face which got that image and there is no such image in the glasse and contrariwise remove the man whither you will the colour is with him sticks in him therefore colour is inherent in him but only from him represented in the glasse The businesse of inhesion or adhesion belongs not to sense to meddle with the eye sees divers colours in a Rain-bow it belongs not to sense to judge whether they inhere there or no so likewise in the Pidgeons neck and wheresoever it findes them Reason may dispute and collect from sense but Sense judgeth not So that first as I said sense when it sees an image in a Looking-glasse collects no negative Proposition that it is not in the object no more then the sense of that man who thinks he sees a man in the Moon should collect that therefore there are none upon earth Secondly if it judg at all of the subject of inherence whether the glass or object be the subject yet this is so extrajudicial an act so out of the reach of sense as therefore there is no strong building upon it thus have I knowne horses mistaken and sheep when the colouts have been the same and the mistake hath seized upon reason guided by sense so that men have sworne cleane contrary so weak is Sense in judging of any thing but its proper object when other things are accidentally joyned with the object they pass an accidental and uncertain judgment upon them and his first conclusion is true Sense telleth me or rather by the information of sense I collect that colour is in the object when I see it directly but his second can no way be true that Sense telleth me when I see by reflection that colour is not in the Object for Sense makes no such Judgment and Reason with Sense makes a cleane contrary collection Thus have I gone through these two Chapters the first of Leviathan the second of Humane Nature which be the Foundation of his whole Book if the rest prove of the same nature my labour will be much lost to meddle with it but I will try some other pieces NOTES UPON THE Second Chapter of Leviathan CHAP. VII How all creatures affect rest or motion as most convenient for them I Have travelled the first Chapter from the beginning to the end I shall not trouble the Reader or my self so with others nor can I expect they should deserve it but if they should I will let pass many things and only touch some remarkable passages which may in my judgement be principally worth the censuring Sect. 1. He begins this Chapter with a sentence which he calls an undoubted truth and I am confident is most absolute and not to be doubted falshood that is That when a thing lyes still unlesse somewhat else stirre it it will lie still for ever This proposition is apparently false in all Animals for every sensitive creature moves its self and hath the Principles of its own motion in its self unless the motion be violent long rest is as unquiet and tedious to such Beasts as long labour and therefore they will rise and they will move themselves rise if for nothing else yet out of a lassitude they have of that lazie condition they were in and likewise they arise and move to their food and sustenance so that the case put in that latitude and indefinite term A thing without any limitation lyes still cannot look like a truth but that it comming from so learned a man men are amazed at the reading of it But then go further and let us view the meanest things even inanimate bodies every thing is unquiet out of its proper place and presseth and indeavours to get to it and when it is out of its place will move towards it Suppose a Plummet of lead hung in the Air by a thred in time the thred wears the Plummet changeth its place by falling down to the earth the Plummet moves its self downward the breaking of the thred cannot move it for indeed the pressing of the weight of the Lead which is out of its place breaks the thred and moves both the thred and its self down so that let any thing lye still yet it will move its self if it be out of its place So likewise in motion upward Take a Bladder full of Air lay something upon it which may keep it under Water and let it rest there then remove the Obstacle which kept it down it will ascend to its proper place above the Water and surely nothing but its self moves it as is most apparent so far is this indefinite Axiome from an undoubted truth that it is most evidently false in all Animal motions and in all natural motions which are of things out of their places Sect. 2. His second Proposition is as bad That when a thing is in motion it will eternally be in motion unlesse something else stop it This is equally false with the other First Animal Motions he grants presently after Men measuring other things by themselves judge they are weary and so go to rest This instance granted in a Man confutes that indefinite term when a thing is in motion and what he speaks of Men there is the same reason of all sensitive creatures which abide a lassitude or wearinesse as well as man and must have their Sabbath their alternam requiem to refresh them or they cannot subsist and therefore when they are in long motions go to rest themselves and certainly a man may justly say that all the locall motions of other things as well as Animals is to rest the bladder which moved it self before from under the Water rests it self upon the Water the Plummet of Lead upon the earth every thing when it gets its own place rests in that So in violent motions when you shoot an Arrow upward it makes hast downward of it self against the violence and gets to the earth where it may and doth rest so that the nature of every thing is so composed that as it is unquiet out of its fit and natural place so it is quiet and rests in it But he seems to give a reason for both Propositions namely that nothing can change it self This may have some resemblance of truth in respect of the essence of things because every change seems to imply a corruption and destructâ—on of what it was changed from into that it was changed into and nothing can affect or endeavours its own destruction or ruine but yet when any body is affâ—cted with hurtfull accidents it doth change them for its own advantage the Water when it hath that destructive accident heat in it by its own force and principles which are in it works out that hurtfull heat and reduceth its self to its own temper of coldnesse when the Violence which the fire offers to it is removed Thus heavy things move downwards light upwards when they can remove or when those Obstacles are removed which
these things life or death are such some men have thought this temporall life a misery clothed with these circumstances they possesse it with like a rotten house which when the winds and raine drives in is worse then the open fields like a Prison it were better have no house then that such is the body to the soul and therefore men may and have often wished to be delivered out of it and death to some men is as desired as a freedome from a Gaole This Gentleman talkes up and downe in these books not only like a natural man but like the worst of them and the wickedest for wise men among them have written much in contempt of these sensual temporal things in which he placeth the only aime and happiness of man Sect. 4. Certainly even in Nature the life of man is not the principal thing of man's happinesse and then not of mans intention and care for Life is a thing which a man enjoyes in common with Beasts and Trees and therefore if man's happinesse should be in that he were no better yea much worse then they whose excellency consists in a relation to man to live only is to be a Beast a Plant only but to live vertuously and reasonably to glorifie that God who gave him those abilities by which his life is happy that is the end of man and of mans life which he is to leave then when he cannot enjoy it upon these conditions and to a Christian man as to the best of Philosophers who had thoughts and assurance of Eternity this life hath been reputed of little value and to die no misery because it is but the passage to a better and more spirituall life although perhaps there may be some difficulties in opening the gate yet it is not to be compared with the happiness it admits into nay it hath been of such esteem amongst men of honour alwaies that they would choose to die vertuously rather then live dishonourably Instances would be numerous out of the Roman story so that it is impossible in that absolute sense without limitation in which he speaks it to be true that this is the whole right of Nature as his Leviathan or his chiefe or principal as his Corpus politicum to preserve this life or to avoid this enemy death which for multitudes may and for not a few reasons ought to be despised These phrases which he useth Sect. 5. From whom we expect the lesse of power he meane's Death and the greatest of bodily paines in the loosing must be censured next and first of the first By death we doe not loose all power yea without doubt like a man out of prison he is more active and able then he was within so is the soul when it is broke out of this gaole or dunghill its natural corruptible body nor can he say that he meant bodily power for then he would not have left out that word Bodily in this which he joyned with Paine in his following sentence men without question who have hopes of that better life hereafter do not expect the losse of all power by this death but rather the increase of it and therefore suppose he should say he meant bodily power which indeed must needs be lost by death yet who is troubled to loose a bag of Silver when in its room shall be left a bag of Gold to loose bodily power and gaine spirituall It was said of our Druids in England who taught the Immortality of the soule Ignavi est rediturae parcere vitae it was a poor dull thing to spare that life which would returne again but then if they had pryed into and could have considered the glorious immortall existence which men shall have hereafter for the mortall and contemptible being here it might have been said that it were not only a dul but a beastly thing for a man so much to affect the sensual pleasures of this fleshly life as to be unwilling for the losse of them to gaine Spirituall perfections we cannot then say that we expect to loose by death all our power and if we do leave bodily powers we are not loosers but gainers by it Sect. 6. His next phrase is That by death we expect in the losing these Powers the greatest bodily paine This Gentleman I guesse hath only looked upon Death in those horrid vizards and disguises which fearfull men masque it with he hath not been so often in the house of mourning as I have and there made this observation that Death is not so horrid as many men conceit it nor the paines so great that Death is not so fearful is apparent not only in experience of those Martyrs who have dyed for the glory of CHRIST and so by their blessed sufferings for him have had an assurance that they shall reigne with him but even in those who with heroick spirits have confronted Death in politique concernments yea sought it which shewed that there is not a necessity of nature to preserve Life or that they expected the greatest paine in the losing it I could fill divers sheets with instances both ancient and moderne these I let passe lest they kick me in the teeth whilest I follow them in the Chase for the former consider how many wicked men have killed themselves for feare of worse paines alive so Sardanapalus so Cleopatra so Nero multitudes esteeming the paines of Death deliverance from the pains of unhappie life and themselves made choice of death upon such Conditions but take one instance where men were not concerned in the benefit of death themselves but took it in relation to others good we may read in the life of Otho or rather in his death that when after his losse in that great and fatal battell betwixt his forces and those of Vitellius he being retreated and discontented his Souldiers flocked to him beseeching him to head them again and regaine the losse of that day promising how that they were all ready to dye in that cause with and for him if there should be necessity and to give him assurance of what they said one of the most obscure and meanest sort of Souldiers drew his sword and killing himself told him know O Caesar that we are all provided thus to die for thee this man had no end for himself but onely to encourage Otho either for his Countries good or his owne to engage againe yet go on and we shall find that Otho unmoved with this or any thing else killed himself likewise and his souldiers carrying him to his funeral Pile many more slew themselves there to dye with him so that as love of his Country or Otho's imagined vertues provoked the first so a bare love to his person inflamed the rest to dye with him now certainly there could not be a necessity of Nature in these men to expect the greatest pains in death nor indeed can I think there is such paine Old men weare out questionless
activitatis beyond the reach of that naturall arm to come at but if it shall please God to enlarge the bounds of that Nature or draw the other neerer to it it may then do that naturally which before without that enlargement it could not doe as we see that fire cannot with its heat warme a thing which is far off yet bring that body neeâ—er to the fire or let the fire be made more intense it can then doe it so can God make a Creatureâ—s understanding more intense and active and if he please make that sun whose glorious light in its self we cannot behold have such gentle Clouds interposed as may make us see him behind them which in its self nakedly without those Cloudes we could not so may God make himself discernable by such expressions as were fit for him and kindly to us it is a mighty fault in the great wits frequently that they will limit God's abilities to their own apprehensions and because they cannot conceive how therefore they will say he cannot doe it and because naturall men in this Condition cannot apprehend this therefore God cannot make such a man and so this Author whilest he labour's to shew how divine excellencies transcend our capacities he himselfe confine's God's infinite power to his owne fancy But I say I have almost all against my undertaking and therefore before I go I will smooth the way by disputing that question de possibilitate rei whether it be possible to be proved or no. Sect. 2. To understand which give me leave to preface somethings necessary to be preconceived first we must know that there is a God that this God is of an infinite excellency infinitely true good immense eternal c. all which have a great consent among Divines that they may be proved by reason Secondly Consider with me that there is a great difference betwixt these two the man pretended able to prove this by naturall reason who never heard nor apprehended it by faith and him who hath assented to it first by faith for the former hath no reason to enquire or with industring to search because those things of God onely concern him by which he is ruled as his omnisciency his justice his providence and the like but these internal excellencies which are onely in God and onely work as one principle in the outward works concerning the Creation or Government of the world these he hath no occasion further to busie his Soul about but then when they are revealed by faith a contemplative Soul ambitiously strive's how he may climb up to them by reason These permitted I shall undertake the Question Sect. 3. The first opposer I meet with is that great Father of the School Aquinas himself who indeed hath spoken as fully as any of his followers his discourse is in prima parte Quest. 32 Art primo in corpore I answer saith he It must be said that it is impossible by naturall reason to come to the knowledge of the Trinity of the divine persons for it is proved before which is Quest. 12. Art 12. in corpore that man by naturall reason cannot attaine to the knowledge of God by the Creatures but the Creature induce's to the knowledge of God as effects induce to the knowledge of the cause that therefore onely can be known of God which is necessary to be affirmed of him as he is the beginning and cause of the creatures but the creative vertue of God is common to the whole Trinity therefore it appertaine's to the unity of the essence not to the Trinity of the persons Thus farre he and this is the first of his Arguments I will answer them by degrees one by one for perspicuity sake To this first I shall answer that although the greatest part of knowledge is either drawn from the cause to the effect or from the effect to the Cause and the first onely can be applyed to God who hath no cause and whose effects some way or other all things are as from that one infinite being God yet Raymund Lully whom I most honour in this case hath thought of other wayes of arguing of as great force and convincing a man's understanding as these to wit demonstratio per aequiparantiam by the proportion and equality of things and per similitudimem by their likenesse that by equiparance or equivalence he conceiveth to be when by one or two of an equall excellencie an other quality is proved to be as excellent as thus because God is infinitely excellent therefore he is infinitely knowing infinitely good againe this argument from equivalence may be brought from the power to the acts thus the act is proportioned to he power where is an infinite power there is an infinite act where a finite power there but a finite act now by these wayes I apprehend that a man may prove the Trinity although not by the effects of God in the Creature as effects Sect. 4. His second Argument is that to prove the Trinity by reason were derogatory from faith which is of things invisible as it is Heb. 11. now saith he if these things were proveable by reason they were not unseene that is of naturall understandings To this I answer that from the same inconvenience the infinite creating power and act of creating were not proveable by reason which is an article of our faith and although we could not prove it yet we must believe it which both he and his followers agree to grant Secondly I answer that although these things of faith are unseen by mere naturall men without all faith yet when a man hath faith then that light of faith may shew him this or that thing of them and his Reason may afterwards likewise discern it for you may conceive a weight too heavy for a weak man to lift yet when a stronger assist's him he can doe it with him which before he could not without him or as you may see a weake-sighted man by the help of his Spectacles reade's those words which else he could not have read without them yet having clearly read them with Spectacles can after by his weaker sight reade them without because the sense is in his head so a man who by his own weake sight of his own reason cannot lift such a burthen as the Trinity yet having the assistance of a stronger his faith he can then lift up his Arme of Reason to beare it likewise so he that was forced to use spectacles assistants to his Reason whereby he might apprehend this Mystery yet having the sense of it in his head by that can afterwards read it by reason so though these holy Mysteries are invisiâ—le to mere naturall men yet when made apparent by faith they may afterwards be discerned likewise by Reason Another argument is that it is unprofitable to faith for saith he when men use reasons that are not convincing they fall into the scorne of incredulous men who
20 31 322 ACTS 2 24 247 2 36 350 11 2 320 15 1 ibid. 2 c. 16 9 71 20 17 292 20 28 ib. 28 2 149 ROM 1 5 136 1 10 87 1 18 128 21 1 19 334 20 2 15 158 334 4 13 369 4 18 136 19 16 29 ibid. I. COR. 2 8 354 2 10 388 2 14 372 6 18 299 6 20 300 8 5 346 348 8 6 ibid. 9 28 269 12 4 390 15 50 372 II. COR. 1 22 390 3 6 389 4 4 347 5 1 242 12 4 242 GAL. 5 24 269 EPHES. 1 14 390 2 10 365 PHIL. 3 19 347 3 20 242 II. TIM 1 10 389 2 13 327 HEB. 1 3 408 1 10 109 11 12 2 5 378 9 12 356 11 1 242 12 1 247 I. PET. 3 20 388 21 II. PET. 3 13 378 I. Epist. St. JOHN 1 2 340 1 1 341 2 REVEL 1 8 114 2 8 320 19 3 329 21 19 338 20 c. 22 13 114 Observations Censures and Confutations Of divers Errours in M R. HOBBES HIS LEVIATHAN Chap. 1. Chap. 2. Of Humane Nature CHAP. I Of Sense its cause c. particularly of Sight Sect. 1. I Let pass his Introduction although very obnoxious to censure and first encounter his first Chapter which seems to be the foundation of what followes but how unfit to support such a heavy building will appear in the examining The Title of this Chapter is Of Sense and he begins with a definition of the thoughts of Man single which he saith are every one representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us called an Object In this observe his first mistake that he makes a mans thought nothing but a representation and he brings no proof for what he affirms nor answers such objâ—ctions as are brought by Philosophers against it but as if his Book were writ by him for the Novices of Pythagoras and his authority were enough he would have it swallowed without chewing but that this is true in no thoughts of men whether intellectual or sensual is most apparent to him who shall consider that when a man sleeps or indeed is attent upon other business waking although both visible and audible objects are presented to him yet he thinks not of them nor discerns them so that a mans thought is more then a representation And to him who shall answer that this is for lack of attention I object he confutes himself for then thought is not onely a representation but something more a cogitation of that man which is an act of the soul and certainly as he himself phraseth it the thought of man is an act of mans but this representation is an act meerly of the object and therefore cannot be the thought of man It is true that in every thought of man there is something appearing but mans thought is not that apparition but the apprehension of that appearance and some way or other some judgment of it the original or first thought is sense concerning which he consents with the stream of Philosophers that nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu one way or other But here he cites another Book where he hath written more at large of this matter I shall apply my self to both that is named Humane Nature or the Fundamental Elements of Policy chap. 2. But because I find some things in one which are not in the other errours enough in both I shall treat of them apart and first of this piece of Leviathan Sect. 2. Here first he undertakes to set down the cause of Sense as if it had but one as indeed by his Philosophy it might seem to have this cause he makes to be the external object which presseth the Organ proper to each sense c. this pressure he followes to the brain and heart I wonder which way from the eye or ear it gets to the heart there this pressure caused a resistance or counter-passion or endeavour of the heart to deliver it self mark now the brain which doubtless is the fountain of sense is left out which endeavour because outward seemeth to be some matter without consider the strange uncouthness of this language if there be such an endeavour which universally cannot be true yet this endeavour is inward although that which presseth it be put out like a man who thrusteth another out of doors that endeavour to thrust him out is within although the man be thrust out all his endeavour must be within unless he follow him out of doors which I think he will not affirm of the brain or heart Secondly consider that it is impossible that the heart or brain should be so displeased with all apparitions although they press them as to endeavour to be delivered of them for there are some things of this nature as sweet Musick Tast Beauties in visible objects in all senses some objects so grateful to the Organ yea heart or brain yea all that they cannot chuse but delight in them yea hug and embrace them with all kindness if so why should they endeavour to expell them yes he may say because they presse them I ask how do the brain or heart discern that pressure All discerning is either by sense or understanding no understanding before sense it must therefore be discerned by sense and then sense must be before there be any sense for he makes sense not to be untill that which pressed be thrown out These are unheard-of discourses amongst Philosophers but his opinions do confute that saying Nihil dictum quod non fuit dictum prius and therefore I must be excused for producing new objections to such opinions consider then that last clause of the former sentence which endeavour being outward seemeth to be some matter without First I have shewed the endeavour must be inward next let us consider how this endeavour can appear to be somewhat without according to him this endeavour expelled that which pressed the brain or heart but which way can this endeavour look like some matter without I am confident that neither any other nor he himself understands what he writ but he would write somewhat to amuse a Reader if he had said the expelled Species or I know not what he calls it that which pressed did seem to be some matter without it had lookt like reason although but like it but to say the endeavour did seem to be some matter without was a strange kind of unreasonable speech but he goes on and I mean to follow him close Sect. 3. And saith he this seeming or fancy is that which we call sense and consisteth as to the eye in light or colour c. this seeming to what doth it seem that which seems seems to somewhat either the soul or the powers of the soul the organs or heart or brain now if it seem so to any Agent whatsoever that act on which apprehends this seeming must be the sense not the seeming
Looking-glass an inanimate eye but the difference lies in the activity of the soul which animates the eye but not the Looking-glasse But he is angry with the conceit of species and would have men believe that that opinion so universally held is founded only upon some Texts of Aristotle but I will tell him it is not so founded upon Texts as if his onely authority had gained the general esteem which that truth hath obtained upon mens judgments but the reasons of him and his followers which this Gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered and not have thought that his bare credit with scorning it should prevaile against Christendom But that a Reader may take notice of some of these reasons and not trouble himself to peruse other books I will set down one or two which may suffice Sect. 5. The first reason of Aristotle is drawn from our experience thus We all observe that when we have discerned things by our senses and the act of sensing pardon that word sensing it is unusuall yet significant is done yet there remains in the sensative memory that image which represented the object at the first now it is impossible that that should be any material corporeal thing for then how could so many huge Towers Castles Towns Kingdoms yea heaven it self if a material heaven remaine crowded in so narrow a compass how could such contraries as black and white hot and cold fire and water high and low remaine in that little Ark of mans memory if they were material and reall things they could not but being spiritual intentional and things as Philosophers speak diminutae entitatis they make a shift with their little entities to creep into such a corner And this confounds likewise another Proposition of his that the reception of these species makes sense for these entities are received and retained and kept fast in that box which received them the memory but are not sense any longer then they are hot and fresh from the object well then there must be such things as these species or else there could be no memory of the object which in a material condition could not exist in the memory A second argument may be drawn from another experiment suppose Aristotle looks upon Plato Aristotle cannot see his own face but in Plato's eyes he can how can that come about but that some intentional species and image of him crept into Plato's eye a material thing could not it must be an intentionall for any material thing would be offensive to Plato's eye nor could it be that Gamboll he talks of so much a stroak from the object for then it must have made Plato see Aristotle not Aristotle himself according to his Philosophy A third argument I can frame thus Every object which is distant from the organ must some way or other make it self reach the organ with its own likeness but for a reall passage of colours or such like objects there can be no imagination there are but two wayes either by the propagation of this image intentionally through the whole medium which therefore is not discerned in its passage through the ayr because the motion is extreamly swift like the passage of light instantaneal and because untill it meets with an eye or glasse or something proper to give it a receipt it hath no pause for a consideration This is the most common way of Philosophers or else it must be by some seminal vertue which it sends abroad which when it finds a womb fit to entertain it there is prolifical and produceth this image and therefore in that regard may be called species because it is such in semine Now if it should be objected that if it were the seed of colours like the seed of plants it would produce a thing of the same nature a reall colour not an intentionall It is answered that second qualities are like equivocal agents they cannot produce their own nature like Mules and the Monsters of Nile the furthest they goe is their image a colour doth not get a colour of its own nature as heat doth heat nor can you make one thing white by putting another white thing to it unlesse you add some of that white body to the other This conceit hath much pleased me and I think would meet with all objections but I am not peremptory in it because I cannot afford my self leasure to spend so much time about such a youthfull study but howsoever one of these wayes I conjecture whosoever shall think that the object works upon the sense 〈◊〉 conceive it and therefore these species There are many other arguments used by Philosophers the least of which he hath not touched but controuleth them with only It is otherwise I will now leave this and come to his fourth and last Proposition in his Humane Nature where before numb 9. CHAP. VI. Concerning Echoes production of sounds and external objects c. HIs Proposition is That as in conception of Vision so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses the subject of their inherence is not the subject I think it false printed he means sure the object but the Sentient Sect. 1. This Proposition is delivered in a strange fallacious way for whereas his whole discourse and intent is to prove that sound as well as colour is not in the object but in the sentient as with colour he joyned images So in this Proposition which concerns other senses he leaves out the object and onely names the conception It is undoubtedly true that the conception is in that part which conceives not the conceived but the business which he labours to prove and is in questâ—oâ— betwixt him and me is Whether there be any thing conceived out of the Sentient in the object he sayes no and labours to prove it Nu. 9. Sect. 2. The first argument he proves this by is drawn from sounds and in them from ecchoes A man saith he may heare double or treble by multiplication of ecâ—â—â—es which ecchoes saith he are sounds as well as the oâ—â—ginal and not being in one and the same place cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them This argument receives its answer variously from Philosophers according to their divers conceits of the nature of sounds for such as conceive sounds to be carried in their real nature by the motion of the ayr to the organ of sense these conclude an eccho to be a new sound propagated by the former differing from the first individually not naturally we may call it if you will another of the same as some Psalms of Hopkins and Sternholds Translation So that as we see musical instruments two in the same room one Violl touched the other out of harmony of parts being fitted and prepared for such a motion and sound receives the same and that sound is the first but a little softer which in a whispering place as I have observed at Gloucester Church it would
bounds and rebounds for although the immanent acts are in the agents yet the things smelt and tasted are elsewhere Sect. 6. Last of all he cometh to the lowest sense of touch or feeling and of this sense he saith So likewise the heat we feele from the fire is manifestly in us and is quite different from the heat in the fire I believe that he speaks truth in this that the heat in my hand is not that particular heat which is in the fire but yet that word quite different was a large Phrase the difference is individual not specifical it is a stream of that Fountain and differs like a streame from the fountaine it loseth by the course it walkes in some degrees of those perfections which it enjoyed at its first seting out but that it is another appeares because take away the fire and the heat doth not instantly follow the fire but by degrees weares out of my hand just like a streame fed and supplyed by a fountaine stop the fountain the streames will in little leasure decay but not instantly be dried as light followes the Candle or as a shadowe the man whose shadowe it is This proves it to be another heate from that of the fire why do we read nothing of apparitions of bounds and rebounds this is nothing to his purpose that heat which is in my hand is the Object of my feeling and it is discerned by some species which expresseth its likeness as other objects and presents it to the sensitive soul which officiates this duty of judging of Touches in every part of a man which is animated by it as it discernes colours by the eye sounds by the Eare c. But which way doth this prove because heat is in my hand which is felt therefore there is nothing in the Object discerned The nature of those Prime qualities Heat Cold Drought Moisture is such that it multiplies their nature even to the Organ and thus onely immediately sends out its likeness whether this Organ be a nerve or something else I question not but second Qualities as light or heavy hard or soft touch but the outward skins only and there and thence transmit their Species which is so apparent as nothing can be more for take the weight of Lead and the lightnesse of a feather when discerned by a mans hand can any man say these are in the hand or Lead or feather So likewise when I feel a down pillow and a hard stone what is it I feel a softnesse or hardnesse in my self or a gamboll of a bound or rebound these things cannot be imagined these are reall things in that pillow in that stone but send forth intentional not reall Images into my hand of their natures Real they cannot be for if real then my hand should be light or heavy hard or soft when it discerns those Objects to be such for whatsoever hath these real Qualities in it is denominated by them and then some image there must be because whatsoever is known must be known by reception into that facultie which knowes it if not in its self yet in its Species or Image and so these who in their realities cannot come at the Organ must do it by their Species But this was much more then needed for a refutation of what he said but I have not done yet with him for although his Argument drawn from heat in my hand to prove the nullitie of an externall Object is vaine as I have shewed for this heat is external to the Organ of that Sense and although it be true that the heat in my hand differs from that in the fire which did produce it yet his Argument is most Illogical with which he endeavours to prove it thus Sect. 7. For saith he our heat is pleasure or pain according as it is great or moderate but in the coal there is no such thing First consider the Proposition then the inference In the Proposition he affirmes that our heat is a pleasure or paine which is a most strange speech in a Philosophical discourse where propriety of speech is expected and from that man in that discourse where like another Adam he would impose Names upon every thing and strives for nothing more then to give things convenient expressions To the business heate is neither pleasure nor pain in us it may produce both according to the convenience or inconvenience it hath with us but is neither heat is a cause of sense but sense is neither pleasure nor pain but they are results out of sense as things agreeing or disagreeing to it so that heate is a cause of both a remote cause but formally it cannot be said to be either Sect. 8. But suppose it be spoken figuratively which in these cases of Philosophical punctuall discourses is not proper the cause for the effect doth it follow that therefore because it is so in a man and produceth not that effect in the fire therefore it is not the same heat certainly causes alwayes work the same effect where the Subject is the same but not else heat hardens clay which is a common Instance but softens wax if fire had sense as a man hath it would find paine or pleasure as a man doth or if a man had no sense like fire he would have no pain or pleasure as the fire hath not the same thing works diversly according to the Subject or Object it is busied about This conceit of his I make no question but meeting with his understanding which was the Mother of it mightily pleased him or else he would never have printed it in two Books and in one have cited the other but certainly meeting with my dull braine infected with contemptible Universitie learning it displeaseth me exceedingly and therefore there is no arguing for the diversity of an Agent from the diversity of operation when the Object is diverse it works upon And here he concludes this businesse saying by this the fourth Proposition is proved c. But how let any man consider Now I thought to have concluded with him but number 10. he crowds together such a heap of Solecismes as must not passe without a consideration of them His number begins thus And from hence also it followeth that whatsoever accidents or qualities our sense makes us think there be in the world they be not there but are seeming and apparitions onely I never thought to have read such a Proposition from a reasonable man The Thief who is to be arraigned at the Bar would be glad he could make the Judge to be of this minde when the evidence shall sweare he saw him break up a house or cut a purse if he could perswade the Judge that it were but an Apparition there were no such thing it were well for him But suppose this Gentlemans hand were put into the fire and when he cryes out for paine a man should tell him there is no such thing but only an apparition
of it do you think he would believe him But by this Doctrine he hath one evasion which I know not what to say to that is when I shall charge him with it he can reply it was onely an apparition of such an opinion or discourse but no such discourse I can prove it no other way but that these eyes of mine shewed it me in a book under his name called Humane Nature or another called Leviathan Sect. 9. But this being only a negative conclusion he proceeds further to a positive thus The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused Surely there was never heard or read so much nonsense and yet it tastes not of folly but a kind of madnesse or else he thinks the world is mad to receive such incredible fancies without colour of reason Is all without us nothing but motion Is the standing still of the earth nothing but motion Is the thing that moves nothing but motion motion moves somwhat that is not motion if so what doth it move whatsoever moves moves something and if that were motion the question goes on infinitely unless we find somthing to be moved which is not motion substances bodies c. are not motion rest is not motion much less are they these motions by which these seemings are caused I discern a stone hard cold heavy by sense are these things yea the stone it self for so they term the things that really involves it nothing but those motions by which they appeare These things confute themselves and yet I may go further many of these representations apparitions seemings are without motion in the object the house standing still unmoved sends forth its image to my eye without motion for all motion is but of six kinds generation and corruption about substances augmentation and diminution about quantities alteration about qualities lation or local motion about place he can find none of these in this house neither in its substance quantitie quality place but the motion is in mine eye no such thing neither mine eye is changed none of these wayes only an image brought to it which is undiscernable by any sense but it self neither is the power of the soul moved which then proceeds to discern the object for it is the same power it was before without any real alteration or change for it hath the same abilities it had neither more nor lesse but it is true there is an internal immament act which results out of that power without any motion or if it may in an improper and forced way be halled into the notion of motion in some unused acceptation yet this must be an internal motion within its self none of those things he speaks of a motion Much of this is needlesse that which sufficeth to shew the weaknesse of his reasoning is to shew that there are hundreds of things discerned by us which are not motions and that is most apparent He proceeds And this is the great deception of sense which also is by sense to be corrected If it were true that this were a deception I should think it a great one yea the most universal deception that ever was in the world but how it shall be corrected by sense that were worth the observing He hath shewed it thus For as sense telleth me when I see directly the colour seemeth to be in the object so also sense telleth me when I see by reflexion that colour is not in the object Sect. 10. First of all observe that if this were true yet being but a particular instance he cannot deduce that generall conclusion out of it concerning all sights much lesse concerning all other senses then observe upon a direct sight he puts onely a seeming to be in the object but upon a reflex peremptorily that it is not in the object when certainly a direct sight shews its object more clearly then any reflex But now to his instance why doth a reflex shew it not to be in the object he sets not down but perhaps he may say in a glass the image may seeme to be in the glasse and not in the object I say the image that which represents the object is there and I have known a Robin Red-breast fighting with his own shadow in a glasse To this I answer that the sight judgeth of colours and therein is not deceived when the distance is not too great nor the organ or medium ill disposed for that is its proper object over which it hath power to judg but in such things as are a common object to it and other senses it is easily mistaken of which kind are figures greatnesse or littleness distance of place and many the like Thus it mistakes the distance of the Moone from the earth the bigness of the stars but then besides these common objects there are other which are objectum per accidens as Logicians an object not out of its own nature affecting that act or faculty in its self but by reason of some other thing to which it is annext or happens to be joyned so we may say we see Socrates or Plato when we see them not but their colour and that colour of theirs is the onely thing by which they are discerned by sight Now there are mighty mistakes in our senses concerning these so when we see one man's cloaths worne by another we think him at the first to be the man whose cloaths he weares so when we see that man to have a red who had a pale face we think him not the same man My opinion of this mistake is because although the vision of the colour is an act of sight yet the applying that colour to the person seemes to be an act of reason a work out of the reach of pure sense This by the way of explication to make all plain that the Reader may the fuller apprehend my answer to this objection punctually then I answer first that there is no such judgment of sense as to say that colour is not in the object for although sense perhaps can onely discern the colour in the glass yet sense meddles not with that question whether the same colour can be in two subjects much less whether this be a real colour in the glasse or whether an intentional or whether it be in the glass or not but if it do meddle with this last yet in that speech which sayes it is in the glasse sense meddles beyond its sphere it judgeth in a cause which belongs not to its Judicature that may be disputed by reason between him and me and sense may give in evidence concerning what it knows circumstantially conducing to the truth but cannot judg of it it is not its proper object so then to say sense sees it in a glass therefore there is no colour in the object is vaine to reason which can discerne that every accident follows its subject remove the glass from the
betwixt the motion of the water which stayes a little while after the stone is stopt and this remaining of the Image that motion of sense is nulled and therein a quiescence of that act but as in all other Causes which are not necessary to the preservation as well as the producing their effects so here when the cause is gone the effect remains the Image apprehended in sense and then it hath no other convenience with that Motion then any other Cause Sect. 3. I râ—jâ—ct not his Etymologie but deny his Deduction Therâ—fore saith he Imagination is nothing but decaying Sence For although Imagination may be derived from Image yet it is something besides sense in its full notion for sense is the meer judgment upon a present Object but Imagination works upon an absent every Sense judgeth of a particular sensative Object so sight of Colours hearing of Sounds c. and no other but Fancy so here I involve the common sense with it because he excludes it and I will multiply no controversie judgeth of all senses and distinguisheth them This is visible this Audible yea conjoynes them together and makes a Composure sometimes for pleasure sometimes for grief of divers of them which sense cannot do sight cannot judge or act any way upon sounds or the ear upon colours as is evident a deaf man though seeing cannot hear yet if ever he did hear his fancy can imagine sounds So that imagination must needs be somthing besides decaying sense which operates where and when Sense cannot and is an act upon that which is the relick of Sense when Sense hath done its work there remains the Species which the Object sent forth and upon this Species the power of imagination works its proper operations Decaying Sense supposeth Sense to be but imagination works when Sense is not as upon Colours when the man that hath seen is blind afterwards there is not the sense of seeing but there is in that man an imagination of colours which he hath but cannot now see So in the dark men imagine colours but can see none I conclude therefore that imagination is something beside sense which exists when sense faileth Sect. 4. He goes on The decay of sence in man saith he waking is not the decay of the motion made in sence but an obscuring of it This I apprehend most untrue for when the Organ ceaseth to judge that motion which he calleth sence ceaseth and is no longer but those Species lie lockt up in the Memory and there is no act of sensation concerning them no not a decayed one That Philosophy which he delivers concerning the Sun and the Stars to illustrate this by I grant that the Stars do emit and send forth their Light when the Sun shineth but the excess of the Suns Light obscures that of the Stars yet his Application of it to this purpose is utterly vain for there both the Objects work like Natural Agents according to their utmost and the greater by its force masters the lesse but here in our businesse the Object is removed or the Organ and there is no operation of one upon the other at all the species being crept within the Organ the eye cannot judge of it and the object or Organ being diverted or indisposed cannot produce such an act any longer it is as if the Stars were removed out of the Heaven not shining with the Sun so that we fancy colors in the dark when no strength of another Object more powerfull doth work upon our sense and sometimes in the dark we do not imploy our Imaginations about colours and yet in that dark we have no vehement Object to obscure our fancy so that it is not the suppression or weakning of sense by another Object which maketh us not see but the cessation of sense by the removal of either Organ or Object one from another And again we may observe that although the Sun shine and the Objects external move never so powerfully yet the fancy is busied about some internal conceit or other things absent which could not be if only the vehement stroakes from the object did produce this act for then that being the fancy should likewise be Sect. 5. After this weak Discourse he draws a conclusion thus From whence it follows that the longer the time is after the sight or sense of any object the weaker is the imagination This hath some Truth in it but is not absolutely true for many instantly upon sight or hearing of a thing have no apprehension of it as we say it comes in at one eare and goes out at another men carelesly taking notice of it like a thing not heeded or cared for lose it presently we conceiving the memory like a Box which keeps these Images may apprehend attention like a Key to it which locks them up in that Box. Or apprehending the memory like wax we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these Images into it but without attention any sensitive object though discerned is lost immediately and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out when contrariwise it often happens that a thing long time forgot and not thought on may be reviv'd and quickned again and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth as I remember Seneca speaks of himself and I think most men may find in themselves to be true that the things which he learned when he was a child did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learned but a little before so that although there may be some truth in this that often it happens out that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing yet because there are many other things conducing to the preservation and destruction of conceptions besides time therefore this is not universally true as he proposeth it yet should not have been censured by me but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before which was an Errour not to be swallowed down Sect. 6. I let pass what is between and come to the upshot This decaying sense saith he when we would expresse the thing it self I mean fancy its selfe we call Imagination This that he calls decaying sense I confesse we call Imagination but I have shewed it not to be sense therefore not decaying sense But saith he when we would expresse the decay and signifie that the Sense is fading old and past we call it Memory Here are dâ—vers words of most distinct nature hudled together to confound the Reader old and past many things are now past yet not old and those past things although but just now are remembred although not old Then saith he Imagination and Memory are one thing which for divers considerations hath divers Names I deny that they are the same thing and prove it thus Sect. 7. They who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other are not the
same thing for powers are distinguished by their Acts and Objects but imagination and memory are such therefore they are not the same The major hath its proof and illustration already the minor shall be thus confirmed first imagination is busied about and acts things which come not into the reach of memory as â—oyning two things together a horse and a man it makes a centaure this presently after he applyes to imagination which he calls compounded imagination now these two although in their parts they were discerned by sense before and wrapt up in the memory yet conjoyned together having been never in the sense cannot be in the memory unlesse after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory but are the fruits of imagination only so likewise we may say that there are many things in the memory which are not imagined when they are in the memory as thus The memory is like a Book in which those things which are attentively perceived by sense are by that attention ingraved or lockt up as was before exprest or written in it imagination is that internall eye which reads this book and sometimes reads one word somtimes another Now as it happens out that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not yea it cannot see all things at once so it is in the memory it is impossible that the Fancy should read half those things which are writ in the Memory many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once and perhaps sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined yet are in the Memory and therefore certainly where there are so distinct acts and Objects the things themselves are distinguished for we never say a man imagineth any thing of which he hath not an actuall conception nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative Memory of which he hath formerly had no sense so that those are as much distinguished in and by their Acts and Objects as any two Faculties can be Sect. 8. What he saith presently after That much memory or memory of many things is called Experience is not true in those general terms which he proposeth for Memory of many things maketh not Experience but Memory of many things alike so that he that shall remember that fire burnt his hand water washt it that this lump of lead felt heavy teat Bladder of Air Light makes not an Experimentall conclusion from such remembrances of either heat or weight or lightnesse but when he shall find that this Air and all he meets with this Lead and many others are such then he hath Experience and by Experience he knows that it is so with all other if he shall reply and produce common language that we usually say that we had once Experience of such or such a passage and therefore one tryal and sense with remembrance of it makes an experience I answer That experience in a late way of acceptation is so used for a particular apprehension with remembrance but because experience is the mother of knowledge and one Swallow assures us not of a Summer nor doth one Conception give us the certainty of any Science therefore the proper way of taking experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature and in that sense he must take it because else in vain he defined it the Memory of many things and should have rather said It is the remembrance of any thing And yet give me leave to interpose my conceit which is that Experience is not rightly termed Memory of one thing or many for Memory contains many things at quiet in it which yet are not experiments until applyed to something else either in speculation or practice so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice we rub up our memories to see what provision is in that Storehouse to furnish us with directions in our businesse at hand and when we find things of like nature these are called Experiments But this being but a nominal discourse as much of that which follow I might have saved as I shall do such things and have suffered him to beguile any man with it for it is not material whether true or false only I have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments and the usefullest I skip now to the 6 pag. of the 2. Chap. CHAP. X. The origine of Dreams their variety c. WHerein impertinently I think to his maine purpose in that Chap. he entreth into a long discourse of Dreams which because it seems to squint at other matters besides this in hand I shall with brevity censure as most unsatisfactory and very erroneous First then he saith there That because the Brain and Nerves are so benummed in the sleep as not easily to be moved by the action of external Objects there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dreams but what proceed from agitation of the inward parts of a mans body Sect. 1. This I conceive erroneous in that latitude of terms which he useth for no doubt there are many Prophetick Dreams concerning which the Scripture both the Old and New Testament are full of Instance as Gen. 40. the Butler and Baker had Prophetick Dreams so likewise Gen. 41. Pharaoh had a Prophetick Dream such another you may find Dan. 2. of Nebuchadnezzer In the New Testament we may observe in the 1. Chap. of S. Mat. v. 20. How an Angel appeared to Joseph in a dream so likewise S. Paul Acts 16.9 Now these and many more which the Scripture and story furnish us withall and we are bound to believe do shew us that there are dreams which arise not from the agitation of the inward parts there being nothing in them that could prognostick any such thing and therefore this Universal Proposition Thâ—re can be no dream but such was a fault not to be pardoned He spake much better in his Humane Nature Cap. 3. Num. 3. where he saith That the Causes of Dreams if they be natural are the Actions or Violence of the inward Parts That Parenthesis if they be natural stopt a great gap for these instances were not natural It was much he should correct the first Copy making it more erroneous error it had before but the rent in his Leviathan was made wider then in his first piece of Humane Nature Sect. 2. Error it had before it was not true to say that all natural dreams come from the agitation of the inward parts for as the greatest Philosopher that was meer man Solomon expresseth it Eccles. 5.3 A Dream cometh through the multitude of businesse not onely when the inward parts of a man are unquiet and violent but even then when they are in the best Composure if a Man have his Fancy disturbed with earnestnesse of thoughts about any businesse in the day in the Night when he takes his rest and both the Outward and Inward Senses are lockt up by Sleep his Fancy being
their Doctrine with Miracles every where it must therefore be understood of the Governours to whom this Religion is committed but how harshly in Common language that Relative those men will be applyed to these Governours may easily appeare to any man who reads it well his Conclusion is that they the Governours being suspected the Religion which they desire to uphold must be suspected likewise and without the feare of the Civil Sword contradicted and rejecâ—â—d Sect. 2. I conceive if his premises had been true the Conclusion would not be deduced out of them for Religion formed is like the statute Lsw as before is expressed the Governours may be thought as Iudges whose ability or integrity may be suspected in expounding the sense of it yet the Law is still as true and remaines as unsuspected as if they were vertuous the folly and corrupt mannage of the Iudges may let in a loosnesse of living and a neglect of the Law but it lessens not the Obligation of it nor the estimation but amongst sleight and trivial persons So if Bishops or the Governours in Religion cease to have Apostolical integrity or sufficiencies or that degree of it which should be expected from such persons they open a gap to the Countenancing of wickedness and prophaneness but the Religion of Christians which is built and founded upon the revealed will of God in the Statute Book the Bible is not tainted by it nor the duty to it in the Opinion of any but men of Fancy for they neither being the foundation nor the evidence of the foundation onely preservers of it out of Office not of nature they may do much harme to the building but not corrupt the foundation nor destroy the evidence of it which was set out by those who were instruments in the first forming that Religion not them which were Governours afterwards Sect. 3. He goes on indeed in some Method and ingenuity to shew how Governours may fall under this suspicion and first he saith That which taketh away the reputation of wisdome in him who formeth or addeth to Religion when it is already formed is the enjoyning a beleefe of contradictories I here stop and tell you there is a difference betwixt the formers of a Religion and the Governours as I have shewed and for this word Contradiction I say that in the forming of Religion which is to be done by the revealed will of God immediately the wit of man is not to dispute contradictions but whatsoever it shall please God to reveale we are to beleeve though it appeare to us Contradictory I dare say I can demonstrate some things which a weak and silly man would think contradictions and a man exceeding me in learning as much as I do him may serve me so and much rather that infinite perfection and not to be fathomed abysse of Gods most unsearchable wisdom may say a thousand things apparent to it feasible by that infinite power which the wisest man may be at a losse to find possible and therefore whatsoever is delivered by the first agents in forming a Religion by the immediate revelation of God must be beleeved although it appear to us full of contradictions but what he speaks to us concerning the Governours if they should adde any thing to the former credenda things to be beleeved which to humane judgement appeares contradictory their wisdome will be disparaged by it may be allowed But at the latter end of that sentence he saith Sect. 4. A man may have a revelation of many things above but of nothing against natural reason This seems to be flat against the excellency of that Faith for which the Father and patterne of the faithfull is commended by St. Paul Rom. 4.18 who speaking of Abraham saith Who against not onely above hope beleeved in hope where in expresse terms the Apostle overthrows his distinction for against hope must be against that hope which natural Reason could give him he beleeved in the promise which God made in Faith as it was with him so it must be with us It is said in the following verse that he considered not his own body now dead nor the deadnesse of Sarahs womb so must we not consider our impossibility in things delivered by God how they oppose our reason but beleeve without thought of nature or reason for it yea though it be against our reason and therefore it is most appositly phrased by St. Paul in the first and last Chapters to the Romans Obedience unto faith men must captivate their Reason to the revelations of God and not considering what Reason saith against it submit to it Thus I think in those cases where the instruments of forming a Religion doe propose any thing though contrary to our reason or contradictory in our apprehension we ought to submit to it although not in those cases to these who have the government in Religion when it is once formed Sect. 5. I will adde one note more pertinent to this business that although in the following 59. pag. he puts downe examples which illustrate his other grounds of suspicion yet as a man guilty he sets down none for this but having as I have reason to mistrust some ill design puts it downe in a language and manner fit enough to steale a beleefe of what he speaks into an inconsiderate Reader although he gives no proof of what he writes to a judicious Reader And now I have finished what I intended concerning this Chapter for the other things which he saith bring these persons into suspicion by reason of the deficience of those qualities I grant to him and cannot choose but say they were handsome and ingenious expressions and likewise fitted with very pertinent examples but they accidentally only when unluckily they happen to be observed by weak capacities doe distract the vivacity and quicknesse of their Faith and so perhaps may in tract of time quench and extinguish the flame of it to its first Principles as I have shewed And here I will settle my self to what followes in the next Chapter CHAP. XVIII Concerning the equality or inequality of men by nature Their prudence and self-opinion of it not universal Sect. 1. THis Chapter is intituled Of the naturall Condition of Mankind as concerning their felicity or misery and is the prettiest great nothing that ever I read it makes a brave and gallant shew of ingenious Paradoxes but is only a shew where truths and falshoods are so ingeniously mixed as the one sets off the other with a great semblance of reality although it be but a semblance He describes a man by his worst peices only many of which are truly in him but delivering them only without his good he makes him little better then an incarnate Devill yea what is worser makes him seeme to act those things justly which we abominate in them so that he should be the hatefullest creature in the world I will therefore for the honour of Mankind
endeavour to rescue it from such foule scandals and aspersions not catching at every word but driving at the maine sense of what he delivers Sect. 2. He layes the foundation of this Chapter upon equality of men which are saith he made so equall by nature that there is an inconsiderable difference I put not down his own words but the sense to avoid tediousnesse This Conclusion for the most part is true but in general false for if we look to the bodies of some men we see them so decrepid that their strength is not considerable alone and what he talkes of confederacy by that accompt he may bring a Fly in competition for a Fly with company enough can effect any thing and for the Soule there are some men so sottish and uncapable of designe or contrivance that certainly there are many Beasts which exceed them in fitness for such business as he allot's them but allow this phrase as he utter's it to be understood of the greater sort and number of men not of all Sect. 3. Then let us consider that Phrase Nature hath made men what shall we understand by Nature Natura naturans the God of Nature who at the first made men then we must affirme this of Adam and Evah which were made without question in no state of enmity nor in an absolute equality but such a difference as was necessary for two friends which might assist one another wishing each other good and the good of each other was the good of both the hopes of each the hopes of both so that those could not be the works of Nature which he meanes being such as were made for peace and amity and where was impossibility of hostility betwixt them the hurt of either being the hurt of both because which soever was destroyed the other lost much of assistance We will therefore see how other sons of Nature are made in what condition whatsoever Man else was made by nature he was made a poor helpless Child in the greatest disproportion both of Soul and body to his Parents that possibly can be and in this state there are none of those things which he fancieth nor hopes of attaining ends nor feares of others assistance but the poor Infant confides and trusts in hâ—s Parents and submits to them Methinks he discourses of Men as if they were Terrigenae born out of the earth come up like Seeds without any relation one to the other I let alone his secret vaunt of Knowledge in the latter end of this 60. Pag. Sect. 4. But in the bottome of that page he saith Prudence is but Experience which equall time bestowes equally upon all men in those things they equally apply themselves to See here the unconstancy of this Author Chap. the 2. Of which I have discoursed he saith Experience is memory of many things Chap. 8. pag. 34. he saith Prudence depends upon Experience now it is but Experience These two are impossible to be true both for nothing doth depend upon it self that which it depend's upon must be distinct from what depend's upon it now we may distinguish thâ—se three thus Memory retaines the actions done and past Experience collects from thence the practices of men in such cases but Prudence according to both Memory Experience and the rules of right reason drawne from all the guidance of History or Natural reason or what else can supply any assistance to the intended end directs a man in his actions and therefore he spake very weakly of Prudence when he said it was but Experience and contrarily there is a mighty difference in mens Prudence for Prudence is a thing acquired by industry and paines in which as men differ in the industry so they doe in Prudence yea all men have not the like advantages of conversing with able men and Bookes which are great helps for the getting Prudence though they may have the same industry Sect. 5. Pag. 61. He saith that that which may make such equality that is of Prudence concerning which he had spoken before incredible is but a vaine conceit of our own wisdome c. for such is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty or more Elâ—quent or more Learned yet they will hardly beleeve there are many so wise as themselves for they see their owne wit at hand and others at a distance This is a strange contradictory passage to its self for first consider that what was conceited by this to be opposed was the equality of Prudence to oppose this he introduceth mens conceits of their own wisdome he that reflects upon his Exposition of names in Cap. 5. pag. 22. shall find Prudence and Wisdome two things Therefore a high esteeme of a mans own wisdom may be without the like imagination of his own Prudence Then consider that he saith Men will allow others more witty learned eloquent but not more wise he proves this because men see their own wit at hand mark how he said just before that they would allow others more wit but not more wisdom the reason saith he because they see their wit at hand would not this if it prove any thing prove the contrary to what he useth it That because their wit not their wisdom is discerned at hand others at a distance therefore their wit must appear great though not their wisdom This manner of false reasoning unreasonable arguing is frequent with him throughout the whole Book Sect. 6. But to the Conclusion this estimation of a mans own eminence in Prudence is least discerned of any thing in that universality which he expresseth for first if Prudence as he just before defined it be but Experience it is impossible that young men should think they have as much Experience as old then if Prudence be as it is the guide of a mans actions to their designed ends then consider that there are none but Fooles who do not take advise of men more excellent in their several wayes then themselves Doe not men that would get health advise with Physicians for the setling their estates advise with Lawyers for the managing of a business at Court or Countrey advise with others more prudent in these practises In this particular business although I am confident I speak more rationally then he or perhaps then some others would doe with whom I consult yet I advise with those lesse scient but I think more prudent then my self whether it be discretion to publish this or not what is the reason of this but that I and all others doe acknowledge our selves to be lesse prudent though we find our selves more learned then some others well then that doubt he raiseth was but a fancy of his own and had no foundation upon any ground of reason or experience and therefore what he builds upon it must needs fall of its self where I leave it and step to the consideration of other inferences which he introduceth the
world without a Law and a common Power over him and others the Law is that writ in their hearts and this is it which St. Paul speake's Rom. 2.15 Which shewe's the law written in their hearts that law of Nature that practique law which is writ in the heart of every man and this common Power is GOD and therefore as St. Paul speakes there their Conscience also bearing witness and their thoughts the mean while accusing or excusing one another where there is evidence accusing excusing there is supposed a common Power so that there is a Common Power and this secretly acknowledged by men and that he hath given them certain lawes for the breach of which there is a horror and dread insomuch as a man cannot live or it is a prodigie to see a man without all Conscience of the principal and fundamentall rules of reason although men may doe and act against those Lawes yet untill a long custom of living have hardned their hearts or some such wicked principles as his have by degrees stollen an approbation in their their understandings by degrees I say for I think it not possible to be done in an instant untill then it is not pospossible for men to sin against these without an accusation of their Consciences He proceed's Sect. 8. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal vertues In a war actually waged force is of great use and may well be called one of the best hinges upon which war is moved yea if we take force not for strength but violence as I think he doth but in the posture of war or in war only in expectation violence is the chiefe support of all injustice but certainly it is most improperly called a vertue in any but a most forced and violent way for vertues are those things which perfect the soule which make the work and worker good but no force doth that neither doth it assist in doing but it is indifferent to good or bad then againe force even in war may be a help to increase the wickednesse of it if the war be unjust it is doubly evill which is fortified with force If the acts of that war be cruell it is doubly bloudy which is effected by force And then for fraud although stratagems are lawfull yet falshood in war is wicked which is comprehended under that notion of fraud as to promise one thing and doe another all Stratagems have a double sense by which the enemy deceive's himself taking the visard from the true face but they having a true face discernable are not all visards and forces where there is no war engaged in but only some private end or design of one man against another they are in themselves wicked and provoke the just vengeance of a war from the injured party upon them He should have said valour and prudence were cardinal vertues in war but force and fraud are these degenerated and when they get these names of force and fraud they never retaine that excellent nature of being Vertues Sect. 9. He urgeth further Iustice and Injustice saith he are none of the faculties neither of the body nor the mind I think if he take Faculty as he seem's to doe for an innate quality no man ever said they were therefore his proof is needlesse when he come's on if they were they might be in a man that were alone in the world as well as his Senses and Passions although they are not innate faculties but acquisite habits I meane the vertue justice or the vice injustice yet the habits may be when they are acquired with that man who is alone and when he is alone though to act accordingly require's a present Object now denominations are given from the habits not the acts He proceed's They are qualities that relate to men in society not in solitude our dispute is of a third sort of men neither in such Society as a civill policy nor a Solitude but men without all relations of being under one common sublunary governance and yet men cohabiting in the same neighbourhood where may be perpetrated those horrid and unjust actions of Murder and Theevery c. And again although the acts of Justice doe suppose other men to doe justice upon yet it is other men not other men in the same City or polities and when by the use of those acts a habite is got it remaine's in Solitude Sect. 10. He draw's another Conclusion Hence thus it is consequent also to the same Condition that there be no propriety no dominion no mine and thine distinct but only that to be every mans that he can get and for so long as he can keep it The wickednesse of this Proposition will best appeare betwixt two States two neighbour Nations they certainly have distinct Dominions and it is injustice for one to take by force from the other or detaine by force what he hath gotten ill which is against all the consent of men from the beginning of the world now these two Nations are without any other coercive power in this world and from that reason are justly paralleld by him to such men as he formerly spake of and therefore these Nations should have no propriety as he explaines himself not in any thing Consider therefore Gen. 12. and the 20. Chap. How in two places Abraham's wife Sarah was like to have been taken from him by the Kings of those Nations where he lived but God punished them for it and they acknowledged it would have been a great sin to have layne with another mans wife Mr. Hobbes would have pleaded with God there is no propriety in any thing All men have title to all things where is no coercive power upon earth there is no injustice the woman is any mans who can get her by fraud or force so long as he can keep her they who have no common power above them as these had not to make Lawes which might appropriate interests to particular persons these are bound to no law nor have any propriety but such as force gives them and then both Abimelek and Pharaoh or other of them might lawfully have kept Sarah Abrahams wife from him but the Principles of the law of Nature say it was unjust and they did not doe it Thus it fared concerning the propriety of Wives now we will examine what propriety men had in Estates where was no such humane authority without doubt the first that ever gave outward Lawes to governe a Nation by was Moses and I conceive the Decalogue to be like our Magna Charta which was not a new law but a briefe and pithy expression of what was the old law by which this people was governed so were the Ten Commandements not a new law but an expression in tables of that morall law of nature which was writ in the heart of men before and practised before his time in particular this of Stealing which injured the possessor of Meum tuum
another of generall obedience in all things should have power to oblige him to breake the Law of Nature upon such a man's command and then it is most wicked First it is sinfull to make such a Covenant and it is doubly wicked to keep it for when a man make's such a bargaine it is supposed to be in licitis et honestis in lawfull and honest things not against the Law of Nature yea should a man in expresse termes Covenant or bargaine in particular to doe this individual thing which is unlawful he were bound to repent and not to doe it his reason he give 's for the Conclusion is not strong enough to enforce it which is Sect. 9. For though the Action be against the Law of Nature yet it is not his but contrarily to refuse to doe it is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant This answer consist's of two parts I shall examine them distinctly First he saith it is not his that is his that doth it he put 's these relative termes very doubtfully to this I reply if it be not his he is not responsible for not doing of it for no mâ—n can be responsible for that which belong's not to him for any act but what is his own that which he hath not power and Authority to doe his doing is not vertuous nor his not doing viticus so that the first part of his answer destroye's the second which make's the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature when he hath covenanted to doe it but certainly those actions are the actors owne acts and he shall answer for them be blessed or cursed for them and because a man owe's obedience to God onely and to men onely for God's sake therefore whatsoever any man shall command contrary to Gods Law written in the Bible or the nature of man is a sin against God and disobedience to men commanding against the Law of God is true obedience with God See one Instance in the first of Exodus begin the Story at the fifteenth verse you shall find Pharaoh commanding the Hebrew Midwives that they should destroy â—he Male Children of the Hebrews it is said in the 17 verse the Midwives feared God and did not as the King of Egypt commanded and in the 21. verse it is said because the Midwives feared God that God made them houses that is blessed them here it is evident that when a Command was given to act that horrid sin of murder which is against the Law of Nature God blessed those persons who feared God more then men and would not be actors in that which was against the Law of Nature to destroy innocent Children nor can Mr. Hobbes have any evasion to say they had not covenanted to doe this act for it is exceeding probable that when Pharaoh commanded them to doe it he would not have dismissed them without a promise as it is reasonable to think when he convented them and charged them with their fault they would have excused themselves with saying they did not promise but besides this Mr. Hobbes a little after this which I intend to treat teacheth that every Subject make's a Covenant with Leviathan to owne his actions and obey him now then although there were no other Covenant these Midwives living under that Government where Leviathan Pharaoh commanded it they had covenanted to obey him yet God blessed them because they did not So that it seeme's their actions were their own for which God blessed them though contrary to the command of Pharaoh Sect. 10. The second part of his answeare is this But contrarily to refuse to doe it that is what is commanded is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Covenant It is true that the breach of Covenant considered in its self is against the Law of Nature for a man by Covenant give 's away his liberty of using or acting that thing for which he covenanted otherwise then by his Covenant but consider now if a man that hath alienated away formerly his right to an estate or had no right to it should make a deed of that estate to another man such an act could be of no benefit to that other This is that man's case who shall Covenant to act against the Law of God written in books or hearts he cannot covenant to doe it it is voyd ipso facto it is God's due and he cannot alien it and what he shall act according to such a Covenant is wicked the very pretence to have power to doe it is a Conspiracy against God and his right of Dominion over us so that there can be no breach of such a Covenant which had no right to tye or bind any man that Conclusion therefore was a great mistake of Mr. Hobbes and is justly censured here because conducing to other ill Consequences hereafter Sect. 11. In the 82. page having discoursed of many things which may and may not be personated towards the midst of that page he saith that the true God may be personated This phrase gave me an amazement for I cannot call to mind any such expression made either in Scripture or Orthodox ecclesiasticall writers and understanding personating in that sense that Mr. Hobbes doth to say the Actor is the person it was too boldly affirmed by him I think without any ground had he spoke of the true God as he did before of Idols to say man might be trusted for those Gods in things which are dedicated to pious uses and so in the place of God receive and dispose such Legacies and in that sense say they personate God quoad haec thus farre there might have been some excuse but to say that the true God may be personated by any thing which is not God was too great an exaltation of the Creature and diminution of his excellency but yet thus he doth as appear's by his Instance as he was first by Moses who governed the Israelites that were not his but Gods people not in his own name with hoc dicit Moses but in Gods name with hoc dicit Dominus first by Moses I am perswaded he can never shew me that the true God was ever personated by Moses A man may be instead of God in divers Offices to the poor are in the room of God instead of his hands receive in God's stead those Almes which for Gods sake are given them Kings and those which are in Authority are in God's stead to govern and rule us and therefore we make conscience of obedience to them because for this purpose they are ordained of God Priests are loco Dei in the place of God in Sacris holy Duties so that they open or shut the gates of heaven absolve and bind mâ—n and he that despiseth them in those holy dispensations despiseth Christ himself but none of these can be say'd to personate God nor can any Creature doe it he who personate's God must
this Text is utterly false which saith that this Life was onely known to God when for ought I find the Philosophers many of them apprehended it much better then they because they conceived the immortality of the Soule and that the Soul coming from God must needs go to him and receive according to its works in this flesh when they the Socinians conceive the Soul of man like a beast's to return to nothing of its self but its corrupted principles where Philosophers apprehended the Soul to return to its incorruptible principle God so that the text meane's thus much that the life which was with God as in the fountaine of it was by our most blessed Saviour revealed to men in such a way as might most clearly manifest him to the meanest Capacity by faith Socinus hath another Text which he would have to serve this illustration but I find it not mentioned by his followers as not of force to clear this exposition Sect. 16. This is Luke 2. and the last Jesus increased in Wisdome and Age so he but better Stature as we and grace with God and men that is in Dei conspectu the Strength of this comparison lye's in this Word with which is not the same with what was so rendred in St. John that was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but I stand not upon this the very Sense be it what it will will overthrow his exposition for I must not run away to other extravagancies for he could not grow in Wisdome Stature or grace in conspectu Dei which is his gloss unlesse he were so re and indeed and therefore whatsoever is the sense of these Words which perhaps an other occasion may give me opportunity to expound his exposition cannot be true and so I passe from his illustrations of this phrase by Scripture which I can observe in any of them and returne to my Text. Sect. 17. The word was with God that is saith he was known to God and God onely before the preaching of John Baptist thus Smalcius likewise and Valkelius what concerne's Angels in this exclusive word Soli I have already touched as likewise how he did falsify Socinus to say he did not use it but they are all peremptory that no man knew he was the word before the preaching of the Baptist but then being pinched by Smiglecius with an objection that he was known to the Shepheards to the wise men to Anna and Simeon he answer's in his 26. chap. to the third part of Smig page 234. thus that he was known to God not onely that he was but his quality that he was the word that before the preaching of John Baptist he was known to neither Men nor Angels they knew him that he should be the deliverer of Gods people from the hands of their earthly enemies but not to be the word some knew that he should deliver his people from their Sins but this word they knew not Well let my Text confute all this which saith the word was with God in the beginning therefore he was then the word if they fly to God's fore-knowledge in his decree as I have said it could not be affirmed of him that he was with God but should hereafter be with him then secondly that he should be the word in their sense is no more but that he should manifest the will of God concerning mens Salvation his Gospel-will and that was known before I know not how Smiglecius pressed his Argument whether in those general terms which Smalcius produceth or particular but to this very distinction of his I shall presse old Simeon's nunc dimittis Luke 2.32 where our Saviour is said to be a light to lighten the Gentiles now let any man imagine how he should be this light but by revealing this will of God to them for my part I can conceive no other and yet this is the whole matter which they make to be expressed by this Term word for although the Term its self be not expressed yet it is cleaâ—ly implyed in that the whole sense of it is either a Metaphor or a Metonymie is evident to this I could adde that the Prophets foresaw this so Isaiah 60.3 The Gentiles shall come to thy light that is the light which his Sermons his miracles did give and that evidence of God's will for our Salvation which he did hold forth this is enough to shew that the Socinians were over-seen in saying that according to their sense no man foresaw that our Saviour should be the word as well as in saying that God did know him to be such when he was not such that is before the preaching of the Baptist and to conclude I have no more to do with this phrase concerning their objections but set down the true meaning of them which is thus The Word which I have shewed was in the beginning the internall Word was with God it would not else indeed be from him for being an internall effect of his understanding it proceeded not inâ—o any externall existence but remained there eternally in Sinu Patris in the bosome of the Father but lest any man should doubt that this word might be some accident of another nature then God was the Text adde's the word was God Sect. 18. What the Word is in their Sense what in ours is apparent now it remaine's whether in theirs or ours it may be most truly said that the word was God in their sense it is that he who declare's the will of God for the Salvation of men is God though he be a man according to his nature yet he is a God according to his Office nor will I do them that injury to say they affirme him God onely in regard of this one particular of revealing the will of God but they say that planè Divâ—na Virtus in illo relucebat So Socinus in his defense of his Animadversions contra Pasnonienses in assertionem primam cap. 4. pag. 74. edit Racov. 1618. So that the effect of their saying is that Christ who was this word was a Creature endowed with divine excellencies But we say that this Word which is a reall Word was God in its nature by being the naturall Son of the Father as my Text he was God Sect. 19. Their exposition of this Text is thus that this Term God is not a proper name to that infinite excellency which created and governe's Heaven and Earth but an Appellative or name of Office and Authority not a name signifying any essence or person so Socinus upon these Words and his Followers but yet he grant's that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it is often applyed to the great God of all he saith it is often given to Angels and Men he seeme's much to delight in that place John 10.34 It is written in your Law I have said ye are Gods ver 35. if he call them Gods unto whom the word of God came c. this he
dispositions so that although there be none of these things interdicted and forbidden the use of them in themselves yet by God that made them and us many of these things being hurtfull to many men the use of them is forbid to such That which he adde's neque ex parte creaturarum c. neither out of the creatures part is there any morall contradiction is not true there is a morall contradiction because many of these things are hurtfull to many men therefore it is a morall contradiction to say they should rightly be judged useful and my first disproportion mentioned the quantity of the creatures enlargeth the contradiction when the vessel will hold but a Pint it is a contradiction to say I will put in a Quarâ— into it when the narrow compass of any particular man's thoughts can make use of but a few things to say that it shall make use of all is a contradiction out of the vast quantity of the creature in respect of the narrowness of our abilities Sect. 7. He urgeth another Argument thus Unless this judgment by that reason instituted be right there can be given no rule according to which a judgment may be instituted of things which the Lord God hath granted man to use or what these things are which he hath withdrawn from his use I answer many wayes according to the condition of the place wherein â—e live's if in a desart unappropriated to any man God hath given him right to use any thing he meet 's with for his accommodation if he live's in a Polity God hath given him right to all such things as the Laws of the Nation entitle him to His third and last Argument for this cause is framed at the bottom of pag. 99. Aut omnes creaturae Either all creaâ—ures are granted to man's use or none I will stop here all creatures are granted to man's use but not to this particular man but to manâ—ind which that word man will involve now he was to prove that they were useful to every particular but he prove's his conclusion for saith he if it be lawful for me to mine own use to destroy any fit meat and natural form why not all if it shall be expedient I answer him first posito quolibet sequitur quidlâ—bet that if it may be expedient is an impossible supposal it cannot be expedient for any single man to destroy this world I answer secondly that it is a fallacy à bene divisiâ— ad malè conjuncta the instances before of meat and drink do evince this conclusion take another I am â—o ride a journey my friend offer 's me five or six horses give 's me power to use any one I can use but one they are all every one such as I have a right unto but cannot use more then one I had right to each singular horse but not to all We may conceive it just so with any particular man Suppose we should grant that God in his journey to heaven allow's man any creature in the world yet because he cannot make use of all he cannot say that he hath right to all conjunctim And then lastly I say as before if a man live in a Polity God hath given him use of such things onely which the Law of the Polity entitle's him unto if in a desart he hath granted him whatsoever he can gain to his use Thus I think his first discourse is clearly enough answered wherein I observe he is a true follower of Mr. Hobbes not in his conclusions onely but his way of proving them by most fallacious Arguments So saith he it is proved that out of the creatures part there is no obstacle in them but that a man may use singulis omnibus every single and all of them This he think 's he hath proved how weakly I have shewed Sect. 8. He go's on next to shew that there is no repugnance out of the part of my neighbour I will wait upon that with which he begin's this pag. 100. This we have proved saith he that man hath right to the use and possession of all things which lack reason I answer man hath but no particular man But saith he since my neighbour is constituted in the same dignity which God would have me sustain is his word he ought to enjoy the same privilege which I do therefore to him should belong a like and equal right â—ver all creatures neither out of the respect of the creatures is one part allotted to him another to me This seem's by him to be an introduction to what follow 's but indeed contain's a main Argument against him for two much less two millions of men particular men cannot have a right to the same thing Therefore saith he we must seek somewhere else to find what portion is allotted to him what to me and then saith he let the adversaries turn which way they will they must confess that the distinction of these creatures ariseth onely out of Covenant this pag. 101. and this saith he they do sufficiently declare who teach that in extreme necessity the ancient right doth revive and the use of those things is made lawful which they by Covenant had disposed away before Thus far he The case which he speak's of may be thus put A man ready to starve for want of food or clothes take's a piece of bread or meat or a warm garment which belong's to another man to supply his extremity here say his Authors in this extremity his right to these things revived therefore saith this Writer he had right to all creatures before or else his instance is weak I answer the consequence is very infirm he may have right to such parcels of the world yet not to all he who hath right to little pieces in a field hath not right to the whole I have shâ—wed in my former piece which I now defend that no right but by some Law the Law of humanity give 's him right to this by which we may and ought to suppose that men should do as they would be done unto and when necessity compell's a man to such an extremity he need not stay to ask for it which in that necessity he cannot do but take that leave which humane nature give 's one to another and by which he is entiteled to those poor fragments but what hath this to do with the universe to the partition of which neither he nor any man living conferr'd to divide Sest 9. Another instance he give 's in a dissolved Common-wealth where the Magistrate can no longer use his authority there it is lawful for men to invade their neighbour's goods so they have an honest intention to deliver them when he and the Commonwealth are restored I put down the sense of his words onely for brevitie's sake and answer That it is not true that it is lawful to take any neighbour's goods in such a case unless he have deserted them
it self This seeming saith he to the eye consisteth in light or colour figured if so then say I it is true that light or colour figured is sight for when we say a thing consists in any thing we mean to expresse its nature but to say that sight is light or colour figured or that light and colour figured is sight is as much as â—o say the understanding is a horse or a horse the understanding or understanding consists in a horse because it is busied about it It is true understanding of a horse doth require the being of a horse or else it could not understand it and sight doth require light or colour figured but it cannot be said to consist in it but as an object He proceeds All qualities called sensible are in the object that causeth them but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our Organs diversly I will let passe this because I shall have full occasion to speak of it in the second part concerning his Element of Policy He goes on neither in us are they any thing but divers motions for motion produceth nothing but motion but their appearance to us is fancy the same waking or dreaming Here is an Aphorisme as if it were undeniable but without any proof or reason of it to be received by the Reader without examining for his authority the Axiome is That motion begets nothing but motion a speech far from all truth in Philosophy for were it not that there is an aim at quiet there would scarce be any motion Finis belli Pax the end to which and the end for which it is but to say it produceth nothing but motion is against all the experience in the world for although in some and most motions it may be said that the effect is not produced by the power of the motion but the vertue of that Agent which operates by motion and whose instrument that motion is yet that way that motion doth produce any thing all things are produced by motion Substances Men Beasts Trees Accidents Colours Quantities Places all whatsoever but all these things are not motions yea this last which is Place and in which motions and the effects of motions are most sensibly discovered is so far from being motion that in our sublunary places there can be no motion in them but onely motions to them nor can they themselves be locally moved for the place of every thing is the Ambient Superficies Now that with us is either of Aire or Water and if a man stir in any place he acquires a new place and alters the old so that in that place he stirs not and you cannot remove the Ambient Aire or Water but it alters his condition so that unlesse he conceive that all things are motion it cannot be true that motion begets nothing but motion for motion produceth all sublunary things When he writ his Leviathan there was motion but this Leviathan I hope is not motion it may perhaps in needlesse Readers cause motion and commotion but certainly it lies still under my paper at this time and will do all this night This is the strangest Proposition that ever was obtruded upon men but I desist from it at this instant perhaps to enlarge hereafter although I think this abundantly enough Where he addes that their appearance to us is fancy I deny it but that act which discerns the appearance may in some sense be called fancy I grant What he addes afterwards concerning the pressure of the eye c. I refer to another place but mean not to lose it At the latter end he censures all the Philosophy Schooles throughout Christendom but he is not so severe against them as to wish them an utter extirpation he will hereafter reserve a room and office for them in the Commonwealth but he lets us see by the way what things when he is made Visitor General of all Christendom would be amended In the mean time I shall shew this use of Universities that there may be alwayes a certain company of learned men in all Professions by whom as by a Standard all dangerous Doctrines may be tryed whether they be Orthodox or useful to the Commonwealth or no which censure I am confident his Leviathan will never abide And now I will examine this same businesse of Sense as it is set down more at large in the second Chapter of his Humane Nature Chapter 2. censures the 2. Chapter of Humane Nature CHAP. II. Concerning the object of Sight Colour Image or Species c. Sect. 1. UPon which my first observation is that although in the head or contents of this Chapter there is put the definition of sense to the 2. number yet in that 2. number nor elsewhere in that Chapter is there any definition of Sense but in that number onely some little discourse of the outward cause of Sense wrought by the object which is most illogically done and for lack of defining he disputes most perplexedly every where I will not trouble the Reader with censuring every line but because that which is material in this Chapter consists in four propositions which he undertakes to prove I will content my self with an enquiry into them 1. The first is that the subject wherein colour and Image are inherent is not the object of things seen This he proves because numb 5. every man hath so much experience as to have seen the Sun or other visible objects by reflexion in the water and the Glasses and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion that colour and Image may be there where the thing seen is not I stop here and will first examine the proposition it self which is proposed with much deceit for he saith The subject wherein colour and Image are inherent is not the object He should have proved first that colour and Image are the same which he knows is denyed by all his adversaries colour is in the object of Sight but there is no need of the Image where the substance is nor can the Image of colour be in the same subject with the colour Sect. 2. This uniting such things as are in their nature distinct breeds a mighty confusion in the discourse and so dazzles a weak sight that it can hardly discern betwixt them I say then that colour is in the object but Image is not Next I come to his proof the appearance of the Sun by reflexion by which he would have proved that colour and Image are not in the object but it doth not prove that the colour is not in the object but onely the Image for the colour remains in the object when the Image and likeness is gone abroad Sect. 3. But he urgeth again that divers times men see the same object double as two candles for one which may happen by distemper or otherwise without distemper if a man will the organs being either in their right temper or equally distempered Not to