than his own Sect though it do not cease to appear unto him also credible But he answers in the second place that this opinion pleaseth him not at all and pretends that in this very case a Pagan is not bound at all to embrace the Faith a Caeterum hoc non placet it a generaliter dictum quippe dum Infidelis sibi persuasum habet suam sectam esse probabitem quamvis contraria sit probabilior tenetur utique in articulo mortis constitutus veram fidem quam probabiliorem judicat amplecti utpote in coarticulo constitutus in quo de extrema salute agitur ac proinde partem quam tutiorem probabiliorem judicat amplectitenetur At extra eum articulum non tenetur quod adhuc prudenter existimet se posse in sua secta perseverare Sanch. op mor. l. 2. c. 1. n. 6. p. 86. Because that when an Infidel is perswaded that his Sect is probable though the contrary which is the Christian Religion appear unto him more probable it is true that at the point of death when his Salvation is reduced to extremity and when by consequence he is obliged to follow that part which he judges to be more sure and more probable he is bound to embrace the true Faith which he believes to be more probable But out of this extremity he is not obliged because he judgeth prudently that he may persist in his idolatry In pursuance of this rule of probability that he acts prudently who follows a probable opinion I believe this Jesuit would not answer for the Salvation of a man who dyes in this estate since he must then believe that he may be saved without Faith and in Idolatry which is the greatest of crimes So that in saying he acts wisely in persisting in Idolatry he saith in effect that it is wisdom to walk in the darkness of death that it is prudence to destroy and precipitate himself into Hell in persuance of his rules of morality and grounding himself upon the principles of probability SECT II. That this Doctrine of Probability favours the Heretiques and nourisheth them in Heresie THe Doctrine of Probability is no lesse favourable to Heretiques then Infidels in that the ordinary arms whereof the Church makes use to defend it self against Heretiques and to assail them being Scripture Counsels Fathers and all that which we have received from the Ancients by Tradition the Jesuits and those who with them defend this Doctrine of Probability find not these evidences for their advantages and are so far from making use of them that they fear and fly from them all they can They cite in their Schools in their writings in a manner as often the Books of the Pagans as of the Scriptures they professe openly to preferre the new Authors above the Ancient they acknowledge not properly for Masters and Fathers any but those of their Society to the judgement and the censure of whom they submit frequently enough the judgements of the Saints which the Church hath always acknowledged for Masters and Fathers Divine or Ecclesiastick authority as well as Faith have scarce any credit in their Schools all as regulated and resolved by the authority of men and humane reason and in all contests and difficulties which they encounter if they cannot prevail by dispute they have recourse to those whom they regard as their Masters and Soveraign Judges in all sorts of matters They appeal to Suarez to Vasquez Molina Lessius and to others such like without making almost any mention of Jesus Christ the Apostles or the Ancient Fathers unless for form and without producing the definitions of the Councils or Traditions of the Church to determine the questions because they find them not conformable to their Spirit nor their designs some can make no use of them because they understand them not and even will not give themselves the trouble to study them and the others because they find not in them what is for their purpose Besides they wish they could content the whole World and answer all persons that consult them according to their humour and disposition Which obligeth them to look out for a Doctrine that is flexible and manageable and which may be accommodated to all occasions The maximes of Faith seem to them too fixed and the rules of the Church and the Gospel too firm and the opinions of the Holy Fathers too exact and too unmoveable For this cause they being not able to make use of them to establish the maximes of which they have need that they may make their designs to prosper and fearing on the other hand that they might be made use of against them to overturn their naughty maximes they find themselves as it were constrained by necessity to do all that they can directly or indirectly to corrupt them weaken them and to take away all credit from them In this they imitate and favour the hereticks of whom they have learned to reject the Holy Fathers especially in the difficulties which regard manners and the conduct of life and to despise Antiquity and Tradition through a blind love of their own novelties and proper imaginations and they are even in some sort more blameable then the Hereticks because they renounce the Father and the Tradition upon a pretence of holding to Scripture and these to follow their new Authors from whom they declare openly that we ought to take Law and rules for Christians Morals rather then from the Fathers of the Church Quae circa fidem emergunt dissicultates eae sunt ex veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homini Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptcribus Colot l. 8 c. 16. p. 714. And indeed there hath never been any heresie which hath not had at the least some sort of probability because there hath yet never been any which hath not had some appearance of truth without which it could have found no followers the spirit of man not being capable to follow any thing but truth nor to be deceived but by the shaddow of it And it often happens that the greatest Heresies took for their foundation the greatest truths and have built on the strongest reasons Which shews clearly that if to follow a probable opinion be to act prudently and if an opinion be probable when it is grounded on the authority of some learned man or some likely reason as the Jesuits and those who hold their Doctrine of Probability tell us there is no heretick who may not maintain against them that he acts prudently whilest he lives in his heresie It is true that the Hereticks have misconceived the truths of which they would make use and especially those of the Scripture which they have corrupted in their sence and in their words that they might fit them to their thoughts and errours b Communis error ex probabili opinione ortus satu est ad gestorum per Sacerdotem vaâ—…em Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p.
seen in doing all they can to spare them in the shame and confusion they have i◠discovering their sins by Confession they are no less to their laziness and effeminacy in discharging them of the penalty they ought to undergo in Penance which is imposed on them to make reparation for their faults by supplying them with divers expedients either to elude or not accomplish them after they are imposed on them or to refuse them when they are imposed 1 Praecipitur imponenda diversa poenitentia progravitate majori aut minori intra eandem speciem num 196. Dicastillus advances this Proposition as a general Principle that it is not necessary that Penance should be proportioned to the crime and that it may be greater or less according to the qualities of the sins If you oppose to him the Councils and the Fathers 2 Rectè solvit hanc objectionem Vasquez respondens olim quidem ita fuisse in usu ..... fervente charitate ..... Ex quibus satis constat non necessitate Sacramenti sed secutos fervorem illorum temporum ejusmodi poenitentias assignare illorum Canonum poenitentiarum autores Dicast n. 197. d. 3. d. 9. tr 8. de poenit He will affirm after Vasquez that they would have a proportion held therein and that it was the use of their times because Christian charity then ruled the hearts of the faithful they assigned different penalties according to the different qualities of crimes following the fervour and piety of those primitive times If you reason against him that the Confessor having the quality of a Judge ought to proceed by the ways of Justice which puts some kind of equality betwixt the fault and the punishment 3 Et quidem in humanis judiciis quamvis nequeat esse justa delicto proportionata sententia qua reus damnetur ad aliquam poenam nisi cognoscatur culpa tamen sententia absolutionis remissionis rei se praesentantis deferenti◠petentis veniam esse potest remittendo quicquid illud fuerit in quo non est servanda proportio qualis esse debet inter culpam poenam ut judicium sit verum justum Dicast n. 747. d. 9. d. 9. tr 8. de poenit He will agree with you that it is so in humane Tribunals but he will pretend that it is not the same thing in the judgment which the Priest exercises in the Tribunal of Penance which without this proportion ceaseth not to be just and true It is not then of ignorance that this Jesuit opposes so openly the Oracles of the Holy Ghost and the decisions of the Church The first Preacher of Repentance made a Precept for it which hath not been prescribed against by following Ages 4 Facite ergo fructus dignos poenitentiae Mat. 3. Luc. 3. Bring forth then fruit worthy of repentance and a Jesuit in these last times which we may well call the dregs of all Ages comes to tell us that we need not bring forth fruit worthy of repentance S. Paul saith 5 Judaeis Gentibus annuntiabam ut poenitentiam agerent converterentur ad Deum digna poenitentiae opera facientes Act. 26. That he preached to Jews and Gentiles that they should turn unto God and bring forth fruit worthy of repentance and a Jesuit tells us at this day that this is not necessary The Council of Trent ordain 6 Pro qualitate criminum convenientes satisfactiones Trid. c. 8. sess 14. Condignant pro modo culpae poenitentiam c. 8. sess 24. That Confessors should impose penances agreeable and according to the quality of their crimes and a Jesuit assures us that this is not the season that this practice had been good in the primitive times of the Church After this excess there is no bar can stop the spirit of a Jesuit any longer when he takes in hand to flatter sinners Scripture it self and the Church assembled have not force enough for this and notwithstanding all their Ordinances a Penance be it what it will always suffices to obtain pardon for the greatest crimes Amicus demands 7 An qui pro poenitentia debet duas aut tres Missas audire satisfaciat si omnes in diversis altaribus eodem tempore simul audiat Whether he on whom it hath been imposed for penance to hear two or three Masses may satisfie his obligation by hearing them all at once upon different Altars He answers with Sanchez that this is lawful and that this opinion is probable 8 Affirmat Sanchez in Summa l. 1. c. 14. in fine Quae sententia probabilis est quia praeceptum Confessoris non est nisi de duabus aut tribus Missis audiendis Amicus t. 8. disp 16. dub 14. n. 112. p. 272. Because the Confessor hath not commanded any thing but to hear two or three Masses He never troubles himself about the intention of the Confessor which in this case he cannot reasonably doubt of he neither obliges the Penitent to inform himself of it perhaps out of discretion and for the honour of the Confessor for fear that learning it of his own mouth and being not disposed to obey him since he can without that discharge himself of his Penance according to the probable opinion of Amicus and Sanchez he might not offend yet more by a manifest disobedience he chuses rather that the Penitent should dissemble and not acknowledge to understand the intention of his Confessor that he might without scandal clude his Commandment The same Jesuite in the same place saith that Penance given for satisfaction of sins may be discharged by an action which is in it self a mortal sin 1 Dico 1. actussatisfactionis Sacramentalis ex pravo fine etiam peccati mortalis elicitus valet ad implendum praeceptum à Confessario injunctum de satisfaciendo pro peccatis confessis modo per talem actum impleatur substantia ipsa satisfactionis Ibid. n. 37. p. 262. The work of Sacramental Penance saith he when it is done with a wicked intent and even to commit a mortal sin ceases not to be good enough to discharge the command of a Confessor about satisfaction for sins confessed provided the substance and body of it be performed Dicastilius is of the same judgment being he saith that Penance enjoyned may not only be performed by accomplishing it in an estate of mortal sin 2 Verum puto non esse peccatum mortale imo absolute nullum peccatum existimo esse Dicast n. 150. d. 10. d. 14. tr 8. de poenit Tandem concedunt communiter Doctores per poenitentiam in peccato mortali impletam adhuc ex fine mortali satisfieri praecepto Confessarii Efficitur enim opus quoad substantiam quod Confessarius praecipit eo ipso est Sacramentalis pars Ibid. n. 154. without committing the least sin even Venial but also for an end which is Criminal which is to say that it
it in this life which is that I have affirmed to be amongst those points of the Jesuits Divinity which I have undertaken to discover I adde that by destroying Penance he ruines at the same time the whole Gospel which began by Preaching Penance and contains in effect no other thing since the whole life of a Christian is nothing else but a continual Penance according to the Council of Trent and all the Fathers So we see that all the places of the Scripture and of the Fathers which speak of Penance are addressed to the living and it would be very hard to find any directed to the dead and which commands or counsels them to do Penance for their sins the Scripture and the Church having always taught until this time that it is impossible because it is impossible to fast after death to weep to wear Sackcloth and Ashes and to do other like Exercise in which the Scripture it self and the Church it self have established the Penance and satisfaction which we owe unto God for our sins Emandemus in melius quae ignoranter peccavimus nè subito praeoccupati die mortis quaeramus spatium poenitentiae invenire non possimus Let us amend and correct those things in which we have ignorantly offended lest being suddenly surprized by the day of death we seek space for Penance and cannot find it saith the Church at the entrance of Lent which is the time which it proposes to all men sinners and innocent perfect and unperfect great and small to do Penance in this life and for it to be remittable to the other world is to abolish it entirely and ruine together with it the whole Gospel and all life of Christianity ARTICLE V. Rules of Conduct for a Confessor according to the Jesuits THE principal Rules of a Confessor towards a Penitent according to them are 1. To examine him if it be needful 2. To give him necessary advices 3. To sound as much as they can his inward disposition and to see if he be grieved for his sin 4. To ordain wholsome Penance for him 5. To give him Absolution if he be in an estate to receive it From all the maxims of the Jesuits Divinity which we have but now related concerning the Sacrament of Penance and all the parts of it it is easie to judge in what manner they would have a Confessor demean himself in the Administration of this Sacrament and what Rules they ought to observe for discharging every of these Duties I. POINT Rules to examine Penitents according to the Jesuits THOSE that need to be examined are 1. Children 2. Ignorant and Blockish People 3. Great Sinners 1 What is meet to be said to those who in their youth have committed many actions of a vitious nature and which nevertheless they believe not to be such That they are not obliged to speak one word of them when they understand and know their nature and conditions and much less repeat their past Confessions Bauny in his sum Chap. 4. P. 150. For Children the Jesuits would not that they should be scared nor any scruple made about the sins of their youth though they be great and they have never yet confessed them whether it be because they have forgotten them or because they knew not that they were so great as they learnt afterwards For they hold that they are not obliged to confess them even after they have received this instruction 2. 2 That if any by ignorance or simplicity have not confessed himself of his faults but only in gross without determining any one in particular it is not needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of those faults if it cannot be done conveniently because we are pressed by Penitents which give not leisure for it Bauny in his Sum Chap. 4. pag. 150. Licèt ignorantia sit culpabilis mortaliter non est necessitas repetendi confessionem ac proinde valida est Filliutius tom 1. mor. qq tract 7. cap. 6 num 132. pag. 185. Henriq Fagund addunt rusticos omnes qui confitentur aliquando sine explicatione numeri diligentia cogendos non esse repetere confessiones factas antea cum indoctis Confessariis Dicastillus tract 8. de poenit d. 9. d. 2. num 57. Poenitens qui priorem confessionem fecit informem non tenetur repetere ...... certissimum absque controversia est ipsum consequi per posteriorem absolutionem gratiam Idem tractat 2. de bapt d. 1. d. 8. n. 203. If a Peasant or a grosly Ignorant Person knowing not how to confess himself say that he hath never accused himself but in gross without noting out any sins in particular the Jesuits will not that he should be made to repeat his Confessions and accuse himself anew by unfolding his sins by parcels especially when they have other persons to confess who give them not leisure though the ignorance which hinders them from knowing and confessing their sins be criminal and renders them guilty of mortal sin or the ignorance of the Confessor himself be the cause Likewise they teach generally that when the Penitent hath made an imperfect Confession he is not obliged to repeat it and he fails not for all that to receive the Grace of the Sacrament by vertue of the following Absolution and Confession 3. 3 Levius minus exactè interrogandus est circa singula qui plura habet peccata quam qui pauciora quia cum solum requiratur diligentia examen humanum hec autem sit illud quod non generat ex se faslidium taedium hujus Sacramenti consequens est ut minus distincta notitia requiratur ab eo qui vel propter peccatorum multitudinem vel aliam ob causam difficilius posset exactam notitiam reddere Tambur lib. 3. method confess cap. 9. sect 5. num 11. Commisi furtum mortale toties non exprimendo furti quantitatem Escobar in prooem ex 2. num 39. pag. 12. c. 15. It is not needful in Confession to tell the said circumstance of the quantity of the theft it suffices in rigour to cause the Confessor to understand that we have sinned mortally in the matter of theft by taking from another such sum as constitutes that sin Bauny in his Sum Chap. 39. pag. 616. It is not needful for the validity of the Sacrament that the Penitent in his Confession tell the number of vicious desires dishonest thoughts and affections which he hath had or reiterated during the time he hath been addicted to them Sufficit dicere toto mense v. c. amavi Mariam etiamsi possit numerus exprimi Bauny in his Sum Chap. 4. pag. 667. Si utrique parti probabiliter adhaeret non tenetur confiteri Potest enim sequi probabilem partem quam maluerit Dicast tr 8. de poenit d. 9. d. 7. num 277. Si quis probabiliter putet se jam confessum fuisse non tenetur confieri etiamsi certo sciat
which he places these 1 Datur non datur recipiendae Consiâ—mationis praeceptum divinum Whether there be a Divine Precept to receive Confirmation where having reported the two contrary Opinions he tells his own in these terms 2 Existimo nullum dari nec divinum nec Ecclesiasticum praeceptum Confirmationis recipiendae Escob tom 2. lib. 12. Pr 31. I believe there is no Precept neither Divine nor Ecclesiastick to receive Confirmation And as if it had not been sufficient to have said it once he repeats it the second time also confirming his errour After which he proposes this other Problem 3 Datur non datur ullum recipiendae confi mationis praeceptum Probl. 32. Whether it be a Venial sin to fail of receiving Confirmation He concludes that 4 Omittere Confirmationem peccatum vaniale est neque peccatum est veniale Probl. 33. Except in the case of scandal or contempt it is not of it self any scandal to omit it He contents not himself with this neither but that he might have occasion to repeat this scandalous Proposition he makes this other question 5 Sub veniall fideles tenentur nec sub veniali tenentur ante Sacramenti Eucharistiae matrimonil susceptionem Confirmationem recipere Probl. 34. Whether the faithful are obliged under the pain of Venial sin to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation before that of the Eucharist or of Marriage And he answers that they are not at all obliged In his other work wherein he hath collected the Opinions of the 24 Elders who represent the Society he demands 6 Quaenam suscipiendi obligatio Non est necessarium necessitate medil neque necessitate praecepti Escob tr 7. ex 3. n. 3. n. 11. p. 794. What Obligation have we to receive Confirmation and he answers that there is none that comes either from any Commandment or from any necessity of this Sacrament it self He generally takes away all sort of obligation and necessity from this Sacrament reducing it into the rank of things free and indifferent And to testifie this yet more he adds that one may without sin at least without any great one have a formal will not to receive it at all sponte omittere provided it be without scandal and contempt As if it were not enough to despise so great a gift of God as that of this Sacrament to refuse it voluntarily without cause There is no King nor Man of quality who would not hold it for a contempt to refuse in this manner any gift though much smaller especially if he offer it to some person of low condition who should shew so little regard of the honour he doth him Mascarenhas who wrote after the rest follows in this point the opinion of his Brethren and speaks also more clearly and resolutely then they supposing himself to be fortified by their Examples and supported by their Authority 7 Omittere hoc Sacramentum absolutè loquendo nec etiam pâ—ccatum veniale est Et ratio est quia nullum de hodatur praecepc tum de jure communâ— nullum datur peccatum nec veniale nisi siâ— contra aliquod praeceptum Mascarenhas tr 1. de Sacram. in genere disp 4. c. 5. p. 47. There is not absolutely saith he any sin no not a Venial one in neglecting to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation because amongst the common Laws of Christian Religion there is none that commands it and it cannot be any sin no not a Venial one which is not against some Commandment He acknowledgeth neither obligation nor precept nor any sort of necessity for receiving Confirmation which is hard to reconcile with the Faith we ought to have in this Divine Sacrament which contains so great an abundance of Grace and fulness of the Holy Ghost For if one should say that he might withdraw himself from it through honour and respect not esteeming himself worthy of so great a gift and bounty of God he would therein testifie at the least some esteem for this Sacrament of the Holy Ghost But to maintain that one may withdraw from it of his own will only and without any reason and without troubling himself about the Graces and Blessings which he might receive therefrom is to testifie manifestly that we make no great account of it and that we would reduce it to the rank of things indifferent And how can men be diverted from it more openly then by making them believe that they may overlook it and neglect even the occasions that are convenient for receiving it without making themselves guilty before God of the least sin But because this wicked Doctrine is entirely opposite to the consent of the Holy Fathers and Councils who acknowledge the necessity of Confirmation the Jesuits have found out a new invention to defeat their Authority herein They answer that the 8 Pontifices Concilin in contrarium adducta loquuntur de necessitate non praeceptl sed utilitatis Escobar supra n. 22. p. 796. Popes and Councils which are alledged against their Opinion speak not of a necessity of command but of a necessity of benefit There is no Commandment so express nor so clearly expressed neither in the Scripture nor in the Books of the Church which may not be cluded by this new unheard of and ridiculous Distinction For hitherto none ever spoke of a necessity of benefit it being clear that what is only beneficial as is Confirmation with the Jesuits is not necessary and that to joyn in this manner a necessity to utility or an utility to necessity is to form a kind of Monster composed of two contrary parts whereof the one destroys the other According to this distinction we may say that whatsoever is in the Church and in the Scripture is necessary because there is nothing there which is not profitable and all the most free Counsels themselves being profitable may be said to be necessary But to shew yet more clearly that this necessity of utility is but a vain word which they have invented to obscure the light of the Ancient Doctrine of the Church it is manifest that according to them it is impossible there should be any true necessity of any kind for the Sacrament of Confirmation since they hold that it is not commanded by any law of God or the Church and that the Grace which it confers may be obtained not only by other Sacraments but also by every sort of good works and exercises of Religion as appears by the Books of English Jesuits condemned by the Clergy of France and since publickly owned by the Jesuits in the Book of Alegambe approved by their General Escâ—bar also expounds his thought more openly demanding 1 Qui data copis recipiendi hec Sacramentum quam postea non facile est habiturus nen recipit deliquitne ut contemptor Minime Ib. n. 23. If he who hath convenience to receive this Sacrament which he cannot easily another time obtain
began to drink though he had formerly often fallen therein when he was drunk d Ea adhibita diligentia etsi postea eveniant minime imputabuntur Ibid. Non teneri ebrios praecavere Ibid. num 43. But if one think of these incoveniences and hath foreseen them they pretend that he is quit thereof provided that he bestow onely some little precaution though to no purpose whatsoever evil may happen thereupon and that one is not at all obliged even unto this precaution when one is urged to these disorders by others e Quippe tempore ebrietatis talia in communi hominum aestimatione non reputantur contumeliosa sed tanquam facetiae admutuntur ibid. n. 44. Nisi grave malum corporis sequatur Escobar tr 2. exam 2. n. 72. p. 302. modo non obsit valetudini Ibid. n. 102. p. 304. Quando vero damnum proximo inforunt imputabuntur si praevideantur Sanch. supra As to the injuries or follies and insolences which are committed against our Neighbours in drunkenness they count them as nothing and let them pass for divertisements as well as blasphemies and impieties against God because they provoke laughter for the most part as well as other excesses of drunkards In a word they permit all things unto drunkards whilst they are drunk provided that they do not notably prejudice their own health nor quite lose their reason and that they do not cause some temporal damage unto men Gluttony of it self is with them but a venial sin and they believe that it becomes a mortal sin but onely in some certain cases and with circumstances very rare f Quando in ea ultimus fiuis bominis collocatur Escobar supra n. 58. p. 298. as when a man makes it his last end saith Escobar It is true that this excess is very great and notwithstanding it seems that this word escaped him or that he did not consider well what he said himself a little after g An comedere bibere usque ad satietatem absque necessitate ob solam voluptatem sit peccatum Cum Sanctione negativè respondee Ibid. n. 103. p. 204. It is some sin but venial to eat and drink as much as one will for pleasure onely without proposing to ones self any other end of which he renders this reason h Quia licite potest appetitus naturalis suis actibus frui Ibid. That the natural appetite may be suffered to go according to its own proper motions and to enjoy the pleasure it finds therein For according to the common language of Philosophie as well as of the Holy Scripture i Frui animo meo mihi bonum est Frui corpore mihi bonum est to love a thing to desire it to look after it and to rejoyce in it for love of it self and for it self is no other thing than to establish it for his last end The Holy Fathers have spoken very earnestly against the Stoicks for their impiety in saying that their happiness consisted in the enjoyment of their own spirits and against the Epicures who placed theirs in the enjoyment of their own bodies They condemned these two kinds of Philosophie as making their spirit and their body their God What judgement then would they have made of those who say at this day and teach it to libertines k Edere bibere usque ad satietatem propter solam voluptatem Frui actibus mei appetitus naturalis mihi bonum est that to eat and drink to ones fill for the pleasure onely which they take therein and to give themselves up to their natural appetites and to enjoy the pleasure which they sind therein is their contentment and their happiness It is clear that these Saints following the rule of the Church would have condemned them as they did condemn the Stoicks and the Epicures of making their God of their bodies and of the pleasure which they have in eating and drinking and in the actions of their sences and in doing this they had followed the judgement which Saint Paul had pronounced on persons which appeared yet less criminal than those whom the Jesuits maintain as innocent whom notwithstanding the Apostle Paul calls Dogs and saith expressely l Quorum Deu◠venter est Ad Philip. 3. v. 19. that they make their God of their bellies ARTICLE V. Of Covetousness I. POINT That the Jesuits authorize all sorts of ways to get wealth and dispense with restitution of what is procured by the most unjust and infamous ways 1. COvetousness consists in loving temporal wealth for its own sake Escobar will not acknowledge this * C'est à dire en s'arrestant à luy au plaisir qu'on y trouve affection for any vice nor for any fault if there occure therein no notable excesse nor any other evil end m Quidnam est avaritia Inordinatus divitiarum amor Escobar tr 2. ex 2. c. 2. n. 29. p. 293. What is Covetousness demands he To which he answers presently that it is a disordered love of riches That is to say that its irregular either in it self because it is excessive or in its end because one refers it to some thing that is evil in it self n Inordinatus quidem amor culpabilis est non ordinatus sive ad rectum finem directus for without this he pretends that it is innocent and lawfull as when one loves wealth for its own sake without too great passion and without any evil design 2. Whatsoever disorder there be in the love of wealth whatsoever passion one can have for riches he holds that it cannot be more than a venial sin If to get them or preserve them he do no point of injustice o Certe in optandis divitiis inordinatio nisi conjunctá sit cum injustitia retinendi vel au serendi alienum invito domino vel cum duritia non tribuendi egeno graviter laboranti solummodo venialis est culpa Ibid. This is certain saith he that the disordered love of riches is but a venial sin if it be not found joyned with injustice and a will to take or retain the goods of another without his consent to whom they pertain or with a hardness of heart unsensible of the miseries of the poor which hinders from relieving them in their great necessities Following this principle not onely covetousness is no mortal sin any longer but also it cannot at all be any of it self and for it to become criminal it behoves that it part from its own proper matter and that it enter upon that of unjustice So then we see the whole crime of Covetousness reduced to injustice but even in this estate and in this extremitie it shall not want protectors amongst these new Divines they find inventions to justifie injustice it self that they might not condemn covetousness with it For it seems that injustice cannot proceed into a greater excess then to sell and buy the honor of women the
at once for one and the same action and that same also an unjust action But it must be said to make these things agree together or to understand this contradiction that he deserves reward according to the Divinity of the Jesuits and that he deserves punishment according to the Laws of God of Men and of natural equity If we consider the crime of Judas according to this Divinity who treated with the Jews to betray our Saviour unto them for money Filliutius Lessius and Layman would have concluded that he was not obliged at all to restore the money which he received having executed that which he had promised and in this they would have shewn the world that they had more large consciences than that Traitor himself And to the end that the Doctrine of these Jesuits may seem yet more strange and that we may see more clearly that they make sport and play with the truth and with the consciences of men they assure us a Nulla est causa cur debeat jure naturae restitui quod acceptum fuerit pro iniqua sententia Lessius supra that a Judge who hath taken money to passe an unjust sentence is not obliged to restore it and they assure us at the same time b Hinc sequitur 1. Judicem teneri restituere id quod accepit ut justam sentiam ferret Lessius ibid. d. n. n. 64. that he who hath received it to pass a just sentence is obliged thereto c Ex his sequitur non esse restituenda accepta à dicente falsum testimonium Filliuâ—ius supra n. 104. Hinc sequitur Judicem teneri ad restituendum id quod accepit ut justam sententiam ferret Idem de teste qui aliquid accipit ut verum testimonium dicat Ibid. n. 102. That a false witness is not obliged to restore that which he has taken but a true witness is bound thereto Lessius observes very well that Saint Augustin is contrary to this so strange a maxime and that he wrote to Macedonius that a Judge who received money to pronounce an unjust Sentence commits a greater crime than he who takes it to do justice But he quotes not this great Saint but onely to refute him without fear that he should rise against him in the last judgement when he shall judge with God not onely the unjust but also the just themselves according to the Scriptures Layman maketh also a third question which he answers at the same time d Si cum alique pactus sis pecunia promissa ne te accuset de crimine patrando qui te jure accusare potest turpis quidem est pactio Sed postquam crimen patratum fuit utrinque obligatio oritus pretium acceptum ante Judicis senteatiam restituendum non est St quidem jus illud accusandi quo ille se sriâ—at pretio aflimabile est Layman ubi supra If you have treated saith he with a man and promised him money that he shall not accuse you of a crime which you are to commit and of which he hath a right to accuse you this bargain is indeed shameful but after this crime is committed you continue both obliged to one and the other and the money which hath been received ought not to be restored before the Judge hath ordained it because the right of accusing whereof he that hath received the money is deprived may be rated for money It must be observed that he saith that e Et pretium acceptum ante Judicìs senten tiam restituendum non est he who hath received money to keep secret the crime of another is not obliged to restore it before that the Judge hath ordained him to do it He presupposes then that if he be accused before an equitable Judge he will condemn him to restore it But how can he do it without injustice if it be true according to the Divinity of the Jesuits that this man hath a right to the money that he hath received if he hath got it lawfully and if he may keep it justly Lessius is of the same advice and after he had made the same question he adds also another new difficulty thereunto saying f Quod si ei qui minabatur accusationem non erat animus accusandi sed solum terrendi poteritne id quod sic extorsit retiuere Less l. 2. c. 17. d. 6. num 42. And if he who threatned to accuse him had no intent to do it but onely to fright him can he retain that which he had drawn from him by this artifice He fortifies this difficulty by reasons continuing thus g Videtur quod non possit quia dolus dedit locum contractui No luisset enim alter dare n si suisset deceptus Deinde quia dedit ut deponas animum quem non habâ—s It aque titulus non subsistit Ibid. It seems that he cannot because he caused the contract by fraud For he who had given him the money would have resolved not to have given it him if he had not been deceived Besides he hath given it to oblige this man to quit the design which indeed he never had at all And for this cause the title upon which he founds the receiving of the money is nul He supports this opinion also by saying that it is Molina's who otherwise is not over-scrupulous But after all this he concludes in these terms h Haec sententia est probabilis contrariam ta men credo veriorem Ibid. This opinion is probable but the contrary notwithstanding is the more true according to my opinion i Ratio est quia etsi non habeat animum habet tamen jus accusandi eoque jure uti potest quod jus est pretio aestimabile sive habeat animum eo utehdi sive non Itaque si quid des ut eo jure non utatur proterit ld retinere Ibid. The reason is because this corzenage and dissimulation whereof this man makes use to draw money from the criminal in threating to accuse him takes not from him the right which he hath actually to accuse him The reason is saith he because though he had no design to accuse him he had notwithstanding power and right thereto and he might make use of this right which may be valued by money whether he had a design to use it or not And for this cause if you give him any thing not to use his right he may detain that which you have given him He quotes Sanchez for this opinion which Escobar approves also in the Preface of his Moral Divinity and grounds it upon the reason of Lessius which is the same with that of Layman because k Jus accusandi est pretio aestimabile sive eo uti intendat sive non Unde accedens dolus non est injustus Escobat in precomio Exam. 2. c. 6. n. 36. p. 12. the right of accusing of which he deprives himself is valuable
nomiur usurae acceptae ita miseeantur rebus usurarii fimilibus ut non possint ab eis distingui tunc dominium censetur transtatum Lessius de just jur l. 2. cap. 20. d. 18. num 136. pag. 354. if the things he has got by usury be so mingled with others their like which belong to the Vserer that one cannot distinguish them it must be presumed that the Vsurer is become a lawful possessor of them Escobar extends this answer so far as to reach a Merchant who hath received more than was due unto him saying that after he hath mingled other mens money which he hath received with his own if he to whom the money pertained demands it back again this Merchant is not obliged to restore it him according to Vasquez z Venditor accepit bona fide pecuniam cum sua commiscet teneturne comparente Domino restituere Escobar Ibid. n. 107. p. 362. A Seller saith he receives in simplicity more money than he ought and he hath mingled it with his own is he obliged to restore it when he who hath given it him comes to him to demand restitution thereof He does not ask if this Merchant be obliged to see and to certifie himself that he hath received more money than he ought he supposes without any difficulty that he ought not he enquires onely if this being true and known he be obliged to restore this money which is not his and which he hath already mingled with his own and he serves himself of the authority of Vasquez to add weight to his resolution a Negat Vasquez de restitutione c. 9. sect 2. dub ult quia non tenetur ratione iujustae acceptionis qui bona fide accepit nec rationâ—râ—i acceptae cum pecuniam acceperit in prest im bona fide assumpserit Ibid. Vasquez saith he denies it he is not obliged thereto neither by any unjust manner by which he hath received this money he having received it in honest simplicity nor by the substance of the thing which he received because he received it in payment and so took it on a good accompt and honest But if these two reasons founded upon simple good meaning which serves for a cloak to the greatest crimes that are according to the Divinity of the Jesuites as we shall shortly behold more clearly content you not and you answer this Casuist that this Merchant is destitute of honest simplicity because that he who gave him the the money came again and made him know that he had given him more then he ought to have done he will tell you for your last answer that he is come too late that the Merchant hath already mingled his money with his own and by this medley he is become thereof the legal possessour ET CUM SUA COMMISCENDO SUAM FECIT I know not what secret vertue he ascribes to the money of a covetous and unjust man to convert into his proper goods that which is anothers This is not according to that which they say commonly and most truly that those of another mingled with our own proper goods consume them and destroy them He had spoken more truly had he said that it was not the mixture but injustice and covetousness that had purchased and appropriated the others money unto this Merchant Covetousness and injustice shew themselves most manifestly 1. In doting upon ones own wealth 2. In the usurpation of that which is anothers by unlawful ways 3. When what is so obtained is retained without a will to restore it The Jesuits teaching their Disciples to love their own goods better then their Neighbours lives say that it is lawfull to kill him when he attempts to take them from us as we have already made appear and shall discover more largely when we come to speak of that commandment of God which forbids murder They teach to usurpe and unjustly to invade anothers goods in maintaining usury and in justifying or excusing the most part of the treacheries and fraud which are used in Merchandise or Traffique They teach to retain and not to restore them as I have made appear already and by thus much it is easie to judge with what exactness and fidelity they maintain the causes which they undertake being they have omitted nothing which might favour covetousness and gratifie the greedy desire which men have for the goods of this world ARTICLE VI. Unfaithfulness COvetousness carries to injustice and both the one and the other engage men in infidelity For as according to Scripture the just man lives by Faith that is to say that the exercise of Faith and fidelity is as it were the bread which nourishes us as the air which we breathe and which is the continual employment and entertainment of this life one may say on the contrary that the unjust man lives by infidelity and that if his life be well examined and we could pierce into the bottom of his heart there would nothing be found in his thoughts in his design and in all the conduct of his life but disguisements deceits and infidelity It is not onely true in the Church that just and honest men live by Faith but one may also say the same thing of all men who live together in any sort of humane Society Faith is not onely the foundation of religion and of Christian life but also that of Estates of Corporations and of civil life It is not properly to live to live amongst dissemblieg and treacherous persons no more than to live among enemies being obliged to keep our selves always upon our guard and to be in a continual distrust and disquiet for fear of being surprized upon every occasion and of losing our goods honor and life In the mean while we shall see our selves reduced to this point if we suffer our selves to be conducted by the advice of the Jesuits and if we regulate our lives by the maxime of their Divinity which doth openly allow and teach dissimulation deceit and infidelity as I shall make clearly appear by this Article Infidelity may be committed first of all in things by the sale and by the exchange of things 2. In contracts and promises 3. In discourses treaties and generally in words I will make three Points of this Article according to these three sorts of infidelity I. POINT Of diverse sorts of unfaithfulness and of deceit which may be committed in things by altering them selling them by false weights and measures and taking those which are anothers without his privity VNfaithfulness and deceit of which we speak here is a true theft disguised and covered with some false pretence of apparent reason There are many persons who are disposed to deceive but they to whom there remains some little conscience are troubled in doing it the light of nature alone which is not intirely exstinguish'd in them makes them to see clear enough in the bottom of their hearts that this is not lawfull they must needs first
the authority of Valentia his fellow Jesuit supposing with him that the whole world hath read and studied their equivocations and maximes of lyes and perjuries and that there is none who ought not to know the ways to defend himself against them as well as to use them In the fourth place that none may be ever caught unprovided of equivocations he teaches this which may be almost always made use of a Decimo deducitur si per injuriam extorqucatur promis sio jurata alieujus pecuniae dandae lioâ—râ— jaranti uti hac aequivocatione Jâ—o tibi me numeraturum pecuniam intelligende ut ille casus tibi regatur à verbo juro ita ut sit sensus tibi juro fore ut numerem pecuniam five tibi sive alteri quod ea oratio patiatur utrumque sensum Ibid. n. 37. p. 29. It follows saith he that if a promise by oath to pay a certain summe of money be drawn from a man unjustly and by force he that swears in this manner may use an equivocation in these terms I swear to you that I will give this money intending that he would give it to him to whom he swears or some other because these words may receive either of these two senses If this form of equivocation seem not subtle enough behold another If in the tongue in which one expresses ones oath the name of God signifie divers things it will be lawful to swear by the name of God taking it in some other signification according to this rule one may without fear swear by the name of Jesus Christ because there are others named Jesus besides the Son of God and that this word Christ is attributed to divers persons in Scripture and that not onely to Christians but also to Jews He adds also in the same place a third way to swear by equivocations which is very easie and very favourable to stammerers that cannot pronounce certain letters b Similiter non esset plus quam veniale mendacium dicere uro ablato i. cum vere nrn urat Ibid Likewise saith he it is but a venial sin at most to say uro which signifies I burn instead of saying jnro I swear to make the proposition false and uselesse though one burn not at all And fearing in some sort that it should be too great a severity to condemn of venial sin him that made use of so pleasant a subtilty he adds c Imo eredo nullum fore mendacium si illud verbum uro accipiatur materialiter ad nâ—hil significandum sicht numeâ—o 10. diximus de ali is jurdamenti verbis materialiter acceptis I believe that it will be no lyes if the word uro be taken materially pronouncing it with a design to signisie nothing in the manner I have opened in the 10. number speaking of other forms which are used in swearing Now in the place whereunto he referres the reader he saith that when one is required to make oath unto a person in a case in which he believes that he is not obliged to swear he may meverthelesse do it without fear of perjury though that he saith be false and that to cover himself from perjury he make use of one or the other of these two expedients I. To take the words which he uses in swearing and which are false in their true and natural sense in a quite different sense such as he pleases provided it be true II. To give no sense at all to his words and to take them materially that is to say as sounds that signifie nothing He pretends that he that swears in one of these two ways doth no great evil though that he says be false in the ordinary senfe But if a man have an intention to assert that which is false and to confirm it with an oath he avows that he sins mortally d Si jurat salsum velitque illa juramenti verba referre ad materiam folsam confirmâ—ndo illam in ex externo juramento est mortale Si autem interiori animo nolit illa ad materiam falsam referre nec potest ob aliquas rei circumstantias rationabiliter ab ali is putari id velle ut inde scandalizentur sed tantum jure suo utens usurpat ea verba ad significandum aliud interius conceptum quod verum sit non peccat mortaliter But if in his own mind he refer not his words to that which is false though that be the proper and natural sense of his words and others cannot for some particular circumstances reasonably believe that this is his intention so that thereby they are scandalized and that onely his right which is to use equivocations to deceive he makes use of these words to signifie some other thing which is true and which he doth conceive in his mind he sins not at all mortally See here the first secret to which he adds another like it proceeding in these terms e Vel usurpat ea verba materialiter nihil per ista confirmare volens non peccat mortaliter imo credo nec hunc venialiter peccare quia nullum est mendacium Sanchez op mor. l. 3. c. 6 n. 10. p. 24. But if he take these words onely materially without design to use them to signifie any thing at all he sins not mortally He fears to be yet too exact and rigorous in this point For which cause he corrects and sweetens his answer saying I believe that he sins not at all no not venially because there is nolye in that which he saith Strange reasoning This man confirms by an oath words that are false and yet he is not perjured he expresses one thing and thinks another And yet notwithstanding according to these Doctors he lies not at all because that he would not lye though he lies effectually speaking contrary to his own conscience These shifts are so grosse that the most simple and most ignorant may easily perceive them They are so base and so ridiculous that they are capable to surprise and make the most serious break out into laughter if Christian charity as well as modesty do not with hold and rather draw compassion from their hearts and tears from their eyes to lament the blindnesse of those who invented them and the lost condition of those who follow them But if we would believe these Masters of equivocations there is no need at all of so many shifts and fallacies for they declare plainly that those who have not wir enough to understand these disquizes and mental restrictions or not to make use of them upon occasion may swear plainly without obliging themselves in any sort whatsoever provided they have no intent to swear nor to promise that which they swear f Fictae promissioni juramentum adjeci teneorne adimplere Asserit Lessius at alii negant Escobat tr 1. ex 1. n. 37. p. 76. I have made a fained promise saith Escobar and I have added an oath thereto
its matter and subject THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK Of the eternal principles of Sin That the Jesuits nourish them that they may gratifie the passions of men and by consequence excite them to Sin HItherto we have shewn that the Jesuits nourish sin by nourishing men in passions in evil habits and in vices in Ignorance and in a false pretence of good intentions wherewith they commonly shelter themselves which are as it were the Fountains and the internal principles of Sin I must now make it appear that they favour no less the outward principles of the same sin which are 1. Humaine reason and authority which furnish arms and expedients to defend them 2. With customs which produce examples to support them 3. The next occasions which draw men to them cause them to fall into them and retain them in them We will treat of every one of these outward principles of sin apart as we have done of the inward CHAP. I. Of the maximes of reason and humane authority FAith is not less elevated above reason then reason is above sense and it is no less disorder to regulate the lives of Christians who ought to live by Faith by the maximes of humane reason and much less of reason corrupted as it now is by sin then to desire to judge spiritual things by sense This were to transform men into Beasts and to subject them to follow their senses in the regulation of their life and to treat Christians like Heathens to give them no other rule for their conversations and actions then the maximes of Philosophie and humane reason Yet this is it which the Jesuits have done and all those who read their Divinity and principally that which treats of manners will find therein no other principles in a manner but those of the lowest Philosophie and humane reason and that corrupted They hardly know what it is to cite Scripture or Councils and if they rehearse any passages of the Holy Fathers it is for the most part for form onely or to resute them rather then to use them for foundations or solid proofs of their opinions in relying on the authority of these great men who have advanced nothing of themselves in points of consequence which belong to Faith or manners which they had not taken from those who went before them in the Church and which came not originally from the Apostles and from Jesus Christ by the Tradition of the Church But the Jesuits far enough from this conduct make profession to invent and to speak things of themselves to follow novelty to make every thing probable to leave to the ingenious to choose in all opinions Whence it comes that making use sometimes of one sometimes of another they accommodate themselves easily to the humours of all the world and have wherewith to content all how contrary soever they can be But this also makes them fall many times into contradictions which are inevitable for them who have no other rule but their own proper sence These are the things which I shall handle in this Chapter to shew what a wound they have given unto Divinity and by consequence thereof to good manners in substituting reason into the place of faith and particular and novel opinions to that of antiquity and the tradition of the Fathers I shall make apparent 1. That their Divinity is novel and that they make profession to follow novelty 2. That every thing in it is probable and that they will have the liberty to follow all sorts of opinions 3 That their School is venal and wholly complaisant to the world and that they will have wherewith to content all sorts of persons in answering every one according to his desire 4. That it is full of contradictions I will treat every one of these points severally dividing this Chapter into so many Articles ARTICLE I. The Jesuits make profession to follow novel maximes and to contemn tradition and antiquity NOvelty hath always been odious in the Church if at any time it were objected unto the Saints they did always defend themselves from it as from a calumny and have had an extream care to advance nothing in the Church which they had not learned in the Church it self so far that they have believed that it was no lesse crime to introduce or receive new Doctrines then to make or adore Idols This is the judgement of Saint Augustin upon these words of the 80. Psalm Non erit tibi Deus recens where he saith that a Deus recens aut lapis aut phantasma est S. August in Ps 80. this new God is an Image of stone or a false imagination And a little after he unfoldeth his thoughts more at large in these words b Non dixit à te quasi simulachrum forinsecus adhibitum sed in te in corde tuo in imagine phantasmatis tui in deceptione â—rroris tui tecum portabis Deum tuum recentem manens vetustus Ibid. it is not said thou shalt have no new God without thee as if he would onely mark the outward and visible forms but he saith you shall not have a new God within your selves That is to say you shall not bear within your hearts in your imaginations in the illusion of your errour a new God contining your selves old and corrupt All novel opinions contrary to the Tradition and ancient belief of our Fathers are to speak properly nothing but phantasmes imaginations and errours these are as it were so many Idols which some would introduce into the Church which they would put into the place of Divine truth which at once is the rule of our life the object of our Faith and of our adoration And as those who make Idols those who sell and those who buy them to adore them are all equally Idolaters so in the same manner those who invent novel opinions those who teach them and those who follow them are all complices of the same fault and though these last may be lesse guilty and are more to be lamented then the others because they do sin with more ignorance and wilder themselves by following blind guides yet they all find themselves involved in the same misery and subject to the same condemnation pronounced by the Fathers and by the Scripture who condemn this sin and forbid it as a sort of Idolatry According to these principles of the Scripture and the language of the Prophet and of God himself we may say there are so many Idolaters as there are writers at this day amongst the Jesuits there being none of them in a manner who are not jealous of their own proper thoughts and who have not introduced into Divinity some novel opinion or who do not make profession to maintain and teach some which have been introduced by their Fraternity to the prejudice of the ancients who have been always received and followed in the Church until these last times Poza hath composed a great volumn which he hath intitled Elucidarium
our Fathers that he might set them in their place If it be true then that we ought to take the ancients for the rule of faith onely and not of works the faith which we receive from them will be dead and barren and if the moderns give us onely the rules of manners without those of Faith our life how good soever it appear would be no other then Heathen And if it be pretended that with the rules of manners they give us also them of faith whether they take them from the ancients or make them themselves as they do those of manners to give them us we are more obliged to them then the ancients or rather we hold all of them without having any need of the ancients we receive good life vertue holiness from those who are no Saints and we hold nothing from the Saints from whom we receive onely a dead faith a Faith of Devils as Saint Augustin speaks according to Scripture And to speak truth the children of the Church receive not their life of the Fathers of the Church and are not their children but of the Fathers of this World and Divines of the last times Celot is not contented to follow Reginaldus in this point but he speaks of himself for novelty against antiquity with a sleightness and contempt unsufferable a Quid agas Sic se habent humana omnia vixerunt moribus suis antiqui nos nostris Utri melius Câ—lot in praef l. 5. p. 240. What shall we do saith he all humane affairs are thus the ancients lived after their rules and we after ours And who shall tell us which are the better He acknowledges that which is too true we now live in a manner quite different from that of the ancients and of the Holy Fathers and this is that which should oblige us to address our selves rather unto them then unto the moderns to learn to regulate our manners and to live Christian-like For as in all sorts of professions we seek the best Masters to instruct us so it is clear that those who have lived holily and who are acknowledged for Saints in the Church are more proper to teach holiness and Christian life then they that are no Saints as all the new Divines are not to say no more of them There is none but Celot who seems not willing to confess that the ancients are better then the moderns in saying that we know not whether their conduct and rules be better then that of the moderns But he should at least have considered that we may well sometimes give the moderns the name of Fathers but not of Saints and that by the Holy Fathers we understand always the ancients so that as well the publick voice of the Church as that of the Society it self suffices to convince the blindness of his Pride But he is not content to equal himself and his to the Holy Fathers and ancient Religious who lived in the primitive times of the Church in a holiness and purity altogether extraordinary he hath also the confidence to preferre himself in these strange terms b Inique de nostro saeculo judicarunt qui nostratum Religiosorum mores ex antiquorum factis expendunt ut quod illi faciendum sibi committendumve censuerunt hoc nos confestim pro vo luntate amplexemur aut fugiamus Plane ut si qu is maturi ae â—i hominem ad pueritâ—…m redire compellat quoniam in illo aetatulae slore vinulum clegantulum nounihil habebat quod matri arrideret Celot Ibid. They do wrong saith he to our age who would judge of the life of the Religious of our times by that of the ancients in such sort that what the ancients have believed themselves to be obliged to do or to avoid we ought also to command or forbid Without other reason then because the ancients have ordained it this is as it were to desire them to return to their infancy who are at maturity of age because that in their first years they had somewhat of pleasant and pretty which flattered the eyes of their Mother He could not have discovered himself more nor testifyed more contempt of these great Saints and first Religious then to compare the moderns to men grown ripe and perfect and the ancients to infants who have nothing at all of solid but onely a prettiness proper to content the easiness and foolish affection of women Whence it follows we are no more to consider the ancient Fathers then as children in regard of the moderns who must be the venerable Fathers of the Fathers themselves and by consequence they can be no longer their disciples since it belongs to perfect men to instruct children and not children to instruct men It seems that it is in this same sence that Celot speaking of Saint Paul the first Eremite of Saint Anthony and many other Saints who imitated them in flying the corruption of the world and retiring into the Desart to serve God there he saith that the Church hath rather tolerated then approved those great personages and their manner of life altogether Holy and Evangelical c Alios tulit potius quam expresse probavit Ecclesia homines seculi fastidio amore Dei incitatos statim cursu in solitudinem se abdentes ut sanctum Paulum ut in primis annis sanctum Antonium alios ab Augustino memoratos Celor l. 5. c. 4. p. 257. The Church saith he rather tolerated then approved formally those who being pressed on by the love of God and contempt of the World retired as it were in haste and went to hide themselves in the wildernesse as Saint Paul and Saint Anthony in the first ages and others of whom Saint Augustin speaks We tolerate onely that which is evil or disorderly which comes always from evil or weaknesse This Jesuit therefore must accuse these great Saints of the one or the other and that their actions which were all holy passe in bis mind for disorders or defects if it be true that the Church did tolerate them onely as he saith and not approve them But she could not give them a greater approbation then by Canonizing them and declaring them Saints for that Angelical and admirable life which they led in the Wilderness as also the Church testifies at this day publickly in its office and its mysteries and all the great personages of the Church the Holy Bishops the Popes and the Doctors have published their praises out-vying as it were one another through all ages of Christianity and Celot perhaps is the first amongst Catholicks that hath had the boldness to debase and dispraise them But this contempt and insolence will appear yet more unworthy and unsufferable when he compares them to those who lived in the first ages of the world of whom the Poets speak as of savages and beasts living without Laws without politie and without conduct in such manner that those who came after being formed and regulated by the
in a Collection which he hath made of the principal decisions which are drawn from the principles of the Doctrine of Probability where after he had reported a great quantity according to the order of the Alphabet he declares that there are an infinite of others which he hath not nor can report because that would be very difficult and tedious and the maxims and use of the Rules of Probability extending themselves in a manner unto all sorts of matters there would need an entire Volume wherein to collect and report them simply Operosum id ita est prolixum quippe per omnes fere materias est percurrendum ut integrum merito volnmen exposcat yet I cannot abstain from reporting here also three taken out of this Author which shew an extraordinary and palpable corruption and a very peculiar deprivation of reason in those who are capable to approve or follow them 1. n Probabile est v. c. hoc vectigal injuste esse impositum probabile item esse impositum juste possumne ego bodie quia sum exocto Regius vectigalium exigere ejusmodi vectigal sequendo opinionem asserentem illud juste esse impositum atque adeo licere mihi sine injustiâ—ia illud exigere cras imo etiam hâ—die quia sum Mercator illud occulte defraudare sequendo opinionem asserentem illud à justitia deficere It is probable saith he for example that an Excise is justly established it is probable on the other side that it is unjust may I being at present established by the King to raise this Impost exact it according to the opinion which maintains that it is just and therefore lawfull for me to levy without doing any injustice and to morrow or the same day being I am a Merchant may I secretly defraud this very Impost following the opinion which condemns it of injustice 2. o Secundo probabile rursus est ablationem famae pecunia compensari probabile non compensari Possumne ego bodie infamatus velle ab infamante compensationem in pecunia cras imo bodie ego ipse alium insamans nolle famam proximi à me ablatam compensare pecunia It is probable that the loss of reputation may and may not be compensated with money May I to day being defamed desire satisfaction in money and to morrow or this very day having defamed another not be willing to allow him the same compensation 3. In the third place p Tertio probabile item reo licere aequivocare in judicio probabile non licere Possumne ego reus bodie aequivocare cras vero creatus Judex urgere reum ut non aequivocet Haec innumerabilia ejusdem generis hic in controversiam narrantur In casibus relatis num 1. 2. 3. atque in similibus licitam esse ejusmodi mutationem concedimus Tamb. l. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect 5. num 1. 2. 3. 21. It is probable that a Defendant may use equivocations in Justice May I being this day Defendant use equivocations and to morrow being chosen Judge constrain the Defendants not to make use of them In the process he answers In this case and other such like I grant that it is lawfull to change opinion He believes therefore that these persons may do that justly unto others which they would not have done unto themselves and which they would free themselves from as much as possible and he sees not that this is to overturn the prime Law of Nature and the Gospel which ordains That we should do unto others that which we would they should do unto us and not to do unto others that which we would not they should do unto us and that this is at once to violate all the Commandments of God which are founded on this principle of Nature and all the Law and Prophets which according to Jesus Christ's saying depend upon this rule and all the Holy Scripture which are nothing else but an extension and explication of this same principle SECT IV. That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability ruines entirely the Authority of the Church of Pastors and Superiors of all sorts TO make this truth appear we must observe that there are four sorts of Principles for ruining the Authority of Superiors 1. By corrupting or destroying the principle of it 2. By bounding it and encroaching upon it 3. By rejecting or weakning its commands 4. By hindring Subjects from obeying The Jesuits by the Doctrine of Probability corrupt the Authority of the Church in the original of it in attributing to it no other than a mere humane power They retrench and destroy it in not consenting that it may prescribe the inward actions of vertue they bound it and encroach upon it by the irregularity of their Priviledges which they abuse to the contempt of the commands and Ordinances of Bishops and invading their Jurisdiction they utterly abolish some of their Laws and they weaken others of them and there are hardly any unto which they have not given some assault by the multitude of inventions they have found out to defeat and elude them These points are entirely verified in the whole process of this Book and some of them in entire Chapters But that which is remarkable and very proper to justifie what I pretend here is this that the means and the armes which they and those who follow their opinion make use of to fight against the Authority of the Church in all these manners are the maxims of their Doctrine of Probability The Authority of the Church is of it self assured and uncontroulable being supported by the firm rock of Gods Word For this cause there cannot be found a means more ready or more infallible to ruine or weaken it than to undermine its foundation and to make it depend on humane reason and authority submitting its Jurisdiction and its power to the disputes and contests of the Schools and rendring in that manner every thing probable that respects its power that they may afterwards become the Arbitrators and Masters thereof It is not needfull here to repeat all that is found in the body of this Book to prove this truth it is sufficient only to report some passages of their Authors and their Disciples in which they avow themselves that the Doctrine of Probability doth absolutely ruine the Authority of the Church and of all sorts of Superiors and they make it so clear in the examples that they produce that after they are read it seems not that any person can doubt thereof Hereof see one manifest proof in the case which Caramouel propounds in these terms q Petrus secutus opinionem benignam probabilem non satissacit mandato sui Abbatis in casu in quo probabiliter non tenetur obedire probabilius tenebatur Praelatus supscribens sententiae severiori judicat illum debuisse obedire proinde peccasse Petitur an possit contra illum procedere punire tanquam inobedientem Caram in com in reg S. Bened. l. 1. n.
but that the help which sinners have one of another in the execution of their wicked designs is one of the outward principles of sin There are few crimes which are committed without the assistance of others and which can proceed without a Servant a Friend a Merchant or some person who favours and furnisheth with money for their execution Though the Holy Scriptures and all the most common rules of Morality do condemn all these voluntary instruments of sin the Divinity of the Jesuits nevertheless forbears not to excuse them I will only rehearse some of the principal decisions of Tambourin because he is the last Author that I know of who hath written on this and who hath taken care to collect almost all that is corrupt in their Morality 1. For Servants he excuseth those of Usurers Dishonest and Duellists who serve them in the execution of their sins a Si jussu heri ulurarti pecuniam numeret deferat recipiat reserat in libros si ejusdem jussu quem scit ire ad adulterandum sternat â—quum ipsum mere comitetur mereque expectet ante sores sternat lictum cibos condiat ministretque contubinae candemque mere ossociet ducendo ad locum ubi dominus peccaturus est januamque aperiat eidem ingressarae si honoret suam beram meretâ—icem si deserat scripta internâ—ntia solius urbanitatis plena si deferat munuscula esculenta praestetque alia officia quae alius famulus aeque praestaret num 18. Non ex sola famulatus ratione sed metu detrimenti V. G. torvis aspiciatur oculis demo expellatur excusatur si referat adulterae vel inimico tali hora ad domum beri vel ad dictum locum accedat si jussu heri insequatur puellam visurus vel requisiturus ubi ea habitet si jussu ejusdem non aperiat modo januam sed doceat ubi herus sit si dominum adjuvet ad ascendendum per fenestram quo ingrediatur in locum ubi peccaturus sit num 19. If a Servant saith he by the command of his Master who is an Vsurer tells the money carries it receives it Books it if by command of his Master whom he knows to be going to commit adultery he saddles his horse attends at the gate makes the bed makes ready meat serves at the table of his Whore accompanies her and conducts her to the place where his Master is to commit this sin if he opens her the door if he reverence this prostitute if he carry Lettors and Messages which contain Civilities only if he barry Presents to her with a Collation and perform all other services which a Servant commonly doth for his Master he is not only to be excused because of his servile condition but also because of the fear of loss if for example he fear that his Master will be angry or turn him out of his house He is to be excused if he go to tell the woman with whom his Master goes to commit adultery that he will be found at home at sush an hour or to his Masters enemy that at such an hour he shall find him at such a place If by the command of his Master he follows a Damsel to see or enquire where she lives if by his command he not only open the door but shew her where his Master is if he aid his Master to get up by the window to enter into the place where he is to commit that sin Wherefore takes he such pains to particularize such infamous actions if it be not for fear least a Servant should make any scruple upon any one of these circumstances and that the Master not being well served should fall short of executing his design or for fear this poor Servant should put himself by his scruple in danger of being frown'd upon by his Master for having hindred him from committing this crime But if you be not satisfied with the excuse of this Servant this Father will furnish him with another founded on the direction of his intention which may serve him as he saith himself b Ratiod scendendi multos à peccato saltem mortisero modo ut in casu proponitur non placeat eis peccatum faciant obsequia praedicta oò aliquem bonum suem puta co quod exhibeant illa officii sui causa Tambur l. 5. Decal cap. 1. sect 4. n. 30. to discharge many persons of sin at least of mortal sin which is that in the cases propounded the servant pleaseth not himself in the sin of his Master and that he do him the services whereof we have spoken for some good end as for the just reward which he expects It is not very necessary to advertise fervants to have this good intention and if it be capable to excuse them it is true that they need fear nothing on this part if this answer will serve them that their Masters sins please them not but so far as they receive some profit and benefit thereby But what this Father makes use of to excuse a servant he also allowes as lawful to a friend c Si amicus meuo vetit ut ego seram munuscula simlia tarpis sciâ—icet amoris incit mâ—nta quae ipse mittit ad suam concubinam possum sine peccato deferre ..... si tibi magni sit ejusmodi amicitia ac vere timeas amittere quiatuno notabilis momenti justus metus accedit Ibid. n. 18 19 20. If my friend saith he will have me carry presents to be given on the account of dishonest Love unto his Concubine to whom he sends them I may carry them without sin if I have an esteem for the love of this man and that I would not lose it because in this case I have a just cause of fearing a confiderable losse The friendship of an Adulterer is very considerable in the judgement of this Divine and this Jesuit and preferrable to that of God himself being he wills that against the command of God a friend may contribute to his crime for fear onely of putting himself in danger of losing his favours he may by the same motive carry on the behalf of this friend presents to a Murderer or to an Impostor to stir them up by false witnesses to dishonour or kill whom he pleaseth and it will not be easie according to this detestable Doctrine to condemn him that gives his friend a Sword to kill himself if he intreat him if it be not that perhaps the life of the Body is more precious and more considerable than that of the Soul and that it is more lawful to co-operate to this then to that or to contribute to an adulterie then to an homicide As for the Merchants they may according to this Author co-operate as much as their vocation or rather their Lust and Interest will permit them to the sins of Idolatry Whoredom unlawful gains and of all sorts of debaucherie d Popest quis vendere agnun
assumpta admittere sicut non solum potest assumere naturam omni sensu externo privatam sed etiam talem sensuum privationem in assumpta jam natura admittere Ibid. n. 130. That there is nothing this way that can hinder the Word from taking the nature of a fool or after he hath taken our nature to suffer it to fall into folly as he cannot only take a nature deprived of all outward senses but also suffer it to fall into this privation after he hath assumed it He is not content only to say that the eternal Word might suffer under folly but he saith also that he might have assumed it voluntarily as he assumed humane nature That is that this proposition the impiety and blasphemy whereof is horrible only to be thought might have been true God is a fool and that with a voluntary folly which is accounted the worst of all He ought to have considered that folly is a disorder of the body and the Soul and of the highest part of the Soul which is Reason and that all disorder is inconsistent with the Wisdom of God as well as sin is inconsistent with it because it is a voluntary disorder and a true folly according to Scripture and if the reason of Jesus Christ had been disorderly it is manifest that his Will might have been so too and that as his Will could not be so by sin which is the folly of the Will neither could his reason be so by folly which is as we may say the sin of the Understanding as some Philosophers esteem Errour is yet a greater evil than folly because folly takes away reason but errour is the cause it is ill used Now it were better to be wholly deprived of any thing then to abuse it as it were better not to have wit then to abuse it in deceiving not to have strength then to abuse it in committing violences and murthers and yet Amicus forbears not to maintain with others that Jesus Christ was capable of erring and that he might erre in deed For the explication of this opinion he distinguisheth two sorts of errours whereof one respects the things we are obliged to know and which he calls Error pravae dispositionis because it includes a wicked disposition from whence it proceeds as from its cause the other respects such things as we are not obliged to know which consists in a simple privation of knowledge error simplicis negationis He saith 2 De secunda non est dubium quin potuerit esse in Christo Nam sicut potuit Verbum assumere naturam irrationalem incapacem omnis scientiae ita rationalem omni scientia spoliatam tam actuali quam habituali Amicus tom 6. disp 24. sect 4 n. 114. p. 359. of this second sort of error that there is no doubt but it might be in Jesus Christ For as the Word might have taken the nature of a beast incapable of all sort of rational wisdom and knowledge so it might in like manner have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all wisdom and knowledge as well actual as habitual He is not content only to maintain a proposition so strange and impious but he would also have it pass as undubitable as if it were not lawful only to doubt of it non est dubium But behold his blindness we need only consider what he saith of the other species of errour which consists in being ignorant of that which is our duty or to have an apprehension of it contrary unto truth He dares not absolutely affirm that this sort of errour might have been in Jesus Christ he contents himself to relate the opinion of Vasquez and some others 3 Tantum de prima est controversia Prima sententia affirmans potuisse de potentia absoluta talem errorem esse in Christo est Vasquez disput 60. c. Ibid. Who hold saith he that this sort of errour might have been absolutely in Jesus Christ and this opinion is that of Vasquez Certainly he doth great wrong to doubt of this sort of errour after he had said that we may not doubt of the other For if it be certain as he pretends that the eternal Word might have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all kind of knowledge and wisdom actual and habitual it follows manifestly that he might have taken it destitute of all that knowledge of things which every reasonable nature is obliged to know as of the knowledge of God and of the first principles of Reason since this sort of errour is necessarily contained in the other Which follows also clearly from the other opinion of the same Jesuit that Jesus Christ might have taken on him the nature of a fool For folly is not only an ignorance of principal duties but of all truths also according to the very definition of the Philosophers who say that it is a general blindness of mind in all things mentis ad omnia caecitas So that if Jesus Christ might have been a fool in humane nature he might have been generally ignorant of all the duties of humane and reasonable Nature and of all the principles of Reason And Amicus shews himself as weak a Logician as Christian in doubting of this last Article after he had said that we might not doubt of that general Maxime whereunto it is inseparably and visibly annexed One of the Reasons of the Jesuits who teach that Jesus Christ was capable of that errour which hath respect unto his duty which they call an Errour of a depraved disposition error pravae dispositionis and which is not only a simple ignorance and simple privation of light but an opposition to the truth and an apprehension contrary to its Rules and Laws is That Jesus Christ might according to them have taken the nature of an Ass as they express it in these very words 1 Foruit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae ergo errorem naturae humanae Amicus ib. n. 116. The Word might have taken upon him the sottish and blackish disposition of the nature of an Ass and by consequent he might have taken the errour of humane nature Which can serve for no other thing then to make this opinion more incredible whether we regard the impiety of these strange words Potuit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae or we regard the consequence which is ridiculous Ergo errorem naturae humanae For the blockish disposition of an Ass is not an ignorance of his duty because it hinders not an Ass to know and perceive all that which he ought to know and perceive according to his nature and much less is it an apprehension opposed unto truth which the nature of an Ass is uncapable to know And so though it were true that Jesus Christ might have been united to the nature of an Ass it would not have followed that he might have been united to a reasonable nature ingaged in errour and in errour contrary
to his duty The second Reason of Vasquez related by Amicus is 2 Non magâ—s repugnat Verbo per naturam assumpram errare falsum materialiter dicere quam in eadem assumpta natura cruciari mori Igitur si poruit in natura assâ—mpta cruciari mori posset per eandem errare falsum materialiter dicere Ibid. n. 116. That it is no more repugnant to the divine Word to erre or to speak a thing false in it self by the nature which he hath assumed then to be tormented and dye in the same nature I will not stay to examine this Reasoning nor to tell what the difference is betwixt dying and erring or speaking falshood to make appear that the one is unworthy and impossible in regard of Jesus Christ and not the other I shall do no other thing but briefly represent according to my design what these Jesuits say Vasquez saith that as Jesus Christ might suffer and dye so he might likewise erre and speak false even in the things he was obliged to know and which appertained as Amicus expounds himself to his condition and duty This is to say plainly enough that Jesus Christ might sin not only in his humane nature but in his God-head it self For though a man may sometimes erre and speak false through ignorance this ignorance excuses him not in things which he is obliged to know since it is of these that the Gospel saith that the servant who knows not his Masters will shall not go without punishment though he shall not be so rigorously punished as he who hath known and neglected to do it Now these Jesuits say that Jesus Christ might have erred and spoke falsely in the things which appertained to his duty and which he was obliged to know and by consequence according to them he might have sinned and deserved chastisement according to the Scripture But though it were so that Jesus Christ as man and in his humanity might erre and speak false without sin in some thing which he was not obliged to know this could not be said of his God-head which knows all things and which ought to know all things and so could not be exempt from sin if it erred or spoke false by the humanity of Jesus Christ since all the words thoughts and actions of this humanity are truly and properly the actions of the Divinity and of the Word who produces them by it as by its instrument according to the Fathers So that if the humanity of Jesus Christ could erre it would be the Word that should erre and should be the Author of this errour and falshood and should truly sin speaking against his light and lying voluntarily which the Jesuits would not be much troubled to consent to according to their Principles though it be a thing horrible to imagine only For in effect they maintain that Jesus Christ is capable of sin as well as errour as also that he might have been subject unto vice Amicus saith well that the Word could not have assumed an humane nature that was in an estate of actual or habitual sin but he adds 3 Major est difficultas de habitibus vitiosis à tali natura antea contractis an illi perseverare potuissent in natura assumpta Ibid. sect 2. n. 42. That there is more difficulty in what concerns the vicious habitudes which this nature might have contracted before it was united to the Word to wit to know whether they might yet continue in it after its union with the Word And to clear up this difficulty he saith that 1 Affirmat Vasquez disp 61. cap. 6. qui quamvis nobiscum sentiat quoad peccatum habituale antea contractum quoad habitus vero vitiosos putat eos assumi potuisse cum natura humana Ibid. sect 2. n. 42. Vasquez affirms that also and that though he be of the same opinion with himself concerning the habitual sin which the humanity might have contracted before that it was united unto the Word yet he believes that the Word in assuming this humane nature might also have assumed the vitious habits which had been found therein But I see not that it would be less dishonour to Jesus Christ to hold him capable of vitious habits then of actual or habitual sins For vitious habits are the springs of sin and consequently contain in them a greater corruption then the sins themselves and the sins are comprised in them as in their spring and principle so that he who is capable of the one is necessarily and infallibly capable of the other Thus the Jesuits do formally attribute sin unto Jesus Christ also they declare him capable thereof when they demand whether the humanity of Jesus Christ being become a sinner Jesus Christ could have satisfied for that sin either in the same humanity or by laying that down and assuming some other The propounding only of these questions is so strange and injurious to Jesus Christ that it offends the faith and ears of the faithful Amicus fails not to answer them as seriously as if they were very important and of great edification 2 Dico 1. potuisset Verbum in alia humanitate assumpta condignè satisfacere pro peccato prioris humanitatis à Verbo dimissae Amicus tom 6. disp 6. sect 5. n. 137. In tali casu potuisset Christus condignè pro peccato suae humanitatis satisfacere I hold saith he that the Word taking another humane nature might in rigour of justice satisfie for the sin of the humanity he first took and after laid down And a little lower he saith that In this case Jesus Christ could have satisfied in rigour of justice for the sin of his humanity And as if these questions were much for the advantage and glory of Jesus Christ before he speaks his apprehension upon them he protests 3 In utroque sensu proposita hypothesis disputanda est ut vis efficacia Christi satisfactionis eluceat Ibid. n. 133. That he proceeds to handle the question in both the senses which he supposed but that he doth it that the vertue and efficacy of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ may appear with more splendour He believes then that to make the satisfaction of Jesus Christ more apparent he ought to make him a sinner and that to give more splendour to his vertue he ought to engage him in crimes of his own as if it had not been sufficiently great and illustrious by his infinite innocence and purity I will not speak at all of the blasphemous and impious suppositions which they make on this subject when they say 4 Occisio Christi ab ipso Christo sibi per impossibile illata fuisset ejusdem ordinis cum satisfactione Christi Ibid. n. 17. That if by way of an impossible supposition it were granted that Jesus Christ might have slain himself this murther and this crime would have been of the same order with the satisfaction of Jesus
according to Scripture There have been Hereticks that have maintained that Jesus Christ was not God and others that he was a man of the same nature as we but there was never any that acknowledging that he was God and Man both at once imagined that he was capable of sinning and falling under the power of the Devil as the Jesuits affirm and testifie by attributing to him a next and natural power of sinning of being in errour and even of that which proceeds from a wicked disposition and deordination error pravae dispositionis to retain and keep wicked habits of being subject unto vices of being obliged to temporal punishments and even of eternal for his own sins as we have now seen in their own proper words 1. If Jesus Christ might have sinned he could not have been the Saviour of men nor delivered them from sin because hereunto it was necessary that he should be himself uncapable of sin according to the Doctrine of the Church and of the holy Fathers 2. If sin might have been in Jesus Christ then sin is no more sin because sin being no otherwise sin then as it is against the will of God if Jesus Christ who is the Son of God and God as well as his Father could sin sin would be voluntary unto him not only according to his humanity which did or should commit it but also in regard of his Divinity and divine person who should permit it or take it unto him voluntarily in the Humanity which should be personally united unto him as well as the other qualities and actions of this humanity which are proper to him and appertain unto him in some sort more than unto the humanity it self 3. But if God could will sin or be partaker thereof by assuming it or permitting it voluntarily in a nature which should be united unto him God should be no more God because he should be no longer the supream Truth which is more inconsistent with sin which is nothing else but errour injustice and malice then light is with darkness 4. This is not the way to withdraw men from sin to attribute it unto Jesus Christ But to move them unto horror and detestation of so strange an opinion it is sufficient to consider that it tends to destroy both the Incarnation of Jesus Christ and even his Divinity it self For as in dying voluntarily in his humanity he did put sin to death and destroyed the Empire of the Devil who was the Author of his death because he suffered this death unjustly being innocent and having no sin at all this opinion on the contrary attributing sin unto him makes him dye at once both in his Humanity and Divinity and subjects him to the power of the Devil to favour and revive sin CHAPTER II. Of Repentance REpentance is a remorse and sorrow for offending God and herein is it the proper and natural Remedy of Sin since as it is committed by pleasure so it must be blotted out by sorrow This sorrow is a vertue which appertains to Religion and it is also one part of the Sacrament of Penance so necessary and so considerable that it hath given even its name thereunto We separate not here these two considerations and that we may treat more largely of Penance we will consider it as a Sacrament and because that in this quality besides grief for sin it contains also Confession Absolution and Satisfaction we will treat here of every one of these by way of preocupation of what should have been said in the Chapter of the Sacraments distributing them into so many Articles ARTICLE I. Of Sorrow for Sin That according to the Jesuits we may be justified by the Sacrament of Penance by a natural sorrow and even without any true sorrow for sin THe first step of a Soul that returns unto God is the knowledge and remorse it hath for offending God 1 Surgam ibo ad patrem meum dicam ei Pater peccavi in coelum coram te Luc. 5.18 I will arise and go unto my father and say unto him Father I have sinned against Heaven and before thy face saith this child after he had departed from the obedience and guidance of his father when he began to resolve himself to return unto him The Jesuits consent well unto this Catholick Truth they do truly affirm that we cannot absolutely obtain pardon of sins without acknowledging with sorrow that we have committed them but when they would expound what sorrow this ought to be they speak of it in such manner as destroys it in effect For they are not content to say that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient to blot out all the sins in the world but they do also maintain that this sorrow ought not of necessity to be supernatural and some proceed so far as to say that without any true sorrow for offending God we may be reconciled unto him by being only grieved that we have not the sorrow which we ought to have Filliutius demands 2 Quaeroâ—n requiratur certa intentio ad contritionem Tom. 1. tract 6. cap. 9. n. 231. If there be any particular degree of sorrow necessary unto contrition And he answereth 3 Dico 3. non requiri certum gradum intentionis Ibid. 234. That there is no certain particular degree which is necessary His reason is 4 Tum quia Scripturae Sancti Patres conversioni in Deum promittunt remissionem peccati absque limitatione intentionis ergo neque nos limitare debemus Filliut mor. qq to 1. tr 6. c. 9. n 234. Because that the Scriptures and holy Fathers allow remission of sins to him that is truly converted unto God without limiting the degree Whence it follows that we ought not to limit it God wills and demands oft in Scripture that for obtaining pardon of sins we should be converted unto him with all our hearts Whence the holy Fathers have taken occasion to say that we ought not to limit or bound the grief of a sinner who is converted since it ought to be with all the affection of his heart and that it cannot be too great nor equal the demerit and indignity of sin And this Jesuit on the contrary saith it must not be limited because it cannot be too little and that it is always great enough to blot out sin See the conformity of his spirit with that of the holy Fathers and Scripture It seems that he would correct his errour in the answer which he makes a little after to this question 5 An contritio debeat esse intentior Whether the sorrow of contrition ought in degree to surpass all other sorrow For he answers 6 Respondeo dico 1. debere esse intentiorem saltem quoad appretiationem Ibid. n. 237. Yes as to appretiation at least But he doth only hide his errour under the obscurity of his words as will appear by the explication he gives himself to this word Appretiation For
which we have indeed and that the fault which may be in this lye can be but slight They say the same of mortal sins which we have confessed already so that if the Confessor examine us we may lye and say that we never committed them without sinning but slightly 10. 10 Si poenitens uni probsbili senâ—ntiae adhaereat Confessarius vero contrariam pâ—… biliorem existimet quid Poenitentis sententiam probabili probabiliori relicta se debet Confessatius conformare Escobar tr 7. ex 4. n. 7. p. 810. Si poeâ—itens in praxi bona fide sententiam sequatur quae à juibusdam Doctoribus tanquam probabilis ac tuts defenditur confessarius vero seu ordinarius seu delegatus eandem speculaâ—ivè improbab lem censeat non obstante sua persuasione tenetur absolutionem conferre Layman lib. 1. tr 1. cap. 5. sect 2. n 10. pag. 7. Ex dictis deducitur Confessarium semper posse debere contra propriam opinionem poenitentem absolvere quando ille pâ—…bâ—bili opinione ductus putat aliquid sibi licitum esse quod Confesiarius juâ—ta susm opinionem putat illicitum Amicus rom 3. disp 15. sect 4. num 90. pag. 212. That when different opinions arise about any thing which appertains to Confession as concerning restitution the disposition necessary for receiving absolution the obligation to quit the occasions of sin and other such like the Penitent may chuse that which is most large and more favourable to his corrupt interests though it be less probable and less safe and that he may oblige the Confessor to follow this opinion which he chuses or at least to leave him to his liberty to follow and act according to this very opinion though the Confessor be of a contrary opinion and believe that which the sinner demands to be dangerous and unlawful 11. 1 1. Imperfectiâ—nes qualâ—s est divinis inspirationibus non correspondere queis excitabantur ad nimiam circa corporalia commoda solicitudinem fugiendam ad fugiendas dignitatum promotiones c. non sunt Sacramenti poenitentiae maâ—…ria quia pâ—ccata non sunt Sic Tannerus l. 2. d. 4. c. 10. d. 4. n. 70. Sarct us in select d. 1. a. n. 4. d. 6 n. 4. d. 7. n. 4. 11. asserens quidem haud permittendum esse poenitentem se accusare quod examen sufficiens non praemiserit quod intente non doleat de peccatis prout posset quod Deum non dilexerit to a quâ valeâ— intentione quia cum haec similia peccata non sint non debent in confessione exponi Esâ—obar tom 2. lib. 140. problem 5. That it is not needful to confess that we have not conformed our selves to those divine inspirations by which we have been excited to flye the too great care of bodily commodities promotions unto dignities c. That these things are no matter of penance because they are not fins That the Penitent is not to be permitted even to accuse himself for not being sufficiently examined nor for not having had so strong grief for his sins as he might have had nor for not loving God so strongly as he might have done because these things and such like are no sins This is the Doctrine of Tannerus roported by Escobar in his Problems and by consequence put in the rank of probable opinions which serves nor only to abridge Confessions but to take away many scruples by permitting us to have as much care as we please of our bodies and if God would turn us from it by his grace to resist it without fear of offending him See here one part of the Jesuits Rules about the Sacrament of Penance and the Duty of Penitents and Confessors by which it is easie to judge whether sinners by following them may become great Saints and Confessors Martyrs and whether the one or the other will work any great miracles Certainly if these Rules so loose and soft be followed it is no matter of wonder to see at this day such throngs of people crowding so frequently to Confession we should rather wonder there are so many Priests who will undertake the Office of Confessors It is true that if the condition of such become contemptible and servile by a conduct as so base and so dishonourable as that which the Jesuits have prescribed them their duty also as well as that of the Penitents is in amends become so easie that following the Maxims of these new Doctors there needs nothing else but to know to speak to confess well and to have good hearing and a clear apprehension to perform worthily the Office of a Confessor CHAPTER III. Of Prayer That the Jesuits destroy Prayer in teaching that the Laity and the Ecclesiasticks themselves may satisfie their obligation to Prayer by praying without attention without reverence and even with voluntary distraction and diverting themselves with all sorts of wicked thoughts MEn fall into sin by being induced thereto by temptation temptation cannot be surmounted but by the aid of God the means to obtain his help is Prayer so that if the life of man according to the Scripture be nothing but a continual combat against temptations it follows that it ought also be a continual prayer to obtain necessary help and strength for the combat This obligation is natural because it is founded on the infirmity of nature and the Son of God hath made thereof an Evangelical Precept 1 Oportet semper orare nunquam deficere Luc. 18.1 Catechismâ—… Conc. Trid. de necessitate orationis That we ought always to pray and never to cease which he saith not only by way of counsel but by way of precept which obligeth of necessity as is observed by the Catechism of the Council of Trent But Father Tambourin tells us 2 Quandonam obligat naturale praeceptum orandi vel adorandi Ego hic sentio quod supr cap. 151. num 8. de praecepto fidei spei charitatis non dari scilicet certum tempus determinatum in quo directè obligat sed else illud in quo obligat indirectè necessitas boni acquirendi aut mali avertendâ— quae acquirere aut avertere sine Dei auxilio nos non posse tunc animadvertimus Sequitur omittentem tempore tentationis orare non peccare nisi contra castitatem quia solum ex periculo violandi castitatem culpabilis est talis orationis omissio Lessius lib. 2. Tametsi sentiremus hoc praeceptum obligare non est nobis in eo explicando diu immorandum cum illud facilè ab omnibus impleatur Quis enim tam perditus est ut aliquando Pater Ave non reciter Tamb. lib 2. decal cap. 4. sect 2. num 5. That it is in the precept of prayer as in that of faith hope and charity that there is no certain time wherein this precept obligeth directly but that there is some wherein it obligeth indirectly to wit when it is necessary to acquire
thence by stronger reason that we are not bound thereunto upon any other occasion And by consequence the obligation to give alms is entirely abolished in all sorts of persons times and occasions But Lessius doth yet farther discover this pernicious Doctrine of his Company adding that even then when this so extream and rare necessity doth happen no person is particularly obliged to provide against it for that the obligation to assist our neighbour in this estate of extream necessity being general and common to all those who have means to do it every one may put it off from himself unto others in such manner that we cannot say that this man or that man in particular is obliged thereunto quae rarius ita contingit ut hunc vel illum in particulari graviter obliget That is to say that the Commandment to assist our neighbour in extream necessity is general to all those who are of ability but it doth ordinarily oblige none in particular And so according to Lessius Divinity a poor man being in entremity may dye of hunger in the view of many persons who may and ought assist him whilst they expect and attend one another no one of them being particularly bound to satisfie an obligation which is common unto them all together And it is from this Principle that he concludes 1 Fortè inter Christianos pauci sunt qui propter defectum operum misericordiae corporalium damnentur That it is apparent that amongst Christians there are few who shall be damned for failing to exercise the works of corporal mercy notwithstanding that the Scripture in divers places and Jesus Christ in the Gospel testifie expresly that the greatest part of men and even of Christians shall be damned for not giving alms and assisting their neighbour in his necessities For having declared that there shall be few Elect and few saved even amongst those that are called that is amongst Christians he declares also that in condemning them at the day of Judgment he will only reprove them for the default in alms and works of mercy saying unto them 2 Discedite à me maledicti in ignem aeternum qui paraâ—us est diabolo Angelis ejus 〈◊〉 â—ivi enim non dedistis mihi manducare sitivi non dedistis mihi bibere c Mat. 25. v. 41. Depart from me ye cursed into eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels because I was hungry and you gave me not to eat I was thirsty and ye gave me not to drink Lessius observed this difficulty and he represents and objects it to himself but a consideration so powerful taken from the express word of Jesus Christ and from the sentence of eternal death which shall be pronounced against those who shall fail of performing the works of mercy was not sufficient to divert him from his opinion For without troubling himself with what Jesus Christ saith he replies in a way and expression which contains more of contempt than respect due unto the Word of God See here his terms 3 Nâ—c resert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii describens meminerit potius operum misericordiae quam aliorum id enim secit ut homines praesertim plebeios qui ad majora spiritualia parum sunt comparati in hac vita ad ea excitaret Haec autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio quia tunc komines nec erunt amplius ad opera misericordiae excitandi Lessiâ—… ibid. It is to no purpose to alledge that our Lord in the 25. Chapter of S. Matthew representing the form of the last Judgment speaks rather of works of mercy than of others For he doth it only to stir up men and particularly those of the common sort who are not capable to comprehend spiritual things to exercise these good works in this life Now this reason cannot have place in the last Judgment because then there will be no need to stir up men unto works of mercy He declares plainly that the Gospel is false and speaks false things to deceive the people and ignorant For if it be lawful to have this opinion of what Jesus Christ himself saith concerning his last Judgment and the circumstances and the words of that Judgment which he will pronounce concerning mens eternal life and death it will by stronger reason be lawful to have the same thoughts of other places of the Gospel which are not so important and generally of all since one cannot be more true than another So we may clude the whole Word of God when we meet therein any thing that doth not agree with our opinions and we shall give occasion particularly in this Subject to those who will conceive with Origen that the pains of the damned shall not be eternal to say that Jesus Christ hath not said that they shall be so but only to divert men from sin and to cause them to fear by proposing unto them infinite punishments according as this Jesuit saith that he neither threatens nor condemns those who fail to do works of mercy but only to intimidate men and particularly those of the Commonalty and to stir them up to employ themselves therein being incapable of other more elevated actions Being all good works are comprised and contained in alms fasting and prayer according to the Scripture it seems that having here treated particularly of alms I ought also to speak of fasting and of prayer because I have said that the Jesuits destroy and corrupt all good works in general But because I have spoken expresly of Fasting in the explication of the Commandments of the Church of Supplication in the Chapter of Prayer and also in that of Ecclesiastick Duties and the obligation which we have to say Divine Service I will be content to send the Reader thither to avoid tediousness and repetitions In reading those places we may find that the Jesuits are no less favourable to mens effeminacy than to their interests and that they are as large and indulgent in freeing them from all the pains of fasting and prayer as in exempting them from the obligation of giving their goods and doing alms testifying by this so obsequious Doctrine and so base and loose a conduct that all their study and care in a manner tends to the establishment of the Kingdom of Lust by favouring the corrupt passions and inclinations of men and in consequence thereof to destroy true Christian piety both in its fountain which is Charity and in its effects and fruits which are good Works CHAPTER V. Of the Sacraments AS the principal Questions which respect the Sacraments depend on the Institution of God and the Church and ought by consequence be resolved by Authority and Tradition the Jesuits who follow most usually their own sense and reason both in Divinity and Philosophy make almost as many faults as steps in this matter My design is not as I have already declared to report generally all their Errours no more than
sufficiently its intent and the thoughts of the Council of Trent upon this Point in the Ceremonies which it prescribes and would have observed in the Betrothing for the Publication of the Bains he saith 3 Praeceptum de denuntiationibus non obligat quando ex illius observatlone notabile damnum sequitur Quaprepter in talibus occasionibus nulla requiritur dispensatio etiamsi ordinatius poffet commode adiri sitque paratus dispensationem concedere non solum quando est certum sed etiam quando est probabilis suspicio Ibid. disp 3. dub 27. num 212. That we are not obliged to observe them when any notable damage would follow thereupon that we are not obliged to demand a dispensation though we might conveniently demand it of the Ordinary and he were ready to grant it That this is not only lawful then when the damage is certain but also when we have some probable suspicion The Order of the Church for the Bains is express as for the Betrothing this Jesuit would abolish the one and the other which are as it were the Preparatives unto lawful Marriage and the Precautions against the clandestine that he might better favour and authorize them against the prohibition of the Council which condemns them In which he doth like them who seize on the Suburbs and Avenues of a City which they would carry by force For after what he lately spoke thus for abolishing the Bains and authorizing clandestine Contracts of Marriage he maintains 4 Addendum verum esse valide etsi matrimonium ab incolis loci in quo Tridentinum viger in loco in quo non viget etiamsi eo transierit eum ob finem clandestine contrahendi non solum valide sed licite posse fieri servando in aliis jus antiquum quamvis eum ob finem transierit ut non obligaretur Tridentini decreto quo obligabatur in proprio loco cujus erat incols Ibid. dub 6. num 42. That not only clandestine Marriage is valid even amongst the Inhabitants of a Country where the Council of Trent is received when they go into another Country where it is not observed that they may marry in secret but that this Marriage is lawful provided that in other things they observe the ancient Laws though they have purposely changed place that they might be discharged from the Law of the Council of Trent by which they were obliged in their own Country We must say then according to this Casuist that it is lawful to make Marriages which the Church doth nullifie and which it never approved in those very times in which it suffered them For these sorts of Marriages have been heretofore indeed valid but they were never lawful on the contrary they have been always censured in the Church But if the Jesuits make Marriages good which are null on the contrary they make those null which are good 1 Dico effe probabile matrimonium metu levi injuste ad hoc incusso celebratum nullum esse in foro conscientiae Tamb. lib. 1. decal cap. 2. sect 6. n. 12. Ex metu quoque justè incusso hujusmodi matrimonium nullum esse non puto improbabile sect 7. n. 3. I say saith Tambourin that it is probable that a Marriage contracted by some slight fear unjustly induced is null in conscience and even some fear justly raised probably may nullifie the Marriage It must then be affirmed that Marriages to which persons are condemned by the Judges which Fathers cause their Children to make which Masters make of their Servants and Princes of their Subjects are null because commonly these Marriages are made with some sort of fear And the same thing must be said of the Professions made by Monks and Nuns and consequently of all sorts of Engagements and Contracts Nevertheless it is apparent that the Jesuits make use of fear as well as hope sometimes for a motive to engage young persons in their Society and they would not refuse a donation or foundation which should be made to them with some fear without doubting whether it might be null For what concerns the use of Marriage albeit the bodies of married persons are not in their own power according to the words of Scripture 2 Non solum publica mere rix sed etiam occulta matitata potest retinere pretium sornicationis adultâ—…ii Dicastill lib. 2. tr 〈◊〉 disp 6. dub 1. 〈◊〉 â—8 Dicastillus forbears not to permit a married woman to retain to her self the price of her Adultery The reason Tambourin brings for it is considerable 3 Ratiomihi viâ—… esse quia vir nonâ—…st ita dominus corporiâ— uxoris ut in illud perfectissimum dominium habeat sed solum ita ut illo uti queat in debito conjugali omnibus aliis exclusis quod certè non tollit uxori facultatem acquirendi licet cum peccato ex turpi sui corporis concessione Tambur lib 7. decal cap. 3. sect 3. num 〈◊〉 The Husband saith he is not so master of the body of his Wife that he hath a perfect dominion over it but he hath only the power to use it according to the Law of Marriage with exclusion of all others which certainly takes not from the woman power to gain something though not without sin by prostituting her body This reason is worthy the Proposition which it is brought to prove For it is a manifest contradiction to say that a husband hath a right to use the body of his wife with exclusion of every other and that nevertheless the woman may sell the use of the same body unto another if in selling this use she sell not that which belongs unto her husband she doth no injustice and she doth not properly commit adultery and her sin will not be more than a simple fornication This Author makes no difficulty to say 4 Expresse excludere finem multiplicandae prolis imo etiam cupere filios non procreare veniale est Tambur lib. 7. cap. 3. sect 5. num 7. That it is no more than a venial sin expresly to exclude from the use of Marriage the end of having children to desire even to have none at all without considering that the begetting of children being the end of Marriage to use it without this end and even against this end excluding it positively by a contrary desire is to abuse Marriage voluntarily is to profane a Sacrament is to reject and contemn the blessing which is especially given to obtain children it is finally to live with a woman in Marriage as out of Marriage abusing her to satisfie a brutal passion and for sensual pleasure alone as debauched persons abuse women single or married who abandon themselves unto them and yet all these excesses are but a Peccadillo according to this Jesuit When we doubt of the validity of a Marriage and have cause to apprehend that it is null Dicastillus gives an invention unto persons whom the fear of God
all appearance thereof to imagine that the will to dye for God should be necessary unto true Martyrdom This same Jesuit hath corrupted another passage of the 3. Chap. of S. John whereof the Council of Trent makes use to explicate the Nature of meritorious good Works saying they are such because they are wrought in God quia in Deo sunt facta By which words the Holy Fathers and the best Interpreters of the Holy Scripture and of the Council of Trent have understood works done by the motion of Gods Spirit which is that of Charity But he will not endure it and is so far transported as to tax them as weak men and subject to imaginary visions who are of this opinion As to that which some represent saith he tr 3. pag. 45. that the Council doth include herein the motive of Charity because that it demands that they be wrought in God it is a meer imagination It may be he never read the Council or it is likely he took no notice that it expounded it self in saying that good works ought to be wrought by a vertue and grace which Jesus Christ inspires continually into his Members in such manner as the Vine continues life and vigour to its branches 1 Cum enim ipse Jesus Christus tanquam caput in membra tanquam vitis in palmites in ipsos justificatos jugiter virtutem influat quae virtus eorum bona opera semper antecedit concomitatur sequitur c. Sine qua nullo pacto grata meritoria esse possent nihil ipsis justificatis amplius deesse credendum est quoniam minus plene illis quidem operibus quae in Deo facta sunt divinae legi pro hujus vitae statu satisfecisse vitam aeternam suo etiam tempore si tamen in gratia decefferint consequendam vere promeruisse censeantur Concil Trid. Sess 6. cap. 16. For Jesus Christ saith the Council communicating vigour continually to those who are justified as the head communicates unto its members and the Vine unto its branches and this vigour preceding accompanying and following always their good works which without it could not in any sort whatsoever be pleasing unto God and meritorious we must believe that there is now nothing more wanting unto persons justified which might hinder us from judging reasonably that the works which are thus wrought in God have satisfied his Law so far as the condition of this present life may permit and that they have merited eternal life which they shall in due time receive provided they dye in this estate of Grace It is clear that this vertue and this vigour which the Council saith that Jesus Christ communicates incessantly to those who do good works is not an habitual vertue or a simple habitude as this Jesuit pretends but that it is actual and it is a motion by which he applies unto them and causes them to act For it is actual Grace as is manifest by the expression of the Council saying that it prevents accompanies and follows all good works which is properly the description of actual Grace according to the Scripture the Judgment of the Fathers and even of the School-Divines themselves and appertains not to a habit which prevents not good works but leaves the will in an indifference to the production of them and it must be the will which prevents and applies this habit in such manner that without this the other cannot move of it self and abides always without acting And so the Council agrees very well with S. Paul the one saying that our good works should be done in Charity and the other that they ought to be wrought in God that is to say in the Spirit and by the Spirit of God who is no other than the Spirit of Love and Charity and the words of the one expound the words of the other But I see no means to reconcile them to this Jesuit for he can no longer pretend that the Council and S. Paul require only habitual Charity with an exemption only from all mortal sin The terms of the Council by which it expounds it self may also serve for exposition unto S. Paul being so clear that it is impossible to obscure them He corrupts also a third passage which is in the second to the Corinthians whereof the Apostle speaks in these words 2 Id enim quod in praesenti est momentaneum leve tribulationis nostrae supro modum in sublimitate aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis 2 Cor. 4.17 For the tribulations which we endure in this life being momentary and light produce in us a far more incomparable full solid and eternal glory And Father Sirmond pretends that he calls the tribulations and afflictions of this life light because they have not in them the weight of the love of God to command them That is that they are light then when they are undergone without love by consequent weighty and burthensom when they are born for love to God These words of S. Paul were never thus expounded in the Church and it is to fight with common sense to say that love is a weight and load which makes things heavy and burthensom which are done upon the motion thereof All the Saints and Interpreters who have spoken of this passage have conceived that S. Paul calls these present afflictions light because that the grief they cause is light in comparison of the Joys which they merit as he saith that they endure but a moment in comparison of the Eternity of Glory which is the recompence thereof But that they should be called light when they are born without love as if love did hinder them from being so is that which never entred into the thought of any Interpreter ancient or novel And if it were so the afflictions of S. Paul could not be light or we must say that he suffered them without love The afflictions of the greatest Saints also could not be light but rather they must have been more weighty and burdensom when they have been entertained and supported with most Charity and on the contrary theirs who suffered without love or without thoughts of God and against their wills should be light and easie which doth equally contradict Faith and Reason It is needless to lose time in refuting these Paradoxes and Extravagancies There is no Divine nor prudent man that sees not even by natural reason and experience that on the contrary it is love and the motions of the affection which renders things light easie and even sweet and pleasant though they be in themselves troublesom and difficult Which is yet more true of the love of God than of that of the Creatures that being infinitely exalted above this in vertue and force as well as in dignity This Jesuit contents not himself to abuse the words of S. Paul in this manner but he aspires unto the fountain and attempts to corrupt it also as well as the streams The
contradict and clude this last and dreadful sentence than by correcting his errour to submit himself thereunto for he is not ashamed to say that the reason which Jesus Christ alledges and whereupon he grounds his judgment is not true and takes not place in the matter wherein he alledges it that is to say in the last Judgment It is not to purpose 1 Nec refert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii describens meminerit potius operum misericordiae quam aliorum Id enim fecit ut homines praesertim plebeios qui ad majora spiritualia parum sunt comparati in hec vita ad ea excitaret haec autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio quia tunc homines non erunt amplius ad optra misericordiae exciâ—tandi Lessim de perfect divin lib. 13. tract 22. pag. 142. saith he to alledge that our Lord in the 25. of S. Matthew representing unto us the form of the last Judgment speaks of the works of mercy rather than others For he doth it only to stir up men and especially the common people who are not capable of comprehending spiritual things to exercise these works in this life Now this reason cannot take place at the last Judgment because then there will be no need to excite men unto works of mercy I will not stay here to examine this excess which will appear strange enough of it self to them who are not void of the common resentments of Christianity because it will be more proper to do it elsewhere We will only observe in this place that one Jesuit hath undertaken to fight and destroy Gods first Commandment and another his last Judgment They who can have the patience to behold a multitude of Expositions of Scripture Councils and Holy Fathers false extravagant unheard of and many times impious need only read Poza's Book which he entituled Elucidarium Deiparae A Volume as big as his would be needful to represent all his excesses I have related some of them in the Chapter of Novelty and elsewhere which I repeat not here to avoid tediousness Father Adam hath surpassed all his Brethren in the same excess For he destroys not only the letter and the sense of Scripture he fights with the Authors themselves whom God hath made use of to impart them to us He decrys them and deprives them of all that authority and credit which is due unto sacred Writers and who were no other than the hand and tongue of the Holy Ghost by attributing unto them weaknesses and extravagancies and affirming by an horrible impiety that following their own imaginations and passions they are sometimes transported beyond truth and have written things otherwise than they were and that they did neither conceive nor believe them themselves in their consciences It will not easily be imagined that this conceit could ever come into the mind of a Monk I will not say but of a Christian who had not entirely renounced the Faith and Church if this Father had not written it in manifest terms and more forcibly than I can represent it in a Book whereto he gives this Title Calvin defeated by himself In the third Part of this Book Chap. 7. he saith That it is not only in criminal matters that zeal and hate inflame a Soul and transport it unto excest and violence but that the Saints themselves acknowledge that they are not exempt from this infirmity And flagrant passions sometimes push them on to actions so strange and ways of expressing themselves so far removed from truth that those who have written their lives have called them holy extravagancies innocent errours and Hyperboles more elevated than their apprehensions and which expressed more than they intended to say He adds also in the same Chapter and in the progress of the same discourse That this infirmity is not so criminal but that God did tolerate it in the person of those Authors whom he inspired and whom we call Canonical whom he left to the sway of their own judgments and the temper of their own spirits He compares the Saints and Fathers of the Church to persons full of passions and violence he excepts not the Canonical Authors themselves and he makes them all subject to the same infirmities and the Canonical Authors also to the greater and more inexcusable For if they be vicious in others they are yet more in these in whom the least faults and the least removes from the truth which in ordinary persons were but marks of infirmity would be as notorious and criminal as the greatest because they would be imputed unto God whose words the Canonical Authors have only rehearsed and it is as unworthy of God contrary to his nature and power to depart a little as much from the truth It is therefore manifest that what this Jesuit saith tends directly to destroy all Holy Scripture Faith and Religion For if the Canonical Writers could exceed and depart a little from the truth in one single point they were subject to do it in all the rest So their discourse is not of divine Authority neither are their Books the Books or Word of God because God is always equally infallible and can never go beyond or depart from the truth in the least whether he speaks himself or by the mouth of his Prophets CHAPTER II. Of the Commandments of God ARTICLE I. Of the first Commandment which is that of Love and Charity THis first Commandment of Love contains in it and requires of us three things to wit that we love God above all Creatures our selves for God and our neighbour as our selves These three coming from one and the same trunk and root shall make three Articles of this Chapter and I will handle all three severally that I may more distinctly represent the Jesuits opinions upon every obligation of the first Commandment and to make it evidently appear that they destroy it in every part I. POINT Of the Command to love God I will relate nothing here save only from Father Anthony Sirmond because he seems particularly to have undertaken to destroy this Precept and because he hath said upon this Subject alone all that may be found in the worst Books of his Fraternity 1. That he abolishes the Command of loving God and reduces it to a simple counsel 2. That according to him the Scripture hardly speaks at all of divine Love and Charity and that our Lord hath very little recommended it 3. That he declares that the love of God may very well consist and agree with the love of our selves 4. And that it is nothing else but self-love SECTION I. That there is no Command to love God according to the Maxims of the Jesuits Divinity OUr Lord speaking of the double Commandment of Love saith That all the Law and the Prophets do depend thereon In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet Prophetae Matth. 22. He saith not that the command to love God doth depend on and is
because he favours him not Here is the case to which he answers precisely and without hesitation in these words If you desire only or receive with joy the effect of this death to wit the Inheritance of a Father the Charge of a Prelate the deliverance from some trouble he procured you the answer is easie that you may desire all these things lawfully and that because you rejoyce not in the evil of another but in your own proper good Dicastillus durst not at first determine upon this question because it seemed to him uncertain the Authority and Example of Castropalao having made him more bold he approves and propounds it as probable and Tambourin makes thereof a Maxime in which there is no difficulty at all facilis responsio Thus it comes to pass that these Doctors who make profession of a complacent Theology go on still advancing not to the better but to the worse as S. Paul speaks and labour to stretch or rather to corrupt mens consciences by stretching and corrupting the most holy and inviolable Rules of Faith and Morality and making those things probable which in themselves are incredible If to desire the death of ones father be of itself a crime as none can question it the crime is yet greater when he is carried thereto by some wicked motive as that of having his estate which comes from covetousness and injustice and contains in it also a notorious ingratitude and it is in the sight of God a kind of theft and usurpation to desire to have the estate of another and which is more of ones father against his will the appointment of God and all the Laws of Reason and Nature So that to justifie the desire a child hath of the death of his father by that which he hath of his goods is to justifie one crime by another wherein many more are also contained This injustice and disorder may appear yet more visible in the other Example brought by Tambourin of an Inferior who desires the death of his Superior A Monk for Example or a Clerk of his Abbot or Bishop that he might enter upon his Office For the desire alone of a Charge of this nature even under pretence of a good motive as to be serviceable unto Souls is a kind of ambition and presumption which renders a man unworthy of that Office which he desires in that manner as S. Thomas after the Scripture and Fathers doth expresly teach us he who hath not this good motive and desires to enter by a way so odious and criminal as is the death of his Superior is not only unworthy of the Office which he so desires but also deferves to be excluded from the Clergy and even to be chased out of the Church as a rebellious and unnatural child from the house of his father who desires to see his death though he dares not kill him himself How then can one of these desires justifie the other How can we say that an Inferior may lawfully desire the death of his Superior if we pretend not that one may be a murderer because he is an Usurper and desire the death of a man because we would have his goods without having either right or capacity but only an unjust and unreasonable pretence unto the one or the other This yet sufficeth not this barbarous and murthering Theology to permit children to desire the death of their father and mother they permit them also to be willing to kill them themselves to attempt their lives and effectually to kill them in some cases It is from this Principle that Dicastillus saith 2 Colligitur ulterius â—…citum esse fillis contra parentes servis contra dominos vassallis contra principes vi vim repellere quando actu invaduntur injuste cum praedictis conditionibus idemque de Monachis aut subditis contra Abbates Superiores Dicastill lib. 2. de just tr 1. d. 10. dub 3. num 30. An in casibus praecedentis dubitationis liceat directe velle intendere mortem injusti aggressoris ad defendendam propriam vitam Negat S. Thomaâ— His tamen non obstantibus asserendum est tanquam verissimum sicut honestum est in executione repeilere aggressorem illum occidendo pari raâ—lone honestum est directe illum velle intendere occidere Dub. 4. num 4. That a child who defends himself against his father who assaults him unjustly may kill him as also Servants their Masters Vassals their Princes Monks their Abbots and their Superiors Which he understands not only in such manner that a Son may kill his Father by accident and besides his intention in his own defence but so as he may have a design to kill him voluntarily For after he had proposed this case which I have now related and many others he concludes that in this case it is lawful to desire to kill him who assails us As for what concerns the respect due unto Fathers and Mothers Tambourin declares confidently 1 That a Son is to be excused from mortal sin who will not acknowledge his Father if he do it not of contempt but to avoid some inconvenience or that he might not be put to the blush in acknowledging him It is manifest that according to Scripture this is to renounce ones father as it is to renounce Jesus Christ to be ashamed to acknowledge and confess him and yet this is a small fault in the Jesuits Divinity Neither is he more religious about their obedience concerning which he demands 2 Filius si recognoscere nolit patrem non ex contemptu sed ad vitandum aliquod incommodum aut crubescentiam à mortali culpa sic puto esset excusand us Tambur lib. 5. decal cap. 2. sect 2. num 17. Whether children may lawfully contract Marriage with persons unworthy of their alliance against the will of their fathers and mothers He answers Though some believe they cannot without mortal sin which is very probable yet he avouches that it is probable and safe in conscience that they may ..... and that Sanchez hath reason to say that a daughter is so free as to Marriage that though she have not yet attained so much as twenty five years of age she may marry her self unto a person unworthy of her without her fathers consent Whence it follows according to this Author that Isaac exceeded his power when he so expresly forbad his Son Jacob to marry in the family of Chanaan which was unworthy of his alliance If the disobedience of a Daughter towards her Father in these circumstances be not criminal it seems it never can be so since it cannot be in a more important matter than this same wherein Marriage is concerned which imports an engagement for the whole time of life and a Marriage with an unworthy person and which proves a disadvantage and dishonour not only to the Daughter who enters it but also to her kindred and whole family But if we object to this Father that
2 Notat Azor quod licâ—t testis pâ—cunia corruptus sese occultet nec dilcedat an tequam juridice rogetur aut ad judicium vocetur non peccat contâ—… Justitiam nic tenetur restituere pecuniam sic acceptam nisi vero similiter crederet esse furtivam Dicost lib. 2. tract 2. disp 4. dub 8. num 156. That if a witness corrupted by money bide or retire himself before he hath been legally examined or cited into the Court he is not obliged to restore the money he receives in this manner As if Justice were no other thing than the formalities and outward appearance of Law A man is in danger to lose his life for not having witnesses of his innocency if being able to deliver him by your testimony you take money not to render him your due assistance you take it to put him to death since not he only who deposes against the truth but he also who conceals a truth whereon the life of an innocent depends is the true cause of his death Which is so much more true or at least more criminal and unjust when he suffers himself to be corrupted by money Tambourin saith 3 Hinc sequâ—tur 1. cum qui accusatur de crimine qued juridice ab accusatore probari nequit non lolum posse negate crimen sed â—tiam dicere accusatorem calumniari mentiti Ita Petrus Navarra lib. 2. cap. 4. num 34. Lege etiam S. Thomam 2.2 q. 69. artz Qui eâ—im â—ccusat de crimine quod probari non potest calumniator est mentiri praesumiâ—ur Tambur lib. 9. decal cap. 2. sect 2. num 2. That he who is accused of a crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuser may not only deny the crime but say that the Accuser lyes and slanders him He sends us to S. Thomas in his 2.2 q. 69. art 2. This is without doubt that we may see his condemnation For S. Thomas proves in that Article That it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself by a slander and that even when he is not legally examined it is not lawful for him to speak an untruth Falsitatem tamen proponere in nullo casu licet alicui Tambourin for all that finds there is no difficulty in his opinion as if this were no lye to say unto a man that he lyes when we know he speaks the truth and to slander an accuser as a slanderer when he accuses us of a crime which we have committed Of two accusers the one speaks the truth the other lyes the one objects a true crime and the other a false and according to Tambourins admirable Divinity he who saith the truth is the lyar and he who objects a true crime is a slanderer of which he doubts not at all But 4 Haec passim in ore sunt omnium illud singulate difficile An si alio modo tâ— ab injusto teste tueri nequeas licite falsa crimina illi possis objicere quanta sufficiunt ad tuam justam defensionem Duo assero Unum satis mihi probabile est alterum satis incertum Probabile mihi est te si id facias non peccare contra justitiam unde nec obligari ad restitutionem Incertum mihi est an id possit licite fieri sine ulla culpa Ut quid enim 〈◊〉 Sodomitam oportet probari esse illum testem si excommunicatum si haereticum Quid enim si sit necesse publicas Scripturas ementiri Possetne Notarius publicus adhuc induci Libenter noâ—um hunc in aliud tempus exolvendum reservo num 4 5 6 7. There is saith he more difficulty in another case It is demanded if you cannot defend your self against an unjust witness but by slandering him may you do it without sin and impose on him so many false crimes as will be necessary for your just defence I say two things one is that it seems to me probable enough the other is that I find it doubtful enough It is to me sufficiently probable that if you do it you sin not against Justice and by consequence that you are not obliged to restitution but I do not know certainly whether this may be done without any sin For if it be needful to prove that this witness is a Sodomite excommunicated an Heretick if it be necessary to this purpose to counterfeit publick Kecords may we sollicite a Notary hereunto I leave this difficulty to be resolved another time It must be observed that he speaks not of a false Witness who charges with false crimes but of an unjust Witness ab injusto teste who accuses of true crimes but secret or which he cannot prove according to the forms of Justice For thus these Doctors expound themselves what they mean by an unjust Witness or Accuser 1 Hic acâ—usator sibi imputer si ex hoc calumniator habeatur immo cum probare non possit atque adeo injuste accusaverit tenetur restituere accusator Dicast lib. 2. tract 2. disp 12. pag. 3. dub 18. n. 285. That this Witness saith Dicastillus may thank himself if in the conclusion he be held for a slanderer since he could not prove the crime and by consequence having accused unjustly he is obliged unto restitution So that according to this Divinity to defend our selves from true but secret crimes and whereof there are no publick prooss we may say to the honestest man in the world who would inform against us in a Court of Justice that he is a Sodomite Heretick Excommunicate c. and we may for proof of this slander make use of false Witnesses counterfeit false Deeds and Writings and corrupt publick Notaries to subscribe them without committing any injustice in all this though according to Scripture those who do evil and those who cause it to be done or only consent thereto commit the same fault But after he hath maintained that herein there is no injustice Tambourin doubts if at least there be not some sin in an action which contains so many crimes because that he knows it not certainly that is to say according to the Principles of his Divinity that it is also probable that there is none therein For a Doctor so learned as he is remains not easily in suspence concerning things which he hath well examined and he doubts not thereof without reason And therefore his doubting of it is a sufficient ground whereon to establish a probable opinion He holds then indeed though he dare not declare it that it is also probable that one may without any sin as well as in justice commit all sorts of crimes to hide one he hath committed and to oppress by slanders false Witnesses forged Writings corruption of Courts and publick Persons him who would discover it because he is perswaded he accuses him unjustly that is to say he cannot prove what he saith by the ways and formalities commonly used in Courts of Justice though it be true and certain Tambourin
Christ There is no need that I insist on these so abominable imaginations and expressions since that which they affirm of him absolutely is no less To prove that Jesus Christ might have sinned effectually they say that he might have had of himself and in himself an obligation to undergo the punishment of sin 5 Respondent docti aliqui recentiores non repugnare in natura assumpta remanere reatum poenae non solum temporalis sed etiam aeternae Ibid. disp 24. sect 2. n. 56. Some new Doctors saith Amicus answer that the obligation to punishment not only temporal but eternal is not inconsistent with the nature assumed by the Word Obligation unto punishment is a propriety and necessary consequent of sin and the obligation to eternal pain the propriety and necessary consequent of mortal sin For it is impossible that he who sins mortally should not be obliged to eternal punishment and it is also impossible that he should be obliged to eternal punishment who hath not sinned mortally both the one and the other being equally contrary to Justice and by stronger reason to the Justice of God Whence it comes that they who say that an obligation to eternal punishment might befal the humanity of Jesus Christ suppose of necessity that this humanity hath sinned mortally and that it may even be actually engaged in mortal sin whilst united to the Word in Jesus Christ it being impossible that he to whom sin is remitted should be lyable to eternal punishment and that God can punish him eternally to whom he is reconciled and to whom he owes eternal life as he owes it to all the just and much more to the Man-God who is his eternal Son This opinion is maintained by some Casuists as saith Amicus but it seems to him very rude and especially to Suarez taking it generally and in its whole extent For this cause that he might sweeten and moderate it he makes a distinction betwixt pain temporal and eternal saying that Jesus Christ might well be lyable to temporal punishment but not unto eternal 1 Respondet Suarez dis 33. sect ult versus finem concedendo de reatu poenae temporalis negando de reatu poenae aeternae quoniam poena aeterna necessariò tollitur cum ipsa culpa Ibid. n. 57. Because saith he eternal punishment is necessarily remitted with the sin and the guilt Whence it follows that if Jesus Christ were obliged to eternal punishment he should be actually in mortal sin by the assertion of Suarez himself who for this reason durst not say that the Humanity of Jesus Christ could be obliged unto eternal punishment But he is at least constrained even by this same reason to affirm that Jesus Christ might sin venially since they hold that he might be lyable on his own account unto temporal punishment and that the obligation to temporal punishment cannot come but from venial sin as the obligation unto eternal punishment cannot come but from mortal sin Which agrees well with that which Amicus saith that Jesus Christ might absolutely sin 2 Dico 4. potentia physica proxima peccandi si non repugnaret defectu divini decreti non repugnaret ratione unionis sanctitatis Verbo participatae in humanitate Christi Amicus ibid. n. 43. by a physical and next power of sinning which would not be incompatible with the union which the humanity of Jesus Christ had with the Word whereof he was partaker if the repugnance came not from the decree of God And if you would know what he means by a physical power of sinning potentia physica peccandi he expoundeth it himself saying that it is 3 Quae constituitur ex principiis intrinsecis ad operandum simpliciter necessariis Ibid. that which proceeds from the internal principles which are simply necessary unto action that is to say unto sinning So that according to his opinion Jesus Christ had in himself a power of sinning and the internal principles necessary to sin and if these principles had not their effect in him that is to say if Jesus Christ did not actually sin it was not because there was any thing in him that was repugnant thereunto non repugnaret ratione unionis sanctitatis à Verbo participatae in humanitate But this came to pass purely and simply from the will and protection of God and from his Decree which he had made not to permit Jesus Christ to fall into sin si non repugnaret defectu divini decreti In this manner Molina Suarez and some others expound the Impeccability of Jesus Christ as Amicus saith 4 Qui docent impeccabilitatem humanitatis Christi fuisse eandem cum impeccabilitate quam habent confirmati in gratia quae non est physica sed moralis Ibid. n. 70. p. 352. maintaining that the Impeccability of the humanity of Jesus Christ is the same with that of those who are confirmed in grace which is not physical but moral That is to say that Jesus Christ was not properly impeccable but by the grace and mercy of God as the Saints might have been in this world as well as he and are also now in Heaven by the same mercy And by consequence that Jesus Christ was of himself capable to sin even as they and that he had sinned effectually without the extraordinary succours and graces he received from God It is from this same Principle that Amicus saith with Vasquez and many others whom he nameth not that it were no inconvenience to affirm that this proposition is true The Word was capable of sin For making himself this objection 5 Objicies 4. implicat Verbum etiam per communicationem idiomatum denominari physicè peccabile Denominaretur autem per communicationem idiomatum physicè peccabile ab ipsa potentia physica peccandi si ea posset cum humanitate unita Verbo manere Ergo c. Ibid. n. 102. It cannot be said without contradiction that the Word by the very communication of the properties of the two natures which are in Jesus Christ should be naturally capable to sin Now this may be said if a physical and natural power to sin may subsist in the humanity which the Word hath assumed He answers to this objection 6 Respondeo 1. negando majorem Multi enim inter quos Vasquez disp 61. cap. ult non reputant absurdum Verbum per communicationem idiomatum denominari peccabile Ibid. n. 103. by denying the major because there are many and amongst them Vasquez who hold that it is no absurdity to say that the Word by the mutual communication of the two natures is capable of sinning And by consequence we might say according to this Divinity what is horrible and dreadful only to think that the Word had or might have been mischievous and wicked and that the Devil might have had him under his power as his Captive and Slave because the Devil is the Prince and Master of sinners