Fourth of Edward the Third and the words of it are these It is accorded that a Parliament shall be holden every year once and more often if need be Now Sir you must observe that this Act was made whilst the King was but Nineteen years of age and both himself and Kingdom under the care of Twelve Governours His Mother Queen Isabel and Roger Mortimer very powerful the Governours of the Pupil King divided amongst themselves and many other pressing affairs of the Nation oblig'd most people to propose that expedient of frequent Parliaments as the most probable means to secure the peace and prosperity of the Kingdom at least until the King should come of riper years and thereby many differences be reconciled After this in the Thirty sixth year of his Reign he called a Parliament and wanting money as generally he did the Parliament would grant nothing until an Act passed for maintenance of former Articles and Statutes there expressed And that for redress of divers mischiefs and grievances which daily happen a Parliament shall be holden every year as another time was ordained by Statute These are the two Statutes intended by our Author when he tells us that the Statute of Edward the first was confirmed by that glorious Prince Edward the third Whereas in truth they were both made by the same King and both in a great measure revoked in his own time Having declared after the making this last Act that he yielded to it only to serve his own turn This Sir is the matter of Fact upon which our Author builds his great pretensions to the old constitutions of Annual Parliaments The first Act was made whilst the King was very young the second when he wanted money and had Twenty six shillings and eight pence granted him upon every sack of wool transported for three years And both first and second Acts were broken by several intermissions before he died Besides we must make this remark that a Parliament seldom met without giving the King some money which might encourage those Kings to assemble them oftner than lately they have done But the truth is Annual Parliaments were lookt upon as so great a grievance to the Nation that we find that about the Tenth year of Richard the Second his Successor it was thought a great Prerogative in the King that he might call a Parliament once a year And both Houses appointed the Duke of Glocester and Thomas Arundell Bishop of Ely to acquaint the King that by an old Statute the King once a year might lawfully summon his Court of Parliament for reformation of corruptions and enormities within the Realm And if we consider with our selves we shall find that if yearly Parliaments were imposed upon us they would become grievances equally insupportable as to have no Parliaments at all For if the Knights Citizens and Burgesses be chosen out of the Countrey Gentlemen and Merchants inhabiting those Countries where they are elected as sure they ought to be what inconvenience if not ruin must it bring upon their affairs when they shall be forced to run every year a hundred or two hundred Miles from their particular domestick affairs to serve in a formal Parliament in which it may be the greatest business will be to make business for the next Indeed for idle persons who live about Town and have nothing to do but to scrible knavish politicks to the disturbance of honest men such a constitution might do well enough if they could get to be chosen members But we find from experience and History that in those days when Ambition and Faction were not so much in vogue as at present men were so far from making parties to get into the Parliament that many Commoners and Lords too have petitioned and been excused their attendance The King 's Queen's and Prince's Servants have stood upon their priviledge of exemption So James Barner was discharged by the King's command Quia erat de retinentia Regis 7. R. 2 and the Lord de Vessey in Edward the Fourths time obtained Licence not to serve in Parliament during his life Rex concessit Henrico Bromflet Dom. de Vessey quod ipse durante vita sit exoneratus de veniendo ad Parl. Besides the very Writ of Summons shews that in the original institution and design of Parliaments a frequent meeting could not be necessary For they were only to treat concilium impendere de magnis arduis negotiis Now God help us if every year should produce such magna ardua negotia such difficult and weighty affairs that the King with his Judges and â—rivy Council could not determine them without assembling his great Council the Parliament I confess in our Authors Chimerical model I am perswaded our circumstances would be bad enough but I thank God we are not gotten there yet Thus you see Sir that this grievance in not having annual Parliaments is become no grievance at all Mer. I begin Cousin to lose all manner of respect for this mistaken Mountebank For I perceive notwithstanding his great words and pretences all is but wind emptinâ—ss and cheat Having therefore fully satisfieâ— me concerning our liberties properties and Parliaments pray forget not to say somewhat of our Religion Trav. Sir I shall not presume to meddle with the Doctrinal part of any Religion that being none of my Province Nor shall I say much concerning the Ceremonial part or discipline of our own that is to say the Church of England It is sufficient to mind you that both the Doctrine and Discipline in Church Government have been established and confirm'd by several Acts of Parliament and Statutes Which Parliaments being the most Soveraign power that our Author himself pretends to set up amongst us we ought all to acquiesce in and be concluded by what they have done until an equal authority shall repeal those Acts or otherwise determine concerning us Mer. There is no objection can be made against this answer But Sir since the difference in our Religion seems manifestly to occasion most of our troubles why may not the King by his own authority dispence with the penal part of these Laws or grant a toleration especially to Protestant Dissenters or encourage an Act of Parliament for uniting them into the Church of England or else why might not the same Church release some part of the rigour of the Discipline and Ceremony since 't is agreed on all hands that the observance or non-observance of them are not points necessary or absolutely conducing to Salvation Trav. Cousin I shall answer you all these questions as plain as I can And first I shall never believe that true and unfeigned Religion especially amongst men where the Doctrine agrees is ever the real cause of any troubles disturbance or disobedience to lawful authority such as is that which produces an Act of Parliament even in our Authors sence being so contrary to the Doctrine and Principles of Christian Religion that I may confidently affirm where
so necessary to be effected that it was morally impossible to succeed in the former until the latter was actually executed It being then most certain that our Authors intention was to establish a Common wealth I shall now give you my reasons why we ought not upon any terms to admit of it And first I shall not insist much upon those vulgar inconveniences which are visible to all men As for example the inevitable consequences of most bloudy wars For can any rational man believe that all the Royal family should be so insensible of their right and honour as never to push for three Kingdoms which would so justly belong to them or could they be supposed to leave England under their popular usurpation what reason hath Scotland to truckle under the Domination of the English Commonalty What pretence hath the English Subject supposing they were to share in the English Government over the Kingdom of Scotland All the world knows that that Kingdom belongs so particularly to our King that the late Rebells themselves did not scruple to call him King of the Scots Why should Ireland also become a Province to an English Parliament Or should both Kingdoms be willing to shake off the Government of their Natural Lawful and antient Monarchy why should they not set up a Democracy or an Aristocracy or what else they pleas'd amongst themselves Is there never a Statesman in the three Kingdoms but Plato Redivivus Can none teach them to Rebel but he No rules to maintain an usurpt Authority but what we find among his extravagancies I am confident you do not believe it Shall these people notoriously known to have hated one another whilst formerly they were under different Governours become the strictest friends when they shall return unto those circumstances under which they were the greatest enemies Will the French King take no advantage having so good a pretext of our Divisions Or should we unite against him under our popular Governours was it ever known that a Confederate army was able to defend themselves long against an Army of equal strength commanded by one sole absolute Monarch Can we foresee any thing but most desperate wars and can wars be supported but by most heavy taxes Were not our Thimbles and Bodkins converted in the late times into Swords and Mortar pieces and by a prodigious transmutation never before heard of were not our Gold and Ear-rings turn'd into a brazen Idol These consequences Cousin and dismal effects of a Commonwealth besides many other are so obvious that I shall not spend any more time to mind you of them Supposing then that none of those former horrid inconveniences might happen I must mind you by the way that one reason why our Author and the Associators desire a Commonwealth proceeds from the fear of a certain Arbitrary power which they pretend the King would introduce as may be seen pag. 161. 208 and in several other places Now Though nothing be more extravagant than such a groundless imagination our Author having assured us that his Majesty never did one act of Arbitrary power since his happy restoration And moreover pag. 176. That our laws against Arbitrary power are abundantly sufficient Yet that we may no more dispute this point I must produce Plato's own authority against himself in these words That the King fears his power will be so lessened by degrees that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his head pag. 208. Nay farther in pag. 214. he shews us That it is impossible he should ever become an Arbitrary King For his present power as little as it is is yet greater than the condition of property can admit and in a word from his beloved Aphorism and the whole course of his Libel he endeavours to prove that Dominion being founded on the property and the property being in the people the King can have no manner of hopes upon earth of becoming absolute nor introducing an Arbitrary Government but by some Army of Angels from Heaven who must procure him an Authority which he cares not for The next and main reason why our Author would set up a Democracy at least as far as I can collect from the whole scope of his discourse is because the State inclines to popularity Now Sir for this last time I must make use of our Author 's own reasons against his own positions and do affirm that for this very reason were there no other all sober men and true Politicians ought to oppose with their utmost endeavours a Popular Government I will not recount to you the many mischiefs desolations and destructions which a popular power hath brought along with it whereever it goâ—â—he better of the antient Established Government of the place Somewhat hath been already said to this purpose in our discourse and much more may be read in the Histories of most parts of the world to which I refer you and shall only mind you of some inevitable consequences which will follow such an innovation amongst our selves And first if it be true that the King hath no power to make himself absolute then we have no cause to apprehend an Arbitrary power in him and by consequence no reason to change But if the inclination of the people be such that they will take advantage of the King's want of power and introduce their own Government what moderation may we expect from men towards those who are to become their Subjects who shaking off all sense of Justice Law Religion and temper dare usurp the Soveraign authority over their natural Governour Where shall we appeal for mercy when having cut the throat of the most merciful King in Europe we expose our own to our ambitious and unmerciful Tyrants Where shall we expect compassion towards our selves when we shall become Parricides and Regicides to our father and our King Where shall we seek after Eqâ—ity when the House of Lords the supreme Court of Equity are most unjustly turn'd out of doors and what end of our miseries can we ever hope for when our Tyrants by our villanous Authors constitution have not only got all the Wealth and Militia into their hands but have perpetuated their usurpation by annual Parliaments never to end Who being Judges of their own priviledges p. 254. may regulate elections as they shall think fit p. 249. Sit Adjourn Prorogue and Dissolve as they alone shall judge expedient What more barbarous villany was ever propos'd and publish'd under a lawful and peaceable Government besides our own upon earth But suppose our poor Country thus enslav'd and our antient Kingdom turn'd into a Common-wealth what can our new masters do for us more than is already done Can our libâ—rties be greater as to our persons and estates It is impossible to suppose it Will our properties be more secur'd all the Laws that ever were upon earth under any Government cannot make them more inviolable Nothing then can remain but liberty in Religion which we call of
whole Nation when joyn'd with so considerable a part as the Church of England they were both overcome by the Dissenters it was morally impossible Besides they had generally taken the Oath of Allegiance which for ought I can hear they have not broken generally I suppose for if there be any of them who refuse the Oath of Allegeance I look upon them as out of the Kings Protection and little better or full as dangerous as open enemies Nor can I imagine what other Government they could or were ever suppos'd to introduce contrary to that which was then establish'd and which they swore to maintain I am apt enough to believe that they might hope for some ease or exemption from the rigour of the penâ—l Laws which neither you nor I can blame in them if they had desir'd Mer. But though they have taken the Oath of Allegeance yet you see that they will not be prevail'd upon to take the Oath of Supremacy And you know that according to our Law the King is no less head of the Ecclesiastical than of the Civil Government Trav. True Sir But this is as much an argument against the Dissenters as the Papists For it is not a greater crime in them nor prejudice to the State to tolerate men who by the principles of their Religion are taught to submit their Consciences to another Spiritual guide in Spiritual matters as many Soveraign Princes themselves do at this day than those who owning the King to be Supreme head of the Church by their words disown him by their actions that is in not obeying his Laws or Rebelling against him as such Besides it is well known that the general opinion of the Popish Recusants the Laity I mean concerning the Pope's Supremacy hath no ill influence upon our Civil Government which is that which I chiefly intend in this discourse but that they think themselves indispensably oblig'd to defend our Lawful Kings and their Civil Authority not only against all temporal powers whatsoever but even against the Pope himself Mer. This Sir I have heard much controverted and the contrary opinion affirm'd by some of their own Writers that is to say That the Pope may and doth Excommunicate heretick Kings as he calls them By which act their Subjects are no more bound to pay them their obedience nay and can absolve the people from their Oath of Allegeance and impower them to depose their natural and lawful Prince and set up some other in his stead Now Sir this is such a doctrine as makes the Papists uncapable of ever being trusted under any Protestant Government Trav. I confess Sir I have heard that some private men have maintain'd some such erroneous and perniciouâ— Principles and flattering the Pope have endeavoured to raise his power to a much sublimer pitch than ever Christ himself or any of his Apostles pretended it should arrive But Sir as Temporal Princes have been ever usurping upon one another and by most unchristian ways sacrificed the innocent blood of many thousands of men for the promoting their own greatness and satisfying their ambitious designs so these Spiritual Emperours have follow'd too much the ill examples of Temporal Princes And being it may be more solicitous to extend their power than encrease the number of true believers have perverted the good use of St. Peters Keys and have rather opened by them the door of dissention and discord upon earth than the gates of the Heavenly Paradise For some years these holy Fathers exercised their arms against one another and how much blood and horrid troubles the dispute between the Bishop of Rome and Patriarch of Constantinople concerning Primacy hath cost Christendom is sufficiently recorded in History I may add farther that this their contention became at last the ruine of the Greek Empire but hitherto the Temporal Princes enjoy'd their rights and Prerogatives undisturb'd until Hildebrand otherwise called Gregory the seventh arrogated to himself a Soveraign authority over all Christian Kings and Emperours as may be seen at large in the History of Henry the fourth Emperour of Germany who was the first unfortunate example of the Papal usurpation which is confirm'd by a learned Roman Catholick Bishop and one who lived in the Reign of Fred. the first his words are these Lego relego saith he Romanorum Regum Imperatorum gesta nunquam invenio quenquam eorum ante hunc à Romano Pontifice excommunicatum vel regno privatum nisi forte quis pro Anathemate habendum ducat quod Philippus ad breve tempus à Romano Episcopo inter poenitentes collocatus Theodosius à beato Ambrosio propter cruentam caedem à liminibus Ecclesiae sequestratus sit Ottofrising c. 35. After this several encroachments were made upon other Princes and the Popes making use as well of St. Paul's Sword as St. Peter's Keys reduc'd most of them under their obedience and as the same Author expresses it destroy'd them by that very power which they had first receiv'd from the benevolence of the Emperours themselves seeming to imitate therein the Prophet David who first overcame the Philistine by the providence of God and then cut off his head with his own Sword Videntur culpandi Sacerdotes per omnia qui regnum suo gladio quem ipsi à regum habent gratia ferire conentur nisi forte David imitari cogitent qui Philistinum priâ—o virtute Dei stravit postmodum prâ—prio gladio jugulavit Now Sir after the Popes were in possession of these great Prerogatives and had perswaded the people to contribute as well to their own as their Princes slavery by granting them this universal right of power it is no wonder if some of their own Clergy have endeavoured by false arguments to maintain this usurp'd authority But Cousin it is well known that this is now become no more than an old antiquated title and gives him no right over Soveraign Princes at this day It is true those Princes who submitted themselves to the constitutions of the Council of Treâ—t permit the Pope to exercise some Spiritual Jurisdiction in their Kingdoms But it is universally and publickly declared that the Popes have no Civil or Temporal Authority over Soveraign Princes nor can they by their Spiritual power or authoritate clavium Ecclesiae depose any King or absolve any Subject from their Faith Obedience or Oath of Allegeanâ—e Mer. Can you give an instance of 〈…〉 made by any Popish Kings and consented to by the Roman Clergy Trav. Yes Sir and that so fully that there can remain no scruple or difficulty and it is by the most Christian King of France and eldest son of the Roman Church and a severe persecutor of the Protestant Religion I will give you the words of the Declaration it self as far as it concerns this particular that you may the better judge your self of the truth It is Declared by the Gallick Church Primum beato Petro ejusque successoribus Christi Vicariis ipsique
I have made some other few remarks as the impertinent comparison which Plato hath made of a Bayliff Attorney or Referrâ—e as they relate to the choosing the Speaker of the House of Commons all which is directly against himself his magisterial definition of Prerogative and many other arrogances and follies all which I hope I shall be able to answer my self without giving you any farther trouble Trav. Sir I do not in the least quâ—stâ—on it however if any thing hath been omitted in which I may be able to give you farther satisfaction I shall â—vâ—r be ready to obey your Commands Coelum ipsum pâ—timus stultitiâ— neque Per nostâ—um pâ—â—imâ—â— scelâ—â— Iracunda Jovem ponere fulmina Horaâ— â—arm l. 1. THE CONTENTS DISCOURSE I. OF the Graâ—iâ—n Commonwealtâ—â— compâ—red wâ—â—h England Page â—4 â—5 Of Plato Lycurgus Sparta and Athens p. 26. 27. sequent The original of the Graecian Governments p. 34. seq Of Solon p. 37. Of Athens p. 41. Of Sparta p. 47. The Ephori p. 48. DISCOURSE II. Division of Government p. 59. Of the House of Commons p. 65. their Institution p. 68. Of the House of Lords p. 66. 67. Of the Kings prerogative in Adjourning Proroguing and Dissolving Parliaments p. 7â— The beginning of Government before the Flood p. 76. After the Flood 7â— Of Ogyges Sithuthrus Deucalian Noe p. 79. Of Natâ—â—e p. 8â— First Kingdoms afâ—… the Flood instituted by fathers of Famâ—lies p. 87. 802. No right of Power nor Liberty originally in the People p. 89 Commonwealths founded upon Vsurpaâ—â—on c. p. 90. Of the Creâ—tion of the World and Mankind according to â—â—cretius and some other Heathen Philoâ—oâ—â—ers p. 91. seq Of Moses â—â—d â—â—â— History p. 97. seq Abraham hâ—d Regal Authority p. 107 Saulâ— â—â—t chosen by the people nor depended â—poâ— them p. 109. Empire not founded oâ— Property p. 113. upon â—â—at it is foundâ—â— p. 125. 127. Not reasonâ—ble thâ—â— the People who have the greatest interest in the Property should have any right of power in the Governmeent except what is subordinate p. 14â— Of Power â—48 God governs humanâ— affairs p. 154. Of force p. 156. That the people by â—â—ving an interest in the Property have â—ot â—â—ereâ—â—â— greater power force or streâ—gtâ— than if they hâ—d it â—oâ— p. 1â—2 Of â—…es p. 169. All Soveraign Priâ—â—â—s â—â—vâ—â—â—ighâ— of â—oâ—er â—veâ— tâ—e 〈…〉 the properâ—y be diviâ—… the people p â—71 Moâ—â—rchs who hâ—ve â—â—joâ—eâ— the Sâ—pâ—eâ—e Aâ—thority hâ—ve yet left the property to the people Of the Scythians p. 178. Of the Assyrianâ— Medes and Persians p. 180. Of the Aegyptian Kings p. 182. Of the Romans p. 185. Of the Brittish Kings p. 192. Of the Kings of Israel â—r of the Jews p. 193. Definition of an â—bsolute Monarch p. 196 197. David â—â—â—bsolute Monarch p. 199. Of Zedâ—kiaâ— and Jeremiah p. 204. Of the â—aâ—hedrim p. 209. Of the Goths â— 212. Of the Lombards p. 216. Of the Vandalls p. 221. Of Clâ—â—mâ—â—â—s King of Sparta p. 225. The death of the last Christian Greek Emperour and loss of Constantinople p. 226. DISCOURSE III. Moses Theseus and Romulus â—ot Founders of Demoâ—râ—ciâ—s aâ— Plato Red averrs p. 242. Of the Gracchi and Agrarian Lâ—w p. 25â— â—53 Of Agis â—nâ— Clâ—â—mâ—neâ— p. 260. Punishmeâ—t of Sedition anâ— Calâ—mniâ—â—ors of the Government in Venice 26â— Of the French Gentry Frâ—emen and Râ—â—â—â—â—â—rs their â—…res p. 27â— Vindiâ—â—tion of 〈…〉 Clergy and Ecclestastical Government against the malicious reflections of Plato Red. p. 274. 277. Soveraign right of power solely in the King p. 279. 284. Of the Kings negative voice in Parliament p. 281. The Kings of England depend not upon the people nor received their right of power from them p. 285. seq 288. The Goths not in England p. 291. Of the Saxons and their Tenures p. 293. 297. Of our late Parliament p. 295. Of K. Edward the Confessor p. 298. Plato Red. designs to set up a Commonwealth p. 304. Of the Kingâ— prerogative p. 306. Of our Liberties p. 315. Of Calumniators p. 317. Of our Properties p. 322. Of Annual Parl. p. 325. Of Religion p. 333. Of Dissenters p. 335. Of Popish Recusants 340. Of Toleration 342. Of the Popes Supremacy 350. 355. Dissenters Doctrine of Deposing Princes 357. A Commonwealth not to be promoted in this present conjuncture of affairs 361. 367. Of Arbitrary power in the King 365. Of Liberty of Conscience 369. ERRATA IN the Preface Line 1. for Inquity read Iniquity p. 66. l. 17. put out But. p. 80. for pâ—rsonatus r. persâ—â—â—tatuâ— l. 12. for Abydnuâ— r. Abydenuâ— p. 86 l. 11. for Government r. faith p. 143. l ult for Vital heat r. Animal â—pirits p 144. l. 1. for Veins r. Nerves p. 185 255 256 294 for Praeda r. praedia p. 186. for lientiam r. licentiam