Selected quad for the lemma: religion_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
religion_n authority_n church_n scripture_n 4,231 5 6.1426 4 false
View all documents for the selected quad

Text snippets containing the quad

ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A67621 The natural fanatick, or, Reason consider'd in its extravagancy in religion and (in some late treatises) usurping the authority of the Church and councils by John Warly ... Warly, John, d. 1679. 1676 (1676) Wing W876; ESTC R15139 52,674 234

There are 6 snippets containing the selected quad. | View lemmatised text

of a visible Church at any time since it was founded if not the being of any truly so called For that principle which obligeth a man to believe that all Councils have been fallible will never put him out of doubt whether the profession of the Church at any time was agreeable to the truth of Religion For seeing the Reasoners rule admits of nothing as certain further than it is knowable by some faculty of the Soul independent form Divine assistance it is impossible that he can have any more than conjectural knowledg Reason being not able to inform him of a Criterion of a true Church by its own evidence but by Revelation which says the true faith shall not fail Now that this true faith is in a doubtful case must be determin'd by those who have power from God to make a certain discovery of it That which is said is so agreeable to the Apostolical rule no Scripture is of private interpretation which must be confest by the Reasoner though there was no Sacred Authority to confirm that Canon that it is only necessary that objections are remov'd The first of which may be this that by the delivery of Reason in private persons to be determin'd by that which prevails in a multitude is to make or set up a Rational Papacy For as each Member of the Roman Church is no further esteem'd Orthodox than he delivers up his private reason either to the Pope alone or as he is in juncto with a general Council which is said to have such power to determine infallibly though the interpretation make Scripture to be no Scripture So every Christian is to be esteem'd Orthodox or Haeretical according to the sense of the Council which hath power to interpret and make his reason to be no reason No such conclusion can follow and if it did it would not break the force of the arguments which confirm the former positions For suppose the Definitions of Councils as conclusions which Reason draws from the premises nor as none can be so rash as to say Reason makes the conclusion true which was so before only it could not commend it to the will and understanding as an object of natural faith till the two propositions were brought as witnesses of the truth of the conclusion or that Logick creates truth but only assists the invention in its search for it so by the same reason none may say that Councils make Articles of true Religion though they are the means of their discovery But let this objection be consider'd as it relates to Papal Decretals The name Pope will never affright the sober man out of that reverence which is due to just Authority Councils and holy Synods or if it be found to be so in a single person For if it could be prov'd as some have affirm'd that the Pope was and is the Church Virtual it would be beyond dispute that infallibility did at some time since Christian Religion was in the World sit in the Chair or at least may do when fundamental controversies arise which threaten the Churches ruine without the imputation of making Scripture to be no Scripture by his Authority It may be safely said by any Christian that he would not give assent to several Doctrines which are urg'd as matters of faith necessarily to be believ'd for the attaining Salvation did not the Church declare them to be so yet the same person on the same principle is not oblig'd to think that which is so defin'd by the Church is made true by its definition Hitherto I have us'd this comparison which makes the determinations of Councils as conclusions of a Syllogism made by the Heads of the World to illustrate the answer to an objection but it being so apposit to another design it shall be us'd to shew that the Reasoner in a Council is not capable of making a Syllogism from mere natural Topicks to demonstrate the truth of that which is debated This will appear to be true from the consideration of the Structure of a Syllogism which leads us to the knowledg of a proposition which was less known by others which are more evident and easie to be understood For the medium which is an ingredient of both propositions is as clear and as certain as a common notion and the truth of the conclusion depends on it which if mistaken makes the Syllogism a fallacy Suppose therefore the Members of a Council as so many Scholasticks arguing they have no such common notions as Philosophers have by which as media they can draw conclusions Although it must be confest that the understanding by its own evidence can judg of the truth of some propositions viz. It is impossible God can do any act which implyes a contradiction c. Yet Divine Revelation is the medium by which truth in propositions which are more obscure is determined Hence it sollows that the Sanctions and Definitions of Councils must be said to be Hypothetically pronounc'd true as this saying is viz. If the Moon is Eclipsed the Earth interposeth it self between it and the Sun Not unlike this is the way of arguing in a Council which proves Christ's humanity from his Passion for if he suffereth humane nature did interpose it self else he could not suffer Now as none will say there is and always was anecessity not in the nature of the Moon but in the manner of its motion that it must be Eclipsed at some times for to say so is to confine the Almighty's wisdom to one System and to take away the possibility of the Worlds being in such a frame in which neither Sun or Moon might be Eclipsed but when it is seen to be so it is evident that the Earths interposition is the cause of that seeming defect So a Council cannot conclude the necessity of Christs being Man but Hypothetically For the Divine decrees which reason cannot know but by Revelation are as the condition or antecedent which makes Christ's humanity necessary Let not this assertion seem strange since it is impossible but that reason must be defective as it appears from the former instance as also from this consideration that the mere Reasoner cannot conclude the necessity of Christs incarnation and will be more at a loss in other mysterious matters of faith The definitions and conclusions of Councils thus hypothetically drawn are not less certain because they are such seeing the Antecedents of their propositions are matters of fact contain'd in holy Scriptures and those who discourse have Divine assistance in discerning the connexion and inferring the consequences Now the connexion and sequel is true because of the Divine direction as is already prov'd and the Antecedent viz. matters of fact is so as it appears from the miracles which confirm'd their truth which were such as reason might discern to be Divine for Reason may be allow'd a Judg in this case though not in all doubts which come under debate in a Council The reason of which is this
vain imaginations who scorn'd all ties of Laws and Religion As subjection to Governours is never more effectually recommended by any mere rational argument than that which comes with this consideration of the necessity of bring obedient to Magistrates because humane nature is not so able to provid for it self in solitude as in Societies So the extravagant Reasoners in Religion are not any way better reduced to obedience to Ecclesiastical Authority than by contemplating the vanity of their own imaginations For that prospect of their own ignorance will make Reason so obsequious and tame that though Ecclesiastical Laws as the Greek Law-giver saies of Laws in general are lookt on as Cobwebs yet they will not think it their interest to break them This consider'd I hope may supplant all censure which might condemn this way of arguing as prejudicial to Religion by rendring arguments which were design'd to fortifie it weakned by too severe an inquisition for this method doth no more violence to Religion than a Chirurgion doth to his Patient whilst he stretches the Sinews in order to set a bone which was out of its place Neither shall I fear that these Papers will be lookt upon as vainly speculative seeing the Dedication directs the Reader to so eminent an Example which alone though the Church was not protected by civil power and truth naked in that sense which the factious Adversary would have it is able to win practice and engage all Christian obedience which is desired and design'd so far as these Papers can promote it by My L d. Your Lordships most humble and obedient Servant John Warly An Advertisement SO often as the word Reasoner occurrs in this Tract it is to be understood of the Author of the Treatise of Humane Reason or of any other who is conducted by his principles and so often as the word Reconciler is us'd it is to be understood of the Author of the considerations of the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion other Authors antient and Modern are either plainly cited or so discoverable by their matter that nothing more need be said by way of Explanation ERRATA REad as streight an Union page 16. for who read which p. 34. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 35. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 65. dele they 73. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 85 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 90. r. terminated p. 92. r. p. 104 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 108 r. Minucius Felix 112. dele that 115. r. as much p. 116. dele least r. or p. 118. r. Erroneous p. 139. dele not and r. are not p. 153. r. scales p. 162. for which r. when 170 r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 173. for that r. what 178. fornor r. now p. 180. Dele not 184. REASON in some late Treatises being set up Umpire in Religion challenging Appeals to be made to it as the highest Tribunal and being asserted with priviledges which are exalted above Pelagian invention or what any other Heresie could project And one Article of the Church of England being threatned by some positions which directly oppose it by saying That a man may be sav'd by the Law or Sect which he professeth so that he diligently frame his life according to that Law and the light of nature I thought my self obliged to examine the foundation on which this natural infallibility was built which is supported by these positions which say That faith is an assent given to Religious matters the understanding and will being no otherwise assisted than they are in drawing other Conclusions And that Reason requires no other assistance in the act of faith than the proposal of that which is to be believed which the Reasoner calls the near approach of the object being brought nigher by Revelation The former account of faith is imperfect and attended with many false conclusions which are deductions from it amongst many let this be considered That no man according to that description of faith can be an Infidel who hath readholy Scripture or its contents or matter proposed to his understanding And as it is an impossibility that Euclid should not render the intelligent Reader a Mathematician so it is equally impossible that the contents of holy Scriptures proposed to the Infidel should not make him a Convert This is necessarily inferred from the former position and shall be more illustrated by a supposition suppose therefore an Ethnic made so much a Proselite to the true Religion by reading holy Scriptures that he gives assent to matters of Religion no further than upon Examination he shall find them agreeable or congenial to his Reason or to speak another Phrase Reason can confess them to be true and let him be suppos'd to speak like the Samaritan-Woman in another case saying I do not believe the Creation of the World the incarnation of Christ and other matters of faith because of the evidence of the Divine Records but because I presume my belief will be ratifi'd and approv'd by my reason which is naturally bound to confess them when they are propos'd it will appear upon experiment that he is a wavering and weak Convert not far remov'd from infidelity This supposition is agreeable to the Reasoners account of faith and that term of art which expresseth it calling under standing and will the Elements of which faith is compounded In examining which I intend not to be so critical as he in interpretation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will equally admit of such critical exercise but rather take it in the common acceptation That out of which bodies are made and into which is their last Return or Resolution which being accommodated to the Reasoners sense will conclude that Religious knowledge was no otherwise in mans mind than Idaea's or some dormantknowledg to be excited by proposal of holy Scriptures or as letters to make words to be fram'd by the Divine Paedagogy the Law and Gospel too being in his sense but as a School-master not according to the Apostles meaning to prompt the understanding This is so false that it may be confuted by History which sayes many perused the Mosaical-Scripture and some past critical judgments on them Longinus and others with the Greek Law-givers though some of their knowledg seems borrowed from them who must be in the Catalogue of Infidels And later ages give examples of this kind many men who must be acknowledged to be Masters of reason being not able to reduce themselves to belief according to the former method which wanting the Divine Testimony to byass their wills and to command assent left them in desperate Scepticism for though the contents of Religion are such as may be presum'd sufficient to command or at least win assent yet the medium which begets this perswasion is taken of holy Scriptures which saith Reason in some sense must be laid aside which shall be more proved in its proper place whilst it resigns it self to a more insallible conduct Let it be
also consider'd if the will and understanding are the Elements of Faith that an Ethnic laying aside the Divine Testimony and retiring to his reason would be more confirm'd in his perswasion As a Chymist asserts his principles and practical knowledge above that which Theory teacheth whilst he Analyses or dissolves a body by which he makes sense a witness of his reason and gives evidence of the truth by both or as the Mathematical knowledge challenges greater certainty than that in other Sciences which taking a Scheme asunder by demonstration and rebuilding it on the same principles confidently and justly calls it true but the success is different in Religious cases as in some curious contexture which is defective by its too fine threads and not far remov'd from nothing when most tenderly unwoven To this another consideration may be added how it can be imagined that the Heathens should be ignorant of the contents of Religion at least so far as practical seeing Reason is allow'd a Judge naturally qualified for decision of Religious controversies and consequently able to comprehend matters of Faith and in capacity to frame Religious precepts or notions without any assistance from without but only furnisht with its own innate faculty For that as well as he who is set up as judge in all controversies must be supposed to understand the whole Law though particular cases determine the sentence to some parts of it Let this be illustrated by that fam'd instance of a Theorem revealed to Pythagoras by a Daemon which although acknowledged to be borrowed from Revelation yet the principles by which judgment was past on it were not derived from that kind Spirit and it may be though possible that the Sophy might have made the discovery without that Monitor and himself proclaim the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This instance apply'd to the present case will force the Reasoner to confess that it was possible that the Ethnic might have luckily discover'd the matter which Religion proposes to be believ'd by his own saculties following their natural conduct which cannot be granted If it is objected that a great part of Religion is to be found in Heathens writings It may find an answer from this consideration that no arguments taken from Pagans Books for the proof of the truth of Religion can be said to prevail otherwise than by being probable and perswasive and they borrowing their force from Christian Interpretations and those which have influence on practice notwithstanding the seeming affinity between Reason and Religion are like Towers or Buildings which at a great distance seem contiguous which the eye by a nearer approach finds remov'd from their fallacious neighborhood That which is said may find another check from the Reasoner's fundamental position which concludes that it is a sufficient assistance to reason in act of faith if the object be brought nigher by Revelation which if true he may impute Heathenish ignorance in matters of Religion to no other cause but the want of holy Scriptures and retort the force of the former considerations by proposal of this question whether it is possible that the curious and secret Mechanism of nature in Animals and other Bodies could be discern'd without a Microscope which being deny'd may make it applicable to the former case Revelation being as necessary for the begetting of faith in the Heathen as a Glass for discerning the small parts of matter This must not be deny'd but if by Revelation the bare proposal of holy Scripture is understood as sufficient to command assent this will be a necessary consequence That the true Religion was not imbrac'd or believ'd in several Ages for no other reason than the Sporades which were confusedly discern'd in the Viá lacteá were not discern'd till Galilaeus made the discovery For as a Telescope was necessary for the discerning of the one so the holy Scriptures for believing of the other the want of which cannot be thought the sole cause of infidelity the contrary being demonstrable from the practice of the Jews who must not altogether by one peremptory sentence be depriv'd of their Reason who have not and perhaps could not be reduc'd to belief though conversant with holy writings this makes way for this Disquisition Whether in the act of faith the understanding is enlightned and consequently the will determined in such manner as it cannot be by a mere natural conduct The affirmative of this may be proved according to the method of the Schools from this Topick of Gods concurse with man which alwayes leaves goodness as its effect which must be called perfection according to the meaning of the Character which was given of the whole Creation that all that was made was good viz. Every Creature perfect in its kind seeing therefore faith is the work of God on the understanding 't is past doubt that it is improv'd and the sight more perfect How it is perfected shall be declared in another disquisition in this place 't is enough if I remove prejudices which the former assertion may create by saying that the perfection which the Soul hath in the act of faith is not such as advances its nature to an Angelical degree of knowledge yet it hath more than could be the result of mere natural powers guided by their own methods Neither must this perfection be restrain'd to simple apprehensions or notions but complex which would be as Ropes of Sand without any true connexion which must be such because matters of Religion transcend reasons highest pitch which knows not how to compound its notions or thoughts so as to make true propositions as may appear from an instance in one fundamental If this question be proposed to reason whether God and Man could be in streight an union as they are in Christ's person it must remain undetermined And God and Man must stand in the proposition as Subject and Praedicate till Divine testimony comes as a Copula To prevent such misprisions this explanation may be added viz. That by the perfection attributed to the Soul in the act of faith no new faculties are to be suppos'd that could transform its nature and remove humanity to another kind However that which is said may make way for an objection if the mind is thus perfected or inlightned to discern the truth of proposition of which it must be ignorant whilest guided or inform'd by its own natural evidence and conduct all believers are Enthusiasts This is no necessary consequence of the former assertion For Enthusiasin derives not its name from the Divine concurse with the Soul in some particular acts but when it comes at times when it is not expected and out of the common course and method or when knowledge which seems extraordinary such as a man could not attain to by use of his reason and which he doth not understand when spoken Now the improvement of the pious mans knowledge which is acquir'd by regular means which Religion commands to be us'd deserves not
is prov'd from the goodness of God which cannot be imagin'd to have deluded his Creature with a false draught of himself This argument is of so great force that I know none so cogent if it meet with a mind praedispos'd for the Reception of truth but is not strong enough to beat the Sceptick off his ground because the very sinews of this argument borrow their strength from a supposition one attribute of God being necessarily suppos'd viz. His goodness before the Reasoner can put himself in a capacity of arguing However it must be granted that supposition doth not destroy the certainty of finding truth for to suppose Falsity in some cases is a sure way to find Truth as in the Rule of false in Arithmetick But this method fails in this case for in those Operations the suppositions are raz'd out and laid by when the work is perfected but in this argument the supposition can never be laid aside for the truth of the Conclusion depends on the goodness of God as known to be such as would not impose on his Creature which the Sceptick will look on as but suppos'd If it be urged in favour of the former argument That Reason concludes the being or existence of the Deity and understands the attributes of God by rules equally certain with those in the Arithmatical instance seeing the Souls faculties are as a Standard by which it can measure the Divine perfections and find what is goodness or wisdom in God by measuring them with the notion or footsteps of them left in the mind The argument thus managed must be acknowledged to be of great value and serviceable to the casuist in solution of doubts but the defect of Reason being necessarily supplyed with a supposition in this way of arguing without which mans faculties may be suspected as false it is not probable the Sceptick will be perswaded out of his affected ignorance After this new Method let old arguments be consider'd which seem more Catholick and easie being drawn from the common appearance or Phaenomena's of Nature and observation of Providence with those from other Topicks by which the Soul is fetter'd so that it cannot evade an assent to the existence of God yet it will appear that the strength and evidence of this argument cannot command that assent without confusion of Thoughts which implyes ignorance and extravagancy which are not tolerable in a Guide That argument which is most obvious is drawn from the admirable Fabrick of the World which must be allow'd to have its due force when it meets with a ductile mind far remov'd from Sceptical stiffness made so by a Divine disposition for receiving Truth without which it is so far from conducting men to the knowledge of God that it will rather incline the mind to Idolatry Heathens practice is an undeniable evidence of this Truth For it may be a reasonable conjecture that Idolatry took its rise from the gross consideration of Wisdom and Power which appear'd in the lovely frame of the World and afterward this power was divided and subdivided into several ranks of Gods and Semi-Gods That the whole World was but as one great Idol may appear from Poetical sayings which Authority may pass in this case Poets being the only Divines in the Heathenish ages who wrapt Religion and that Secular wisdom in verse who Deified the World under that great name Pan. If it be said that Shepheards had this name given them by Poets yet it is plain that the mystery was terminated in higher beings as Plutarch allows Pan to have influence on the Oracles as Superintendent and some have applyed the story of his death to Christ's suffering which is enough to shew he was more than a Shepherd or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For that age as others before consider'd the World and its Creator in one grosse notion which they expres't by Pan as may be prov'd from the account which Orpheus gives of that Idoliz'd name in another place further to be consider'd But seeing this way of argument from Practice may not appear so convincing as that of Theory because all do not tread the same steps with equal success and the question is not what knowledge of God hath been but what may be learn't from the Creation To this demand a short answer may be return'd When a man takes a serious prospect of the World one of these thoughts will arise either that it had a beginning of it self or that it was the work of some Architect if he is inclinable to allow the former all that Reason can do in order to his conviction is to shew the impossibility of the World 's being its own cause or maker This prov'd can only remove him from Atheism or at least dispose him for a belief of the existence and knowledge of God He therefore who arrives to this degree of knowledg in strictness and propriety of speech deserves not the name Theist any more than a man comeing out of a Cell or Wilderness seeing a Diamond or Jewel hath only so much knowledg to pass sentence that it is not of the same kind of stones which he treads on deserves the name of a Jeweller or seeing a stately Pallace hath only skill to conclude that the stones did not meet by mutual consent as the fabulous story sayes of the building of Thebes for erecting that Fabrick neither did grow so uniformly out of the Earth may be said to know an Architect or a Builder If in defence of this argument it is said that he who denyes that a Fabrick can raise it self tacitly implyes the necessity of the being of some Builder This granted will not relieve the Idiot for the Builder can be no otherwise said to be known by him than under the general notion of a Cause Now who will be so ridiculous as to say that a man understands what an Architect is and what kind and degree of knowledge gives him that name who hath only a general notion of him by which he calls him the cause of a House which description is so rude that it cannot be allow'd except Logick can justifie it by terms of Art unknown to the Idiot however it cannot acquit him from the imputation of grosse ignorance which will appear greater when he considers the nice operations of nature For if Creatures are look't upon which are most expos'd to common view nature sitting in them as on the stage it is but little and that conjectural knowledge he can pretend to let the Heavenly bodies be an instance to prove mans ignorance of their nature and influence who will pretend to know except from Astrologer as ignorant as bold for what design the Heavens so regularly muster their forces till the event shews it or to determine what dependance the World hath on some of the Stars and positively conclude that they are not Worlds though not of the same frame with this of which Men are Inhabitants Now if man is ignorant of the dependance
own principles and when it submits to the Divine Testimony 't is because Reason is informed by Revelation That it is not a Competent Judge of Religious Mysteries yet that assent being guided by the Divine Testimony instead of evidence diverting the faculties of the Soul from their usual method is enough to assert Reasons being laid aside Yet this will not make way for a cavilling complaint that the Divine determination doth violence to the faculties whilst thus diverted from their usual method for the Divine concurse which determines them can no more be said to do violence than the Mathematicians information of the Judge in the former case can be called compulsion when he prevailed with him to pass true sentence which he without the Artist could not have pronounc't It is not necessary that matters of belief are clearly and distinctly understood for faith takes its name from perswasion which is not always begotten by demonstration and from assent more than from the manner how it is wrought for the Divine method hath several ways to command belief sometimes it makes an extempore Convert grace working effectually in a moment sometimes it operates through the whole course of mans life to perfect the work It is enough that men are assured that their assent is terminated in truth because of the Divine determination which makes the Will like the Load-stone which instance is much used by the Reconciler which will certainly conduct the Mariner though he knows not how it is directed whether by a materia subtilis passing through the poles of this low vortex or any other mysterious way of nature To speak all if Sailing had been laid aside till the Pilot could demonstrate its infallible direction from its causes the greater part of the World would have been unknown and the terra incognita would take more room in the Mapp than the known part of the World The same may be concluded of faith for if all belief was to be suspended until the manner how it was wrought was explained a great part of the World would pass as Infidels Thus far the infirmity of the mere natural sight hath been discovered it now remains that I inquire in what sense the Reconciler who urgeth belief as an Act of Prudence by which if he only understand a rational choice excluding grace the former discourse will equally conclude against him and the Reasoner For if a man endued with natural Prudence must necessarily embrace the Christian Religion because its contents are such as will command assent from the Reasonable man he shuts out Grace in the Act of Faith and makes the Holy Scriptures more sufficient and in another sense than ever they were said to be for which they are said to be so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Athanasius Cyril and other holy Fathers it is to shew they are self-sufficient without the subsidies of Traditions not in any other sense for although it must be granted that the proposal of Scripture is enough to condemn the Infidel as imprudent yet this condemnation may not be justified only because the evidence of Scripture was not allow'd for it is more than probable that the neglect of Petitioning for Grace and opposing it when offered to help unbelief doth adjust the severity of that saying He who believes not shall be damn'd Natural Prudence is not a sufficient qualification for the imbracing Christian Religion if we take it in Aristotles sense who defines it an habitual knowledg which can discern what is good and what is evil as they have relation to practice lib. Sexto Ethicor. ad Nicom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence thus defin'd can have no place as Antecedent to belief because that mere Reason in several Cases cannot judge what is good for man and what evil and therefore will demur at some duties absolutely necessary for the attaining of happiness such as are self-denial and other injunctions which natural prudence will not choose if left to its own evidence And if it be considered as subsequent to belief there is no need of it in discerning what is good in practice and what is evil for duties in Religion are indispensably enjoyned which destroyes consultation which denominates a man Prudent I shall conclude this particular with Christ's deciding the Controversie by ranking the Prudent man in this sense not so wise as a Babe without Divine assistance And when it is taken in a better sense Divine direction and concurse is suppos'd as necessary to supply the defect of the mind and therefore may challenge the Etymology which Aristotle gives of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whilst he calls it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which God alone is able to do and make men wise unto Salvation Add to this another consideration that a Prudential choice of Religion supposes it and its reward too to be exposed as a prize not in the Apostlical sense So that he who hath the greatest stock of Prudence must pass as most Religious when he who hath the least be esteem'd a Reprobate From all that is said I shall only infer this conclusion seeing our eye-sight needs alteration and it self is indispos'd the Believer doth safely resign himself to the conduct of the All-seeing-eye according to the Rule of a severe Philosopher who would not admit any truth but upon the evidence of Reason who says we may in some Cases as safely trust others as our selves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist lib. Sext. Ethic. ad Nicom So far as men follow an unerring conduct so far they are infallible though they are not their own Leaders Hitherto Reason hath been considerd as it is in a single person but the following Disquisition considers it in a multitude or an Assembly as it attends their Sacred Votes by which it is made more infallible than when as a Monarch it asserts its seeming priviledges by renouncing all manner of assistance in drawing conclusions but only that which were nature affords relying on private evidence which also is suppos'd in every particular Member of a Council Therefore it is proper to examine whether Reason only inlightned by apprehending the story and contents of the old and new Testaments is capable of appeals made to it as Judg and the last determiner of Controversies so as it can pass infallible judgment on propositions offer'd as Revelation And whether the fallibility of some Councils renders all so suspicious that the Christian cannot safely rely on Conciliary definitions The first branch of this inquiry is affirmed by the Reasoner and the other he will not have deny'd because it makes way for the proof of the former for by infinuating that all Councils are fallible he presumes he may as well appeal to a fallible self as a fallible multitude But this assertion may be checkt from this consideration That there is much difference between these propositions General Councils may err And All have been and are lyable to Error If the latter is granted it will destroy the certainty
Miracles being works which exceed mere natural power or ordinary course of nature it is furnished with faculties which can discern what is natural and what not but is at a loss in higher mysteries This assertion perhaps may be checkt by an instance in conciliary proceedings in discerning Canonical Books of Holy Scripture from Apocryphal or any falsly so called in which judgment is past by mere rational evidence whilst it distinguisheth the one from the other by their Contents This must not be granted for though the contents of Holy Scriptures are a good argument of their truth yet they are not the only Characteristicks to distinguish them from others which are not Canonical When there is any debate in a Council concerning any part of Scripture to be admitted into Canon appeals are not made to mere Reason to judg of its contents any further than by comparison of them with those of other Books which are received without any controversie It is the Councils business to argue as the Apostolical Canon says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Church of England concludes the definitions of Councils deductions of Reason Artic. 21 which admits of this limitation or rather interpretation that though Reason draws the conclussions yet their truth is not measur'd by a bare congruity to it but the reception of it in the primitive Church or the most free and unbiassed Councils and so much of its as belongs to the Old Testament by the Jewish Catalogue and by several other Rules which are as a Touchstone to discover Gold and distinguish it from baser Mettals To speak all Conciliary Discussions in this case do not inquire how Revelation is agreeable to Reason but what is to be admitted as Revelation and what to be rejected and when that is done compare one Text with another till they agree which consent is the most infallible evidence of truth However it is scarce probable that the Reasoner will be perswaded or argued out of his pretended private infallibility whilst he concludes every individual man may proceed on the same ground which Councils do because each rational man being in some degree more or less able to draw conclusions by Analogy or comparing the several contents of Holy Scriptures Wherefore let it be suppos'd that each reasonable man is naturally qualified to find truth yet seeing the promise of Divine assistance which is the most sure foundation on which infallibility can rest is not to a single person those natural qualifications cannot assure them of finding it I am sensible that the Reasoner may take occasion from what is said of urging a question whether the former assertion doth take the priviledge from every private person so that in any case he cannot interpret Scripture The affirmative of this question may be safely maintain'd as it hath respect to private persons who are known Members of the Church and have opportunity of being acquainted with and to be inform'd what is the interpretation and sense of the Church in general which must be a direction to those who pass judgment in particular cases for they may not appeal from Synods to their own private reason and because truth is certainly to be found in Councils and there are Rules of finding it If it is further demanded whether a private person who hath neither learning or opportunity to understand the sense of the Church may not be a safe interpreter of Scripture in order to his own Satisfaction and Salvation As this proposes an extraordinary case so the answer may be dubiously return'd However it may be said to the first part of the question that it cannot be well supposed that any illiterate person should of necessity be ignorant of the sense of the Church seeing he is a known Member of the same and the pastors are as Mouths to declare it To the other part of the question which supposes a Christian so unfortunately amongst the Infidels plac't that he cannot have access to Pastors of the Church it is enough to propose another question viz. Whether the Thief on the Cross who may be supposed to want time though nothingmore could be wanting whilst Christ was with him did give assent to all fundamentals of Religion by faith as explicit as is required of other Chistians who have the advantage of more time and other circumstances The answer given to this will help the solution of the other doubt The manner of Conciliary proceedings being considered and the unfitness of the mere reasoner for such debates in he next place the necessity of Councils shall be prov'd by which the other part of the Disquisition will be better understood Such Sacred Assemblies are necessary though not at all times for some ages pass't without them for the exigency of the Church requires such supplies To imagin it could always be without them is to conclude it exempt from all possibility of erring and independent as to the Divine conduct which is promis'd to lead it and continue it in the way of truth The former cannot be granted for Heresies must be and then there is as great necessity of their condemnation The latter cannot be allow'd for as it intrenches on the Divine Dominion so it doth equalize the Church Militant with the Triumphant whose greatest Trimuph is ovr Error This necessity of Councils is confirm'd from the consideration of different opinions concerning matters of faith which equally commend themselves to the Christian and render his Will so indifferent that he knows not to which part to incline till determined by Authority It is no strange thing to meet with two opinions in other cases which plead for themselves with such equal probability that the most accurate judgment will rather suspend its belief than give assent to either neither let it appear a prodigy if Religion afford such cases as would render its proselytes or professors sceptically puzled without a more infallible guide than their own Reason But it may be said that in other cases the wise men do not give themselves up to a Sect or Council of Philosophers to be Vmpires in dubious matters This is granted for it is unreasonable that they should deliver up their Reason to the most fam'd Sophies but the reason is not the same in Religious debates For a single person may be qualifi'd for finding truth in Philosophy with such certainty as may vie with the numerous Sects but no private member of the Church may pretend to that cretainty which must be allow'd in Councils It is possible that one man may be master of more reason and Philosophy than is to be found in all the World at that time and one walking Library more valuable than a Vatican but Religious knowledg is not design'd to be so Monastical as to live in solitude or a single person Besides if it could be prov'd that the Philosophers had the same assurance of a true conduct in their doubts by reason which the Councils have by Divine supplies he would be unreasonable