know and vnderstand new matters Of such a soule is verefied the saying of Hippocrates The going of the soule is the thought of men For there are some who neuer passe out of one contemplation and thinke not that the whole world can discouer another such These haue the propertie of a beast who neuer forsakes the beaten path nor careth to walke through desert and vnhaunted places but only in the high market way and with a guide before him Both these diuersities of wits are ordinarie amongst professors of learning Some others there are of high searching capacities and estranged from the common course of opinions they iudge and entreat of matters with a particular fashion they are franke in deliuering their opinion and tie not themselues to that of any other Some sorts are close moist and very quiet distrusting themselues and relying vpon the iudgement of some graue man whom they follow whose sayings and sentences they repute as sciences and demonstrations and al things contrarying the same they reckon vanitie and leasings These two differences of wits are very profitable if they be vnited for as amongst a great droue of cattell the heardsmen accustome to mingle some dozen of goats to lead them and make them trot apace to enioy new pastures that they may not suffer scarcitie so also it behoueth that in humane learning there be some goat-like wits who may discouer to the cattell like vnderstandings thorow secrets of nature and deliuer vnto them contemplations not heard of wherein they may exercise themselues for after this manner arts take increase and men dayly know more and more CHAP. VI. Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last chapter and their answer ONe of the causes for which the wisdome of Socrates hath bene so famous till this day is for that after he was adiudged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest man of the world he sayd thus I know this only that I know nothing at all which sentence al those that haue seene and read passed it ouer as spoken by Socrates for that he was a man of great humblenesse a despiser of worldly things and one to whome in respect of diuine matters all else seemed of no valure But they verely are beguiled for none of the antient Philosophers possessed the vertue of humilitie nor knew what thing it was vntill God came into the world and taught the same The meaning of Socrates was to giue to vnderstand how little certaintie is contained in humane sciences and how vnsetled and fearfull the vnderstanding of a Philosopher is in that which he knoweth seeing by experience that all is full of doubts and arguments and that we can yeeld assent to nothing without fearing that it may be contrary For it was said The thoughts of men are doubtfull and our foreseeings vncertaine And he who will attaine the true knowledge of things it behooues that he rest setled and quiet without feare or doubt of being deceiued and the Philosopher who is not thus wise grounded may with much truth affirme that he knoweth nothing This same consideration had Galen when he sayd Science is a conuenient and firme notice which neuer departeth from reason therefore thou shalt not find it amongst the Philosophers especially when they consider the nature of things but verely much lesse in matters of Phisicke nay rather to speake all in one word it neuer makes his full arriuall where men are Hereby it seemeth that the true notice of things fails to come this way and to man arriueth only a certaine opinion which makes him to walke vncertaine and with feare whether the matter which he affirmeth be so or no. But that which Galen noteth more particularly touching this is that Philosophie and Phisicke are the most vncertaine of all those wherewith men are to deale And if this be true what shall we say touching the Philosophie wherof we now intreat where with the vnderstanding we make an anotomie of a matter so obscure and difficult as are the powers and faculties of the reasonable soule In which point are offered so many doubts and arguments that there remains no cleare doctrine vpon which we may relie One of which and the principall is that we haue made the Vnderstanding an instrumentall power as the Imagination and the Memorie and haue giuen drinesse to the braine as an instrument with which it may worke a thing far repugnant to the doctrine of Aristotle and all his followers who placing the vnderstanding seuered from the bodily instrument prooue easily the immortalitie of the reasonable soule and that the same issuing out of the body endureth for euer Now the contrarie opinion being disputable the way hereby is stopped vp so that this cannot be prooued Moreouer the reasons on which Aristotle groundeth himselfe to proue that the vnderstanding is not an instrumentall power carrie such efficacie as other than that cannot be concluded For to this power appertaineth the knowing and vnderstanding the nature and being of whatsoeuer materiall things in the world and if the same should be conioined with any bodily thing that selfe would hinder the knowledge of the residue as we see in the outward sences that if the tast be bitter all the things which the tongue toucheth partake the same sauour and if the christalline humour be greene or yellow all that the eye seeth it iudgeth to be of the same colour The reason of this is for that the thing within breeds an impediment to that without Aristotle sayth moreouer That if the vnderstanding were mingled with any bodily instrument it would retaine some qualitie for whatsoeuer vniteth it selfe with heat or cold it is of force that it partake of the same qualitie But to say that the vnderstanding is hot cold moist or drie is to vtter a matter abhominable to the ears of all naturall Philosophers The second principall doubt is that Aristotle and all the Peripateticks bring in two other powers besides the Vnderstanding the Imaginatiō the Memorie namely Remembrance and Common sence grounding vpon that rule That the powers are knowne by way of the actions They sayd That besides the operations of the Vnderstanding the Imagination the Memorie there are also two other different So then the wit of man taketh his originall from fiue powers and not from three only as we did proue We sayd also in the last chapter after the opinion of Galen that the memorie doth none other worke in the braine saue only to preserue the shapes and figures of things in such sort as a chest preserueth and keepeth apparell and what so else is put thereinto And if by such a comparison we are to vnderstand the office of this power it is requisit also to prooue another reasonable facultie which may fetch out the figures from the memorie and represent them to the vnderstanding euen as it is necessarie that there be one to open the chest and to take out what hath bene
moisture and drouth For if fire bring in heate to the wood it is because they both possesse a body a quantitie wherof they are the subiect the which faileth in spirituall substances and admit as a thing yet impossible that bodily qualities might alter a spirituall substance what eies hath the diuell or the reasonable soule wherwith to see the colours and shapes of things or what smelling to receiue sauours or what hearing for musicke or what feeling to rest offended with much heat seeing that for all these bodily instruments are behooffull And if the reasonable soule being seuered from the bodie remaine agreeued and receiue anguish and sadnesse it is not possible that his nature should rest free from alteration or not come to corruption These difficulties and argumentes perplexed Galen and the other Philosophers of our times but with me they conclude nothing For when Aristotle affirmed that the chiefest propertie which substance had was to be subiect to accidents he restrained the same neither to bodily nor to spirituall for the propertie of the generall is equally partaked by the special and so he said that the accidentes of the bodie passe to the substance of the reasonable soule and those of the soule to the body on which principle he grounded himselfe to write all that which he vttered as touching Phisnomy especially that the accidents by which the powers receiue alteration are all spirituall without body and without quantitie or matter and so they grow to multiplie in a moment through their mean and passe through a glasse window without breaking the same And two contrarie accidents may be extended in one selfe subiect asmuch as possibly they can be In respect of which selfe qualitie Galen tearmeth them vndiuidable and the vulgar Philosophers intentionall and the matter being in this sort they may be verie well proportioned with the spirituall substance I cannot forgoe to thinke that the reasonable soule seuered from the body as also the diuell hath a power sightfull smelling hearing and feeling The which me seemeth is easie to be prooued For if it be true that their powers be known by meanes of their actions it is a thing certain that the diuell had a smelling power when he smelled that roote which Salomon commaunded should be applied to the nosthrils of the possessed And likewise that he had a hearing power seeing he heard the musicke which Dauid made to Saul To say then that the diuell receiued these qualities by his vnderstanding it is a matter not auouchable in the doctrine of the vulgar Philosophers For this power is spiritual and the obiects of the fiue senses are material and so it behooueth to seeke out some other powers in the reasonable soule and in the diuell to which they may carrie proportion And if not put case that the soule of the rich Glutton had obtained at the handes of Abraham that the soule of Lazarus should returne to the world to preach to his brethren and persuade them that they should become honest men to the end they might not passe to that place of torments where himselfe abode I demand now in what maner the soule of Lazarus should haue knowen to go to the citie and to those mens houses and if the same had met them by the way in company with others whether it could haue known them by sight and been able to diuersifie them from those who came with them and if those brethren of the rich glutton had inquired of the same who it was and who had sent it whether the same did partake anie power to heare their words The same may be demāded of the diuel when he folowed after Christ our redeemer hearing him to preach seeing the myracles which he did and in that disputation which they had togither in the wildernesse with what eares the diuell receiued the words and the answeres which Christ gaue vnto him Verily it betokens a want of vnderstanding to think that the diuell or the reasonable soule sundered from the bodie cannot know the obiects of the fiue senses albeit they want the bodily instruments For by the same reason I will prooue vnto them that the reasonable soule seuered from the bodie cannot vnderstand imagine nor performe the actions of memorie For if whilest the same abideth in the body it cannot see being depriued of eies neither can it discourse or remember if the braine be inflamed To say then that the reasonable soule seuered from the body cannot discourse because it hath no braine is a follie verie great the which is proued by the selfe history of Abraham Sonne remember that thou hast enioyed good things in thy life time and Lazarus likewise euill but now he is comforted and thou art tormented And besides all this there is placed betwixt you and vs a great Chaos in sort that those who would passe from hence to you cannot nor from you to vs. And he said I pray thee then O father that thou wilt send to my fathers house for I haue fiue brothers that he may yeeld testimony vnto them so as they come not also to this place of tormentes Whence I conclude that as these two soules discoursed betweene themselues and the rich glutton remembred that he had fiue brothers in his fathers house and Abraham brought to his remembrance the delicious life which he had liued in the world togither with Lazarus penance and this without vse of the braine so also the soules can see without bodily eyes heare without eares taste without a tongue smell without nosthrils and touch without sinewes and without flesh and that much better beyond comparison The like may be vnderstoode of the diuell for he partaketh the same nature with the reasonable soule All these doubts the soule of the rich glutton will very well resolue of whom S. Luke recounteth that being in hell he lifted vp his eies and beheld Lazarus who was in Abrahams bosome and with a loud voice sayd Father Abraham haue mercie on me send Lazarus that he may dip the point of his finger in water and coole my tongue for I am tormented in this flame Out of the passed doctrine and out of that which is there red we gather that the fire of hell burneth the soules and is materiall as this of ours and that the same annoied the rich glutton and the other soules by Gods ordinance with his heat and that if Lazarus had carried to him a pitcher of fresh water he should haue taken great refreshment thereof and the reason is verie plaine for if that soule could not endure to abide in the bodie through excessiue heate of the Feuer and when the same dranke fresh water the soule felt refreshment why may not we conceiue the like when the soule is vnited with the flames of the fire infernall The rich Gluttons lifting vp of his eies his thirstie tongue Lazarus finger are all names of the powers of the soule that so the scriptures might expresse them Those who
sences for euery one hath his particular composition the eyes haue one the eares another the smelling another and the feeling another and if it were not so there should be no more but one sort of operations and that should all be seeing tasting or feeling for the instrument determines rules the power for one action and for no more By this so plaine and manifest a matter which passeth through the outward sences we may gather what that is in the inward With this selfe power of the soule we vnderstand imagine and remember But if it be true that euery worke requires a particular instrument it behooueth of necessitie that within the braine there be one instrument for the vnderstanding one for the imagination and another different from them for the memorie for if all the braine were instrumentalized after one selfe manner either the whole should be memorie or the whole vnderstanding or the whole imagination But we see that these are very different operations and therfore it is of force that there be also a varietie in the instruments But if we open by skill and make an anotomie of the braine we shall find the whole compounded after one maner of one kind of substance and alike without parts of other kinds or a different sort onely there appeare foure little hollownesses who if we well marke them haue all one selfe composition and figure without any thing comming betweene which may breed a difference What the vse and profit of these may be and whereto they serue in the head is not easily decideable for Galen and the Anotomists as well new as ancient haue laboured to find out the truth but none of them hath precisely nor in particular expressed whereto the right ventricle serueth nor the left nor that which is placed in the middest of these two nor the fourth whose seat in the braine keepes the hinder part of the head They affirme only though with some doubt that these foure concauities are the shops where the vitall spirits are digested and conuerted into animals so to giue sence and motion to all the parts of the body In which operation Galen sayd once that the middle ventricle was the principall and in another place he vnsayes it againe affirming that the hindermost is of greatest efficacie and valure But this doctrine is not true nor founded on good naturall Philosophie for in all mans body there are not two so contrary operations nor that so much hinder one another as are discoursing and digestion of nourishment and the reason is because contemplation requireth quiet rest and a cleerenesse in the animall spirits and digestion is performed with great stirring and trauaile from this action rise vp many vapours which trouble and darken the animall spirits so as by means of them the reasonable soule cannot discerne the figures And nature was not so vnaduised as in one selfe place to conioine two actions which are performed with so great repugnancie But Plato highly commends the wisdome and knowledge of him who shaped vs for that he seuered the liuer from the braine by so great a distance to the end that by the rumbling there made whilst the nourishments are mingled and by the obscurenesse and darkenesse occasioned through the vapours in the animall spirits the reasonable soule might not be troubled in his discourses and considerations But though Plato had not touched this point of Philosophie we see hourly by experience that because the liuer and the stomack are so far from the brain presently vpon meat and some space thereafter there is no man that can giue himselfe to studie The truth of this matter is that the fourth ventricle hath the office of digesting and altering the vitall spirits and to conuert them into animal for that end which we haue before remembred And therefore nature hath seuered the same by so great a distance from the other three and made that braine sundred apart and so far off as appeareth to the end that by his operation he hinder not the contemplation of the rest The three ventricles placed in the forepart I doubt not but that nature made them to none other end than to discourse and philosophise Which is apparantly prooued for that in great studyings and contemplations alwaies that part of the head finds it self agreeued which answereth these three concauities The force of this argument is to be knowne by consideration that when the other powers are wearie of performing their workes the instruments are alwaies agreeued whose seruice they vsed as in our much looking the eyes are pained and with much going the soules of the feet wax sore Now the difficultie consists to know in which of these ventricles the vnderstanding is placed in which the memorie and in which the imagination for they are so vnited and nere neighboured that neither by the last argument nor by any other notice they can be distinguished or discerned Then considering that the vnderstanding cannot worke without the memorie be present representing vnto the same the figures and fantasies agreeable therevnto it behooueth that the vnderstanding part busie it selfe in beholding the fantasmes and that the memorie cannot do it if the imagination do not accompany the same as we haue already heretofore declared we shall easily vnderstand that all the powers are vnited in euery seuerall ventricle and that the vnderstanding is not solely in the one nor the memory solely in the other nor the imagination in the third as the vulgar Philosophers haue imagined but that this vnion of powers is accustomably made in mans body in as much as the one cannot worke without the aid of the other as appeareth in the foure naturall abilities digestiue retentiue attractiue and expulsiue where because each one stands in need of all the residue nature disposed to vnite them in one selfe place and made them not diuided or sundered But if this be true then to what end made nature those three ventricles and ioyned together the three reasonable powers in euery of them seeing that one alone sufficed to vnderstand and to performe the actions of memorie To this may be answered that there riseth a like difficultie in skanning whence it commeth that nature made two eyes and two eares sithens in each of them is placed the whole power of sight and hearing and we can see hauing but one eye Whereto may be sayd that the powers ordayned for the perfection of a creature how much the greater number they carrie so much the better assured is that their perfection for vpon some occasion one or two may faile and therefore it serues well to the purpose that there remaine some others of the same kind which may be applied to vse In an infirmitie which the Phisitions tearme Resolution or Palsie of the middle side the operation is ordinarily lost of that ventricle which is strooken on that side if the other two remained not sound without endammageance a man should thereby become witles and void of
impaired many times the operations of the vnderstanding are thereby lost and yet those of the memorie and the imagination remaine sound which could not come to passe if the vnderstanding enioyed not a particular instrument for it selfe besides this which the other powers do partake To this I know not what may be yeelded in answer vnlesse it be by some metaphysicall relation compounded of action and power which neither themselues know what it meaneth nor is there any other man that vnderstands it Nothing more endammageth mans knowledge than to confound the sciences and what belongs to the Metaphysicks to entreat thereof in naturall Philosophie and matters of naturall Philosophie in the Metaphysicks The reasons wherevpon Aristotle grounded himselfe are of small moment for the consequence followeth not to say that the vnderstanding because it must know materiall things should not therefore enioy a bodily instrument for the bodily qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument make no alteration of the power nor from them do the fantasmes arise euen as the sensible placed aboue the sence causeth not the selfe sence This is plainly seene in touching for notwithstanding that the same is compounded of four materiall qualities and that the same hath in it quantitie and hardnesse or softnesse for all this the hand discerneth whether a thing be hot or cold hard or soft great or little And if you aske in what sort the naturall heat which is in the hand hindereth not the touching that it may discerne the heat which is in the stoue we answer that the qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument do not alter the instrument it selfe neither from them do there issue any shapes whereby to know them Euen as it appertaineth to the eye to know all figures and qualities of things and yet we see that the eye it selfe hath his proper figure and quantitie and of the humours and skins which go to his composition some haue colours and some are diaphane and trasparant all which hindereth not but that we with our sight may discerne the figures and quantities of all the things which shall appeare before vs and the reason is for that the humours the skins the figure and the quantitie serue for the composition of the eye and such thinges cannot alter the sightfull power and therefore trouble not nor hinder the knowledge of the outward figures The like we affirme of the vnderstanding that his proper instrument though the same be materiall and ioyned with it cannot enlarge it for from it issue no vnderstandable shapes which haue force to alter it and the reason is For that the vnderstandable placed aboue the vnderstanding causeth not the vnderstanding so it remaineth at libertie to vnderstand all the outward materiall thinges without that it encounter ought to hinder the same The second reason wherein Aristotle grounded himselfe is of lesse importance than the former for neither the vnderstanding nor any other accident can be qualiti-like for of themselues they cannot be the subiect of any qualitie For which cause it litle skilleth that the vnderstanding possesse the braine for an instrument togither with the temperature of the 4. first qualities that therfore it may be called qualitie-like inasmuch as the braine and not the braine and not the vnderstanding is the subiect of the heat the cold the moyst and the drie To the third difficulty which the Peripateticks alleage saying That by making the vnderstanding an instrumētall power we reaue one of those principles which serue to prooue the immortality of the reasonable soule we answere That there are other argumentes of more soundnesse whereby to prooue the same whereof wee will treat in the chapter following To the second argument we answere that not euery difference of operations argueth a diuersitie of powers for as we will prooue heereafter the imaginatiue performeth matter so strange that if this maxime were true in sort as the vulgar Philosophers had it or admitting the interpretation which they giue it there should be in the braine ten or twelue powers more But because all these operations are to be marshalled vnder one generall reason they argue no more than one imaginatiue which is afterwardes diuided into many particular differences by the meanes of the sundry operations which it performeth the composing of the shapes in the presence or the absence of the obiects not onely argueth not a diuersitie of the generall powers as are the common sense and the imaginatiue but euen not of the verie particulars To the third argument we answere that the memory is nothing els but a tendernesse of the braine disposed with a certaine kinde of moisture to receiue and preserue that which the imaginatiue apprehendeth with the like proportion that white or blew paper holdes with him who writeth for as the writer writeth in the paper the things which he would not forget and after he hath written them returnes to read them euen so we ought to conceiue that the imagination writeth in the memorie the figures of the things knowen by the fiue senses and by the vnderstanding as also some others of his own framing and when it will remember ought saith Arist. it returneth to behold contemplat them With this maner of comparison Plato serued himselfe when he said that fearing the weake memorie of old age he hastened to make another of paper namely bookes to the end his trauailes ought not to be lost but that hee might haue that which might represent them vnto him when he list to read them This selfe doth the imaginatiue of writing in the memorie and returning to read it when it would remember the same The first who vttered this point was Aristotle and the second Galen who said thus Forasmuch as that part of the soule which imagineth whatsoeuer the same be seemeth to be the selfe that also remembreth And so verily it seemeth to be for the things which we imagine with long thinking are well fixed in the memorie and that which we handle with light consideration also soone we forget the same againe And as the writer when he writeth faire the better assureth it to be read so it befalles to the imaginatiue that if it seale with force the figure remaineth well imprinted in the braine otherwise it can skarsly be discerned The like also chanceth in old deedes which being sound in part and in part perished by time cannot well be read vnlesse we gather much by reason and coniecture So doth the imaginatiue when in the memorie some figures remaine and some are perished where Aristotles errour had his originall who for this cause conceiued that remembrance was a different power from the memorie Moreouer he affirmed that those who haue great remembrance are likewise of great vnderstanding which is also false for the imaginatiue which is that that makes the remembrance is contrarie to the vnderstanding in sort that to gather memory of things and to remember them after they are
made the lawes Whence oftentimes it falleth out that a Iudge of good wit giueth a sentence without knowing the decision of the law and afterwards findeth the same so ruled in his books and the like we see somtimes betideth the pleaders when they giue their iudgement in a case without studying The lawes and rules of reason whosoeuer well marketh them are the fountaine and originall whence the pleaders gather their arguments and reasons to prooue what they vndertake And this worke for certaine is performed by the discourse which power if the pleader want he shall neuer skill to shape an argument though he haue the whole ciuill law at his fingers ends This we see plainly to befall in such as studie the art of oratorie when the aptnesse thereunto is failing for though they learne by art the Topicks of Cicero being the spring from which flow the arguments that may be inuented to prooue euerie probleme both on the affirmatiue and the negatiue part yet they cannot thereout shape a reason Againe there come others of great wit and towardnes who without looking in booke or studying the Topicks make 1000 arguments seruing for the purpose as occasion requireth This selfe falleth out in the lawyers of good memorie who will recite you a whole text very perfectly and yet of so great a multitude of lawes as are comprised therein cannot collect so much as one argument to prooue their intention And contrariwise others who haue studied simply without books and without allowance worke miracles in pleading of causes Hence we know how much it importeth the common wealth that there may be such an election and examination of wits for the sciences inasmuch as some without art know and vnderstand what they are to effect and others loden with precepts and rules for that they want a conuenient towardlinesse for practise commit a thousand absurdities which verie ill beseeme them So then if to iudge plead be effected by distinguishing inferring arguing chusing it standeth with reason that whosoeuer setteth himselfe to studie the lawes enioy a good vnderstanding seeing that such actions appertain to this power and not to the memorie or to the imagination How we may finde whether a child be endowed with this difference of wit or no it would do well to vnderstand but first it behooueth to lay downe what are the qualities of discourse how many differences it compriseth in it selfe to the end we may likewise know with distinction to which of these the lawes appertaine for the first we must weet that albeit the vnderstanding be the most noble power and of greatest dignitie in man yet there is none which is more easily led into errour as touching the trueth than the vnderstanding This Aristotle attempted to prooue when he said That the sense is euer true but the vnderstanding for the most part discourseth badly the which is plainly seen by experience for if it were not so amongst the Diuines the Phisitions the Philosophers and the Lawyers there would not fall out so manie waightie dissentions so diuers opinions and so many iudgements and conceits vpon euery point seeing the trueth is neuer more than one Whence it groweth that the senses hold so great acertaintie in their obiects and the vnderstanding is so easily beguiled in his may well be conceiued if we consider that the obiects of the fiue senses and the spices by which they are known haue their being reall firme and stable by nature before they are knowen But that truth which is to be contemplated by the vnderstanding if it selfe do not frame and fashion the same it hath no formall being of his owne but is wholly scattered and lose in his materials as a house conuerred into stones earth timber tiles with which so many errors may be committed in building as there shall men set themselues to build with ill imagination The like befalleth in the building which the vnderstanding raiseth when it frameth a trueth for if the wit be not good all the residue wil worke a thousand follies with the selfe same principles Hence springs it that amongst men there are so sundrie opinions touching one selfe matter for euery one maketh the composition and figure such as is his vnderstanding From these errours and opinions are the fiue senses free for neither the eies make the colour nor the tast the sauours nor the feeling the palpable qualities but the whole is made and compounded by nature before anie of them be acquainted with his obiect Men because they carrie not regard to this bad operation of the vnderstanding take hardinesse to deliuer confidently their owne opinion without knowing in certaintie of what sort their wit is and whither it can a fashion a truth well or ill And if we be not resolued heerein let vs ask some of these learned mē who after they haue set down in writing and confirmed their opinions with many arguments and reasons and haue another time changed their opinions and conceit when or how they can assure themselues that now at last they haue hit the nail on the head themselues will not denie but that they erred the first time seeing they vnsay what they said tofore Secondly I auouch that they ought to haue the lesse confidence in their vnderstanding because the power which once ill compoundeth the trueth whilest his patrone placed so much assurance in his argumentes and reasons should therefore the sooner take suspect that he may once again slide into error whilest he worketh with the selfe same instrument of reason and so much the rather for that it hath been seen by experience that the first opinion hath borne most trueth and afterwards he hath relied vpon a worse and of lesse probabilitie They hold it for a sufficient token that the vnderstanding compoundeth well a trueth when they see it inamored of such a figure and that there are arguments reasons which moue it to conclude in that sort and verily they misse their cushion for the same vnderstanding carrieth the same proportion to his false opinions that the inferiour powers haue ech with the differences of their obiect for if we demand of the Phisitions what meat is best and most sauoury of al that men accustomably feed vpon I beleeue they will answere that for men who are distempered and of weake stomacke there is none absolutely good or euill but such as the stomacke is that shal receiue it for there are stomacks saith Galen which better brooke beefe than hennes or cracknels and othersome abhorre egges and milke and others againe haue a longing after them and in the maner of vsing meates some like rost and some boild and in rost some loue to haue the bloud run in the dish and some to haue it browne and burned And which is more worthie of consideration that meat which this day is fauourly eaten and with good appetite to morrow will be lothed and a farre worse longed for in his roome All this is
that if a 100000 men be begotten ech of them comes to the world with a health so peculier and proper to himselfe that if God should on the sodaine miraculously change their proportion of these first qualities they would all become sicke except some two or three that by great disposition had the like consonance and proportion Whence two conclusions are necessarilie inferred The first is that euerie man who falleth sicke ought to be cured conformable to his particular proportiō in sort that if the phisition restore him not to his first consonance of humours he cannot recouer The second that to performe this as it ought is requisite the phisition haue first seen dealt with the patient sundry times in his health by feeling his pulse perusing his state and what maner countenance and complexion he is of to the end that when he shall fall sicke he may iudge how farre he is from his health and in ministring vnto him may know to what point he is to restore him For the first namely to weet and vnderstand the Theorick and composition of the art saith Galen it is necessarie to be endowed with great discourse and much memorie for the one part of phisick consisteth in reason and the other in experience and historie To the first is vnderstanding requisite and to the other memorie and it resting a matter of so great difficultie to vnite these two powers in a large degree it followeth of force that the phisition become vnapt for the Theorick Where-through we behold many Phisitions learned in the Greeke Latine tongue and great Anotomists and Simplicists all workes of the memory who brought to arguing or disputations or to finde out the cause of anie effect that appertaineth to the vnderstanding can small skill thereof The contrarie befalleth in others who shew great wit and sufficiencie in the Logicke and Philosophie of this art but being set to the Latine and Greeke tongue touching simples and anotomies can do little because memorie in them is wanting for this cause Galen said verie wel That it is no maruell if among so great a multitude of men who practise the exercise and studie of the art of Phisicke and Philosophie so few are found to profit therein and yeelding the reason he saith It requires a great toile to find out a wit requisite for this Science or a maister who can teach the same with perfection or can studie it with diligence and attention But with all these reasons Galen goeth groping for he could not hit the cause whence it comes to passe that few persons profit in Phisick Yet in saying it was a great labour to find out a wit requisit for this science he spake truth albeit he did not so far-forth specifie the same as we will namely for that it is so difficult a matter to vnite a great vnderstanding with much memorie no man attaineth to the depth of Theoricall phisick And for that there is found a repugnancie between the vnderstanding and the imagination whereunto we will now prooue that practise and the skill to cure with certaintie appertaineth it is a miracle to find out a Phisition who is both a great Theorist and withall a great practitioner or contrariwise a great practitioner and verie well seen in Theorick And that the imagination and not the vnderstanding is the power wherof the phisition is to serue himself in knowing and curing the diseases of particular persons may easily be prooued First of all presupposing the doctrine of Aristotle who affirmeth That the vnderstanding cānot know particulars neither distinguish the one from the other nor discerne the time and place other particularities which make men different ech from other and that euery one is to be cured after a diuers maner and the reason is as the vulgar Philosophers auouch for that the vnderstanding is a spiritall power and cannot be altered by the particulars which are replenished with matter And for this cause Aristotle said That the sense is of particulars and the vnderstanding of vniuersals If then medicines are to worke in particulars and not in vniuersals which are vnbegotten and vncorruptible the vnderstanding falleth out to be a power impertinent for curing Now the difficultie consisteth in discerning why men of great vnderstanding cānot possesse good outward senses for the particulars they being powers so repugnant And the reason is verie plain and this is it that the outward senses cannot well performe their operations vnlesse they be assisted with a good imagination and this we are to prooue by the opinion of Aristotle who going about to expresse what the imagination was saith it is a motion caused by the outward sense in sort as the colour which multiplieth by the thing coloured doth alter the eie And so it fareth that this selfe colour which is in the christallin humour passeth farther into the imagination and maketh therin the same figure which was in the eie And if you demād of which of these two kindes the notice of the particular is made all philosophers auouch and that verie truely that the second figure is it which altereth the imagination and by them both is the notice caused conformable to that so commō speech From the obiect and from the power the notice springeth But from the first which is in the christallin humour from the sightfull power groweth no notice if the imagination be not attentiue thereunto which the phisitions do plainly prooue saying That if they lance or sear the flesh of a diseased person who for al that feeleth no pain it shews a token that his imagination is distracted into some profound contemplation whence we see also by experience in the sound that if they be raught into some imagination they see not the things before them nor heare though they be called nor tast meat sauorie or vnsauory though they haue it in their mouth Wherefore it is a thing certaine that not the vnderstanding or outward senses but the imagination is that which maketh the iudgement and taketh notice of particular things It followeth then that the phisition who is well seen in Theoricke for that he is indowed with great vnderstanding or great memory must of force prooue a bad practitioner as hauing defect in his imagination And contrariwise he that prooueth a good practitioner must of force be a bad Theorist for much imagination cannot be vnited with much vnderstanding and much memorie And this is the cause for which so few are thoroughly seen in phisicke or commit but small errors in curing for not to halt in the worke it behooueth to know the art and to possesse a good imagination for putting the same in practise and we haue prooued that these two cannot stick togither The Phisition neuer goeth to know and cure a disease but that secretly to himselfe he frameth a Syllogisme in Darij though he be neuer so well experienced and the proofe of his first proportion belongeth to the vnderstanding and of the second
to the imagination for which cause the great Theorists doe ordinarily erre in the minor and the great practitioners in the maior as if we should speake after this maner Euerie feuer which springeth from cold and moist humours ought to be cured with medicins hot and drie Taking the tokening of the cause this feuer which the man endureth dependeth on humors cold and moist therefore the same is to be cured with medicines hot and drie The vnderstanding will sufficiently prooue the truth of the maior because it is an vniuersall saying That cold moist require for their temperature hot and drie for euerie qualitie is abated by his contrarie But comming to prooue the minor there the vnderstanding is of no value for that the same is particular and of another iurisdiction whose notice appertaineth to the imagination borowing the proper and particular tokens of the disease from the fiue outward senses And if the tokening is to be taken from the feuer or from his cause the vnderstanding cannot reach therunto onely it teacheth the tokening is to be taken from that which sheweth greatest perill but which of those tokenings is greatest is only known to the imagination by counting the damages which the feuer produceth with those of the Syntomes of the euill and the cause and the small or much force of the power To attain this notice the imagination possesseth certain vnutterable properties with which the same cleereth matters that cannot be expressed nor conceiued neither is there found any art to teach them Where-through we see a phisition enter to visit a patient and by meanes of his sight his hearing his smelling and his feeling he knoweth things which seem impossible In sort that if we demand of the same phisition how he could come by so readie a knowledge himselfe cannot tell the reason for it is a grace which springeth from the fruitfulnesse of the imagination which by another name is termed a readinesse of capacitie which by common signes and by vncertain coniectures and of small importance in the twinckling of an eie knoweth 1000 differēces of things wherein the force of curing and prognosticating with certaintie consisteth This spice of promptnesse men of great vnderstanding do want for that it is a part of the imagination for which cause hauing the tokens before their eies which giue them notice how the disease fareth it worketh no maner alteration in their senses for that they want imagination A phisition once asked me in great secresie what the cause was that he hauing studied with much curiositie all the rules and considerations of the art prognosticatiue being therin throughly instructed yet could neuer hit the truth in any prognostication which he made To whom I remember I yeelded this answer that the art of Phisick is learned with one power and put in execution with another This man had a verie good vnderstanding but wanted imagination but in this doctrin there ariseth a difficultie verie great and that is how phisitions of great imagination can learn the art of phisicke seeing they want that of vnderstanding and if it be true that such were better than those who were well learned to what end serueth it to spend time in the schooles to this may be answered that first to know the art of phisicke is a matter verie important for in two or three yeares a man may learn al that which the ancients haue bin getting in two or three thousand And if a man should heerin ascertain himselfe by experience it were requisit that he liued some thousands of yeeres and in experimenting of medicines he should kill an infinit number of persons before he could attain to the knowledge of their qualities from whence we are freed by reading the books of reasonable experienced phisitions who giue aduertisment of that in writing which they found out in the whole course of their liues to the end that the phisitions of these daies may minister some receits with assurance and take heed of other-some as venomous Besides this we are to weet that the common vulgar points of al arts are verie plain and easie to learn and yet the most important of the whole worke And contrariwise the most curious and subtile are the most obscure and of least necessitie for curing And men of great imagination are not altogither depriued of vnderstanding nor of memorie Wher-through by hauing these two powers in some measure they are able to learn the most necessarie points of Phisicke for that they are plainest and with the good imagination which they haue can better looke into the disease and the cause thereof than the cunningest doctors Besides that the imagination is it which findeth out the occasion of the remedie that ought to be applied in which grace the greatest part of practise consisteth for which cause Galen said that the proper name of a phisition was The finder out of occasion Now to be able to know the place the time and the occasion for certain is a worke of the imagination since it toucheth figure and correspondence but the difficultie consisteth in knowing amongst so many differences as there are of the imagination to which of them the practise of Phisicke appertaineth for it is certaine that they all agree not in one selfe particular reason which contemplation hath giuen me much more toile and labour of spirit than all the residue and yet for all that I cannot as yet yeeld the same a fitting name vnlesse it spring from a lesse degree of heat which partaketh that difference of imagination wherewith verses and songs are endited Neither do I relie altogether on this for the reason whereon I ground my selfe is that such as I haue marked to be good practitioners do all piddle somwhat in the art of versifieng and raise not vp their contemplation very high and their verses are not of any rare excellencie which may also betide for that their heat exceedeth that tearme which is requisit for poetrie and if it so come to passe for this reason the heat ought to hold such qualitie as it somewhat drie the substance of the braine and yet much resolue not the naturall heat albeit if the same passe further it breedeth no euill difference of the wit for Phisicke for it vniteth the vnderstanding to the imagination by adustion But the imagination is not so good for curing as this which I seeke which inuiteth a man to be a witch superstitious a magician a deceiuer a palmister a fortune teller and a calker for the diseases of men are so hidden and deliuer their motions with so great secrecie that it behooueth alwaies to go calking what the matter is This difference of imagination may hardly be found in Spaine for tofore we haue prooued that the inhabitants of this region want memory and imagination and haue good discourse neither yet the imaginatiō of such as dwell towards the North is of auaile in Phisicke for it is very slow and slacke only the same is