessary a Consequence may deny the clearest Truths which have hap'ned in the World. These Facts being true the Birth of Jesus Christ his Actions his Death his Resurrection his Ascension and in general all the particulars of his Life have been foretold several Ages before they have happened and what is most considerable they have been foretold not by one or two particular Persons but by a long Train as I may say of Prophets who have succeeded one another in several Ages and who seem to have been chiefly rais'd up for this purpose by Prophets I say in whom were to be seen all the Marks which denote Persons inspired of God. If these Matters of Fact be true our Saviour himself has justified his Mission by a great number of Miracles all infinitely above the force of Nature and circumstanced in the likeliest manner in the World to persuade us they were the immediate Effects of an Almighty Power If these things be true the Eternal God has raised up his Son from the Grave took him up into Heaven and thereby declared in an unquestionable manner That he owned him not only for his great Prophet but for his only Son it not being to be supposed he would do all these things in favour of one that had falsly usurp'd that Title If these Facts be true Christianity has establish'd it self in the World in a manner wholly Divine and which shews with the greatest evidence That Heaven has concern'd it self in it the Powers thereof alone being able to triumph over the Resistances and Oppositions of the Earth So that I do not comprehend how a Man can acknowledg all these things and deny Christian Religion to be of God. You are in the right repli'd I but the difficulty if there be any consists in establishing the Truth of these things How will you prove them For you know the Infidels are not agreed in them The Infidels said he do not dony all of them They acknowledg several of them and which consequently there 's no need of justifying As to the rest in which they will not agree with us it 's no hard matter to establish the Truth of them But what Proofs said I must one use for this Such as are wont to be offered to prove these king of things answered he I know all sorts of Proofs are not proper to establish all kind of Truths Abstracted Verities such as are those which Metaphysicks teach us are not proved by the Senses nor by Authority but by Domonstrations Whereas on the contrary Matters of Fact do not shew themselves at least in this manner but if they be present we make People see or touch them whom we would convince of the truth of them and if they are past and at a distance we use the Testimony of those who have seen them or certainly known them Thus the Truths which serve for a Foundation to the Proofs of the Christian Religion consisting in Facts and those past and ancient enough you plainly see hence we must not expect to establish them by Metaphysical or Mathematical Demonstrations nor by the Depositions of Sense We must content our selves with the Testimony of those who have seen them with their own Eyes and who could not be deceived themselves nor have any design of deceiving others Is this sufficient repli'd I. A bare Testimony of Men can it produce any thing else than a Humane Faith And is Humane Faith a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith Is not Humane Faith a kind of Opinion and can an Opinion uphold what the Scripture calls (e) Heb. xi i. the Substance of things hoped for and a demonstration of such as are not seen I am surpriz'd said he that so small a thing should stop you When we consider in the Testimony received only the bare Authority of him that speaketh when we attend to that alone and the Faith which is grounded thereon has no other Foundation than the esteem we have for the Probity and Sincerity of
what I do not know but by the relation of my Senses than of that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence But this is not all for I say but one half of what may be alledg'd The Example which you have made use of gives me occasion to add something stronger You ask me if it be more evident there 's a City called Rome than 't is evident that it 's now Day You do not consider That I do not only know by myown Senses it is Day but by those of others For were I in fine blind yet I might know this with certainty I need only to be led to the Exchange to Church to Dinner c. for this purpose And therefore I take it for granted That the blind Men about our Streets are as certain 't is Day as that there is such a place as Rome I believe then That the Evidence which arises from the relations of Sense considered alone is not greater than the moral Evidence being impossible to be less as I now proved I affirm That in this Supposition to demand whether 't is more evident it is Day than whether there be such a City as Rome is just as if you should ask whether two be more than one The Existence of Rome as to us has but one only Evidence and that a moral one Whereas it is now Day has two the Moral Evidence and the Evidence of Sense Each of these two is at least equal to that of the Existence of Rome It is at least then as much again evident it is Day as that there 's a City called Rome Yet is it true said I it 's more evident the Eucharist is Bread and Wine than that it is Day Only the Senses of those who live and are awake at present attest the latter whereas the Senses of all Men who live or have lived since the planting of the Gospel have affirm'd the former All our Senses do not attest it 's now Day only our Sight tells us so whereas all our Senses tell us That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine In effect take a consecrated Host take consesecrated Wine Ask your Eyes what they are Ask your Nose your Palat and your Hands Ask them ten thousand times the same Question they will ever answer you what they have always answer'd those who have consulted them on this Matter They will tell you 't is Bread and Wine In a word the Senses never attested any thing in a more clear expressive and authentic manner than what they depose on the Subject of the Eucharist And if they deceive us herein they are not to be believed in any thing whatever Grant we then the Proofs of Christianity do use the highest degree of Moral Evidence seeing the Testimony of our Senses circumstanc'd in the manner as that is which shew's us the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine hath at least twice as much evidence as that which has the highest degree of moral Evidence it 's beyond all question that this Testimony is twice again as evident as the Proofs of Christianity This is clear and I doe not believe you either will or can deny it Here then are three grand Conclusions which I draw from this Principle The first That if Transubstantiation were one of the Doctrins of Christianity as you pretend Christian Religion would be opposed with greater strength than Mr. Huet could bring forth to maintain it In effect did Transubstantiation make a part of Christian Religion one might oppose against it whatever is offered against Transubstantiation I have now shew'd you one may oppose against Transubstantiation all the evidence of Sense One might offer all this same Evidence against Christianity were it true that Christianity comprehended Transubstantiation This is that which opposes Christianity in your Principles Let 's see now what Mr. Huet do's to maintain it He brings Arguments which as we have already observ'd are only grounded on moral Evidence which is never half so great as that of sense If then two be more than one it 's clear That granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Christian Doctrins Christianity is attack'd with greater strength than Mr. Huet can defend it with It is clear according to this Supposition an Infidel will more strongly prove That Christian Religion is false than Mr. Huet can prove it is true All which would never be were Transubstantiation put out of the number of Christian Doctrins By which means the Proofs of this Holy Religion would conserve all their strength and the Infidels would have nothing that 's rational to oppose against them These Proofs are most solid in themselves and capable of convincing every reasonable Body who searches the Truth and is disposed to follow it through all parts where he finds it There 's nothing but Transubstantiation which weakens them Granting Transubstantiation these Proofs will be of no validity Take away this Doctrine our Proofs subsist and have their effect It do's not belong then to your Doctors who hold Transubstantiation to defend Christianity The best Arguments will never be good ones in their Mouths Only we can propose them without weakning them So that I told you nothing but what you find true when I affirmed a while ago That Mr. Huet's Book which would be an excellent Work were it writ by a Protestant is without conviction coming from a Man of your Party And this is Sir my first Conclusion The second follows which is That whereas an Infidel to whom was offered Mr. Huet's Arguments without any mention of Transubstantiation or who should suppose that Christianity do's not oblige us to believe it would be irrational should he not embrace a Religion so well grounded so in like manner he would fall in to as great a fault and act as much against Reason if supposing the contrary and letting himself be perswaded one cannot be a Christian without believing Transubstantiation he should receive both Transubstantiation and Christian Religion What I have now been saying to you does necessarily draw along with it this Consequence But to remark more clearly the necessity of it be pleased to observe That what makes an Infidel a Christian are the Reasons which perswade him That the Christian Religion was revealed by God. In effect that which induces us to believe Things are the Reasons good or bad which seem to us to uphold the Opinion which we embrace So that should one Persuade ones self of any thing without Ground or Reason that Man will act foolishly and sottishly though the thing it self should be true So the Infidel who shall make himself a Christian without Reason would apparently offend against good Sense And this is the general Notion of your Divines which I need not alledg to you for having read them you must needs remember them A Man then never believes without Reason if he believes wisely and judiciously But it seldom hapning that the Reasons are all on one side there being commonly some for and some against
you will not deny but every time when this happens it 's the duty of a wise Man and of such a one who will not be mistaken to take the Ballance if I may so speak and exactly weigh these Reasons to give the preference to those which appear to him of greatest weight I do not know whether any Body uses to do otherwise One may I confess prefer Reasons which in truth and reality are of less force than the contrary ones But this is when a Man deceives himself Ex duobus credibilibus non tenetur homo credere alterum quod est minus vel equaliter credibile Bannez 22. Quast 10. Art. 1. Concl. 3. Non est prudentis hominis alteram partem assentire prae alterâ si pari vel sere pari momento rationes utrinque urgeant Censeo ad haec neque fieri omnino posse ut eam partem quis approbet assensu suo in quam nihil inclinat majoris ponderis quam in adversam Rationis utrinque pares rationes sunt nullae Multo minus fieri potest ut alteram partem quis approbet si in alteram inclinet pondus majus Est Dilucid Communis doctrinae Theol. n. 22 23. by taking the weakest Arguments for the strongest For in fine I am persuaded That a Man convinced of the weakness of a Reason will never after value that as he do's another which appears stronger to him seeing to yield to a Reason is to judg it stronger than that which opposes it It 's the same with Reasons or Arguments as 't is with Weights put two Weights in a pair of Scales and if they be equal the Scales shall stand at an equal ballance if they be unequal the Scale will immediately incline downwards wherein is the greatest weight In the same manner offer a rational Man Arguments which maintain an Opinion and others which oppose it If after all things well considered he finds these Opinions of equal force he will encline to neither side But for the smallest advantage which those of one side have over those of the other the Mind determines it self for the strongest Or at least it do's not determine it self for the weakest and it is every whit as impossible it should do it as 't is impossible a lesser Weight should weigh down a greater But whether this be so or not you will at least allow me this That it ought not to be and that 't is contrary to good sense to determine ones self in favour of an Opinion which we see grounded on Reasons less strong than those which oppose it And this is what your Authors do acknowledg (h) Martinon de fide Disp 5. Sect. 7. n. 42. and in effect were it otherwise one might innocently leave a good Religion and take up a bad one although we saw the Religion we leave more firmly grounded than that we take up But this being ridiculous it must be acknowledged that good Sense will not let a Man embrace an Opinion which he sees is more strongly opposed than maintained This being granted Sir Let 's suppose an Infidel to whom is offered Mr. Huet's Arguments if he be wise he will not yield to them till he has seen whether there be any thing which opposes these Arguments which counterballances them or dissipates them Imagine we afterwards the Christian Doctrine to be proposed to him discharged of Transubstantiation 'T is clear he will find nothing which shall counterpoise these Reasons So that these Reasons being good and nothing being able to diminish the solidity of them if he be wise he will embrace them Let us on the contrary imagine that by an Illusion of which we have seen a thousand Examples he is made believe That Transubstantiation is inseparable from Christianity What will he do If he be rational he will take the Ballance and weigh on one hand Mr. Huet's Arguments and on the other those which combat Transubstantiation and consequently Christianity in the supposition he is in that they are inseparable If he holds the Ballance even he will find That the Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation weigh more than those which favour Christianity He will find that the first weigh two and the second but one In effect the weight of Reasons is their Evidence The Reasons which oppose Transubstantiation have all the evidence of Sense those of Mr. Huet have only a moral Evidence which at most have but half of that of Sense The first then weigh as much again as the second This being so how can you expect the Infidel should give the preference to the second over the first and whom will you perswade that if he does do it he will act regularly Do you know what right Reason will suggest to him That Transubstantiation is not one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches He will say it is impossible Mr. Huet's Reasons should be valid if Christianity comprehends Transubstantiation and it must necessarily be either that this Doctrine has been added to the Christian Religion contrary to the intention of its Founder or that these Reasons be false Yet it 's apparent these Reasons are not false seeing they are evident and that the more they are considered the greater impression they make We must then believe that Transubstantiation which would destroy them should it take place is not one of the Christian Doctrines He will confirm himself in this Opinion by this Consideration That the Author of Christianity whoever he was having form'd his Religion with a design to make it be embraced by all Men and being able to make it very fit to be universally received by not burdening it with Transubstantiation it is not to be supposed he introduced this Doctrine which is likely only to make it be rejected by judicious Men. This will more especially appear to him inconceivable in respect of God whom he will acknowledg for the true Author of this Holy Religion if he well comprehends the force of Mr. Huet's Reasons So good and wise a God could nto on one hand require Men should embrace the Revelation he offered them and on the other lay an invincible opposition between this Revelation and the purest notices of Reason which he himself had given them to be their Rule in all Cases he could not on one hand oblige them to be Christians under pain of eternal damnation and on the other so order things that they could not be such without violating all the Maxims of good Sense and all the Rules of Prudence And this is Sir what the Insidel will say if he be a rational Person But if he has not understanding enough to perceive all this yet at least he will see That right Reason will not let him embrace the Christian Religion such as it is offered him I add in the Third place That not only he ought not to embrace it but that it is impossible he should Which is easy to be proved from the principles of your own Divines All of
Senses are deceived in taking for Bread and Wine what is not so The second is That if our Senses may be mistaken in the Eucharist they may be as well mistaken in every thing else so that their Depositions have nothing certain The third is That if our Senses may be mistaken in the discovery of their Objects be they what they will The Proofs of Christian Religion are of no value The better to comprehend the Force of this Argument I believe 't will not be amiss to pass over it again and carefully to examine its Propositions The first appears to me very evident for I have always taken Error to be the persuading of a Man's self That a thing is what it is not or to judg that it is not what it is This being granted it cannot be denied but that our Senses do deceive us in the Eucharist if they attempt the perswading us That it is any other thing than what it is Yet this they do if Transubstantiation takes place For in fine if this Doctrine were true the Eucharist would not be Bread and Wine but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. And yet our Senses attest the contrary they all unanimously say with one Voice that it is not our Lord's Body and Blood but Bread and Wine To prove what I say Shew the Eucharist to an Infidel who has no knowledg of your Mystery and ask him what it is He 'l answer without hesitation 't is Bread and Wine Ask a Child the same question he will return you the same answer In fine offer it to a Brute and he will do what he is wont when ordinary Bread and Wine is set before him Now what is the common light to this Infidel this Child and brute Beast nothing else but that of Sense whereupon it cannot be denied but our senses tell us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and it appears impossible to affirm that it is not so without giving the lye to these Faculties This will appear more clearly if you please to consider That the Faculty which tells us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is the same which makes us discern other Objects and makes us say of each of them This is such a thing Who will deny that 't is by means of the Senses we discover what is present to us In effect those who have lost the use of their Senses do discern nothing and those who are not absolutely deprived of these Faculties yet have them weak'ned through defect of the Organs are easily mistaken Lead a blind Man within some paces of a Statue and ask him what that is which stands before him He will answer you he do's not know offer the same question to another that is not quite blind but yet has bad Eyes He 'l tel you perhaps 't is a Man. Whereas on the contrary a Man whose sight is good will tell you presently 't is a Statue Is it not plain then That 't is the Sight which discerns this Object When then we see the Eucharist and we touch and taste it we say it's Bread and Wine it 's clear we say it from the relation of our Eyes our Hands and our Mouths And consequently if it be found that 't is not Bread and Wine it cannot be denied but that 't is our Senses which have cheated and deceived us It is not worth the while to set upon the proving of a thing which your Divines willingly grant One might produce some hundred's of places in their Works where they affirm what I say (a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses Chap. 6. They maintain that the Fathers (b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. have strictly charged their People not to trust their Senses in this occasion extreamly blaming those who suffer themselves to be guided by these Faculties in a matter wherein according to them we should follow no other Light than that of Faith and Revelation They pretend nothing do's more enhance the merit of this Faith Than her raising her self above the Senses and perswading her self of the contrary of what these Faculties do witness to us I doe not doubt Sir but you have observ'd all this in the reading of your Authors It 's true answer'd he and I will not contest with you about this first Proposition But I will not grant you the second For in fine what necessity is there that the Senses deceiving us in this Object they cannot faithfully instruct us in any other Is it not very likely that this is a single Error and without any consequence May they not deceive us in this occasion and in some others without extending this to all In effect the greatest Lyars do sometimes tell true and perhaps there is not one amongst this sort of People but speaks more Truth than Lies Why may we not then say the same thing of our Senses You have not well comprehended my meaning rerepli'd I for I did not say That if our Senses be deceived in the Eucharist they must necessarily be deceived in every thing else But only that they may be so that the thing is not impossible and we shall never be certain of the contrary unless we know it by some other way This is all I say and I hope to shew you in what follows that I need no more In the mean time my Proposition thus exprest is undenyable In effect he that deceives once may deceive always and 't is sufficient a Witness be once detected of Falsity to be suspected all his Life Thus the Senses according to you making untrue reports on the Eucharist we may as well suspect them to do the same on other things This is clear but to make it more unquestionable be pleased to consider That if the Senses do once deceive their relation is no longer a certain Mark and an unquestionable Proof of Truth For how can we look on that to be a certain Mark of Truth which is sometimes joyn'd with Error And consequently To have no other Foundation for ones Perwasions than the relations of our Senses this would be to rest on uncertain and doubtful Marks and to expose ones self to the greatest likelihood of being deceived To say the same thing in another manner let me Sir ask you Whether the bare relation of our Senses without any other Succours be a sufficient Motive to persuade us what they attest or not If it be 't is not possible our Senses can once deceive us for if they should we should have a sufficient Motive to persuade us of a thing which is false which we must be far from saying For were this so we should be bound to deceive our selves and this Error would not only be excusable but necessary there would be an Obligation of falling into it and 't would be a fault if we did not But this is intollerably absurd Now if the Testimony of our Senses be not a sufficient Foundation whereon to ground a solid
bereaved of all his five Senses or only of the two principal ones Sight and Hearing suppose him at the same time both Deaf and Blind how will you make him understand the solidity of these Proofs You may speak to him long enough of the Prophecies of the Old Testament of our Saviour's and Moses his Miracles and other things which establish the Truth of Christian Religion This will be just the same as if you discoursed to a Stone It 's only our Senses then which make us receive these Proofs So that should we know That those of the Apostles and other Witnesses of the Truth could not deceive them this would signify nothing to us should we have just reason to believe we might be deceived by ours By consequence the certainty of Sense is doubly necessary to establish the solidity of the Proofs of Christianity and these Proofs will be two ways uncertain if the report of our Senses be not to be trusted See now Sir if there be any thing more true than what I told you a while ago That Transubstantiation absolutely destroys these Proofs and takes from them all their Validity See whether in supposing this Doctrine one may hinder Libertines from using this arguing It 's contrary to good Sense to receive this Revelation which destroys it self which overthrows its own Foundations which annuls and discredit's the means by which it endeavours to establish it self and whose Proofs cannot be true without being false nor assured without being uncertain This is what may be said of Christianity if it be true it teaches things contrary to the relation of our Senses For in fine Christianity has hitherto establish'd it self only on the depositions of these Faculties Hereby it has met with belief in the Minds of Men. If then one of its Maxims be we must not trust any of our Senses it 's evident and unquestionable we may say of it what we now affirmed It 's evident it is self-contradictory enjoining us on one hand to believe the report of our Senses when they instruct us in what should induce us to receive it and forbidding us at the same time to hearken to them in one of its chiefest Doctrines It overthrows its own Foundations seeing it destroys the faithfulness of our Senses on which the persuasion which we have of its truth is grounded Hereby it annuls and discredits the means by which it endeavours to set up it self and this is so visible that we need not undertake to shew it In a word its Proofs cannot be true without being false nor certain without being uncertain In effect if the Proofs of Christianity be good whatever it say's is true and if whatever it says be true these Proofs be nothing worth seeing one of the things which it affirms is That the report of our Senses whence these Proofs be taken is uncertain Is it not true Sir That setting up Transubstantiation the Infidels would on very good grounds use this Arguing In particular would they not have reason to complain that they are not sincerely dealt with seeing we pretend to convince them by the Depositions of Witnesses which we do not produce till we have strip'd them of all their Authority and declared them unfaithful and deceivers After this great Interest I see nothing which is worth contending for and if our Faith loses the means of establishing it self in the World as she do's lose it in losing her Proofs It 's not worth the while to demonstrate the other Consequences of your Doctrine nor particularly the Disorders which the uncertainty of our Senses once establish'd would infallibly bring forth into the World. They are both infinite and inexplicable because that in effect our Senses are almost the only Guides which we follow and their Fidelity is the chief Foundation of all the certainty we can have therein Your abstracted Truths which are perceivable only to the Understanding and which are so useful in Sciences are of little use in the Commerce of the World wherein Men apply themselves to things which be singular which are not known but by the interposition of the Senses So that to ruin the certainty of our Senses is to turn all into confusion and reduce Men to such a condition that they shall not take a step without being troubled with some Scruple But as I have already observ'd this is not the Point 'T is sufficient I have shew'd That the solidity of the Proofs which establish the Truth of Christian Religion depends on the certainty of our Senses so that Transubstantiation absolutely destroying this certainty invalidates these Proofs and stops the Mouths of those who undertake the Conversion of the Infidels This single Consequence is dreadful enough and we need not draw any other to shew the falsity of the Principle whence it flows It 's better to pass to my third Proof which is to shew That your Doctrine overthrows the certainty of our Reason as well as that of our Senses and gives such an establishment to Scepticism as bereaves us of all means of finding out the Truth And this is what I intend to make clear to you if I have not already tired your patience I shall hear you with all my Heart answer'd he but I must tell you That before I hear your third Argument I should be very glad to examine the two you have already offered me for I see abundance of things which I might oppose against what you have said but they lying something obscurely and confusedly in my Mind I must beg time of you to bring them into some clearness and order which as soon as I have done I shall not fail to wait on you with an account of them I easily consented to what he desired telling him I wish'd every Body would as maturely examine these great Points before they determin'd themselves I blam'd the rashness of those whose Eyes are dazl'd with the first glance of an Argument whereby they fall into a ridiculous lightness or an insupportable obstinacy Mr. N. spake to the same purpose and our conversation having for some time been on this Point I took my leave of him and departed CONFERENCE III. Wherein are confirmed the two Proofs contained in the two preceding Discourses THE next Day Mr. N. took the pains to come to me and immediately told me he had carefully appli'd himself to examine my Reasons and believed he had found a solution of them I have observed said he to me that both your Propositions depend on the same Supposition to wit That Transubstantiation is directly contrary to the reports of our Senses and that whereas this Doctrine tells us the Eucharist is no longer Bread nor Wine but the proper Body and Blood of our Saviour our Senses on the contrary tell us That this Sacrament is not the Body and Blood of our Saviour but real Bread and Wine This has inclined me to think That tho our Divines have not considered your Proofs in the same manner you have proposed them
yet I might find in their Writings wherewith to defend my self by what they answer to the direct Testimony of our Senses which your Authors have always objected I have enquired into what they have said on this Subject and found five different Solutions Some of them have absolutely denied without reserve that our Senses have any certainty Others acknowledg that these Faculties do not deceive us in the things comprehended in the order of Nature but they will not suffer us to consult them in Matters of Faith. Some allow them a certainty in Matters of Faith but say 't is a certainty inferior to that of Faith. Most of them assure us That the Senses do not perceive the Substance so that the Error wherein one falls by persuading one's self that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is not in the Senses but in our Reason Others do in fine acknowledg that our Senses do well perceive the Substance but in an indirect manner and with great incertitude so that their report is not certain but in reference to the accidents I am well assured the two first Answers be false and should I not otherwise know it your second Reason would not permit me to doubt of it For in fine were our Senses without certainty whether in general or in particular in Matters of Faith the Proofs of Christian Religion would be but mere delusions as you sufficiently convinced me Yesterday The third of these Answers supposes a Thing which is false to wit That a Faculty which has certainty may ever have need of being corrected It supposes another which is very doubtful and in which our Divines are not agreed viz. That Faith has more certainty than the Testimony of our Senses Moreover granting all this to be true I know not whether one might make use of it against your Reasons You do not speak of the certainty which a Man that believes already may have of the Truths of Salvation but only of that which one might give an Infidel But the means to perswade an Infidel that the Senses may deceive must be by convincing him of the Divinity of our Religion which accuses the Senses of Infidelity And the way to convince him of the Divinity of this Religion must be by Reasons which suppose that these Faculties do not deceive us I do not then make any great reckoning of these three Answers and therefore I shall not oppose them against you But 't is not the same with the two last for if it be true that our Senses reach not so far as the Substance but perceive only the Accidents all that these Faculties learn us of the Eucharist is That this Sacrament still retains the Accidents of Bread and Wine which is a true Notion and contains nothing contrary to our belief Should we say moreover with those who make the second Answer That our Senses well perceive the Substance but yet in a manner indirect and subject to Error and Deceit one may truly say That Transubstantiation is contrary to the report of our Senses but not to this direct and certain report whence springs this firm perswasion called Experimental Knowledg It will be only contrary to this indirect and uncertain Report which can only establish a tottering Opinion which is almost as often false as true This being granted you cannot reestablish your Proofs unless you distinctly maintain these three things First That the Senses do perceive the very Substance it self either directly or indirectly however with certainty The second That this Certainty which our Senses give us touching the Substances is greater than that of the Facts whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity The third That this Certainty is the ground of these Proofs and that they cannot subsist if our Senses may be deceived in the discerning of these kind of Objects ' I would be an easy matter for me said I to him to maintain this against all opposition But others (a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses having already done it and this Discussion being likely to engage us into difficult Enquiries and the force of my Arguments not depending thereon I therefore am willing to wave that dispute and betake my self to what is so evident and undeniable as I am sure must satisfy you Will you not grant me Sir That we do every day discern one Substance from another Will you not grant me for Example that I now distinguish whatever is in this Chamber and that I can truly say This is a Table this is a Book this is a Bed this a Chair I do not say there 's certainty in these Judgments I make I do not determine which is the Faculty which makes me do it I only say I do do it Can you deny me this to be true or shall I set about the proving of it No answer'd he A Man must be void of Sense that requires it Will you then in the second place deny me pursued I that I make this judgment by some of the Faculties which God has given me I mean those Faculties purely natural which are common to all Men and perform their Functions without any supernatural assistance internal or external without any external Revelation without any inward illumination of the Spirit I am far from denying it answered he and I am perswaded there 's no Catholick that questions it This said I is enough and I need no more for the subsistence of my Proofs And to convince you of what I say I shall bring them to this Head I shall retrench whatever you dislike in them and instead of the Senses which trouble you I shall only speak of that natural Faculty which makes us distinguish one Substance from another You 'l see they will keep all their strength and be wholly sheltred from your Distinctions I begin with the second There being some necessity for it It consisted of these three Propositions 1. If Transubstantiation has place our Senses deceive us in the report they make of the Eucharist 2. If our Senses deceive us in the report which they make of the Eucharist they may as well deceive us in every thing else 3. If our Senses may deceive us in every thing the Proofs of Christianity are of no solidity This is the sum of my Second Proof which I offered you yesterday Now be pleas'd to observe how I further express it 1. If Transubstantiation has place the natural Faculty which God has given us whereby to distinguish one Substance from another this Faculty deceives us in the notice it gives us of the Eucharist 2. If the natural Faculty whereby we distinguish one Substance from another be mistaken on the Subject of the Eucharist nothing hinders but that it may be the fame on other Substances 3. If the natural Faculty whereby we discern the Substances has no certainty the Proofs for Christian Religion be of no weight You see Sir that forming my Argument in this manner your Distinctions are beside the purpose and
altogether fruitless Wherefore you cannot defend your self but in denying some of the Propositions of which it consists but which of the three can you deny Not the first I suppose For in fine if Transubstantiation has place The Sacrament of the Eucharist is not Bread nor Wine but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. Yet the natural Faculty whereby we discern the Substances from one another whatever that is and whatever name we give it this Faculty tells us that 't is not the Body and Blood of Christ but Bread and Wine If you doubt of this shew this Sacrament to a Man indued only with those Faculties which Nature has given us and who has never received any supernatural assistance to a Jew or to a Mahometan or Pagan Ask him what it is and you 'l see how little he will hesitate to answer you it 's Bread and Wine If you still doubt of this desire a Priest to mix a consecrated Host amongst others unconsecrated Employ then all your natural Faculties to distinguish that which is the Body of Christ from the rest which is mere Bread You 'l find all your care here to no purpose It 's then certain that the natural Faculty whereby we discern Substances affirms plainly the Eucharist to be Bread and Wine and therefore deceives us if your Belief be true Thus my first Proposition labours under no difficulty And the second is no less certain than the first For in fine if the natural Faculty whereby we distinguish one Substance from another may take the Body of Christ for Bread and Wine there will be no deceit of which 't will not be capable there being nothing in the World more discernable and subject to less mistakes than an human Body on one hand and a morsel of Bread and some drops of Wine on the other I have only then to prove my third Proposition which is in effect the only one which appears to have need Yet is it certain I shall have little trouble to make you agree with me in it It saith That the certainty with accompanies the Acts of the natural Faculty and makes us distinguish the Substances That this Certitude I say is the Foundation of the Proofs of Christianity and that we cannot solidly establish the truth of this Holy Religion if the Senses may deceive us in the reports they make of these kind of Objects I conceive nothing more certain than this Proposition In effect we agreed in our first Conference That the Proofs of Christian Religion depends on the Truth of certain Facts which we never saw but which are attested to us by Persons whose Testimony ought not to be suspected by us Yet it will reasonably be so if we be not in a capacity to discern certainly particular Substances And this will clearly appear if we run through the most important of these Facts The most considerable and the most decisive is without difficulty being our Saviour's Resurrection for the whole depends hereon If this Fact be false the Gospel is but a mere Romance and if it be true it cannot be deni'd but God has declar'd himself hereby in the most authentic manner in the World in favour of our Holy Religion And the Apostles were chiefly sent to attest the Truth of this Fact and hence it is That they so often seem to affect as it were the title of Witnesses of their Master's Resurrection But 't is very considerable That the Apostles were not present at our Lord's Resurrection He was not in the Sepulchre when these holy Men arrived there and they found only the Funeral Linen wherewith his Body was wrapped They knew not then our Saviour was risen by seeing him come out of the Tomb and as they beheld Lazarus but they gathered it from two other Facts of which they were certain having already seen the first and seeing then actually the second The one was his Death and the other his Life They were sure our Lord had expired on the Cross That his Side was pierced with a Spear that they might be certain of his Death They knew that he was buried and consequently could not have the least suspicion that he was not really dead They saw him afterwards alive and walking acting and speaking whence they concluded in the clearest manner in the World and the least liable to mistake that he was effectually risen It 's then plain that the Truth of Christ's Resurrection depends on one hand in knowing whether he died and on the other whether he liv'd after his Death But what certainty can there be of either of these two Facts if there be none in the judgment we make of Substances These two Facts are equally contested The Basilidians denied heretofore the first and the Mahometans deny it to this day both affirming 't was not our Saviour Christ but Simon the Cyrenian that was crucified by the Jews The Jews have ever denied the second They say it 's very true our Saviour died on the Cross but that he never rose again and that what the Apostles related of it was a mere Fable If we may be deceived in these kind of Objects what can we oppose to either of these Enemies of the Truth How shall we convince either the Basilidians or Mahometans That it was Jesus and not Simon who expired on the Cross How shall we perswade the Jews the Apostles were not deceived in imagining they saw him alive and risen Will not both one and the other have grounds to tell us we have no certainty for what we affirm The Turks will tell us That seeing we may be so easily deceived in the discerning of Substances it 's very likely the Jews took Simon for Jesus Christ The Jews will answer the Error was not theirs but that the Apostles took some Spirit or living Man for their Master And as to us we have nothing convincing to oppose against one or the other And here Sir let me entreat you to consider the imprudence of Bellarmine Amongst other Reasons he uses to shew the Senses have no certainty when the Question is about discerning the Substances he particularly cites (b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. the Instance of Mary Magdalen who took our Saviour risen for the Gardiner I shall not stand to shew here the weakness of this Argument nor say 't was scarcely then light when Mary came into the Garden where our Saviour was buried Neither shall I use long Discourses to prove That her trouble grief or perhaps modesty would not let her look directly on a Man whom she did not know But that which I would entreat you to consider is the stroak which this Argument of Bellarmine might give to the certainty of our Faith were it as solid as he pretends it to be It proves nothing or it proves one might take our Saviour risen for another Man and consequently that one might take another Man for Jesus Christ risen and so when the Apostles saw our Lord risen they
which follow'd him and who hereby in some sort shew'd their readiness to receive his Doctrine Believe me (a) John xiv for my Works said he to them And in another place (b) St. John v. 36. The Works which I do bear testimony of me He used them to confirm the Faith of his Disciples and opposes this alone to the Temptations which shook them (c) Luke 24.25 26 27. O fools and flow of heart to believe all that the Prophets have spoken Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into his Glory Then says St. Luke beginning at Moses and all the Prophets he expounded to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself And when St. John the Baptist sent to him his Disciples to demand of him whether he was the Messias he gave them for his full answer these words (d) Mat. xi 4 5. Go and tell John what you see and hear The Blind recover their sight the Lame walk the Lepers are cleans'd the Deaf hear the Dead are risen and the Gospel is preached to the Poor The Apostles have herein imitated their Master as well as in other things one of them declaring at the end of his Gospel (e) John x◠That he wrote the Miracles of the Son of God that we might believe that Jesus is the the Christ the Son of God and that believing we might have Life through his Name The Fathers have followed these incomparable Guides The modern Authors have trod in their steps Ask me now Sir then no more what hurt there is in saying Mr. Huet's Proofs be of no weight I dare say they be not only valid but that he can not be a Christian who naturally denies them Your Answer is also attended with this Vexation that 't is equally injurious to the Wisdom of God and to the Memory of those who have hitherto embraced the Profession of the Truth For as to the first if the accomplishment of the ancient Prophecies the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles do prove nothing Wherefore did God take that care to perform them And whom will you perswade that he rais'd up such a long train of Prophets so many times forced Nature and overthrew the ancientest and firmest of its Laws and that he did all this I say for nothing without any Necessity any Reaor Profit Is this the Character of the Divine Wisdom which commonly arriving at the greatest Ends by the smallest and most contemptible Means in appearance must needs be far from using such great ones and setting at work such Machins to do nothing I say moreover that your Answer is injurious to an infinite number of Christians How many have there been since the Birth of Christianity who have embraced this Holy Religion by being convinc'd of its truth by proofs of the same nature of Mr. Huet's I mean by the consideration of the Prophecies of the Old and New Testament and the Miracles of Christ and his Apostles If what you say be true they have been simple and foolish People who have yielded to such things as they ought to have despised Their Faith was not a solid Perswasion but a fond Belief more worthy of blame than praise and thus lightly believing they have shew'd themselves of the number of those mention'd by the Son of Sirach Qui citò credunt leves sunt corde And further If Miracles be of no value why do you require them of us Why will you have our first Reformers rejected for this very Reason Why do you reject People and reject them without hearing them as they think they ought to be and that for this only reason that they wanted an unnecessary thing and a Proof which concludes nothing Is not this I appeal to your self very strange In a word Sir if Mr. Huet's Proofs be not good where shall we find better What can we say to the Insidels to bring them to the knowledg of the Truth And with what success shall we labour for their conversion We shall not want Prooss nor Means said Mr. N. we shall have the Proofs of Reason taken from the nature of the Christian Doctrine it self the Truth Sublimity and Purity of its Precepts and from the conformity it has with the common notions which the corruption of our Nature has left us and some other such like Considerations which do not depend on Arguments of Sense Who has told you Sir replied I that these kind of Proofs are proper to convert all sorts of Infidels without exception Can you deny what even those who would make the best of them have expresly remark'd (f) Cloistian Convers That they are a little abstracted and require not only some application of Mind but morcover greater light and penetration of thought than the Vulgar is commonly endued with Yet we must convert the Laplanders the wild Irish and Cannibals which is to say brutish People and such about whom it has been disputed in the Schools of Spain whether they have the use of Reason and whether they be of the same kind with other Men. What way then have you for the instructing them in things which surpass the Capacity of our Tradesinen and Peasants But what will you say if I shew you That your Transubstantiation destroys these kind of Proofs as well as Mr. Huet's Will you not grant me after this that this is a very dangerous Doctrine and that you cannot soon enough retrench it from the number of those Truths which are taught by Christianity Yet I can establish more than this For I can shew that your Belief banishes Certainty from the Acts of Reason as well as from those of Sense I can shew you it sets open a large Door to Pyrrhonism whereby it may absolutely reign in the World there being nothing which can be reasonably opposed against it You see Sir 't is impossible to say any thing of greater force against your Doctrine For Scepticism is the last and greatest irregularity whereinto Reason can throw it self All others appear to me slight in comparison of this And so much the rather because all others may be cured whereas this is without remedy In effect the Sceptics doubting of every thing and agreeing in nothing they give no hold to those whose who would reduce them So that 't is impossible to dispute regularly with them For as Motion cannot be made but upon something that 's immovable so a Dispute must turn on something which is indisputable What way is there then to dispute against a Man who doubts of all and not only doubts whether what you tell him be true but doubts moreover whether you do tell him of it whether he hears it yea whether he doubts of it As for my part I regard all the reasonings of those who undertake to convince Sceptics as a perpetual begging of the Question For in fine 't is impossible to reason against them without laying down something which they will not grant because that in
effect these People agreeing in nothing and it being in the mean time imimpossible to reason without laying down something it 's clear there 's no reasoning against them without granting what 's in question which is one of the greatest saults a Man that argues can fall into It 's then impossible fairly to deny what I said when I affirm'd That Transubstantiation opens a door to Scepticism and puts men into a necessity of denying every thing What I said at first is a small matter that it makes void Mr. Huet's proofs it spares none overthrowing generally and without exception whatever establishes the truth of Christian Religion So that if I justifie this as I am perswaded I easily can I shall be sorry to add any thing to the proof which this alone surnishes me with In effect those who shall be capable of digesting this may digest every thing I believe you are in the right said Mr. N. and I do acknowledg if you can convince me Transubstantiation draws along with it Scepticism you will make me suspect it In effect I conceive nothing more dangerous nor at the same time so ridiculous as Scepticism and you can never speak any thing too bad of it which I will not subscribe to But I do not much fear your proving what you talk of And I for my part said I do not doubt but I shall do it Shall I not do it if I convince you that in admitting Transubstantiation one is engaged not to rely on any evidence be it of what kind it will. For in short Sir you know the whole dispute with the Sceptics is to know Whether there be any thing certain The Sceptics absolutely deny this We as to our parts affirm That as there are things doubtful and uncertain so there are some we are sure of and which one may and ought to believe and when we be asked what those things be we answer they are precisely those which are evident Because that in effect according to us the evidence of a thing is the foundation of its certainty and infallible mark of its truth The Sceptics on the contrary say that evidence and falsity have nothing inconsistent that they may be found together and therefore to conclude a thing to be true because of its being evident is ill reasoning and an exposing of ones self to manifest danger of being deceiv'd So that the whole amounts to this Whether one may or ought to rely on the evidence of a thing as an infallible mark of truth For if we cannot the Sceptics have reason and we can offer nothing against them And consequently if I shew you that in granting Transubstantiation there is no evidence of whatever rank it may be which does not consist very well with error and falsity Now shall I not hereby shew you that this Doctrine draws after it the whole train of Sceptical doubts I suppose then a man must be a perfect Sceptic or none at all For the mitigations which some would introduce be absolutely ridiculous For in fine we must assure our selves of whatever is evident or assure our selves of nothing seeing we cannot assure our selves of any thing but on the account of its evidence And consequently if evidence be the lawful ground of certitude we must be sure of whatever is evident and put away all Scepticism without reserve On the contrary if the evidence of a thing be not sufficient to produce a certainty of it we can be sure of nothing we must be perfect Sceptics and never believe or do any thing So that all those who are not perfect and compleat Sceptics are not Sceptics at all seeing they part with the fundamental maxim of their ridiculous System I agree with you in all this says Mr. N. and will acquit you of your promise if you show me that Transubstantiation separates Evidence from Truth This is no hard matter to do reply'd I for in effect I know but two sorts of evidences the one which strikes the senses the other which is perceiv'd by the mind I have shew'd you that if Transubstantiation takes place the first is a most unfaithful Note of the Truth I have shew'd you that amongst this great multitude of things which strike the senses there is not perhaps one which they do more distinctly perceive than the matter of the Eucharist I have shew'd you that 't is an object which shews it self not only to one or two of our senses as most of those things do which make us apprehend them but generally and without exception all those which God has given us I have shew'd you That they all unanimously do depose that 't is Bread and Wine and that whatever precaution they use to hinder themselves from being deceived they all find the same thing and never change their language This then being a thing which you do believe to be false and in effect it cannot be true if your Transubstantiation be receiv'd you see my only task is to convince you That according to your Principles this first kind of evidence may lead us into error I am not agreed in that reply'd he For tho our senses may deceive us in the Eucharist they deceive us only in respect of the substance therein contained but will make us faithful reports on the accidents And you know our Divines and Philosophers confine the certainty of the senses to the bare accidents By which means there lyes open a large field for these saculties to exercise their functions in without running a risk of being mistaken This field said I to him is not so vast as it appears to you Your Authors and especially Bellarmin * Bell de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. do not pretend the senses have certainty in respect of all sorts of accidents without exception They count two different ranks the one which are only perceiv'd by one sense as Colours by the Sight Sounds by the Ear Scents by the Smell The others which are perceiv'd by more than one sense as Greatness Scituation Figure Motion They call the first proper Objects and the second common ones They add that the report of our senses is not certain but only in respect of their proper Objects but as to the common ones they may easily be déceived Here 's then the certainty of the Senses reduced to half the size you gave it But this is not all for Bellarmin stops not here He moreover distinguishes the judgments we may make on the proper Objects of our Senses in Generals and in Particulars For example when we see a Colour we may say first in general of it This is a colour not a scent or savour We may say likewise in particular This is such a colour 't is white or red not green or black He tells us the Senses are not certain but in the first of these judgments they often deceiving us in the second See Sir whereunto this Doctrine reduces the certainty of the Senses For my part I could like as
These Philosophers make great reckoning of a proof which they use against the Vacuum of the Epicureans They affirm that to suppose a Vacuum is to contradict ones self because say they that a Vacuum if there be one must be extensive in length largeness and depth But supposing it this would be a Body for a Body according to them is nothing else but that which is extended in length largeness and depth So that were it a Body 't would not be a Vacuum To suppose then a Vacuum is to contradict ones own Supposition The Cartesians affirm nothing can oppose this proof yet is it false if Transubstantiation be true For there is according to you in the Eucharist something extensive something that is long large and deep and yet not a Body The Peripatetics says Mr. N. admit not of this proof and it does not oppose the manner in which the Cartesians explain Transubstantiation for you know they will not grant That the Accidents of Bread and Wine subsist without a Subject This is true reply'd I to him But first the existence of Accidents without a Subject is however opposed by a proof which the Cartesians respect as demonstrative And then the manner in which the Cartesians explain what you say God does in the Eucharist ruins the most part of their Physical Demonstrations as others have observed * See the Treatise of the authority of the Senses before me So that you cannot deny but this Doctrine overthrows the certainty of Demonstrations But this ought not much to surprize you seeing your Belief overthrows the chiefest and most unquestionable of all Principles I was about proving this when I was hindred by a Message from a Gentleman I desired Mr. N. to permit me to write an Answer to it who yielding to my request our conversation was by this means interrupted for some short time CONFERENCE V. Wherein is sinally shew'd That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism and absolutely destroys the certainty of first Principles AS soon as I had ended my Answer I rejoyn'd Mr. N. and reassumed our former Discourse You have not forgotten where we left off said I to him presently I had undertook to shew you That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism at its full length and absolutely overthrows the certainty of our Notices I have shew'd it in respect of those which arise from our senses I afterwards justified it on the subject of Demonstrations so that I have only now to shew you That this Doctrine does not spare the clearest and most unquestionable of all the Principles I shall now prove to you That if your Belief takes place the most certain of these Maxims will be found false and consequently the rest which depend thereon and which at most have not more evidence than this first will be doubtful and uncertain This surprises you without doubt and you imagine I undertake a strange task Yet I hope easily to acquit my self of it Only inform me which of those great Truths you may make most account of This has been a matter of some contest replied he to me I was taught in the Colledge that the first and the most certain of all the Principles is this great Maxim That it is impossible the same thing can be and cannot be Or to express it in another manner That it is impossible for two contradictory Propositions to be true at the same time I have been always told this is the first step our mind takes in the search of Truth and at the same time the last thing we find when we search after the foundations of our Perswasions Yet the Cartesians do not grant this * See the Art of Thinking part 4. chap. 5 c. they are agreed indeed that this Maxim is certain and unquestionable for who dares deny it But they affirm 't is of no great use and however not the first of all Principles They prefer this other Maxim before it One may affirm of each thing whatever is contain'd in the distinct Idea we have of it For my part I think it an easy thing to agree them The Cartesians Principle is undoubtedly the first of Affirmatives and the fittest to prove Positive Truths But that of the Schools is the first of the Negatives and the properest to destroy Errors and Falsity I am easily of your mind replied I. But I must add That Transubstantiation do's absolutely overthrow both one and the other of these two Axioms as well as a great many others whose certainty is very near that of theirs Which I shall now prove to you beginning at the Principle of the Cartesians on which I shall not long insist Mr. Rohaut shews in the beginning of his Treatise of Physics * Roh Phys part 1. chap. 7. That 't is impossible to conceive distinctly matter without conceiving 't is extended in length largeness and depth that it is figured and impenetrable I relate not his Words to you you may read them in his Chapter of Matter Yet you do not believe our Saviours Body is impenetrable in the Eucharist You believe 't is there after the manner of Spirits totum in toto totum in qualibet parte For thus has the Council of Trent defined it As to Figure I do not know how it can be given to a Body whose parts are penetrable and enter into one another In sine I do not understand how length can be attributed to it or largeness or depth for what wou'd be the length largeness and depth which wou'd be in it Will it be what it has in its natural Estate Our Senses attest sufficiently the contrary Will it be that of Bread and Wine This cannot be For were this so the Body of Christ might be divided into two halfs into three thirds into four parts c. seeing all these Divisions may be made of the Host Here 's then three things which are clearly comprehended in the Idea a man has of a Body and which yet one cannot affirm of that of Jesus Christ And consequently here are three Proofs of the falsity of the Cartesians great Principle Here 's now a fourth These Philosophers will not deny that that which makes the Essence of each thing is comprehended in the distinct Idea which one has of that thing and that the thing is comprehended in the distinct Idea which we have of that which makes its Essence For example if extension be the Essence of Matter as they pretend they will acknowledg that Extension is comprised in the Idea of Matter and the Matter in the Idea of the Extension and thus as one may affirm of Matter that it is Extensive so one may affirm of that which is Extensive that it is Matter They will as little deny that the Mass or Collection of Modusses is not that which makes the particular Essence of every thing for every Body knows the Aversion they have to substantial Forms so much mention'd in the Colledg By consequence 't will be equally impossible to
form to ones self a distinct Idea of Bread and Wine without bringing in all the Modusses of these two Substances and distinctly conceiving the Mass of these Modusses without conceiving the Bread and Wine See now Sir if according to the Maxims of the Cartesians you dare affirm there 's Bread and Wine in the Eucharist as you say there 's that which makes the Essence of Bread and Wine Being not well versed in the new Philosophy saies Mr. N. I shall not undertake to answer what you now offered me But shall reserve my reply till you undertake to shew me our belief destroys the Principle of the Schools which tell us That two contradictory Propositions cannot be true And I am even impatient to see how you will prove this I will easily shew you said I That this Doctrine includes a great number of Contradictions and consequently of necessity either this Doctrine must be false or the contradictory Propositions may be true It 's certain if I undertake to shew you by Arguments that your belief is contradictory I shall I imagine be engaged in great contests with you We must run over all the knotty Questions of the Schools and examine their nicest Distinctions And this is as little pleasant to me as I believe 't is to you But I have another less tiresome way than this first Which is to shew you Sir That your Doctors agree 't is contradictory to say divers things which are the necessary consequences of your belief which they easily grant every time they think not of Transubstantiation and when the Idea of this Doctrine which commonly confounds their Senses leaves them some liberty of judging of things according to the light of nature Behold here an example of what I say Transubstantiation according to the common Sentiment of the Schools do's necessarily imply the Existence of Accidents without a Subject I affirm That this very thing is a pure Contradiction and here 's the manner how I shew it You will allow me it 's a Contradiction to affirm That an Accident is not an Accident 'T is your Suarez who teaches it in so many words If the Accident * Suar. Met. disp 32. sect 1. n. 4. says he has no Subject 't is not an Accident but a Substance You do not rightly comprehend this Author's meaning says Mr. N. The Essence of the Accident do's not consist to be actually in a Subject but only to may be therein to be proper to this 'T is this Disposition and this Aptitude which makes the Essence of the Accident and which never leaves it and this is whatever Suarez meant in the passage you have cited You deceive your self reply'd I Suarez sense is That Accidents will be Substances if they be not actually in some Subject To behold more distinctly this truth observe if you please that he does not say this but to prove there are Substances for thus he speaks He says it cannot be denied but there are Accidents seeing this is a thing which the Senses attest Whence he concludes there are Substances because if there were not Substances the Accidents would be without a Subject and if they had no Subject they would not be Accidents but Substances Had this Jesuit the Thought you impute to him his Argument would be reduced to this There are Accidents The Accidents are proper to have Subjects These Subjects must be Substances Then there are Substances But first if Suarez meant this 't is strange he did not say it He has spoken enough in his Life not to be to seek to express his Thoughts and not to use such uncouth ways as these would be Moreover in attributing to him this sense you make him make a ridiculous Argument For in fine what will this consequence be Accidents are proper to exist in SubSubstances There are then Substances This is just as if I should say The Fire is proper to melt Ice Therefore where ever there is Fire there must necessarily be Ice Water is proper to quench Fire Where ever then there is Water there is also Fire This may suffice on the Subject of your first Contradiction The second is a little more palpable It consists in your making the Body of Christ to be in several places at once without losing its Unity For in fine if it be in several places at once it 's separate from its self and if it be separate from it self 't is no longer one only Body All Philosophers agree there 's no certainer mark of a real distinction than separation especially that which they call mutual and which they say consists in separate things subsisting each apart after the Separation The mutual separation of two Extreams saith Suarez * Suar. Met. in indice voce distinctio is an evident sign they be really distinguisht Elsewhere he says this is the principal sign †Idem Met. disp 7. Sect. 2. n. 9 10. He also affirms it matters not to know Whether the separation be made naturally or supernaturally and that all one can say of it is That when the separation is made naturally the distinction is more visibly and apparently known than when God does does it by Miracle Yet he affirms it to be then no less real And of this he gives us a considerable example He says if we consult only natural reason we shall be apt to doubt whether Quantity be distinct from Matter because in effect these two things do never subsist without one another in the order of Nature But he adds That the Mystery of the Eucharist does not permit us to doubt of their distinction seeing that Quantity does therein Miraculously subsist without Matter On this same Principle Suarez and all your other Doctors affirm it impossible that the Modusses should subsist without the things Modifide no not by an effect of Infinite power because say they there being no real distinction between the Modus and the thing Modifide it 's impossible the Modus should subsist without the thing Modifide There cannot then be a real separation between that which is not really distinct and to suppose such a separation is a manifest contradiction Yet your belief supposes this It supposes the Body of Jesus Christ in several places at a time I mean in several separate places which have no contiguity between them but are distinguished by considerable spaces and by a great number of Bodies which lye between them Let 's imagine three Consecrated Hosts one here the other in China and the third in America The Body of Christ is in all these three places and at the same time in Heaven It 's perfectly entire in each of these four places It 's then separate and far distant from it self Pray tell me Sir is not this fair reasoning to say The body and the soul of a child of God are two distinct Substances for after death the body remains in the Sepulchre and the soul goes to Heaven This is what cannot be denied But if this reasoning
most famous Divines acknowledg it we know it essential to all changes to have two different Terms one of which is destroy'd and the other produced and you 'l agree with me herein if you run over all the changes remarkt hitherto whether Substantial or Accidental Natural or Supernatural You 'l see there 's always an Accident if the change be accidental or a Substance if it be substantial which ceases to exist and another Accident or another Substance which begins to exist and takes the place of the Accident or Substance which is destroy'd And consequently if the Bread were chang'd into the Body of Jesus Christ the Body of Christ must necessarily be produced by this change And as it would be produced by it self it would have a real relation to its self contrary to that Maxim which implies That nothing produces it self and That nothing relates to its self In fine Sir this is a constant Maxim and ever suppos'd tho it be never exprest That whatever has all the sensible marks of a thing is that thing That having the essence of it it ought to bear its name Hereon depends the certainty of discerning whether of single things or Species For in fine our judgments cannot pierce into the bottom of things or discover their essence by this sort of knowledg call'd intuitive in the Schools We only know them by the help of the sensible marks which distinguish them So that to overthrow this Maxim is to render the discerning of things absolutely impossible or at least doubtful and uncertain And yet this is the effect of Transubstantiation It places the Body of Christ in the Eucharst under the sensible marks of Bread and Wine where there 's none of these two Substances and you believe our Lords Body exists in a place where it has none of the marks which are wont to make it known and to distinguish it from the rest of things This Sir may suffice to shew you That Transubstantiation absolutely overthrows the certitude of our Notices I believe you perceive That if it subsists the first Principles be false Demonstrations themselves deceive us our Senses are subject to a thousand delusions and in a word we ought to doubt of whatever we have hitherto held for most certain and we have nothing else to do but to plunge our selves into Scepticism which I reckon to be the most deplorable condition in the world seeing 't is the total annihilation of our reason Mr. N. was about answering me but was hindred by the coming in of one of his Friends who had business with him We having been a great while together I laid hold on this occasion to take my leave of him CONFERENCE VI. Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine of the Trinity is Demonstrated AFTER this last Conversation there past some days before I saw Mr. N. again He came not to me and I was unwilling to force a visit on him but having at length by good hap met with him alone in his usual Walks I joyn'd my self to him We fell at first into several Discourses and at length on Matters of Religion when I made bold to ask him Whether he had thought on what had past in our former Conferences He answer'd That he had in truth ruminated thereon after I had left him but he was resolved to disturb himself no more with those Matters For to what purpose said he unless to shake a mans faith and discompose his mind For I am so perswaded of the truth of Transubstantiation and I find it has such strong tyes with the Principles of Christianity that I do not at all doubt but it makes up a part of this holy Religion So that your reasons tending only to shew me that if Transubstantiation be a Doctrine of Christianity we are to blame in being Christians I not doubting of the first must insensibly doubt of the second Wherefore I had rather once for all to banish these thoughts out of my head and remain in the state wherein I have hitherto lived than to run the risk of turning Libertin which is the thing in the world I most hate In effect continued he without giving me time to answer If your way of arguing be good I could make use of it against the Mystery of the Trinity and easily direct your proofs against this Capital Truth and that with the same success as you have done against Transubstantiation Take for example the most specious Objection of the Arrians and Socinians They affirm this great Mystery absolutely ruins one of the most certain Principles of Sciences What we believe reduces it self to two Heads First That the Persons of the Trinity are really distinct from one another the Father is not the Son and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. The other That neither of these Persons is really distinguisht from the Divine Essence which they possess That the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost God and what is more That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are but one God possessing only one Divinity so that the Divinity of the Father is the same with that of the Son and that of the Father and the Son is not different from that of the Holy Ghost Pray Sir now inform me how to accord all this with the principle which passes for unquestionable in Metaphysics to wit That if two Subjects be not distinct from a third they cannot be distinguisht between themselves How can this principle subsist if it be true that the Divine Persons which are most distinct in themselves are not at all from the Essence which is common to them what can you say in this Demonstration When two Subjects do not really differ from a third They differ not really from one another The Persons of the Trinity differ not really from the Divine Essence which they possess Then they differ not really from one another You will grant me that this is a Physical Demonstration and otherwise evident than those call'd Moral May I not then apply to the Trinity the first proof you have used against Transubstantiation and say That if this Mystery made part of the Christian Religion the Objections the Insidels bring to oppose it would have more force than the proofs which establish the Divinity of it seeing these proofs have only a Moral evidence and the Objections which might be brought against them have all the evidence term'd Physical I say the same thing of your second proof I need only change therein two words and instead of Sense and Transubstantiation say Reason and the Trinity I need only say If the Mystery of the Trinity be true our Reason deceives us in the judgment she makes of it in thinking to see clearly and distinctly That the persons of the Divinity are not different from one another If our Reason deceives us in this it may as well deceive us in all other
things if it may deceive us in all things the proofs of Christianity are of no validity Even your third proof cannot escape the being appli'd to the Mystery of the Trinity In effect its observable That the Maxim I now alledg'd to you is not only a Metaphysical principle but the foundation of all affirmatory Syllogisms which prove one cannot joyn two terms by the affirmation but by shewing one may joyn them both to a third term'd a mean. By consequence if this Maxim be false as it must of necessity be if the Mystery of the Trinity be true we must no longer think of arguing but yield up the certainty of this sort of knowledg to the Sceptics And here 's Sir the natural use of your Method if it be follow'd we must retrench from our Religion whatever our reason will not suffer and as soon as ever she shall see any opposition to arise between her Maxims and our Mysteries we have no other party to betake our selves to but that of disowning these Mysteries and rejecting them as so many Errors Thus Faith shall depend on our Capricio and we shall henceforward believe not what it shall please God to reveal to us but whatever it shall please us to imagin Would you have me to take this course or to become an Arian or Socinian and do you think we ought to yield up every Article of our Faith as soon as ever we shall find any repugnance in them to the deceitful Maxims of our wretched reason which oftner serves to lead us out than in the way and to blind us than to enlighten us Far am I repli'd I from this and tho I am perswaded of the innocency of my Method I should be the first to condemn it did I believe 't would produce such pernicious effects But it s certainly an offering of great violence to make it serve for the drawing from it such dangerous Conclusions Pray let me justifie it and for this purpose give me your attention for some minutes It 's first very strange you should reject Arguments wherein you cannot remark the least defect They consist of sundry Propositions amongst which there 's not one but what is not only true but moreover evident Moreover they be strictly alli'd and their Conclusions are drawn in the most natural manner in the world Ought they then to be rejected on vain suspicions and uncertain apprehensions Is not this proceeding injurious to faith For what would she be might her Doctrines be combated by Reasons which suffer no reply and from which there 's no defence but by saying We wont examine them Is not this formally to accuse her That she will not endure the light Should all the world follow your example what shall we answer to the Libertins of the Age how would they triumph over our Religion Moreover let me entreat you to consider there 's great difference between your two first proofs and my two first yours are drawn from Reason and mine from Sense You say 't is evident to Reason there are three Essences in the Trinity or that there 's only one Person Whereas I say it 's evident not only to Reason but to Sense That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine What matter is it said Mr. N. that the Evidence which you oppose to that of the Proofs of Christianity is that which is perceiv'd by Reason or that which strikes the Senses seeing the first is no less than the second or to speak better seeing that is far greater than this It 's of great concern answer'd I and that on divers accounts First because the Supposition you make is not certain You suppose That the certainty of the acts of reason such as that is which springs from Demonstration is greater than that which arises from the report of the Senses I confess this is the Cartesians opinion But you know the Gassendists hold the contrary These last which are certainly not to be contemn'd hold there 's no greater certainty than that of the Senses They tell us They are the Senses which perswade us of the truth of the first Principles and that we know not for example The whole is greater than a part but by observing in all the Objects which have struck our Senses that the part was always lesser than the whole They are not only the Gassendists which are of this opinion The Vulgar and generally all those who are not Philosophers are herein of their opinion and if you will have them comprehend there are certain things of which they ought to be more strongly perswaded than of what they see they will presently believe you are not in earnest with them This appears considerable to me for you know neither Faith nor Salvation are the portion only of Philosophers the ordinary people having as great a right to them as the most Learned So that my Proofs have this advantage That they be convincing according to the Hypothesis of all the world whereas yours suppose things which few know and concerning which all those who are capacitated to judg are not agreed Especially the first of yours supposes a thing which Mr. Huet opposes with all his strength * Huetii Demonst Evang. pag. 3 4. That Physical Demonstrations have greater evidence and certitude than Moral ones He affirms on the contrary That Moral Demonstrations are the most convincing of all and that neither Physics nor Metaphysics nor Geometry has one to be parallel'd with them whether in general with those which perswade us of most matters of fact or in particular with those which he makes use of to establish the truth of Christian Religion He hereupon sufficiently enlarges himself and I doubt not but you have remarkt that place as well as I. I may then deny your Supposition which if I should I shall have very able persons for my Abettors But I 'le grant what you say to be true and suppose all the world of your opinion I know another way to solve your Objection which is Sir That should I agree with you That considering things in general the evidence of Reason is greater than that which offers it self to the Senses this will not hinder me from maintaining That in particularising things we shall find incomparably fewer things evident to Reason than of such as are perceived by the Senses In effect how few are the Truths which are perceiv'd by reason alone * Dogmatists such as maintain against the Sceptics the certainty of Sciences wherein not only the Sceptics but the Dogmatists do agree Scarcely is there one which has not been debated Pro Con. It 's not the same of those which are perceiv'd by the Senses For excepting the Sceptics whom you cannot bring in against the Senses seeing they are as bad friends to Reason Scarce will you find one who will not allow what the Senses discover to us at least in gross and popular Objects if I may say so and which are the only ones we now speak of
Consult all the Sects of the Philosophers all the people in the Universe to know whether it be now day or whether an Horse be greater than an Ant you will find I do not say not a Sect or Nation but not any one particular person that denies this The light of Sense has moreover this advantage over that of Reason that it 's less liable to be disordered by prejudices Prejudices make people doubt who are strongly possessed by them of Truths which a free Reason and a disengaged mind clearly perceives What is there for example which my reason perceives more distinctly than the impossibility of a Body's being in two places without division Yet your Reason imagines to see the contrary Whence comes this but from the prejudice wherewith one of us is possess'd But 't is not the same with the Senses There 's no prejudice which hinders them from seeing Objects such as they are which we must always understand of the most apparent and grossest Objects There are two sorts of clearness says an Author much esteem'd among you * Lawful Prejudices chap. 14. the one so lively and piercing that it 's impossible for men not to see it and which is such as cannot be darkned by any cloud of Prejudices or Passions whereby it shews it self uniformly to all men of this kind adds he are things exposed to the Senses In a word It 's a thousand times easier to deceive our Reason than our Senses There 's no truth so certain which a Sophister will not render doubtful by his Subtilties and Artifices Even the most learned People are sometimes deceived and we have seen but too many Examples of this in all Ages But deceive my Senses if you can on Objects as familiar as those we now spake of Go and inform any one That the food he commonly uses is not Bread and Beer The evidence of Sense then has great advantages over that which is perceiv'd only by Reason whence appears the Possibility of my Proofs being good and your two first objections being not so Nay the thing is not only possible but true and I hope to convince you of it with little trouble Whatever you have hitherto said to me turns on these two Suppositions The first That Reason sees evidently on one hand the truth of this maxim of the Philosophers That when two Subjects be not distinct from a third they are not so from one another The second That there 's more evidence in this than there is in the Reasons which establish the Truth of Christian Religion But I first affirm to you It 's impossible these two Suppositions can be true And if they were the Arians and Socinians wou'd have good grounds to deny the Mystery of the Trinity For first if our Reason evidently saw the Truth of the Maxim you bring against me we must necessarily say one of these two things Either that in effect this Maxim is true or that Evidence is not a certain mark of Truth Here 's no medium You must of necessity take one of these sides The second differs in nothing from Scepticism you must therefore take the first It must be said that according to you the Maxim of the Philosophers is true That 's my thought says Mr. N. Are you of the same mind repli'd I on the subject of the Opposition which you think you evidently see between this Maxim and the Mystery of the Trinity Do you think this to be a true and real Opposition Or do you believe it to be false altho you evidently see it Should I say it 's false answer'd he you wou'd make me the same Objection you have already made you will tell me there may be error in things most evident seeing I might evidently see Opposition where there is none and that thus Evidence wou'd not be the mark of Truth and consequently That the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing To avoid such dangerous Extremities I had rather tell you that this Opposition is as true as 't is evident You believe then said I to him that effectively and in the Truth of the thing the Mystery of the Trinity is directly against an unquestionable Maxim. You believe there 's a real Contradiction between these two things and that 't is impossible to make them agree This is certainly true answer'd he Then said I the Sceptics must have good grounds seeing Contradiction is not the note of Falsity What is there more unquestionable than this Maxim That if a Proposition be true that which contradicts it must necessarily be false Is not this the Foundation of certainty You now see Sir on what precipices you cast your selves and what are the unavoidable Consequences of your Suppositions Hence you see the necessity of acknowledging there are some false and that in effect if the Philosophers Maxim be true it 's not contrary to the Mystery of the Trinity or if there be any Opposition between this Mystery and this Maxim we must not conclude the Maxim to be false seeing it's impossible the Mystery shou'd be so But this is not all I wish you wou'd explain your self on Mr. Huets Sentiment I lately mention'd to you Which Demonstrations do you believe most certain Physical or Moral ones Or to speak more precisely wherein think you lies most certainty and evidence in the Demonstration you brought against me in the name or the Socinians and Arians or in those Mr. Huet makes use of to prove the Truth of the Christian Religion Take which side you will you cannot escape me If you say the advantage lies on the side of Mr. Huets Proofs you deliver up to me your Objection In this Supposition right Reason will have us believe the Trinity notwithstanding the difficulties therein seeing nothing's more conformable to her Maxims than always to prefer that which is more evident before that which is less But if you say on the contrary That the Arians and Socinians Objection has more strength than Mr. Huets Proofs You hereby acknowledg That the Doctrine of the Trinity is contrary to good Sence and ought therefore to be rejected whether by retrenching of it from the number of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches supposing it can be separated from it or by rejecting the whole of Christianity supposing this Doctrine be inseparable from the rest In effect were these Proofs and this Objection of an equal force they wou'd bring the mind into suspence whence right Reason cou'd not draw it out She wou'd not know on which side to determine her self and finding at bottom of this Religion things which will appear to her evidently false She wou'd carry us as far off from it as She wou'd bring us near it in making us comprehend the force of the Proofs which authorize it Moreover making two contrary Judgments on the Subject of Religion one that it is true because the Proofs produced in its favour are good the other that it is false because it teaches