or being idle which could not be 401 VII Vasques chargeth Lully with a mistake of a formal cause for an efficient who is mistaken by him 402 And the cause proved no less efficient then formal 403 The discourse drawn into a perfect syllogisme proving the eternal plurality of persons by production 404 The Objection urging that Angels cannot produce the like effect answer'd 405 VIII Vasques's satisfactory answer to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion 406 The Bishop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity ibid. God's infinite Simplicity and Unity ibid. His spiritual faculties Understanding and Will. ibid. Himself the infinite object of his Understanding 407 Which is eternally productive of his internal word ibid. And that word substantial the same with Himself ibid. The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wisemen by a Star 408 IX God's will as fruitful by love as his Understanding by knowledge ibid. And so productive of a third Person which is likewise God 409 X. Misprinted XI ibid. XI These divine productions not to be multiplyed because infinite by which an objection's answer'd 410 XII The objection made by the Assertours of the Greek Church answered according to the sense of the Catholick touching the procession of the holy Ghost 411 Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it ibid. XIII How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and holy Spirit 412 XIV Why they are called three persons being no Scripture-language and how long ago debated by St. Augustine 414 The extent or limits of this personal distinction the Bishop reverently forbeare's to determine 415 And dislike's the rash curiosity of the Schoolmen 416 XV. His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason ibid. And seldom quoting the Fathers 417 A digression to the Reader ibid. CHAP. XXXVI I. Select Aphorismes out of which the Author who apologizeth for Mr. Hobbes draw's his discourse 418 A good foundation of his to build upon 419 His noble Quaere ibid. II. Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense touching the conservation of life ibid. III. His study of it as to his own particular 420 All men may not have like reason to be so intent ibid. The parts and faculties of men not to be levell'd with those of beasts 421 The publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private ibid. IV. What right a man hath to the means of preserving life and how he is to use them 422 V. Each particular maâ— cannot pretend a right to the whole world 423 Nor to things conducing only to mediate and particular ends 424 VI. The danger of pretending a right to all and to having a right judgment of it 425 Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time 426 All cannot be useful to one particular person ibid. Nor every thing to every one 427 Of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge ibid. The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtfull ibid. VII Other rules by which to institute a right judgment beside Reason 428 How all creatures are granted to man's use limited ibid. His impossible supposition ibid. His fallacy a bene divisis c. 429 VIII The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all 430 The case of necessity implye's no such universal right ibid. IX Nor the dissolution of any Common-wealth 431 X. An Objection fram'd by the Author 432 A second of his not so strong ibid. The first but weakly answered by him without regard to God's end ibid. XI His first argument for universal right returning extreme necessity 433 The Bishop's severall answers to it ibid. His second argument for ancient right in a lawful defence 434 How the force or invalidity of this argument may be understood and how the practice moderated ibid. XII His Objection and Answer 435 The Bishop's Animadversions shewing the difference between just defence and unjust invasion and stating the right of possession ibid. Fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself 436 Propriety without Covenant ibid. The right to goods gotten by conquest what ibid. Thâ— Bishop's answer from the fallibility of judgment 437 XIII His the Apologist's argument against the right of Occupancy ibid. Which the Bishop shew's to hold well against Covenant ibid. What is the right in necessity ibid. Discovery give 's not an equal right with Occupancy 438 The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case ibid. The Author 's two Propositions destructive to humane Society 439 And Trade ibid. The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates ibid. Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed 440 The Texts of Holy Scripture illustrated or cited GEN. Chap. Verse Page 1 28 181 29 4 3 4 126 4 9 184 4 26 125 6 5 129 Â Â 185 9 1 2. 186 3 c. 208 9 26 440 9 27 44 188 10 14 305 12 14 161 15 c. 13 3 156 4 5 13 7 143 8 9 17 6 305 19 4 183 5 c. 20 2 161 3 c. 23 3 162 4 c 32 10 309 40 5 71 41 1 ib. EXOD. 1 15 282 16 c. 4 16 329 4 36 286 7 1 ibib 7 1 330 20 2 288 22 28 286 32 7 288 32 11 290 LEVIT 24 11 289 12 c. NUMB. 15 35 290 36 c. DEUT. 9 12 288 JUDGES 4 17 156 I. SAM 17 36 270 26 7 ibid. I. KINGS 21 9 145 II. KINGS 6 25 255 JOB 10 5 314 19 25 338 26 PSAL. 2 7 334 10 6 ibid. 14 1 92 19 1 115 3 4 36 9 389 78 39 376 90 2 109 94 8 95 94 9 96 102 27 314 113 5 355 115 16 185 142 6 245 PROV 1 20 309 ECCLES 5 3 72 ISAIAH 4 6 376 6 3 344 40 3 329 55 9 306 11 312 JER 17 5 376 DAN 2 1 71 3 16 247 MIC 5 2 303 315 ZACH. 2 8 298 13 7 316 MAL. 3 4 306 312 WISD 11 20 104 13 5 116 II. MACCA 7 2 247 3 c. St. MATTH 1 20 71 3 3 330 3 11 364 3 16 387 390 3 17 334 7 2 146 10 1 386 17 11 358 18 18 298 25 45 ibid. 28 18 386 19 20 St. MARKE 13 23 258 St. LUKE 2 32 344 2 52 343 3 4 330 3 22 383 3 38 105 12 19 239 12 33 ibid. St. JOHN 1 1 318 324 328 408 1 2 352 1 3 357 1 4 361 1 5 362 1 6 ib. 1 7 363 1 9 378 1 10 365 1 11 299 374 1 14 ibid. 1 17 378 1 18 346 1 23 330 1 29 364 3 12 355 3 13 354 355 4 25 358 8 58 111 10 11 326 10 34 346 35 348 12 3 347 13 15 362 14 4 326 6 14 26 358 15 1 326 17 3 338 18 37 385 19 28 358 20 21 385 20 23 385 398 20 29 120
that of St. John in his Revelation The words Being with God signifie more thâ—n Known to God against Socinus and hâ—s â—ollowers Eternal life before Christ's Iâ—carnation knowne to the Angelâ— blessed Souls Prophets Philosophers Although not till afterward manifested to others The Phâ—losophers excell the Socinians in this knowledge Socinus's other Text of no validity to his purpose The Discourse resumed concerning the knowledge of the Word before the preaching of St. John Baptist Whether in the Socinian or Catholick sense may be more truly said the Word was God God with them no proper name but an Appellative â— Contrary to the use of it single thâ—oughout the New Testament How Satan is called the God of this World c. How the belly God The Socinian's Criticisme about the Article Answered And Sociâ—uâ—'s Instances How St. Cyrâ—ll's rule is to be understood Smalcius answered about Tautology As likewise to that objection God cannot be with himself Loâ—d and God not both one The Word God with though not of the Father The Sociniaâ—s conceit of tâ—e Word being with God in the bâ—ginning Improbable having no Evangelical authority That they pretend to prove's it not The distinction of Christ's Divinity and Humanity illustrated His ascent into heaven which they insist on not corporeal His double capacity of Priest and Lay-man alledged by them discussed How all things were made by him St. John's method very considerable against the Socinians interpretation Which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy Scripture Christ's interest in the Câ—eatiâ—n reinforced against the Socinians glosse Wherein he was a principal no bare instrumental Cause Their other slight objection answered The use of words The benefit of Tradition How life eternall and what else is to be understood ver 4. Hâ—w both that and the naturall life is said to be the light of men How Christ is called the lâ—ght according to Socinus How according to the Bishop What 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly and why rendred was Why the Evangelist chose to use it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 writing of St. John Baptist Socinus put 's a diminution upon St. John's testimony of Christ. Which is evidently affirmatâ—ve of his Divinity Socinus misinterprets creation by recreation or regeneration And in supplie's to his purpose a Text in the Epistle to the Ephesians Another violence of his in wresting actuall regeneration to regeneration in endeavour Smalcius's gâ—oâ—â—e His various significations put upon the word World Wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his Reader The Bishop's Animadversions 〈◊〉 sense â—irectly opposite to that evident in the Text. The genuine sense of the Terms not changed as they object Smalcius's reply to Smeglecius Little bâ—câ—ming a Socinian The World knew not the Woâ—d but by supernaturall grace What men appâ—ehend of God by naturall abilities The objection about Saint Johâ—'s upbraiding the world answered The exposition of the words immediately following why omitted The Socinians Word couâ—d not be made Flâ—sh Their evasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of St. John's Gospell Their heterodox interpretation of flesh Not evident in Scripture Cited by Socinus The result of their Comment The summe of ours The union of the Divinâ—ty with the humanity implieth no mutation of God into Man Notwithstanding the predâ—cation God is Man Whâ—ch is asserted â—nd by a familliar instance illustrated Their Objection Answer'd by the dependaâ—â—â— of substances up on God Another Argument of Smalcius's Answer'd by the manner of existing Christ a true man though a divine persâ—n Whose conception and gestation in the blessed Virgin 's wâ—mb conduced nothing to his personality The Divinity an humanity uniâ—ed render him neither two Sons nor two persons Object Of his being the same God with the Father and the holy Ghost Answer Which identity implies not that they were made flâ—sh with him As Scotus illustâ—ate's excellently The Bishop's apology to the Reader Smâ—lcius's fiâ—st Qâ—erie c. Rectifyed Answered All actions not alwayes necessariâ—y according to the nature of him or that which act 's Smalius's second Querie Answeâ—ed and frustrated His third Querie Answered with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the Father and holy Ghost Our Saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authoriâ—y and plenitude of power in himself Whâ—ch he exercised in giving commission to his Apostles The Socinian's opinion of the holy Ghost Confuted and this proved that he is a distinct person of the Trinity not a mere Attribute of the Deity Noâ— the Gospel oâ— Christ as they pretend out of holy Scripture Not the gift of God to certain men but by a figure A defiance to them that call for Reason in these mysteries Which notwithstanding may be subservienr to Faith Câ—rthagâ—na's lâ—tle lesse then blasphemous intimating God's power of enlarging the capacâ—ty of his Creature What of God to be proved by Reason and by whom to be attempted Aquinas's first argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the Trinity The Bishop's answer grounded upon Lulli's demonstratâ—on by aequiparance Aquinas's second Argum. The Bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of Faith The Bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of Reason His third argument from scorn and scâ—ndal Answer'd by the adherence to infallibility of Scripture Trigosius and Carthagena passed by Truth not oppos'd to Truth The Bishop closeâ—h with Raymund Lully whom he vindicateth against Vasques And Aymericus who make's him an haeretick His advice to the Pope and Cardinal about convertâ—ng the Saracens Hiâ— devout enterprize according to it wâ—th successe His like adventure among the 〈◊〉 Their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance The notable effâ—ct of his sufferings Lully's undertaking according to Vâ—sques Whose Arguments he recite's and forme's The first prove's a personal plurality by concord Another from equality distinction Vasques's first Answer excepting against the supposiâ—ion of a reall effective act in God The Bishop's Râ—ply that Lulâ—y not only suppâ—sâ—d but proved it His Lordship's explanation of Lully's sense by the necessity of God's acting somewhat from all eternity or being idle which could nâ—t be Vasques chargeth Lully with a mâ—stake of a formal cause for an efficient Who is mâ—staken by him And the cause proved no less efficient then formal The discourse drawn into perfect syllogisme provâ—ng the eternall plurality of persons by production The Objection urging the Angel cannot produce the like effect answer'd Vasquâ—s's satisfactâ—â—y answerâ— to Lully's arguments for his second Conclusion The Bâ—shop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the Trinity God's infinite Simpliciâ—y and Uniâ—y His spiritual faculties Understandâ—ng and Will Himself the infinite objâ—ct of his Understanding Which is eternally productive of his internal Word And that word substâ—â—tiâ—â— the same with himself The Bishop guided to this discovery by Scripture as the Wise-men by a Sâ—ar God's Will as fruitful by love as hiâ— Understanding by knowledge And so productive of a third person which is likewise God These divine productions not to be multiplyed because infinite by which an objection's answered The objection made by the Assertors of the Greek Church answered accordâ—ng to the sense of the Catholick touching the procession of the holy Ghost Illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and Holy Spirit Why they are called three persons being no Scripture-language and â—ow long ago debated by St. Augustâ—ne The extent or limits of this personal distiâ—ction the Bishâ—p â—eveâ—ently forbear's to determâ—ne And dislâ—ke's the rash curiosity of the School-men His Lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason And seldom quoting the Fathers A digression to the Reader Select Aphorâ—smes out of which the Author draw's his Discourse A good foundation of his to build upon His noble Quaeâ—e Animadversions upon his ambiguous sense touching the conservation of life His study of it as to his own particular All men may not have like reason to be so intent The parts and faculties of men not to be levelled with those of beasts The publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private What right a man hath to the mâ—aâ—s of preserviâ—g life and how he is to use them Each particular man cannot pretend a right to the whole world Nor to things conducing onely to mediate and particular ends The danger of pretending a right to all and so having a right judgment of it Two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time All cannot be usefull to one particular perperson Nor every thing to evâ—ry one Of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge The use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful Oâ—her ruleâ— by which to institâ—te a right judgment beside reason How all creatures are granted to man's usâ— limited Hiâ— impossible supâ—osition His falâ—acy à bâ—ne divisiâ— c. The equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all The case of necessity imply's no such universal right Nor dissolution of any Common-wealth An Objection fram'd by the Author A second of his not so strong The first but weakly answer'd by him without regard to God's end His first Argument for universal right returning extreme necessity The Bishop's severall answers to it His second Argument for ancient right in a lawfull defense How the force oâ— invalidity of this argument mâ—y be understood and how the practice moderated His Objection And answer The Bishop's Animadversions shewing the difference between just 〈…〉 invasion staâ—ing the râ—ght of possâ—ssion Fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself Propriety withouâ— Covenant The râ—ght to goodâ— gotten by conquest what His third Argument The Bishâ—p's answer from the fallibiliâ—y of judgmâ—nt His argument against the right of Occupancy Which the Bishop shew's to hold well against Covenant What is the râ—ght in necessity Discovery 〈◊〉 not an equal right with Occupancy The imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case The Author 's two Propositions destructive to humane Society and Trade The difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates Little peace to be expected if that of Occupancy be not allowed
for the matter or substance of the invisible Agents so fancied they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other conceit but that it was the same with the Soul of man and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame to a man that sleepeth or in a Looking-glasse to one that is awake which men not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancy think to be reall and external substances and therefore call them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines umbrae and thought them Spirits that is thin aeriall bodies and those invisible Agents which they feare to be like them save that they appear and vanish when they please Thus far he In which Period are many strange and forced Expressions without any proof or illustration I will touch them briefly but first I must expound that Phrase used twice by him Invisible Agents by that he must understand the false Gods of the Gentiles for the first Clause that they conceited those false Gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man I yeeld onely more excellent so was every Daemon esteemed and so even those Heroes which were from humanity in the esteeme of Idolatrous men exalted to a coelestial excellency thought of a greater perfection then themselves had in their earthly condition and that they had influence and power over these earthly things and therefore had Prayers and sacrifice offered to them But then let us consider his Philosophy concerning mans soul he saith That these Idolaters who thought their Gods like mans soul thought a mans soul was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame or in a Looking-glasse I am perswaded he dreamt when he writ this he did not so much as see it in any glasse in this world and although it is too much to say he never read it in any book for his Book will witness that many unexpected things are in Books yet I can say that I never heard or read of any Idolater that ever had that absurd opinion concerning the Soul These two things are things of a very little Entity the meanest of Accidents the one a Dreame the work of a sleeping fancie the other the apparition of a Looking-glasse the weak effect of a poor Accident Colour in which it produced it self in a most feeble and weake condition Contrariwise the soul of man is the most excellent and substantial part in the most excellent Creature man the Author of all those noble effects which the wit or industry of man can attaine unto and all this affirmed by these Idolaters in their Philosophical Books Sect. 5. But he seems to give a reason for it thus which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the fancie think to be reall and external substances and therefore call them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines Umbrae I cannot conceive to what this Relative Which looks by the preceding words it should be referred to the Dreames or Image in a Looking-glasse but by the consequent words it seems to look further to the Invisible Agents for no man was ever so foolish to think that Dreams or the Image in a Looking-glasse are real substances nor yet is it true of one piece of them which is the Image in the Looking-glasse to say it is a Creature of the fancy for the Image is there whether the fancy conceit it so or no. But then to take this word Which as it relates to the invisible Agents which the words following implie and therefore call them Ghosts no man ever called the image in a Looking-glasse a Ghost now then in this Sense although a strange perturbed one he saith that men not knowing these Gods of theirs those invisible Agents to be nothing but Creatures of the fancy called them Ghosts I beleeve if they had known them to be Creatures of the fancy they would not have so called them Ghosts as the Latines call them Imagines and Umbrae Certainly I am perswaded that the Latines did never call their Gods Imagines or Umbrae This is a most perplexed discourse I know not how to make sense of it nor I beleeve he himself for mark he goes on and thought them Spirits that is thin aerial bodies Consider the relative Them what doth he meane by it Their Gods those Invisible Agents That cannot be for the following words and these Invisible Agents which they feared to be like them Now if by them before he meant these Invisible Agents he could not say that they thought them like themselves but for the other mentioned before the Dreames or Images in a Glasse no man ever thought to be Spirits or aerial bodies But he puts a difference betwixt Spirits and Ghosts or Imagines or Umbrae or I know not what how that they apaear and vanish when they please and it seems the Ghosts did not this I beleeve is not delivered by any I am confident by none of his enemies that are studied in Schoole and Vniversity-Learning but thus he builds Castles in the aire and I was about to say fights against them but he leaves them upon these weak foundations and never casts a Trench or plants a Battery against them with any solid Argument it may be he throwes a stone an ill word somtimes but not the least attempt to prove what he sayes that ever I read Hee proceeds with a discourse from which I withhold my hand till I come to his Treatise of Angels which will administer occasion of fuller censure and here I will leap over to Page 52. CHAP. XIII The opinion of Ghosts Ignorance of second causes Devotion to what we feare taking things casual for Prognostiques mistaken for seeds of Religion Of the Sybils and their Oracles IN which he sets down foure things wherein consists the natural seed of Religion Opinion of Ghosts Ignorance of second Causes Devotion towards what we feare and taking things Casual for Prognostiques Certainly here is a foundation laid for Atheisme Sect. 1. It is impossible that so goodly a tree as Religion should grow out of such rotten and contemptible seeds as these First I observe here that these he cals seeds he puts not for the immediate but remote causes of Religion the immediate Cause to consent what I can with his Phrase or the body of the tree which supports these glorious Acts is the assurance that there is a GOD these foure Seeds as he calls them do but produce that beleefe in us and that very weakly not able to make a man forsake all for God which Religion must do Another observation may be that he doth not make these conceits of his to be the seeds of false Religion only but even of true for so presently he discourseth that these seeds produced either true or false Religion according to their culture so that the culture of Abraham Moses our blessed Saviour was but
things or the very sensitive in sensitive things for there is necessary to sight and understanding a two-fold Light internall and externall internall which enable's the power to work and externall which render's the object visible this internall light is that life which God preserve's in any living thing that doth see but then apply it to the eternall life inchoate or begun here so those graces which put a man in the State of future happinesse do likewise like light shew him the way to it or for that light perfect in Heaven for thaâ— glory which felicitate's and make 's us happy doth likewise enlighten and shew that blessed object of the most sacred Trinity Here we have no controversy with them I am briefe therefore And the light shined in darknesse and the darknesse comprehended it not To this all that Socinus saith is that Christ is called the light not onely because by heavenly Doctrine he enlighten's men to Life eternall but likewise because that by an irreprehensible and most holy Life he shined before them that they ought to imitate him for so he saye's John 13.15 I have given you an example that as I have done so should ye do likewise the men of this world were this darknesse saith he c. this hath much truth with it but not all that this Text conteyneâ—s for first if we conceive Christ to be this light as he saith we may take him in a two-fold Capacity as the word of which was spoke before the word of God then we may consider that this which was before shined in his humanity which was darknesse in Comparison and that darknesse comprehended it not that is obscured it not so but that some ray or glorious Lustre of his Divinity brake out or else the whole person came into the World which was darknesse and that darknesse laboured to crush and suppresse him but did not comprehend him Sect. 8. There was a man sent from God whose name was John Let me here admonish the Reader of one word to prevent a future objection with which the whole troop of the Socinians are full and boast that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which we render was signifye's in its proper nature to be born or begotten of another or draw his Originall from another and from thence I conceive the word gigno in Latine to be derived but because amongst all created things there is nothing which is not originated doth not draw its being from some other therefore it is often used to signify to be but I am perswaded no where in the language of this Evangelist and could the Latine or English Language so well beare with the Graecisme they would have rendered it there was a man made sent factus missus but because that sound 's harshly in these languages they choose rather to be contented with saying he was sent then he was made sent this Caution I premit now I meet with the word for the elegancy of the English rendred it so but it was used in its naturall sense where the language would beare it all things were made by him c. for although the sense be the same to say he was made sent as to to say he was sent yet the English or Latine phrase better agree's with the latter then the former and the Evangelist did of purpose as St. Cyrill thought change the phrase from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he had used before In the beginning was the word and the word was with God and the like because the word was not made nor created but when he came to St. John although the sense be much the same he changed the phrase from he was to that he was made such made sent because he was a made creature Sect. 9. The same came for a Witnesse to beare witnesse of that light I find little in these words excepted against by them onely Socinus urgeth that if John Baptist were a Witnesse of Christ he either knew him not to be that great God or else he very weakly performed his trust for he onely testifyed that he was Christ that he was the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the World that he should baptize with the holy Ghost and with fire that he was greater then himself but nothing of his being the great God I put down his sense and first I answer to his last Clause that if he had put it down in the clearest words that he or I could invent they would have found where some of these words had been used to another sense some where or other in Scripture but I am perswaded that he did witnesse enough to satisfy any Conscience that were not absolutely resolved to the Contrary for first consider that place in the 29. of this Chapter Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sinnes of the World Who can take away man's sinnes but God but the great God against whom they were committed and therefore he saye's in the 34. Verse of the same bearing witnesse of it This is the Son of God we mince it in our translation to make the phrase smoothe there is an Article at both Son and God it should be that Son of that God both with an Emphasis which these men stand much upon in other places I know their expositions of these words but I bring them for illustration that a man who is not maliciously benâ— might think this enough to expresse him the God and then looke upon St. Matth. 3.11 he shall baptize you with the holy Ghost and with fire who could do that but the great God then see in the same place whose shooes latchet I am not worthy to untyâ— certainly the meanest man is worthy enough to unty the Shooe-latchet of the greatest King in the World who is onely a man but if he be God likewise the greatest is not worthy of the meanest Office about him Certainly St. John Baptist delivered abundantly enough for the satisfaction of any sober man in this point I proceed That all men through him might believe I find no dispute concerning this businesse out of these words I let them passe therefore nor about the two next Verses I come therefore to the tenth Verse Sect. 10. He was in the World and the World was made by him and the World knew him not Socinus in his Comment upon these Words boast's much pag. 19. that no man which he knowe's expound's them right but himselfe and his exposition is that the New Testament being full of Hebraismes and the Hebrewes having compound Words do therefore use uncompounded words for compounds and so in this place the World was made by him is as much as re-made regenerated made anew and to this purpose he produceth Ephes. 2.10 we are his Workmanship created in Christ Jesus unto good works Certainly if there be no clearer Text then this this Term made need not be wrested to re-makeing for first let the
trouble the Reader with my transcribing all I answer to this that this double sight may be two wayes either by a distemper of the Organ or by a false reflection in the medium The first I have had and have been cured by Physick The second is easie for there may be multiplying glasses and many such instruments which many deliver the species double and then the colour or object must appear such but here is no reason to prove that the colour is not in the object because Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis if the eye be indisposed it must needs follow that the species shall be qualified accordingly And for the medium or middle place or mean which transports the species â—o the eye it must needs be that the liquor will taste of that tap out of which it runs that every story is enlarged or lessened multiplyed or diminished according to the affection or disposition of the deliverer and so the indisposition of the medium varying the species it must needs be that the colour must appear such although it be other but he proves his conclusion thus one of these Images therefore is not inherent in the object See here the fallacy put in his proposition at the first Confounding colour and the Image of it It is true the Image or species for I will maintain that word is not in the object but the colour is and where he sayes one is not in the object I say neither is but the colour of which that is an Image which he in this place doth labour to infringe and therefore as his Proposition was fallacious so his proof is vain And I think I have said enough to this Proposition Sect. 4. His second is That there is nothing without us really which we call an Image or colour This Proposition is short and his proof as short thus numb 6 Secondly that the Image of any thing by reflection in glass or water or the like is not any thing in or behind the Glass or in or under the water every man may grant to himself which is the second Proposition Here you may observe how the former fallacy runs through the whole discourse His Proposition was that there was nothing without us which we call Image or colour In his proof he disputes only of Images by reflection not at all of colours so that were his argument true yet it proved not his conclusion because it proves not that colours are not without us but his argument is false his antecedent as well as consequence the Image is in the Glasse as appeares for else from the Glass it could not be multiplied to the eye the Image is there but the colour is the object the Image is first in the glass and from the glass by removing or multiplying it self it comes to the eye and what he sayes will be granted is impossible for him that hath eyes and sees the Image there CHAP. III. Image and Colour what The effect of violent strokes upon the eye The apparition of Light motion of Fire working of the Sun c. Sect. 1. HIs third proposition is that the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion agitation or alteration which the object worketh in the brain or spirit or some internal substance of the head Here is a tedious Proposition and there is a tedious proofe of it to avoid confusion therefore I will take this proposition into some pieces and examine them apart and then overthrow his proof Sect. 2. First I observe the old fallacy Image or colour both put as one and the same but it is false in both to say that either of them is but an apparition unto us of the motion which the object worketh in the brain First for Image c. All Images certainly are the apparitions of those things whose Images they are the Image of a horse is the apparition of a horse for they are the apparitions of such things as they make appear and they make these things and these things onely appear whose Images they are Now these visible species make red and greene coloured things appear to wit the object not the motion of the brain which without doubt can have none of these colours For although it is possible to be conceived that from these Images conveighed to the brain the brain may receive some likenesse of the object yet that likenesse represents and is the apparition of the object not the brain But then to say it is the apparition of this motion is ridiculous it is true motion because a thing known hath it's apparitions it could not be known else but that is a distinct apparition as the nature of motion is distinct from other things so must its apparition be but to say that all these Images are apparitions of motions is as much as if he should say that the apparition of any thing which is quiet and doth not move were the apparition of a motion yea the conceipt which a man hath of rest it selfe which is incompetible with motion should be the apparition of it's clean contrary which is motion and the conceipt of the braine being quiet should be the conceipt of the brains motion then which nothing can be more abhorring both to sense and reason Sect. 3. And then in the next place colour is not an apparition of the motion c. which the object worketh in the braine c. His very phrase confutes it for colour is the object now if it be the object it is not an apparition of the moâ—ion which the object worketh Again colour is a permanent thing an apparition of a motion is transient as the motion is and that motion he names is of little or no stay at all most suddain Again if it be an apparition of such a motion how came that motion to be green yellow blew c. either it hath it originally from it self and then that motion hath colour in it or else it hath it from the mover which is the object then how could the object make it of any colour when by this Gentleman it hath none It cannot be therefore as he saith that either colour or Image can be the apparition unto us of the motion which the object worketh Sect. 4. Secondly observe how unconstant this gentlemans Philosophy is to himself I noted before in his Leviathan how he joyned the heart with the brain in his production of sense and presently after the heart alone but here clean contrary he puts the seat of sense to be the braine spirits or some internal substance of the head which contradictions seem to me most extreamely strange in a man so cryed up for learning in a book so laboured unlesse a man could think that conceiving himself infallible he should write Quicquid in Buccam venerit what came next I come now to his proof of his conclusion which is Numb 7. Sect. 5. For the
expounded by the Schools page 205. Christ had a plenarity of power in his mission from the Father chapter 33. s. 18. page 385. Moral Philosophy hath a subject of a greater extent then Mr. Hobbes seem's to allow it chapter 29. s. 8. page 261. How Moses was instead of God to Aaron chapter 30. s. 12. page 286. How made a God to Pharaoh ibid. A messenger and mediatour betwixt God and his people s. 15. page 290. Motion aim's at quiet chapter 1. s. 3. page 5. All things produced by it p. 6. Things without us are not motions causing apparitions chapter 6. s. 9. page 48. The six kinds of motion page 49. No eternity of motion in things moved unto which no stop or impediment occurre's chapter 7. s. 2. page 55 How standing water recover's its rest after motion chapter 9. s. 1. p. 63. A bladder's sudain stopping its motion of ascent on the top of the water s. 2. page 64. The first mover immoveable chapter 14. s. 8. page 101. How naturall bodies move themselves without being moved by that which is moved page 102. N Naboth destroyed not by Ahab's but Jezabell's malice chapter 19. s. 4. page 145. The being and nature of things consist's not in their second but their first act c. chapter 5. section 1. page 32 The right of nature extend's farther then to the preservation of life chapter 22. section 1. page 164. Necessity of nature make's not every particular man desirous to preserve his life section 3. page 166. He that judgeth by the right of Nature hath a Law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment chapter 23. section 2. page 177. To which he is oblig'd by Reason ib. When the Law of Nature for preservation may be dispens'd with page 178. What is the Law what the Right of Nature chapter 24. section 1. page 181. Not such as Mr. Hobbes define's it chapter 25. section 1. page 190. External impediments may hinder but not take away naturall power section 2. p. 191. Nature's aiming at the benefit onely of particulars an errour which run's through Mr. Hobbes's whole discourse section 3. p. 193. How far naturall abilities conduce to the knowledge of God chapter 33. section 13. page 372. Actions not alwayes answerable to the principles of his or its nature which act's section 17. page 383. Severall acceptions of necessity and the different effects of it accordingly chapter 22. section 2. page 165. Nothing necessary that God hath not provided for by some Law ibid. No new Patent made to Noah but that to Adam re-enforced chapter 24. section 4. p. 185. Noah's sonne 's like co-heires or enter-commoners in their right page 186. O Obedience due in submission to any punishment by a lawful Magistrate chapter 25. section 7. p. 199. God to be obeyed before man chapter 30. section 9. p. 282. an instance in the Hebrew midwives ibid. The title of Occupancy sacred chapter 19. section 4. page 145. Before Occupancy Reason or Armâ— decide the title p. 147. Of all titles to Interest Occupancy most evident section 11. page 163. How far in case of necessity to be remitted chapter 36. section 13. p. 437 Discovery give 's not an equall right with Occupancy p. 438. Little peace to be expected if the right of Occupancy be not allowed p. 440. Ochinus pervert's the sense of Acts 20.17 28. to detract from the divinity of Christ chapter 31. section 2. page 293. Refuted by Smiglecius ib. To whom Smalcius replie's p. 294. Ochinus deserted by the Socinians ib. The discourse between Ochinus and his Spirit moderated by the Bishâ—p chapter 31. section 10. p. 315. One in essence may be plurally expressed when the effects are divers section 7. p. 309. The heathen Gods not believed for their Oracles but the Oracles for their Gods chapter 13. section 5. page 90. P The right of Parents over their Children chapter 24. section 2. page 182. What make's passions sinful chapter 21. section 2. p. 154. The various constitutions of the objects to our passions ibid. The passions to be moderated by prudence and right reason the ancient Ethnick Philosophy and Saint Paul's chap. 29. section 12. p. 269. ch 36. s. 3. p. 421. The barbarous Persecutions endured by the Primitive Christians chapter 25. section 6. p. 197. Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too circumstantiall chapter 30. section 1. p. 272. No lesse applicable to a feigned then a true Person section 2. p. 273. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 suppositum anciently used to denote what we term Person section 3. p. 274. Person differently used in severall Arts and Faculties ibid. Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes section 4. p. 275. No man Personates hiâ—self ibid. That of Cicero interpreted Vâ—us sustineo tres personas Mei Adversarii Judicis ibid. Perâ—on how taken by Criticks page 276. Boethius's definition of a Person section 5. ibid. objected against by Ri. de Sancto Victore ibid. By Scotus p. 277. Boethius's other definition of a person more difficult ibid. The former definition explain'd and vindicated by the Bishop section 6. page 278. The Etymology and common acception of Persona p. 280. Not the Actor but the acted is the person ib. The true God improperly and over-boldly said to be personated chapter 30. section 11. p. 284. Moses though instead of God did not personate him p. 285. s. 12. p. 287. Nor do Kings Nor Priests ibid. Moses's phrase shew's he personated not God section 14. p. 289. Uncomly to say our Saviour personated God who was really God himself chapter 31. section 1. p. 291. Personality what chapter 33. section 15. page 379. What that of Christ in the flesh ib. Diversity of persons imply's not diversity of things section 17. page 384. The whole Divine nature not necessarily engaged in the acts of any single person in the Trinity ibid. The eternal plurality of Persons by production in the holy Trinity syllogistically proved chapter 35. section 7. p. 404. Why no more persons then three in the holy Trinity section 11. p. 410. How the product of two Divine Agents may be one and the same Person section 12. p. 411. How the three Divine Persons must necessarily be Father Son and holy Ghost section 13. page 412. St. Augustine's argument for their being called three Persons which is no Scripture-language section 14. p. 414. How great is the Personal distinction in the holy Trinity a mystery yet unrevealed chapter 35. section 14. p. 415. Personal and relative perfection taught by Philosophers chapter 29. section 10. p. 263. How man's knowledge is from Phantasms chap. 14. s. 4. p. 95. The foundation of Ethick Oeconomick and Politick Philosophy chapter 29. section 9. p. 262. Mr. Hobbes's Philosophy compared with that of Epicurus section 10. p. 263. With that of Lucretius page 265. The Philosophers language used by the Primitive Fathers and St. Paul chapter 32. section 14. p. 337. That of Plato consonant to holy Job's and our Saviour's in St. John p. 338.