not of any thing really extant in Nature These were their undoubted opinions and apprehensions herein but whether their own natural Pride of temper was the cause of these their extravagant opinions or whether some other false Scheme of Principles which they had entertain'd had in some sort betray'd 'em into this excess of self-conceit I shall not here determine Tho' perhaps the ignorance of a future state of Rewards and Punishments after this life joyn'd with their attempt to give an account of that great question which so much puzled the Heathen World Cur bonis malè malis bené This perhaps might in some measure oblige 'em being not fully assur'd of a future State to entertain such false opinions of Man's self-sufficiency so placing all things within his own power that he needed not to be beholden to any other assistance but from himself or to any future expectations to make him happy As for the calamities that befal Men here in this Life they no ways alter the case in reference to happiness or unhappiness for those they say only reach the Body which according to them has no nearer relation to the Soul than their Cloaths have to it Thus the Stoicks plac'd their happiness where some sort of Phanaticks among us place their Holiness meerly in the inward Man without any regard to the outward as if we could be either Happy or Holy without any respect at all to one of the essential Parts of our Constitution as if the inward Man of the one could be holy in the midst of all outward Debaucheries and the inward Man of the other happy in the midst of bodily torments Thus tho' we grant the Soul to be the Soveraign yet the Body may justly challenge the Liberty of the Subject The other Sect of Philosophers who have erred in the other extream is that of Epicurus who attributes too much to the Body But this may some say is too favourable an expression when as indeed he doth destroy both all Soul in Man and excludes God out of the World But my charge here doth not rise so high it is sufficient for my purpose what is generally granted by all that in the account he gives of Man the Body is too predominant and the indolency of the Body seems far to surpass the tranquillity of the mind For it cannot be made appear That Epicurus by his tranquillity meant that peace of Conscience and Serenity of Soul which is the result of a Vertuous and Holy Life but only that quiet of mind in opposition to the disturbance of business or those perplexities of mind which may arise either from Bodily Distempers or some secret fears and jealousies Now if that peace and comfort of a good Conscience in the sense before described be not meant by tranquillity of mind then tho' perhaps the word may sound well yet indeed it falls short of the true and real happiness of the Soul and rises little higher than the concerns of the Body We do naturally either make our selves in some measure like him whom we worship or we fancy him whom we worship like our selves Thus Epicurus placing the happiness of the Deity in an idle unconcern'd freedom from business did hence probably assert ours to consist in the same or else being first strongly perswaded of the excellency of the thing and being mightily pleased with the agreeableness thereof himself did thence ascribe it also to the Deity as that wherein all happiness both Humane and Divine did consist It is indeed unreasonable and uncharitable to urge the consequences of an opinion upon the Author when he does expressly deny those consequences to be his opinion yet I think that he that in words acknowledges a God and yet his Principles are such as are generally embrac'd by real Atheists such an one is not capable of any just Apology For there is not the same Reason of all consequences some are next and immediate others are distant and remote these of the last sort ought not to be urg'd upon the Author of the opinion but those of the former may That Epicurus did assert the Being of God and entertained great and honourable thoughts of his Nature is very certain as appears out of Diog. Laertius So that none so charge him with Atheism as if he did not in words acknowledge a God that which is here asserted is this that that opinion of God which flatters him with high and honourable thoughts concerning himself his own intrinsick excellencies his own happiness and immortality which yet are but irrespective Attributes such as bear no relation to us and in the mean time to assert that he no ways concerns himself at present nor will hereafter take any notice to punish or reward Humane Actions This notion of God lays no Obligation on a Man to holiness of Life or Obedience to that God whom in words he thus admires and is such a Notion of God as even an Atheist provided he be not a perfect Mad Man ought to assert both because perhaps it may some ways tend to still and quiet the clamours of natural Conscience and also as it is safe and customary in respect of those with whom he lives For we never yet heard of a Kingdom or Common-wealth of Atheists such as make it their business positively and openly to assert and defend the Opinion of Atheism But here 't is reply'd That whatever his Principles were in themselves or what ever bad use others might make of them yet that he for his part was a severe practiser of Vertue and Religion But it may be justly questioned whether the joynt belief of a Corporeal God and a mortal Soul had ever any good influence upon an holy Life But suppose Epicurus in general to be a very Vertuous and Pious Person and that those contrary imputations of Vice and Luxury were mere Scandals cast upon him by the Stoicks yet we must consider how far and upon what grounds and for what ends he thus led a vertuous life Now it doth not appear that it was any further than only in order to a pleasant Life and tho' 't is true that Religion and Vertue are the most proper means in order to this end yet it is not probable that he so understood his own principles nor indeed were they capable of being so understood For supposing that there lyes no obligation upon us to any duty any further than as it promotes a pleasant Life in that sense wherein he takes it it is easily conceivable how some degrees of Vice may consist with these Principles provided that they so partake of this days pleasure that they do not incapacitate themselves for those of to morrow And tho' he tells us that the Gods are delighted with the Vertues of Men yet this is but cold encouragement to the practice of the more difficult Duties of Religion seeing tho' they do so far take notice of Mens vertuous actions as therewith to delight themselves yet not so
the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things and from the Nature of Man that is from the consideration of his Soul and Body not supposing or including any such Natural Notices I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World Valeant quantùm valere possunt Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing and absolutely reject all the rest this I think is to give our Adversaries advantage over us Thus that Ingenious Gentleman Mr. Tyrrell in his late Book p. 197. tells us That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly and without difficulty to be read from the great Book of the Creation without any assistance from natural Impressions and he cites Rom. 1. 19 20. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Where he says The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind guided by things without us for the proof of a Deity But it doth not appear from hence that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds as the 20th doth to the outward Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is manifest in them I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes render'd inter but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept why should we look for another For the invisible things of him from the Creation By Creation here is neither meant the things created nor the Act of Creation but only it relates to the time thereof From the Creation that is ever since the Creation by which says Dr. Hammond it appears That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Doings or Actions here of the Works of Creation that is solely but of all things that from time to time to this inclusively have been done in the World by him and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines and Miracles and Actions of Christ the whole business of the Gospel Nay I may add that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mention'd Even his Eternal Power and Godhead 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World The other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature that it is neither a State of Equality nor a State of War I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan concerning Speech and the particular uses of it viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts and the improvement of Knowledge to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our selves and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another but now how can these Uses be applyed to that cross-grain'd state of Nature which he has describ'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence What place is there for Arts and Sciences What room for friendly counsel and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another where what counsel we give to others ought rather in reason to be suspected seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage Why should we desire or hope for the assistance of others seeing there we design nothing but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine Now Speech must be suppos'd in the State of Nature for without it he tells us there could be no entering into Societies no Compacts no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those who aspire to knowledge to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words and framing true Definitions in examining those of former Authors and either to correct 'em when deficient or to make new ones themselves Therefore he says in Geometry which is the most accurate Science Men begin with setling the significations of their words which setling of Significations they call Definitions and place 'em at the beginning of their work Now it had been well if Mr. Hobbs had practis'd his own rule and that in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy that is if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings Nature and had fix'd the Significations of those Expressions Naturally and by Nature Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive and into corrupt and depraved Nature Which he having no where done it has occasion'd a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto which if he had done in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies which were perhaps at first begun and afterwards continued by the want of it 'T is true he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words but yet has been so far from setling and fixing their Significations as he calls it that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty especially in those other places where they are mentioned singly without any intimation at all in what sense they are to be taken In his Preface to his Book de Cive where 't is objected that from his Principles it would follow that Men are wicked by Nature This he says does not follow for though Men by Nature that is from their first Birth as they are meer sensible Creatures c. Here Nature must signifie Man as he comes first into the World with respect meerly to his Animal Qualisications which he has in common with other Creatures In the same Preface forasmuch as God over-rules all Rulers by Nature that is by the dictates of Natural Reason here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher than the lower Faculties of the Soul Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another that is as Man here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent The Law of Nature he thus defines that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members as much as in us lies Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle
Opinion of a God there would be no Idolatry nor Superstition But this Argument as it is deficient in other respects so also is it in respect of time for the Church on Earth might have been the Kingdom of Christ for the first four or five hundred Years after his Appearance in the World notwithstanding the force of this Argument For it then only began to be an Argument when the Pope began to arrogate so much Power to himself And indeed Mr. Hobs had great reason to thank the Church of Rome for affording him so much Sophistical matter to stuff his Kingdom of Darkness withal Another Artifice by which Mr. Hobs would disparage a truth that he has a mind to oppose is with a Philosophical Gravity to feign an idle and ridiculous original to which judiciously to ascribe it thus he fancies that Aristotle from the consideration of this or such like Propositions Homo est animal from the Copula in this Proposition he took occasion first to assert separate Essences Celestial Intelligences and humane Souls Leviat Latin p. 320. Another instance he gives of the false interpretation of Scripture is the asserting the immortality of the Soul and its being really distinct from the Body but now one would scarce desire a better Argument for the proof thereof than the very Answers he gives to those places of Scripture which are commonly alledg'd for it so weak and frivolous many times are they Eccles. 12. 7. The Spirit returns to God that gave it which words says he may suffer this interpretation but then they must undergo a great deal of pain and have a great deal of Patience if they suffer it One great defect which seems to run through all Mr. Hobs his Interpretations of Scripture is this that he supposes himsels on the defensive part and that all that he had to do was only to invent some frivolous Evasion or put some forc'd Interpretation upon the place and then all was done whereas he ought positively to prove that that of his was the only true and genuine sense and meaning of the place both from the generally approv'd concurrent Testimonies of the best and purest Ages from the just and proper acceptation of the words by the best and most approved Authors from the general scope and design of the Context and from the natural tendency that his Sense and Interpretation has to promote those noble ends of Vertue and Piety in the World which God and Christ design'd to carry on by the Scriptures None of which things Mr. Hobs hath as much as attempted to do The Spirit returns to God that gave it that is says he God only knows whence it comes and whither it goes And I could wish that he had been true to his own Interpretation But then how comes he so positively to assert its Mortality at present and at what Periods it must return again to Life c. Another place he says which seems to make for the immortality of the Soul is Matt. 22. 32. Where our Saviour affirms Abraham Isaac and Iacob to be alive to which he answers That they were indeed alive but not actually but as by the promise of God they were sure of Eternal Life but he also tells us That the wicked are sure of eternal Death and thus why may not the wicked be as properly said to be dead even whiles they are alive by vertue of the threatning as the Righteous can be said to be alive by vertue of the promise even then when they are suppos'd not to be at all The sum of Mr. Hobbs his Opinion herein is this he supposes the Soul not to be any thing really distinct from the Body but that it is compos'd of the purer parts of the Spirits and by consequence it dies with the Body not that it is annihilated for matter in this sense is immortal that is not naturally capable of annihilation but that upon such grand indispositions of Body which is called Death the Soul is render'd uncapable of such agitations and such reactions in which the nature of a living Creature doth consist So that according to this Opinion a Man can no more properly be said either to be alive or dead than Quicksilver may for though it be not so Organized as Mans Body is though it hath neither heart nor brain to transmit Spirits to each other and though it has not the use of Speech yet may it have a Soul as really intelligent as that of ours The greatest part of the rest of this Chapter is employ'd in confuting or exposing some Opinions of the Church of Rome yet we may observe that notwithstanding his severe handling that Church in some respects yet her Authority is then valued by him when she seems any ways to favour his Opinions thus he cites her Authority to confirm his assertion That Spirits are mere Phantasms because she in her Exorcisms calls 'em so I shall here only further observe how he hath transform'd all the Subjects of Satan into Phantasms in the beginning of his Kingdom of Darkness and in the latter end thereof has allegoriz'd all the Officers and Ministers of the Pope into mere Hobgoblins That which gave the first occasion of employing my thoughts this way was those false Opinions concerning God those various modes of Theism which now prevail in the World which seem to be nothing but Epicurism and Hobbianism transform'd into other I know not whether I may say into better shapes Now if what I here write may but give occasion to some abler Pen more fully to examine and confute those fatal Principles and I hope it will rather than a good Cause should suffer by my ill management If these Papers I say have this good effect I shall not then need to make any other Apology but think my Pains very well bestow'd FINIS AN APPENDIX TO THE Seventh Chapter I Would not there be thought in the least to favour that false and foolish that dangerous and destructive opinion of Theism an Opinion which grants indeed the Being of God and natural Religion but denies all Divine Revelation made to Mankind afterward and thus it seems a composition of the worst ingredients incident to humane Nature Pride Ignorance and Ingratitude of Pride as not duly acknowledging the frailties of humane nature of Ignorance as not fully understanding the true state and condition of laps'd Mankind of Ingratitude as not thankfully acknowledging the benefits of Divine Grace But Secondly besides these there are others who granting a Divine Revelation made to Man do yet so melt it down as it were below it self till it come to an equal temper with or very little exceed mere natural Religion 3. Others who in words acknowledge a God but denying the common Principles of all Religion the immortality of the Soul and a future State seem perfectly to entertain the Doctrine of Epicurus As for the light of Nature which these Men so much Idolize I shall grant to it as much
hence is a great presumption at least of the falseness of such Principles seeing Truth always lyes so plain and easie especially in things of this nature so consistent with our natural Apprehensions and with all other Truths both natural and revealed that it stands not in need of such perplexed ways and methods for its own defence Nor is Mr. Hobbs the only man that hath made false representations of Human Nature there are also some foreign Philosophers who have been very obnoxious in this Particular Cuperus in his Arcana Atheismi 9. 10. cb 2. lib. denies all Natural Knowledge of God and all Natural Difference betwixt Good and Evil And in his Proeme p. 2 3. he makes Natural Reason to be ratiocinatio ex innatis homini affectibus passionibus legitimè deducta And this farther account he gives of these Affections p. 3. Affectus passiones Iesu Christi mandatis contrarias sive quae nos ad ea quae ipse prohibuit sectanda stimulant per se suâ naturâ non esse malas nec expeccato originali maláve consuetudine ortas existimo These seem but bad Principles for Human Nature to proceed upon And as for right Reason Rectam sanam rationem appello ratiocinationes ex claris apud neminem controversis sacrae Scripturae sensibus vel ex expressis verbis in scripturâ contentis vel per legitimam consequentiam elicitas This indeed is true but right Reason in the just and full nature of it is of larger extent than arguing meerly from Scripture And P. Poiret in his Cogit ration de Deo lib. 3. cap. 10. makes all the Reasons of Truth and Goodness to depend wholly upon the Divine Decree and that nothing is in it self either good or evil but only as God has been pleased to make it so and might also if He had so pleased have made it quite otherwise These I shall make some short Reflections upon and leave the fuller examination thereof to some abler Pen. I have not had recourse to Scripture to prove my Assertions because my design here is to speak of Man as guided rather by Reason than Revelation and because those I have here to deal with do more especially appeal thereto Yet here I cannot but take notice of the strange Humour of some men who reject some things for those very Reasons for which they ought to receive 'em thus when they are urg'd with Scripture they look upon that only as something that would impose upon their Understanding and oblige 'em to a blind Obedience as if it designed only to erect an arbitrary government over the Minds of Men without giving any reason of its Commands But though they will not give these Writings the credit and authority justly due to 'em upon account of their divine Revelation yet it would be unreasonable to reject 'em and the things therein contained before they have enquir'd into the Reasons and credibility of 'em which if they vouchsase to do I doubt not but as our Saviour said in another case If ye believe not me yet believe my Works So here tho' they believe not the Scriptures for their authority yet they will at least be convinc'd by the Reason contain'd in ' em Thus a learned Prelate of our Church Tho' sacred Authors have little authority with Atheists speaking as meer Witnesses yet when their Testimony is attended also with the highest Reason those Reasons must be acknowledg'd and answer'd though the Author be rejected Nor do I here insist much upon the authorities even of Heathen Authors being willing so far to comply with the Humours of some of the present Age as only to appeal to mens unprejudic'd Reasons whether what is here humbly propos'd to consideration be true or no for if what is writ by any one be not in it self reasonable I know no authorities great enough to make it so Only if any think that the concurrent Testimonies of such Authors may add any strength to the things here handled I doubt not but they who have been but moderately conversant in those Writers may easily furnish themselves with such authorities from their own reading and observation I shall here advertise the Reader one thing further That whereas I have frequent occasion of making use of these words Vice and Virtue I there take 'em according to the acceptation of our old English Dictionaries and in the sense wherein the ancient moral Philosophers formerly took 'em that is to signifie much what the same thing with Good and Evil Sin and Duty as supposing 'em founded upon something more sixt and certain than the Custom of Countries or the Mode and Fashion of those with whom we do converse I should have counted this a needless Advertisement but that I find the ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding p. 158 159 c. telling us That the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Virtue and Vice is his Approbation or Dislike Praise or Blame which by a secret and tacite consent establishes it self in the several Societies Tribes and Clubs of Men in the World so that Virtue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem is Virtue And here he quotes Cicero Tusc. lib. 2. Nihil habet natura praestantius quà m honestatem quà m laudem quà m dignitatem quam decus Which he says are all Names for the same thing But here we may observe that he puts Honesty in the first place then Praise viz. such as is consequent hereupon quà m dignitatem that is that Dignity of Nature which is the greatest Ornament of a Man The same Author of that Essay hath much better explain'd the sense of the old Heathen Philosophers upon this Subject p. 17. If one of those had been asked here I suppose the Question should not have been propounded as before Why a Man must keep his word but rather thus why a Man should not break his word he would have answer'd because it was dishonest below the Dignity of a Man and opposite to Virtue the highest perfection of Human Nature By the Dignity of a Man I suppose was here meant the same that Tully meant by his that is the Dignity of Human Nature consider'd in it self not with respect to the accidentally good or bad Opinion that Men might entertain of it But he further tells us p. 159. That the Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute Whatsoever things are lovely whatsoever things are of good report if there be any virtue if there be any praise c. Phil. 4. 8. But the Apostle doth not here appeal to common Repute absolutely but with a certain restriction and limitation that Men do not confound the notions of Good and Evil whatever things are of good report with this Proviso that there be any Virtue or any such Praise as is virtutis comes then we are to think on
motion and agitation of the particles how can any one secure himself or others that a saction of the dissenting Particles for Example or such a motion as causes dissent may not rise up when the nature of the thing requires the contrary assent and by this means erect a Babel in Man and bring all into confusion Further If Cogitation consist only in the various motion and disposition of the Atoms then Phaeton might possibly produce a greater and more undoubted Deity out of his flaming Chariot than that of his Father Phoebus If this Hypothesis be true then Ex quovis ligno fiat Mercurius and the Chair may be as infallible as he that sits in it and this perhaps might gratifie some Men in the World all other methods failing thus to solve Infallibility by mechanick Principles Pardon me if in a ferious argument I thus seem to trifle seeing those I have here to deal withal first taught me the way For herein they seem rather to give an Essay of their own extravagant Fancies than to perswade others that they themselves believe their own Assertions But to return These Men must either assert That there neither is nor can be any such thing as Spirit in the World or if there be that it is impossible for such a being to cogitate neither of which will they be ever able to prove As for the being of a Spirit they do indeed with as much strength of confidence as weakness of Reason tell us that the Notion thereof includes in it a Contradiction tho' this they do not as much as attempt to prove any other way than first by supposing a material Universe and that nothing but matter is contained in it But this is to beg not prove the Question But the Essences of things being unknown the Notion of a Spirit seems as obvious and intelligible as that of matter for we may as easily conceive of one thing to which we attribute cogitation as its immediate property as we do of another to which we ascribe extension and impenetrability And then supposing a Spirit Cogitation seems the natural result of such a being Tho' I do not here go about to explain the particular way and manner how Spirits think for it is hard to conceive how their own Native penetrability or the reduplication of themselves upon themselves does any ways explain the manner of Cogitation We must satisfy our selves with this which is as far as our most exact Searches will extend to That first and immediate properties are not demonstrable of their Subjects neither as to the things themselves nor as to the modes Indeed Sharron in his Book of Wisdom lib. 1. ch 7. tells us that Spirits and Devils according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Divines are corporeal Here he cites Tertullian Origen St. Basil Gregory c. The Names he mentions but not their Assertions or the Places where they say so But this being a general accusation we may as easily deny it as he assert it But as for those places which perhaps may seem to favour his assertion I doubt not but they may and have already receiv'd easy Solutions from one of these general considerations 1. That either they asserted the opinion of the Platonists who yet were no favourers of an universal corporeity viz. That Souls were never in a perfect State of Separation from all Body but had certain etherial Vehicles and so in that respect might partake in some Sense of a Corporeal Nature Or 2. He doth not rightly interpret those places of the Fathers where perhaps sometimes body or matter may be ascribed to the Soul or Angels but then by Body there is to be meant nothing but Substance or Essence So that their Sense was good and orthodox though their Expressions might be liable to exception and yet I think it is only Tertullian that expresses himself in that manner The said Sharron goes on and tells us That Whatever is Created being compared with God is gross corporeal material and only God incorporeal I would willingly here be so charitable as to think that such was his awful respect and veneration of the Divine Essence that he would not easily grant any thing else to partake of the same generical nature Far be it from me to speak any thing that may in the least derogate from the excellency of the Divine Essence only we may consider that it is no honour done to that to depress other things below that just Order wherein God has placed them This seems but a piece of Will-worship and something like the Opinion of those who think they cannot sufficiently magnifie God's love to some unless they absolutely damn all the rest thus also as if we could not sufficiently magnifie the Spirituality of the Divine Nature unless we dispose all other beings into the rank and Order of Corporeity 2. Though I do not assert this yet I would propound it to consideration whether it may not be possible for the nature of a Spirit to admit of degrees of excellence as to the very Essence and Substance thereof and not only in respect of its more accidental perfections yet so as that which we suppose of the lower order to be perfectly Spiritual and contain nothing of Corporeity in it and perhaps the Logicians meant this when they called God Super-Substantia But he says further if it appear That Spirits change their place the very change shows they are moveable divisible subject to time and the successions thereof c. Which are all qualities of a Body But here I would only ask Whether the existence of a Spirit be possible or whether God could have created such a being or no If he could then his argument proves nothing for supposing such a being it must move and be in a place just in such a manner as we now suppose Souls and Angels to be and move and the argument would have the same force if we either suppos'd or were on all sides assur'd of the actual being that it has now So that it either proves the impossibility of a Spirit or else nothing at all to the purpose this being only such an objection or such a difficulty as would lye against an acknowledged truth I should now Secondly show how from hence we justly infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature But I shall not need to spend any time herein for though there have been some who granting the immateriality of the Divine Nature have yet asserted the Corporeity of the Soul yet there never was any who granting the Soul to be immaterial ever asserted God to be Corporeal As for those who assert a material Universe and a Corporeal Deity they may perhaps nomine ponere but indeed they do re tollere Deum For a Corporeal Deity is inconsistent with the Notion we have of God uncapable of the Perfections we ascribe to him and unable to perform such actions as do properly belong to such a being But however those
who thus suppose a Corporeal God do also suppose a Corporeal Soul Thus from the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature 3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship that seeing we consist of Soul and Body therefore must we offer both to God as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship First Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism Secondly By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves or at least think that we did so of that God whom we for ought they perceiv'd did so rudely worship But then on the other hand we must have a more especial regard to the Soul for without this all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body whether it enjoy'd any State of Praeexistence or was then first created when first put into the Body or if it did praeexist then in what manner whether in a pure separation from all matter or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle is not my design here to examine only 't is observable that in things of this Nature where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things there Men are usually determin'd to this or that side of the question by very accidental considerations as in this case of Praeexistence by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philosophy or by those previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable Nor Secondly shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political rather than of Natural Philosophy I shall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body being discouraged therefrom by the difficulties of the thing and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it Claubergius hath a discourse particularly de conjunctione Anime Corporis but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it I shall submit it to the judgment of those who will take the pains to peruse it His way is this The Soul says he is united to the Body by those mutual actions that pass betwixt 'em but more especially by those more confused operations of sense and by the less distinct perceptions of mind And in his 37th chap. he tells us that homo alius alio idem seipso diver so tempore magis minúsve homo censeri debet For according to him the denomination of a Man as such consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body which is more especially perform'd by the operations of Sense Now I see not why that especially should denominate us men wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties why such a one should not be counted as much yea more a Man than he that lives more by sense That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense is very true but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in these more confused operations the difficulty would perhaps still return Nor shall I here dispute whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame or of the more principal Parts of the Body doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station and launch into those other unknown Regions or whether besides this there be not also requir'd which seems as probable as immediate an act of God to take it out as there was to put it into the Body only we may observe that God both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us by laying violent hands upon our selves to separate those whom God hath thus strictly joyned together that whatever natural tye it is under as to the Body 't is certain it ought not to quit its Station without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand the one by ascribing too little to the Body and too much to the Soul the other by attributing too much to the Body and too little to the Soul in the Accounts they give of humane Nature The Stoicks would make Man so wholly rational that they will scarce allow him to be sensible and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature and the Epicureans on the contrary make all the most noble Actions of the Soul meerly subservient to the designs of such Pleasure as is really below the true happiness of the Soul By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body all those motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites so far as they are natural The Design therefore of the Stoicks to root these Passions out of Humane Nature is First impossible Secondly it would be prejudicial thereunto were it feisible for these when duly regulated become the subject matter of moral Vertue and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Vertue Among the many charges brought against Stoicism that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious and the most unanswerable it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of ones self as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man far above any thing that is called Mortal and in some respects equal to God himself As for Repentance they look upon that as a mean thing far below the height of their attainments Innocence indeed is better than Repentance but for them to pretend unto it argues a great deal of Pride founded upon a bad understanding of their own State But this description which they give of a Wise Man is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds but
Communications of Divine Grace to Christians now under the Gospel 2. Suppose that God always made use of these imaginary Representations in the Conveyance of his Will to the Prophets will it therefore follow ad prophetizandum non esse opus perfectiore mente sed vividiore imaginatione Will it therefore follow that they did tantùm per imaginationem percipere Will it therefore follow that they did non nisi ope imaginationis percipere Though God in the wise methods of his Providence did make use of second Causes will it therefore follow that the whole Causality must be ascribed to them Could the Fancy alone or the Fancy and Understanding together rightly judge of the sense and meaning of those Representations without the further assistance of Divine Illumination to assert either of these would argue him either a bad Philosopher or a worse Divine so that it would be hard to conceive how these imaginary Representations without a more immediate interpretation of their sense and meaning would be any thing better than idle shows and insignificant appearances CHAP. III. Of natural Notions of Truth and Goodness THere is nothing that affords us more noble or more useful matter whereon to exercise our Speculations than a serious Enquiry into the respective natures of Truth Goodness which are things of so great Excellency in themselves and of such near relation to us that it doth not become a Man a Philosopher or a Christian to be ignorant of either 'T is observ'd by some that Pilate immediately upon his propounding that Question to our Saviour What is Truth He went forth not staying sor an Answer yet Providence hath not left us in the dark in things of this nature we have the certain Guides of Reason and Revelation as much as God thought fit to impart to us sufficient to satisfy all sober though not over-curious Enquiries sufficient to all the ends and purposes of this humane State Truth indeed both natural and reveal'd hath ever since its first appearance in the World variously suffer'd by the Ignorance of some and the Malice of others by the contrary and eager pretences of opposite Parties by the weaknesses and follies of Men and by the power and subtlety of the Devil and especially by that universal deluge of Sin and Wickedness which both upon a natural and moral account is very prejudicial to the concerns of Truth both as Vice is naturally destructive of good Principles and also as wicked Men are ready to believe though never so false what they think would be their Interest to be true Thus if we consider the state of the Gentile World in the first Ages we shall there find a very bad face of things For not to speak of the grossness of popular Errours and the no less impious than false apprehensions of the generality of the common sort the most exact Enquiries of their Philosophers were often false but always mixt with a great deal of uncertainty in their Discourses having commonly a contrary Sect and Company of Men that whatever was asserted by one was many times with as much vigour and equal probability of reason contradicted by another So that a sober and serious Enquirer after Truth though he might have reason enough not to profess himself a Sceptick but to believe that there was such a thing as truth yet he might then see too much cause to despair of ever finding the certain way that led to it among so many By-paths of errour and uncertainty And even now in the Christian World the many errours in Opinions and the more fatal Heresies of wicked practices do sufficiently-testify that Truth doth not enjoy such an undisturb'd Empire as might have been hop'd and wish'd since Christ's appearance in the Flesh. Now among all these disadvantages under which Truth always labour'd and even still labours Providence hath more especially provided these two ways for the preservation of it 1. By natural inscription upon the minds of men 2. By after revelation for the further illustration and confirmation of it And these two are as it were the two Pillars that have preserved it both from the deluge of Sin and the violence of all other opposition 1. Natural Inscription I hope I shall not need to desire the Reader not to impose any such gross sense upon this word as is inconsistent with the nature of an Immaterial Soul I shall here therefore first briefly explain what I mean by truth of first Inscription or natural Notions For the Defendant has always leave to state his own Question and to declare in what sence he undertakes the defence of it this I the rather intimate because some Men will put such a Sense upon these words innate imprinted or impress'd frequently made use of in this Question as none that I know of go about to defend First I do not here assert the Opinion of the Platonists concerning innate Ideas in all its circumstances I do not here suppose the Soul to praexist nor do I make all the knowledge we have in this state to be nothing but reminiscence or recollection of what we knew in the other Secondly These natural Notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and Ideots without any assistance from the outward Senses or without the help of some previous Cultivation For thus reason it self which yet we say is natural to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires some supervenient assistances before it arrive at the true exercise of it self and it is as much as I here contend for if these notions be in the same sense connatural to the Soul as reason it self is But Thirdly The use of our Understandings being first suppos'd that is our faculties labouring of no natural defect nor depriv'd of those other advantages that God and Nature have made necessary thereunto then our Souls have a native power of finding or framing such Principles or Propositions the Truth or Knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense or observation thus knowing what is meant by a whole and what by a part hence naturally results the truth of this Proposition totum est majus sui parte without being any ways oblig'd to sense for it Of this nature are those universal Propositions the truth whereof doth not depend upon the actual Existence of any thing as quicquid agit est c. Now I suppose we may easily discern a difference betwixt the Truth of such Propositions as these and those others which are brought by some to vie with those natural Notions viz. White is not black Fellowness is not sweetness c. I shall here 1. enquire into the grounds and reasons upon which Dr. Parker late Bishop of Oxford in his account of the Platonick Philosophy asserts Experimental Observation to be the great Rule and Measure of Truth And first he blames the Platonick Theology for resolving Knowledge into its first
towards his Neighbour by observing the great Rule of doing as he would be done by such an one tho' never so ignorant in other things yet contributes his share to the common good c. There is no doubt but he doth but then may we not rather argue thus that since Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that one single Proposition as indeed having no explicit notion of it and yet do their Duties both towards God their Neighbours and themselves that therefore they have some other way of coming to the Knowledge of their Duty without resolving the Laws of Nature into their proper Causes as it is called Dr. Lock the Ingenious Author of the Essay of humane Vnderstanding has spent the First Part of his Book wholly against these innate Principles relating either to Speculation or Practice One great objection that he brings against 'em is this that Children and Ideots have no apprehension of 'em and therefore they cannot be any original Impressions upon the minds of Men because if they were they would soonest appear in such these being suppos'd now to be in puris naturalibus not tinctur'd with any adventitious prejudices of Art or Education and upon this account also there cannot be pleaded that universal consent that is pretended to be given to these original Notions or common Principles seeing thus perhaps one third part of Mankind do not assent to ' em In Answer hereto 1. I observe that those who make this objection as I before intimated will not give the Defendant leave to state his own Question and explain his own sense and meaning of it but will put such a sense upon these words innatâ—â—â—r natural as if a thing could not be thus natural or innate to the Soul unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the Face that they must necessarily assent thereto even before by the common course of nature they are capable of assenting to any thing whereas those who defend this Question make these â—â—â—â—â—â—l or innate notions more conditional things depending upon the Concurrence of several other circumstances in order to the Souls exerting of ' em Thus the Ingenious Mr. Tyrrell has well observ'd of Mr. Hobs that he only takes the measure of humane nature from those Passions which precede the use of reason and as they first and chiesly shew themselves in Children and Fools and Persons unexperienc'd where as according to the Opinion of the best Philosophers we suppose the truer nature of man ought rather to be taken from his utmost perfection viz. his reason c. p. 256. So here 't is thought that the truer judgment of these natural notions ought to be taken rather from the most perfect state of Man rather than as they either do or do not show themselves in Children and Ideots And whereas 't is asserted that these general Maxims are assented to as soon as propos'd and the terms rightly understood to this the Ingenious Author Dr. Lock replies that then there must be an infinite number of innate notions even those which no one ever yet pretended to be such as an Apple is not an Oyster black is not white c. Now these and such as these he says are more readily assented to than those quicquid agit est contradictories cannot be both true at once c. because Children and Fools will readily assent to the former but these latter require more attentive-thought and consideration for the understanding of ' em I shall not here mention that distinction which the Logicians perhaps would make use of in this Case of some things being more known in themselves and yet not so to us because I know not what credit now a-days may be given to Men of that old-fashion'd way of thinking But the Ingenious Author himself doth assert these three ways of acquiring Knowledge First By intuition thus we have the knowledge of our being p. 318. Man also knows by intuitive certainly that bare nothing cannot produce any real being p. 312. The second way of Knowledge is by Reason Thirdly By Sensation Now the Knowledge of these Universal Truths or general Maxims I conceive is by the first way rather by intuition than by reasoning or by the consent or dissent of the terms For these Propositions Cogito ergo sum or that upon which this depends quicquid agit est bare nothing cannot produce a real being the truth of these Propositions doth not so much depend upon any consideration of the terms but seems rather the summary result of the whole which that Author seems very well to express by intuition or intuitive certainly But then as to those other Propositions wherein we deny one Idea of another as a Man is not an Horse blue is nor yellow c. The truth of these depends upon the actual existence of Things and the consensus dissensus terminorum But Mr. Norris the ingenious Author of the Reflections upon the foresaid Essay of Humane Vnderstanding pag. 20. doth not allow any such Things as Mental Impressions or Characters upon the Mind what way soever they may pretend to come there So that though he agrees with Dr. Lock in denying all natural and innate Notions in the Mind of Man yet it is for other Reasons than those which Dr. Lock goes upon and upon a far different Hypothesis So that Mr. Norris his Reflections may be a sufficient Answer to Dr. Lock 's Opinion as it is defended by him shewing the invalidity of the Grounds and Reasons upon which he founds it though in the mean time he agrees with him in the conclusion in denying all Natural and Native Characters upon the Soul Which thing says he in the place above cited Of Mental Impressions or Characters written upon the Mind if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor I take to be meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. But here I humbly conceive that when we speak of Natural Notions or Native Impressions of Truth and Goodness made upon the Minds of Men though perhaps there may be something of Metaphor in it yet the sense and meaning of it is generally understood nor is there any danger lest any one should hence conclude the Soul to be made of White-paper and the Knowledge we find there to be written with Pen and Ink Heb. 10. 26. I will put my laws in their hearts and in or upon their minds will I write them That is says Dr. Taylor Duct Dubit p. 4. You shall be govern'd by the Law of natural and essential Equity and Reason by that Law which is put into every Man's Nature and besides this whatsoever else shall be super-induc'd shall be written in their Minds by the Spirit who shall write all the Laws of Christianity in the Tables of your Consciences Now I do not see any need of any such curious Remark either upon the Text or Comment that if this pretend to any thing more than Figure or
of the Case before the Fall it is proportionably the same since for though the Fall did very much weaken our Facultics yet it did not wholly alter or invert the method of acquiring or retaining Knowledge There are indeed some who define an Idea to be nothing else but the similitude or representation of a thing made in the Brain which definition being so peculiarly appropriated to meer sense and fancy they cannot conceive any Idea or Conception to reside any where else and that we talk mystically and unintelligibly if we suppose any other Idea to which that definition doth not or cannot belong But tho' it may be justly question'd whether the mode of sensation be yet fully and clearly explicated viz. how the phancy can represent outward objects in proportionable similitudes to the superiour perceptive faculties seeing perhaps it would be very difficult to demonstrate that any thing besides motion can be communicated to the Seat of the Soul yet I shall at present grant that the Understanding doth make use of the Representations of the Phancy for the apprehending those things which were there first impress'd and thus I here suppose all material objects are apprehended by such sensible representations But now the Question is Whether the Understanding cannot frame right Notions or Apprehesions of those things which according to our modes of conception neither are nor can be represented by the Fancy Whether there be not some things knowable both moral and intellectual Objects relating both to Truth and Goodness which are not and cannot be the Objects of Sense So that whatever it is that terminates the Act of the Understanding that may be properly call'd an Idea Notion or Conception Nihil est intellectu quod non c. This cannot be universally true in that latitude wherein some would take it For Aristotle himself grants a Power of judging of drawing Consequences from particular Instances to the Understanding which doth not belong to the Sense and this Power I suppose will be granted to be something and indeed it is most probable that he did not extend that saying any further than as it relates only to sensible and material Objects One Argument commonly made use of to prove the Soul distinct from the Body doth also prove the Operations of Sense and Phancy distinct from those of the Understanding That Faculty of the Mind say they by which we reason and judge of Objects is so far from being a Body that it must withdraw it self from all bodily Representations when it sets it self to contemplate more speculative and sublime Truths for if the Soul should always frame its Notions according to the Notices of Sense this would only betray it into Errour but now when it abstracts from this and with Reason corrects what may be there justly deem'd amiss this evidently shews the distinction of these two Faculties and the superiority of the one above the other So that that opinion w ch makes the Soul so wholly to depend upon the representations of sense in all its operations seems to have a bad influence upon the belief of its immateriality or however upon the excellency of its way of acting by making it more subject to the Body than God and Nature ever made it Those therefore who either from the observation of the accidental bad use that some Men make of the distinction of these two Faculties or from the difficulty they themselves find in assigning the differences betwixt 'em are therefore enclin'd to believe that there is no difference at all These Men like unskilful Artists do rather cut then loose the knot and like those inconsiderate Men who from the difficulties and seeming irregularities of Providence or from their own inabilities or unwillingness to take the pains to solve 'em do take as they think this more compendious way to extricate themselves viz. to deny that there is any such thing as Providence in the World But it is here objected that the opinion which I here assert lays a Foundation for Fanaticism and Enthusiasm as it gives occasions for the Enthusiasts to think that those Men are too much immers'd in matter and too great Slaves to sense and fancy who do not presently apprehend their pretended illuminations and mysterious non-sense I shall here therefore briefly show wherein the nature of Enthusiasm doth properly consist and that this opinion which I here assert is no ways chargeable with giving any occasion or encouragement to it But 1. we may observe that God in the wise disposals of his Providence has many times plac'd truth upon the Confines of Errour nor is it any disparagement to it if sometimes by reason of this Vicinity it may accidentally give occasion to it This should rather teach us the true exercise of our Understandings to distinguish betwixt the false glosses and plausible appearances of Errour and the realities of Truth 2. I shall not here go about to recriminate for to asperse other Men's Opinions is not to vindicate our own for though they may be charg'd with as bad Consequences as those they cast upon ours yet this will not make our own innocent if they be in themselves obnoxious I might perhaps with as much or more reason charge Aristotle's Opinion Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius erat in sensu with giving countenance to Atheism as the contrary doth to Enthusiasm Dr. Cudworth's 5th Chap. Intellectual Systeme This being briesly premis'd I answer That according to the most rational account of Enthusiasm which founds it only in some irregular and turbulent Motions arising from the Body and acted more especially upon the Scene of Fancy according to this I do not see how the aforesaid Opinion hath any more influence upon Enthusiasm than it has upon any other Errours and false Opinions whatever Thus the Enthusiast together with most other erring persons do take their own mistaken Fancy and false Apprehensions for the Dictates of Reason and Understanding So that Enthusiasm seems rather sounded in the contrary Opinion in not distinguishing betwixt these two and the Enthusiast of all others seems the least chargeable with this Errour if it be one of distinguishing betwixt the Phantasins of Sense and Imagination and the Ideas of the Understanding for as such he scarcely acknowledges any higher Faculty in the Soul than that of Phancy So that that Opinion of distinguishing betwixt the Representations of Sense and the Idea's of the Understanding hath not any natural tendency to favour Enthusiasm unless we make it the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first grand Foundation of all Errours and mistakes in general for almost all erring persons do tell those that differ from 'em that either they are not speculative enough rightly to apprehend their Notions or that they are too much prejudic'd with false Opinions readily to entertain them As an Appendix to this Chapter I shall add some short Reflections upon the 10th Chap. 3. lib. of P. Poiret's Cogitat rationales de Deo and
under that mean design of self-preservation in the narrowest sense as if right reason had no other or higher end and design than that of a Man's private security here in this World It would be tedious to reckon up all those several Senses which in several places he gives to those words accordingly as may best serve the purpose he is then about Now in the midst of these various Significantions how must we interpret those places where he tells us That the Dispositions of Men are naturally such that unless they be restrained through fear every Man will distrust and dread each other that Men by Nature are in such a state wherein their Wills are their supreamest Law with respect to their Self-preservation How shall we know whether by Nature here be meant the Dictates of right reason truly so call'd or only the irregular motions of Passion and sensitive Appetite But I shall here leave Mr. Hobbs to the just severity of his own censure and a little examine Chap. 13. of his Leviathan wherein he makes the State of Nature a State of Equality and a State of War These are the two imaginary Poles upon which his State of Nature moves First He tells us That Men are by Nature equal 1. As for strength of Body the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest and to kill is the greatest thing and they that can do the greatest thing are equal quod erat demonstrandum The Confutation of some kind of errors may give occasion to something worth the Writer's Thoughts or the Reader 's Pains but the confuting of such insipid stuff as this cannot but be tedious to both By this way of arguing he might prove that the meanest Creature in Nature is or may be equal to Man For did not a Fly once kill a Pope And may not a Spider poyson an Emperor But then how this should become a Principle of Policy any other way than as by considering this casual Power which the weakest Man or meanest Creature may have over us thereby to incite our utmost care and circumspection and to beget in us an inoffensive behaviour towards all Men how I say this should be an Argument to prove the natural equality of all Men as the Phrase is us'd in Politicks is hard to understand Then as to the Faculties of the Mind he says he finds a greater equality among Men than that of strength of Body for Prudence is nothing but Experience which equal time gives equally to all but suppose that Men were equal as to Prudence which yet is evidently false yet there are other faculties or habits of the Mind wherein one Man may excel another Here it is not material to enquire whether the Souls of Men were equal as to their first Creation we are now to consider 'em in a more complex'd capacity as join'd with such and such Bodies wherein we find as much variety in their several abilities and inclinations now as if they were really created unequal but certainly Prudence must be something more than mere Experience for Prudence is a further habit super-induc'd upon the Faculty whereby we are enabled to manage our affairs according to the Rules of Reason and Equity thus Experience to Prudence is but as undigested meat to the nourishment of the Body Experience indeed may collect general Rules for the mannagement of the affairs of Life but then it is Prudence which by considering matters of fact in all their Circumstances by comparing them with the present state of things and the possibilities of future contingencies doth as it were digest experience into laudable nourishment but if we did suppose Men equal in their natural yet it will not thence follow that they are so in their Political capacity too For since Men did not at first spring out of the Earth like Mushrooms but came into the World by the ordinary methods of Generation by way of Father and Son therefore there must needs be a subordination and inferiority among 'em a dependance upon one another in respect of Causality and an Obligation in respect of Duty and Obedience Nor secondly is the state of Nature a state of War if any two men says Mr. Hobbs desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy they become Enemies and in their way to their end endeavour to destroy or subdue each other If he speak this in reference to Dominion or Empire that common Mistress courted by all as he says in the state of Nature it may be justly question'd whether all do thus inordinately affect superiority and whether all find themselves thus naturally enclin'd to destroy those that seem to stand betwixt them and the Throne or are there not some more modestly vertuous who out of consciousness of their own inabilities and out of due respect to other Mens Merits above their own who would quit their pretences to Empire and willingly live in obedience to others Is it not inordinate Pride and Ambition rather than the dictates of nature and right reason in those who thus unreasonably aim at nothing less than a Crown Secondly These natural Usurpers do not make use of the most proper means in order to their own self-preservation Here I would only apply Mr. H. his own way and method of reasoning against the attempt of obtaining Soveraignty by Rebellion to the present Case Pa. 73. Lev. 'T is manifest says be that though the event should follow yet because it cannot reasonably be expected but rather the contrary and because by gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like manner the attempt thereof is against reason Now doth not this equally hold good against the attempt which these natural Usurpers do propound to themselves of an Universal Empire would not the great hazard of any ones particular design succeeding make the action in Mr. Hobbs his own account very unreasonable So that there is but little reason for Men to betake themselves to that way of anticipation in this state of nature that is for a Man to endeavour to Master all before him so long till he see no other Power great enough to endanger him seeing that very equality which he supposes should more effectually perswade 'em to Peace or some more Friendly way of composing differences rather than urge 'em to War seeing no single Person can in reason ever hope to attain to Empire since he must always have ten thousand as strong and as cunning as himself to oppose all his designs Thus that equality which seems to give him right doth at the same time hinder him from the actual procurement of it He grants indeed That this condition of War was never generally over all the World yet he says in many places they live so now for the Savage people in many places of America except the Government of small Families the Concord whereof depends upon natural Lust have no Government at all c. But how is Government though of small Families consistent
that notion which he hath fram'd of a Kingdom as to its first Constitution which must be by conferring Rights by mutual Compacts and Covenants being an acquisition of power over their Subjects by their own consent Now he fancies though without any good grounds that the People of the Iews under Abraham and Moses were such a Kingdom wherein the People did transfer their Rights and did mutually Covenant with God for the Constitution of a Kingdom according to his own Notion whereas indeed there was no more drawing of Articles whereby God did acquire any more new right over them then than there is now under the New Testament 2. Supposing that this formal transferring of rights was necessary to the constituting of a Kingdom amongst Men yet it will not follow hence that God too must acquire his right of Government the same way for certainly God's right of Commanding doth not depend upon the Peoples Choice and willingness to obey 3. Though Christians do not go about to chuse God their Soveraign as they do a King in Elective Kingdoms by majority of Votes yet their very taking upon them the profession of Christianity and expecting Salvation upon its own terms doth imply a tacitCompact Thus the New Testament is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Covenant too So that the Church on Earth may as properly be call'd the Kingdom of Christ now as the People of the Iews the Kingdom of God then and Mr. Hobs himself tells us Ch. 31. Levi. that to reign in the proper acceptation of the word is to rule by commanding threatning and promising Now why may not Christ be now said properly to rule by his word and laws that is by commanding threatning and promising But let us examine the reasons why the Church upon Earth cannot be call'd the Kingdom of Christ All that is there offer'd is Errori huic quod Ecclesia qu. e nunc est in terris c. Here he calls it an errour supposing that he had prov'd it so in his 35 Ch. Where he purposely insists upon this Argument There he tells us that the Kingdom of God by Divines is sometimes taken for that Eternal Happiness which the Blessed shall enjoy in the Kingdom of Glory Sometimes it is taken for the Kingdom of Grace here on Earth But here he doth not prove which he ought to have done that these are false and improper Interpretations of the word or inconsistent with the true sense of those places where the Divines so interpret them only he says contra in Scripturis Sacris invenio regnum Dei ubique fere significare regnum proprtè dictum c. Now this one word fere almost doth quite invalidate the force of all his Argument for granting that the Kingdom of God is sometimes taken in that sense of his before-mention'd which yet will be very hard for him to prove yet if there be other places wherein that word occurs which cannot so be interpreted then that is not the necessary and constant sense and meaning of it I shall here briefly examine those places of Scripture which he draws rather than leads to the confirming his own Notion Gen. 17. 7. And I will establish my Covenant between me and thee and thy Seed after thee in their Generations for an Everlasting Covenant to be a God unto thee and to thy Seed after thee Here he says Abraham promis'd to obey God for himself and his Posterity but indeed he doth not mention one word to any such purpose so that there was no transferring of rights no inducing obligations per verba in praesenti but all the reason that Mr. Hobbs had to cite this place in favour of his Opinion seems only this because there is mention made of a Covenant and he supposes all Covenants must be made according to his own Model but I might as well cite Ier. 31. 31. where God promises to make a new Covenant with the House of Israel after those days c. Which is to be understood of the coming of the Messias in the Flesh to prove a Kingdom of God properly so call'd now under the Gospel as this of Gen. is cited to prove it then Another place is Exod. 19. 5. If ye will hear my Voice and keep my Covenant ye shall be to me a peculiar people c. these are the words that thou shalt speak to the People And Moses call'd the Elders of the People and laid before their Faces all these words which the Lord commanded him and all the People answered together and said All that the Lord hath spoken we will do Here God seems to require the consent of the People for the ratifying of his Covenant To this I Answer 1. That these and such like Covenants though they have so much of the nature of a Compact as that the Blessings therein promis'd are conditional and to be obtain'd only by the performance of the Conditions yet upon the whole they seem rather conferring of benefits than severe stipulations so that the conditions being propos'd no one that hath the use of reason will refuse to comply with ' em 2. Though God commanded Moses to declare his Covenant to his People yet it cannot be suppos'd that the obligation did depend merely upon their acceptance for God had right to command what he there requir'd though he had not join'd to the observance of his Laws such particular Rewards 3. God might have particular Reasons to deal in this more sensible manner with the Iews in complyance with their imperfections out of tenderness of affection to 'em to let 'em see that he requir'd their own consent to what he enjoin'd 'em hereby to lay a great sense of obligation upon 'em because if they now rebell'd they would not only break their natural Laws of duty to him as God but also violate their own Promises Consequent upon this errour that the Church now on Earth is the Kingdom of Christ and that there ought to be one Man or a Company of Men by whom our Saviour now in Heaven speaks to Men on Earth consequent to this it is that the Pope challenges an Universal Power c. That which I here first observe is his artificial sliding of these two Propositions together viz. That the Church on Earth is the Kingdom of Christ and that there ought to be one Man or one Company of Men which should rule the same as universal head under him hereby to impose upon the unwary Roader as if they were Propositions altogether of the same import whereas the one is only a false consequence drawn from the other but it is no unusual Artifice with Mr Hobbs to charge false Inferences upon true Principles thus if possible to disparage what he is not able otherwise solidly to disprove but by the same way of arguing he may prove that there is no God from those Superstitious and Idolatrous Practices which are accidentally consequent upon and occasion'd by the belief of a Deity for if there were no
est utilis He tells us p. 48. That the Discourses which the Apostles made before their Iudges did not contain any thing which one might not as well say without inspiration But to prove the Apostles divinely inspir'd we do not only consider what they said but also what they did upon those occasions I do not here speak of the Miracles done by the Apostles but those practical Resolutions and pious Performances consequent upon theirinward Perswasions and Convictions 2. What the Apostles said and did in those Circumstances then were greater and stronger Arguments of their being inspir'd than any thing of the like nature would be to us now and the Reason is because the Gospel was a Religion then newly reveal'd and not grown as it were habitual to 'em by a long-continued Belief of it they acted not only against all the Power and Authority of the World which was then vigorously set against 'em but also against their own late Principles and Practices of a different Religion and they successfully attempted and perform'd such things which nothing but a Divine Impulse could prevail with a prudent man to undertake Upon the whole this Author seems very much to resemble Mr. Hobbs in his Arguings he would have the liberty of putting what Interpretations he pleases upon places of Scripture and then puts his Adversary to disprove 'em and this is that wherein the strength of his Plea doth generally consist But I humbly conceive that whereas he goes about to advance a novel opinion he ought first by positive Arguments to consute the sormer and prove that those Interpretations formerly put upon those places of Scripture are neither agreeable to the true sense of the Words nor to the analogy of Faith and not think it sufficient for him in this case to tell us That such or such a place may be interpreted so or so Thus p. 177. 't is remarkable how industriously he labours to put the Proof upon Mons. Simon it being Mr. N's as this Author is call'd usual way rather to suppose than prove any thing Thus in the very next Page 178. he vigorously supposes these two things 1. That St. Paul Acts 23. speaks not there as a Prophet but as a meer private Person 2. That he confesses himself to blame in giving such Language to the High-Priest but offers not the least thing in proof of either only makes the one Supposal to prove the other the latter to prove the former But if St. Paul spoke as a Prophet as the generality of Interpreters do assert and nothing here offer'd to prove the contrary then we cannot in reason suppose him to beg Pardon for what he spoke as such and therefore some other Interpretation ought to be put upon that place ERRATA PAge 3. line 6. for aed read and p. 6. l. 22. a comma only p. 11. l. 22. r. effectual p. 17. l. 28. for dispose r. depose p. 18. l. 26. for the r. their p. 19. l. 28. make a comma at Service l. 29. dele Semicolon p. 33. l. 1. for motions r. motives p. 42. l. 15. for they r. thus p. 44. l. 25. for it is r. is it p. 55. l. 26. dele his p. 86. l. 26. for and r. but p. 89. l. 14. dele Colon p. 107. l. 12. after God and says he p. 145. l. 19. for it r. this p. 160. l. 28. for awfully r. lawfully p. 184. l. 20. for now r. more p. 188. l. 6. add what to the beginning of the line p. 189. l. 14. r. Martyr p. 190. l. 26. r. contradistinctions p. 194. l. 15. for principal r. principle p. 196. l. 2. after Kingdom add or p. 103. l. 23. for viz. that r. and p. 196. l. 26. add to in the beginning of the line p. 57. l. 12. for we r. he in the running Title of Chap. 8. for of r. upon p. 141. l. 5. add For if Arguments drawn from Natural Reason have no force of themselves to prove a God antecedent to Divine Revelution I do not see how they can have any afterwards and if they be such as any ways depend upon Divine Revelation so far will they be of less force to convince an Atheist Thus Simplicius prays that be may be mindful of this Nobility of Nature