the Father begot his Son and that the Father and the Son produced the Holy Ghost for these Emanations are necessary But the World not being a necessary Emanation of God those who see his Being the most clearly do not see evidently which are his external productions Nevertheless I do believe that the Blessed are certain that there is a World but it is because God assures them of it in making his Will known to them after a manner which is unknown to us And even we here below are certain of it because Faith teaches us that God has Created this World and that this Faith is Consonant to our Natural Judgments or to our compound Sensations when they are confirm'd by all our Senses corrected by our Memory and rectified by our Reason It is true it seems at first that the Proof or Principle of our Faith supposes there are Bodies Fides ex auditu It seems to suppose Prophets Apostles Holy Writ and Miracles But if we observe it strictly we shall find that though we only suppose appearances of Men of Prophets of Apostles of Holy Writ of Miracles c. What we have learn'd by those pretended appearances is absolutely undeniable since as I have prov'd it in divers parts of this Work God alone can represent those pretended appearances to the Mind and God is no deceiver for Faith it self supposes all this Now in the appearance of Holy Scripture and Miracles we learn that God has Created an Heaven and an Earth that the Word was made Flesh and other Truths of this kind which suppose the existence of a Created World So that it is certain by Faith that there are Bodies and thereby all those appearances become Realities I need not inlarge any farther to answer an Objection which appears too abstruse to the common sort of Men and I am of Opinion that this will suffice to satisfie all those who are not too difficult Therefore we must conclude from all this that we can and even that we ought to correct the Natural Judgments or compound perceptions which have a relation to sensible Qualities which we attribute to external Bodies or to that which we animate But as to the Natural Judgments that have a relation to the actual Existence of Bodies though we might absolutely forbear forming free Judgments agreeable to them we ought not to do it because those Natural Judgments agree perfectly with Faith Besides I have particularly made this Remark that Men should seriously reflect upon this Truth That nothing but Eternal Wisdom can inlighten us and that all the sensible knowledge in which our Body has any share is deceitful or at least is attended with that Light to which we feel our selves oblig'd to submit I am sensible that the common sort of Men will not approve these Thoughts and that according to the abundance or defect of their Animal Spirits they will either laugh or be frightned at these Arguments For the Imagination cannot indure abstract and extraordinary Truths It either looks upon them as frightful Spectres or ridiculous Phantasms But I had rather be expos'd to the raillery of strong and bold Imaginations and to the Indignation and Fear of the weak and timorous than to be wanting in what I owe to Truth and to those generous defenders of the Mind against the efforts of the Body who know how to distinguish the answers of illuminating Wisdom from the confused noise of a perplexing and seducing Imagination AN EXPLANATION OF THE Fifth Chapter of the Second Book Of Memory and Spiritual Habits I Forbear speaking of Memory and Spiritual Habits in this Chapter for several Reasons the chief of which is that we have no clear Idea of our Soul For what means have we clearly to explain the dispositions which the Operations of the Soul leave in it which dispositions are its Habits since we do hot even clearly know the Nature of the Soul It is evident that we cannot distinctly know the alterations a Being is capable of when we do not distinctly know the Nature of that Being For if for instance Men had no clear Idea of extension they would in vain endeavour to discover the Figures of it However since some are desirous I should speak upon a matter which in it self is not known to me this is the method I will observe to follow none but clear Idea's in it I suppose that God only acts in the Mind and represents the Idea's of all things to it and that when the Mind perceives any Object by a very clear and lively Idea it is because God represents that Idea to it after a very perfect manner I suppose moreover that the Will of God being absolutely consonant to Order and Justice it is sufficient to have a right to a thing to obtain it These Suppositions which are distinctly conceiv'd being made the Spiritual Memory explains it self easily for Order requiring that Persons who have often thought on some Object should the easier think on it again and have a clearer and more lively Idea of it than those who have thought but little on it the Will of God which operates continually according to Order represents to their Mind as soon as they desire it the clear and lively Idea of that Object So that according to that Explanation the Memory and other Habits of pure Intelligences consist not in a facility of operation which results from certain Modifications of their Being but from an immutable Order of God and in a Right which the Mind acquires over those things Which have already been submitted to it and the sole power of the Mind depends immediately arid only on God the force or facility which all Creatures find in their Operations being in that sense only the Efficacious Will of the Creator And I do not think we are obliged to abandon this Explanation upon the account of the ill habits of Sinners and of the Damn'd for tho' God does whatever is real and positive in the Actions of Sinners it is evident by what I have said in the first Explanation that God is not the Author of Sin However I do believe and think my self oblig'd to believe that after the action of the Soul there still remains some alterations which do dispose it to that same Action But as I know them not I cannot explain them for I have no clear Idea of my Mind in which I can discover all the Modifications it is capable of I believe by Theological Proofs and not by clear and evident ones See the Explanation on the 7th Chap. of the 2d part of the third Book that the Reason for which pure Intelligences see Objects which they have already consider'd more clearly than others is not meerly because God represents those Objects to them in a more lively and more perfect manner but because they are really better dispos'd to receive the same Action from God in them Just as the facility which some persons have acquir'd to play upon some Instruments does
Conversations towards the end The Stoics who had but a confused knowledge of the disorders of original Sin could not confute the Epicureans their happiness being but barely Ideal since there is no felicity without Pleasure and they could not relish Pleasure in the meer persuit of vertuous actions 't is true they might find some satisfaction in following the Rules of their imaginary Virtue because it is a natural consequence of the knowledge our Soul has that she 's in the most eligible condition she can be in This joy of the Mind might maintain their Resolutions for some time but it was not strong enough to resist Pain and conquer Pleasure 'T was secret Pride and not Joy that made them keep their Countenance for when no one was present they soon lost all their Power and Wisdom like Kings upon the Theatre whose Grandeur vanishes in a moment It is very different with those Christians who exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel Their Joy is solid because they most certainly know they are in the happiest condition they can possibly be at present Their Joy is also great because the Good they taste through Faith and Hope is infinite For the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a sensible Joy and this Joy is so much the more vigorous as the Hope is stronger because a strong Hope representing the Good as present necessarily produces that Joy and sensible Pleasure which always accompanies the presence of Good Nor is their Joy uneasie because it is founded upon the promises of God by the Blood of whose Son it is confirmed and maintain'd by the inward Peace and inexpressible sweetness of Charity which the Holy Ghost diffuses in their Hearts Nothing can separate them from the true Good when they taste and are pleased with it through the Delectation of Grace The Pleasures of Corporeal Enjoyments are not so great as those they feel in the love of God rather than quit them they choose Contempt and Pain they are not affrighted at Reproaches and Disgrace and the Pleasures they find in their Sufferings or to speak more properly those they meet with in God when they contemn every thing to be united to him are so violent that they transport them and makes them speak a new Language and with the Apostles boast of the Miseries and Injuries they suffer The Scripture tells us That when the Apostles departed from the Council they were filled with Joy that they were accounted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS And this is the disposition of Mind in true Christians when they have received the greatest Affronts for defending the Truth JESVS CHRIST being come to reestablish that Order that Sin had overthrown and Order requiring that the greatest Goods should be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures it is plain that things ought to happen after the manner we have related But besides Reason Experience confirms it for a Person no sooner takes a resolution of contemning every thing for God but he is commonly so affected with a Pleasure or inward Joy that he as sensibly feels God to be his Good as before he evidently knew him to be so True Christians assure us every day that the Joy they have in the Love and Service of God is inexpressible and 't is very reasonable to believe them concerning what passes in themselves The wicked on the contrary are perpetually tormented with mortal Disquiets and such as are divided betwixt God and the World partake also of the Joys of the Righteous and Dissatisfactions of the Wicked They complain of their Miseries and 't is likewise just to believe their Complaints are not groundless God strikes Men to the very quick when they make choice of any other object for their chief Good but himself and 't is this wound that makes them really miserable But fills the Mind of those with excessive Joy who only unite themselves to him and 't is this Joy which gives the true Felicity The abundance of Riches and possession of Honours and Dignities being external cannot cure the wound God makes And as Poverty and Contempt are also without us so they cannot hurt us when the Almighty protects us It is evident by what has been said that the objects of our Passions are not our Good and that we must only follow their Motions for the preservation of our Lives That sensible Pleasure in respect of our Good is what our Sensations are in relation to the Truth and even as we find our Senses deceive us in matters of Truth so our Passions deceive us concerning our Good That we must submit to the Delectation of Grace because it evidently enclines us to love the true Good nor is followed with the secret reproaches of Reason like the blind instinct and confused pleasure of the Passions but is always attended with a secret Joy agreeable to the condition we are in And last of all since God only can act upon our Mind we can find no Felicity out of God except we would suppose that God rewards none but the Disobedient or Commands us to love that most which least deserves our love CHAP. V. That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Vnion with God by the knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue And that on the contrary its Imperfection proceeds only from its dependance on the Body because of the disorder of its Senses and Passions THE least reflexion is enough to discover to us that the good of the Mind must necessarily be something Spiritual for Bodies are much inferior to the Mind and cannot act upon it by their own strength They are not able immediately to unite themselves to it nor are they intelligible of themselves and therefore cannot be its good On the contrary Spiritual Things are intelligible from their own Nature and may unite themselves to the Mind consequently be its good if we suppose them superior to it for that a thing may be the good of the Mind it is not enough to be Spiritual like that it must be above it that it may be able to act upon it instruct and recompence it otherwise it cou'd neither make it more happy nor more perfect and therefore cou'd not be its good Of all things both Intelligible and Spiritual there is none but God that is thus superior to the Mind from whence it follows that nothing but he is or can be its true good nor can we therefore become more perfect or more happy but in the enjoyment of God Every one is convinced that the knowledge of the Truth and love of Virtue makes the Mind more perfect and that the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Inclinations renders it more imperfect The knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue then can be nothing else but the union of the Mind with God and even a kind of possessing of him And the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Heart can likewise be nothing else but the separation
Good And when we Sin what do we Nothing for we love a false Good that God enclines us not to love by an invincible Impression We cease to seek the true Good and make useless the motion which God imprints on us Now when we love any particular Good only or against Order we receive from God as great an impression of Love as if we stopt not at this Good Moreover this particular determination which is neither necessitated nor invincible is also given us of God Therefore when we Sin we produce no new modification in our selves However I confess when we do not Sin but resist Temptation we may say in one Sense that we give our selves a new modification because we would think of other things than on the false Goods which tempt us But what we then do is produced by the action which God impresses on us that is by our motion towards Good in general or by our Will assisted by Grace or illuminated by a light or impelled by a preingaged Pleasure For in short if 't is pretended that to Will different things is to give our selves different Modifications I grant that in this Sense the Mind can diversly modifie it self by the action it receives from God But it must always be observed that that action that God performs in us depends upon us and is not invincible in respect to particular Goods For when a particular Good is presented to us we have an internal Sensation of our liberty in respect to it as we have of our Pleasure and Pain when we feel it We are even convinced of our Freedom by the same reason that we are convinced of our Existence for 't is the internal Sensation we have of our Thoughts which teaches us that we are And if in the time that we are conscious of our liberty in respect to a particular Good we ought to doubt whether or no we are free because we have no clear Idea of our liberty We must also doubt of our Pain and Existence at the time even when we are very unhappy since we have no clear Idea either of our Souls or of our Pain It is not the same with internal Sensation as with our external Senses These always deceive us in something when we follow their information but our internal Sensation never deceives us 'T is by my external Senses that I see Colours upon the surface of Bodies that I hear sounds in the Air and feel pain in my Hand c. and I am deceiv'd if I judge of these things upon the relation of my Senses But 't is by internal Sensation that I see Colours hear Sounds suffer Pain and I deceive not my self to think I see when I see hear when I hear or suffer when I suffer provided I stay there I explain not these things more at large because they are evident of ' emselves Thus having an internal Sensation of our liberty at the same time that a particular Good presents it self to our Mind we ought not to doubt whether we are free in respect to this Good Yet as we have not always this internal Sensation and sometimes only consult what remains of it in our memory after a very confused manner We may think of the abstracted Reasons which hinder us from feeling our selves persuaded that it is not possible for Man to be free Like a Stoic that wants nothing and who can Philosophise at his ease can imagine that Pain is not an Evil because the internal Sensation he has of it does not actually convince him of the contrary He may prove as Seneca has done by Reasons that in one Sense are true that 't is even a contradiction that a wise Man can be unhappy Yet when the internal Sensation we have of our selves will not suffice to convince us that we are free we may perswade our selves of it by Reason For being convinced by Reason that God only acts for himself and that he cannot give us any motion which tends not towards him the impression towards good in general may be invincible but it is plain the impression he gives us towards particular Goods must necessarily be free For if this impression was invincible we should not have any motion to go to God altho' he gives us motion only for himself and we should be necessitated to stop at particular Goods although God Order and Reason forbid it So that we should not Sin through our own default and God would be truly the cause of our Irregularities since they would not be free but purely natural and absolutely necessary Thus although we should not be convinced of our liberty by the internal Sensation we have of our selves we might by Reason discover that its necessary that Man should be created free supposing that he be capable of desiring particular Goods and that he can desire these Goods only by the impression or motion that God continually gives him for himself which may likewise be proved by Reason But 't is not the same of the capacity we have of suffering any Pain To discover that we have this capacity there is no other way but internal Sensation and yet no one doubts but Man is subject to Pain As we know not our Soul by a clear Idea as I have elsewhere explained 't would be in vain for us to try to discover what it is in us which terminates the action that God imprints on us or what it is in us which is overcome by a determination that is not invincible and that may be changed by our Will or impression towards whatever is good and by its union with him who includes the Ideas of all Beings For as we have no clear Idea of any modification of our Soul there is only an internal Sensation which teaches us that we exist and what we are 'T is this Sensation therefore that we must consult to convince our selves that we are free It answers us clearly enough when we actually propose any particular good to our selves For there is no Man who can doubt that he is not invincibly carried to Eat a Fruit or to shun some inconsiderable Pain But if instead of hearkning to our internal Sensation we give attention to abstracted Reasons which divert us from thinking of our selves it may be we might even lose the sight of our selves and forget what we are and that endeavouring to reconcile the knowledge of God and the absolute power he has over us with our liberty we should fall into an Error which would overthrow all the Principles of Religion and Morality Here is an Objection that is used to be made against what I have said and although it be very trivial it nevertheless is a difficulty to some Men. The hatred of God say they is an action wherein there is no Good Therefore it is perfectly the Sinners and God has no part in it Consequently Man acts and gives himself a new modification by an action which proceeds not from God I Answer That Sinners hate
God than of Bodies and when they look within themselves they discover more clearly certain Wills of God according to which he preserves all Beings than those of their best Friends or of those whom they have study'd all their life For that Union of their Mind with God and of their Will with his I mean with the Eternal Law or with the Immutable Order is an immediate direct and necessary Union and the union they have with sensible Objects being only Establish'd for the preservation of their Health and Life it only makes them know those Objects according to the relation they have to that design It is this immediate and direct Union which is only known says St. Augustin by those whose Mind is purified which enlightens us in the most secret recesses of our Reason and exhorts and moves us in the most inward part of our Heart 'T is this which teaches us what God Thinks and even what God Wills that is his Eternal Truths and Laws for no body can question our knowing some of them evidently But the union we have with our best Friends does not teach us evidently either what they think or what they will We think we know it perfectly but we are commonly mistaken when we only know it because they tell it us The Union we have by our Senses with Bodies which surround us cannot inform us neither For the relation of the Senses is never absolutely true nay it is often false in all respects according as I have explained it in this Book And therefore I say that it is more difficult than Men think to prove positively that there are Bodies notwithstanding our Senses assure us there are because Reason does not assure us of it so positively as we imagine and because it is necessary to consult it with great application to be satisfied in it But as Men are more sensible than reasonable and hearken more willingly to the Testimony of their Senses than to that of internal Truth they have always consulted their Eyes to assure themselves of the Existence of Matter without giving themselves the trouble to consult their Reason And therefore they are surprised when they are told that it is difficult to demonstrate it They think it is sufficient to open their Eyes to see that there are Bodies and in case there is any fear of being deluded they think it sufficient to draw near and to touch them after which they can hardly conceive there can be any reason to doubt of their Existence But our Eyes represent Colours to us upon the surface of Bodies and Light in the Air and in the Sun Our Ears convey Sounds to us as being dispers'd thrô the Air and Bodies which reverberate the Eccho And if we credit the Relation of the other Senses Heat will be in Fire Sweetness in Sugar Odor in Musk and all sensible qualities in the Bodies which seem to exhale or to disperse them Nevertheless it is certain by the Reasons I have alledg'd in the first Book of The Search after Truth That all those Qualifications are not out of the Soul which feels them at least it is not evident that they are in the Bodies which surround us Why then should we conclude on the bare Relation of the Senses which deceive us on all occasions that there are indeed external Bodies and even that these Bodies are like unto those we see I mean those which are the immediate Object of our Soul when we look upon any with the Eyes of our Body Certainly this is not without its difficulty what ever men may say of it Moreover if we may assure our selves of the exiistence of any Body by the bare Relation of our Senses it is particularly of that to which our Soul is immediately united The most lively Sensation and that which seems to have the most necessary Relation to any Body actually existing is Pain Nevertheless it happens often that those who have lost an Arm feel violent Pains in it even long after its Amputation They are very sensible that they have lost it when they consult their Memory or look upon their Body but the sensation of Pain deceives them And if as it sometimes comes to pass one should suppose their absolutely losing the Remembrance of what they have been and their retaining no other Sense but that by which they feel a Pain in their imaginary Arm certainly they could never persuade themselves that they have not an Arm in which they feel such cruel Pains There have been Men who fancied they had Horns upon their heads others who believed themselves to be Butter or Glass or that their Body was not form'd like other Men that it was like that of a Cock of a Woolf of an Ox. It will be urg'd that they were mad and I grant it But their Soul might be mistaken in those things and consequently all Men may fall into the like Errors if they judge of things according to the Relation of their Senses For it is observable that those Mad-men really behold themselves as they fancy they are The Error is not precisely in the Sentiment they have but in the Judgment they form for if they did say barely that they feel or behold themselves like a Cock they would not be deceived They are only deceived in believing that their Body is like unto that which they feel I mean to that which is the immediate Object of their Mind when they consider themselves Thus those who believe they are such as they really are are no more judicious than Mad-men in the judgment they form of themselves if they only judge barely according to the Relation of their Senses It is not by Reason but good Fortune they are not deceiv'd But at the bottom how can we be certain whether those who are called Mad-men are really so Might not one say that they only seem to be mad because they have particular Sentiments For it is evident that a Man is look'd upon as a Mad-man not because he sees that which is not but because he sees the contrary of what others see whether others are deceived or not A Peasant's eyes for instance are disposed in such a manner that he sees the Moon such as she really is or such only as she is seen We partly see those things when we behold the Moon through a Telescope or perhaps as she will be seen at some time or other with Prospectives of a new Invention He looks upon her with Admiration and cries out to his companions What huge Mountains do I see what deep Valleys what Seas what Lakes what Gulphs what Rocks Do you not see many Seas towards the East and that there is hardly any thing but Lands and Mountains towards the West and South Do you not behold a Mountain on that very side much higher than any of those we have ever seen and do you not admire a perfect black Sea or a horrid Whirl pool in the centre of that Planet What will
designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
fortifie its emotions that the least suspicion frightens and disturbs the Reason False Zealors think they do God service when they submit to their Passions they blindly follow the secret motions of their Hatred as proceeding from the Internal Truth and stopping with satisfaction at such sensible proofs as justifie their excess they confirm themselves in their errors with an unconquerable obstinacy As for Ignorant and Weak Persons they create to themselves ridiculous and imaginary subjects of fear and like Children who walk in the dark without a guide they imagine frightful Bugbears are disturb'd and cry out as if they were undone light re-assures them if they are ignorant but if Men have weak Minds their imagination is always disturbed The least thing which relates to that frightful Object renews the traces and course of the Spirits which causes the symtom of their fear so that 't is absolutely impossible to cure or appease them for ever But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind it continually produces such unjust and violent Judgments in it that we cannot think on 'em without horror To change the Mind possessed with these Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul and to cure it would be absolute impossible if we could set bounds to the Mercy and Power of God Those who walk in the dark rejoyce at the appearance of light but this Man cannot endure it since it hurts him because it resists his Passion His fear being in some manner voluntary because 't is produced by his hatred he loves to be affected by it since we love to be agitated by those Passions which have Evil for their Object when the Evil is imaginary or rather when we know as in Tragedies that the Evil can't hurt us The Phantoms that these form to themselves who walk in the dark vanish at the approach of light But this Man's Phantoms cannot be dissipated by the light of the truth for instead of dissipating the darkness of his Mind it only incenses his imagination so that whilst he applies himself to the Object of his Passion the light reflects and it seems to him as if these Phantoms had real Bodies since they reflect some weak rays of light which strike upon them But if we should suppose in these Persons a sufficient docility and reflection to make 'em listen to and apprehend such Reasons as are capable of dissipating their Errors yet their imagination being disordered through fear and their Hearts corrupted through hatred and false zeal these Reasons how solid soever they might be in themselves would not be able long to stop the impetuous motions of these violent Passions nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing proofs For we must observe that there are some Passions which never return again whereas there are others that are constant and durable Those which are not maintained by the sight of the Mind but only produced and fortified by the sensible view of some Object and the fermentation of the Blood continue not but commonly die immediately after they are produced But those which are attended with the contemplation of the Mind are lasting for the Principle which causes them is not subject to change like the Blood and Humours So that Hatred Fear and all the rest of the Passions which are stirr'd up or preserved by the knowledge of the Mind and not by the sensible sight of some Evil must necessarily subsist long These Passions are therefore more durable violent and unjust but not more lively and sensible as has already been shown The perception of Good and Evil which excite the Passions is produced three several ways by the Senses Imagination and the Mind The perception of Good and Evil by the Senses or Sensation of Good and Evil produces the quickest and most sensible Passions Good and Evil perceived by the Imagination only excites them after a much weaker manner and the perception of Good and Evil by the Mind purely never produces true ones because it is always attended with some motion of the Animal Spirits The Passions are given us only for the good of the Body and by that to unite us to all sensible things for although sensible things can be neither good or bad in respect to the Mind they are so however in relation to the Body to which they are united Thus the Senses discovering much better the relation that sensible Objects have to the Body than the Mind it self can They must excite much more lively Passions than a clear and evident knowledge is able to do But because all our discoveries are attended with some motion of the Spirits a clear and evident knowledge of a great Good and great Evil which is not perceived by the Senses always excites some secret Passion Yet all our clear and evident discoveries of Good and Evil are not followed by some sensible Passion which we perceive and so on the other side all our Passions are not attended with some knowledge of the Mind For if we sometimes think of Good and Evil without feeling our selves moved we often find our selves moved with some Passions without knowing what they are nay sometimes without perceiving the cause of ' em One who breaths in a good Air feels a motion of Joy without knowing from whence it proceeds or what good 't is he possesses which causes this Joy And if there is any invisible Body which mingles with the Blood and hinders its fermentation it will produce sorrow and perhaps he will attribute the cause of his sorrow to any visible thing which occurs in that moment of his Passion Of all the Passions none are more sensible or more quick and consequently less attended with the knowledge of the Mind than horrour and antipathy agreeableness and sympathy It sometimes happens that a Man sleeping under a shady Tree would of a suddain and unexpectedly be waked at the sting of a Gnat or tickling of a Leaf even as if he were bitten with a Serpent The confused Sensation of something as terrible as death frights him without perceiving that he is agitated with a most powerful and violent Passion which is an aversion of desire On the contrary a Man in some necessity by chance discovers a small good the satisfaction of which surprizes him and he applies himself to this trifle as to the greatest good imaginable without making the least reflexion upon it The like also happens in the motions of sympathy and antipathy We sometimes see a certain Person whose habit and external appearance has some secret alliance with the present disposition of our Body we are forthwith touched with a vehement inclination for him and without any reflexion are induced to love and wish him well 'T is this I know not what which agitates us since Reason has no share in it And the contrary happens in respect to those whose Air and Manners excite disgust and horrour in us They have I know not
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
those which surround us which is of a Nature so much the more perfect as it is more distant from us Here is Aristotle's Reasons but I desie the most Intelligent of his Interpreters to joyn distinct Idea's to the Terms which he makes use of and to prove that this Philosopher began with the most Simple things before he spoke of the more compounded which is absolutely necessary to reason well as I have before proved If I was not afraid of being tiresome I would yet translate some Chapters of Aristotle But besides our taking little Pleasure to read them in our own Tongue when we clearly understand what he means I have sufficiently shewn by the little I have related that his Manner of Philosophizing is wholly useless for the Discovery of Truth For since he says himself in the Fifth Chapter of this Book that those that deceive themselves in any thing at first deceive themselves a Thousand times more if they advance far It is plain that if he knew not what he said in the two first Chapters of his Book we may reasonably believe that it is not safe to take things upon his Authority without examining his Reasons But to be better perswaded of it I will make it appear that there is not one Chapter in this Book wherein there is not some Absurdity In the third Chapter he says the Heavens are incorruptible and not subject to Alteration he brings many very foolish Arguments to prove this because for Example there is the Habitation of the Immortal Gods and because there was never any Change observed in them This last Reason might be admitted if Aristotle could have proved that any one had come from thence or had lived near enough to these celestial Bodies to make accurate Observations of them But however I don't know who would believe such an Authority since Telescopes do shew us the contrary He pretends in the Fourth Chapter to prove that there are no contrary Circular Motions Yet it is manifest that the Motion from East to West is contrary to that from West to East In the Fifth Chapter he improperly proves that Bodies are not infinite drawing his Proofs from the Motion of simple Bodies For What hinders but that there may be above his Primum Mobile some immoveable Extension In the Sixth he uselesly amuses himself to prove that the Elements are not infinite For who can doubt of it when we suppose with him that they are included in the Heavens which surrounds them But he makes himself ridiculous when he endeavours to prove it by their Weight and Lightness If the Elements were infinite says he they would have an infinite Weight and an infinite Lightness which cannot be Therefore c. those that would see his Arguments at large may read them in his Books I think it Loss of Time to relate them In the Seventh he continues to prove that Bodies are not infinite and his first Proof supposes it necessary for all Bodies to be in Motion which he does not prove nor indeed can it be proved He maintains in the Eighth that there are not many Worlds of the same Kind by this pleasant Argument If there was another Earth like this we inhabit the Earth being heavy by Nature it would fall upon ours because ours is the Center to which all heavy Bodies ought to tend From whence has he learned this but from his Senses In the Ninth he proves that 't is even impossible there should be a Plurality of Worlds because if there was any Body above the Heavens it would be simple or compound in a Natural or Violent State which cannot be from the Reasons he has drawn from his three Kinds of Motion which I have already spoken of He affirms in the Tenth that the World is Eternal because he cannot prove that it had a Beginning and that it will always endure since we see whatsoever is created corrupts in Time This he has likewise learnt from his Senses But who has taught him that the World shall always endure He imploys the Eleventh Chapter in explaining what we mean by incorruptible as if the Equivocation was much to be feared and that a great Use ought to be made of its Explanation Yet this Term Incorruptible is so clear of it self that Aristotle does not give himself the Trouble to explain neither in what Sense it ought to be taken nor how he understood it himself It would have been more to the Purpose if he had defined an infinite Number of Terms he makes use of which stir up only sensible Idea's For we might then it may be have learned something by reading his Works And in the last Chapter of the first Book of the Heavens he essays to prove that the World is incorruptible and will eternally endure because he cannot prove it had a Beginning All things says he subsist for a finite or infinite Time But what is infinite only in one Sense is neither finite nor infinite Therefore nothing can subsist after this manner This is the way of reasoning us'd by the Prince of Philosophers that Genius of Nature who in stead of discovering die true Cause of Natural Effects by clear and distinct Idea's has established a Heathen Philosophy upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses or upon such as are too general to be of any Use in an Enquiry after Truth I do not here find Fault with Aristotle because he did not know that God created the World in Time to make known his Power and the Dependance of his Creatures and that he will never destroy it that we may know also that he is immutable and never repents of his Designs But I believe my self able to confute his weak Proofs of the Worlds Eternity Though he sometimes is excusable in the Opinions he maintains yet he is hardly ever so in the Reasons he brings when he treats on Subjects which include any Difficulty We are it may be already perswaded of it by what I have said although I have not related all the Errors I have met with in the Book I have extracted and I have endeavoured to make him speak more clearly than he was accustomed to do But that we may be fully convinced that the Genius of Nature hath never discovered either the Secrets or Springs of it It will be proper for me to shew that the Principles this Philosopher makes use of to explain Natural Effects have no Reason in them It is plain that we can discover nothing in Physicks if we begin not with the most simple Bodies the Elements For the Elements are the Bodies into which all others resolve because they are contained in them either actually or * I speak according to the Sentiments of the Peripateticks c. 3. l. 3. de Coelo Potentially so Aristotle defines them But we cannot find in the Works of Aristotle that he has by a distinct Idea explained these simple Bodies into which he pretends the others resolve And consequently his
Elements not being clearly known it is impossible to discover the Nature of the Bodies which are composed of them This Philosopher says true that there are four Elements Fire Air Water and Earth But he does not clearly know the Nature of them He gives no distinct Idea of them Nay he will not have his Elements to be composed of the Fire Air Water and Earth that we see for in short if it were so we should at least have some Knowledge of them by our Senses It is true in many Places of his Works he endeavours to explain them by the Qualities of Heat and Cold Humidity and Driness Weight and Lightness But this manner of Explication is so impertinent and ridiculous that I cannot conceive how so many learned Men should be satisfied with it 'T is what I am going to prove Aristotle in his Book of the Heavens pretends that the Earth is the Center of the World and that all Bodies which he pleases to call simple because he supposes them to move by their own Nature must be moved by simple Motions He affirms that besides the Circular Motion which he maintains to be simple and by which he proves that the Heavens he supposes to move Circularly are a simple Body that there is only two which are simple The one descending or from the Circumference to the Center the other ascending or from the Center to the Circumference That these simple Motions agree with simple Bodies consequently that the Earth and Fire are simple Bodies one of which is absolutely heavy and the other absolutely light But because Heaviness and Lightness may meet in one Body either absolutely or in part he concludes that there are also two Elements or simple Bodies one of which is heavy in part and the other light in part viz. Water and Air. This is the Method he takes to prove that there are four Elements and no more It is evident to such as examine Mens Opinions by their own Reason that all these Propositions are false or at least they can never pass for clear and indisputable Principles of which we have very clear and distinct Idea's and which may serve for the Foundations of Physicks It is certain that there is nothing more absurd than an Essay to establish the Number of Elements by Imaginary Qualities of Weight and Lightness In saying without any Proof that there are some Bodies which are heavy others light through a Principle in their own Nature For if we may speak without proving what we say we may affirm that all Bodies are naturally heavy and that all endeavour to approach to the Center of the World as the Place of their Rest And we may on the contrary maintain that all Bodies are Naturally light and have a Tendency to the Heavens as the Place of their greatest Perfection For if we object to him who says all Bodies are heavy that Air and Fire are light he can only answer that Fire and Air are not light but only less weighty than Earth and Water and that is the Reason they seem light It is so with these Elements as if a Piece of Wood which seems light in Water not because it is light of it self since it falls down when it is in the Air but because the Water which is more heavy makes it ascend and bears it up If on the contrary we should object to one who would maintain that all Bodies are Naturally light that Earth and Water are heavy he would likwise answer that these Bodies seem heavy because they are not so light as others which surround them That Wood for instance seems heavy in the Air not because it is heavy since it swims when it is in the Water but because it is not so light as Air. It is therefore ridiculous to suppose these Principles indisputable that Bodies are heavy or light in their own Nature On the contrary 't is plain that all Bodies have not the Power of Motion in themselves and that 't is indifferent to them whether they are moved upward or downward East or West North or South or any other Way we can conceive But if according to Aristotle there are four Elements such as he wishes them to be Two Naturally heavy and two Naturally light viz. Fire Air Earth and Water What Consequence can we draw from thence to discover the Knowledge of the Universe These Four Elements are not such Fire Air Water and Earth as we see they are quite different we know them not by our Senses and still less by Reason because we have no distinct Idea of them I mean we know all Natural Bodies are composed of them since Aristotle has said it But the Nature of these compounded Bodies is unknown to us and we cannot discover them but by knowing the Four Elements or simple Bodies which compose them for we know the compound only by the simple Fire Aristotle says is Naturally light the ascending Motion is simple Therefore Fire is a simple Body since Motion must be proportioned to what it moves Natural Bodies are compounded of simple Bodies Therefore there is Fire in all Natural Bodies But a Fire which is not like to that we see for Fire is often only in Power in Bodies which are compounded of it What is it these Periparetick Discourses teach us That there is Fire in all Bodies either Actual or Potential that all Bodies are composed of something which we do not see and whose Nature we are unacquainted with We see then that here is very much advanced But if Aristotle does not discover to us the Nature of Fire and the other Elements of which all Bodies are composed probably we may imagine he has discovered at least the chief Qualities and Properties of them We shall further examine what he says thereof He declares to us there are four principal Qualities which belong to the Sense of feeling l. 2. c. 2 3. de gen corrupu Heat Cold Moist and dry of which all others are composed In this manner he distributes these first Qualities to the Four Elements To the Fire he gives Heat and Dryness to the Air Heat and Moistness to the Water Coldness and Humidity and to the Earth Coldness and Dryness Chap. 2. He affirms Heat and Cold to be active Qualities and Dryness and Humidity to be passive ones He thus defines Heat That what collects things of the same kind Cold which assembles all things either of the same or of a different kind Moisture that which is not easily contained in its own Bounds but in Foreign Limits and Dryness that which is easily contained in its own Bounds and not easily in the Limits of the Bodies that are about it Thus according to Aristotle Fire is a hot and dry Element 'T is therefore an Element which collects things of the same Nature which is easily contained within its own Limits and difficultly in the Limits of Forreign Bodies The Air is an hot and moist Element and therefore assembles
things of the same kind and is not easily contained in its own Limits but in that of others Water is a cold and moist Element which gathers things together both of the same and of a different Nature which is hot easily contained within its own Bounds but in that of others And in fine the Earth cold and dry and therefore collects things of the same and of a different Nature which is not easily contained in its own Bounds and very difficultly in that of others Here the Elements are explained according to the Sentiment of Aristotle or according to the Definitions he has given of their chief Qualities and because if we will believe him the Elements are simple Bodies whereof all others are compounded the Knowledge of these Element and their Qualities must be most clear and distinct since all Physicks or the Knowledge of Sensible Bodies which are composed of them ought to be deduced from thence Let us see then what is defective in these Principles First Aristotle joyns no distinct Idea to the Word Quality We know not whether by Quality he means a real Being distinct from Matter or only the Modification of Matter It seems sometimes as if he meant it in one Sense and sometimes in another It is true in the Eighth Chapter of Categories he defines Quality to be that which causes a thing to have such or such a Name but that will not satisfie our Demands Secondly the Definitions he gives of his four first Qualities Heat Cold Moist and Dry are all false or useless This is his Definition of Heat Heat is that which assembles things of a like Nature First we do not see that this Definition perfectly explains the Nature of Heat although it should be true that Heat collects all things of the same Nature But secondly it is false for Heat does not collect all things of the same Nature Heat does not assemble the Parts of Water it rather dissipates them into a Vapour Nor does it assemble the Particles of Wine or those of all other Liquors or fluid Bodies whatever Nor even those of Quicksilver On the contrary it resolves and separates all solid Bodies and even Fluids although of a different Nature And if there are any whose Parts Fire cannot dissipate 't is not because they are of the same Nature but because some are too gross and too solid to be raised by the Motion of the Parts of Fire In the third place Heat indeed can neither assemble nor dissipate the Parts of any Body whether Homogeneous or Heterogeneous For to assemble to separate or dissipate the Parts of any Body it must move them Now Heat can move nothing or at least 't is not evident that Heat can move Bodies For although we consider Heat with all the Attention possible we can only discover that it may communicate to Bodies a Motion which it has not in it self Yet we see that Fire moves and separates the Parts of Bodies that are exposed to it It is true but it may be it is not from its Heat for even it is not evident that it has any at all 'T is rather by the Action of its Parts which are visibly in a continual Motion It is plain that the Parts of Fire which strike against any Body must communicate a Part of their Motion to it whether there is Heat in Fire or not If the Parts of this Body are but a little solid and gross the Fire cannot move them and make them slip one upon another In short if they are a Mixture of subtle and gross ones the Fire can only dissipate those that it can push strong enough to separate intirely from the rest Thus Fire can only separate them and if it assembles them 't is merely by Accident But Aristotle pretends quite the contrary Separation says he which some attribute to Fire is only a resembling of things of the same kind De gen corr l. 2. c. 2. for 't is only by Accident that Fire dissipates things of a different kind If Aristotle had at first distinguished the Sentiment of Heat from the Motion of the Particles whereof the Bodies we call Heat are composed and had afterwards defined Heat taken for the Motion of the Parts by saying Heat is that which agitates and separates the invisible Parts whereof visible Bodies are composed he would have given a tollerable Definition of Heat Nevertheless it would not perfectly have contented us because it would not precisely have discovered to us the Nature of the Motion of hot Bodies Aristotle defines Coldness to be that which assembles Bodies of the same or of a different Nature This Definition is good for nothing For 't is false that Cold assembles Bodies To assemble them it must move them but if we consult Reason 't is evident Cold can move nothing In Effect by Cold he means either what we feel when we are cold or that which causes the Sensation of Cold. Now it is plain that the Sensation of Cold can move nothing since it can push nothing What it is that causes Sensation we cannot doubt when we examine things by our Reason for 't is only Rest or a Cessation from Motion So Cold in Bodies being only a Cessation from this Sort of Motion which accompanies Heat it is evident that if Heat separates yet Cold does not Thus Cold assembles neither things that are of a like or different Nature for what can push nothing can assemble nothing In a Word as it does nothing it collects nothing Aristotle judging of things by the Senses imagines Cold is also positive as well as Heat because the Sensations of Heat and Cold are both real and positive And he also thinks that these two Qualities are active And indeed if we follow the Impression of our Senses we have Reason to believe that Cold is a very active Quality since cold Water congeals reassembles and in a Moment hardens melted Gold or Lead after a little is poured upon them although the Heat of these Metals is great enough to separate the Parts of any Body they touch It is evident by what we have said of the Errors of the Senses in the first Book that if we rely only upon the Senses to judge of the Qualities of Sensible Bodies it is impossible to discover any certain and undoubted Truth which can serve as a Principle to assist us in the Knowledge of Nature For by this Method only we cannot discover what things are hot and what cold For of many Persons who should touch Water that is luke-warm some of them would think it hot and others cold Those that are of a hot Constitution would think it cold and those that are of a cold would think it hot And if we supposed Fish capable of Sensation 't is very probable they would think it hot when all Men think it cold It is the same with the Air it seems hot or cold according to the different Dispositions of the Bodies that are exposed
to it Aristotle pretends 't is hot but I believe those that dwell towards the North are of another Mind since many learned Men whose Climate is not colder than that of Greece have maintained it to be cold But this Question which has always been considerable in the Schools has never been sufficiently resolved to affix any distinct Idea to the Word Heat The Definitions Aristotle gives of the Words Heat and Cold can fix no Idea to them The Air for instance and even Water though never so hot and scalding reassembles the Parts of melted Lead with those of any other Metal whatever Air collects all Fatness in Gums and other solid Bodies And one must be a Peripatetick indeed to think of exposing Mastich to the Air to separate the Ashes from the Pitch or any other compounded Bodies to dissolve them again The Air then is not hot according to the Definition Aristotle gives of Heat Air separates Liquors from Bodies which are imbibed in it hardens Dirt and dries Linnen that is extended in it although Aristotle makes it moist The Air therefore is hot and drying according to this same Definition We cannot then determine the Air to be hot or cold by this Definition We may affirm it is hot in respect to Dirt since it separates the Water from the Earth that is mixed with it But must we try all the divers Effects of Air upon all Bodies to know whether or no there is Heat in the Air we breath If so we can never know any thing of it the shortest Way therefore is not to Philosophize at all upon the Air we breath in But upon a certain Pure and Elementary Air which is not to be found here below and positively affirm with Aristotle that 't is hot without giving any Proof of it or even without knowing distinctly what we mean by this Air or by this Heat For this Way we shall give Principles that will not easily be overthrown not because of their Evidence and Solidity but because they are obscure like Phantoms which cannot be hurt because they have no Substances I shall not here stay upon the Definitions that Aristotle gives of Moisture and Dryness because it is plain enough that he has not explained the Nature of them For according to these Definitions Fire is not dry since it is not easily contained within its own Bounds and Ice is not moist since it is contained within its own Bounds and is not easily accommodated to the Limits of other Bodies It is true Ice is not moist if by moist he means fluid But if we understand it so we may say Flame is very hot as well as melted Gold or Lead It is likewise true that Ice is not moist if by moist we mean that which easily sticks to things that touch it but in this Sense Pitch Fat and Oyl are much more humid than Water since they stick more strongly than Water In the same Sense Quicksilver is moist for it sticks to Metals and even Water is not perfectly moist for it cleaves not to the Generality of Metals We must not then recur to the Testimony of the Senses to defend the Opinions of Aristotle But let us no further Examine the marvelous Definitions that this Philosopher has given us of the four Elementary Qualities and let us suppose also that all whatever the Senses tell us of these Qualities is indisputable Let us further excite our Faith and believe that all these Definitions are most just Let us only see if it be true that all Qualities of Sensible Bodies are compounded of these Elementary Qualities Aristotle pretends it and he ought so to do since he looks upon these four first Qualities as the Principles of those things he would explain in his Books of Physicks He teaches us then that Colours are engendered of the Mixture of die four Elementary Qualities that white is produced when Humidity surmounts Heat as when Old Men turn Grey Black when Humidity is overcome by Dryness as in the Walls of Cisterns and all other Colours by the like Mixtures that Tasts and Smells are also produced by a different Mixture of dry and moist caused by Heat and Cold that even Lightness and Heaviness depend upon it In a Word according to Aristotle it is necessary that all Sensible Qualities should be produced by the two Active Qualities of Heat and Cold and be compounded of the two Passive moist and dry that there may be some probable Connection between his Principles and the Consequences he draws from them However it is yet more difficult to perswade our selves of all these things than of all those that we have hitherto related of Aristotle We shall have some Trouble to believe that the Earth and other Elements would not be coloured or visible if they were in their Natural Purity and without any Mixture of Elementary Qualities although the learned Commentators of this Philosopher assures us of it We comprehend not what Aristotle means when he affirms the Whiteness of the Hair to be produced by Humidity because the Humidity of Old Men is stronger than their Heat although to endeavour to clear him of the Thought we put the Definition in the Place of the thing defined For it seems to be an incomprehensible Piece of Nonsence to say the Hairs of Old Men turn White because that which is not easily contained in its own Limits but in the Limits of other Bodies surmounts what assembles things of the same Nature Nor have we less Difficulty to believe that Taste is well explained when he says it consists in the Mixture of Dryness Humidity and Heat chiefly if we put instead of these Words the Definitions this Philosopher has given of them as it would be useful to do if they were good And it may be also that we could not forbear laughing instead of the Definitions of Hunger and Thirst that Aristotle gives of them by saying that Hunger is the Desire of Heat and Dry and Thirst the Desire of Cold and Moist we should substitute the Definition of these Words calling Hunger The Desire of what assembles things of the same Nature and of what is easily kept within its own Limits and difficultly in the Limits of others and define Thirst the Desire of what assembles things of the same and of different Natures and of what cannot be easily contained in its own Limits but easily in the Limits of others Certainly 't is a very useful Rule to discover if we have defined Terms well and not to deceive our selves in our Reasonings only often to put the Definition in the Place of the thing defined For by that means we know whether the Terms are equivocal and the Measures of the Relation false and imperfect Or if we reason consequently This being granted what can we say of the Arguments of Aristotle which become an impertinent and ridiculous Piece of Nonsence when we make use of this Rule And what must we say likewise of all those that reason
of But that we may the more easily discover them it is requisite to read Descartes's Principles carefully without receiving any thing he says except when the Force and Evidence of his Reasons permit us not to doubt of it As Morality is the most necessary of all Sciences we must also study it very carefully for 't is chiefly in that Science that 't is dangerous to follow the Opinions of Men But that we may not deceive our selves in it but preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must only meditate upon undoubted Principles such as are confessed by all those whose Minds are not blinded with Pride for there is no undoubted Principle of Morality for Spirits of Flesh and Blood and such as aspire to the Quality of great Wits These sort of Men comprehend not the most simple Truths or if they comprehend them at least they always dispute them through a Spirit of Contradiction and to preserve such a Reputation Some of these most general Principles of Morality are That God having made all things for himself he has created our Minds to know and our Hearts to love him That being also as Just and Powerful as he is we cannot be Happy if we do not follow his Orders nor Unhappy if we do That our Nature is Corrupt that our Minds depend upon our Bodies our Reason upon our Senses and our Wills upon our Passions That we are uncapable to do what we see clearly to be our Duties and that we have need of a Saviour There are also many other Principles of Morality as That a retreat from the eager Pursuit of the World and Repentance are necessary to disunite us from Sensible Objects and to increase that which we have with intelligible and true Goods I mean those of the Mind That we cannot enjoy violent Pleasure without becoming Slaves to it That we must never undertake any thing through the Incitement of Passion Nor seek an Establishment in this Life c. But because these last Principles depend upon the precedent and on the Knowledge of Man they ought not immediately to pass for undoubted If we consider these Principles orderly and with as much Care and Application as the weight of the Subject requires and receive for true only the Conclusions consequently deduced from these Principles we shall have a certain Morality which perfectly agrees with that of the Gospel although it is not compleat and large It is true in Moral Reasonings it is not so easie to preserve Evidence and Exactness as in some other Sciences and the Knowledge of Man is absolutely necessary to those that would make any great Progress And this is the reason that the generality of Men do not succeed in it They will not consult themselves to know the Weakness of their own Nature They omit to enquire of the Master who inwardly teaches them his own Will which is the Immutable and Eternal Law and the true Principles of Morality They do not hear him with Pleasure who speaks not to their Senses who answers not according to their Desires nor Flatters their Secret Pride They have no respect for such words as do not dazle the Imagination which are pronounced without a Noise and are never clearly heard but in the Silence of the Creatures Yet with Pleasure and Deference they consult Aristotle Seneca and some new Philosophers who seduce them either by the Obscurity of their Words the Turn of their Expressions or Probability of their Reasons Since the Sin of Adam we esteem only what relates to the Preservation of the Body and Conveniency of Life And because we discover these sort of Goods only by the Means of our Senses we make use of them in all Occurrences The Eternal Wisdom who is our true Life and the only Light which can illuminate us often shines before the Blind and speaks only to the Deaf when it speaks in the Recesses of the Soul for we are almost always out of our selves As we continually interrogate all Creatures to learn some new Good which we enquire after it is requisite as I have already said that this Wisdom presents it self before us without our going out of our selves to teach us by sensible Words and convincing Examples the way to arrive at true Felicity God continually imprints a Natural Love in us for him that we may always Love him and by this same Motion of Love we continually Estrange our selves from him by running with all the Power he has given us after Sensible Goods which he has forbid us to do So that willing to be loved by us he renders himself Sensible and presents himself before us by the Delights of his Grace to fix all our Vain Agitatitions and to begin our Cure by Sensations or Delectations like to those which had been the Original of our Disease Therefore I do not pretend that Men may by the Power of their Minds so easily discover all the Rules of Morality which are necessary to Salvation and much less that they are able to act according to what they know for their Heart is yet more Corrupted than their Minds I only say that if they admit none but evident Principles and consequently reason upon these Principles they will discover even the very Truths that we learn in the Bible because 't is the same Wisdom which immediately speaks from it self to those who discover Truths from the Evidence of Reasoning and who speaks by the Holy Scriptures to those who learn it from their Senses We must then study Morality in the Gospel to spare our selves the Trouble of Meditation and Certainly to learn those Laws according to which we ought to regulate our Manners For those who are not contented with Certainty because it only convinces the Mind without enlightning it must carefully Meditate upon these Laws and deduce them from their Natural Principles that they may evidently discover by their Reason what they already know by Faith with an entire Certainty This way they will be convinced that the Gospel is the most Solid of all Books That JESVS CHRIST perfectly knew the Disorder and Distemper of Nature That he has procured a Remedy the most Useful for us and the most Worthy of himself But that the Light of Philosophers is only thick Darkness and their brightest Vertues only an insupportable Pride and in a word that Aristotle Seneca c. are only at best but Men to say no worse of them CHAP. VII Of the Vse of the first Rule which respects Particular Questions WE have sufficiently explained the General Rule for Method which chiefly regards the Subject of our Studies and to prove that Descartes has exactly followed it in his System of the World but that Aristotle and his Followers have not observed it It is now proper to descend to particular Rules which are necessary to resolve all sorts of Questions The Questions that may be formed upon all manner of Subjects are of diverse kinds of which it will not be easie to give a
they mean and all the Diffiulty there is to resolve this trifling Question proceeds from their not having conceived it clearly and not thinking that Fishermen as well as others sometimes look in their Cloaths for certain little Animals which they throw away as soon as they have taken them and still carry with them what they cannot catch Sometimes also there are not all the necessary Conditions in a Question for the answering it and that makes it at least as difficult as when unuseful ones are added For instance in this to make a Man immoveable without binding or hurting him or rather having put a Man's little Finger in his own Ear by this Posture to make him so immoveable that he cannot stir from the Place where he is put until his little Finger is taken from his Ear again This at first appears impossible and it is so indeed for we can walk very well although our little Finger be in our Ear. But here is a Condition wanting which would remove all Difficulty if it was expressed viz. That he must be made to embrace some Pillar or something like it with that Arm whereof the Finger is in his Ear for then he cannot get from the Place without taking his Finger from his Ear. It is not added as a Condition of a Question that there is yet some other thing to do on purpose that the Mind should not seek for it nor discover it But those who undertake to resolve these sort of Questions must make all necessary Demands to clear the Point wherein the Difficulty of the Question consists These Arbitrary Questions seem to be trifling and so indeed they are in one Sence for we learn nothing by resolving them Yet are they not so different from Natural Questions as perhaps we may think them to be we must do very nigh the same things to resolve both For if the Craft and Malice of Men make Arbitrary Questions perplexing and difficult to resolve Natural Effects are also in themselves incompassed with Obscurity and Darkness And these Darknesses must be dispersed by the Attention of the Mind and Experiments which are kind of Demands that we make to the Author of Nature even as we take away Equivocal and useless Circumstances from Arbitrary Questions by Attention of the Mind and by the proper Demands we make to those who propose them But let us explain these things Methodically and in a more Serious and Instructive Manner There is a great Number of Questions which seem very difficult because we understand them not and which therefore want an Explication Yet which ought rather to pass for Axioms than true Questions for it seems to me that we ought not to place in the Number of Questions certain undoubted Propositions whose Terms we conceive We demand for instance as a Question difficult to be resolved whether or no the Soul is immortal because those that make the Question or that pretend to resolve it do not clearly conceive the Terms of it As the Words Soul and Immortal signifie different things and know not how they are understood so they cannot resolve whether it is Immortal or not For they neither know precisely what they demand nor what they seek By this Word Soul we may understand a Substance which thinks wills feels c. we may take the Soul for the Circulation of the Blood and Configuration of the Parts of the Body or we may take it for the Blood and Animal Spirits So by this Word Immortal we mean what cannot perish by the ordinary Power of Nature or else what can never change or what can neither corrupt nor dissipate like a Vapour or Smoke Thus suppose we take the Words Soul and Immortal in some one of these Significations the least Attention of Mind will make us able to judge whether it is Immortal or not For first 't is plain that the Soul taken in the first Sense viz. for a Substance which thinks is Immortal if we also take Immortal in the first Sense for what cannot perish by the common Power of Nature for 't is not even conceivable that any Substance can become nothing we must have Recourse to the extraordinary Power of God to conceive it possible Secondly the Soul is immortal if we take Immortal in the third Sense for what cannot corrupt nor resolve into a Vapour or Smoke for 't is evident that what cannot be divided into an infinite Number of Parts cannot corrupt or be resolved into a Vapour Thirdly the Soul is not Immortal if we take Immortal in the second Sense for what cannot change For we have sufficient convincing Proofs of the Variations of our Soul That sometimes it feels Pain sometimes Pleasure sometimes it wills certain things and then again ceases to will them as being united to the Body it cannot be separated from them c. If we take the Word Soul in any other Signification 't will be very easie to see whether it is Immortal or not by taking the Word Immortal in a fixed and certain Sense so that what makes these Questions difficult is because we conceive them not distinctly and the Terms which express them are Equivocal so that they have rather need of Explanation than Proof It is true some Persons are stupid enough and others sufficiently Imaginative to take the Soul always for a certain Configuration of the Parts of the Brain arid Motion of the Spirits and it is certainly impossible to prove to these sort of Men that the Soul is Imortal and cannot perish For on the contrary 't is evident that the Soul taken in the Sense they understand it is Mortal so that 't is not a Question difficult to resolve but a Proposition difficult to make Men understand which have not the same Idea's of it as we have and who do all they can not to have them and to blind themselves When it is asked if the Soul is Immortal or any other Question whatever we must immediately take away the Equivocal Terms and know in what Sense they are taken that we may be able distinctly to conceive the Condition of the Question And if those that propose it know not what they mean we must require them to form some distinct Notions and determine them If we ask them and find their Idea's agree not with ours it will be useless to answer them For what Answer can we make to a Man who for instance imagines that a Desire is only the Motion of some Spirits and a Thought is nothing else but a Trace or an Image that Objects or Spirits have produced in the Brain and that all the reasoning of Men consist merely in the different Situation of some little Parts which are diversely disposed in the Head To answer him that the Soul taken in the Sense he means it is Immortal is to deceive him or make our selves ridiculous to him But to answer him it is Immortal would be in one Sense to confirm him in an Error of the greatest
and undoubted Principles For we have discovered that the Air which encompasses the Loadstone c was driven from between the Loadstones by Bodies which are continually emitted from their Poles ' which find free passage on one side and are stopt on the other And if we would discover near what the Magnitude and Figure of the Pores of this Loadstone are through which these little bodies pass we must yet make other Experiments but they would lead us to subjects which we intend not to treat of Upon these Questions we may consult the Principles of M. Descartes I shall only answer an Objection which immediately offers it self from whence is it that these little bodies cannot re-enter by the same Pores they came out that besides a certain Figure representing the Spiral Chanels of a Screw which we may suppose to be in the Pores producing this Effect the Inflexion of the little Branches which compose these Pores may in one Sense obey the little Bodies which pass a-cross them and in another Sense make them rough and stop their passage So that we need not be too much surprised at the difference of the Poles of the Loadstone for this difference may be accounted for many ways and all the difficulty is amongst several Causes to discover the true one If we had endeavoured to resolve the Question we have just now examined in beginning with the Corpuscles which we suppose to be emitted from the Loadstone C we should have found the same thing And we should likewise have discovered that the Air is composed of an infinite Number of Particles which are in continual Agitation for without it 't would be impossible that the Loadstone c should approach to the Loadstone C. I shall not stay to explain this because 't is not difficult I will give you here a Question more compound than the foregoing in which many Rules must be made use of 't is demanded what can be the Natural and Mechanical Cause of the Motion of our Members The Idea of Natural Cause is clear and distinct if we understand it as I have explained it in the precedent Question but the Term of the Motion of our Members is equivocal and confused for there are many sorts of these Motions some of the Will Natural and Convulsive ones There are likewise different Members in Mans Body So that according to the first Rule I must ask of which of these Motions it is that they would know the Cause But if the Question is left indeterminate so that I may make use of any I shall chuse I would examine the Question after this manner And first consider the Properties of these Motions and because I immediately discover that Voluntary Motions are commonly more readily performed than the Convulsive ones I conclude from thence that their Cause is different Therefore I can and ought to examine the Question by Parts for it would appear to be of too long a Discussion I would oblige my self therefore first to consider Voluntary Motion and because we have many Parts which concur to this Motion I would first consider the Arm as composed of many Muscles which have generally some Action when we lift a Weight up or when we differently move Bodies but I keep only to one supposing the rest to be formed very near after the same manner I instruct my self of its Composition by the Help of some Book of Anatomy or rather by a Sensible Sight of its Fibres and Tendons which I get some able Anatomist to dissect for me to whom I make all the Demands which shall afterwards produce in my Mind some Method for me to find what I seek Considering therefore all things attentively I cannot doubt but the Principle of the Motion of my Arm depends upon the Contraction of the Muscles which compose it And if I have not a mind to perplex my self with too many things I may suppose according to the common Opinion that this Contraction is produced by the Animal Spirits which fill these Muscles and by this means shorten them the whole Question then which respects Voluntary Motion will be reduced to know how the few Animal Spirits which are contained in an Arm can suddenly swell the Muscles according to the Orders of the Will with a sufficient Force to lift a Burden of an Hundred Weight or more When we consider this with any Application the first means that presents it self to the Imagination is commonly that of some violent and quick Fermentation like to that of Gunpowder or certain Liquors filled with Volatile Salt when they are mixed with those that are Acid or full of fixt Salt A little Gunpowder when lighted is capable of raising not only an Hundred Pound Weight but a Tower and even a Mountain Earthquakes which overthrow Towns and shake whole Provinces are also produced by Spirits which are kindled under Ground much like Gunpowder Thus supposing in the Arm such a Cause of the Fermentation and Dilatation of Spirits we may say that it is the Principle of the Power that Men have to perform such quick and violent Motions However as we ought to distrust this means which enters into the Mind only by the Senses and whereof we have no clear and evident Knowledge we must not too easily admit of it For indeed it is not sufficient to give a Reason of the Force and Quickness of our Motions by a Comparison since this Reason is confused and imperfect For we must here explain a Voluntary Motion and Fermentation is not Voluntary The Blood excessively ferments in Feavers and we cannot prevent it The Spirits are inflamed and agitated in the Brain and their Agitation diminishes not according to our Desires When a Man moves his Arm after diverse Ways according to this Explanation he must make a Million of great and small quick and slow Fermentations that begin and which is still more difficult to explain according to this Supposition that end in the same Moment he wills it These Fermentations must not dissipate all their Matter and this Matter must be always ready to take Fire When a Man walks Ten Miles how many Thousand Times must the Muscles which he uses in walking be filled and emptied And what a vast Quantity of Spirits would be required if Fermentation should dissipate and destroy them at every Step. This Reason is therefore imperfect to explain the Motions of our Bodies which entirely depend upon our Will It is evident that the present Question consists in this Mechanical Problem By Pneumatick Machines to find the means of overcoming such or such Force suppose a Hundred Weight by another as small as we will suppose the Weight of an Ounce and that the Application of this little Force shall produce its desired Effect and depend upon the Will Now this Problem is easily resolved and the Demonstration of it is clear We may resolve it by a Vessel which has two Orifices one of which is a little more than 1600. Times greater than the other
he should have known exactly the disposition of all the parts of the Body and of those he made use of I have given Reasons for it in this Article and elsewhere A giving of Names is rather a sign of Authority in the Scripture than of a perfect Knowledge As the Lord of Heaven had made Adam Lord of the Earth he was willing Adam should give the Animals Names as he himself had done to the Stars Omnibus eis nomina vocat Ps 47. It is evident that Sounds or Words neither have nor naturally can have a Relation to the things they signifie whatever the Divine Plato and mysterious Pythagoras say about it One might perhaps explain the Nature of a Horse or of an Ox in a whole Book but a Word is not a Book And it is ridiculous to imagine that Monosyllables as Sus which in Hebrew signifies a Horse and Schor which signifies an Ox should represent the Nature of those Animals Nevertheless it is very likely that those are the Names which Adam has given them for we find them in the Book of Genesis Cap. 49.17 32.5 And the Author of Genesis assures us moreover That the Names which Adam gave to the Animals are the very same which were used in his time for I do not see that he could mean any thing else by these words Omne quod vocavit Adam animae viventis ipsum est nomen ejus But I grant that Adam gave Names to Animals which had some Relation to their Nature and submit to the learned Etymologies which an Author of this Age gives us about them I grant that Adam might call Domestick Animals Behemoth because they keep silence the Ram Ajil because he is strong the Goat Sair because he is hairy the Hog Chazir because he has little eyes and the Ass Chamor because there are many red ones in the East But I think it enough only to open ones eyes to know whether the Goat is hairy the Ass red and whether the Hog has little eyes Adam calls Beir and Behemah what we call a Brute or a great Domestick Animal because those Beasts are mute and stupid What is to be concluded from thence that he perfectly understood their Nature That is not evident I should rather fear that Men would conclude from thence That Adam being simple enough to interrogate an Ox as the largest of all Domestick Animals and being surpris'd at his not being able to answer him he despis'd him and in contempt called him by the name of Beir and of Behemah Second Objection against the Fourth Article THere are pre-engaging Sensations which are troublesome and uneasie Adam was just and innocent therefore he could not be affected with them He must needs be guided on all occasions by Reason and Knowledge and not by pre-engaging Sensations like to those we have at present Answer I own that there are Pre-engaging Sensations which are disagreeable and painful But they were never uneasy to the first Man because that as soon as ever they began to assault he would no longer be affected by them and as soon as ever he had that he was no longer affected by them Those Sensations only respectively gave him notice of what he was to do or not to do They did not disturb his Felicity they only made him sensible that God could punish him and make him miserable if he should prove unfaithful to him To persuade our selves that the first Man was never surpris'd by any sensible Grief we need only consider two things First that Grief is very inconsiderable when the Motions to which it is annext are very weak since it is always proportion'd to the strength of the Motions which are communicated to the principal part of the Brain Secondly that it is the nature of Motion always to include a succession of time and that it cannot be violent at the first instant it is communicated This being suppos'd it is plain that the first Man was never surpris'd by any violent Grief that was capable of making him unhappy For it was in his power to stop the Motions which occasion'd it Therefore if it was in his power to stop them at the very instant they began their Action certainly he did not fail to do it since he desir'd to be happy and that Aversion is naturally joyn'd with the sense of Pain Thus Adam never felt any violent Pain But I think we are not oblig'd to say that he never felt any inconsiderable uneasiness like unto that which we feel when we taste green Fruit which we thought to be ripe His Felicity would have been very tender if it could have been disturb'd by so small a matter For Delicacy is a sign of Weakness and Pleasure and Joy have but little Solidity in them when the least thing dissipates and annihilates them Pain or Grief never disturb Happiness effectually unless it is involuntary and when it subsists in us against our Wills Jesus Christ was happy even upon the Cross though he felt great Pains because he suffer'd nothing but what he was willing to suffer Therefore as Adam suffer'd nothing against his Will no body can say that we make him unhappy before his Fall because we suppose here that he was warned by pre-engaging Sensations but such as were respectful and submissive of what it was fit for him to avoid for the preservation of his Life Objection against the Fifth Article ADam felt pre-engaging Pleasures which are involuntary Motions Therefore Adam was agitated by involuntary Motions Answer I answer That Adam's Sensations did precede his Reason I have prov'd it in the Fourth Article But I deny that they did pre-engage his Will or that they excited any involuntary Motions in the same For Adam was willingly warn'd by his Sensations of what he ought to do for the Preservation of his Life but he never would suffer himself to be agitated against his Will for that is contradictory Also whenever he had a mind to apply himself to the Contemplation of Truth without the least Distraction of Mind his Senses and Passions kept a perfect Silence Order requires it and it is an absolute Consequence of the Power he had over his Body See the Explanation upon the 3d Chapter of the 5 Book I answer in the second place That it is not true that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion and Love Pleasure and Love are manners of the Soul's Existence But Pleasure has no necessary Relation to the Object which seems to occasion it and Love has a necessary Relation to Good Pleasure is to the Soul what Figure is to the Body and Motion is to the Body what Love is to the Soul Now the Motion of a Body is very different from its Figure I grant that the Soul which is continually mov'd towards Good advances as it were more easily towards it when induc'd thereto by Pleasure than when it suffers Pain as a Body which is push'd forward rouls more
the Husband is her Head and Master We see that the Evangelists and even the Blessed Virgin calls Joseph the Father of Jesus Christ when she says unto her Son Thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing Ecce pater tuus Ego dolentes quaerebamus Therefore since the Holy Scripture assures us that it is by the Woman we are all liable to Death and to Sin it is absolutely necessary to believe it Nor can it be thrown upon Man But though it assure us in other places that by Man Sin came into the World there is not the same necessity to believe it since that may be attributed to the Man which belongs to the Woman And if we were obliged by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman it would be mote reasonable to excuse the Man than the Woman However I am of opinion that the Passages I have quoted ought to be explained in the Literal sense and that we ought to conclude That both the Man and the Woman are the Real Causes of Sin each in their way The Woman because Sin is Communicated by her as it is by her that Man begets Children And Man because his Sin has occasion'd Concupiscence as his Action is the Cause of the Impregnation of the Woman or of the Communication which is between the Woman and her Child 'T is certain that it is the Man who impregnates the Woman and consequently he is the Cause of the Communication which is between her Body and the Childs since that Communication is the Principle of its Life The said Communication does not only give to the Bodies of Children the Dispositions of their Mothers it also gives to their Minds the Dispositions of her Mind Therefore we may say with St. Paul That By Man Sin was introduced into the World and nevertheless upon the account of that Communication we may also say that Sin proceeds from the Woman that it is by her we are all lyable to Death and that our Mother has conceived us in Iniquity as it is said in other places of the Scripture Perhaps it may be urged That though Man had not sinned the Woman would have had sinful Children for having sinned her self she had lost the Power God had given her over her Body And therefore though the Man had remained Just she would have Corrupted the Brain and consequently the Mind of her Child upon the account of the Communication she had with it Certainly this does not appear lively For Man whilst Righteous knowing what he does cannot give the Woman that miserable Fruitfulness of conceiving sinful Children If he remains Righteous he will have no Children but for God and sinful Children can never be acceptable to God for I do not suppose a Mediator in this place However I grant that in this case the Marriage might not have been dissolved and that the Man might have known his Wife But it is certain the Body of the Woman did belong to her Husband since it was taken out of his and was of the same Flesh Duo in carne una It is also certain that the Children belong as much to the Father as to the Mother This being granted we can never imagine that the Woman after her Sin would have lost the power she had over her Body unless her Husband had sinned as well as her self for had the Woman been deprived of that power her Husband remaining in Innocence there would have been this disorder in the Universe That a Just Man should have had a Corrupt Body and Sinful Children Now it is contrary to Order or rather it is contradictory that a Just God should punish the Man when he is in perfect Innocence Therefore Eve feels no Involuntary and Rebel Motions immediately after her Sin She is not as yet ashamed to see her self naked She does not hide her self On the contrary she draws near to her Husband though naked as well as her self Her Eyes are not as yet opened She is as before the absolute Mistress of her Body Order required that immediately after her sin her Soul should have been disturbed by the Rebellion of her Body and by the shame of her own and Husband's Nakedness For it was not reasonable that God should any longer suspend the Laws of the Communication of Motions in favour of her as I have said in the Seventh Article But whereas her Body belongs to her Husband and her Husband is still Innocent she is not punished in that Body That punishment is deferred until he has himself eaten of the Fruit which she presented to him Then it was they both felt the Rebellion of their Bodies they perceived they were naked and that shame obliged them to cover themselves with Fig-Leaves Therefore we must say That Adam is really the Cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence since it is his sin that has deprived his Wife as well as himself of the power they had over their Bodies and that it is for want of this power the Woman produces Traces in her Brain and in the Brain of her Child which corrupt the Soul from the very moment it is created OBJECTION Against the Twelfth Article Those speak by guess who say that the Communication of the Mothers Brain with that of her Child is necessary or useful towards the Conformation of the Foetus For there is no such Communication between the Brain of a Hen and her Chickens and yet the Chickens are perfectly well form'd ANSWER I Answer that in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication by the use I make of it to Explain the Generation of Monsters and certain Marks and Natural Apprehensions For it is evident that a Man who falls into a swoon at the sight of a snake because his Mother was frightned by one while she bore him can only have this Weakness because the Traces were formerly form'd in his Brain like unto those which open themselves when he sees a snake and that the said Traces have been attended with the like accident Therefore I guess not for I do not presume to determine wherein the said Communication does precisely consist I might say it proceeds from the Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Mothers Womb and by the Nerves with which that part is probably fill'd And yet I should no more guess in this than a Man who never having seen the Machines of the * Samaritan Fountain upon Pont Neuf in Paris should affirm that there are Wheels and Pumps in it to draw up the Water However I am of opinion it is sometimes lawful to guess provided we do not pretend to set up for Prophets or speak with too much assurance I fancy Men may be allowed to say what they think provided they do not aim at Infalibility or injustly impose upon Mens Minds with a discisive behaviour or by the help of some Terms of Art We do not alwayes guess in saying things that are not seen and are contrary
to prepare other sorts of Diet than Nature supplies indeed I confess it necessary that Men should make use of the same Reason to moderate their Eating And if Cooks have found out the art of making us eat old Shooes in a Ragoo we ought to use our Reason and distrust these adulterated Meats which are not such as God made them for he gave us our Senses only in relation to the Order of Natural Things We must also observe that our Imagination and Senses are mistrustful when we take unusual Food For if a Man had never eaten nor seen any one eat of a certain Fruit which he had met with he would at first have some aversion and sense of fear in tasting it his Imagination and Senses would naturally be very attentive to the relish he tasted Though never so hungry he would eat but little the first time and if this Fruit had any dangerous quality it would not fail to excite some surprize in him Thus his Machine is disposed after such a manner that he would decline it another time and the aversion which he had for it sensibly discovering it self in his looks would deter others from eating it All this would or might be performed in him without the assistance of his Reason for I speak not here of those supplies which Reason and Instruction may afford But seeing our Friends take bad Nourishments we do the same for we live by Opinion and Example emboldens us We examine not the effect these Nourishments produce in us and we are not afraid to eat to excess Thus our Senses do not so much share in the Intemperance as is believed It is true there are possibly such Fruits whose relish may impose upon us though we are never so attentive to the admonition of our Senses but this is certainly very rare and we must not conclude from particular Instances that our Senses are corrupt and commonly deceive us in reference to the good of the Body perhaps they deceive because we have altered our Organ by Unnatural Nourishment 'T is certain that high-seasoned Dishes which we feed on do by their too penetrating Particles hurt the Fibres of our Tongue and vitiate its delicateness and discernment The Example of such as relish only Ragoos is a proof of this for if we find no savour in Corn and Raw Flesh it is because our Tongue is become insensible of their parts their motions being moderate But though we suppose there are Fruits whose taste is capable of beguiling the most delicate Senses and which are yet in their Natural Perfection we must not believe that this is the effect of Sin but because 't is impossible that the Sensation of Taste which is formed and perfected according to the most simple Laws of Nature should have sufficient discernment for all sorts of Meats Besides the defect of this Sense would not be remediless because when Mothers have an aversion for dangerous Fruits they communicate it to their Children not only in the Womb but much more when born into the World for Children only eat what is given them by their Mothers who Machinally and by the Air of their Countenance impress upon them that horrour which they themselves have for Fruits that are dangerous to be eaten So that God has sufficiently provided by our Senses for the preservation of Life and nothing can be better ordered For as Order requires that the Laws of the Union of our Soul and Body should be very simple they must be very general and God ought not to establish particular Laws for cases that happen very seldom Reason on such occasions must assist the Senses for Reason is useful in all things But the Senses are determined by some Natural Judgments which are more useful than can be conceived as I have proved in the First Book yet even these Judgments are sometimes Erroneous for 't is impossible it should be otherwise without multiplying the most simple Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body If we consider Man as he is now in a State of Infirmity we must grant that his Senses often deceive him even in things that relate to the Preservation of Life for the Oeconomy of his Machine being troubled it is impossible but in proportion to that trouble there should be many irregular Motions excited in his Brain however his Senses are not so corrupted as is ordinarily believed and God has so wisely provided for the Preservation of Life by the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body which although they are very simple are often sufficient to restore our Health that it is a much surer way to follow them than to use our Reason or such Physicians who do not carefully study the Disposition of their Patients for even as a Wound closes up and heals of it self when constantly cleansed and licked as is seen in wounded Animals so common Distempers are soon dispersed when we let them alone and precisely observe such a state of Life as these Diseases by a kind of Instinct and Sensation dictate to us A Man for Example who has a Feaver finds that Wine is bitter and offensive to him in that condition yet this same person finds it agreeable and good when in Health It even often happens that Wine is very good for the Sick when they relish it provided this relish is not an effect of some previous Habit of Drinking but that their desire of it proceed from the present Disposition of their Body So that we cannot doubt but that we ought to consult our Senses in Sickness what way we should take for the recovery of our Health And this is what I believe we ought to do The Distempered should be extreamly attentive to certain secret Desires which the actual Disposition of their Body does sometimes excite in them but above all to take heed lest these Desires should proceed from some preceding Habit they must let loose their Imagination and think on nothing that may determine it observe their present Inclination and examine whether it is the effect of their Disposition This done they ought to follow it but with much Caution for 't is extreamly difficult to be assured whether these secret Inclinations proceed from the Disposition of their Body and it is sometimes useful to consult some Experienced Person upon it But if the Sick letting loose his Imagination as I have said find nothing presented to his Mind he must rest and keep to a sick Diet for this will probably excite in him some Desire or dissipate the Humours that cause the Sickness For if the Distemper is increased notwithstanding such a strict Diet and Rest that it 's necessary to have recourse to Experience and Physicians he must then exactly tell every thing to some skilful Physician who if possible knows his Constitution he must explain clearly to him the beginning and progress of the Distemper and the condition he was in before he fell sick thereby to consult the Experience and Reason of
are in themselves or the Body which speaks only out of interest and in relation either to the preservation or conveniency of Life For in fine What Prejudices will not be justified if we take the Senses for Judges to whom almost all Prejudices owe their birth As I have already shewn in the Search after Truth When I see one Bowle hit another my Eyes tell me or seem to tell me that it is truly the Cause of the Motion it impresses For the true Cause which moves Bodies does not appear to my Eyes Bur when I ask my Reason I see evidently that Bodies cannot move themselves and their Moving power depending only upon the Will of God which successively preserves them in different places they cannot communicate a power which they have not nor could communicate if they had it For 't is plain there is a Wisdom requisite and one that is infinite too to regulate the Communication of Motions with the exactness proportion and uniformity that we see A Body moved cannot know the infinite number of Bodies it meets at every moment It is farther clear That although we should even suppose knowledge in it it could not have enough to regulate in the instant of the Shock the distribution of the Moving power it self is carried with If I open but my Eyes it appears plain to me that the Sun is very gloriously bright and seems not only to be visible it self but makes all the World so too 'T is that which covers the Earth with Flowers and Fruits which gives Life to Animals and which by its Heat penetrates into the very Bowels of the Earth and produces Stones Marbles and Metals there But when I consult Reason I see nothing of all this and if I consult it faithfully I clearly discover that my Senses seduce me and that it is God who performs all in all Things For knowing that whatever changes happen in the Body they have no other principle but the different communication of Motion which occur in visible or invisible Bodies I see that it is God who does all Things since it is his Will which Causes and his Wisdom which Regulates all these Communications I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations Corruptions Alterations and generally of all the Changes which happen in the Body which is an Opinion that is now sufficiently received amongst the Learned But whatever Opinion they have about it signifies little for it seems much more easie to conceive that a Body drives another when it meets it than to apprehend how Fire produces Heat and Light and draw from the power of Matter a Substance which was not there before And if it be necessary to acknowledge That God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motions by a much stronger Reason we ought to conclude That none but he can Create and Annihilate Real Qualities and Substantial Forms I say Create and Annihilate because at least it seems as difficult to me to draw from Matter a Substance which was not in it or to cause it to re-enter again as to Create or Annihilate it But I shall not stand upon Terms I only make use of them because there is no other which I know of that clearly and without Equivocation express the Changes which the Philosophers suppose every Moment to happen through the power of Second Causes I had some difficulty here to relate the other Proofs which they commonly give for the Power and Efficacy of Natural Causes for they appear so weak to those who are able to resist Prejudices and prefer their Reason to their Senses that it does not seem likely that reasonable Men should be perswaded by them Yet I will produce and Answer them since there are many Philosophers who make use of them The first Proof If Second Causes do effect nothing we could not says Suarez In his Metaph. Disp 18. Sect. 1. Assert 1. In Metaph. Arist qu. 7. Sect. 2. Fonseca and some others distinguish Animate from Inanimate Things for neither of them would have an inward principle of their Actions ANSWER I Answer That Men would have the same Sensible Proofs that have convinced them of the distinction they put between Animate and Inanimate Things They would alwayes see Animals perform Certain Actions as Eating Growing Crying Running Leaping c. Nor would they observe any thing like this in Stones And it is this only which makes the common Philosophers believe that Beasts live and Stones do not for it must not be imagined that they know by a clear and distinct View of the Mind what the Life of a Dog is It is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question If it were necessary I could here prove That the Principal of a Dog's Life differs very little if at all from that of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies whatever they be can only consist in the motion of their parts and it is not difficult to judge that the same Subtil Matter which in a Dog causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits and is the principle of his Life is not more perfect than that which gives Motion to the Springs of a Watch or causes Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock which is the principle of their Life or to speak as others do of their Motion The Peripatetics ought to give to those whom they stile Cartesians a clear Idea of what they call The Life of Beasts Corporeal Soul Body which perceives desires sees feels wills and afterwards we will clearly resolve their difficulties if they continue to propose them The Second Proof We could not discover the Differences nor Powers of the Elements So that Fire might cool as Water does and the Nature of nothing would be settled and fixed ANSWER I Answer That Nature continuing as it is that is whilst the Laws of the communication of Motions remain constantly the same it is a contradiction that Fire should not burn or not separate the parts of certain Bodies Fire cannot cool like Water except it becomes Water For Fire being only fewel whose parts have been agitated with a violent Motion by an invisible Matter which incompasses them as is easie to be demonstrated it is impossible these parts should not communicate some of their Motion to the Bodies which they meet Now as these Laws are constant the Nature of Fire its vertues and qualities cannot change But this Nature and these Vertues are only consequences of the general and efficacious Will of God who does all in all things as we learn from the Scripture So that the study of Nature is false and vain in every respect when we seek for any other true Causes than the Will of the ALMIGHTY I own we must not have recourse to God or the Universal Cause when we inquire into the reason of particular Effects For we should make our selves ridiculous if for instance we said that 't was God who dryes the wayes or
their unserviceableness he sometimes bestows them in great number which nevertheless produces but little Effect Why all these Ambages and indirect wayes Would it not have been sufficient for him to have will'd the Conversion of a Sinner to have effected it after an efficacious and invincible manner Is it not plain that 't is because he acts by the most simple wayes and that Order requires it although we do not alwayes see it For God can only act according to Order and Wisdom although his Order and Wisdom are often impenetrable abysses to the Mind of Man There are certain very simple Laws in the Order of Grace consonant to which God commonly acts For this Order has its Rules as well as that of Narure although we know them not as we see in the Communication of Motions Let us only follow the Counsel given us in the Holy Gospel by him who perfectly knew the Laws of Grace I say this to quiet the unjust Complaints of Sinners who despise the Advice given them by JESVS CHRIST and who charge God with their Malice and Disorders They would have him to perform Miracles in their Favour and dispence with the common Laws of Grace They live in Pleasure seek after Honour and continually renew those Wounds which sensible Objects have made in their Brain and often add more to them and yet would have God cure them by a Miracle Like to wounded Men who in the excess of their Pain rend their Cloaths tear up their Wounds and then at the sight of approaching Death complain of the Cruelty of their Surgeons They would have God save them because say they he is Good Wise and Powerful and need but Will it and we are Happy He ought not surely to have made us to Damn us But they ought to know that God has done all that could be done by Order and Wisdom which he consults We should not believe that he leaves us since he has given us his own Son to be our Mediator and Sacrifice Yes God would have us all saved But by such wayes as we ought carefully to study and exactly to follow He consults not our Passions in the execution of these designs but only his Wisdom and follows Order And Order requires us to imitate JESVS CHRIST and to follow his Counsel that we may be sanctified and saved But if God has not predestinated all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son who is the Model and Exemplar 't is because in this he acts by the most simple wayes in relation to his designs which tend all to his Glory And God is an Universal Cause and ought not to act like Particular Causes which have particular wills for whatever they do 'T is also because his Wisdom which in this respect is an Abyss to our Understandings wills it should be so In fine 'T is because this conduct is more worthy of God than any other which would be more favourable to Reprobates For even the Order which condemns them is as worthy of our Adorations as that whereby the Elect are sanctified and saved And nothing but our Ignorance of Order and our Self-love could make us condemn such a Conduct as Angels and Saints will eternally admire But let us return to the Proofs of the Efficacy of Second Causes The Fifth Proof If Bodies had not a certain Nature or Power to act and if God did all things there would be nothing but what was Supernatural in the most Common Effects The distinction of Natural and Supernatural which is so well received in the World and established by the universal consent of all the Learned would be Chimerical and Extravagant ANSWER I Answer That this distinction is as ridiculous in the Mouth of Aristotle for the Nature that this Philosopher has established is a pure Chimera I say that this distinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar who judge of things by the impression they make upon their Senses For they know not precisely what they mean when they say that Fire burns by its own Nature I confess this distinction may pass from the Mouth of Divines if by Natural Effects they mean those which are consequences of General Laws that God has established for the general production and preservation of all things and that Supernatural Effects are such as depend not upon these Laws In this sense this distinction is true But the Philosophy of Aristotle joyn'd to the impression of the Senses I think makes it dangerous because this distinction may turn those from God who have too much respect for the Opinions of this wretched Philosopher or such as consult their Senses instead of entering within themselves to seek the Truth there So that we ought not to make use of this distinction without explaining it St. Austin having used the word Fortune L. 1. de Retract 1 Cor. 10.19 retracted it although there were few persons who could be deceived by it St. Paul speaking of Meats offered to Idols tells us That Idols are Nothing If the Nature of the Heathen Philosophy is a Chimera a Nothing Men ought to be advertized of it for there are many Men who will be deceived by it And more than we suppose who inconsiderately attribute the Works of God to it who are taken up with this Idol or Fiction of Mans Mind and render it Honours which are only due to the Divinity They are willing that God should be the Author of Miracles and certain extraordinary Effects which in one sense are unworthy of his Greatness and Wisdom and they refer to the Power of their imaginary Nature those constant and regulated Effects that Wise Men only know how to admire They likewise pretend that this wonderful disposition which all living Bodies have to preserve themselves and beget their like is a production of Nature For according to these Philosophers 't is the Sun and Moon which begets a Man We may further distinguish Supernatural from Natural Order in many respects For we may say that the Supernatural refers to future good that it is established in consideration of the Merits of JESVS CHRIST that it is the first and chief of all Gods designs and many other things sufficient to preserve a distinction which they are vainly apprehensive should fall to the ground The Sixth Proof The Chief Proof that Philosophers bring to prove the Efficacy of Second Causes is deducted from the Will and Liberty of Man Man wills and determines of himself and to will and determine is to act It is certain it is Man who commits sin God is no more the Author of it than he is of Concupiscence and Error Therefore Man acts ANSWER In many places of the Search after Truth I have sufficiently explained what the Will and Liberty of Man is and principally in the First Chapter of the First Book and in the First Explanation upon that Chapter It is useless to repeat it here I confess that Man wills and determines of himself because
and gives us Motion and Life nor is it that which covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers and which supplies us with Food and Nourishment This Philosophy teaches us with the Scripture that it is God only who gives Rain and regulates the Seasons who gives Nourishment to the Body and fills the Heart with Joy Acts 14.15 16. Ergo nihil agis ingratissimè Mortalium qui te negas Deo debere sed naturae quia nec natura sine Deo est nec Deus sine natura sed idem est utrumque nec distat Officium si quod à Seneca accipisses Annoeo te diceres debere vel Lucio Non creditorem mutares sed nomen Seneca l. 4. Of Benefits c. 8. Ego Dominus non est alter formans lucem creans tenebras faciens pacem creans malum Ego Dominus ficiens omnia haec Isa 45.7 Amos 3.6 That he only is capable of doing us good and thereby has given us a perpetual Testimony of what he is although in Ages passed he has permitted all Nations to walk in their own ways According to the Language of this Philosophy we must not say That it is Nature that fills us with Good nor that it is God and Nature together But that it is God alone speaking thus without Equivocation that we may not deceive the Simple For we must distinctly acknowledge him the onely Cause of our Happiness if we would make him the onely Object of our Love 'T is likewise an undoubted Truth That we ought to fear such Things as are able to hurt us and fear them in proportion to the Evil they can do us But this Philosophy tells us That it is God alone that can do us Evil that it is he as Isaiah says who creates Darkness as well as Light who makes peace and creates Evil and even that no Evil happens but from him according to the Prophet So that it is him alone we ought to fear We must not fear either Plague or War Famine our Enemies nor even Devils themselves but God alone We ought to fly a Sword when ready to wound us shun Fire and avoid a House that is likely to fall upon us yet must not fear these Things We may fly such Bodies as are Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil but we must fear only God as the True Cause of all Evils and Misfortunes and only hate Sin which necessarily provokes the Cause of all our Happiness to become the Cause of all our Evils And in short all the Motions of our Minds ought to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to it and the Motions of our Body may relate to those about it This is what we learn from that Philosophy which admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes But this Efficacy being supposed I cannot see but we have some reason to fear and love Bodies And that to regulate our Love according to Reason it is enough to prefer God above every Thing else the First and Universal to Second and Particular Causes Then it is not necessary to love God with all our strength Ex totâ mente ex toto corde ex tota anima ex totis viribus at the Scripture says Yet when we content our selves with preferring God to all other Beings and adore him with a Love of Esteem and Preference without continually endeavouring to honour and love him in all Things it often happens that we deceive our selves that our Charity is dissipated and lost and that we are more taken up with Sensible than the Soveraign Good For if the greatest Sinners and it may be even Idolaters were asked If they preferred not the universal to particular Causes They would not perhaps be afraid in the midst of their Debauches and Extravagancies to Answer That they failed not in so Essential a Duty and knew very well what they owed to God I confess they would deceive themselves but take away the Efficacy of Second Causes and they will have no probable pretext to Justifie their Conduct And if it be supposed they may say this for themselves when their passions blind them and they listen to the Testimony of their Senses Since I am made to be happy I neither can nor ought to forbear loving and respecting whaterver may be the Cause of my Happiness Why therefore should I not love and respect Sensible Objects since they are the True Causes of the Happiness I receive in their Enjoyment I acknowledge the Supream Being is alone worthy of our highest Adoration and I prefer him to every Thing but not seeing that he requires any Thing of me I enjoy the Goods he has given me by the means of Second Causes to which he has subjected me and I pay no Acknowledgments to him which perhaps would dishonour him As he does me no good immediately and by himself or at least without the Assistance of the Creatures it is a sign he does not require my Mind and Heart should be immediately applied to himself or at least he is willing that the Creatures should divide with him the Acknowledgments of my Heart and Mind Since he has communicated a part of his Power and Glory to the Sun has surrounded him with Brightness and Majesty Established him Supream over all his Works and 't is by the Influence of this Great Luminary that we receive all the Necessary Goods of Life Why should we not then employ a part of this Life in enjoying his Light and testifying the sense we have of his Greatness and Benefits Would it not be the utmost Ingratitude to receive the Abundance of all Things from this Excellent Creature and have no Sentiment of Gratitude for it And would it not likewise be an unaccountable blindness and stupidity to have no Motion of respect and fear for him whose absence freezes us to death and who by approaching too near us may burn up and destroy us I say it again that God is preferable to all Things that we must esteem and love him infinitely more than the Creatures but that we must also love and fear them For thereby we honour Him who made them merit his Favours and oblige him to bestow New Benefits upon us It is plain he approves of the Honour we pay his Creatures since he has communicated his Power to them and all Power merits Honour But as Honour ought to be proportioned to Power and that the Power of the Sun and all Sensible Objects is such that from them we receive all sorts of Goods it is just we should honour them with all our strength and next to God consecrate our whole Being to them Thus we naturally reason when we follow the Prejudice we have received from the Efficacy of Second Causes 't is probably after this manner that the first Authors of Idolatry reasoned Here is what he thought of it who is esteemed the most Learned of the Jews He thus begins a Treatise he
is Just and Wise that He loves not Disorder that Nature is Corrupted that the Soul of Man is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed 't is not a Substance distinct from their Bodies Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may represent him as criminal and all Mankind besides because they believe that Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if from his own way of Arguing we should accuse him of Impiety because he maintains Opinions from whence we deduce That God is not Just Wise Powerful Sentiments which overthrow Religion which oppose Original Sin which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should treat him as unjust and cruel for making innocent Souls suffer and even Annihilating them for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner they are innocent 'T is only to nourish his Body that he kills Bodies and Annihilates their Souls which are of more value than bodies Again If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal this Cruelty however unjust it is might perhaps be pardonable but how many Substances wholly innocent does he Annihilate only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies where the Inhabitants build * Linsch ch 37. Hospitals for Beasts where the Philosophers and many of the best Sort of Men are so charitable even in respect to Flies that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways in which they pass would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body nor distinct from it and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice whereof these People would accuse him if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom This Example might be sufficient to show That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles even when they disavow these Consequences But be it as it will I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn than these of Monsieur de la Ville The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous if they treated Monsieur de la Ville and other persons who are not of their Opinion as Impious and Heretical 'T is only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith and the Church has not obliged us and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles will not oblige us to believe That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies that they know not their Masters that they neither Fear Desire nor suffer any thing Because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths The Second Proof Almost all Men are perswaded that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us That Nourishments act in us and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life and that all Sensible Objects have a Vertue which is proper to them by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power and to fear him only 'T is a Common Notion according to which all Men act That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain to make us Happy or Unhappy This is a supposed Principle we ought therefore to love and fear them This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners It is evident by Reason and the first of Gods Commandments that all the Motions of our Soul whether Love or Fear Desire or Joy should tend towards God and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that would devour us But we ought to love and fear God only All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone We ought to love him with all our Power This is an indispensible Law We can neither love nor fear what is below us without being disordered and corrupted To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to do them honour To love Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the Heat of the Sun as if it were the true Cause thereof nay even to love ones Father Protectour Friend as if they were capable of doing as good this is to give them that honour which is due to God only We must not love any one in this sense 'T is permitted and we ought to love our Neighbour by wishing or procuring for him as a Natural or Occasional Cause whatever may conduce to his Happiness but not otherwise We must love our Brethren not as capable of doing us good but as of enjoying with us the true Good These Truths appear evident to me but Men strangely obscure them when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers pretend that Creatures can do nothing if God did not concur to their Action and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause We ought neither to fear nor love them but God only on whom all things depend This Explication shows Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville that 't is a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining at the expence of Religion Aristotles Opinions and the Prejudices of their Senses if by examining their Heart I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching Mens Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality by the Consequences
of which it is proper to change all the motions of the Passion suddenly determine the course of the Animal Spirits to the Nerves which encompass these Arteries that by their contraction they may shut up the passage whereby the Blood ascends into the Brain and by their dilating lay open that which disperses it self through all the other parts of the Body These Arteries which carry the Blood to the Brain being free and all those which disperse it through the rest of the Body being strongly tied by these Nerves the Head will be filled with Blood and the Face coloured with it But any circumstance changing the shaking of the Brain which caused this disposition in these Nerves the Arteries that were contracted are unloosed and the others on the contrary are strongly contracted Thus the Head is void of Blood a paleness diffused over the Face and the little Blood which goes out of the Heart and which the Nerves we spoke of admit into it to maintain life descend mostly into the lower part of the Body the Brain is defective of Animal Spirits and all the rest of the Body is seized with a weakness and trembling To explain and particularly prove what we have already said it would be necessary to give a general knowledge of Physics and a particular one of Human Bodies But these two Sciences are also too imperfect to be treated of with all the exactness I could wish besides if I should push this matter farther it would soon carry me from my subject and therefore I shall only give a general and gross Idea of the Passions and am satisfied provided this Idea be not false These Shakings of the Brain and Motions of the Blood and Spirits are the fourth thing that is found in each of our Passions and they produce the fifth which is the sensible Emotion of the Soul In the same time that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain into the rest of the Body there to produce the Motions that 's proper to maintain the Passion the Soul is carried towards the good that it perceives and that so much the more violently as the Spirits go out of the Brain with the more force because it is the same shaking of the Brain which acts the Soul and Animal Spirits The Motion of the Soul towards good is so much the greater as the sight of good is more sensible and the Motion of the Spirits which proceed from the Brain to disperse themselves into the rest of the Body is so much the more violent as the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain caused by the impression of the Object or Imagination is stronger so this same shaking of the Brain rendring the sight of the good more sensible it is necessary that the Emotions of the Soul in the Passions should augment in the same proportion as the Motion of the Spirits do These Emotions of the Soul differ not from those which immediately follow the intellectual sight of the good we have spoke of They are only stronger and more lively because of the union of the Soul and Body and the sensibility of the sight which produces them The sixth thing which occurs is the Sensation of Passion the Sensation of Love Aversion Desire Joy Sorrow c. This Sensation is not different from that we have already spoke of it is only more quick because the Body hath a great share in it But it is always followed with a certain Sensation of Sweetness which renders all our Passions agreeable to us and is the last thing observed in every one of our Passions as has been already said The cause of this last Sensation is thus At the sight of the Object of the Passion or any new Circumstance some of the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Head to the extream parts of the Body to put it into the gesture the Passion requires and others forcibly descend into the Heart Lungs and Bowels from thence to draw necessary assistances which has already been explained Now it never happens that the Body is in the condition it ought to be but the Soul receives much satisfaction from it whereas if the Body is in an estate contrary to its good and preservation the Soul suffers much pain Thus when we follow the Motions of our Passions and stop not the course of the Spirits which the sight of the Object of the Passion causes in our Body to put it in the condition it ought to be in relation to this Object The Soul will by the Laws of Nature receive this Sensation of delight and inward satisfaction because the Body is in the state it ought to be in On the contrary when the Soul following the Rules of Reason stops the course of the Spirits and resists these Passions it suffers pain proportionably to the evil which might from thence happen to the Body For even as the reflexion that the Soul makes upon it self is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses when doing its duty and submitting to the order of God it would discover that in a proper condition or abandoning it self to its Passions it is touched with remorse which teaches it that 't is in an ill disposition Thus the course of the Spirits excited by the good of the Body is accompanied with a sensible Joy or Sorrow and afterwards with a Spiritual one according as the course of the Animal spirits is hindered or favoured by the Will But there is this remarkable difference between the Intellectual Joy that accompanies the clear knowledge of the good estate of the Soul and the sensible Pleasure which accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body that the Intellectual Joy is solid without remorse and as immutable as the truth which causes it whereas sensible Joy is generally accompanied with Sorrow of the Mind or remorse of Conscience whence it is unquiet and as inconstant as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood which causes it In fine the first is almost always accompanied with a great Joy of the Senses when it is a consequence of the knowledge of a great good that the Soul possesses and the other is seldom accompanied with any Joy of the Mind although it be a consequence of a great good which only happens to the Body if it is contrary to the good of the Soul It is therefore true that without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST the satisfaction the Soul tastes in abandoning it self to its Passions is more agreeable than that it feels in following the Rules of Reason and it is this Satisfaction which is the cause of all the Disorders that have followed Original Sin and it would make us all Slaves to our Passions if the Son of God did not deliver us from their servitude by the delights of his Grace For indeed what I have said on the behalf of the Joy of the Mind against the Joy of the Senses is
only true amongst Christians and was absolutely false in the Mouth of Seneca and Epicurus and in short of all the Philosophers who appeared the most reasonable because the Yoke of JESVS CHRIST is only sweet to those that belong to him and his Burthen only seems light to us when his Grace supports us under it CHAP. IV. That the Pleasures and Motions of the Passions engage us in Errors at the sight of Good and therefore we ought continually to resist them With the manner how to oppose Libertinism WHatsoever we have already in general explained about the qualities and effect of the Passions shews them not to be free they take up their residence in our Breasts without our leave and there is nothing but the consent of our Will which absolutely depends upon us The prospect of Good is naturally followed with a Motion and Sensation of Love a Shaking of the Brain and Motion of the Spirits a new Emotion of the Soul which increases the first Motion of Love and a new Sensation of the Soul which augments the first Sensation of Love and in fine a Sensation of Complacency which recompences the Soul for the Bodies being in a state convenient for it All these things pass in the Soul and Body Naturally and Mechanically that is without their having any part in it since our consent only truly depends upon us This Consent must also be regulated preserved and kept free notwithstanding all the endeavours of our Passions to the contrary 'T is to God alone that it must submit its liberty yielding only to the Voice of the Author of Nature Internal Evidence and to the secret reproaches of Reason We should never consent but when we clearly see we should make an ill use of our liberty if we refused it And this is the chief Rule that must be observed to avoid Error 'T is God only who evidently shews us that we must submit to what ever he requires to him alone therefore we must wholly devote our selves There is no Evidence in the Alurements and Caresses the Frights and Menaces we receive from our Passions They are only confused and obscure Sensations to which we must never give ear We must stay till these false lights of the Passions are dissipated and wait for a purer light to guide us till God himself speaks to us We must enter into our selves and there enquire for him that never leaves us but continually instructs us He speaks low but his Voice is distinct he illuminates but little yet his light is pure Rather his Voice is as strong as 't is distinct and his Light as bright and active as 't is pure But our Passions keep us always out of our selves and by their noise and darkness hinder us from being instructed by his Voice and illuminated by his Light He even speaks to those who ask nothing of him and those whose Passions have put them at the greatest distance from him do nevertheless now and then hear some of his Words But they are such Words as are strong threatning and terrible and pierce more than a two edged Sword which penetrates the most secret Recesses of the Soul and discerns the thoughts and motions of the Heart Heb. 4.12 13. For all things are open before his Eyes and he cannot behold the irregularity of Sinners without making them inwardly to feel his severe Reproaches We ought therefore to enter into our selves to approach near him to desire him to inform us of what we would know to hearken to and obey him For if we always give ear to him we should never be deceiv'd and by continually Obeying him we should free our selves from the miseries and inconstancies of our Passions to which Sin has subjected us We must not think with some pretended Wits whom the pride of their Passions have reduced to the condition of Beasts and who having so long contemned the Law of God seem at last to know no other than that of their infamous Passions We ought not I say like those Men that are guided merely by Flesh and Blood to imagine that in following the motions of our Passions and secret desires of our own Hearts we shou'd follow God and obey the voice of the Author of Nature for this would be the utmost blindness and according to St. Paul Rom. 1. the temporal punishment for Impiety and Idolatry that is the punishment of the greatest Crimes Indeed this punishment is so much the greater as that instead of appeasing the wrath of God as all other temporal ones do it continually exasperates and encreases it until the terrible day wherein his just anger shall triumph over all Sinners Their Arguments however want not probability and seeming very agreeable to common Sense they are favoured by the Passions and could never be destroy'd by all the Philosophy of Zeno. We must love good say they and pleasure is the character that Nature has united to it and by this character we can never be deceived since it proceeds from God who has affixed it thereto that we might distinguish it from evil We must also fly evil continue they and pain is the character that Nature has united to that nor can we be deceiv'd by it since God has instituted it that thereby we might discern it from good We taste Pleasure when we abandon our selves to our Passions and feel Pain and Bitterness in resisting them Therefore the Author of Nature would have us give up our selves to our Passions and never resist them since the Pleasure and Pain he makes us feel in these occurrences are certain proofs of his Will in respect to them To follow God therefore is to persue the desires of our own Hearts and to obey him is to conform our selves to the instinct of Nature which enclines us to satisfie our Senses and Passions After this manner they confirm themselves in their impious Opinions and by this means endeavour to stifle the secret reproaches of their Reason and for the punishment of their Crimes God permits them to be dazled with these false lights which blind instead of enlightning them but with such a blindness as they are insensible of and wish not to be delivered from God gives them over to a reprobate Sense abandons them to the desires of their Hearts to shameful Passions and Actions unworthy of Man as the Scripture tells us that after being as it were fatned by their Debauches they may to all Eternity become the victims of his Wrath. But we will solve the difficulty they propose which the Sect of Zeno not being able to do have denied that Pleasure was good or Pain an evil But this was too rash an attempt and unbecoming Philosophers and I dont believe it ever made those change their Opinion who experimentally found that a great Pain was a great Misery Since therefore Zeno and all the Heathen Philosophy could not resolve this difficulty offered by the Epicureans therefore we must have recourse to a more solid and