that good which he willeth the Reason hereof the Apostle doth immediately after expresse in these words I find then a law that when I would do good evil is present with me and a little after But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind c. Which amounts to this that man in a natural state hath a free-will to good and evil yet much more to evil because the will is moved by a two-fold principle 1. By it self when it doth represent a certain object to it self without being moved by the inclination of the body 2. By the inclination of the body which is a strong appetite which men are subjected unto through the forcible propensities of their body's Yea oftentimes this proveth so strong that it easily bendeth the will to its aim Now when the will is moved through it self without being incited by the appetite of the body it doth and can do good and leave it VIII The second Scripture proveth the impossibility of Good in Atheists or in any without the ordinary concurss of God IX There may be farther urged That a natural man naturally hath no faith and consequently cannot do a good act Rom. 10. 17. So then faith cometh by hearing and hearing by the word of God Wherefore a natural man cannot believe because he doth not hear the word of God I answer That the Apostle speaks of the extraordinary means of faith and not of the ordinary A natural man then believeth naturally or by ordinary means Or thus The word of God is either written or imprinted in men's hearts I say then that in the first sense faith doth come by attending and hearkning to the word of God which is imprinted in all men's hearts except in Atheists in whose hearts the Law of God is quite blotted out Phil. 1. 29. For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ not onely to believe on him c. Ergo Faith is not natural I answer That faith through Christ is given and is supernatural but faith whereby we believe there is a God and that he is mercifull and therefore will find a means to save us is natural Although we cannot actually know or believe the assigned means whereby he will save us Wherefore there is onely a partial faith in natural men and not a compleat and entire faith for they cannot believe naturally in Christ unlesse it be given to them from God as the Text doth evidently expresse Many more are produced as that of Acts 16. 14. Rom. 10. 9. Heb. 12. 2. All which may be easily answered from what hath been explained just now X. It is time that I should prepare to defend my own Positions with the same force as was used by them of the contrary opinion That there is a free-will of doing good and evil in natural men I prove by the 1 Cor. 7. 37. Neverthelesse he that standfast in his heart having no necessity but hath power over his own will and hath decreed so in his heart that he will keep his virgin doth well First the Apostle teacheth that a man doth not act necessarily having no necessity but contingently that is voluntarily Secondly That he hath a free will What is to have a power over his will else but to enjoy a freedom of will and that either in acting or not acting and not only so but in acting good or evil and quoad specificationem actus as expresly in keeping of his virgin which is a good act XI Acts 5. 4. Whiles it remained was it not thine own and after it was sold was it not in thine own power Here is particularly implyed a free-will of doing evil or good Either Ananias might have given the whole price of the possession or part In choosing to give a part under pretext of the whole he chose evil or otherwise he might have chosen to give the whole and so might have chose good for it was in his own power as the Text holds forth XII Deut. 30. 11. For this commandment which I command thee this day is not hidden from thee neither is it farre off It is not in Heaven nor beyond the Seas that thou shouldest say who shall go up for us to Heaven and bring it to us or Who shall go beyond the Seas for us and bring it unto us that we may hear and do it But saith Moses the Word is very nigh unto thee in thy mouth and in thy heart that thou mayest do it What is more plain then that hereby is intended a free-will which a man hath of doing good or evil XIII Prov. 6. 5. Deliver thy self as a Roe from the hand of the hunter and as a bird from the hand of a fowler This holds forth that a man can deliver himself from evil yet not without God's concurss Psal. 94. 8. Understand ye brutish among the people and ye fools when will ye be wise Ergo A natural man hath a power of understanding if he will or else may refuse it Or an ignorant man hath a will of being wiser and knowing or of rejecting wisdome and knowledge Matth. 23. 37. How often would I have gathered thy children together even as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings and ye would not Ergo Man had a will of coming to God for other wayes God would have called upon them in vain which is impossible The same may be inferred from Prov. 1. 24. Isa. 1. 19. If ye be willing and obedient ye shall eat the good of the Land but if ye refuse and rebell c. Ergo Man can will and refuse Rev. 3 20. Isa. 65. 12. Eccles. 15. 14. Zech. 1 c. XIV The next thing I come to prove is that man hath a spark or remnant of good in him Rom. 2. 14. For when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by nature the things contained in the Law these having not the Law are a Law to themselves Which sheweth the work of the Law written in their hearts their conscience bearing witnesse c. What is here meant by doing by nature the things contained in the Law but that a man naturally hath a remnant of Good in him for how could he other wayes do the things of the written Law through which he may know the Law and doth what the Law commands and hath a conscience bearing witnesse This Text makes good my distinction that there is a two-fold Law one expressed or written and the other impressed in mens hearts or the Law of nature The same we have also in Ezek. 18. 21. Luc. 13. 5. Rom. 1. 19 20 21. Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them What can be more clear XV. I do farther prove That a natural man cannot do a Theologick good act through himself and being onely assisted with the ordinary concurss of God A theologick good act is which doth fully and entirely satisfie and please God There
Situation is 8. What Duration is I. QUantity is an Attribute of a Being whereby it hath Extension of Parts II. Quantity is either Formal and Immaterial which is the extension of the Form beyond which it is not and within which it acteth or Material which is the Extension of a material Being III. Quality is whereby a being doth act as from a Cause IV. Relation is whereby one being is referred to another V. Action is whereby one being acteth upon another as through a meanes VI. Passion is whereby one being receiveth an Act from another VII Situation is whereby a being is seated in a place A Place is which doth contain a Being VIII Duration is whereby a being continueth in its Essence CHAP. XXII Of Causes 1. What a Cause is That the Dectrine of Causes belongeth to Metaphysicks 2. Wherein a Cause and Principle differ 3. What an internal Cause is What Matter is 4. What a Form is and how it is divided 5. What an external cause is I. A Cause is whereby a Being is produced It doth appertain to Metaphysicks to treat of Causes for else it would be no Science which requires the unfolding of a being by its Causes Ramus did much mistake himself in denying a place to the Doctrine of Causes in this Science and referring it altogether to Logick 'T is true that the Doctrine of Causes may conveniently be handled in Logick as Arguments by which Proofes are inferred yet as they are real and move the understanding from without they may not for Logick is conversant in Notions only and not in Realities II. A Cause differeth from a Principle or is Synonimous to it according to its various acception In Physicks it is taken for that whose presence doth constitute a Being and in that sense it is the same with an internal cause to which a Cause in its late extent is a Genus and consequently is of a larger signification A Principle sometimes denotes that whence a being hath its Essence or Production or whence it is known In this sense did Aristotle take it in the 5th Book of his Met. Chapt. 1. Whereby he did intimate a threefold Principle to wit a Principle of Constitution Generation and of Knowledge or of being known A Principle as it is received in the forementioned sense is of a larger signification then a Cause It is usually taken for a word Synonimous to a Cause In this Acception is God said to be the Principle that is the Cause of all Beings III. A Cause is either Internal or External An Internal Cause is that which doth constitute a Being by its own Presence An Internal Cause is twofold 1. Matter 2. Form Matter is an internal cause out of which a being is constituted So earth is the Matter of man because a man is constituted out of Earth Matter is remote and mediate which is out of which the nearest and immediate matter was produced or constituted or nearest and immediate out of which a being is immediately constituted For example The nearest matter of Glass is Ashes the remote is Wood which was the Matter of Ashes But this Distinction doth more properly belong to Logick IV. A Form is a Cause from which a being hath its Essence A Form is remote or nearest A remote form is from which a being consisting of remote Matter had its Form The nearest Form is from which the nearest Matter hath its Essence The remote matter is either first or second The first is out of which the first being had its Essence The Second is out of which all other beings had their essence A Form is divisible into the same kinds The first Form was from which the first being had its essence The second from which all other beings have their essence These Divisions are rather Logical then Metaphysical V. An external Cause is by whose force or vertue a being is produced The force whereby a being is produced is from without for a being hath no force of it self before it is produced therefore that force whereby a being is produced is necessarily from without This Cause is only an efficient Cause Other Divisions of Causes I do wittingly omit because some are disagreeing with the Subject of this Treatise and belong to another Part of Philosophy as to treat of the first cause belongeth to Pneumatology of final Causes to Morals Others are very suspicious CHAP. XXIII Of the Kinds of Causes 1. The Number of real Causes That a final cause is no real Cause The Causality of Matter and Form 2. The Division of an Efficient 3. That an Efficient is erroneously divided in a procreating and conservating Cause 4. That the Division of a Cause into Social and Solitary is illegal 5. That the Division of an efficient Cause into Internal and External is absurd 6. That all Forms are Material 7. That there are no assistent Forms I. THere are only three real Causes of a Being a Material Formal and Efficient Cause Wherefore a Final cause is no real Cause I prove it A real Cause is which doth really effect or produce a Being But these are only three Ergo. 2. A Final Cause doth not cause any effect concurring to the constitution of a being as each of them three forementioned do for matter causeth an effect by giving her self out of which a being may be constituted A Form doth produce an effect by giving through her presence unity distinction from all others to Matter An efficient Cause effecteth by educing a Form out of the matter and uniting it to the Matter Which three causalities are only requisite to the production of a compleat being and they constituted in actu constitute a being at the same instant If so what effect doth a final Cause then produce Certainly not any contributing to the essential constitution of a being These three being only necessary any other would be frustaneous Possibly you will object that the final Cause moveth the efficient Suppose I grant that it doth not infer that it concurs to the real and essential production of a being The causality which it exerciseth is in contributing per accidens to the constitution of a being which if only so it doth not appertain to this place neither can it be equally treated of with Causes which do act per se. II. An End moveth the efficient An efficient is either Natural or Moral Natural efficients are moved necessarily or act e necessitate Naturae Hence we say a Cause being in actu to wit a Natural Cause its effect is likewise necessarily constituted in actu It is not so with a final Cause for that may exist without producing an effect All Natural Causes move for an end per accidens in that they answer the Ordination of the Creator who hath created all things for an end which accordingly act for the same out of Necessity of Nature Moral Efficients are moved by an end Yet it is not the end which produceth the effect but the efficient it self You
a Material one but none Real XIII Besides all this there is an Absolute Power conferred upon Gods Creatures in general and upon man in particular I do not mean Absolute Simpliciter for that were Repugnant as I have proved in my Theol. but secundam quid I will further explain it to you The Power which all Creatures have of being and acting at that present Moment wherein they enjoy their being and do act is absolute because they cannot but enjoy that same being and act at that Moment wherein they have a Being and do act Ergo it is Absolute but not simpliciter for were it so then they would obtain that absolute power of being from and out of their own Nature which we know is dependent from Gods Power and according to this sense none consisteth of an absolute power but God alone because his Nature is alone independent It is then absolute secundum quid because God hath ordained that which is to be and that which ever hath been to have been and that which shall be to come to pass In short Absolute secundum quid I take for that which is unchangeable as all beings and their Actions are in that sense as I have proposed They are unchangeable because Gods Ordination in Creating Giving Forbearing and in all other Particulars is unchangeable This Distinction is of that use that many Points in Divinity cannot be resolved but by its being applied to them I shall content my self with the having named it since I have Treated of it at large in another Part of my Philosophy XIV The Absolute secundum quid powers which God hath conferred upon his Creatures are by Physitians otherwise termed Faculties Facultates which are derived from a faciendo doing that is they are actual dispositions whereby Effects are done Hence Galen Lib. 1. de Natur. Facult Par. 3. Prima euim actionis ipsius potentia causa est The first cause of an Action saith he is the power And in another place of the same Book he renders himself thus Facultatum quatuor naturalium essentia in partium singularum nutriendarum temperie est that is The Essence of the four Natural Faculties consisteth in the temperament of the parts that are to be nourished which is nothing different then if he had said the Faculties Facultates sunt temperamenta facientia are temperaments actually doing effects Now it is evident that Galen held the Temperament of bodies to be their Forms which if so then questionless his Opinion tended to assert that Powers and their Subjects were really identificated and that all powers were actual Moreover we shall find throughout all his Tomes that his sense touching powers and Faculties doth e Diametro agree with what I have set down in this present Treatise As for Hippocrates I cannot read a word throughout all his works but what tends against Aristotle in every Particular forasmuch as it relate to our Subject In the Conclusion I must remember you to observe that many Terms as Formal Substance Accident and divers others I have somtimes made use of in the same sense as I have proposed them in the Foregoing Chapters other times I have intended them in the same Acception which Philosophers vulgarly receive them in But herein the Sense of the Matter will easily direct you FINIS RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book By Gedeon Harvey Doctor of Physick and Philosophy LONDON Printed by A. M. for Samuel Thomson at the Sign of the Bishops-head in St Paul's Church-yard 1663. TO HIS Most Honoured Mother ELIZABETH HARVEY Dear Mother AMong those serious Admonitions which from your singular Affection and Care you have so oft repeated to me This I remember hath been one of the most earnest of them that above all I should mind things of Eternity such as alone can make me eternally Happy Herein I cannot but acknowledge your greatest Love tending to invest me with the greatest Happinesse returning you all thanks that so great a Benefit is worthy of Moreover to shew my entire Obedience to so important a Command I have here drawn up a few Heads touching the Greatest Happinesse and the Means whereby to procure it which I do with all humility present unto you as a Debt due to your self in regard I have extracted the principal Rules from the Rudiments which your constant Practice and wholesome Precepts had in my younger years infus'd in me The cause and object which alone can afford us this infinite Happinesse is the Summum Bonum whereunto we are to direct all our aim which that we may with successe attain unto are the continual Prayers of Your most affectionate and obedient Sonne Gedeon Harvey RELIGIO PHILOSOPHI OR Natural Theology The FIRST PART The fourth Book CHAP. I. Of the Nature of Natural Theology 1. What Theology is 2. That Theosophy is a fitter name to signifie the same which is here intended by Theology That in knowing God we become Philosophers 3. What a Habit is 4. What it is to live happily That there is a mean or middle way of living which is neither living in happiness or living in misery 5. How Theology is divided 6. What Natural Theology is What Supernatural Theology is The first Doubts of a natural man 7. The Dignity of Theology I. THEOLOGY is a habit of enjoying the greatest Good and living in the greatest Happiness This practick Science might from the eminence and transcendence of its end and object crave a more excellent name for Theology signifieth only a discourse of God and expresseth a Theoretick Science and therefore is too strict to adequate the whole and full concept of what is generally intended by Theology This name is fitter to be imposed upon the Doctrine of God as he is theoretically discoursed of in Pneamatology The parts of which Doctrine might be aptly denoted by Theology Angelology and Psychelogy whereas this noble Science is better expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or wisdome of God because wisdome comprehendeth an universal collection of all practick and theoretick Sciences all which we know by knowing God and we know them to be in and from God For do we not know that all natural Beings are in and from God they are in God because God comprehendeth and conserveth them in and by his Power Is not God the Pattern of our Actions And do we not know that our actions are good or evil from knowing them to have some likeness to his Actions or to be altogether different from them Do we not know our selves in knowing God wherefore without knowing God we know Nothing In knowing God to be the first Cause and Creator of all natural Beings we know Natural Philosophy and become Natural Philosophers In discerning good from evil in our actions by comparing them to the most perfect actions of God we attain to Moral Philosophy In knowing him to be the Being of Beings we reach to the knowledge of supernatural Philosophy or Metaphysicks
contradict him 2. He did mistake the nature of Essence and Existence as further apppears out of my Metaphysicks 3. It infers an absurd Definition of Creation to wit that it is the mutation of a being a non esse accidentali ad esse accidentale consequently an accident only is produced de novo and not a Substance 4. That the essences of things are eternal a great absurdity I grant they are from all eternity that is from an eternal being 5. Did God contain the essences of things in himself it followes that he also contained their matter in himself a great Blasphemy A mediate Creation is the production of a being a nihilo termini vel formae sed ex aliquo materiae a nihilo formae supple ultima This kind of Creation is expressed by two different words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or making is whereby God created a being ex aliquo materiae sed a nihilo formae ulterioris In this sense did God create the Fishes and Fowl 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or an artificial formation is whereby God formed man also a nihilo formae ulterioris Mediate Creation differs from Generation through that thereby a form is introduced in an instant hereby successively by a preceding alteration 2. Thereby a being is constituted a nihilo formae ulterioris hereby ab aliquo formae ultimae tanquam a termino a quo That is effected by the immediate causality of God this by a mediate one VIII The Chaos being so equally mixed and balanced abided in one place The place which did contain it was not corporeal because it would have been needless since its own balance did sufficiently preserve it in its own internal place It s magnitude was equal to the present magnitude of the world For although through its expansion and opening the fire and ayt were heaved up yet they were heaved up no further then the weighty Elements descended so that what space was left by the one was taken up by the other but had there been a vacuum left by any of their egressions then indeed it must have possessed a larger place As for the tangible quality which it had it must needs have been soft because it being temperated ad pondus could acquire no other then a temperate one and such is soft Colour it had none ex accidenti because there was no light to discern it nevertheless that doth not hinder but that it had a fundamental colour in it self which must have been red that being the only colour issuing out of a temperamentum ad pondus Tast is also detracted from it ex accidenti but in it self it must have been sweet for the same reason We cannot edscribe any smell to it per se because being close shut or not yet opened none can grant that it could have affected any supposed smell since it could not have emitted any Exhalations from it That it had a finite time Scripture testifieth Gen. 1. 1. In the beginning c. but the beginning is a distinction and Note of finite time Ergo. Reason proves no less That which was finite in all its other modes could not be capable of one single infinite mode But such was the Chaos and such is the world now Ergo. Whose parts are subject to a beginning and ending its whole must also have been subject to the same But our daily experience confirms to us that all things are subjected to a beginning and ending Ergo. It s figure is round we know from the form of the Elements Besides rotundity is a figure of the greatest equallest and perfectest extension but such is most sutable to the greatest equallest and perfectest body Ergo. The Chaos was also finite in its globosity and extent of parts I prove it The compleated world being finite in its globosity and extent of parts doth necessarily infer the finiteness of the Chaos in the same particular because the compleated world was framed out of it Now that the world is terminated in magnitude the circumvolutation of the Aplane and the Planets in a finite time to wit in 24 hours doth certainly demonstrate for were the world infinite in magnitude they must then also require an infinite time to rowl round about it the contrary of which is doubted by none Here that trite Axiom may be objected qualis causa taelis effectus Such as the cause is such also is its Effect But God is an infinite cause ergo his effect namely the world must also be infinite I answer That this Maxim holds only in univocis and naturalibus but not in their opposites 2. It is a Character of Gods infiniteness that he can act finitely and infinitely for could he act only infinitely then might he be supposed to act necessarily which is a note of finiteness and limitation in a cause 3. The action whereby he effected this finite work is infinite as I have observed before wherefore in this he acteth both finitely and infinitely And since I am about answering Objections it will not be amiss to insert some objected by Bodinus in Theatr. Nat. and Cajetan against the pre-existence of the Chaos before the compleated world 1. Eccles. 18. 1. Where God is said to have created all things at once Ergo there was no pre-existent Chaos I answer that Creation here doth imply an immediate creation through which God created the matter of all things at once 2. They resume the words of Austin asserting that to God there is nothing before or after another no past or future time but that all things are like as it were in one moment filling that which hath a most perfect being Wherefore say they Moses did distinguish the Creation into several sections and divisions to accomodate things created in an instant to our capacity I answer That had Moses writ that God had created all things in a moment we could have understood him as plainly as he hath writ otherwise for we know that Scripture containes many harder sayings then this would have been So that it is a great levity in them to retort the genuine sense of sacred words to their oblique brow As for that of Austin it hinders not but that all things past present and future are as in an instant to God and yet to us may be past present and future The Chaos is not only finite in duration and continuated quantity but also in discrete as they term it quantity or number It s quantity is the least and the greatest it is the least in discrete quantity for there was but one Chaos 2. But the greatest in continued quantity The proof of these depends reciprocally from one another The Chaos is but one because it is the greatest were there then more then one Chaos but two three or more or infinite it could not be the greatest but part of the greatest and so the whole must be greater then the part on the other side it is the greatest because
and there are so many qualities that unless they indigitate to a particular sensible quality they effect little Their vain Groapings Guessings and Ignorances depend upon the Cloud which they leave upon the nature of Density and Rarity for did they but study the true Definition of either it would not a little contribute to their Information In the first place They imagine Density to be a violent quality whereas you see it is natural 2. They make no distinction between Density Thickness for Thickness doth in the same sense although improperly contain much matter in little Dimensions notwithstanding they are different so doth Thinness contain little matter under great Dimensions as improperly as Rarity Wherein is Rarity then distinct from Thinness nevertheless do Authors affirm that many thin bodies are dense The same is attested by Cardan How then can the above-given Definition stand good A thing shall then contain at once much matter in small dimensions and little matter in great dimensions ergo a thing is thin and thick rare and dense at once No question it is also an erroneous Assertion that some thin bodies are essentially dense or that any thick bodies are essentially rare neither is Tenuity or Crassitude the cause of Density as Scaliger doth well infer in his 283 Exerc. but a contiguous Gravity VII The first power or Form of Fire is Levity with Contiguity The Second next slowing thence is Rarity which is an expansion or diduction of a body that is light with Contiguity This followeth Levity with Contiguity because a thing which is contiguously light cannot but be diducted Scaliger doth justly except against Cardan in Exerc. 4. You say that the reason or manner of a rare and dense body is taken from the multitude or paucity of matter Moreover it is not the multitude or paucity of Matter makes Density or Rarity neither doth Density cause the multitude of matter or Rarity the paucity of it The Demonstration is the same for both because the same body may be rarified or condensed without the encrease or decrease of Matter Averrhoes Lib. 4. Phys. Comment 84. doth hesitate very much in this Particular as appeares by his contradictory affirmations for in that place he asserts that Rarity and Density are contraries in quantity Again in the next following Comment he saith that Rarity and Density are not of the essence of quantity In Lib. 7. Phys. Com. 15. he affirms Rarity and Density to be qualities but in Lib. 1. Metaph. Com. 15. he refers them to the Predicament of Situs and Lib. 8. Phys. Com. 77. he saith that Rarefaction and Condensation are Local Motions Zimara doth labour to draw all these various Dictates of Averrhoes to a good sense When he seemed to place them in the Category of Situs saith he his intention was only to relate the Opinion of other men In saying that Rarefaction and Condensation were in the Predicament of quantity he meant that quantity did consecute them but not formally for a greater quantity doth follow Rarity and thence the possession of a greater place wherefore Rarefaction is primarily and essentially an alteration and a motion to quality but secondarily and by consequence it is to a greater quantity and a larger place Tolet. Lib. 4. Phys. Cap. 9. Text 84. tels us the Opinion of Aristotle upon this intricate Point He expounds his Judgment upon Rarefaction which in short implies Rarity and Density to be two contrary qualities educed out of the power of matter as others also are for when a thing is condensed or rarified that doth not happen properly because something is expelled or something doth enter or because the parts are conjoyned among themselves or are separated by reason of a vacuum voidness but because such a quality Rarity or Density is educed out of the power of matter so as that its Subject should be changed as when it is made hot or cold for the Ancients said that no part of a thing was changed in Rarefaction or Addensation but that its parts came only somewhat nearer or were removed from between themselves However Aristotles Dictates contain nothing of this but when a thing is rarefied or condensed the whole and the parts too are changed by an accidental mutation in receiving a quality educed out of the power of matter which is apparent because in a rare body every part is rare which if Rarity hapned only through the separation of parts among themselves the parts doubtless would remain dense which is false as appeares in things that are rare and most in the Elements A great deal ado about nothing That which through it self is most obvious they involve into obstruseness through their Cavils Whether Averrhoes intended his words in that meaning as Zimara comments or not which is more probable because he doth not give the least hint of an indirect sense of his words and therefore they are to be understood in their direct intention As for Zimara his reconciliation that alledging no reason and since the same might be guessed of his words although he had purposed them for a contrary signification it doth not merit any acceptance is not material either promising no truth or evidence Tolet. rejects the Judgment of the Ancients upon this Particular but hath not the ingenuity to add Reasons to consute them only from an inbred School-bending to Aristotle saith as he is told He declares then with the Philosopher that in Rarefaction and Addensation the whole and parts are changed by an accidental mutation in receiving a quality educed out of matter because in a rare body every part is rare In the first place his Reason is weak for in a rare body every part is not rare as appeares in the ayr which they term to be rare wherein many dense parts as black Clouds are contained nevertheless the whole Body is called Ayr a majori 2. Supposing that every part of the whole is rare he infers nothing but that every part or the whole is rare which is idem per idem 2. If Rarity saith he were caused through separation of parts among themselves the parts would remain dense It seems by Rarity and Density he apprehends nothing else but the diminution or augmentation of quantity for in the same Comment he writes thus You must note that to be made little out of great is to be condensed and out of little great to be rarified Here he contradicts himself before he stated them qualities now they are changed into quantities But to his Reason 'T is true as he saith if Rarity were caused through separation of parts in a mean body among themselves the parts would remain dense supposing that the light parts were separated from it But supposing the dense parts of a mean that is equally consistent of dense and rare parts body the remaining parts would be rare 2. A dense body is not rarefied through any separation of its parts or inflation of its minima's but by the adjoyning of
of Magnitude or sometimes of the universal Center 4. None but the whole body of the Elements do tend to or strive for the universal Center but particular or mixt bodies for their own particular Center as you may read further in the Chapter of Local Motions II. The earth is and must necessarily be the Center of the world or of all the other Elements within which it is contained like the Yolk of an Egge within the White and the Shell I prove the Proposition If the nature of Earth be to move conically from the Circumference to its own Center through a contiguous gravity and the nature of Air Fire be to be equally diffused from the center through their levity ergo the earth must needs fall to the midst of them all its parts tending circularly and conically to their Center The earth being arrived to the center it resteth quiet and unmoveable the Reason you shall know by and by Return back to the explanation of the manner of the dissolution of the Chaos which cannot but demonstrate the evidence of this Point to you Nevertheless let us consider that old Phansie of Pythagoras Plato Aristarchus Seleucus Niceta and others upon this Matter revived by Copernicus in the preceding Centenary and weigh its probability 1. He imagineth the fixed Stars and their Region to be the extremity of the world and both to be immoveable 2. That the Figure of that Region doth appear to us to be circular but for what we know our Sense may be deceived 3. That the Sun is the Center of the aspectable world being immoveable as to its ex ernal place notwithstanding since through help of the Telescopium is observed by the discerning of the motion of its Spots to change his face about although still remaining in the same external place its own Axis in 27 daies 4. Between these two immoveables the Planets are said to move and among them viz. between Mars and Venus the Earth is imagined as a Planet to move about the Sun and to absolve her Circuit in twelve Moneths 5. That the Moon is seated between the Earth and Venus and is thought to move through its own particular motion about the earth between that space which there is granted to be between her and Venus and between her and Mars Besides the Moon doth also move with the Earth as if she were her Page about the Sun absolving her course much about the same time In like manner are the four Stars first discovered through a Telescopium by Galilaeus said to follow the motion of Jupiter and to move with it about the Sun in twelve years there being besides another motion adscribed to them whereby they move about the Same Jupiter between the space which is between it and Saturn and between it and Mars the innermost whereof absolves its course about it in a day and a quarter the next in three daies and a half the third in three daies and four houres the last in sixteen daies and eight houres besides these they have found out by the help of the said Telescopium Stars which are Concomitants to each Planet 6. That the space between Saturn and the fixed stars is almost immense That the Region of the fixed stars is immoveable he takes for granted without giving any probable proof for it for which notwithstanding may be urged Omne mobile fit super immobili that all moveables do move upon an immoveable which if granted doth not inferre that therefore the Region of the fixed starres must be immoveable since he hath stated one immoveable already namely the Sunne what need is there then of more Further if we do grant two universal immoveables we must also grant two universal contrary motions whereof the one is moved upon one immoveable the other upon the second but the universal diurnal motion of the stars we see is one and the same ergo but one universal immoveable is necessary Lastly He cannot prove it by any sense only that it must be so because it agrees with his supposition and what proof is that to another The holy words in Eccles. do further disprove his position where it is said that God moved the Heavens about within the compass of his Glory His second Position denotes him no great Naturalist The third Position infers the Sun to be the immoveable Center of the world 1. This doth manifestly contradict Scripture which doth oft make mention of the Suns rising and going down And in Isaiah 38. 8. the Sun is said to have returned ten degrees back And in another place Let not the Sun move against Galbaon 2. The Sun is accounted by most and proved by us to be a fiery body or a flame and therefore is uncapable of attaining to rest in a restless Region which if it did its flame would soon diminish through the continual rushing by of the fiery Element tearing its flames into a thousand parts whose effects would certainly prove destructive to the whole Universe but especially to all living Creatures 3. Were the Sun immoveable and enjoying its rest ergo that rest must either be a violent detention or a natural rest not the first because that could not be durable or what can there be thought potent enough to detain that vast and most powerful body of the Sun for that must also be sensibly demonstrated and cleared otherwise you do nothing Neither can it be the latter for were it natural it must not only have a natural principle of rest but also be contained in a vacuum or else in a Region whose parts have likewise attained to a natural rest through the enjoying of their Center It is a property of a Center to be as a point in comparison to the Circumference but nothing can be contracted to a point but Earth and water as I have shewed above whereas according to their own confession the Sun is a vast great body and its Beams spreading and dilating ergo it must be only Earth and Water Now what sign of predominance of Earth and Water is there apparent in the Sun for were it so the Sun would shew black and give no light The Moon is liker if any to be the Center it consisting by far of more earth then the Sun as her minority in body motion and degree of brightness do testifie Lastly Is it not more probable that our sight should hallucinate or be deceived in judging the Sun not to move then in judging it to move all Astronomical Phaenomena's being so consentaneous to this latter Judgment Besides how is it possible for us to judge whether the Sun doth move or rest since that according to this supposition we are carried about with that swiftness By the same reason we may doubt of the motion of all the other Planets The fourth Position concludes a most rapid motion of the earth What principle of motion can the earth consist of Of none certainly but of fire and air which are admitted into her body in
or through it without taking its first impulse from against a body whence through reflection it might pass through This premitted I answer that according to the first intention a Vacuum is capable of giving a passage to a body locally moving through it provided it takes its progress from without upon an immoveable center I prove it Air Fire and the other Elements move through a Vacuum for otherwise did they move through another body it would infer a penetration of bodies If then the Elements obtain such a power ergo consequently their mixt bodies 2. This Maxim Omne mobile sit super immobili i. e. All moveables move upon an immoveable body is alone to be understood of the foundation of motion viz. That all moveables must move from an immoveable Center that is take their beginning thence either by impulse reflection refraction or continuated protrusion 3. That Motion whereby a moveable passeth through a Vacuum is continuated upon its own Center or upon another body instead of a Center for all motions must take their beginning upon an immoveable or at least upon that which is not inclined to the same motion in the same swiftness that the body which moves upon it doth 4. A single body can neither press through not move that is out of its place locally in a Vacuum because it enjoying its Center and not being violently detained would rest upon that Center 5. Neither can a mixt body move locally that is change its ubi in a Vacuum because the reason of a bodies changing of its ubi is the impulsion of another body striving for its center upon it For example water moves upwards because the air striving for its Center protrudes it out of its seat upwards as hath been mentioned air being compressed within the body of water is moved out of it because of the waters compression downwards whereby it is squeezed upwards But not through its own motion Now in a Vacuum there is no external body to strive or to impell upon it 6. A body would not cease to move locally internally because of the violent detentions of the Elements contained within pressing one another away from the Center 7. Suppose there were a confusion of the four Elements as big as a fist cast without the Universe they would change their internal places as the Elements changed theirs in the Chaos viz. The weighty Elements being less in extent would sooner gain the Center than the others and as for the rest they would move in the same manner as the Elements move here but of this more in the next Chapter And now you may easily comprehend that the present world doth not at all change it s Ubi but is immoveably fixed although continually changing its internal places 8. Angels if conceited to be pure spirits may move in and through a Vacuum but if apprehended to be of a circumscriptive quantity they cannot CHAP. XIX Of Physical Motion 1. What a Physical Motion is The kinds of it The definition of Alteration Local Motion and quantitative motions The subdivision of Local Motion 2. That all alterative and quantitative motions are direct 3. That all externall motions are violent 4. That all weighty mixt bodies being removed from their Element are disposed to be detruded downwards from without but do not move from any internal inclination or appetite they have to their universal Center 5. The causes of swiftness and slowness of external Local Motion 6. That light bodies are disposed to be moved upwards 7. That ayry bodies being seated in the fiery Region are disposed to be moved downwards 1. THe same reason that perswaded me to treate of a Vacuum and Antiperistasis in the preceding Chapter is also a motive why I deferred the Treatise of Physical motions hither Physical motions are so called in opposition to Hyperphysical or Metaphysical and are proper to natural bodies A Physical motion then is a change of a natural body in any one or more of its Physical modes or in all A change is a transitus passing from that which is not to that which is to be Whence we may plainly collect the differences of it to be as many as it may vary in its Modes and intirely in its Essence viz. Physical motion is either to quantity quality action passion relation situation duration to a new Essence c. and particularly to a greater or less quantity to colour figure heat coldness c. This infers that there are many more universal differences or kinds of motion than Aristotle stated However I shall only insist upon these three as being most taken notice of viz. Alteration which is a change of a quality of a Physical being External Local motion which is a change of the external place wherein a natural being is seated And Auction and Diminution which are changes of the quantity of a natural being Alteration as I said before in the Chapter of Coct is nothing else but the change of internal places of the Elements in a mixt body Thus a body grows hot when the intrinsick fire of a mixt body begins to be more united and condensed and is nothing else but the change of internal places which by this fire were dispersed and now are reduced in o a lesser number or into places more united and less remote So a mixt body happens to grow colder when the earthy minims within it change their places and are reduced to nearer places and so grow more piercing to the center apprehend the same of the other qualities External Local Motion is either understood in a large sense as it comprehends alteration or change of internal places or as it denotes a single internal motion from an internal place to an internal place and in this acception we have made use of the word above in assigning the forms of the Elements or strictly it is restrained to external Local Motion which is the change of an external place in natural bodies That is whereby natural bodies are moved out of one external place into another The universal Elements naturally and strictly are not subjected to Local Motion since their change of place is only internal to wit within one another Whereas external Local motion is restricted to the change of an external place however we may improperly or in a large sence conceive them to move locally Neither are the Elements capable of auction or diminution because their quantity and forms are definite wherefore they are only apt to undergo alteration or change of their internal places like we have hitherto demonstrated Mixt bodies are disposed to the change of their external and internal places Of their internal it is apparent since they are never exempted from alteration their external is no less obvious Auction or Diminution are changes of the Elements in a mixt body both of internal and external places That is do comprehend a local motion and alteration The subdivisions of these three are various but for brevities sake we shall here only appose that
That the evil habit inheres in the soul per se. 3. In what manner the Habit of good is taken to inhere per se in the soul. 4. That God created every man theologically good Several Objections relating to the same assertion answered 5. How the soul partaketh of the guilt of Original Sinne. The opinion of the Synod of Rochel upon this matter I. NOw we may easily explain how two contrary habits can inhere in one and the same subject No question it is impossible two contraries should inhere both per se in one subject for the nature of contraries is to expell one another out of the same subject Yet it is not repugnant but that two contrary habits may inhere both in one subject provided the one exist in it per se and the other per accidens or that they be not inherent in one partial subject although they may in the total for it is possible for a man to be afflicted with two contrary diseases in two parts of his body yet both are sustained by one total subject In like manner may the evil habit be principally and originally inherent in the body and the good habit in the soul yet both these are contained in one man II. Notwithstanding all this there are some who obstinately do affirm that the evil habit inheres in the soul per se but how do they prove it Certainly upon these suppositions 1. That the habits may be altered and the substance remain the same 2. That the first man acted through habits 3. That the good habit being removed the evil habit succeeded in its steed and consequently that an Accident doth migrate è subjecto in subjectum which is against their own maxims These suppositions being all false as hath been proved at large cannot be a firm foundation for any conclusion whatever they have built upon them And therefore I conclude again 1. That in the first man there was a natural disposition of acting good but no habit 2. That there became two habits in man after his fall the one of good and the other of evil III. That the habit of good inheres in man per se Quatenus actionis principium dicatur anima inest ei habitus bonus per se aut prout habitus sit accidens secundum istud potest animae attributi inesse per accidens quia ipse habitus est accidens quae tamen mihi est in usitata locutio And the habit of evil per accidens Non quatenus proficiscatur ab anima tanquam à mali principio sed duntaxat quatenus sit animae instrumentum Here one may object If an evil act proceed per se from the soul than the evil habit is also inherent in her per se. As to this the same I may argue from a good act and thence infer the inherence of the good habit per se. But it is certain that two contrary opposites secundum idem ad idem cannot exist together at the same instant in the same subject so that the one habit must necessarily inesse per se and the other per accidens Before I go farther let me tell you once for all when I say that the good habit is per se in man I do not imply that it is ex se but è Dei gratia è voluntate potentia divina ordinata to deny this is to rob God of his honour and is no lesse than a blasphemy wherefore it ought to be a great caution to all men how they assert good habits per se or good works per se lest they offend IV. God creates every man theologically good that is God infuseth the soul theologically good into the body being good also for otherwise God would be supposed to joyn good to evil How could the body be evil before the advent of the soul If it were evil it must be morally evil for there is no doubt but it was and remaineth physically good but that cannot be admitted because there is no moral evil without a rational will Good and evil is taken in a double sense 1. Good or evil is that which is agreeable or disagreeable with the Law of God 2. Good or evil is which is convenient and sutable or inconvenient and unsutable to a being According to the first acception The soul is infused good into a good body because of the reason fore-mentioned But according to the last it is not Here may be demanded Whether it agreeth with God's goodnesse to infuse a good soul into an unsutable body I answer That it doth not detract one title from God's goodnesse for he hath ordained that man should multiply and increase and therefore hath given man a power of increasing and multiplying The power which man exerciseth to multiply is through propagation of his body only and uniting the soul to it The body being then prepared for the souls reception the soul at that instant is raised out of the body è potentia materiae receptiva not out of it as è materiali principio eductivo like unto material forms but by the divine power which is ever present where God hath ordained his benediction so that God doth not withdraw his power of creating a soul when ever a body is prepared for it although that body is generated by the worst of men because God hath ordained it for God doth create a soul not because a wicked man hath disposed a body for the reception of it but because of his ordained blessing to mans increase V. The soul being united to the body immediately partaketh of the guilt of original sinne What original sinne is me thinks is not distinctly expounded by our ordinary institutionists They say It is a natural disposition to evil naturally descending from Adam to all men it is that which is called The sinne dwelling in man The Law of our members The old man The flesh The body of sinne c. First I demand What sinne is I shall be answered That it is a breach of God's Law Ergo A sinne is an act for to break God's Law is to act against God's Law A disposition say they is whereby an agent can act Ergo A disposition to sinne is no sinne because a disposition is no act but whereby we can or do act So that original sinne is the first act of sinne which the first man acted who comprehending in him whole mankind since all men were to descend from him the sinne which he acted was also acted by whole mankind and consequently the guilt of that sinne is imputed to every man The habit of sinne being entered through one act whereby we are render'd prone to evil and commit actual sinne or do act sinne the same habit and disposition hath also ceased on all mankind So that original is rather the first actual sinne after which followed the habit of sinning and with the original or first sinne of man the habit of sinning is withall communicated to mans posterity This very sense
may be dtawn from their own words although it was against their intentions The Synod held at Rochel in the year 1607. in the moneth of March rendreth her self in these words as further appears by their Confession We believe that whole mankind ever since Adam is corrupted with such an infection as original sinne is to wit an original defect And in the 11th Artie We believe that this defect is a sinne and is sufficient to damn whole mankind from the highest to the lowest yea moreover the Infants in their Mothers womb What can any body apprehend by this original defect but an actual sin or how could Infants be guilty of it CHAP. XX. Of the manner of Man's multiplication 1. The state of the controversie 2. That the Rational Soul is not generated or produced by generation That there are three kinds of productions out of nothing 3. That the Soul is not propagated either from the Father or Mother 4. That impious opinion concluding the Rational Soul to be generated tanquam ex traduce confuted 5. An Objection against the Authors opinion answered 6. That the foetus before the advent of the Rational Soul is informated with a form analogal to a sentient form 7. That God is the remote cause of man's generation 8. That man doth generate man naturally and per se. 9. The opinion of Austin Jerome and others upon this matter 1. I Had almost in the last Chapter fallen unawares into that intricate Controversie about man's multiplication and increase but fore seeing the extent of it I thought it fitter to retire my self to this Chapter and treat of it here singly Man consisteth of body and soul as touching the body there is no doubt made of it but that it is propagated tanquam ex traduce All the stumbling is at the rational soul whether she be infused or propagated in like manner as the body or I may state the Question thus Whether the soul of man is created or produced by generation Conclus The Rational Soul is not generated or produced through generation I prove it That which is indivisible is produced in an indivisible part of time namely in an instant But the Soul of man is indivisible and therefore is produced in an instant Again that which is produced in an instant is created and not generated Because generation doth follow alteration which is by succession Ergo The Soul would not be constituted in an instant but successively and consequently would be corporeal 2. If the Soul had a power of generating a Soul it had also a power of destroying it by means contrary to those wherby she had produced it 3. Generatio unius est corruptio alterius vice versa Ergo Quicquid est generabile est corruptibile The generation of one form or being is the corruption of another and the corruption of one is the generation of the other Ergo What ever is generable is corruptible and what ever is corruptible is generable So then when ever the soul is generated another soul or form is corrupted And when the soul is corrupted another form or soul is generated which may be as the Indians hold the soul of an horse or of an asse c. and so the soul is made material To this possibly your answer will be That it is so in natural productions but not in supernatural I ask you then Why do you object this for an argument to prove the propagation of the soul viz. that man Homo generat sibi similem doth generate his like otherwise he would be inferiour to a beast Ergo You assert that man doth generate naturally like unto other creatures 4. If otherwise to generate its like were a property belonging to supernatural beings then Angels would have a power of generating other Angels which they have not Or if this power of generating were onely superadded to one kind of supernatural beings namely to souls then a soul would be more noble than an Angel 5. There are but two wayes of producing a substance to wit è materia praeexistente vel è nihilo out of a preexistent matter or out of nothing What is the soul produced out of a preexistent matter as out of a potentia eductiva If you grant this you expose your self to be suspected for a Plinianist and to assert the soul to be material Ergo It must be created out of nothing Now there are three kinds of productions out of nothing 1. Enihilo termini ulterioris sed aliquo materiae 2. Enihilo materiae sed aliquo termini 3. Enihilo materiae nihilo termini Here you must take terminus for forma for what is it that doth terminate the matter but the form and so the world was created ex aliquo materia sed nihilo termini for it was created out of the Chaos which was a rude matter without an ulterior forma or terminus After the same manner was the body of man created for neither the Chaos or dust out of which man was created had an ultimate form Neither are you to imagine here that generation and this kind of creation is one for although in generation there is not that form existent in the matter which is intended in it yet generation is ab aliquo formae ultimae in eadem materia praeexistent is The last kind of creation is exemplified by the creation of the Chaos of the dust of Angels and of Souls This manner of production is proper only to an infinite power But you may demand Why cannot God invest the soul with this power I answer It is impossible to God Non simpliciter sed secundum quid and to the nature of the soul. As to God it is impossible because should he confer his infinite power upon man he would make him equal to himself 2. It is impossible to the nature of the soul because she being limited cannot be unlimited or infinite at the same time Omne quod est idem quod est necesse est esse IV. Were the soul extraduce then she would be propagated either from the Father or Mother or from both Not from the Father for then the rational soul would be inherent in the geniture at the same moment of conception which all grant is not then from the Mother as James Hostius his opinion was which is absurd for all grant that the Mother is a passive and the Father an active principle besides if so men's souls would be extreamly weak not from both for then the soul would be of a mixt nature which is no lesse absurd Give me leave here to examine Sealiger's notion which Sennert Kyper and others do assume to demonstrate the manner of the souls propagation Seal Exerc. 6. D. 11. An anima catelli sit pars animae patris Cur non dividitur ad materiae divisionem material is anima totaque est in sui parte quod in plant is manifestum est Gignit autem animam anima sui promotione eadem sanè ratione