morte immort Ferrariens Philippus Faber Collegium Complut others especially Albertinus Tom. 1. Corol. Alexander Valignanus apud Possevinum Tom. 1. Biblioth Select Thomas Carmelita l. 11. c. 12. de conversione Gentium Bagotius tom 2. Instit d. 4. Menasseh Ben Israel de Resurr Mortuorum à c. 8. Zanchy de oper Creat l. 2. c. 8. Fromundus l. 4. de Anima Carleton in Philosophia tract de Anima q. 10. Morisanus in Philosophia tract de Anima Quaest 5. Petrus Gassendus tom 1. de Philosophia Epicuri where he musters up all the objections made by Lucretius and confutes them all which men of Learning did not only hold the reasonable Soul to be an immortall substance but also that thus much might be proved of it by naturall reason Thom. Campanella in his Metaph. very copiously This high preeminence in the Soul of immortality we trace out chiefly by the operations of it as by so many steps which lead unto the knowledge thereof because according to the rule in Philosophy sicut se habet res ad esse sic ad operari sicut ad operari sic ad esse By the nature of any thing we may search out the operations and again by the operations the nature One of the chief operations of the soul is the act of understanding by the indication of which we learn it to be immateriall and again by the being so not to be corruptible or dissolvable by any naturall agent or which is all one to be immortall These acts or operations intellectuall do by three wayes prove the immortality First because they simply are intellectuall Secondly because they terminate upon objects spirituall and are apprehensive of them Thirdly because they fall even upon materiall objects after a manner immateriall First according to Aquin. 1. p. q. 14. a. 1. Valentia ibid. Raynaud Nat. Theol. d. 2. q. 2. a. 3. Aquin. l. 10. con Gent. c. 44. and others no power or substance that is not devoid of matter can be intellectuall nor again any object directly and immediately intelligible which is not also immateriall the reason is because corporeity or matter darkens the power and confines it to singularities The words of Petrus de Aquila called Scotellus 1. Sent. dist 35. q. 1. are very pertinent and these By how much saith he any thing is freed from matter by so much is it both objectively and also actively intelligible because according to Avicenna and Aristotle Immateriality is the cause of Intellection But God is the most remote from matter and therefore is the most of all intellective Wherefore since matter and corporeity are over-grosse to admit of intellection and that the soul of man is intellective it can be neither materiall nor corporeall but contrariwise of nature elevated above matter that is to say spirituall and incorruptible Secondly The soul doth not onely understand mean objects but the highest and the purest of all that is to say all objects spirituall and God himself I grant to Aureolus that the object and the power need not be alike in nature and therefore it is no formall consequence that because the object is spirituall therefore the power must be so but yet neverthelesse the materiall consequence is very good because it is wholly necessary that the power intellective should be free from all those impediments of understanding whether like or unlike which are situate within the sphere of the object or without it and that moreover as Pet. Aureolus 2. Sent. dist 19. himself confesses there ought to be some resemblance or proportion between the object and the power at least quoad rationem cognoscentis cognoscibilis but between a materiall power and a spirituall object there is none First because the power is too low and gross Secondly because a spirituall entity is situate without the sphere or compasse of the object as for example an Angell is quite without the compasse of any eye corporeall because he is such an object as is not visible but intelligible onely that is to say perceptible onely by a power that is higher then any sense and properly intellective which the eye is not because materiall and a spirit is therefore imperceptible to our sight and beyond the lines of the object because the object of the sight is colour figure magnitude c. none of which are in a spirit And though as Arriaga teacheth in some kinde a corporeall agent may act upon a spirit for a body united to a soul as it is in man according as it is severally disposed may transmit something upon the soul cause alterations in it contristate or rejoice it yet neverthelesse can it not do any thing by way of vision because the soul hath nothing in it wherewith to terminate the sight in which case it must be wholly invisible even although it were no spirit but some other kind of entity as namely a sound is which though it partake of materiality yet is it invisible and therefore imperceptible by the eye though not by another sense For this cause it seems improbable that any corporeal eye can be enabled to see the Deity by means of any elevation or sublevation whatsoever contrary to the opinion of a late learned Grecian Leo Allatius l. de consen Eccl. Occid Orient As then one reason why an eye corporeall cannot see a spirit is because the organ of vision is corporeall so on the other side one reason why a soul may be sensible of a spirit is because the soul is spirituall and thereby prepared to receive an impression from it and also is conformably to the object a power intellective as the same object is intelligible I said before that a sound cannot be seen but I add now that it may be seen easier then any spirit can because a sound is material and therefore one degree nearer to visibility then a spirit and for this cause needing no intellective faculty to apprehend it as every spirit doth so that against the eyes seeing of a spirit there be two impediments whereas against the seeing of a sound there is but one Out of all this I deduce that if the Object be spirituall the Faculty perceiving must be no lesse Thirdly the soul doth not entertain materiall objects after a material manner but contrariwise after a manner immateriall for it abstracts them from the dross of matter the grossnesse of singularity Now it is a certainty that Vnumquodque recipitur secundū modum recipientis Every thing is received according to the form of the recipient not according to the own wherefore seeing the manner of being is correspondent to the manner of operation seeing again that the manner of the souls operation even upon things materiall is immateriall therefore the manner of being of it must be also immateriall The impression declares the figure of the seal If then the souls impression upon material objects be spirituall the soul it self is also spirituall The understanding
the reprehender with greater force then it can be cast upon them by him or any man Now although it be a thing not evident that the spirits seeming to appear are really the souls of such or such deceased persons yet have we no reason to think otherwise but if that they are their good or evill Angells which by divine appointment do act in their behalf and likenesse yet even by that it will appear that those souls are still alive for God himself did often appear by such deputies and manifest himself to Moyses and Abraham by the apparition of his Angels But yet it is a thing no lesse reasonable to judge that they are humane spirits that make an apparition in themselves or at the least in their deputies then to judge that they are spirits Wherefore whoso question 's whether these appearing spirits be souls or no but rather deluding Devils putting on their likenesse may as well doubt whether on the contrary side those same Devils be really Devils and not the souls of men or again whether those living men whom our eyes daily do behold be really men or rather not some delusive apparitions I would fain learn why men contrary to the doctrine of Aristotle Epicurus should distrust their senses in judging every thing to be the same it seems unlesse they see some urgent reason to the contrary Surely in behalf of such apparitions there may be just reasons given because it is not unlikely that souls which had so much dealing in the world during the time of their habitation in the body and contracted so many obligations of justice might after death have something remaining here for them to rectifie and to give notice of unto the living whom it doth concern Besides say that they who appeared were Devils and not souls yet this alone would argue immortality for to Doggs and Horses or such like who have no relation to a future life neither Devils nor souls doe appear neither were it to any purpose that they should I add that if no returnes of souls were to be admitted but that being once gone from hence they were never to be heard of more many men would be afraid that indeed our soules were nothing but a breath or a slender exhalation which after it was once dissipated was never again to be drawn together and consequently that all the reasons brought for immortality were but sophisticall and found out to flatter us in that opinion for so indeed it fell out with Epicurean and wicked men who pleased themselves with Nō est agnitus qui sit reversus ab inferis There was never any known to have returned from the Dead which is as much as to say There were never any Ghosts or souls of men that did appear unto the living after death In the first Edition of this small Tract this argument of Apparitions brought up the rear but it pleased the Censurer of it in Oxford to dash it quite out though for what reason I do not know If it were because he counted all the narrations of apparitions to be fabulous he must give us leave to preferre before him so many faithfull witnesses who have avowed them Again although he esteemed them fabulous yet seeing all men of judgement did not so he might have left the argument to go as farre as it might and every reader to censure of it as he should see cause and not thus to impose laws upon other mens understandings and presume to put down his judgement as a rule to others But contrariwise if he scraped out this argument for fear such stories of apparitions might lead the way to some doctrines which he himself was not willing to admit this his way of proceeding I must tell him seems to me to relish more of craft then ingenuity and also to be so farre from reasonable as he who uses it may justly be compared to him who after a preposterous manner would deny the Premises therefore onely because he did not like the Conclusion or to an evil Astronomer who will not frame his Hypotheses according to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or celestiall apparences but contrariwise correct his apparences according to his Hypotheses Wherefore our Censurer by this course of his seemed desirous to maintain what he did hold already to be true or false rather then to correct his errours and to take right information for beating out the truth We do acknowledge that the Law the Prophets and the Gospell well understood are sufficient to instruct us and again that for our ordinary intelligence and concernments we are not to expect messengers from the dead yet this will not inforce us to discredit all the testimonies of apparitions which time hath left us or to say that in all occasions they are fruitlesse for as Tostatus reasoneth although they would do no good upon the kindred of Dives which as it seems was hard-hearted yet they might upon others and again although they did not conferre to any living mans conversion and salvation yet they might rectifie some injustices and errours committed by the dead and this for the most part is the errand for which they pretend to come as Tyraeus and other writers teach us and of this Tostatus q. 89. in c. 16. Matth. and q. 54. in c. 17. recites an example happening in his own time and also teaches that at the transfiguration the soul of Moyses appeared upon mount Tabor CHAP. VIII The Catabaptists errour about the sleeping of Souls related and refuted HAving examined our Adversaries chief arguments brought by him for proving the soul's dying and mortality it remains that we take into consideration another errour one of no small affinity with this yea and in effect all one with it namely the sleeping of soules and their being in a state insensible from the first instant of their separation from their bodies untill the generall resurrection Such as maintain this errour not daring as Zanchius l. 2. de oper creat c. 8. notech openly to deny the immortality of mens souls because it seemed over plainly contradictory to the holy Scripture and to the judgements also of the gravest and wifest Philosophers and Divines do therefore deprive them of all sense knowledge or any other vitall operation and lay them to sleep untill the judgement day in which they are to be reunited to their bodies which time is to be the first of their awaking But indeed if this tenet of theirs be viewed diligently we shall finde that this pretended sleep is nothing else but a direct death and onely different in the name and the reason is because for a spirit to be destitute of all vitall and intellectuall operation is nothing else but to be dead seeing that life is nothing else in the soul besides the perpetuall motion or action of it Wherefore in consideration and acknowledgement of this incessant activity Cicero and others delivered that the souls of men were made of fire celestiall and unextinguible borrowed
in proportion to these we are to think that the degree of reason though never so imperfect is essentially distinct from that of sense though never so perfect and is superiour unto it As then it would be no small absurdity for us to confound the confining degrees of life and no life sense and vegetation so also would it be to confound sense and reason and to allow between them a difference no greater then accidentall secundum magis minus Secondly the same appeareth by the different objects of either faculty Reason for example is sensible of religion of spirits of future times of shame of compassion but Brutes have no sense at all of these no feeling of them neither more nor lesse neither perfect nor imperfect But if the degrees of sense and reason differed onely accidentally that is to say according to greater or lesse graduall perfection and no more then would it follow that whatsoever reason apprehends perfectly sense also would apprehend at least imperfectly in one degree or other which seeing sense does not we may safely inferre from thence that reason is essentially different from sense and again that sense is not an imperfect reason but contrariwise no reason at all perfect nor imperfect Again we see that Reason bridles Sense and like a shoar confines it and therefore Reason and Sense are no more one thing then the Bridle and the Horse or then the Shoar and the Ocean Of which point more may be seen in Aquinas his Commentatour Ferrariensis l. 2. cont Gentes c. 66. Thirdly the same also doth appear out of the contrariety and disagreement which we daily do experience betwixt the two judgements of reason and sense as also between the two appetites sensuall and rationall and the great repugnancy we find between them throughout our whole life and by the great businesse and sharp conflicts which are caused thereby much to our cost and labour The opposition betwixt the indication of sense and the judgement of reason is evident because the sense for example judgeth the sunnes diameter to be but a span reason here opposeth and concludeth it to be much greater then the diameter of the whole earth Infinite other examples might be given but this one may suffice for all The disagreement of the two appetites and how they draw severall waies and torture the heart of man is evident First by every mans experience Secondly by the suffrages of the Genes Ovid brings in Medaea complaining tragically in these words Metamorph. l. 17. Aliudque cupido Mens aliud suadet Video melioraproboque Deteriora sequor A new-felt force my striving powers invades Affection this discretion that perswades I see the better and approve it too The worse I follow Seneca in Hippolyto accords Quae memoras scio Vera esse Nutrix sed furor cogit sequi c. Good Nurse thy counsell I confesse is true But forc'd by fury I the worst pursue The writings of Plato Cicero Seneca Hierocles and other Philosophers abound with the doctrine of making resistance against passions and the unruly appetitions of the body Aristotle l. 1. Ethic. c. ult l. 7. c. 23. The pleasures saith he of the minde be repugnant to those of the body and those actions which delight the minde are praeternaturall to the body So he The same lesson is taught us by the Authour of Pythagoras his life extant in the Bibliotheca of Photius Wherefore saith the Authour we being made up of various faculties do lead a toilsome life and incommodious forasmuch as every other creature is governed by one simple nature but we by severall which natures do draw wayes contrary to one another as namely we are sometimes moved to the better by that within us which is divine but at other fits the portion irrationall being predominant we are overwrought unto the worse But admit say you all this is so yet it proves no peculiar perfection in man above that of other creatures of sense because this same contrariety of appetites is common to him with brute beasts for example it is found in a dogge which having an appetite to a piece of meat dares not touch it for fear of blows lo then here is one appetite of eating and another contrary unto it which is of keeping his bones whole which later being the greater crosses the former and makes him to refrain I answer by denying that here is any contrariety between those two appetites but onely an accidentall inconsistency between the objects of them which hinders him at that time from satisfying of them both no contrariety I say because one of them does not oppose directly or condemne the other for he both likes the meat and likes also the saving of his skinne harmlesse just as a man thievishly disposed likes to steal a horse and likes also the keeping of his person safe from the severity of the laws in which case the dogge and the thief are much at one both of them being disposed like beasts but now with an honest and rationall man it is farre otherwise for as with one appetite he is incited to the stealing of the horse so with another he disapproves it and condemnes it as an act unjust and irrationall and herein consists the difference of these appetites from the former So in fine although the objects of the appetites such as beasts and bestiall men do covet might be consistent as many times they may as for example that a man may both steal a horse which he likes and also escape the law which to do he likes as well yet neverthelesse the rationall appetite would contradict and countermand the theft as an act irrationall and unjust Lastly the Holy Scripture is plentifull in this argument The Spirit saith our Blessed Saviour is willing but the Flesh is weak And his Disciples advise Walk ye in the Spirit and the desires of the flesh you shall not fulfill The spirit coveteth against the flesh and the flesh against the spirit I find in my members a law leading me captive unto sinne I do not that which I will c. Mark 14.38 Gal. 5.17 Rom. 7.22.23 Also Rom. 7.21 I am delighted with the law of God according to the interiour man but in my loins I see another law repugnant to the law of God and captivating me in the law of sinne Yea so apparent was this disagreement as that Galen l. 5. de dogmat Hippoc. thought they could not subsist in one and the same soul and therefore concludes that in man there must be two different souls and into this same errour afterwards fell the Manichees as S. Augustine testifyeth l. de duab Animab l. 1. Retractat c. 9. Which erroneous believers deduced also falsly that there were two first principles or Gods one of them good the other bad that from the good the rationall soul proceeded and from the bad the sensuall from one the appetites of good from the other the desires of evil Pythagoras Aristotle Julianus
of a spirit spiritually might peradventure be ascribed to the virtue or aptitude of the object but the understanding after a spiritual refined manner those objects that be grosse and materiall cannot be referred to any other thing then to the virtue of the faculty it self By this then it appears that in an eye corporeall there is a two-fold repugnancy against the seeing of a spirit viz. one because the power is materiall and therefore not intellective of any object at all spirituall or corporeall the other because every spirituall Entity is without the precincts of the visive faculty Wherefore on the contrary side the eye of the minde by the being in a state able to receive some notions of a spirit and to judge it to be an Entity devoid of matter may upon a two-fold evidence be determined to be spiritual Thus by these severall wayes the action of understanding in the Soul proves the incorruptibility thereof The first is by the being precisely intellective The second because intellective of spirituall entities The third because it understands materiall objects immaterially which act is done by abstracting of which act whether it be confused or distinct we are forthwith to consider more at large The second operation of the understanding is the knowing of spirituall things by abstraction from singularities and materiall objects after a manner immateriall and by penetrating into the quiddities or essences of things for of these conceal'd and hidden entities unto which our senses can have no accesse the soul of man gets some intelligence and attaineth of them notices though not perfect intuitive or comprehensive yet not contemptible or untrue neither are these essences temperatures as Basson and some others fondly and without probability do imagine as is elsewhere to be shewed A third is a reflection upon it self which acts are above the nature of matter as Albertinus Campanella in Phys and others doe suppose for certein Against abstraction some object that it is no perfection but rather an imperfection that manner of knowledge being confused But this objection is inefficacious for supposing the infirmity of humane understanding the force of our understanding things abstractedly is most perfect and distinct and of all other hath the least confusion in it though in such understandings as be above humane and are able with one view to comprehend abstraction is needlesse and no perfection As for humane understandings we finde by experience that the meaner and grosser they are the lesse they can abstract and indeed abstraction in the understanding is a subtle act and like to extraction in Chymistry which takes the purer parts from the faeculent and resolves bodies into their severall native parts which before did lie confused in one heape and mingled together For the preventing of objections we adde that there is a great and manifest difference betwixt a knowledge confused and an abstracted because the former of these two is done by making a commixture of the superiour differences with the inferiour that is to say of the genericall perfections with the specificall and individuall but the later is done by an intentionall or intellectuall separation of one from the other namely by the considering but one yet knowing more then one that is to say both the superiour and inferiour for we do notabstract from what we know not but from what we know so that according to the humane way of understanding this abstraction is not a confused way of knowledge but a distinct not an imperfect but an exquisite because by this the understanding doth as it were anatomize the object either pitching upon severall formalityes as they use to call them or else upon severall connotations to different effects as the Nominalls speak according to the different virtues conteined in the same object An abstractive knowledge makes Genus and Species by the drawing off from matter and singularity a confused does not so but fastens upon the inferiour degrees indistinctly and in grosse As for example a confused view if it perceive a figure or a tree does not distinguish the particulars as not whether it be round or triangular an Elme or an Oake but an abstractive knowledge supposes a particular sense of all for otherwise there could be no abstraction of one from the other Campanella in his Metaphysicks and some other also related by Carleton alias Compton disp 25. would have it that the eye abstracts though but a power materiall then namely when it sees confusedly as when it perceives for example a man but discernes not whether he be Socrates or Plato This objection is prevented already because the sense cannot abstract from what it sees not in particular nor yet draw off from individualls compleat or incompleat Againe the not-knowing of a perfection is not an abstraction from it and therefore the eye seeing colour and not sweetnesse doth not abstract from that sweetnesse as Campanella did imagine it to doe A fourth is the eminency of the acts of understanding which argue a principle nobler and higher than any mortall entity This argument is largely prosecuted by Lessius Mariana and Campanella and before these by Cicero A confirmation hereof is that some acts of humane understanding be inorganicall But Molinaeus in his Summe of Philosophy lately published will not agree to this objecting that it is contrary unto experience because saith he even at that time when the understanding doth abstract most and contemplates objects that be spirituall it makes them as it were materiall ascribing extension both to God and Angels circumscribing them in places and assigning lines and limits to them Againe there is nothing saith he in the understanding which hath not been formerly in the sense Thus objecteth he Our answer is to this Maxime of Philosophie that according to the learned Thom. de Argentina q. 3. Prologi ar 4. it is to be understood with limitation namely that whatsoever is in the understanding hath been formerly in the sense some way at least or other that is to say either immediatly or mediatly in it self or in the cause effect or signe It 's true accidents may enter by themselves into the sense so forward into the understanding but substances whether materiall or immateriall doe not so nor yet things absent in time or place whether they be substances or not Actions and events of ages past also of people absent of verityes supernaturall we know by testimonies as by signes and not by our senses immediatly we know a future Eclipse by the cause the soul of man by the effects and so also doe we know God namely by his word and by his works one as by a signe the other as by an effect neither hath God ever been known unto our senses Secondly we answer that the soul being in the middle region betwixt pure bodies without spirit and pure spirits without body as on the one side it cloathes pure spirits with some corporeall vestures so on the other it doth devest materiall objects of
from the starres and the Poets in relation also to this did feign that Prometheus stole fire from heaven wherewith he gave life to his men of clay which he had made Now fire as we know is an element alwayes in action yea even then when it is raked up in ashes for even then it works both upon the food that maintains it and also on the adjoyning bodies Wherefore no charm no medicine soporiferous can cast the spirit of man into such a dull and deadly heavinesse as it shall not so much as have a feeling of it self nor be awaked by any other voice then that of the last trumpet which shall with a dreadful found call all to judgement and which noise shall be heard even by bodies then which there is nothing more dead or more corrupted nothing farther off from life as having the atomes of which they were composed now all disordered and scattered with the wind and therefore that soul which can be rouzed up by a voice no lower must needs be more then a sleep or laid down to rest Sleep is a thing different from Death though nearly allied unto it as Seneca doth signifie in the Prosopopeia following Et tu somne domitor laborum Pars humanae melier vitae c. Sharp sorrows tamer steep that art Of life humane the choicer part Astrea's off-spring here beneath Faint brother unto pallid Death Consanguineus Lethi Sopor saith another Sleep is Death's kinsman but how near we will not examine and yet so near we are sure as to a spirituall or intellectuall substance they are both one and one of them as destructive of life in it as the other because though they in themselves be things distinct yet sleep is as deadly to the soul as death it self is to the body and can agree as little with it because though sense can rest from action yet reason cannot in regard there is a greater and a more eminent kinde of vivacity in the one then in the other If the Authours of this phantasie would be understood let them declare first what kinde of Entity they take a spirit to be secondly seeing a spirit hath no body to rest nor senses to shut up nor vitall or animall spirits to repair what this sleep of a spirit is I mean how they will define it If they cannot do this then are they bunglers and speak they know not what and therefore not regardable If they say it is a cessation from action and from possibility immediate of action then hath a spirit no life left in it more then a stone or a dead body and so in this case to sleep and to dy signify the same thing though in terms that are different Yet say that they indeed could tell us what kind of thing this sleep should be that same is not enough unlesse besides they do prove it strongly for such extravagancies as this is are not to be admitted without convincing arguments to make them good Let us hear then what their arguments be and let us consider also of what weight CHAP. IX Volkelius his Arguments for this Errour examined and refuted VOlkelius a known man and a most principall Socinian is the stoutest Champion in this attempt therefore let us hear him what he saith Holy men saith he after their change of this present life with death are said in the Scripture not to be any longer Psal 39.14.37.10 Jerem. 21.15 Matth. 2.18 Thren 5.6 and being dead do neither live actually nor understand c. And though the spirits of men return to him that gave them as shall be demonstrated elsewhere yet that those same spirits be persons which do any thing or be sensible or do now enjoy pleasures everlasting is a thing so farre off from being taught us by the holy Scripture as on the contrary side it is easily shewed to be repugnant to them and that also by reasons very evident For Paul affirmeth that if the resurrection of the dead were not to be hoped for a vain thing it were to think of piety or for the Truth 's sake to undergo so manifold calamities and that of all men the Christians would be the most miserable Which assertion of his could not be true of the souls of men without the resurrection were setled in such pleasures and authority as that they did not onely enjoy a good eternall but were also in a state to give assistance unto others because that same felicity of theirs would be so great as scarcely no accession might be made unto it by the resurrection Thus reasoneth Volkelius My answer to the first part is by denying it to be said in Scripture simply and absolutely that souls departed or men departed have no Being at all but onely that they have no being upon the earth in regard that by dying they cease not only to be men any longer of this world but even to be men as before death they had been and this must needs be the true meaning of the places quoted by the Adversary in the Margin and not that other which he pretendeth because it is a thing most evident both in reason and in holy Scripture also that the parts of which men are composed be not annihilated by death without any remnant of Being left them but that they cease onely to be united or to be men in respect of which deficiency alone it might be truely affirmed of men as it is in Scripture that after death they are not in being To the second part I say that although the soul after separation from the body be not a person humane or an entity compleat yet still hath it a stable subsistence and leaveth not to be a substance intellectuall or a spirit Wherefore it doth not follow that because the soul is not a person or a compleat entity after separation that therefore it can have no action but must either sleep or dy The soul be it separated or united is a spirit a spirit is intellective an intellective substance can neither dy nor wholly cease from action as before hath been proved and therefore is not capable either of sleep or slumber or in any danger of being benummed and much lesse of death To the third I answer that the Apostle speaketh there not of Christian souls being miserable but of Christian mens being so and therefore let the souls be never so happy after death yet if there should be no resurrection the men could be never otherwise then miserable yea farre more miserable then any other men because in this life they should be afflicted in a higher degree then others and in the next they should not be at all You will say What matter is it if the men be miserable in this world and never happy in any world so the souls in the next world be made happy In opposition to this I say Yes it is a matter and a very great matter also if we will weigh things rightly for to be miserable in