better than a Philosopher The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind viz. Thinking Reasoning c. which we concluding not to subsist by themselves nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it we think them the Actions of some other Substance which we call Spirit of whose Substance or Nature we have as clear a Notion as of that of Body the one being but the supposed Substratum of the Simple Idea we have from without as the other of those Operations which we experiment in our selves within so that the Ideas of Corporeal Substance in matter is as remote from our Conceptions as that of Spiritual Substance Hence we may conclude that he has the perfectest Idea of any particular Substance who has collected most of those Simple Ideas which do exist in it among which we are to reckon its Active Powers and Passive Capacities Tho' not strictly Simple Ideas Secondary Qualities for the most part serve to distinguish Substances For our Senses fail us in the discovery of the Bulk Figure Texture c. of the minute parts of Bodies on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend and Secondary Qualities are nothing but Powers with relation to our Senses The Ideas that make our Complex ones of Corporeal Substances are of Three sorts First The Ideas of Primary Qualities of Things which are discovered by our Senses Such are Bulk Figure Motion c. Secondly the Sensible secondary Qualities which are nothing but Powers to produce several Ideas in us by our Senses Thirdly The aptness we consider in any Substance to cause or receive such alterations of Primary Qualities as that the Substance so altered should produce in us different Ideas from what it did before And they are called Active and Passive Powers All which as far as we have any notice or notion of them terminate in Simple Ideas Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute Particles of Bodies it is not to be doubted but they would produce quite different Ideas in us as we find in viewing things with Microscopes Such Bodies as to our naked Eyes are coloured and opaque will through Microscopes appear pellucid Bloud to the naked Eye appears all Red but by a good Microscope we see only some Red Globules swimming in a transparent Liquor The Infinite wise Author of our Beings has fitted our Organs and Faculties to the conveniences of Life and the business we have to do here We may by our Sences know and distinguish Things so far as to accommodate them to the Exigencies of this Life We have also Insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful Effects to admire and magnify the Wisdom Power and Goodness of their Author Such a Knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition we want not Faculties to attain and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living Besides the Complex Ideas we have of material Substances by the simple Ideas tâ—â—en from the operations of our own Minds which we experiment in our selves as Thinking Understanding Willing Knowing c. coexisting in the same Substance we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit And this Idea of an Immaterial Substance is as clear as that we have of a Material By joyning these with Substance of which we have no distinct Idea we have the Idea of a Spirit and by putting together the Ideas of coherent solid Parts and Power of being moved joyned with substance of which likewise we have no positive Idea we have the Idea of Matter The one is so clear and distinct as the other The substance of Spirit is unknown to us and so is the substance of Body equally unknown to us Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body viz. Solid coherent Parts and Impulse we have distinct clear Ideas of So likewise have we of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit Thinking and a power of Action We have also clear and distinct Ideas of several Qualities inherent in Bodies which are but the various Modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts and their Motion We have likewise the Ideas of the several modes of Thinking viz. Believing Doubting Hoping Fearing c. As also of Willing and Moving the Body consequent to it If this motion of Spirit may have some difficulties in it not easie to be explained we have no more reason to deny or doubt of the existence of Spirits than we have to deny or doubt of the existence of Body because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained The Divisibility in infinitum for instance of any finite Extension involves us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent We have therefore as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of Spirit as with our notion of Body and the existence of the one as well as the other We have no other Idea of the Supream Being but a Complex one of Existence Power Knowledge Duration Pleasure Happiness and of several other Qualities and Powers which it is better to have than be without with the addition of Infinite to each of these In which Complex Idea we may observe that there is no Simple one bating Infinity which is not also a part of our Complex Idea of other Spirits because in our Ideas as well of Spirits as other things we are restrained to those we receive from Sensation and Reflection CHAP. XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances THere are other Ideas of Substances which may be call'd Collective which are made up of many particular Substances considered as united into one Idea as a Troop Army c. which the Mind makes by its power of Composition These Collective Ideas are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind bringing things remote and independent into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one Conception and signified by one name For there are no things so remote which the Mind cannot by this Art of Composition bring into one Idea as is visible in that signified by the name Universe CHAP. XXV Of Relation THere is another Sett of Ideas which the Mind gets from the comparing of one thing with another When the Mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another and carry its view from one to the other this is Relation or Respect and the denominations given to things intimating that Respect are what we call Relatives And the things so brought together Related Thus when I call Cajus Husband or Whiter I intimate some other Person or Thing in both cases with which I compare him Any of our Ideas may be the foundation of Relation Where Languages have failed to give correlative Names there the Relation is not so easily taken notice of As in Concubine which is a Relative name as well as Wife The Ideas of
of Reflection are to me the only Originals from whence all our Ideas take their Beginnings The Understanding seems not to have the least glimmering of Ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two Sources These when we have taken a full Survey of them and their several Modes and Compositions we shall find to contain out whole stock of Ideas and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways 'T is evident that Children come by degrees to be furnish'd with Ideas from the Objects they are conversant with They are so surrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect them that some Ideas will whether they will or no be imprinted on their Minds Light and Colours Sounds and Tangible Qualities do continually sollicite their proper Senses and force an entrance into the Mind 'T is late commonly before Children come to have Ideas of the Operations of their Minds And some Men have not any very clear or perfect Ideas of the greatest part of them all their Lives Because tho' they pass there continually yet like floating Visions they make not deep Impressions enough to leave in the Mind clear and lasting Ideas till the Understanding turns inward upon its self and reflects on its own Operations and makes them the Objects of its own Contemplation When a Man first perceives then he may be said to have Ideas having Ideas and Perception signifying the same thing It is an Opinion maintain'd by some That the Soul always Thinks and that it always has the actual Perception of Ideas as long as it Exists And that actual Thinking is an inseparable from the Soul as actual Extension is from the Body But I cannot conceive it any more necessary for the Soul always to Think than for the Body always to Move The Perception of Ideas being as I conceive to the Soul what motion is to the Body not its Essence but one of its Operations And therefore though Thinking be never so much the proper Action of the Soul yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should always Think always be in Action That perhaps is the priviledge of the Infinite Author and Preserver of all Things Who never Slumbers nor Sleeps but is not competent in any Finite Being We know certainly by Experience that we sometimes Think and thence draw this infallible Consequence that there is something in us that has a Power to Think but whether that Substance perpetually Thinks or no we can be no farther assured than Experience informs us I would be glad to learn from those Men who so confidently pronounce that the Human Soul always Thinks how they come to know it Nay how they come to know that they themselves Think when they themselves do not perceive it The most that can be said of it is That 't is possible the Soul may always Think but not always retain it in Memory And I say it is as possible the Soul may not always Think and much more probable that it should sometimes not Think than it should often Think and that a long while together and not be Conscious to it self the next Moment after that it had Thought I see no reason therefore to believe that the Soul Thinks before the Senses have furnished it with Ideas to Think on and as those are increas'd and retain'd so it comes by Exercise to improve its Faculty of Thinking in the several parts of it as well as afterwards by Compounding those Ideas and Reflecting on its own Operations it increases in Stock as well as Facility in Remembring Imagining Reasoning and other Modes of Thinking CHAP. II. Of Simple Ideas OF Ideas some are Simple others Complex A Simple Idea is one uniform Appearance or Conception in the Mind which is not distinguishable into different Ideas Such are Sensible Qualities which though they are in the Things themselves so united and blended that there is no Separation no Distance between them yet the Ideas they produce in the Mind enter by the Senses simple and unmix'd Thus tho' the Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax yet the Simple Ideas thus united in the same Subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different Senses These Simple Ideas are suggested no other way than from the two Ways above-mentioned viz. Sensation and Reflexion The Mind being once stored with these Simple Ideas has the power to repeat compare and unite them to an infinite variety and so can make at pleasure new Complex Ideas But the most enlarged Understanding cannot frame one new Simple Idea nor by any force destroy them that are there CHAP. III. Of Ideas of one Sense IDeas with Reference to the different ways wherein they approach the Mind are of Four Sorts First There are some which come into our Minds by one Sense only Secondly There are others convey'd into the Mind by more Senses than one Thirdly Others that are had from Reflexion only Fourthly There are some suggested to the Mind by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection First Some enter into the Mind only by one Sense peculiarly adapted to receive them Thus Colours Sounds Smells c. come in only by the Eyes Ears and Nose And if these Organs are any of them so disorder'd as not to perform their Functions they have no Postern to be admitted by no other way to bring themselves in view and be perceiv'd by the Understanding It will be needless to enumerate all the particular Simple Ideas belonging to each Sense nor indeed is it possible there being a great many more than we have Names for CHAP. IV. Of Solidity I Shall here mention one which we receive by our Touch because it is one of the chief Ingredients in many of our complex Ideas and that is the Idea of Solidity It arises from the Resistance one Body makes to the Entrance of another Body into the Place it possesses till it has left it There is no Idea which we more constantly receive from Sensation than this In whatever posture we are we feel somewhat that supports us and hinders us from sinking downwards And the Bodies we daily handle make us perceive that while they remain between them they do by an unsurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them This Idea is commonly called Impenetrability I conceive Solidity is more proper to express it because this carries something more of Positive in it than Impenetrability which is Negative and is perhaps more a Consequence of Solidity than Solidity it self This seems to be the most Essential property of Body and that whereby we conceive it to fill space The Idea of which is that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance we conceive it so to possess it that it excludes all other solid Substances This Resistance is so great that no Force can surmount it All the Bodies in the World pressing a drop of Water
true Knowledge in his Understanding and has instead thereof Chimaeras Language being the great Conduit whereby Men convey their Discoveries Reasonings and Knowledge from one to another he that makes an ill use of it thô he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge which are in Things themselves yet he does as much as in him lies break or stop the Pipes whereby it is distributed to the publick use and advantage of Mankind He that uses Words without any clear and steady meaning What does he but lead himself and others into Errors And he that designedly does it ought to be looked on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge If we look into Books of Controversy of any kind we shall see that the Effect of obscure unsteady and aequivocal Terms is nothing but noise and wrangling about Sounds without convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding For if the Idea be not agreed on between Speaker and Hearer for which the Words stand the Argument is not about Things but Names It deserves to be considered and carefully examined Whether the greatest part of the Disputes in the World are not meerly Verbal and about the Signification of Words and that if the Terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their Significations to the single Ideas they stand for those Disputes would not end of themselves and immediately vanish CHAP. XI Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses TO remedy the defects of Speech above-mentioned the following Rules may be of use First A Man should take care to use no Word without a Signification no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand This Rule will not seem needless to any one who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words as Instinct Sympathy Antipathy c. so made use of as he might easily conclude that those that used them had no Ideas in their Minds to which they applied them Secondly Those Ideas he annexes them to should be clear and distinct which in Complex Ideas is by knowing the particular ones that make that Composition of which if any one be again Complex we must know also the precise collection that is united in each and so till we come to Simple ones In Substances the Ideas must not only be distinct but also conformable to Things as they Exist Thirdly He must apply his Words as near as may be to such Ideas as common use has annexed them to for Words especially of Languages already framed are no Man's private Possession but the common measure of Commerce and Communication and therefore it is not for any one to change the stamp they are current in nor alter the Ideas they are affixed to or at least when there is a necessity to do so he is bound to give notice of it And therefore Fourthly When common use has left the signification of a Word uncertain and loose or where it is to be used in a peculiar Sense or where the Term is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake there it ought to be defined and its Signification ascertained Words standing for Simple Ideas being not defineable their Signification must be shewn either First By a Synonymous Word Secondly by naming a Subject wherein that Simple Idea is to be found Thirdly By presenting to the Senses that subject which may produce it in the Mind and make him actually have the Idea that word stands for Mixed Modes may be perfectly defined by exactly enumerating those Ideas that go to each Composition This ought more especially to be done in mixed Modes belonging to Morality since definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of Moral Words can be known and yet a way whereby their precise meaning may be known certainly and without leaving any room for any Contest about it For the explaining the Signification of the names of Substances both the forementioned ways viz. of Shewing and Defining are requisite in many cases to be made use of their Names are best defined by their leading Qualities which are mostly Shape in Animals and Vegetables and Colour in inanimate Bodies and in some both together Now these leading Qualities are best made known by shewing and can hardly be made known otherwise The shape of a Horse or Cassowary will be but imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words the sight of the Animals doth it much better And the Idea of the particular Colour of Gold is not to be got by any description of it but only by the frequent exercise of the Eyes about it The like may be be said of those other Simple Ideas peculiar in their kind to any Substance for which precise Ideas there are no peculiar Names But because many of the Simple Ideas which make up our specifick Ideas of Substances are Powers which lie not obvious to our Sense in the Things as they ordinarily appear therefore in the Signification of our Names of Substances some part of the Signification will be better made known by enumerating those Simple Ideas than in shewing the Substance it self For he that to the Yellow shining colour of Gold got by Sight shall from my enumerating them have the Ideas of great Ductibility Fusibility Fixedness and Solubility in Aqua Regia will have a perfecter Idea of Gold than he can have by seeing a piece of Gold and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities It were to be wished that Words standing for Things which are known and distinguished by their outward Shapes should be expressed by little Draughts and Prints made of them A Vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease and in less time teach the true Signification of many Terms especially in Languages of remote Countreys or Ages and settle truer Ideas in Mens Minds of several Things whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors than all the large and laborious Comments of Learned Criticks Naturalists that treat of Plants and Animals have found the benefit of this way And he that consults them will find that he has a clearer Idea of Apium and Ibex from a little Print of that Herb or Beast than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them and so no doubt he would have of Strigil and Sistrum if instead of a Curry-comb or Cymbal which are the English Names Dictionaries render them by he could see stamped in the Margin small Pictures of these Instruments as they were in use amongst the Ancients Fifthly The last Rule that I shall mention is That in all Discourses wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another he should use the same Word constantly in the same Sense if this were done which no body can refuse without great disingenuity many of the Books extant might be spared many of the Controversies in Dispute would be at an end several of those great Volumes swollen with ambiguous Words now used in one Sense and by and by in another would shrink into a very
do it because the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two Angles And so of this the Mind has no immediate or Intuitive Knowledge In this case the Mind is fain to find out some other Angles to which the three Angles of a Triangle have equality and finding those equal to two Right ones comes to know the equality of these three Angles to two Right ones Those intervening Ideas which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others are called Proofs And where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived it is called Demonstration A quickness in the Mind to find those Proofs and to apply them right is I suppose that which is called Sagacity This Knowledge thô it be certain is not so clear and evident as Intuitive Knowledge It requires pains and attention and steady application of Mind to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas it considers and there must be a Progression by Steps and Degrees before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty Before Demonstration there was a Doubt which in Intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of distinct Ideas no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye that can distinctly see White and Black whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour Now in every step that Reason makes in Demonstrative Knowledge there is an Intuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate Idea which it uses as a proof for if it were not so that yet would need a proof since without the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement there is no Knowledge produced By which it is evident that every step in reasoning that produces Knowledge has Intuitive Certainty which when the Mind perceives there is no more required but to remember it to make the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas concerning which we enquire Visible and Certain This Intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Intermediate Ideas in each step and progression of the Demonstration must also be exactly carried in the Mind and a Man must be sure that no part is left out which because in long Deductions the Memory cannot easily retain this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than Intuitive and Men often embrace Falshoods for Demonstrations It has been generally taken for granted that Mathematicks alone are capable of Demonstrative Certainty But to have such an Agreement or Disagreement as may be Intuitively perceived being as I imagine not the priviledge of the Ideas of Number Extension and Figure alone it may possibly be the want of due Method and Application in us and not of sufficient Evidence in Things that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of Knowledge For in whatever Ideas the Mind can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement immediately there it is capable of Intuitive Knowledge and where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas by an Intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any intermediate Ideas there the Mind is capable of Demonstration which is not limited to the Ideas of Figure Number Extension or their Modes The reason why it has been generally supposed to belong to them only is because in comparing their Equality or Excess the Modes of Numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable And in Extension thô every the least excess is not so perceptible yet the Mind has found out ways to discover the just Equality of two Angels Extensions or Figures and both that is Numbers and Figures can be set down by visible and lasting Marks But in other Simple Ideas whose Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees and not Quantity we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their Differences as to perceive or find ways to measure their just Equality or the least Differences For those other Simple Ideas being Appearances or Sensations produced in us by the Size Figure Motion c. of minute Corpuseles singly insensible their different Degrees also depend on the variation of some or all of those Causes which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different Degrees of these Simple Ideas Thus for Instance not knowing what number of Particles nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of Whiteness we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of Whiteness because we have no certain Standard to measure them by nor means to distinguish every the least difference the only help we have being from our Senses which in this point fail us But where the difference is so great as to produce in the Mind Ideas clearly distinct there Ideas of Colours as we see in different kinds Blue and Red for instance are as capable of Demonstration as Ideas of Number and Extension What is here said of Colours I think holds true in all Secondary Qualities These two then Intuition and Demonstration are the degrees of our Knowledge whatever comes short of one of these is but Faith or Opinion not Knowledge at least in all General Truths There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employed about the particular Existence of finite Beings without us which going beyond probability but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty passes under the name of Knowledge Nothing can be more certain than that the Idea we receive from an External Object is in our Minds this is Intuitive Knowledge but whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any Thing without us corresponding to that Idea is that whereof some Men think there may be a question made because Men may have such an Idea in their Minds when no such Thing Exists no such Object affects their Senses But 't is evident that we are invincibly Conscious to our selves of a different Perception when we look upon the Sun in the Day and think on it by Night when we actually taste Wormwood or smell a Rose or only think on that Savour or Odour so that I think we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge this also of the Existence of particular external Objects by that Perception and Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them and allow these three degrees of Knowledge viz. Intuitive Demonstrative and Sensitive But since our Knowledge is founded on and employed about our Ideas only Will it follow thence that it must be conâ—ormable to our Ideas and that where our Ideas are clear and distinct obscure and confused there our Knowledge will be so too I answer No For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas its clearness or obscurity
consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception and not in the clearness or obscurity of the Ideas themselves A Man for instance that has a clear Idea of the Angles of a Triangle and of Equality to two Right ones may yet have but an obscure Perception of their Agreement and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge because as far as any Ideas are obscure or confused so far the Mind can never perceive clearly whether they Agree or Disagree CHAP. III. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge FRom what has been said concerning Knowledge it follows that First We can have no Knowledge farther than we have Ideas Secondly That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas either by Intuition Demonstration or Sensation Thirdly We cannot have an Intuitive Knowledge that shall extend it self to all our Ideas and all that we would know about them because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another by Juxta-position or an immediate Comparison one with another Thus we cannot intuitively perceive the equality of two Extensions the difference of whose Figures makes their parts uncapable of an exact and immediate application Fourthly our rational Knowledge can not reach to the whole extent of our Ideas because between two different Ideas we would examine we cannot always find such proofs as we can connect one to another with an Intuitive Knowledge in all the parts of the Deduction Fifthly Sensitive Knowledge reaching no farther than the Existence of Things actually present to our Senses is yet much narrower than either of the former Sixthly From all which it is evident that the extent of our Knowledge comes not only short of the Reality of Things but even of the extent of our own Ideas We have the Ideas of a Square a Circle and Equality and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the Ideas we have being reduced to the four Sorts above-mentioned viz. Identity Co-existence Relation and Real Existence I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these First As to Identity and Diversity our Intuitive Knowledge is as far extended as our Ideas themselves and there can be no Idea in the Mind which it does not presently by an Intuitive Knowledge perceive to be what it is and to be different from any other Secondly As to the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in Co-existence in this our Knowledge is very short thô in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge concerning Substances for our Ideas of Substances being as I have shewed nothing but certain Collections of Simple Ideas co-existing in one Subject Our Idea of Flame for Instance is a Body hot Luminous and moving upward When we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of Substance What do we but enquire what other Qualities or Powers these Substances have or have not which is nothing else but to know what other Simple Ideas do or do not Co-exist with those that make up that Complex Idea The reason of this is because the Simple Ideas which make up our Complex Ideas of Substances have no visible necessary Connexion or Inconsistence with other Simple Ideas whose co-existence with them we would inform our selves about These Ideas being likewise for the most part Secundary Qualities which depend upon the Primary Qualities of their minute or insensible Parts or on something yet more remote from our Comprehension it is impossible we should know which have a necessary Union or Inconsistency one with another since we know not the root from whence they spring or the Size Figure and Texture of Parts on which they depend and from which they result Besides this there is no discoverable Connexion between any Secundary Qualitie and those Primary Qualities that it depends on We are so far from knowing what Figure Size or Motion produces for Instance A Yellow Colour or Sweet Taste or a Sharp Sound that we can by no means conceive how any Size Figure or Motion can possibly produce in us the Idea of any Colour Taste or Sound whatsoever and there is no conceivable Connexion between the One and the Other Our Knowledge therefore of Co-existence reaches little farther than Experience Some few indeed of the Primary Qualities have a necessary Dependance and visible Connexion one with another As Figure necessarily supposes Extension receiving or communicating Motion by Impulse supposes Solidity But Qualities Co-existent in any Subject without this Dependance and Connexion cannot certainly be known to Co-exist any farther than Experience by our Senses informs us Thus thô upon trial we find Gold Yellow Weighty Malleable Fusible and Fixed yet because none of these have any evident Dependance or necessary Connexion with the other we cannot certainly know that where any Four of these are the Fifth will be there also how highly probable soever it may be But the highest degree of Probability amounts not to Certainty without which there can be no true Knowledge For this Co-existence can be no farther known then it is perceived and it cannot be perceived but either in particular Subjects by the observation of our Senses or in general by the necessary Connexion of the Ideas themselves As to Incompatibility or Repugnancy to Co-existence we may know that any Subject can have of each sort of Primary Qualities but One particular at once One Extension One Figure and so of sensible Ideas peculiar to each Sense For whatever of each kind is present in any Subject excludes all other of that Sort for Instance One Subject cannot have Two Smells or Two Colours at the same time As to Powers of Substances which makes a great part of our Enquiries about them and is no inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge Our Knowledge as to these reaches little farther than Experience because they consist in a Texture and Motion of Parts which we cannot by any means come to discover and I doubt whether with those Faculties we have we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this part Experience is that which in this part we must depend on and it were to be wished that it were improved we find the Advantages some Mens generous pains have this way brought to the stock of Natural Knowledge And if others especially the Philosophers by Fire who pretend to it had been so wary in their Observations and sincere in their Reports as those who call themselves Philosophers ought to have been our acquaintance with the Bodies here about us and our insight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater As to the Third Sort the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in any other Relation This is the largest field of Knowledge and it is hard to determine how
another as those that convey the most real Truths and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us Thus he that has learnt the following words with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them viz. Substance Man Animal Form Soul Vegetative Sensitive Rational may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is And of this sort a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions Reasonings and Conclusions in Books of Metaphysicks School-Divinity and some part of Natural Philosophy and after all know as little of God Spirits or Bodies as he did before he set out Thirdly The worst sort of Trifling is To use words loosely and uncertainly which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them or find in them That which occasions this is That Men may find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy under the Obscurity or Perplexedness of their Terms to which perhaps Inadvertency and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute To conclude barely Verbal Propositions may be known by these following marks First All Propositions wherein two Abstract Terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of Sounds For since no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other but it self when its Abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term it can signifie no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two Names signify the same Idea Secondly All Propositions wherein a part of the Complex Idea which any Term stands for is predicated of that Term are only Verbal and thus all Propositions wherein more comprehensive Terms called Genera are affirmed of Subordinate or less Comprehensive called Species or Individuals are barely Verbal When by these two Rules we examine the Propositions that make up the Discourses we ordnarily meet with both in and out of Books we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of Words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs CHAP. IX Of our Knowledge of Existence HItherto we have only considered the Essences of Things which being only Abstract Ideas and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence give us no Knowledge of Existence at all We proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things and how we come by it I say then that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition of the Existence of God by Demonstration and of other Things by Sensation As for our own Existence we perceive it so plainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof I think I reason I feel Pleasure and Pain Can any of these be more evident to me than my own Existence If I doubt of all other Things that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence and will not suffer me to doubt of that If I know I doubt I have as certain a Perception of the Thing Doubting as of that Thought which I call Doubt Experience then convinces us that we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence and an Internal Infallible Perception that we are In every act of Sensation Reasoning or Thinking we are conscious to our selves of our own Being and in this matter come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty CHAP X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God THO' God has given us no innate Ideas of himself yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with he hath not left himself without a Witness since we have Sense Perception and Reason and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry our selves about us nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great point since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover and know him so far as is necessary to the end of our Being and the great concernment of our Happiness But thô this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers yet it requires Thought and Attention and the Mind must apply it self to a Regular deduction of it from some part of our Intuitiv Knowledge or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other Propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration To shew therefore that we are capable of Knowing that is being certain that there is a God and how we may come by this Certainty I think we need go no farther than our selves and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence I think it is beyond question that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being he knows certainly that he Exists and that he is Something In the next place Man knows by an Intuitive Certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real Being than it can be equal to two Right Angles If therefore we know there is some Real Being it is an evident Demonstration that from Eternity there has been Something since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else Next it is evident that what has its Being from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its Being from another too All the Powers it has must be owing to and received from the same Source This Eternal Source then of all Being must he also the Source and Original of all Power and so this Eternal Being must be also the most powerful Again Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge we are certain then that there is not only some Being but some Knowing Intelligent Being in the World There was a time then when there was no knowing Being or else there has been a knowing Being from Eternity If it be said there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge I reply that then it is impossible there should have ever been any Knowledge It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge and operating blindly and without any Perception should produce a knowing Being as it is impossible that a Triangle should make it self Three Angles bigger than Two Right ones Thus from the Consideration of our selves and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an Eternal most Powerful and Knowing Being which whether any one will call God it matters not The thing is evident and from this Idea duly consider'd will easily be deduced all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without
many Ideas are produced in us without pain which we afterwards remember without the least offence Thus the pain of Heat or Cold when the Idea of it is received in our Minds gives us no disturbance which when felt was very troublesome and we remember the pain of Hunger Thirst Head-ach c. without any pain at all which would either never disturb us or else constantly do it as often as we thought of it were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds and appearances entertaining our Fancies without the real Existence of Things affecting us from abroad Fourthly Our Senses in many cases bear witness to the Truth of each others Report concerning the Existence of sensible Things without us He that doubts when he sees a Fire whether it be Real may if he please feel it too and by the exquisite pain he will be convinced that it is not a bare Idea or Phantom If after all this any one will be so Sceptical as to distrust his Senses and to question the Existence of all Things or our Knowledge of any Thing Let him consider that the certainty of Things existing in Rerum naturâ when we have the Testimony of our Senses for it is not only as great as our Frame can attain to but as our condition needs For our Faculties being not suited to the full extent of Being nor a clear comprehensive knowledge of all Things but to the preservation of us in whom they are and accommodated to the use of Life they serve our purpose well enough if they will but give give us certain notice of those Things that are convenient or inconvenient to us For he that sees a Candle burning and has experimented the force of the Flame by putting his Finger in it will little doubt that this is something Existing without him which does him harm and puts him to pain which is assurance enough when no Man requires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by than what is as certain as his Actions themselves So that this Evidence is as great as we can desire being as Certain to us as our Pleasure or Pain that is Happiness or Misery beyond which we have no concernment either of Knowing or Being In fine when our Senses do actually convey into our Understandings any Idea we are assured that there is something at that time really Existing without us But this Knowledge extends only as far as the present Testimony of our Senses employed about particular Objects that do then affect them and no farther My seeing a Man a Minute since is no certain Argument of his present Existence As when our Senses are actually employed about any Object we know that it does Exist so by our Memory we may be assured that heretofore Things that affected our Senses have Existed and thus we have the knowledge of the past Existence of several Things whereof our Senses having informed us our Memories still retain the Ideas and of this we are past all doubt so long as we Remember well As to the Existence of Spirits our having Ideas of them does not make us know that any such Things do Exist without us or that there are any Finite Spirits or any other Spiritual Beings but the Eternal God We have ground from Revelation and several other Reasons to believe with assurance that there are such Creatures but our Senses not being able to discover them we want the means of knowing their particular Existence for we can no more know that there are Finite Spirits really Existing by the Idea we have of such Beings than by the Ideas any one has of Fairies or Centaurs he can come to know that Things answering those Ideas do really Exist Hence we may gather that there are Two sorts of Propositions One concerning the Existence of any Thing answerable to such an Idea as that of an Elephant Phenix Motion or Angel viz. Whether such a Thing does any where Exist and this Knowledge is only of Particulars and not to be had of any Thing without us but only of God any other way than by our Senses Another sort of Propositions is wherein is expressed the Agreement or Disagreement of our Abstract Ideas and their Dependence of another And these may be Universal and Certain So having the Idea of God and my Self of Fear and Obedience I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me and this Proposition will be certain concerning Man in general If I have made an Abstract Idea of such a Species whereof I am one Particular But such a Proposition how Certain soever proves not to me the Existence of Men in the World but will be true of all such Creatures whenever they do Exist which Certainty of such general Propositions depends on the Agreement or Disagreement discoverable in those Abstract Ideas In the former Case our Knowledge is the consequence of the Existence of Things producing Ideas in our Minds by our Senses In the later the consequence of the Ideas that are in our Minds and producing these general Propositions many whereof are called Eternae veritatis and all of them indeed are so not from being written all or any of them in the Minds of all Men or that they were any of them Propositions in any ones Mind till he having got the Abstract Ideas joyned or separated them by Affirmation or Negation But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as Man is endowed with such Faculties and thereby furnished with such Ideas as we have we must conclude he must needs when he applies his Thoughts to the Consideration of his Ideas know the truth of certain Propositions that will arise from the Agreement or Disagreement he will perceive in his own Ideas Such Propositions being once made about Abstract Ideas so as to be true they will whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past or to come by a Mind having those Ideas alway actually be true For Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same Ideas and the same Ideas having immutably the same Habitudes one to another Propositions concerning any Abstract Ideas that are once true must needs be Eeternal Verities CHAP. XII Of the Improvement of our Knowledge IT being the received Opinion amongst Men of Letters that Maxims are the Foundations of all Knowledge and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain Proecognita from whence the Understanding was to take its rise and by which it was to Conduct it self in its Inquiries in the Matters belonging to that Science the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propositions called Principles as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge was to be had of that Subject That which gave occasion to this way of proceeding was I suppose the good Success it seem'd to have in Mathematicks which of all other Sciences have the greatest Certainty Clearness and Evidence in them But if we consider it
Doubt Wavering Distrust Disbelief c. It is a Rule generally approved that any Testimony the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth the less Force it has and in Traditional Truths each Remove weakens the force of the Proof There is a Rule quite contrary to this advanced by some Men who look Opinions to gain Force by growing Older Upon this ground Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning come by an inverted Rule of Probability to pass for Authentick Truths and those which deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Relators are thought to grow venerable by Age and are urged as undeniable But certain it is that no Probability can rise above its First Original What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one Witness must stand or fall by his only Testimony thô afterwards cited by Hundreds of others and is so far from receiving any Strength thereby that it becomes the weaker Because Passion Interest Inadvertency Mistake of his Meaning and a thousand odd Reasons or Caprichois Mens Minds are acted by may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong This is certain that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated The Second sort of Probability is concerning Things not falling under the reach of our Senses and therefore not capable of Testimony And such are First The Existence Nature and Operations of Finite Immaterial Beings without us as Spirits Angels c. or the Existence of material Beings such as for their smallness or remoteness our Senses cannot take notice of As whether there be any Plants Animals c. in the Planets and other Mansions of the vast Universe Secondly Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the works of Nature wherein thô we see the sensible Effects yet their Causes are unknown and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced We see Animals are generated nourished and move the Loadstone draws Iron c. but the Causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture In these matters Analogy is the only help we have and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another produces Heat and very often Fire we have reason to think that what we call Heat and Fire consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter This sort of Probability which is the best conduct of rational Experiments and the rise of Hypotheses has also its use and influence And a wary reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of Truths and useful Deductions which would otherwise lie concealed Thô the common Experience and the ordinary course of Things have a mighty influence on the Minds of Men to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their Belief yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it For where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aimed at by him who has the power to change the course of Nature there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary Observation This is the proper case of Miracles which well attested do not only find Credit themselves but give it also to other Truths There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony whether the Thing proposed Agree or Disagree with common Experience and the ordinary course of Things or no The reason whereof is because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is God himself This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt Evidence beyond Exception This is called by a peculiar Name Revelation and our Assent to it Faith which has as much Certainty in it as our Knowledge it self and we may as well doubt of our own Being as we can whether any Revelation from God be True So that Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation only we must be sure that it be a Divine Revelation and that we understand it right else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of Enthusiasm and all the error of wrong Principles if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not Divine Revelation CHAP. XVII Of Reason THE word Reason in English has different Significations Sometimes it is taken for True and Clear Principles Sometimes for Clear and Fair Deductions from those Principles Sometimes for the Cause and particularly for the Final Cause but the Consideration I shall have of it here is as it stands for a Faculty whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them Reason is necessary both for the enlargement of our Knowledge and regulating our Assent for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion and is necessary and assisting to all our other Intellectual Faculties and indeed contains Two of them viz. First Sagacity whereby it finds intermediate Ideas Secondly Illation whereby it so orders and disposes of them as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain whereby the Extremes are held together and thereby as it were to draw into view the Truth sought for which is that we call Illation or Inference and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas in each step of the Deduction whereby the Mind comes to see either the Certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas as in Demonstration in which it arrives at Knowledge or their probable Connexion on which it gives or with-holds its Assent as in Opinion Sense and Intuition reach but a little way the greatest part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas In those Cases where we must take Propositions for true without being certain of their being so we have need to find out examine and compare the grounds of their Probability In both Cases the Faculty which finds out the Means and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one and Probability in the other is that which we call Reason So that in reason we may consider these Four Degrees First The discovering and finding out of Proofs Secondly The regular and methodical Disposition of them and laying them in such order as their Connexion may be plainly perceived Thirdly The perceiving their Connexion Fourthly The making a right Conclusion There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning Reason and that is whether Syllogism as is generally thought be the proper instrument of it ant the usefullest way of exercising this Faculty The Causes I have to doubt of
Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflection Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition upon the credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation concerning which we must observe First That no Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new Simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection Because Words by their immediate Operation on us cannot cause other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and such as Custom has annexed to them which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any new and formerly unknown Simple Ideas The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signify to us Things of which we have never before had any Idea at all For our Simple Ideas we must depend wholly on our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional in distinction to Original Revelation By the One I mean that impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man to which we cannot set any bounds And by the Other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered by Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason but in such there is little need or use of Revelation God having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them and Truths discovered by our natural Faculties are more certain than when conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation For the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas Thâ—s also holds in matters of Fact knowâ—â—le by our Senses as the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Orignal from Revelation and yet no boâ—y I think will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed to be writ by Moses inspired But he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is still less than our assurance of his Senses Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason For since no evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such a Revelation can exceed if equal the Certainty of our Intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge The Ideas of One Body and One Place do so clearly agree that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distinct places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation Since the Evidence First That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to God Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own Intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of Faith For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out Knowledge Because thô Faith be founded upon the Testimony of God who cannot lye yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a Divine Revelation than it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith which can have no Authority against the plain and clear dictates of Reason But Thirdly There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions or none at all and other things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural use of our Faculties we can have no knowledge at all These being beyond the discovery of our Faculties and above Reason when revealed become the proper matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against God that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again and the like are purely matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do First then Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Mater of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason but with this difference that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds in such I say an Evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever God hath Revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of Faith But whether it be a Divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of Divine Original in the words we receive it and the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason and therefore Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason has a right to be
urged or assented to as a matter of Faith wherein Reason has nothing to do Whatsoever is Divine Revelation ought to over-rule all our Opinions Prejudices and Interests and hath a right to be received with a full Assent Such a submission as this of our Reason to Faith takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge this shakes not the foundations of Reason but leaves us that use of our Faculties for which they were given us CHAP. XIX Of wrong Assent or Error ERROR is a mistake of our Judgment giving Assent to that which is not true The Reasons whereof may be reduced to these Four First Want of Proofs Secondly Want of Ability to use them Thirdly Want of Will to use them Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability First Want of Proofs by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had but also of those Proofs which are in being or might be procured The greatest part of Mankind want the Conveniencies and Opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves or of collecting the Testimonies of others being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition whose Lives are worn out only in the provisions for living These Men are by the constitution of Humane Affairs unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build and which are necessary to establish those Opinions For having much to do to get the means of living they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries It is true that God has furnished Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take if they will but seriously employ them that way when their ordinary Vocations allow them leisure No Man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think on his Soul and inform himself in matters of Religion were Men as intent on this as they are on Things of lower concernment There are none so enslaved to the necessity of Life who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge Secondly Want of Ability to use them There be many who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies These cannot discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie nor follow that which in it self is the most probable Opinion It is certain that there is a wide difference in Mens Understandings Apprehensions and Reasonings to a very great Latitude so that one may without doing injury to Mankind affirm that there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this respect than between some Men and some Beasts But how this comes about is a speculation thô of great consequence yet not necessary to our present purpose Thirdly For want of Will to use them Some thô they have opportunities and leisure enough and want neither Parts nor Learning nor other Helps are yet never the better for them and never come to the knowledge of several Truths that lie within their reach either upon the account of their hot pursuit of Pleasure constant Drudgery in Business Laziness and Oscitancy in general or a particular aversion for Books and Study and some out of Fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those Opinions which best suit their Prejudices Lives Designs Interests c. as many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts who have reason to fear that their Affairs are in no very good posture How Men whose plentiful Fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings can satisfie themselves with a lazy Ignorance I cannot tell But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of Knowledge I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that ever think of a future state and their concernment in it which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes nor shall I take notice what a shame it is to the greatest Contemâ—ers of Knowledge to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen that however they may think Credit Respect and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune yet they will find all these still carried away from them by Men of lower condition who surpass them in Knowledge They who are blind will always be led by those that see or else fall into the Ditch and he is certainly the most subjected the most enslaved who is so in his Understanding Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability which are First Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident but doubtful and false taken for Principles Propositions looked on as Principles have so great an influence upon our Opinions that it is usually by them we judge of Truth and what is inconsistent with them is so far from passing for Probable with us that it will not be allowed Possible The reverence born to these Principles is so great that the Testimony nor only of other Men but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established Rules The great obstinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions thô many times equally absurd in the various Religions of Mankind are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional Principles so that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes renounce the Evidence of their Senses and give their own Experience the Lye rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these Sacred Tenents Secondly Received Hypotheses The difference between these and the former is that those who proceed by these will admit of matter of Fact and agree with Dissenters in that but differ in assigning of Reasons and explaining the manner of Operation These are not at that open defiance with their Senses as the former they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently but will by no means admit of their Reports in the explanation of Things nor be prevailed on by Probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are Thirdly Predominant Passions or Inclinations Let never so much Probability hang on one side of a Covetous Man's Reasoning and Monâ—y on the other it is easie to foresee which will prevail Thô Men cannot always openly gain-say or resist the force of manifest Probabilities that make against them yet yield they not to the Argument Not but that it is the nature of the Understanding constantly to close with the more probable side but yet a Man hath power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries and not permit a full and satisfactory