usefulnesse and convenience Pleasant Good is which is coveted for its pleasure and delight which it affordeth These two are not to be desired for their own sake but for their covenience and pleasure which do accompany them This Division is erroneous upon a double account 1. Because Good doth not formally include in its formal concept any delight usefulnesse or honesty but onely a perfectionation 2. The dividing members cannot be equally attributed to all the kinds of good and therefore the distribution is illegitimate IV. Good according to the subject wherein it is inherent or according the appetite through which it is coveted is either Natural Sensible or Moral Natural Good is which is coveted from a natural Being The appetite through which natural Beings do covet Good is commonly called a natural Propensity or Inclination Sensible Good is which is coveted by living creatures Their appetite is called a sensitive appetite Moral Good is which is coveted by man His appetite is otherwise known by the word Will. Before I conclude this Chapter I must intreat you to remember and take notice of the several acceptions and distinct significations of Natural Supernatural Counter-natural Preter-natural of Good Moral Good and Theologick Good For you are to interpret their significations variously otherwise you will much mistake my meaning CHAP. VI. Of the greatest and highest Good 1. A further illustration of the greatest Good 2. That the highest Good is the neerest end of Natural Theology 3. What the Summum Bonum is otherwise called That the greatest Good is our last end 4. The inexpressible Joy which the soul obtains in possessing the greatest Good 5. Two great benefits which the soul receiveth from the Summum Bonum I. IT was necessary for you first to know what Good was in General before you could conceive what the highest Good is So then having laid down the Doctrine of Good in short it now remains to open to you what the greatest Good is The greatest Good is that which doth make us most perfect and that is God alone I prove it There is nothing can perfectionate usmost but God alone Wherefore he is the onely Summum Bonum II. The highest Good is the neerest end of Natural Theology I prove it That which we do immediately and neerest incline unto and covet is the neerest end But we do immediately and neerest covet and incline unto the Summum Bonum Wherefore the Summum Bonum is the neerest end I confirm the Minor We do immediately covet that which doth perfectionate us because it is out of necessity The necessity appears in this in that we must live to God for without him we cannot live or exist and consequently we cannot be perfectionated without him Now that which is most necessary must precede that which is lesse necessary for it is possible for us to live without happinesse and only to enjoy our being if God had so pleased And therefore happinesse is not absolutely necessary but is superadded to this our appetite meerly from Gods bounty We ought first to bend and incline to God because he is our Summum Bonum and doth perfectionate us and not only because he doth make us happy In this bending to God we answer to our end and are true beings The same is also witnessed by Scripture Prov. 16. God hath made all things for himself III. Summum Bonum is otherwise called our last End because it is that in which all our good Actions seem to terminate I prove that the greatest Good and happiness is our last End All Trades and Professions tend to make provision for mans life This provision as meat and drink c. serveth to keep the Body in repair that so it may continue a convenient mansion for the Soul and serve her through its organs The prime organs are the inward and outward Senses which are subservient to the Soul in advertising her of all things which may be prejudicial to man and in pleasing her by conveying the objects of all external beings to her and commending them to her Contemplation which doth chiefly consist in the discovery of the causes of all things The Soul being now brought and seated in the midst of her speculations doth not come to any rest or satisfaction there but still maketh way and passeth through them untill she arrives to the last object and its last end which is the farthest she can dyve This last object is God because he is the last end of our contemplations for beyond him we cannot conceive or think any thing It is also certain that all beings have their end and are terminated by it This doth infer that the actions of man must also have their end The principal actions of man are them of the Soul to wit his understanding The understanding is not terminated by any material substance for it can think and understand beyond it neither are created immaterial substances objects beyond which the Soul of man cannot imagine for it doth imagine know and understand God but beyond God it can imagine nothing All Beings have their causes them causes have other causes these other causes at last must owe their being to one first Cause otherwise causes would be infinite which is repugnant Wherefore we cannot think beyond the first Cause IV. The Soul having sublimed her self into a most sublime thought of God there she resteth and admireth his great power in giving a Being to all sublunary and superlunary things She admireth his wisdome and providence in preserving them all She is astonisht at his infinite love towards mankind in Breathing his Essence out of his own brest The joy and acquiessence which the Soul findeth in the contemplation of this last End and first Cause is so great and unexpressible that there is nothing in this vast World to resemble it unto but to it self Thus I have demonstrated how all the Actions of man tend to one last End and Summum Bonum V. From the Greatest Good we receive two benefits First it makes us most perfect and most happy Secondly it terminates our faculties for in all other Things we can find no rest but in the Summum Bonum only All other things can give us no rest because they are ordained for a further end and subject to changes and alterations every moment but the Summum Bonum is the same for ever and ever As for the happiness which doth redound from the possession of the Summum Bonum it is a Joy and contentment beyond expression None is capable of conceiving what it is except they who are the possessors of it The joy is such that if a man hapneth to it and is confirmed in it he can never desert it a moments want of it would seem to be the greatest misery CHAP. VII Of the false Summum Bonum 1. The Summum Bonum of the Epicureans unfolded and rejected 2. That Wealth is a greater torment than a Summum Bonum The Riches of Seneca That we ought to
That the evil habit inheres in the soul per se. 3. In what manner the Habit of good is taken to inhere per se in the soul. 4. That God created every man theologically good Several Objections relating to the same assertion answered 5. How the soul partaketh of the guilt of Original Sinne. The opinion of the Synod of Rochel upon this matter I. NOw we may easily explain how two contrary habits can inhere in one and the same subject No question it is impossible two contraries should inhere both per se in one subject for the nature of contraries is to expell one another out of the same subject Yet it is not repugnant but that two contrary habits may inhere both in one subject provided the one exist in it per se and the other per accidens or that they be not inherent in one partial subject although they may in the total for it is possible for a man to be afflicted with two contrary diseases in two parts of his body yet both are sustained by one total subject In like manner may the evil habit be principally and originally inherent in the body and the good habit in the soul yet both these are contained in one man II. Notwithstanding all this there are some who obstinately do affirm that the evil habit inheres in the soul per se but how do they prove it Certainly upon these suppositions 1. That the habits may be altered and the substance remain the same 2. That the first man acted through habits 3. That the good habit being removed the evil habit succeeded in its steed and consequently that an Accident doth migrate è subjecto in subjectum which is against their own maxims These suppositions being all false as hath been proved at large cannot be a firm foundation for any conclusion whatever they have built upon them And therefore I conclude again 1. That in the first man there was a natural disposition of acting good but no habit 2. That there became two habits in man after his fall the one of good and the other of evil III. That the habit of good inheres in man per se Quatenus actionis principium dicatur anima inest ei habitus bonus per se aut prout habitus sit accidens secundum istud potest animae attributi inesse per accidens quia ipse habitus est accidens quae tamen mihi est in usitata locutio And the habit of evil per accidens Non quatenus proficiscatur ab anima tanquam à mali principio sed duntaxat quatenus sit animae instrumentum Here one may object If an evil act proceed per se from the soul than the evil habit is also inherent in her per se. As to this the same I may argue from a good act and thence infer the inherence of the good habit per se. But it is certain that two contrary opposites secundum idem ad idem cannot exist together at the same instant in the same subject so that the one habit must necessarily inesse per se and the other per accidens Before I go farther let me tell you once for all when I say that the good habit is per se in man I do not imply that it is ex se but è Dei gratia è voluntate potentia divina ordinata to deny this is to rob God of his honour and is no lesse than a blasphemy wherefore it ought to be a great caution to all men how they assert good habits per se or good works per se lest they offend IV. God creates every man theologically good that is God infuseth the soul theologically good into the body being good also for otherwise God would be supposed to joyn good to evil How could the body be evil before the advent of the soul If it were evil it must be morally evil for there is no doubt but it was and remaineth physically good but that cannot be admitted because there is no moral evil without a rational will Good and evil is taken in a double sense 1. Good or evil is that which is agreeable or disagreeable with the Law of God 2. Good or evil is which is convenient and sutable or inconvenient and unsutable to a being According to the first acception The soul is infused good into a good body because of the reason fore-mentioned But according to the last it is not Here may be demanded Whether it agreeth with God's goodnesse to infuse a good soul into an unsutable body I answer That it doth not detract one title from God's goodnesse for he hath ordained that man should multiply and increase and therefore hath given man a power of increasing and multiplying The power which man exerciseth to multiply is through propagation of his body only and uniting the soul to it The body being then prepared for the souls reception the soul at that instant is raised out of the body è potentia materiae receptiva not out of it as è materiali principio eductivo like unto material forms but by the divine power which is ever present where God hath ordained his benediction so that God doth not withdraw his power of creating a soul when ever a body is prepared for it although that body is generated by the worst of men because God hath ordained it for God doth create a soul not because a wicked man hath disposed a body for the reception of it but because of his ordained blessing to mans increase V. The soul being united to the body immediately partaketh of the guilt of original sinne What original sinne is me thinks is not distinctly expounded by our ordinary institutionists They say It is a natural disposition to evil naturally descending from Adam to all men it is that which is called The sinne dwelling in man The Law of our members The old man The flesh The body of sinne c. First I demand What sinne is I shall be answered That it is a breach of God's Law Ergo A sinne is an act for to break God's Law is to act against God's Law A disposition say they is whereby an agent can act Ergo A disposition to sinne is no sinne because a disposition is no act but whereby we can or do act So that original sinne is the first act of sinne which the first man acted who comprehending in him whole mankind since all men were to descend from him the sinne which he acted was also acted by whole mankind and consequently the guilt of that sinne is imputed to every man The habit of sinne being entered through one act whereby we are render'd prone to evil and commit actual sinne or do act sinne the same habit and disposition hath also ceased on all mankind So that original is rather the first actual sinne after which followed the habit of sinning and with the original or first sinne of man the habit of sinning is withall communicated to mans posterity This very sense
substantia agens acting substance which if so then an accident is not really distinguisht from a substance and a substance must be conceived to act immediately through her self Aristotle lib. de respir. describes life to be the permansion or abiding of the vegetable foul with the heat From which that of Scaliger exercit 202. sect 5. is little different Life is the union of the soul with the body Here the Philosopher appears only to describe life to be a duration which is but an accident neither doth Scaliger's union signifie any thing more 2. They distinguish the soul really from the heat and body which in the same sense are identificated The matter and form of life of a living substance or a Plant are originally the matter and form of the Elements That the matter of living substances is Elementary there are few or none among the wandring Philosophers but will assert it with me yet as for their form their great Master hath obliged them to deny it to be Elementary and to state it to be of no baser a rice than Coelestial Give me leave here to make inquiry what it is they imply for a form Is it the vegetable soul which Aristotle makes mention of in his definition of life Or is it the soul together with the heat wherein it is detained which is accounted of an extract equally noble with her Be it how it will the soul is really distinguisht by them from the matter and from the Celestial heat here they take heat in a sense common with Physicians for Calidum innatum that is heat residing it the radical moisture its subject and acknowledged for a form So likewise the heat Calidum innatum is diversified from the matter and from the soul wherefore it is neither matter or form What then Their confession owns it to be a body Celestial and therefore no Elementary matter Were I tied to defend their tenents I should answer that there was a twofold matter to be conceived in every living body the one Celestial and the other Elementary But then again one might justly reply That beings are not to be multiplied beyond necessity They do answer for themselves That it is to be imagined a tye vinculum whereby the soul is tied to the body So then according to this Doctrine of theirs I should understand the vegetable soul to be immaterial and of the same nature in respect to its rice and immortality with the rational soul for even that is in like manner tied to the body by means of the Calidum innatum and are both apprehended by Aristotle to be Celestial of no mixt body and really differing from their matter If so the vegetable soul must be received for immortal as being subject to no corruption or dissolution because it is Celestial and consequently a single Essence without any composition and to which no sublunary agent can be contrary But again how can it be a single essence since it is divisible and therefore consisteth of a quantitative extension and is a totum integrale Such is their Philosophy full of contradictions and errours In the next place I would willingly know how this innate heat together with its primogenial moisture may properly be termed Celestial since it is not freed from corruption and dissolution whereas all Celestial bodies are exempted from dissolution and therefore the Philosopher takes them for eternal Are not coldness and dryness as much necessary per se for life as heat and moisture Are heat and moisture sole agents without coldness or dryness or are fire and water sufficient principles for actuating life In no wise for as you have read they are uncapable of existing in one subject unless accompanied by air and earth II. Wherefore I say That the form of life is spirits or subtilities of the Elements united in mixtion and a just temperament Spirits are derived from the word spiro I breathe as being bodies no less subtil than a breath Their constitution is out of the best concocted temperated and nearest united parts of the Elements in which parts the Elements embracing one another so arctly minutely and intimately do of a necessity separate themselves from the courser parts of the mixture and so become moveable through the said course parts they acquire withal a great force through the predominancy of fire condensed by earthy minim's and glued together by incrassated air The force and agility in motion of the influent Spirits depends upon the compression of the weighty parts of the body depressing the said spirits out of their places because they hinder the weighty parts from their center which being through their incrassated air naturally gendred glib and slippery do the easier yield to slip out and in from one place to another The efficient of spirits is the universal external heat viz. The Celestial heat mainly proceeding from the greater mixt bodies contained within the heavens For although the peregrin Element's contained within the earth are capable enough of uniting themselves and constituting a mixt body through their proper form yet they remain unable of uniting themselves so arctly as thereby to become spiritous and constitute a living substance wherefore they do stand in need of the external efficiency of the Celestial bodies which through their subtil heat do accelerate their most intimate union in uniting the internal heat before dispersed through the parts of a body to a center whereunto they could not reach without the arct and firm adherence of some incrassated aerial and terrestrial parts which here are yet more closely united into one and refined from their grosser parts Hence it is that Vegetables are no where generated but where a sufficient influence may arrive from the Celestial bodies and for this reason the earth at a certain depth doth not harbour any living Creature as any Vermine or Plants but only near to its Surface The qualification or gradual distinction of this heat partially effects the difference of living bodies for to such a Vegetable only such a degree and qualification of Celestial heat is requisite and to another another and withal observe that this efficient heat doth not become formal neither doth it unite it self to the intrinsick heat of a Plant but exhales after the execution of its office The reason is because it is in many particulars unlike to the internal spirit of a Vegetable and therefore being unfit to be united to it must consequently after the performance of its function expire The spirits predominating in fire reside in an incrassated air the which being continuated throughout the whole matter is the immediate subject whereby the spirits are likewise extended throughout the same body and are although mediately rendred continuous III. The properties of a vegetative form are to be moveable forcible actually warm mollifying attractive recentive concocting expulsive nutritive accretive and plastick The two former I have touched just before Touching the third I say those spirits are actually warm but not sensible to our
of the first knock or division of the Chaos By what means the Earth got the Center and how the waters Ayr and Fire got above it Why a Squib turnes into so many whirles in the Ayr. ib. 6. The qualifications of the first Light of the Creation A plain demonstration proving the circular motion of the Heavens or of the Element of fire to be natural and of an Eval Duration ib. 59 CHAP. XI Of the second Division of the Chaos 1. An Enarration of Effects befalling the Elements through the second knock The proportion of each of the Elements in their purity to the Peregrine Elements p. 60. 2. The ground of the forementioned proportion of the Elements 61 62. 3. That fire and ayr constitute the Firmament p. 63. 4. A grand Objection answered ib. 64. CHAP. XII Of the Third Division of the Chaos 1. The effects of the third knock Why earth is heavier than water Why water is more weighty near the top than towards the bottom Why a man when he is drowned doth not go down to the bottom of the Ocean Why a potch'd Egge doth commonly rest it self about the middle of the water in a Skillet Why the middle parts of Salt-water are more saltish than the upper parts p. 66 67. 2. Whence the earth hapned to be thrust out into great protuberancies How the earth arrived to be disposed to germination of Plants A vast Grove pressed into the earth p. 68. 3. The cause of the waters continual circular motion ib. 69. 4. The cause of the rise of such a variety of Plants p. 71. CHAP. XIII Of the Fourth Fifth Sixth and Seventh Division of the Chaos 1. An Enarration of the Effects of the fourth Division That Nature created the first bodies of every Species the greatest is instanced in Bees Fishes and Fowl That all Species are derived from one individuum That Adam was the greatest man that ever was since the Creation What those Glants were which the Poets faigned p. 72 73 74. 2. How the Sun and Moon were created That a Lioness is not more vigorous than a Lion p. 75. 3. How the Stars of the Firmament were created p. 76. 4. How the durable Clouds of the Ayr were created ib. 5. The Effects of the fifth Division ib. 6. The Effects of the sixth Division ib. 7. The Effects of the last Division ib. CHAP. XIV Of the Second and Third Absolute Qualities of the Elements 1. What is understood by Second Qualities p 78. 2. What the Second Quality of Earth is p. 79. 3. Aristotle's Definition of Density rejected ib. 4. The Opinions of Philosophers touching the Nature of Density p. 80. 5. The forementioned Opinions confuted p. 81. 6. The Description of Indivisibles according to Democritus disproved That all Figures are divisible excepting a Circular Minimum That Strength united proveth strongest in around Figure and why ib. 82 83. 7. What the Second Quality of Fire is Cardan Averrhoes Zimara Aristotle Tolet and Zabarel their Opinions touching the Nature of Rarity confuted p. 84 85 86 87. 8. The Second Quality of Water Aristotle Joh. Grammat Tolet Zabarel and Barthol their sence of Thickness and Thinness disproved p. 88. 9. What the Second Quality of Ayr is p. 89. 10. What is intended by third fourth or fifth Qualities An Enumeration of the said Qualities What Obtuseness Acuteness Asperity Levor Hardness Rigidity Softness Solidity Liquidity and Lentor are and their kinds ib. 90 91 92. CHAP. XV. Of the Respective Qualities of the Eements particularly of Fire Earth and Water 1. What is meant by the Respective Qualities of the Elements Why they are termed Second Qualities p. 93. 2. That heat is the second respective or accidental quality of fire That fire is not burning hot within its own Region That fire doth not burn unless it flames is proved by an Experiment through Aq. fort ib. 3. That heat in fire is violently produced The manner of the production of a Flame What it is which we call hot warm or burning How fire dissolves and consumes a body into ashes p. 94. 4. That Heat is nothing else but a Multiplication Condensation and Retention of the parts of fire The degrees of Heat in fire and how it cometh to be warm hot scorching hot blistering hot burning hot and consuming hot p. 95. 5. A way how to try the force of fire by Scales Why fire doth not alwayes feel hot in the Ayr. ib. 96. 6. Plato and Scaliger their Opinion touching heat p. 97. 7. The Parepatetick Description of Heat rejected How fire separateth Silver from Gold and Lead from Silver p. 98. 8. What the second respective quality of Earth is What Cold is The manner of operation of Cold upon our Tâ—â—ct p. 100. 9. The second respective quality of Water That Water cooles differently from Earth ib. 10. Aristotle and Zabarel their wavering Opinions touching Cold. That Earth is the primum frigidum ib. 101. CHAP. XVI Of the remaining Respective Qualilities of the Elements 1. The second Respective Quality of the Ayr. That water cannot be really and essentially attenuated The state of the Controversie 102 103. 2. That Ayr cannot be really and essentially incrassated Why a man whilest he is alive sinkes down into the water and is drowned and afterwards is cast up again That a woman is longer in sinking or drowning than a man The great errour committed in trying of witches by casting them into the water p. 104 105 106. 3. That a greater Condensation or Rarefaction is impossible in the Earth p. 107. 4. In what sense the Author understands and intends Rarefaction and Condensation throughout his Philosophy p. 108. 5. The third Respective Quality of Fire What Driness is The definition of Moysture The third Respective Qualities of water and Ayr. Aristotles description of Moysture That Water is the primum humidum In what sense Ayr is termed dry in what moyst p. 109. CHAP. XVII Of Mixtion 1. What Mixtion is Three conditions required in a Mixtion p 110. 2. Whether Mixtion and the generation of a mixt body differ really p. 111. 3. Aristotles definition of Mixtion examined Whether the Elements remain entire in mixt bodies 112. 4. That there is no such Intension or Remission of Qualities as the Peripateticks do apprehend The Authors sense of Remission and Intention p. 113. 5. That a Mixtion is erroneously divided into a perfect and imperfect Mixtion p. 114. CHAP. XVIII Of Temperament 1. That Temperament is the form of Mixtion That Temperament is a real and positive quality p. 115. 2. The definition of a Temperament Whether a Temperament is a single or manifold quality Whether a complexion of qualities may be called one compounded quality p. 116. 3. VVhether a Temperament be a fift quality A Contradiction among Physitians touching Temperament Whether the congress of the four qualities effects be one Temperament or more ib. 117. 4. That there is no such thing as a Distemper What a substantial Change is p. 118. 5.
that they should really divide the Will from the understanding or Mind which of its own nature is formally indivisible So that the forementioned Objection doth not conclude any thing against my Assertion since it infers not the will and understanding to be distinguished formally but to differ only in matter from which our division is prescinded V. Practick Knowledge is divided in Logick Moral Philosophy and the Art of Nature whereby she is helped and may otherwise be called the Art of Physick in a large sence These tripartited Parts being less universal and less mediate are drawn from a triple end or effect of Philosophy determined by a triple Object 1. The Soul 2. The Body 3. The Manners The end of Philosophy upon the Soul is to help it in its Defect consisting in its subjection to Errours which constitutes Logick The effect of Philosophy upon the Body is to relieve its Defects consisting in nakedness want of Conveniences and subjection to Diseases To this the Art of Physick prescribes Remedies and Helps 3. The Effect of Philosophy upon the Manners which are actions produced by Soul and Body joyned in unity is to regulate them in their Extravagancies and Depravations which specifieth Moral Philosophy Note that Logick and Moral Philosophy are here taken in their largest signification Theoretick Knowledge is divided according to the universal formality I mean Formality in respect to one another of the subdivided Members and not to Philosophy it self to which these are only material Subdivisions of the speculative Object which is threefold 1. A Material Object inherent in material Essences which limits it to Natural Philosophy 2. An Immaterial Object depending from immaterial Beings which determines it to Pneumatology 3. An Object communicable to both or abstracted from each which is a Being in general as it is communicable to material and immaterial Objects which constitutes the Subject of Metaphysicks VI. All inferiour and less universal Knowledges must be comprehended in some one of the divided Members of Philosophy otherwise it would be an erroneous Distribution wherefore some of the Liberal Arts as Arithmetick Grammar Rhetorick are reduced to the Art of Logick as it is taken in a large sense implying a Habit of guiding Reason being defective in its Judgment and in Elocution or Utterance The Arts of Musick Geometry Astrology are comprehended in the Art of Nature as also the Art of Physick strictly so called and the servile Arts as the Art of Husbandry of Weaving of Warring c. Likewise are Oeconomicks and Politicks referred to Moral Philosophy Astronomy to Natural Philosophy VII The most universal parts of Philosophy namely Theoretick and Practick are treated of inclusively as far as their Inferior Parts do contain them So that thereby Authors save the labour of discoursing of them separately and of repeating the same Matters in vain Nevertheless was that Partition necessary because through it Philosophy is contracted to its less universal Parts VIII The common quadripartited distribution of Philosophy is too strict the subjected Members exceeding its extention for example to what part of Philosophy will you reduce the Art of Medicine possibly you may refer it to Natural Philosophy which may not be because the one is practick and the other speculative The like Question may be demanded concerning all the Servile and Liberal Arts Wherefore it was requisite to add the Art of Nature to the practick Knowledges Pneumatology hath been abusively treated of in Metaphysicks because its Object namely Spirits is more contracted then a Being in general If you answer that it is a part dividing a Being in general and therefore it ought to be reduced to its whole then by vertue of that Argument Natural Philosophy ought to be referred to the same Science because that is the other opposite dividing part for a Being in Metaphysicks is treated of as it is abstracted from a Material and Immaterial Substance CHAP. V. 1. What Method is requisite in the Ordering of the particular Treatises of the several Parts of Philosophy 2. What Order is observed in the Placing of the General Parts of Philosophy I. THe Method requisite in the Ordering of the particular Treatises of the several Parts of Philosophy is not indifferent most preferring a Synthetick in Theoretick and an Analytick Method in Practick Knowledges all excluding an Arbitrary Method in matters necessary and such are Philosophick II. The Order observed in the placing of the General Parts of Philosophy is drawn from their Dignity or primality of Existence If from their Dignity Pneumatology is the first because of its most excellent Object The next Metaphysicks because of its most general Object Moral Philosophy is the first in respect of time because our Will is the first Faculty we exercise next after our Production whose first act is to incline a Child to suck which being subject to be immoderate in it is learned by use and direction of its Nurse to be better regulated in its appetite and to know the Rule of Temperance Hence it is an universal saying Disciplinae fuerunt prius in usu quam in arte Disciplines were in use before they were in art The Will being the first which required the help of Prudence and Moral Philosophy was the only cause which moved Socrates to teach Morals first and not because the Science of Physicks were or seemed to be obscure and hard to be known for even in them he was more skilful and learned than any ever was among the Heathens The first in Nature and respect to Knowledge is Metaphysicks comprehending all the others in it self The first quoad nos is Logick which doth dispose our understanding for the Discipline of the other parts Each of these Parts obtain a distinct consideration Metaphysicks are considered as abstracted and Immaterial that is most remote from Singulars not properly immaterial as a Spirit but as inherent in its less universals and by contraction may be material Physicks are considered as a less universal and nearest to Singulars which by their common habit and Representation exhibit a common unity which constitutes a less universal wherefore whatever cannot be proved by experience that is by our Senses to be existent in Singulars makes an Opinion or Errour in the universals So that the proof of Pneumatology as well as of Natural Philosophy depends from our Senses and experience in Singulars Wherefore every Philosopher ought to make probation of all Assertions in whatever part of Philosophy it be by Arguments drawn either mediately or immediately from Singulars and especially in Natural Philosophy which way of Arguing produceth a Certainty and Evidence or Demonstration Metaphysicks The Second Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Metaphysicks 1. Of the Etymology and Synonima's of Metaphysicks 2. The Authors Definition of Metaphysicks That a Being is univocal to an objective and a real Being 3. The true formal and adequate Object of Metaphysicks 4. Wherein Metaphysicks differs from Philosophy IT will be needless to propound any thing
1 B. of the Parts of Liv. Creat C. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we ought to divide a being by them parts which are contained in its essence and not by its Accidents The division of Matter in Metaphysical and Physical may be rejected upon the same ground These divisions as they are objective appertain to Logick where only second notions are treated of and are very useful to the directing of Reason VI. Forms are divisible in material and immaterial If material is understood to be that which doth inhere in matter which is its most frequent and ordinary acception for most Philosophers take it in that sense then all worldly beings are material what being is there but which doth inhere in Matter You may say mans soul. The soul of man according to this acception is material But if you take immaterial for that which can or doth exist out of matter then there are immaterial forms Neither can this be naturally for a Natural Form is which giveth an actual specification and numerication to matter If so how can a form give an actual Specification and numerication to matter when it is not united to it I prove that the Form giveth an actual specification and numerication to matter Forma dat esse i. e. Specif Numer non posse esse materiae A Form giveth a being not a power of being to Matter For matter hath the power of being from it self and not from the Form This is true for most Peripateticks hold that Potentia is essential to matter The Soul of man when once freed from its tye to the body ceases to be a Form but therefore doth not cease to continue a being So that I conclude there are immaterial beings but no immaterial Forms It is ridiculous to doubt whether the Soul of man when separated hath an Appetite or Inclination to its Body or to that matter which it did once informate because the soul in its separated estate is a compleat and perfect being and doth not need a Body neither is the Soul a Form in that state Wherefore should it then have an Appetite to its Body Such an Appetite would be in vain You may answer that it wanteth a Subject to inhere or subsist in I grant it and therefore it subsisteth in God VII A Form is improperly divided in an assistent and informating Form because one being is satisfied with one Form for had it two forms it would be a double being 2. That which they intend by an assistent form is coincident with an Efficient Cause CHAP. XXIV Of the Theorems of Causes 1. That a Cause and its Effects are co-existent 2. That there are but three Causes of every Natural Being 3. That there is but one Cause of every Being 4. That all Beings are constituted by one or more Causes 5. That all Causes are really univocal 6. That all Natural Causes act necessarily 7. That the Soul of a Beast acteth necessarily 8. That all Matter hath a Form That Matter is capable of many Forms I. A Cause and its Effect are existent at one and the same time This Theorem is received among most Philosophers who render it thus Posita Causa ponitur Effectus The Cause being stated that is reduced into action its Effect is also stated or produced The Reason depends upon their relation one to the other to whose Relata it is proper to exist at one and the same time according to that trite Maxim Relata mutuo sese ponunt tollunt Relations do constitute and abolish one another II. There are three Causes of every Natural Being whereof one reduced to Action supposeth the others also to be reduced to action The Proof of this is demonstrated by the same Axiom by which the next forementioned was inferred III. There is but one Cause of all Beings A Cause here is taken in a strict sense for that which produceth an effect essentially and really distinct from it self In this Acception is an efficient the only cause of all Beings Matter and Form are no Causes according to this Interpretation but Principles because they do not constitute an effect essentially different from themselves A Cause sometime is taken in a strict sense for that which produceth an Effect different from it self modally and so there are two to wit Matter and Form Lastly A cause as it signifieth in a middle signification participating of each acception comprehends a triplicity of causes viz. An Efficient Matter and Form IV. All beings are constituted by one or more Causes God is of himself and not from any other as from an efficient cause and consisteth of one pure formal cause By formal Cause understand an immaterial being Angels are constituted by two Causes namely by an Efficient and a Form All other Beings are constituted by more V. All Causes are univocal This is to be understood of Efficients only Whatever Effect a Cause produceth it is like to its Form and is formal only For it cannot generate matter that being created Wherefore it cannot produce any thing else but what like to it self and consequently produceth alwaies the same effect whereas an equivocal cause should produce different effects You may demand why it hapneth that many effects are different as we observe in the Sun which by its heat doth produce Vegetables and Animals which are different I answer that the Difference doth result from the diversity of the Matter upon which it acteth and not from the causality that being ever one and the same The diversity of Effects is accidental to the Efficient and therefore not to be allowed of in Sciences VI. All Natural Causes act Necessarily Hence derives this Maxim Natura nunquam errat Nature doth never erre because she acts necessarily Against this Maxim may be objected that Nature erreth in generating a Monster This is no Errour of Nature It might rather be imputed an Errour if when it should produce a Monster it doth not That which acts after the same manner at all times doth not erre But Nature doth act in the same manner at all times Ergo she doth never erre I prove the Minor If she acts differently at any time it is in a Monster But she doth not act differently in a Monster as in the example forenamed of a Dog without Legs she doth through the Efficient cause educe a form out of the matter which she extendeth according to the extent of the subjected matter the matter therefore being deficient in quantity it is accidental to Nature if thereby a being is not brought to the likeness of its Species The Soul of man may be considered either 1. As a Natural Cause and so it acteth also necessarily in giving a Being and Life to the Body For as long as it abideth in the body it cannot but give Life to its Parts 2. As it is above a Natural Cause in that it hath a power of acting voluntarily without the Necessity or Impulse of Nature VII The Soul of a Beast doth act
necessarily and by Instinct of Nature This Conclusion may seem to contradict what is set down in the precedent Paragraph containing that to act necessarily is to act alwaies in the same manner whereas Beasts act in sundry manners and produce various Effects as sometimes they feed other times they run or lie down which are all various acts and performed in various manners These Acts are called spontaneous which generally are received as differing from Natural and Voluntary and constituting a Mean between Necessary and Contingent although improperly for there is no Mean between Necessary and Contingent because whatever is Necessary cannot be Contingent and whatever is Contingent cannot be Necessary These Acts must be either the one or the other They are not contingent for then a Beast as a Beast could not act necessarily Since then it is more evident that they act necessarily at most times it is an invincible Argument that they do not act contingently This by the way I return to the forementioned Objection and to reconciliate them seeming Contradictions I say that 1. Nature doth act alwaies in the same manner through the same Principles and upon the same Object 2. Nature doth not act alwaies in the same manner through different Principles and upon different Objects For example Opium raises fury in a Turk and layeth it in an European These are different Effects because the Objects are different Coral is heavy and weighty from its Earth and thence proveth obstructive in the body of man Coral is also informated by a sublime spirit through which it is aperitive and cordial The difference of these effects proceeds from the difference of Principles I apply this to the Acts of a Beast which are different because they proceed from different Principles Nevertheless them Acts are alwaies the same as far as they proceed from the same Principles although different from one another But as for a voluntary Principle that acteth effects different from it self as it is one and the same Principle The Proprieties of voluntary are 1. To act different Effects through one and the same Principle 2. To have a power of suspending an Action 3. To act with Election The Proprieties of Naturals are 1. To act the same Acts through the same Principle 2. To act alwaies and withal necessarily without having a power of suspending its Action 3. To act through an Impulse of Nature A Brute doth feed from an Instinct of Nature and therefore cannot but obey it at the same Instant of that Instinct provided there be food for it to feed upon Neither can it suspend that Action for a moment but as soon as it is impelled it moveth towards its food This is evident in a Dog if he be very hungry and have a bone in his sight he will move towards that bone although you beat him never so much A Brute moveth locally either to avoid pain or to search for food If a Beast move after it is filled it moveth to avoid pain and in that it answereth to the Impression of Nature whereby all natural beings move to avoid that which is inconvenient to them or disagreeing with them which it feels in lying long through the weight of his bones one pressing the other and therefore moves to else himself either by standing going or running He goeth or runneth so long until he is pained by it and then to ease himself and to avoid that pain he lieth down again VIII All Matter hath a Form because it would be nothing if it had no Form For from thence it is thought to receive unity now without unity a being is no being All Matter hath but one essential Form for had it two essential Forms it would be two Beings and consequently no Being because whatever is not one or is more then one is no Being The Form giveth Unity and Distinction to the Matter Matter is capable of many Forms successively that is one after another as for example The Matter which is in an Herb is capable of receiving the form of Chyle of Bloud and of Flesh Or if burnt of Ashes if then melted of Glass In like manner man receiveth first the form of a Plant afterwards of an Animal or sensible Living Creature lastly of a Man A Form doth act without intermission For should its Action cease at any time at the same moment would the Form cease also with it THE DOCTRINE AND CONTROVERSIES Of POVVER The FIRST PART The third Book The Doctrine and Controversies of Power The Third Book CHAP. I. Of Powers according to the Peripateticks 1. The Opinion of the Peripateticks touching the Soules Action That according to the same Opinion a Substance is said not to act immediately through it self but through superadded Powers 2. That a Substance acteth through as many different Powers as it produceth different Acts. 3. That the said Powers are really and formally distinct from the essence of the Soul 4. That Powers are concreated with the Soul and do immediately emanate from her Essence 5. That immaterial Powers are inherent in the Soul as in their Agent Material ones in the Matter as in their Subject 6. That Powers are distinguisht by their Acts and Objects The Authours Intent in treating of the Faculties of the Soul IT is an universal Truth That all Essences which have a Being have it for an Operation Wherefore there is nothing idle within the Creation but all its parts from the Center of the Earth to the Circumference of the Heavens are found to perform some Action or other without Intermission which ceasing the essence from whence it issued forth ceaseth with it When fire and Water cease from diffusion and concentration then their being ceaseth withal Hence it is evident that the Soul of man since it hath a being performeth an operation or Action the which according to the sense of the Peripatetick School is impossible to be effected through the substance of the Soul their Reason being grounded upon that Dictate of their great Master viz. No substance acteth immediately through it self but by a superadded power This they do illustrate by this Instance The Elements do not act through their Substance or Form but through their heat coldness c. which are qualities distinct from their Form and Substance Hence doth Aristotle conclude 1. That nothing is contrary to a Substance but to its power and qualities because a substance cannot act through it self 2. That no Substance can be affirmed to be more or less a substance then another that is no substance can be either remitted or intended for example one fire cannot be said to be more a fire then another because it doth cast a greater heat which proceedeth from its stronger power and heating quality and not from its being more a fire then another fire is but one fire may be said to be hotter and greater then another which happeneth as I hinted before through the intention of its quality and access of quantity II. A Substance being
sense are the Forms of the Elements said to be Powers which without doubt are actual Nutritive and vital Powers are actual Vertues of nourishing and cherishing life Obediential powers are actual dispositions whereby beings are capable of receiving new forms from God at ove or beyond their natural forms That all Natural Powers are and must be actual this ordinary Saying doth plainly infer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 All things that are made by Nature or Art must be made from that which is Actual that is in Actu Against this may be Objected That the power of seeing remaineth in a man who is asleep although he doth not actually see I Answer That that power is as much actual from within as it was before but its Acts depending upon Objective Motions from without are secluded by the intervent of the Eye-lids or retraction and incrassation of the Optick Ayr In the same manner a Candle actually burning in a dark Lanthorn is not abolisht in its enlightning power by the being shut in upon which a darkness ensueth for the Candle burneth actually still The Stomach is not deprived of its actual concocting power in not seeming to concoct in the defect of Victuals for the same Principle is stirring still in the Stomach although there is no external Object to work upon Wherefore Scaliger Exerc. 325. d. 4. saith well Non enim tollitur potentia per Objecti ablationem quia fluit ab internis Principiis essentialibus For a Power is not removed by the removing of the Object because it flowes from internal essential Principles To assert that a Power although Actual is the Cause of an Act and not the Essence wherein this Power is inherent may justly be disgusted by any Natural Philosopher who collects his Knowledge of mixt bodies by means of his Senses and apprehends its Affections and Properties together with the body it self and not as if they were really distinct from it Although in Metaphysicks a distinctio Rationis or a distinction of the mind is allowable by which the Notions of Partial beings are totally abstracted from one another and from their Essence but in Physicks it is so absurd and perillous that the assent thereunto hath missed many Physitians into a Labyrinth of Errors which have proved very fatal and ominous to their unhappy Patients In an ardent Feaver where a great Heat and Inflamation broiles the tormented body of the Decumbent a Peripatetick AEsculapius argues thus with himself this is not the fire kindled within the Nutritive or Vital Vessels but its power quality and heat inherent in that fire whence he is perswaded to prescribe a whole Kinderken of Ptysan and Juleps to subdue this heat imagining all this while that the heat and fire are two really distinct things omitting in the mean time such helps which might remove the burning or flaming Essence by substracting the entire body of fire which done the heat is also removed with it which may be performed by Evacuations as Phlebotomy and Purges From this same Tenent spreads another no less erroneous concerning Humours Humores peccant vel Substantia Quantitate vel Qualitate Humors say they become vitious either in their Substance Quantity or Quality Humors become vitious in their Substance when they variate tota substantia in or through their whole substance from themselves as in the Plague where the blood is changed throughout its whole substance and become venomous which is when it doth in a small quantity and short time extinguish our vital Flame Now whether to extinguish our natural heat doth not proceed from a power inherent in that venomous Bloud let them confess How then according to their own Maximes can Bloud be vicious in its substance no substance acting immediately through it self for bloud sanguis dicitur vitiosus quia labem partibus inurit is said to be vitious when it acts by injuring the parts It remains then that humors according to their own Principles cannot be vicious in their substances but powers or qualities 2. Humors are pronounced to be peccant when they do through their abundance wrong the Parts in their Functions This is contradictory to their own received Doctrine For whereas Quantity being an Affection and Passion of Matter can be in no wise active because nothing as they say is contrary to it How then can it act since all Action is affirmed to tend to its contrary according to this Maxim Nihil agit in Simile Nothing can act upon its Like 3. It remaines that Humors must only be peccant in their quality Not so neither for then we should only have need of alterative Medicines and Evacuations would seem to be in vain What numerous Absurdities do scatter from this Spring of Falshood A part of Democritus and Ana of Heraclitus his Philosophy and of Socrates his Dictates ad pondus omnium would make a better Misce for a Recipe to introduce us unto a sound Doctrine of Physick From all which I Argue That Powers are neither really or formally distinct from their Subject and to avoid these forementioned Absurdities I state that 1. All Substances act through themselves so far as they have a power of Acting 2. All Powers are really Identificated with their Subject 3. Powers may be distinguisht from their Subject modally and through operation of the mind 4. Powers are intended and remitted through the access and detraction of Degrees of the same kind and are facilated or retarded through Habits or the defect of them The first Proposal containes three Assertions 1. That all substantial Essences do as they term them act which is evidenced through this Axiom All which is is for to operate 2. That all Substances or according to my Metaph. Essences act immediately through themselves 3. That Substances act through themselves so far as they have a power of acting IV. That all Substances act immediately through themselves popular Speeches do testifie as Fire burnes a Horse runs c. Certainly these Actions are predicated of the Substance or Essence of Fire or of a Horse not of their powers as if they were really distinct from them for then they should say the fires power burnes a horses faculty runs These Predications would be absurd How can a Power according to the vulgar Peripatetick Acception be a power and yet be said to act it would be a Contradiction since that a Power whilst it doth act is no more a Power but is changed into an Act hence they say that a Power and an Act are privative Opposites so that the one cannot be Categorically predicated of the other Here may be replied that a Substance acts through its power wherefore it is not the power that acts but the Substance To this I Answer that it may be granted that a Substance acts through its power but then it is not to be understood so as if the Substance acted through another thing or being which is superadded to its Essence as they do vulgarly conceive but that a Substance
a Material one but none Real XIII Besides all this there is an Absolute Power conferred upon Gods Creatures in general and upon man in particular I do not mean Absolute Simpliciter for that were Repugnant as I have proved in my Theol. but secundam quid I will further explain it to you The Power which all Creatures have of being and acting at that present Moment wherein they enjoy their being and do act is absolute because they cannot but enjoy that same being and act at that Moment wherein they have a Being and do act Ergo it is Absolute but not simpliciter for were it so then they would obtain that absolute power of being from and out of their own Nature which we know is dependent from Gods Power and according to this sense none consisteth of an absolute power but God alone because his Nature is alone independent It is then absolute secundum quid because God hath ordained that which is to be and that which ever hath been to have been and that which shall be to come to pass In short Absolute secundum quid I take for that which is unchangeable as all beings and their Actions are in that sense as I have proposed They are unchangeable because Gods Ordination in Creating Giving Forbearing and in all other Particulars is unchangeable This Distinction is of that use that many Points in Divinity cannot be resolved but by its being applied to them I shall content my self with the having named it since I have Treated of it at large in another Part of my Philosophy XIV The Absolute secundum quid powers which God hath conferred upon his Creatures are by Physitians otherwise termed Faculties Facultates which are derived from a faciendo doing that is they are actual dispositions whereby Effects are done Hence Galen Lib. 1. de Natur. Facult Par. 3. Prima euim actionis ipsius potentia causa est The first cause of an Action saith he is the power And in another place of the same Book he renders himself thus Facultatum quatuor naturalium essentia in partium singularum nutriendarum temperie est that is The Essence of the four Natural Faculties consisteth in the temperament of the parts that are to be nourished which is nothing different then if he had said the Faculties Facultates sunt temperamenta facientia are temperaments actually doing effects Now it is evident that Galen held the Temperament of bodies to be their Forms which if so then questionless his Opinion tended to assert that Powers and their Subjects were really identificated and that all powers were actual Moreover we shall find throughout all his Tomes that his sense touching powers and Faculties doth e Diametro agree with what I have set down in this present Treatise As for Hippocrates I cannot read a word throughout all his works but what tends against Aristotle in every Particular forasmuch as it relate to our Subject In the Conclusion I must remember you to observe that many Terms as Formal Substance Accident and divers others I have somtimes made use of in the same sense as I have proposed them in the Foregoing Chapters other times I have intended them in the same Acception which Philosophers vulgarly receive them in But herein the Sense of the Matter will easily direct you FINIS RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book By Gedeon Harvey Doctor of Physick and Philosophy LONDON Printed by A. M. for Samuel Thomson at the Sign of the Bishops-head in St Paul's Church-yard 1663. TO HIS Most Honoured Mother ELIZABETH HARVEY Dear Mother AMong those serious Admonitions which from your singular Affection and Care you have so oft repeated to me This I remember hath been one of the most earnest of them that above all I should mind things of Eternity such as alone can make me eternally Happy Herein I cannot but acknowledge your greatest Love tending to invest me with the greatest Happinesse returning you all thanks that so great a Benefit is worthy of Moreover to shew my entire Obedience to so important a Command I have here drawn up a few Heads touching the Greatest Happinesse and the Means whereby to procure it which I do with all humility present unto you as a Debt due to your self in regard I have extracted the principal Rules from the Rudiments which your constant Practice and wholesome Precepts had in my younger years infus'd in me The cause and object which alone can afford us this infinite Happinesse is the Summum Bonum whereunto we are to direct all our aim which that we may with successe attain unto are the continual Prayers of Your most affectionate and obedient Sonne Gedeon Harvey RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Theology 1. What Theology is 2. That Theosophy is a fitter name to signifie the same which is here intended by Theology That in knowing God we become Philosophers 3. What a Habit is 4. What it is to live happily That there is a mean or middle way of living which is neither living in happiness or living in misery 5. How Theology is divided 6. What Natural Theology is What Supernatural Theology is The first Doubts of a natural man 7. The Dignity of Theology I. THEOLOGY is a habit of enjoying the greatest Good and living in the greatest Happiness This practick Science might from the eminence and transcendence of its end and object crave a more excellent name for Theology signifieth only a discourse of God and expresseth a Theoretick Science and therefore is too strict to adequate the whole and full concept of what is generally intended by Theology This name is fitter to be imposed upon the Doctrine of God as he is theoretically discoursed of in Pneamatology The parts of which Doctrine might be aptly denoted by Theology Angelology and Psychelogy whereas this noble Science is better expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or wisdome of God because wisdome comprehendeth an universal collection of all practick and theoretick Sciences all which we know by knowing God and we know them to be in and from God For do we not know that all natural Beings are in and from God they are in God because God comprehendeth and conserveth them in and by his Power Is not God the Pattern of our Actions And do we not know that our actions are good or evil from knowing them to have some likeness to his Actions or to be altogether different from them Do we not know our selves in knowing God wherefore without knowing God we know Nothing In knowing God to be the first Cause and Creator of all natural Beings we know Natural Philosophy and become Natural Philosophers In discerning good from evil in our actions by comparing them to the most perfect actions of God we attain to Moral Philosophy In knowing him to be the Being of Beings we reach to the knowledge of supernatural Philosophy or Metaphysicks
This name doth in a large sense expresse Philosophy and in a strict sense denotes Theology as it is defined here above The wise Apostle James seemeth to impose this very name in that place of his Epistle Wisdome that is from above is c. What is wisdom from above but the wisdom of God II. The Genus of the Definition is a Habit which is a rooted disposition whereby we are inclined to operate with ease It is not the enjoyment of one single happiness which can make a man happy for one act is transitory and is not at all durable but it must be a rooted happiness the possession of which doth make us happy for ever Since we are to live for ever we must either be rooted in happinesse if we intend to be everlastingly happy or else rooted in evil whereby we continue in misery without end III. The happinesse which we reap from this Philosophy is not an ordinary happinesse but it is a happinesse in its highest degree and Perfection or it is a durable contentment accompanied with the greatest joy that is possible to be enjoyed by us in this world On the other side the misery which attends the habit of evil is no lesse tormenting dismall and dolefull than the other is joyfull IV. The Differentia of the Definition is to possesse the greatest good and to live in the greatest happinesse All Practick Sciences do operate for an end and therfore are to be defined by that End To live happily is to live in contentment and joy There seems to be a Medium between living in joy and living in misery which is to live for a Passe-time For there are many who do all things for a Passe-time they play at Cards Dice and Bowls they discourse and all for a Passe-time Some take Tobacco and drink themselves drunk for to passe away the time Certainly these can neither say that they are affected with joy or misery but seem to be in a neutral state Of these doth Sallust justly give his opinion Multi mortales dediti ventri at que somno indocti incultique vitam sicut peregrinantes tranfiere Quibus profecto contranaturam corpus voluptati anima oneri fuit Eorum ego vitam mortemque juxta aestumo quoniam de utraque siletur There are many men who being given to their gut and to sleep continuing unlearned and rude have passed away their dayes like unto Travellers To whom indeed against nature their body was a pleasure and their soul a burden These mens life and death I judge alike for there is no notice taken of either V. Theology is Natural or Supernatural VI. Natural Theology is a natural habit of possessing the greatest good and living in the greatest happinesse that a natural man may attain unto in this world and in the world to come Supernatural Theology is a supernatural habit of possessing the greatest good and living in the greatest happinesse that a man may supernaturally attain unto in this material and in the next spiritual world It is not my drift to treat of supernatural Theology in this volume neither do I pretend more in that than a Christian Disciple and not as a Teacher to which a special Call and an extraordinary spiritual disposition must concur but my chief design and aim is rationally to demonstrate a Natural Theology such which a man through his natural gifts of reason and understanding may reach unto without an extraordinary concurrence of God with him The benefit which is hence expected serveth to convince those desperate and carnal wretches from their affected Atheism yet must be lesse affected with it than to be rooted and confirmed in it In which if otherwise they are Reasoning will not take any effect upon them The first doubt or query which a natural man doth or may propose is Whether it is possible for him to know through his reasoning if his soul be immortal For saith he if my soul is mortal it will prove in vain to make further search after happinesse then is or can be enjoyed in this world The second scruple which a man or rather the Devil doth foolishly move to himself is Whether the soul now being demonstrated to him to be immortal there is a God For whence can he expect any happinesse after death but from God Thirdly Whether it is possible to a Natural man by his own power and Gods ordinary assistance or concurrence to procure the possession of the twofold before-mentioned Summum Bonum But before I apply my self to the solving of these Doubts I must explain what the greatest happinesse is which I intend to perform briefly and clearly in the next Chapter I need not adde many words to the illustrating of the eminence and worth of this Divine Science since the name it self doth speak it The eloquence of Cicero doth thus set forth the dignity of wisdom in his 2. Offic. By the immortal Gods what is there more to be desired than wisdome what is better to a man what is more worthy of a mans knowledge The same may be better applyed to the wisdome of God that is concerning God God saith Austin is wisdome himself through whom all things are made and a true Philosopher is a lover of God in that he is a lover of wisdom If we are ignorant of God we are no Philosophers and through that ignorance we fall into great Errors Lactantius in his third Book doth expresse himself much to the same tenour where speaking of Philosophers he saith It is true they have sought for wisdome but because they did not search after it as they should have done they fell further into such errors that they were ignorant of common wisdom CHAP. II. Of the end of Natural Theology 1. Wherein Moral Philosophy differeth from Natural Theology and wherein it agreeth with it That the Heathen Philosophers were no true Philosophers Aristotle his dying words Epicure his miserable Death after so pleasant a Life 2. A Description of the greatest Happinesse Queries touching the greatest Happinesse 3. Whether the greatest Happinesse is the neerest and principal end of Theology 4. How the greatest Happinesse is otherwise called 1. ONe or other may object against our Definition of Natural Theology that I do confound it with Moral Philosophy I answer Moral Philosophy is taken in a large sense for a habit of living in the greatest happinesse here and hereafter and then it is synonimous to Natural Theology Or in a strict sense for a habit of living in the greatest happinesse only in this world which may be tearmed an Epicurean Moral Philosophy and is such whose object vanisheth with the expiration of the soul out of the body This last is grounded upon a false maxime of its End to wit that the greatest happinesse which â—â—â— be enjoyed in this world is essentially different from 〈…〉 which we may enjoy hereafter It is essentially different because according to their folly there is no happinesse to be expected any where
sutable to him he cannot let his desires slide another way The worst actions which men do act are either when they are alone or when they are in other company and absent from their partner When they are in other company they are apt to be drunk to swear and to project base designs which a man seldome or never doth perpetrate in the presence with his mate Or if he did it is an hundred to one if her fear modesty or some other vertue did not prevent him Man could seldome think evil thoughts because his companion is supposed to divert him in proposing pleasant or usefull discourses What woman is there which can be inordinate in any of these fore-instanced actions if she is suted to a mate and adheres to his fellowship onely 'T is true women and men although both joyn'd in a constant adherence have sometimes agreed in wicked designs but this hapneth alwayes in a couple unsutably paired and consequently much given to wandring so that they did not contract that evil habit from themselves but from others Had the first man and the first woman continued constantly together it would have been a far harder task for the Devil to have deluded them but they being separated although but for a few moments and either of them admitting conference with the Devil were soon corrupted What an easie task of Government would it be if most men were paired so as never to be asunder from their fellow They could hardly assent to mischief or if they were bent to it Law might sooner work upon their joint-interest than if it were single But take this only as by way of discourse XII It is necessary among men to give honour to whom it is due and to return it with thanks when they do deserve it Were it only to cause a distinction of persons in respect to civil Government it doth imply a necessity It is proper for us to know what honour is for how could we else acquit our duty in this part to God to the supream Magistrate or to our Parents XIII We are not to be over-scrupulous in taking of an oath provided it tend to the preservation of the Commonwealth and that the supream Magistrate be it the King Prince or plural Magistrate do require it We are obliged to it upon a double consideration 1. Because the Magistrate doth command or imposed it which is obliging among all Nations 2. Because it tends to the preservation of the whole body of the people And this common reason doth convince to be binding CHAP. VIII Of the Subject of Natural Theology 1. Man consisting of Body and Soul is the adequate subject of Natural Theology 2. Reasons proving the Soul to be the original and principal subject of Theology 3. That the Understanding and Will are really and formally one The confutation of the vulgar definition of Will A full explication of the Will and the manner of its acting What speculalative and practical signifie 4. What the Will is in a large sense 5. What the Will is in a strict sense 6. An Explanation upon the first description of Will 7. The Effects of the Will Whether appetibility doth not equally imply volibility and appetibility in a strict sense 8. Whether mans appetite is distinct from his Will I. THe fourth Question proposed is Which is the Subject of Natural Theology By Subject I mean the Subjectum inhaesionis wherein this habit is inherent To answer you in general The whole man as he consisteth of soul and body is the subject of Theology for the effects of it to wit happinesse and joy are as sensibly received by the body as by the soul for the body receiveth its essence conservation and bodily pleasures from it The soul cannot alone be properly said to be the subject because the soul without the body is not man II. The soul is originally and principally the subject of Theology I say originally because the soul is the original cause of the pleasures of the body yea and of its constitution for the body was created for the soul and not the soul for the body The soul is the original cause of the pleasures of the body in that the soul doth make choice of them and applieth them to the body for example meat drink and other pleasures are applyed to the body in that the soul makes choice of them and conceiveth them to be pleasant to the body otherwise the body could not attain to them The soul can enjoy pleasures when the body is in paine but the body cannot when the soul is in paine The soul is the principal subject of Theology because the greatest happinesse and good is enjoyed by it the delights of the body not being comparable to them of the soul The soul receiveth its pleasure by instants of time the body onely by succession III. The operation whereby the soul doth imbrace the greatest good and happinesse is from the understanding as it is speculative and practick and not as it is a two-fold faculty formally distinct through the understanding and the will for these are not really and essentially distinct I prove it if the understanding cannot understand without the will or the will without the understanding then they are not really and essentially distinct because it is proper to beings which are really and essentially distinct to operate without each other But the understanding cannot understand without the will neither can the will will without the understanding Therefore they are not really distinct I prove the Minor The will is primarly a bending of the understanding to an action of the mind but the understanding cannot understand unlesse it bends to that action of the mind So neither can the understanding be bent to action unlesse it understandeth Wherefore the one doth imply the other The most there is between them is a modal distinction You may object that it follows hence that a man may be said to will when he understandeth to understand when he willeth which predications are absurd I answer That it includes no absurdity at all for a man when he understandeth doth will every particular act of the understanding which he understandeth or otherwise how could he understand On the other side a man understandeth when he willeth according to that trite saying Ignoti nulla Cupido That which a man doth not know he cannot desire or will Wherefore I argue again that the one includeth the other the will implyeth the understanding and the understanding the will Possibly you may deny my supposed definition of will which is a bending to an action of the mind If you refuse it propose a better Your opinion it may be is to wander with the multitude and so you commend this The will is through which a man by a fore-going knowledge doth covet a sutable or convenient good and shunneth an inconvenient evil I will first account the absurdities of this definition and afterwards prove them to be so First you
from the other for the conceiving of unity is not the conceiving of Good c. Again The action of understanding or conceiving is but one formally flowing from one mind or one understanding faculty otherwise were it double it would require a double name Moreover there is but one first and formal faculty of all beings because all second faculties are derived from one and what is this faculty in man but the understanding Whence it appeareth that the understanding faculty is one formally and manifold materially or rather to speak more properly the understanding faculty is but one and its acts are many According to this last Caution the understanding cannot be said to be speculative or practick but its acts are either speculative or practick Or thus The understanding is formally only speculative I mean speculative as it is taken in an universal indifferent and unlimited sense Further The understanding is materially also speculative and practick By speculative I mean an absolute and single habit of conceiving an Essence or Mode without any other duplicated and relative action Practick is attributed to the understanding when it acteth that is understandeth upon an essence or mode by a duplicated and relative action A relative action of the understanding is when it considereth and understandeth an object relatively or related to another object which among the most universal attributes of a being is goodness So that to understand a being practically is to understand it to be good and related through that goodnesse to another being as when I understand an Ox to be good for plowing carrying c. I consider him relatively as related to another being Now then this I call a practick Act of the understanding and from such acts is the understanding termed practical Hence let us examine What difference there is between these two objects being variously acted upon by us and wherein they do agree The difference which there is between them ariseth from themselves and is that the one is understood not to be the other They agree in that they were apprehended or acted upon by one faculty of the mind or that they are objects of one and the same faculty of the mind The distinction which there is imagined in the faculty is none for it is the same faculty that understandeth a thing to be good to be true c. A Looking-glasse is not changed from being a Glasse because it represents several essences and modes as faces hands or legs so neither is the understanding different or changed because it discerns several objects It may be one may say that this is not the case but whether this practical understanding is the will or not is the doubt for the will you may imagine is Actually to move or to act that which the understanding hath conceived convenient When a man conceiveth a thing to be good as in the before-mentioned instance of an Oxe to be good for the plow it is the action of the understanding as it is practick and this cannot be called the will but the will is when you act that which the understanding hath conceived expedient to be acted as when you put an Oxe to plow after you have apprehended him to be good for it doth issue from the will and is as it were a command of the soul upon the inferiour faculties to do that which the understanding hath perceived to be practick So that practick is that whereby we act and not whereby we may act The understanding is named practick because thence the soul may act that which the understanding apprehendeth practick The will is more properly termed practick because thereby the soul doth act for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth action which according to Aristotle is either immanent or transient so that Praxis in a large sense is predicated of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is vulgarly referred to a transient action and of Praxis as it is strictly limited to an immanent action To remove this Objection you must consider these notions 1. That the soul is a single Being and therefore hath but one formal single power which formal power seemeth but really is not to be different from it self in that in the brain it understandeth in the Liver it sanguificateth in the Muscles it moveth These are onely external and material differences not formal for it is one and the same faculty of the soul which moveth understandeth c. 2. This Question may be taken in a double meaning 1. Whether the will and understanding in respect to the soul are different faculties That is Whether the soul doth understand and will by two powers differing in themselves This is made clear in the Discourse of Powers 2. Whether these faculties in respect to themselves are really different to wit Whether to refuse or imbrace an object which are the acts of the will and to judge or apprehend it to be imbraced or refused which is the act of the practick understanding are different acts and consequently proceeding from habits materially different Now take my answer I say That to will and understand an object practically are acts really identicated and proceed from one faculty of judgement or understanding I prove it To make an impression from within upon the phansie is an act of the intelligent faculty but to will and understand practically is caused by an impression from within upon the Phansie Ergo They are caused or proceed through one and the same act from one and the same faculty which is the understanding I confirm the Assumption by this instance When a man doth will meat 1. He makes a practical science upon it and judgeth it to be good or convenient for his body Next after this he doth judge it necessary for him as to eat when his stomack is hungry 3. He judgeth the means whereby to procure it to be a local motion as through which a man doth move towards his meat and moveth it unto his stomack 4. He judgeth That to make a motion to an object is by moving the spirits of the phansie towards that object which motion excites all the other spirits contained in the external members to move to the same object Lastly To judge is to be moved by an impression of any species upon the phansie which the Agent understanding made thereon so that these four judgements of the understanding are impressions and motions upon and in the phansie which being constituted the will is also constituted You may then observe That the will is not a single act but one act composed out of many single acts and united one to the other by a subordination All these four motions concurring to a will are effected by one faculty and therefore are not different These four acts are as it were parts which constitute a will for one being deficient a man cannot will unlesse he judgeth an object to be good he cannot covet it neither will he covet it unlesse he judgeth it necessary to make up a
which doubtlesse must prove painfull Joy which is supposed the best of passions is painfull it rendring a man restlesse and full of anguish not knowing where to bestow himself The like may be attributed to Fear Love Anger Sorrow Hope c. 9. Passions are vain fading away and leaving no real good behind them A man when his passion is over wondreth how he could have been drawn into such a passion One that hath been lately in love with any thing after a while when that love to such an object is ceased in him admireth at himself how he could have loved it and so of all the rest 10. All passions whether good or evil are redoubled with sorrow and melancholly 11. All passions are hurtfull both to soul and body to the soul because she thereby is taken off from her Summum Bonum to the body because passions do dissipate or suppresse the vital and animal spirits whence we may observe that a passionate man is seldom long lived 12. A passion is a great sinne 13. Most men are apt to shun others that are passionate or seem to be so For we commonly say I care not for such a one because he looks like an angry or spitefull man or he looks like a doting fool 14. Atheism is a collection of the habits of all passions in one man Wherefore it is necessary for a man who endeavoureth to live eternally in happinesse with his Creatour to wean himself from all passions whatsoever and shun them as being most detestable VIII Secondly Pleasures of the body are to be waved and contemned as much as possible because by these man's soul was first drawn aside Are we not apt to shun and be a verse from any thing that offended our bodies or caused a sicknesse Much more ought we to shun that which cast our souls into a mortal disease Pleasures of the body consist in the enjoyment of objects coveted by our sensual appetite but these are beyond necessity or more than our bodies require for instance to eat and drink of variety or more than our natures require is counted a pleasure but that is beyond necessity So that all pleasures are beyond necessity Wherefore when we say such an one eats or drinks for pleasure that is he eats or drinks beyond necessity or more than his nature requires We must then also forbear going to see idle showes or playes for they rob our souls of her pleasure and diverts her from contemplating her Summum Bonum Pleasures in the fore-mentioned sense differ from passions only Secundum magis minus more or lesse since that each of them if often repeated may easily turn to a passion how detestable they are hath been shewed already The pleasures of the body destroy both body and soul their natural effects enervate our strength their moral ones damn our souls Bodily pleasures belong only to beasts to those of the soul to men Let us not then be so foolish as to make an exchange Pleasure is the Devils bait whereby he sweetly draweth us to Hell A bodily pleasure is also a great sinne because thereby we do not answer the end of our Creation Had the first man not eaten more than his nature required or had he abstained from variety both which being pleasures he could not have sinned but eating beyond necessity he fell into a pleasure and afterwards into a passion by repeating the same over and over again IX Thirdly You must resist the Devil with all your force who since you are fallen back from his party will prove no mean enemy to you and therefore 1. Consider where he intends to attack you and be sure always to have a Sentinel abroad who may give you a timely alarm when he approaches for to make an assault upon you Then as a prudent Captain you are to know your strength and view your whole Fort first where you are the weakest 2. wherein your greatest strength lies that so you may alwayes be in a readinesse of relieving your Fortresse Besides it will be a piece of prudence in you to know whence to procure assistance if upon occasion you should be fiercely set upon Your greatest weaknesse is in your out-works which are your external senses and some of your in-works as your sensual appetite and internal senses Your greatest strength consisteth in your soul namely in her reasoning faculty and will Your aid and assistance is God whom you are constantly to implore for succour and relief Consider withall your enemies weapons wherewith he intends to encounter you And lastly take notice of his strict discipline and policy in managing of his affairs and therefore how much the more ought you to bestir yourself and look about you Now I will take leisure to unfold your weaknesse to all There is never a sense but it hath its weaknesse attending it 1. The Eyes they are apt to be inchanted with shows and playes and especially such as are obscene Your Ears with immodest discourse Your Taste with gluttony and drunkennesse Your Sent with noxious perfumes And lastly your other Sense with lust All these are great and dangerous weaknesses Are not some people so corrupt and slavishly tied to see shows and playes that there is nâ—â—â—r a day but they must see either a show or a play they dream of playes they do constantly talk of playes and if there was but a fine show or play to be seen the next discourse is what have you not seen such a show such a rare play Now mark the Devils policy there is never a tempting play or show but the Devil sets it off either by casting a lustre upon their eyes or a pleasantnesse upon the gestures a splendour upon the habit and a clangour upon the speech of the Actours You cannot imagine how dead and simple a play would seem without the Devils vernishing of it and this is evident many having seen rare playes upon whose eyes the Devils could not work and to them they appeared as nauseous and simple as it proved admirable and rare to others upon whose eyes this glosse would take The like may be said of painted or patcht faces how strangely are they set off with a glosse upon some mens eyes and how ugly they appear to others whose eyes are uncapable of a glosse To these they seem like a picture or a patcht thing made up by Art like to a hansome doublet with a patch upon the elbow And is not this a pretty stratagem of the Devils What a harmony doth an immodest tale strike upon some mens ears O pray say they tell that once over again it is one of the best that ever I heard Do you not think that the Devil gives a little touch here to to set off this melody To others again it proveth a harsh discord so that while men play thus upon the Organs the Devil he blows the Bellows The Pallat or Taste is as ready to be enticed as any of the others Pray listen to
r. impose p. 26. l. 16. r. What is p 32. l. 26. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 35 l 20. r. latter p. 41. l. 34. dele it p 63 l 32 r. and exciting p. 71 l 18 dele it p. 73. l. 27. r. others l. 29. r. Immodesty l. 35. r. ells weights p. 75. l. 22 r eternal p. 90 l. 2. r. spermatick l. ult dele also p. 94. l. 14. r. coactè p. 95. l. 16. r. forbidden p. 98. l. 11. r. attribui FINIS Archelogia Physica Nova OR NEVV PRINCIPLES OF Natural Philosophy The SECOND PART The First Book By GEDEON HARVEY Dr of Phys. and Phil. Late Physitian to His Majesties Army in Flanders LONDON Printed by J. H. for S. Thomson at the Bishops Head in St Pauls Church-Yard 1663. Natural Philosophy The SECOND PART The First Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Philosophy 1. The Etymology and Synonima's of Natural Philosophy 2. The Definition of Natural Philosophy 3. An Explanation of the said Definition 4. What a Natural Being is 5. What a Natural Essence is 6. What Nature is 7. The various Acceptions of Nature NAtural Philosophy is so called because it treateth of Nature and Natural Beings It is also known by the name of Physicks which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nature Aristotle in his Metaphysicks Book 6. Chap. 1. calleth it the second Philosophy Cicero in his Book of Divin nameth it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a Discourse of nature II. Natural Philosophy is a Knowledge of a Natural being III. This Definition stateth a Natural being to be the Subject of Physicks which is somewhat restricted from a being in general as being less universal and therein it is distinguished from Metaphysicks where a being is discoursed of as a most universal Entity but here as a less Natural in the Definition doth lay a restriction upon a being and giveth it a specifick consideration and therefore it proves trustraneous to add quatenus naturale as far as it is natural for otherwise what need would there be to appose Natural did it not imply the same Or in case you omit Natural you may define natural Philosophy to be a knowledge of a being so far as it is natural and so it is the same again Here you may take Astronomy to be coincident with Physicks because it treateth of the Heavens which are natural beings Herein I do resolve you thus Astronomy is not a knowledge of the Heavens for a knowledge doth explain a thing through its Causes and Affections but Astronomy doth not treat of the Causes of the Heavens wherefore it followeth that Astronomy is not a proper Science of the Heavens Although Astronomy containeth the Doctrine of the Motion of the Heavens which is only an Affection or Property of the Heavens yet therein it doth not constitute a Science unless in an improper although usual signification wherein Science is taken for any kind of Knowledge be it of the Causes or Affections of a thing be it Theoretick or Practick and according to this Acception is the Art of Grammar frequently called a Science Astronomy is a partial Science or it is a part of the Science of Physicks as discoursing of one of the affections of a natural being which is the Motion of the Heavens But since each of these partial Sciences if treated of all in one Volume would grow to a vast Mole Philosophers do therefore handle them in several Books and Treatises IV. A Natural being is that which consisteth of Nature or which hath a Natural Essence V. A Natural Essence is that which consisteth of Natural parts namely natural Matter and natural Form VI. Nature is a disposition of an Elementary being whereby it doth act according to its truth I say it is a Disposition and therefore no power because all dispositions are Actual VII Nature is variously taken 1. For a single Essence exempted from all Composition according to which sense God is only called Nature and for to distinguish his Nature from others he is called Natura Naturans Nature naturating or nature which giveth nature to all other natures 2. It is also taken for a derived being which is distinctly specified by Natura Naturata Nature naturated or for nature which hath obtained its nature from the naturating nature 3. For the Quiddity and Essence of a natural being and according to this last acception it is to be taken here As God alone is called Nature according to the first acception so are Angels and Soules that are separated from their Bodies called in a sense common to Elementary beings Nature But Nature in the third signification is only appropriated to Elementary beings I omit the mentioning many other Acceptions of Nature because they are inclusively contained in these before-mentioned CHAP. II. Comprehending an Explanation of the Definition of a Natural Being 1. What is meant by disposition 2. An Objection against the Definition of a Natural being Answered 3. What it is to act according to Truth 4. That the Subject of this Science is more properly named a natural Being than a natural Body 5. Aristotles Definition of Nature rejected by several Arguments 6. That Nature is a property of a Natural being 7. The difference between Nature and Art 8. That Nature in respect to God acteth constantly for an End 9. The Division of Nature I Come now to explain the Definition of Nature which Explanation is the more necessary because through its obscurity many doubts and mistakes might otherwise be occasioned The Genus is a Disposition or Vertue which you are to take here in a concrete consideration according to the sense expressed in the Third Chapter of Powers By vertue I intend an actual strength and power of acting as it is inherent in a natural subject II. Against my Definition may be Objected That Nature its Substance but a Disposition or Vertue is an Accident Therefore it cannot be the right Genus To this I Answer That Vertue is a Property of a being not really distinct from it but modally only now since we can only know a thing by its Modes as doth appear in my Metaphysicks therefore beings for the understandings sake are to be explained by them and are to be taken to be the same really with their subject A Disposition then is the same as if I had said a Subject or being disposed and powerful Through Elementary being is meant a being constituted by the Elements wherein I do distinguish natural beings as they are the subject of this Science from the nature of Angels and separated Souls which are immaterial and not constituted through the Elements as Origen did falsly suppose III. To act according to its Truth is to act conformably to the Divine purpose and Idea whereby beings do act the same and are the same which God did purpose they should act and intend they should be To be the same being is to be that which they are and act that which they do act Where
singular and Individual being I do willingly pass by other Observations concerning Nature in general because I have touched many of them in my Metaphysicks CHAP. III. Of the Principles of a Natural Being 1. That Privation is no Principle of a Physical Generation or of a Physical Being That Union might be more properly termed a Principle then Privation 2. The Principles of a Material being stated by Pythagoras rejected 3. That to treat of Matter and Form is more proper to Metaphysicks 4. That the Materia Prima of Aristotle is a Non Ens. 5. That the Chaos had a Form 6. The Authors Materia Prima 7. That it doth not appertain to Physicks to explain the nature of the first Matter 8. What the first Form of all natural beings is I. IN Metaphysicks it is made known that all created beings consist of Parts and that no being except God alone is single but all are compounded This is also proper to a natural being whose composition is to consist of Matter and Form I need not tell you the diversity of Opinions among Philosophers upon this Particular they being fully related by Aristotle in his Physical Auscultations wherefore I shall only examine his as being thought the most Authentick by modern Philosophers The said Philosopher states three Principles which do necessarily concur to the Production of a natural being namely Matter Form and Privation As for two of them no doubt but they are principles but the third is disputable Privation is Logical that is it is imaginary and assinged to a being by a second intention of the mind and therefore his Commentators do generally teach that it is to be counted no other then a principle per accidens If per accidens it is no part of a being if it is any thing it is a part of Generation for this doth immediately presuppose a privation but a being presupposeth it mediately only through and by meanes of Generation If the call that a principle of Generation which doth necessarily concur to the constitution of a natural being then that should rather be termed a principle which doth concur to it per se as for Instance union Union doth necessarily and per se concur to the generation of a natural being but privation doth only concur to it per accidens Union is not only necessary at the moment of Generation but also after a being is constituted it is that without which a being cannot consist So that I say that union is infinitely more proper to be termed a principle then privation and why did not Aristotle dream of that â— To speak properly neither of them can be taken for a Principle of a natural being whereby it should be constituted to be that which it is Union is unnecessary because unity doth imply it since then that all beings are metaphysically constituted by an unity which can be also applied to Physicks it is needless to mention union in this Science otherwise we might aequo jure refer all the Modes of a being to it I much strange why Aristotle omitted the inserting Privation in Metaphysicks among the universal causes of an universal being and why he did not as justly refer it to that part of Philosophy as he did Matter and Form it being of as large an extent and universality as either of these Possibly you will deny it to be of an equal extent with them or assert that it is of no larger universality then a natural being is Herein I deny your denial and assertion for it is of a larger extent then a natural body is since it is appliable to Angels and Devils who must as necessarily have had a privation for a principle of Generation as Naturals for even they were not before they were Wherefore since he referred Angels and Devils to Metaphysicks he ought aequo jure to have placed privation in the same Rank The same Argument I may use against his eight Books of Physicks there being little else contained in them but what is as common to spiritual beings as to corporeal as for Instance Time Finiteness Motion c. all which are common to immaterial beings Wherefore had Aristotle treated of these Particulars in his Physicks Doctrine gratia it might have deserved an excuse but since he tâ—eated of them there per se it can be accounted no less then an Errour II. Pythagoras taught a Trinal Number of Principles constituting a material being 1. A Point 2. A Line 3. A Superficies or Surface These are rather sorts and kinds of quantity which for that reason do more properly appertain to Metaphysicks for besides these there are many others concurrent to the constitution of a material being as hath been disputed of elsewhere Yet this is observable in this Opinion that Pythagoras and many other wise men did collect the principles of a being by means of their senses for it is in vain to talk of Essences and Forms in such a manner as Aristotle did which a man cannot apprehend what they are and for this reason he stated three principles of a material body because these three could be evidently perceived by sense III. To treat of Matter and Form doth rather belong to Metaphysicks because they are principles remote from physical bodies I say they are remote because they are applied to natural bodies by means of the Elements for natural bodies consist of Matter and Form so far as they consist of the Elements and the Elements are really and properly the Matter and Form of a natural being Now in every Science the Principia proxima are only to be treated of for otherwise you might draw all Metaphysicks to this Tract Aristotle did erroneously discourse of these things in Physicks since he had treated of them in Metaphysicks My purpose was no other then to rehearse these matters for an Introduction and to shew the mistakes of others herein IV. Matter in a natural being is either first or second The first matter is which is not produced out of any other and therefore is termed to be ingenerable and incorruptible The second matter is which is produced out of the first and is said to be generable and corruptible Aristotle in his 1 Book of Phys. C. 9. T. 82. defineth the first matter to be the first Subject of every thing out of which remaining a being is generated through it self and not by accident The ancient Philosophers could hardly understand what this first matter was because of its difficulty wherefore Aristotle himself was forced to describe it negatively in the 1 B. of Metaph. Ch. 3. T. 8. The first matter is that which through it self hath neither essence nor quantity nor any thing of that by which a being is determined which is as much as if he said I know better what it is not then what it is and this kind of knowledge is common to Fools and Wise men So that from this Description we may collect that it is not cognoscible since it is not determined and
for this a mans body although alive must needs be less weighty then the thick water at the bottom of the Sea I do not speak of the Seas depth near shoars but where it is of an ordinary profundity as in the Ocean Dissolve Salt into water the middle parts shall be more saltish then the superficial parts for the same reason Besides these experiments the understanding affords also an argument to demonstrate the same If the natural propension of water be concentration then the further it is remote from its center the more it must incline to it But the natural propension of water is concentration ergo II. Since then it is yielded that water is violently detained and remote from its center no wonder if it doth squeeze the extime parts of the earth whereby the earth giveth way in rotundity and is protruded either into longitude or latitude Water having formed but a small dent into the earth a greater quantity of water must needs depress thither and so through a continuated force bores a greater cavern into the earth until at last it hath perduced into her a vast grove whereinto the body of water did retire and so constituted the Ocean The earth being thus impacted by the waters must of a necessity be protruded above some part of the waters and hereby was the earth disposed to germination of plants she being now exposed to the celestial Influences and moderately irrigated and foecundated by the remaines of the water The Representation of the Chaos after its third Division IV. Through this division was the earth in part detected whereby as I said before it was rendred capable of germination or protruding plants God did also congregate the earth and separated her body from heterogeneous Elements yet not so but that there remained still some small part of them These heterogeneous Elements as I may call them for doctrines sake were coagulated into small bodies of divers figures These bodies were of a different size and proportion according to Gods intent and purpose for to effect various and divers kinds of mixt bodies The different proportion was that in some there was a greater quantity of fire in others of ayr c. The coagulation of these small bodies was a close and near compaction of the elements within one small compass Through this compaction each element was pinched in as it were which caused the same violent detention of each as you have read to be in water necessarily augmenting the force and activity of each element in fire it effected a heat which is nothing else but a greater and condensed motion of the fire look below in the Chapt. of 2d Qualit in ayr it agitated a thin swelling or bubling which proceeds from a coarctation of the ayr whereby it is constipated in its motion towards the circumference by water moving to the center Water again is incitated to a stronger motion through the detention of ayr swelling up against its compression The earth is no less compelled to require her natural place the Center then she is opposed by the fire Were all these violent motions as it were equal in their elements being formed also in one figure they might continue so for ever like as if they were all surprized by a Catoche but being coagulated in an unequal proportion and unlike figure they break through one another in some progress of time and being confused in various figures they effect also protrusions of no less variety in figures Observe that in these commistions the elements are confused in a contrary manner then they are placed without in their entire bodies For here the fire against its nature as it were is constituted in the center next the ayr then earth and water is outermost There the earth is the center next to it is water c. Herein appeares the wisdom and providence of Nature which although casting the Elements into a fight yet directs terminates them into a most perfect friendship These coagulated bodies are called seeds which are multiplied according to the number of the kinds thence budding Seeds understand in a large sense as they denominate the Rudiments and first beginnings of all mixt bodies Otherwise Seeds are strictly attributed to living Creatures alone as to Plants and Animals Although Hearbs and Plants are alone nominated by Moses to be produced through this Division yet the seeds of Minerals and of their recrements as they erroneously term them and of Stones were also implied since their Creation is no where else mentioned CHAP. XIII Of the Fourth Fifth Sixth and Seventh Division of the Chaos 1. An Enarration of the Effects of the fourth Division That Nature created the first bodies of every Species the greatest is instanced in Bees Fishes and Fowl That all Species are derived from one individuum That Adam was the greatest man that ever was since the Creation What those Giants were which the Poets faigned 2. How the Sun and Moon were created That a Lioness is not more vigorous then a Lion 3. How the Stars of the Firmament were created 4. How the durable Clouds of the Ayr were created 5. The Effects of the fifth Division 6. The Effects of the sixth Division 7. The Effects of the last Division AS there was a coagulation of the waters and earth so God did in the same manner through the fourth Division coagulate and further purifie the Elements of fire and ayr This coagulation was of the heterogeneous Elements namely of part of the adjoyned 16 parts of the peregrine Elements These being congregated did condense and unite a great portion of fire which condensation through a mixture of ayr water and earth constituted it into a flame Earth giveth a body to fire and staies its light parts ayr and water keep in the flame Look below where I have particularly illustrated the generation of a flame 1. These coagulations consisted of parts differing variously in quantity some greater others less Nature did also observe a most exact order among them to wit she first coagulated one greatest body afterwards some greater bodies lastly many little ones I prove this In all kinds there is one greatest because there is the least for where there is a least there must necessarily be a greatest Among Bees there is one which is the greatest and therefore he is the Leader and King of all the rest Among Fowl we see the same namely that there is one greatest in each kind of them which all the rest follow and fly about In a multitude of Fishes they all swim after and about one which is the greatest among them c 2. The greatest of all kinds were created at the beginning of the world because that being the Superlative degree and therefore excelling the others must have been created immediately by God he creating immediately nothing but what is the most excellent Since that all beings have their rise and origine from one it is necessary that this one should be the greatest That all
compress its parts any more then it was compressed before but a stone or other mixt heavy body lying upon the ground presseth a hole into the ground yet if as much more earth as there is contained in such a stone were cast upon the same place it would not make any sensible cavity or Impression the reason is because in a stone or mixt body the earth is violently detained and therefore useth the greater force or compression to the Center but earth being in its natural seat doth not This quality may be called coldness supposing it to be a passion wrought upon the tact by the earth punctually pressing to the Center In this sense coldness is an absolute quality in another it may be taken for a privation of heat because it seizeth upon the tact only in the absence of heat According to the former sense doth the Poet elegantly explain the nature of Cold. Nam penetrabile frigus adurit For the penetrating cold doth burn By penetrating its compression is intended That the cold is penetrating and pressing none that ever hath been in Greenland will deny wherefore in that it is an absolute quality In the latter sense it may be taken for a privation for it is the absence of heat which effecteth Coldness yet not per se but per accidens because as long as the heat is in a body it doth through its motion ad extra balance and temper the motion of cold ad iutra but the heat being departed then coldness doth through its compression punctually divide the continuous parts of the body as the ayry and waterish parts of it and so coldness is reduced to action through the defect of heat to balance it This we are sensible of in the Winter at which time there being a detraction of the ambient heat the earthy parts contained in the Ayr do then through their weight press down upon us and being arrived to our skin they repel the heat which being repelled they joyn with the earthy parts of our Body and so cause a greater punctual compression whence we soon feel a dense acuteness thence an asperity and thence a hardness or rigidity When again we approach the fire then its heat joynes with our internal heat and expelling the extrinsick cold parts it doth force the intrinsick ones back to the Circumference and so we grow hot again VIII There is also a Compression observeable in water but much different from that caused by earth water compressing the tact with a continuation and not punctually and therefore the compression made by water is equal thick and obtuse whence it is that when we have newly washt our hands with cold water we feel a thick levor upon them caused by the continuous pressure of the water The division which produceth this cold passion in our tact is not by separating or disjoyning its continuous parts but by squeezing the Ayr contained within its pores which being squeezed impelleth also the fiery spirits seated about these Pores from which impulsion we feel a punctual and acute division so that the passion raised by water doth per se only compress obtusely the continuous parts of our tact through a squeezing and per accidens it disuniteth them punctually by impelling the fiery spirits effentially inhering in the said tangent parts besides water containing some earthy points doth by reason of them excite withal a small acute compression Arist. Lib. 2. de ort anim Cap. 4. and in Lib. 1. de Meteor Cap. 4. seemes to assert that coldness is nothing else but a privation of heat For saith he the two Elements implying water and earth remain cold by reason of the defect of circular motion making heat Zabarel Lib. 2. de qual Elem. cap. 3. makes good my Opinion although by guess or at least we must say that coldness is really in it self a positive quality but wherein this positive quality consisteth he knoweth not but that it ariseth from a privation of heat and in respect of heat it may take place among privations This tends to the same purpose as I have stated before namely that coldness cannot act unless heat be absent in such a proportion as that it may have power over it The same is appliable to heat and the other qualities viz. that they are privations in regard they cannot act without the absence of their Opposites but that they are positive because they act sensibly in the absence of the said opposites But what shall I think of Aristotle who hath soon altered his opinion in Lib. 2. de Ort. Inter. Text. 9. Cold is that doth equally conjoyn and congregate bodies that are of the same Gender as well as those of a differing Gender A plain Contradiction for that which doth conjoyn and congregate bodies by condensation must be positive according to his own words yet nevertheless above he asserted it to be a Privation I wave this and proceed in making disquisition upon his Definition Broath as long as it remaines boyling hot the fat of it is contained within it being exactly mixed with the water but assoon as it cooles it is separated and cast forth to the top ergo cold doth segregate heterogenea from homogenea Earth separates her self from water and water segregates her parts from fire and ayr but water and earth are cold and yet do not congregate their own parts with others of another gender Ergo. 2. This is no more but the mentioning of one of its remote effects for they themselves grant that it produceth this effect through condensation ergo cold is not formally defined but described through one of its effects It now proves easie to us to decide that inveterated dispute concerning the primum frigidum That which doth most divide the tact by compression is the primum frigidum or the coldest but the earth doth most compress our tact or tangent parts for it doth compress the tact acutely and water obtusely only ergo it is the coldest 2. According to their own Tenents that which doth most condense is the coldest but earth condenses most for it condensates her own parts into Metals and Stones but water although it incrassates yet it cannot condense bodies into that consistence which earth doth ergo 3. That which is heaviest is the coldest for condensation is an effect of weight but earth is heaviest ergo Lastly If it be your pleasure to name Earth a frigidum in summo and Water a frigidum in remisso Fire a calidum in summo sive intenso and Ayr calidum in remisso you may without Offence CHAP. XVI Of the remaining Respective Qualities of the Elements 1. The Second Respective Quality of the Ayr. That water cannot be really and essentially attenuated The State of the Controversie 2. That Ayr cannot be really and essentially incrassated Why a man whilst he is alive sinkes down into the water and is drowned and afterwards is cast up again That a woman is longer in sinking or drowning then a
such a Rarefaction or greater Condensation because it consisteth as I have proved out of indivisible minima's If then we should grant a rarefaction or greater condensation we must allow the minima's of earth to be divisible for how could they either be retcht or give way into themselves else and so it would be divisible and indivisible at once which is absurd The same Argument serves against the condensation and rarefaction of fire But more of this in our Discourse de vacuo IV. Condensation Rarefaction Attenuation and Incrassation although impossible in this sense yet in another are usually received and may be allowed Condensation in a tolerable acception is when a rare body is united to a dense body and because it is then as it were made one body with the dense substance it is said to be condensed Thus when fire is united to earth it is said to be condensed but through this condensation there is nothing detracted from or added to the natural rarity of the fire 2. Condensation is also taken for the frequent and constant following of one particle of fire upon the other Now you must not conceive that the fire hereby is condensed or impacted in its rarity no but that one part pusheth the other forward and being so pusht forward one before the other they are said to be condensed that is following one another so close as that they just come to touch one another Thus we say that condensed fire warmeth or heateth the hand because many parts follow one another and so push one another forward into the substance of the hand so that condensation of fire in this sense is nothing else but an approximation of the parts of fire that were dispersed before 2. Fire burneth the hand when its parts being condensed according to both these two acceptions are received and collected following close upon one another and so do burn the hand The reason is because as the force of earth and water is intended by violent detention so is fire which being violently detained by earth and water doth move with greater force Besides through the latter of these condensations the parts of fire are more collected and united The fire is violently detained when it is detained from moving from the Center to the Circumference Besides according to these two latter acceptions you are to understand condensation above whereas I have attributed it to fire A body is said to be rarefied when it is affixed to a rare element thus they conceive earth to be rarefied when its minima's are diffused by a portion of fire A body is attenuated when it is united to a thin Element so water is attenuated when its parts are diducted through the renuity of Ayr. A body is said to be incrassated when it is adjoyned to a thick Element Thus Ayr is understood to be incrassated when it is cloathed about with water Remember that I have made use of these words in my foregoing Discourses according to the said Interpretations V. The Third Relative Qualities are such as do immediately emanate from the Second The third respective Quality of fire is Dryness A Dryness is an expulsion of Moysture which fire doth by forcing it to the Circumference and dividing ad extra its continuity Dryness in the earth is an effect of coldness through which it divides ad intra the continuity of moysture inwards and forceth it to the Center Moysture is an effect of water through which it overlaies a body with its own thick substance expanded in ayr it is a quality whereby it overlayes a body with its thin substance Aristotle in stead of describing these qualities he sets down one of their Attributes Moysture is that which is difficultly contained within its own bounds and easily within others This is openly false for the ayr is difficultly contained within the bounds of others insomuch that it striveth to break through with violence and therefore is more easily contained within its own bounds So water is easier contained within its own bounds for when it is poured upon the earth it vanisheth presently which is not a containing of it Besides granting this Attribute to them both it is only a mark of Moysture and not the Description of its formality No doubt but water is moyster then ayr because it is more apt to cleave through its thickness and adhere to a body then ayr which by reason of its tenuity is not so tenacious Wherefore it is Idleness in thâ—se who say that the ayr is moyster then water although water moistneth more because of its thickness And as concerning the primum siccum it belongeth to the earth because that obtaineth greater force in detracting waterish moysture which is the moystest That it doth so appeares hence because the waterish moysture through its weight is more obedient to the impulse of earth then of fire But if you agree to term nothing moyst but what hath a palpable Dampness and that drying which removeth the said dampness then water alone is moystning and ayr drying because ayr through its tenuity divides the crassitude of the water and so disperseth it CHAP. XVII Of Mixtion 1. What Mixtion is Three Conditions required in a Mixtion 2. Whether Mixtion and the generation of a mixt body differ really 3. Aristotles Definition of Mixtion examined Whether the Elements remain entire in mixt Bodies 4. That there is no such Intension or Remission of Qualities as the Peripateticks do apprehend The Authors sense of Remission and Intention 5. That a Mixtion is erroneously divided into a perfect and imperfect Mixtion HItherto we have sufficiently declared the absolute and respective Qualities of the Elements That which I must next apply my self unto is to enarrate the qualities befalling them joyntly in their union one with the other I. Their union is called Mixtion which is an union of the Elements in Minima's or Points Observe that mixtion sometimes is taken for the union of parts not in points but particles and is termed Union by Apposition as when you mixe Barly and Oates together into one heap Anaxagoras and many of the ancient Philosophers did opiniate that Mixtion consisted only in the apposition of little parts to one body but Aristotle hath justly reprehended them for this Assertion and confuted their Opinion Lib. 2. de Gen. Corrup Cap. 10. Properly Mixtion is effected through an exact confusion of parts and their union in Minima's or the least particles the exactness consisteth in this that there must be an equal measure sive ad pondus sive ad justitiam of parts Parts are either little or great The great are constituted out of little and the little out of the least In mixture to wit an equal one are generally three condititions required 1. A mutual contact without which there must be a vacuum in misto a mixt body 2. This mutual contact must be in points whereby every point of an Element toucheth the minimum of another hence they say well mixtio fit
Phys. Fernel and others oppose it To decide a Controversie agitated by the greatest of Philosophers and Physitians needs a deep inspection Wherefore I demand what they understand by a fifth quality whether a quality really or modally only differing from the four single qualities of the Elements 2. Whether the Authors of the contrary opinion intend by Harmony or Concord any thing distinct from the single qualities of the Elements There is none I find answereth to this which compels me to handle the Question in supposing the one party to mean by a fifth quality a quality really distinct and the other by Harmony of the Elements to intend nothing distinct from the elements being united in a proportion A temperament is not a fifth quality really distinct from the qualities of the elements because a temperament cannot exist without the four qualities of the elements for take away but one of those qualities and you take away the temperament A temperament formally is not a Harmony or Concord only because a Harmony or Agreement of the four qualities is an Accident or condition following or attending the union of qualities Wherefore a harmony of the said qualities is an Accident or Mode differing modally from a temperament for when we conceive a temperament we do not conceive a harmony although we conceive a harmony to be a conditio sine qua non of a temperament because without it they could not be united A temperament is not a proportion of the Elements but the union of the Elements in a proportion A temperament is a fifth quality modally distinct from the elementary single qualities but not really for a temperament is the union of four qualities in one wherefore this one quality is the same really with the four united although modally different 2. A totum is modally only and not really distinguisht from its parts united but a temperament is a totum and the qualities united are the parts united Ergo. I cannot but strange at many Physitians defining a temperament to be a harmony and yet asserting the first qualities to be contrary A Contradiction For if the first qualities be contrary they expel one another out of the same Subject but if they are harmonical they will embrace and preserve one another in their beings which that they do is abundantly demonstrated above Others again assert that a temperament doth include an union not only of the first qualities but also of the substances of the elements A Dulness Wherein would a temperament then differ from Mistion Had they affirmed that mistion did imply or include a temperament it would have been an Heroick Saying not to be expected from them Whether from the congress of the four qualities there result two temperaments one out of the active qualities the other of the passive is a further doubt objected by them In the first place they are deceived in distinguishing the first qualities into active and passive qualities because among them the one is no more active or passive then the other they being equally active and passive 2. It is a contradiction to define a temperament to be the four qualities united into one harmony and afterward to conceive one harmony to be two that is two temperaments IV. Properly and absolutely there is no distemperament or intemperies because the form of every mixt body is a temperament Wherefore a distemperament sounds nothing else but a non-temperament and consequently there is no distemper I confess a mutation or change of the proportion of the Elements there may happen in a mixt body yet notwithstanding that change the temperament remaines a temperament If then you intend by an Intemperies nothing but such a change it may be defined to be the alteration of the form of a mixt being Alteration is the intention or remission of one or more of the vertues powers or forms of the Elements as they are temperated Intension and Remission take in the senses formerly set down Although in a strict sense every intention or remission of a first quality in a mixt body changeth the Form of it yet because that every change is not durable but many are soon expelled again through which a mixt body returnes to its former form wherefore such changes are only counted substantial changes or mutations whereby a body is so much changed that it is irreducible to its pristine Form and whereby it produceth Accidents altogether sensibly differing from those that were produced by its foregoing Form for example when the temperament of a man is so much subverted and changed by the appulse of another temperament that it is rendered uncapable of reduction to its former temperament or form and the accidents produced by it are altogether sensibly differing from those that were produced by the foregoing temperament as when a mans Heat is subverted by the appulse of Cold so as he is deprived thereby of Life Sense and Motion then his form is changed into the form of a Cadaver dead Corps because now other accidents are produced being altogether sensibly different from the former and the lost Accidents are irreducible This is a substantial change or mutation because the entire essence of the thing is changed V. An Accidental change or Alteration is when the temperament of a body is so far changed as that its Modes or Accidents appear to be sensibly changed yet not totally but partially and when the change is gone no further then it is expulsible and the former temperament reducible I said sensibly changed because it is not every insensible increase or decrease of any of the first qualities of a mixt body deserveth the name of Alteration although in a large sense it doth It will not be amiss to give you an Instance A man when he is feaverish is alterated because fire is intended more then it was in his precedent temperament which therefore produceth a sensible burning pains and weaknesses but since his old temperament is reducible it is only to be counted an Alteration or Accidental Change Another distinction between a substantial change and an Alteration is that a body by a substantial mutation is so much changed as that you do not know it to be the same thing it was but an alterated body although it is somewhat changed yet it is not so much changed but that you may know what it was If there be any Infinitum in the world none is liker to be it then the number of temperaments for there are as many temperaments possible as there are Elementary Indivisibles excepting four to which one indivisible being added changeth the temperament and again another and another and so on until all the indivisible be apposed admitted to that changeth the temperament again and again CHAP. XIX Of the Division of Temperaments 1. What an equal and unequal Temperament is That there never was but one temperament ad pondus That Adams Body was not tempered ad pondus That neither Gold nor any Celestial bodies are tempered ad
pondus 2. That all Temperaments ad Justitiam are constantly in changing That there are no two bodies in the world exactly agreeing to one another in temperature 3. The Latitude of Temperaments How the corruption of one body ever proves the generation of another 4. That there is no such unequal temperament as is vulgarly imagined That there is an equal temperament is proved against the vulgar opinion That where Forms are equal their matters must also be equal 5. What a Distemper is What Galen intended by an unequal temperature 6. VVhen a man may be termed temperate VVhat bodies are said to be intemperate 7. The combination of the second Qualities of the Elements in a temperature Their Effects I. A Temperament is divided into an equal temperament or a temperamentum ad pondus or unequal otherwise called by Philosophers a temperamentum ad justitiam An equal temperament is constituted out of an equal proportion of the forms of the Elements and therefore it is called a temperamentum ad pondus because it is so equally tempered that if it were weighed one Element would not over-balance the other This Temperament consisteth of an Arithmetical proportion It is otherwise called an anatick temperament An unequal temperament is where the elementary forms are united in an unequal proportion It is called temperamentum ad justitiam because there is just such a proportion of the forms of the Elements as to fit it to act such an act or to exercise such Offices The proportion observeable in this temperament is a Geometrical proportion whereby one Element overtops the other or is elevated above the other in such a degree or measure as to produce such certain effects Nature never appeared in more then in one temperament ad pondus but ever after in temperaments ad justitiam as I have shewed a little before I have proved that the Chaos was the only temperament ad pondus which its nature and end did require thereby it was rendered capable of existing in a vacuum void space and needed no external place to contain it because it contained it self The body of Adam in his Innocency was not temperated ad pondus because it would have rendered him immoveable for the Elements being supposed to be in an equal proportion and counterpoysing one another local motion must have been impossible Celestial bodies although of so long a duration or Gold whatever Alchymists say to the contrary are neither tempered ad pondus because the one could then not be heavy or the others light II. Since that a temperament ad justitiam ever obtaines one Element or two or three predominating over the others its force being greater then the others doth by that means free it self daily from their detention by which a temperament is constantly in changing increasing in one and decreasing in another quality this experience tels us viz. that every being after its first production in a sensible time undergoeth a sensible change of its Temperament and consequently undergoeth an insensible change of temperature in an unsensible time in such a manner that there is no body but doth at least change every minute of time in the detraction of a Minimum Hence we are supplied with a reason why there are not two bodies to be found exactly like unto one another in temperament because bodies are alwaies a changing You may object That many substances produce effects diametrically like to one another ergo their temperament must be alike withal I deny the Antecedence for although their Effects are alike according to their appearance to our senses notwithstanding Reason perswades us that there must be an insensible dissimilitude between their temperaments and consequently between their Effects III. The degrees of Changes or Latitude of Temperaments in bodies are these 1. There is an insensible change or alteration which our senses cannot discern but it is only discoverable through Reason 2. The second degree is a sensible alteration which is evidently discernable by sense in that its effects are sensibly different yet they must not be so far deviated from the wonted preceding effects as to be judged entirely unlike to them 3. A total change and mutation of Form to the reception of which the two forementioned alterations are previous dispositions This degree of change in respect to the expulsion of the preceding form is taken for a Corruption in regard of the subsequent form it is accounted a Generation Hence derives this Maxime Generatiounius est corruptio alterius vice versa The Generation of one is the corruption of another I cannot resemble the expulsion of a form out of a body and a reception of another into the same subject to a better example then to a Ship in sight to one standing on the Pierhead at Dover but out of sight to those that are at Calice whither the Ship is bound now the further this Ship sailes the more it appeares in sight to them at Calice and the less to the others at Dover until it is come quite into sight to them at Calice and then it is quite gone out of sight from the others Even so it is in alteration for as the Ship fore-instanced groweth insensibly less and recedes from one Coast to another so an alteration likewise is insensible But after a sensible time the ship appears sensibly less and more remote so after a sensible time an Alteration groweth sensible and as the Ship at last after these insensible and sensible diminutions and recesses is suddenly quite gone out of sight and vanished so a mix body after all these insensible and sensible alterations is suddenly changed into another form and become another substance the former being vanished The same is observeable in man who altering insensibly every day in his temperament draweth nearer and nearer to his Bed of rest and after some years expiration findes sensibly that he is altered in his temperament both which alterations dispose him to his last sudden change and substantial mutation Galens delineation of the Latitude of temperaments doth tend to the confirmation of what I have proposed Lib. 1. de Temper he writes thus If a quality is exuperant it becomes an Intemperies if it be yet more augmented it turnes to a Disease if it be most increased it is Death or a substantial mutation IV. A Temperament is vulgarly likewise divided into equal or a temperament ad pondus and unequal or a temperament ad justitiam They define an equal temperament to be that which is equally and exquisitely tempered and an unequal temperament to be that which is unequally and inexquisitely mixt If this be their meaning of equal and unequal then their division is illegal because a temperament ad justitiam is as exquisitely and equally mixt as a temperament ad pondus for Gold is tempered ad justitiam but none will deny that Gold is equally tempered in particles although not in great pieces That it is equally tempered in Particles its equal colour equal consistence of
spirits How the Air happens to burst through a sudden great light That a sudden great Light may blind kill or cast a man into an Apoplexy 8. How Light renders all Objects visible Why a piece of Money cast into a Basin filled with water appears bigger than it is The causes of apparent Colours Why a great Object appears but small to one afar off The difference between lux and lumen What a Beam is What a Splendour is That the Lights begot by the Stars and other flames are not distinguished specie How the Coelum Empyreum is said to be Lucid. I. VVE are now to ennumerate and unfold the remaining qualities risen from the mixture of the Elements such are Light Colours Sounds Odors and Sapors We will first begin with Light as being the excellentest among them Light is a quality emanating from flaming fire A flame is nothing else but incrassated Air expanded and deducted in rotundity by condensed fire which is detained and imprisoned within the foresaid qualified Air. The difficulties requiring illustration are 1. How the fire comes to be condensed 2. How imprisoned 3. Why the Air doth immediately surround it 4. How light is propagated and the manner of its action As to the first Fire I have told you will not burn unless it be condensed for being naturally rare it penetrates through the incrassated Air with ease but being condensed it doth not because it is adjoyned to a heavy gross body namely the minima's of the Earth and Water which doth put a stop to its pass but nevertheless the force of fire is stronger by reason of those adjoyned heavy minima's For fire being violently detained by them is grown stronger 2. Fire being to divide another thick body makes use of the compressing accuteness of Earth to divide it which it effects by protruding those dense parts before it for through its single rarity it could not 2. Fire flying out and being expulsed out of a mixt body if it doth not meet with incrassated Air to retain it will pass and vanish but hitting against incrassated Air it strives to pass the Air again being continuous doth maintain her continuity with all her force and thirdly the fire moving circularly makes a circular dent into the mass of the said thickned Ayr which it beats against the advenient Ayr also striving from all parts to recover its situation and therefore necessarily surrounding the fire The Ayr again is also become stronger because of its violent detention notwithstanding the fire being the more potent doth diduct it into an oval or round Figure in the same manner as Wind striving to pass the water doth blow it up into a bubble Fire being thus condensed imprisoned and surrounded with thick ayr and diducting the same ayr into an oval or round Figure is called a flame II. The properties of a flame are 1. to be burning hot 2. to be an lux illuminans illuminating light The burning proceeds from the particles of condensed fire violently striking through the moisture of a mixt body whereby it divides it into ashes or a black crust tending to ashes Before I shew the manner of emanation of Light let us first examine what it is we call Light Light is that which is visible and renders all things about it visible Wherefore you do mark that Light is nothing but that which affects and moves the eye-sight If then I make it appear to you whereby it is that fire doth affect the Eye-sight therein I shew you the manner of emanation or operation of Light You must apprehend the optick spirits to be a thin continuous body equally interwoven through all its parts with a proportion of thin yet a little condensed fire for were it not a little dense it could not heat so that it is very like to the ambient ayr in substance and its other qualities 2. Supposing it to be an ayr we must conceive it to be continuous with the ambient ayr when the eyes are open This premitted I infer light to be nothing else but a continuous obduction of the Ayr caused by a flaming fire But let me here intreat your serious intention upon what I shall discover concerning the nature of Light it being one of the difficultest mysteries of all Philosophy and although its effects are luminous to the Eye yet its nature is obscure to the Understanding The search of this moved Plato to leave Athens and set saile for Sicily to speculate those flames of the mount AEtna Empedocles the Philosopher hazarded himself so far for to make a discovery of the nature of a flame and its light that he left his body in the Mongibell fire for an experiment although much beyond his purpose It is almost known to all how that the Learned Pliny took shipping from the promontory Misenas to be traversed to the Mount Pomponianus whither curiosity had driven him to fathom the depths of the Vesuvian flames but before he could feel the heat the smoak smothered him III. First then I prove that Light is an effect of a flame There is no flame but it causeth light and by the light we know it is a flame Ergo Light is an inseparable accident and a propriety quartimodi of a flame the Antecedence is undoubted Doth not a Candle a Torch a focall flame cause lights Or did you ever see light and doubted of the flame of it What is the reason when we hit our fore-heads against any hard thing we say there strikes a light out of our eyes It is because the violence of the stroke did discontinuate the optick ayr through which the condensed fire did unite and diduct the intrinsick ayr which was incrassated through the same stroke and so made a flame or rather a flash which is a sudden flame that is quickly lighted and quickly laid Secondly Light is not a single quality inhering in fire alone for were it so then where ever fire is there should be light but to the contrary we find that there is fire inherent in the ayr and many other bodies yet the ayr remains dark after the descent of the Planets 2. Were fire naturally light we could never be in darkness because the vast Region of fire is so large that it could not but illuminate thrice the extent of the ayr Thirdly Light is not fire rarefied and exporrected throughout all the dimensions of the ayr for who could ever imagine that a Candle being so small a flame should serve to be drawn out through the ayr and fill it with light to the extent of six or eight Leagues for a Candle may be seen at Sea in a clear dark night six or eight Leagues off or further so that it is absurd to imagine this and unworthy of a Philosophers maintaining it 2. It is impossible that fire could be so exactly mixt with ayr in an instant for so large an extent 3. There is never a particle of illuminated ayr but it is light to the full extent
consequently is the deeper coloured But that which is continuous although very thick yet it gathers nothing near so much as a continuous body because its continuity hinders its pass and so the light reflects upon it and produces a splendor whereas a contiguous body divides the ayr and giveth way for its entrance and so it pinches and next darkneth it Wherefore Gold being continuous that is consisting of much water condensed and ayr incrassated reflects the light and so produces a splendor Now that Gold consisteth of those moist parts I prove it because Gold contains a Lentor in it which is a concomitant of water and ayr as I shewed you before for cast a piece of Gold into the fire and let it lye there for some proportionate time and being taken out you may diduct it into any form or figure and turn or bend it any way Since that Gold consisteth of a proportion of continuous parts it is thereby rendred splendid and yellow from the proportion of contiguous parts contained within it Wherefore if you reduce Gold into a Calx you deprive it of its splendor because you have taken away its continuity of parts IV. Give me leave to demonstrate to you the reasons of all the various colours which Mercury attains to through its various preparations and thence you may collect the reasons of Colours befalling all other bodies whether Mineral or Vegetable through their several preparations Mercury is 1. splendid because of its thick continuity of parts 2. It s Silver-like colour derives from its paucity of contiguous parts which it containing in that small quantity doth render it a little darker than white and is the cause why it is not pellucid like unto water 3. The reason why Mercury becometh white like unto a white frost by being dissolved by Aqua Fort. is because it is diducted and attenuated through all its dimensions and therefore collecting and pinching the light a little only it appears white 4. Mercury changeth into a yellow colour after it hath been dissolved by oyl of Vitriol and being separated from the dissolvent by exhalation it abides white but being cast into water it changeth yellow The whiteness which remains in Mercury after the evaporation of the oyl is the colour of the corosive salt coagulated into an attenuated body by the Mercurial vertue The casting it into water doth deprive it of the forementioned salt which is dissolved into water that which doth remain is the courser part of the salt incorporated with the Mercury whose substance contains such a proportion of earth as to gather somuch of the obtended ayr and to pinch it into a yellowish colour 5. The whiteness of Mercury sublimate corrosive and of Mercury sublimate Dulufied derives more from the attenuated salt than the body the Mercury 6. The same corrosive Mercury sublimate dissolved into fair water and precipitated by oyl of Tartar changeth into a clay red Here you must not imagine that it is the oyl of Tartar in a drop or two doth colour the whole substance of the precipitated body for it self is of another colour besides were it of the same it is improportionate to colour a whole body by a drop or two It happens then through the deprivation of the thinner parts of the corrosive salt swimming in the water That which the oyl of Tartar performed in this preparation is nothing but to free the body from its detaining spirit which it doth by attracting it to its own body and uniting it self with it into a small body the red colour depends upon the quantity of thickned earth of the precipitate I shall not importune you with the relation of colours befalling through other preparations since you may easily infer a reason of them from what hath been proposed concerning the variation of colours in Mercury V. From this discourse I do further infer 1. That the formality of colours doth mainly consist in a respectiveness and relation to our sight and is no hing else but what man by his sight discerns it to be for had man no sight there would be no colours although there would be an alteration upon the ayr extended Likewise light would not be light but ayr obtended So that I say the Absolutum fundamentum Relationis suppositae would be there but not ipsa relatio because the Correlatum is defective The like understand of sounds sents or tasts which as to us are nothing but certain realities moving our animal spirits by certain respective modes which realities moving the senses in certain modes are called such or such sensible qualities what they may be further really in themselves we know not because we perceive no more of them than what we call such and such the others although real yet we suppose them to be non entia because we do not perceive or know them But I prove the Proposition All positive and absolute beings perform their actions responding to their modes But none of these fore-mentioned qualities may be so termed sensible qualities to wit colours sounds unless modifying the senses 2. That a mixt colour is not an intentional quality produced by the coloured object in the ayr but a real quality really inhering or effected in the ayr by the original action of a fundamental colour What shall an intentional quality act really Ergo Quiddam esset in effectu quod prius non fuerit in causa which contradicts that Maxime concluding the contrary Besides colour would be affected with two sorts of accidents one really inherent in the object the other in the ayr 3. It supposeth accidents to migrate è subjecto in subjectum which is impossible Nevertheless Scaliger pretends to prove Light to be a quality produced in the ayr and distinct from the efficient that is that Lumen is really distinguisht from Lux if so then Lumen could exist when Lux is separated and removed from it but that cannot be ergo there is no real distinction between them According to the same rule we might raise a real distinction between the coloured object immediately altering the ayr and the colour or lumen produced in the ayr from that colour being a Lux in comparison to the other This real distinction is rejected by the same Arguments because a colour in the ayr or a Lumen cannot exist when the colour or Lux in the object is removed 3. That notwithstanding the respective formality there is a real foundation in coloured bodies which is a certain degree of temperature whereby they being somewhat contrary to our sense move and act but mediately upon its temperament 4. That through this absolute foundation a colour doth move or act really upon the ayr and through it upon other inanimate bodies yet not as it is a colour but as it is an absolute foundation or a degree of temperament This motion is not very considerable for although it may move a light thin body out its place yet it will hardly move locally a thick or
I. A Tast Sapor is a quality whereby a mixt being moveth the tasting faculty The tasting Faculty is inherent immediately in the fixt animal spirits and mediately in the influent ones of the Tongue and Palat. These Spirits are in two degrees thicker then the auditory spirits there being the olfactive spirits intercedent differing but one degree in thickness from the said auditory spirits The object of this faculty is required to be respondent to it in consistency wherefore the faculty viz. the Spirits being dense and thick the Objects of the tast do move the same faculty by a greater density and thickness then those of visibles and audibles Otherwise if the Object be thinner and rarer then is requisite it is uncapable of moving the tast hence it is that we cannot tast air or warmth proceeding from fire That which is thick moves the tast by a kind of continuous compression of the spirits in the tongue thus fair water affects the tast which the more ayry and thin it is affects the tongue the more Water being tempered with Spirits makes a kind of a sharp and brisk tast for instance Wine Dense bodies move the Palat by a contiguous compression and therefore make a more distinct and forcible tast Summarily tast is nothing else but the discerning of the several temperatures of mixt bodies effecting several passions in the tongue and upon its gustative faculty which several passions are said to be several tasts Hence it is also obvious that the quality whereby a tast moves the gustative faculty is nothing but its action whereby it acteth distinctly in several Subjects wherein a different gustable quality is inherent Since the Gustative Spirits are deeply latent within a porous and Spongie body nothing can move the tast unless it be of that thinness or small quantity as that it may pass the pores of the tongue the passing of which subtilities waterish Moysture doth very much facilitate which proves in stead of a Vehicle to them and makes those passages slippery Hence it is that no great bodies have any tast unless they be first attrited and diminisht by the teeth and the more they be diminisht the more their tast becomes perceptible Dry bodies are not so gustable as when they are a little moistened whereby they reserate the pores of the tongue and procure a passage to the seat of the taste II. As many different waies as objects move the taste or cause severall passions in it so many different tasts there be That which doth only gently shake the taste and as it were doth but tickle it is sweet and deriving from a temperateness yet so as that water is abounding in it That which doth sensibly alterate the taste is an intermediate sapour that which doth most alterate it so as it may not pervert the faculty is an extream sapour Extreme sapours depend upon the greatest predominance of each Element in a several mixt body which being four do also constitute four extreme tastes 1. A fiery hot taste as in Pepper Ginger c. 2. An earthy taste 3. A waterish taste 4. An ayry tast not such as Theophrastus cals a fat taste like there is in oyl The rest are intermediate as bitter acerbe acid and salt for that is a tast mixt out of a waterish and ayry tast Peripateticks assert that tastes for to move the gustable faculty are to be immediately applyed to it and there they assert that tastes are only real among all the sensible qualities But this doth not alwaies hold true for tasts may be communicable through a medium and if the air is at any time to be allowed to be a medium it is sometimes in tasts and alwaies in odors to wit the air as Apothecaries do all testifie for when they are powdering or a peeling of Colocynthis its bitter taste doth very sensibly reach their tongue III. A smell or scent is a quality or action whereby a mixt body moves the olfactive faculty The difference between this and the gustable faculty is none other but that the one consists in a degree of a finer and thinner consistency of spirituous air and the same difference is between their objects viz. a taste is of a thicker body than a scent in manner that the scent is too subtil to strike the gustable faculty and a sapour is too thick to strike the olfactive faculty wherefore that which through its subtility passeth the sence of taste doth thereby reach to the sense of smelling moving its faculty withal It is thâ—n apparent That the objects of both these senses are the same differing only in subtilty of body and that they are nothing but temperaments of bodies comminuted and moving the said powers immediately yet not so but that the subtiler parts for to move the sense are requisite to be separated from the courser and more then that each needs a Vehicle or a medium for to be carried and directed through the subtil passages to the deep latent sensory The vehicle of tasts is water to which spittle and drink are equipollent as being through its thickness respondable to receive so thick and course an object a thinner vehicle as the air could not receive it because it is too thin to support it The vehicle of scents is air as being through its thinness proportionated to receive and convey such subtil bodies were this vehicle thicker it would through its gravity expel or express bodies of that subtility that smells are of You may here observe the depravate Judgments of the Peripateticks concerning the mediums of sensible objects where they ought to grant a medium as to scents and tastes they withhold it where they should allow no medium there they grant it as to audibles and visibles I stated temperaments of bodies to be the objects of sense by which you are to understand the subtiller and volatick parts of substances reduced to a certain degree of temperament and obtaining certain vertues of acting So that hereby I do not intend any quality distinct from a substance for the objects of sense but real bodies so qualified as to move sense where mark qualities are not really distinguished from their bodies but really identificated with them in the concrete although in the abstract they are distinguisht ratione for what is a quality in a body else but a body qualified Wherefore the action performed through the quality of a body is not to be taken as if the body were one thing and the quality another but as one and that action proceeds from the body qualified of this I have discoursed more at large in my Metaphysicks IV. Smels do nourish no more than tastes nourish the animal spirits none doubts but that neither nourishes the solid or humoral parts because of their unsutableness in consistency and temperament Wherefore although some are said to have sustained their life for a long time through smels alone as it is recorded of Democritus who sustained his life three daies through the
sight Flies are delighted in the sent or rather taste for they have no organ particularly destined for smells of honey That which doth most offend and almost pervert our sent is a stinking smell This offence of sent is various in degrees according to the degrees of the ingrate motion of smells and thence according to the property of those degrees we specifie and distinguish smells whose kinds are named by the same names that tastes are as being consentaneous to them not only in the thing it self but also in name viz. they are either fiery sharp as Pepper bitter salt acid or sour acerbous putrid which subvert and offend the sent and are various according to the subject whence they are emitted and do receive their names also thence so we say it smels like a carrion like excrements like piss like stinking fish like rank meat it smells as if it were musty c. As several scents are offensive to man so are beasts offended with several sents which they do naturally flee because they are dissentaneous to their olfactive ficulty So Flies are offended with the smoak of Brimstone rathe I suppose because it choaks them Serpents with the sent of Galbanum and Mise with the sent of an Asses claw burnt Some people will say That the Plague doth oft carry a sent with it not unlike to the smell of a mellow apple or according to others like the scent of May flowers It is certain that infected houses do smell so because they are moist and dampish and thence putrid and therefore the fitter to receive the venome of pestilent air but it is not a sent which the Plague brings along with it but which it finds in the house for I have oft smelt such scents in garden houses which proceeded from the dampness of the boards The Plague is so subtil a venome that it passeth the grosseness of mans sent and therefore cannot be smelt nevertheless it is sented by Dogs Cats Flies and other creatures which are so much offended by it that they usually flee such houses I have been in several Towns where the Plague did rage very violently but when ever I was occasioned to go into strange houses I generally took notice whether there were any Dog or Cat in the house or whether I could see any Flies about the Room which if I did I was the better satisfied Let me tell you could the Plague be sented by man the Plague would be no plague for as I told you That which doth move our sent must be of a certain essential thickness which if concommitant to the venome of the Plague were impossible that it should work such pernicious and potent effects unless it were of so subtil a body that it should flee our sent Hence I do also infer that it is impossible for a man to be poysoned through a sent because if a thing be so thick as to move out sent it is impossible it should produce such an effect in that thickness Probably you may object that the Italians have attained to a way of poisoning men by the smell of perfumed Gloves or by a sent impressed upon the inside of a Letter which if a man do open and receive the sent of it through his nosthrils it will certainly kill him In the first place it is doubtful whether they have attained to that perfection of cowardly murder through sents if they have not questionless their Genius doth lead enough that way it is more for want of industry knowledge and skill than inclination however it being possible enough and supposing it to be so I answer That it is not the smell doth kill a man but something which being of that subtility that it fleeth the sent is mixed with some perfume wherewith the fore-mentioned gloves are perfumed The like answer doth dissolve the objection of poyson contained within the Letter VI. The coursest of all the senses is the Tact or feeling faculty to which the coursest kind of objects without any commâ—nution are appropriated So that the courser an object is the more tangible it proves This must also be applied immediately to the organ because no medium is course enough to carry or convey it to the sensory Had the Peripateticks proposed that question here which they moved concerning seeing and hearing viz. Whether we are capable of sensation in a vacuum they would have shewed themselves to have had some skill in the matter But let us referre the same question to the sense of feeling and question Whether it be possible to feel a thing in a Vacuum I answer affirmatively What should hinder the Tact from feeling supposing the object to be applyed to the sensory For it needs no air for its vehicle VII Themistius Averrhoes AEgidius Jandunus Apollinaris Marcellus Avicenna Albertus Magnus Cardan and others do seem to state as many different kinds of feeling as there are different objects that do move the Tact differently according to which rule they may allow almost infinite kinds of feeling Their mistake is gross for according to the same rule there should be as many kinds of seeing hearing c. but this is absurd The case is this It is not every distinct act or object which causes a difference in the faculty for one faculty may perceive many different kinds of objects and yet not be multiplied in its faculty but remain one and the same look in my first book of Phil. and in the Metaph. where I have insisted more largely upon this point and illustrated how a faculty may be one formally and manifold materially Scaliger Exerc. CCCXXXVI d. 3. is so much taken with his Veâ—ereal Titillation that he honoureth it with the name of a sixth sense Alas his subtillity could hardly reach to maintain the dignity of it What Because it pleased his phansie therefore it must be called a sixth sense Or did he specifie it from the common tact because it was proper to the Membranes of the Genitals then upon the same account the tact of his head is specifically distinguisht from the tact of his knee or is it because it is a titillation No certainly for every sensible part of the body may be tickled but the subtiller the part is the more exquisite acute and piercing the titillation is and therefore no wonder if those parts being circumvested with thin membranes being of a most exquisite sense perceive so acute and piercing a titillation Man is generally cried up to have the most exquisite tact of all Creatures but why should he be said to be only excellent in feeling and not in all his other senses For he judges more distinctly of all sensibles than other creatures although he doth not perceive them at such a distance as other animals the excellency of sensation not consisting in remoteness of its action VIII Tangibility then is a quality whereby a mixt body moves the Tact. The principality of the tact consists in a thick course spiritous air the moving of
greater apposition of fewel This fewel at its first apposition to the fire is not yet attracted or become a fit nutriment for it before it succeeds the incrassated air by a continuation and through an impulse of the ambient air and then being attracted it is concocted and its aerial parts are gradually adjoyned to the former air where its formal parts to wit its latent fire being adunited to the form of the former fire doth accrease the former fire and form which accretion must necessarily attract yet more nutriment which nutriment acceding doth each time increase its form and matter Even so it is with Plants attracting much nutriment the which the gradual increasing of their form and matter doth dispose to a greater attraction which again a greater supply of formal material parts do necessarily consecute But seeing that all Plants do accrease no further than to a determinate quantity of formal and material parts it will not prove amiss to give the reason of it which we shall do hereafter In order to a further explanation of this definition let us first shew you the Homonymia of accretion 1. It is taken for an augmentation of number in naturals animals or others Thus a heap of Corn of Beasts or of Men is said to be augmented because it is increased by access of a greater number of individuals of the same species 2. It is strictly appropriated to the augmentation of an Element through the apposition of another Element or of its own namely to rarefaction For example Water is said to be accreased when it is rarefied according to my intention attenuated by the apposition of air 3. It is understood for an accrease proper to living creatures that is such as is performed through an introsusception as they vulgarly term it of nutriment whereby a body is increased throughout all dimensions 4. Erroneously for an accretion by adgeneration or apposition so fire is said to accrease by apposition of fewel but this kind of accretion is the same with that caused through rarefaction 5. Philosophers intend it sometimes for an increase of vertue or perfection in a body as of heat in a fire or cold in a frost whence they term it a vertual accretion 6. For the accretion of material parts only or of the Mole or body of a thing wherefore it is vulgarly agreed to call it a dimensive accretion To distinguish accretion as it is treated of here you are to apprehend it for the accrease of a Vegetable in matter and form or as they term it both for a dimensive and virtual accretion Accretion is otherwise called auction or augmentation which notwithstanding in a proper sense do differ from one another in largeness and strictness of signification Auction is common to all the forementioned kinds of accretion Augmentation is restricted to that which happens through apposition but Accretion is only proper to living substances or to such as is performed by an introreception of Elementary parts and whereby they are extended into all dimensions Accretion comprehends in it all the kinds of motion viz. alteration auction and Local motion A Vegetable is increased virtually or in its qualities and likewise the nutritive actions are performed by alteration That it is related to auction the name and definition it self doth convince Local motion is likewise necessary for the effecting of Accretion because by its means the aliment is attracted to the central parts of a living substance By the precedents we may easily be resolved whether a vegetable accreaseth through a penetration of Dimensions or by the admission of a Vacuum I answer through neither but by the giving way of the parts and their being extended by the succeeding aliment Notwithstanding you may reply the doubt to remain the same still for the succeeding nutriment is either received in a full body or in an empty or void one If in the former then a penetration of dimensions must be allowed if in the other a vacuum must be admitted I answer That in one sense the nutriment is received in a vacuum that is void of such nutriment as is to be next received but not in a vacuum simpliciter for it is replenisht with vapours or air or excrements which are protruded by the advent of the nutriment and so it is received in pleno 2. Whether Augmentation be effected through extension of parts or pulsion I answer through both The first is requisite because without it Accretion is impossible since thereby a body is extended into all dimensions Neither can the second be wanted since the succeeding parts may be conceived to impel one another forward and the formost of them to propel the preceding nutriment VI. The first and last of a Plant is its first generation and its last propagation By the first generation I intend the first rice and production of a Plant out of the Earth without being derived by propagation from any preceding Vegetable or in one word its sementation Although by course of my method I ought to have treated of this before yet knowing that the premitted notions would add much to the explanation of this matter it did prevail with me to subjoyn this to them The earth we spy to be the universal Mother of all Vegetables being within her self divided into several wombs within which she is apt to conceive divers genitures or seeds and retaining he fame untill their perfection she then casts them forth from her I shall first make observation upon the Wombs of the Earth next upon her Conception then upon the Protrusion of her Foetus The Surface of the Earth is divided into numerous Wombs of various Figures and various dispositions of temperament bigness c. The Wombs of the Earth that are destined for Vegetables are small and narrow Cavities formed by the transcursions of exhalations and vapours though their passage impressing that variety of Figures These formed are actuated with a prolifick heat Calidum consisting out of part of the heat of the through passed subtilities and part of the influent heat The Cavities graven within are left rough and close filled up with air or other thin substances as vapours these must needs be rough because where ever we see the Earth excavated it alwaies appears rough which contributes much to the conception and retention of the seed or geniture and so doth its closeness These Wombs do not remain long ventous without being gravidated with some spermatick matter which is constituted out of the most subtil and active parts or spirits of passing exhalations being so arctly knit and united into a subtil temperament of their Elements that they might be termed volatil bodies actuated most by fire and air These spirits or volatil bodies cannot divagate without meeting with some moisture which doth unite them and cohibite them into one body nevertheless they continue in making their way untill they arrive to some Cavity where they may be harboured or else they may be stayed by so much
or through it without taking its first impulse from against a body whence through reflection it might pass through This premitted I answer that according to the first intention a Vacuum is capable of giving a passage to a body locally moving through it provided it takes its progress from without upon an immoveable center I prove it Air Fire and the other Elements move through a Vacuum for otherwise did they move through another body it would infer a penetration of bodies If then the Elements obtain such a power ergo consequently their mixt bodies 2. This Maxim Omne mobile sit super immobili i. e. All moveables move upon an immoveable body is alone to be understood of the foundation of motion viz. That all moveables must move from an immoveable Center that is take their beginning thence either by impulse reflection refraction or continuated protrusion 3. That Motion whereby a moveable passeth through a Vacuum is continuated upon its own Center or upon another body instead of a Center for all motions must take their beginning upon an immoveable or at least upon that which is not inclined to the same motion in the same swiftness that the body which moves upon it doth 4. A single body can neither press through not move that is out of its place locally in a Vacuum because it enjoying its Center and not being violently detained would rest upon that Center 5. Neither can a mixt body move locally that is change its ubi in a Vacuum because the reason of a bodies changing of its ubi is the impulsion of another body striving for its center upon it For example water moves upwards because the air striving for its Center protrudes it out of its seat upwards as hath been mentioned air being compressed within the body of water is moved out of it because of the waters compression downwards whereby it is squeezed upwards But not through its own motion Now in a Vacuum there is no external body to strive or to impell upon it 6. A body would not cease to move locally internally because of the violent detentions of the Elements contained within pressing one another away from the Center 7. Suppose there were a confusion of the four Elements as big as a fist cast without the Universe they would change their internal places as the Elements changed theirs in the Chaos viz. The weighty Elements being less in extent would sooner gain the Center than the others and as for the rest they would move in the same manner as the Elements move here but of this more in the next Chapter And now you may easily comprehend that the present world doth not at all change it s Ubi but is immoveably fixed although continually changing its internal places 8. Angels if conceited to be pure spirits may move in and through a Vacuum but if apprehended to be of a circumscriptive quantity they cannot CHAP. XIX Of Physical Motion 1. What a Physical Motion is The kinds of it The definition of Alteration Local Motion and quantitative motions The subdivision of Local Motion 2. That all alterative and quantitative motions are direct 3. That all externall motions are violent 4. That all weighty mixt bodies being removed from their Element are disposed to be detruded downwards from without but do not move from any internal inclination or appetite they have to their universal Center 5. The causes of swiftness and slowness of external Local Motion 6. That light bodies are disposed to be moved upwards 7. That ayry bodies being seated in the fiery Region are disposed to be moved downwards 1. THe same reason that perswaded me to treate of a Vacuum and Antiperistasis in the preceding Chapter is also a motive why I deferred the Treatise of Physical motions hither Physical motions are so called in opposition to Hyperphysical or Metaphysical and are proper to natural bodies A Physical motion then is a change of a natural body in any one or more of its Physical modes or in all A change is a transitus passing from that which is not to that which is to be Whence we may plainly collect the differences of it to be as many as it may vary in its Modes and intirely in its Essence viz. Physical motion is either to quantity quality action passion relation situation duration to a new Essence c. and particularly to a greater or less quantity to colour figure heat coldness c. This infers that there are many more universal differences or kinds of motion than Aristotle stated However I shall only insist upon these three as being most taken notice of viz. Alteration which is a change of a quality of a Physical being External Local motion which is a change of the external place wherein a natural being is seated And Auction and Diminution which are changes of the quantity of a natural being Alteration as I said before in the Chapter of Coct is nothing else but the change of internal places of the Elements in a mixt body Thus a body grows hot when the intrinsick fire of a mixt body begins to be more united and condensed and is nothing else but the change of internal places which by this fire were dispersed and now are reduced in o a lesser number or into places more united and less remote So a mixt body happens to grow colder when the earthy minims within it change their places and are reduced to nearer places and so grow more piercing to the center apprehend the same of the other qualities External Local Motion is either understood in a large sense as it comprehends alteration or change of internal places or as it denotes a single internal motion from an internal place to an internal place and in this acception we have made use of the word above in assigning the forms of the Elements or strictly it is restrained to external Local Motion which is the change of an external place in natural bodies That is whereby natural bodies are moved out of one external place into another The universal Elements naturally and strictly are not subjected to Local Motion since their change of place is only internal to wit within one another Whereas external Local motion is restricted to the change of an external place however we may improperly or in a large sence conceive them to move locally Neither are the Elements capable of auction or diminution because their quantity and forms are definite wherefore they are only apt to undergo alteration or change of their internal places like we have hitherto demonstrated Mixt bodies are disposed to the change of their external and internal places Of their internal it is apparent since they are never exempted from alteration their external is no less obvious Auction or Diminution are changes of the Elements in a mixt body both of internal and external places That is do comprehend a local motion and alteration The subdivisions of these three are various but for brevities sake we shall here only appose that