is to say Peers or in parity among themselves as well likewise the People to attain to the truth of Democracy may be Peers or in parity among themselves and yet not as to their Estates be oblig'd to levelling 8. INDUSTRY of all things is the most accumulative and Accumulation of all things hates levelling The Revenue therfore of the People being the Revenue of Industry tho som Nobility as that of Israel or that of Lacedemon may be found to have bin Levellers yet not any People in the World 9. PRECINCTS being stated are in the next place to be form'd to their proper Offices and Functions according to the truth of the Form to be introduc'd which in general is to form them as it were into distinct Governments and to indow them with distinct Governors 10. GOVERNMENTS or Governors are either Supreme or Subordinat For absolute Monarchy to admit in its Precincts any Government or Governors that are not subordinat but supreme were a plain contradiction But that regulated Monarchy and that Democracy may do it is seen in the Princes of Germany and in the Cantons of Switzerland Nevertheless these being Governments that have deriv'd this not from the Wisdom of any Legislator but from accident and an ill disposition of the matter wherby they are not only incapable of Greatness but even of any perfect state of Health they com not under the consideration of Art from which they derive not but of Chance to which we leave them And to speak according to Art we pronounce that as well in Democracy and in regulated as in absolute Monarchy Governors and Governments in the several divisions ought not to be Soveraintys but subordinat to one common Soverain 11. SUBORDINAT Governors are at will or for life or upon Rotation or Changes 12. IN absolute Monarchy the Governors of Provinces must either be at will or upon Rotation or else the Monarch cannot be absolute In regulated Monarchy the Governors of the Countys may be for life or hereditary as in Counts or Lords or for som certain term and upon rotation as in Viscounts or Sherifs In Democracy Chap. V the People are Servants to their Governors for life and so cannot be free or the Governors of the Tribes must be upon rotation and for som certain term excluding the Party that have born the Magistracy for that term from being elected into the like again till an equal Interval or Vacation be expir'd 13. THE term in which a man may administer Government to the good of it and not attemt upon it to the harm of it is the fittest term of bearing Magistracy and three years in a Magistracy describ'd by the Law under which a man has liv'd and which he has known by the carriage or practice of it in others is a term in which he cannot attemt upon his Government for the hurt of it but may administer it for the good of it tho such a Magistracy or Government should consist of divers Functions 14. GOVERNORS in subordinat Precincts have commonly three Functions the one Civil the other Judicial and the third Military 15. IN absolute Monarchy the Government of a Province consists of one Beglerbeg or Governor for three years with his Council or Divan for Civil matters and his Guard of Janizarys and Spahys that is of Horse and Foot with power to levy and command the Timariots or Military Farmers 16. IN regulated Monarchy the Government of a County consists of one Count or Lord for Life or of one Viscount or Sherif for som limited term with power in certain Civil and Judicial matters and to levy and command the Posse Comitatus 17. IN Democracy the Government of a Tribe consists of one Council or Court in one third part elected annually by the People of that Tribe for the Civil for the Judicial and for the Military Government of the same as also to preside at the Election of Deputys in that Tribe towards the annual supply in one third part of the common and soverain Assemblys of the whole Commonwealth that is to say of the Senat and of the Popular Assembly in which two these Tribes thus delineated and distinguish'd into proper Organs or fit Members to be actuated by those soverain Assemblys are wrought up again by connexion into one intire and organical Body 18. A PARLAMENT of Physicians would never have found out the Circulation of the Blood nor could a Parlament of Poets have written VIRGIL'S Aeneis of this kind therfore in the formation of Government is the proceding of a sole Legislator But if the People without a Legislator set upon such work by a certain Instinct that is in them they never go further than to chuse a Council not considering that the formation of Government is as well a work of Invention as of Judgment and that a Council tho in matters laid before them they may excel in Judgment yet Invention is as contrary to the nature of a Council as it is to Musicians in consort who can play and judg of any Ayr that is laid before them tho to invent a part of Music they can never well agree 19. IN Councils there are three ways of Result and every way of Result makes a different Form A Council with the Result in the Prince makes absolute Monarchy A Council with the Result in the Nobility or where without the Nobility there can be no Result makes Aristocracy or regulated Monarchy A Council with the Result Chap. V in the People makes Democracy There is a fourth kind of Result or Council which amounts not to any Form but to Privation of Government that is a Council not consisting of a Nobility and yet with the Result in it self which is rank Oligarchy so the People seldom or never going any further than to elect a Council without any Result but it self instead of Democracy introduce Oligarchy 20. THE ultimat Result in every Form is the Soverain Power If the ultimat Result be wholly and only in the Monarch that Monarchy is absolute If the ultimat Result be not wholly and only in the Monarch that Monarchy is regulated If the Result be wholly and only in the People the People are in Liberty or the Form of the Government is Democracy 21. IT may happen that a Monarchy founded upon Aristocracy and so as to the Foundation regulated may yet com by certain Expedients or Intrusions as at this day in France and in Spain as to the Administration of it to appear or to be call'd absolute of which I shall treat more at large when I com to speak of Reason of State or of Administration 22. THE ultimat Result in the whole body of the People if the Commonwealth be of any considerable extent is altogether impracticable and if the ultimat Result be but in a part of the People the rest are not in Liberty nor is the Government Democracy 23. AS a whole Army cannot charge at one and the same time yet is so
be Captains while Soldier and Officer too follows his Affections or Interests which way soever they frame I should be glad to know when a Dragon fell from that Court that did not bear down Stars with his Train But the Prevaricator is set upon it wheras of late years the Janizarys are known to have bin far more imbru'd in the Blood of their Princes than ever he gives us his honest word that of late years in Turky they begin to learn the art of poising the Janizarys who are the Foot of the Princes Guard by the Spahys who are the Horse of the same and so have frequently evaded the danger of their Mutinys At which rate seeing every Army consists of Horse and Foot no Army could be mutinous If these had not bin meer slights and so intended he might have don well to have shewn us one Mutiny of the Janizarys appeas'd by the Spahys But all the parts of his Politics as was said of those in Rhetoric consist of Pronunciation THUS the Wounds of Monarchy notwithstanding the former or this last Remedy of foren Guards are still bleeding or festering BUT his Courage is undaunted aut viam inveniet aut faciet he will either mend a Government or make one by asserting without any example but with egregious confidence That the perfection of Consid p. 48 49. Monarchy is free from those flaws which are charg'd upon it and that it consists in governing by a Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under yet not tall enough in any particular Person to measure with the Prince and by a moderat Army kept under the notion of Guards and Garisons which may be sufficient to strangle all Sedition in the Cradle from which mixture or counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army arises the most excellent form of Monarchical Government THERE 's for your learning now A Model which is a short Horse and a Legislator that has soon curry'd him To the parts of it consisting of a Nobility and in force I have already spoken severally I shall now speak to the whole together that is to the imagin'd mixture or counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army and because there is nothing in Nature that has not had a natural effect by som example THE scale of Arms or of Iron continu'd in the Line of WILLIAM the Conqueror and the scale of Property or Gold continu'd in the Barons of England and their Successors But in this before the Barons Wars consisted not the perfection of the Monarchy Book I because it preponderated too much on the side of Arms nor after the Barons Wars because the King putting Power which he could not keep out of their fingers into the hands of the Nobility it became a vicious Constitution and a Monarchy only in name so says the Considerer therfore the Balance being then only even when neither the King could overbalance or get the better of the Barons nor the Barons overbalance or get the better of the King the perfection of Monarchy consisted in the Barons Wars LYCURGUS the Second MARK the King by all means must have a Nobility weighty enough to keep down the People and then he must have an Army to hold Gold weight with his Nobility as if the Nobility in that case would keep down the People and not fetch them up as did the Barons into their Scale that so together they might weigh down the Army which sooner or later is the infallible consequence of this Phansy or let it be shewn where it was ever otherwise To instance in France is quite contrary where all the considerable Offices and Commands being in the Nobility or the richer sort of that Nation the Balance of Arms and of Property are not two but one and the same There is no way for Monarchy but to have no Army or no other than the Nobility which makes the regulated Monarchy as in France Spain c. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobility and People too that is destroy them both which makes the absolute way of Monarchy as in Turky the wit of man never found nor shall find a third there being no such thing in Nature THIS Chapter is already with the longest and yet I must give you a Corollary pouce de roy or a piece above measure relating to a Question on which the greenest Politician that ever brought his Verjuce to the Press has spur'd me WHERE he desires to know my opinion of the way of governing by Councils which he confesses he has always thought admirable he dos not Consid â— 49 50. mean such as are coordinat with the Prince which have bin seen in the World but such as those of Spain purely of Advice and Dispatch with power only to inform and persuade but not limit the Princes Will. For almost all the Weaknesses which have bin thought incident to Monarchy are by this course prevented and if there be any steadiness and maturity in the Senat of a Commonwealth this takes it all in TO give my Counsil without a Fee and deal sincerely with a Prevaricator Let the Prince that is such a one as his hold himself contented with his Divan or Cabinet If this be that he means we are agreed but if he would have more I can make no less of his words than a hankering after such Councils as I have propos'd and that these are such as he always thought admirable such as prevent almost all the Weaknesses incident to Monarchy and take in the steadiness and maturity of a Commonwealth HOW may we make this agree with that other place where he says that there is no frame of Laws or Constitution of Government which will not decay and com to ruin unless repair'd by the Prudence and Consid p. 68. Dexterity of them that govern Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch as well as from a Senat or Assembly of Men he has not yet met with any conviction but rather finds it reasonable to think that where Debates are clearest the result of them most secret and the execution sudden which are the advantages of Monarchy there the disorders of a State will soonest be discover'd and the necessary Remedys best apply'd Chap. 9 In that former place he bethought himself that the Debates of Rome were as clear as those of ANTIOCHUS that her Results were as secret as those of PHILIP or PERSEUS and of more sudden execution than either of theirs He doubted it might be true which is affirm'd by good Authors and commonly enough known that for the clearness of Debate and secresy of Result the world never saw any thing like the Senat of Venice and that in all appearance they are for execution as quick with the Divan as the Divan can be with them Now when all this is don to banish so generous Thoughts without shewing us for what cause and knock under the table is sad news But he shall sind me in any thing that is
such Objections as they afford me it should be alleg'd that to prove an Order in a Commonwealth I instance in a Monarchy as if there were any thing in this Order monarchical or that could if it had not bin so receiv'd from the Commonwealth have bin introduc'd by the Kings to whom in the judgment of any sober man the Prevaricator only excepted who has bin huckling about som such Council for his Prince no less could have follow'd upon the first frown of the People than did in REHOBOAM who having 1 Kings 12. us'd them roughly was depos'd by the Congregation or the major part It is true that while Israel was an Army the Congregation as it needed not to assemble by way of Election or Representative so I believe it did not but that by all Israel assembl'd to this end should be meant the whole People after they were planted upon their Lots and not their Representative which in a political sense is as properly so call'd were absurd and impossible Nor need I go upon presumtion only be the same never so strong seeing it is said in Scripture of the Korathites that they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle and their Fathers 1 Chron. 9. 29. being over the Host of the Lord were keepers of the Entry That is according to the Interpretation of GROTIUS the Korathites were Book I now keepers of the Gates as it appears in the Book of Numbers their Numb 4. Ancestors the Kohathites had bin in the Camp or while Israel was yet an Army But our Translation is lame in the right foot as to the true discovery of the antient manner of this service which according to the Septuagint and the vulgar Latin was thus they were keepers of the Gates of the Tabernacle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 familiae eorum per vices and their Fathers by turns or Rotation So that Offices and Services by Courses Turns or Rotation are plainly more antient than Kings in the Commonwealth of Israel tho it be true that when the Courses or Rotation of the Congregation or Representative of the People were first introduc'd is as hard to shew as it would be how after the People were once planted upon their Lots they could be otherwise assembl'd If Writers argue well and lawfully from what the Sanhedrim was in the institution by JEHOSAPHAT to what it had more antiently bin to argue from what the Congregation was in the institution by DAVID to what it had more antiently bin is sufficiently warranted THESE things rightly consider'd there remains little doubt but we have the courses of Israel for the first example of Rotation in a popular Assembly Now to com from the Hebrew to the Grecian Prudence the same is approv'd by ARISTOTLE which he exemplifys in the Commonwealth of THALES MILESIUS where the People Pol. l. 4. c. 14. he says assembl'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by turns or Rotation Nor is the Roman Prudence without som shadow of the like Proceding where the Prerogative pro tempore with the jure vocatae being made by Lot gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole People But the Gothic Prudence in the Policy of the third State runs altogether upon the Collection of a Representative by the Suffrage of the People tho not so diligently regulated by Terms and Vacations as to a standing Assembly were necessary by Turns Rotation Parembole or Courses as in the election of the late House of Commons and the constitutive Vicissitude of the Knights and Burgesses is known by sufficient experience WHEN the Rotation of a Commonwealth is both in the Magistracy and the People I reckon it to be of a fourth kind as in Israel where both the Judg and the Congregation were so elected THE fifth kind is when the Rotation of a Commonwealth is in the Magistracy and the Senat as in those of Athens of the Achaeans of the Aetolians of the Lycians and of Venice upon which Examples rather for the influence each of them at least Athens may have upon the following Book than any great necessity from the present occasion I shall inlarge in this place THE Commonwealth of Athens was thus administer'd Epitome of the Athenian Commonwealth THE Senat of the Bean being the proposing Assembly for that of the Areopagits call'd also a Senat was a Judicatory consisted of four hundred Citizens chosen by Lot which was perform'd with Beans These were annually remov'd all at once By which means Athens became frustrated of the natural and necessary use of an Aristocracy while neither her Senators were chosen for their parts nor remain'd long enough in this Function to acquire the right understanding of their proper Office These thus elected were subdivided by Lot into four equal parts call'd Prytanys each of which for one quarter of the year was in office The Prytany or Prytans in office elected ten Presidents Chap. 12 call'd Proedri out of which Proedri or Presidents they weekly chose one Provost of the Council who was call'd the Epistata The Epistata and the Proedri were the more peculiar Proposers to the Prytans and to the Prytans it belong'd especially to prepare business Petit. de Leg Att. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the Senat. They gave also audience to any that would propose any thing concerning the Common-wealth which if when reported by the Prytans it were approv'd by the Senat the party that propos'd might promulgat the business and Promulgation being made the Congregation assembl'd and determin'd of it Sic data concio Laelio est processit ille Graecus apud Graecos Cic. pro Flac non de culpa sua dixit sed de poena questus est porrexerunt manus Psephisma natum est THE Prytans and their Magistrats had right to assemble the Senat and propose to them and what the Senat determin'd upon such a Proposition if forthwith to be offer'd to the People as in privat cases was call'd Proboulema but if not to be propos'd till the People had a years trial of it as was the ordinary way in order to Laws to be enacted it was call'd Psephisma each of which words with that difference signifys a Decree A Decree of the Senat in the latter sense had for one year the power of a Law after which trial it belong'd to the Thesmothetae 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to hang it in writing upon the Statues of the Heros and assemble the Congregation These Magistrats were of the Ulpiâ—n ad Phil. 1. number of the Archons which in all were nine the chief more peculiarly so call'd was ARCHON EPONYMUS he by whose name the year was reckon'd or denominated his Magistracy being of a Civil Poll. l. 8. c. 8. concernment the next was the King a Magistrat of a Spiritual concernment the third the Polemarch whose Magistracy was of a Military concernment the other six were the Thesmothetae who had several Functions common with the nine others peculiar or proper to themselves as 〈◊〉
likewise regardless of this point into which nevertheless he saw so far as not seldom to prophesy sad things to his Successors neither his new Peerage which Chap. 3 in abundance he created nor the old avail'd him any thing against that dread wherin more freely than prudently he discover'd himself to stand of Parlaments as now mere Popular Councils and running to popularity of Government like a Bowl down a hill not so much I may say of Malice prepens'd as by natural instinct wherof the Petition of Right well consider'd is a sufficient Testimony All persuasion of Court Eloquence all patience for such as but look'd that way was now lost There remain'd nothing to the destruction of a Monarchy retaining but the name more than a Prince who by contending should make the People to feel those advantages which they could not see And this happen'd in the next King who too secure in that undoubted right wherby he was advanc'd to a Throne which had no foundation dar'd to put this to an unseasonable trial on whom therfore fell the Tower in Silo. Nor may we think that they upon whom this Tower fell were Sinners above all men but that we unless we repent and look better to the true foundations must likewise perish We have had latter Princes latter Parlaments In what have they excel'd or where are they The Balance not consider'd no effectual work can be made as to settlement and consider'd as it now stands in England requires to settlement no less than the Superstructures natural to Popular Government and the Superstructures natural to Popular Government require no less than the highest skill or art that is in Political Architecture The sum of which Particulars amounts to this That the safety of the People of England is now plainly cast upon skill or sufficiency in Political Architecture it is not enough therfore that there are honest men addicted to all the good ends of a Commonwealth unless there be skill also in the formation of those proper means wherby such Ends may be attain'd Which is a sad but a true account this being in all experience and in the judgment of all Politicians that wherof the Many are incapable And tho the meanest Citizen not informing the Commonwealth of what he knows or conceives to concern its safety commits a hainous Crime against God and his Country yet such is the temper of later times that a man having offer'd any light in this particular has scap'd well enough if he be despis'd and not ruin'd BUT to procede if the Balance or state of Property in a Nation be the efficient cause of Government and the Balance being not fix'd the Government as by the present Narrative is evinc'd must remain inconstant or floting then the process in the formation of a Government must be first by a fixation of the Balance and next by erecting such Superstructures as to the nature therof are necessary CHAP. III. Of Fixation of the Balance or of Agrarian Laws FIXATION of the Balance of Property is not to be provided for but by Laws and the Laws wherby such a Provision is made are commonly call'd Agrarian Laws Now as Governments thro the divers Balance of Property are of divers or contrary natures Book I that is Monarchical or Popular so are such Laws Monarchy requires of the standard of Property that it be vast or great and of Agrarian Laws that they hinder recess or diminution at least in so much as is therby intail'd upon Honor But Popular Government requires that the standard be moderat and that its Agrarian prevent accumulation In a Territory not exceding England in Revenue if the It is at present in more hands but without fixation may com into fewer Balance be in more hands than three hundred it is declining from Monarchy and if it be in fewer than five thousand hands it is swerving from a Commonwealth which as to this point may suffice at present CHAP. IV. Shewing the Superstructures of Governments The Superstructures of Absolute Monarchy THAT the Policy or Superstructures of all absolute Monarchs more particularly of the Eastern Empires are not only contain'd but meliorated in the Turkish Government requires no farther proof than to compare them but because such a work would not ly in a small compass it shall suffice for this time to say that such Superstructures of Government as are natural to an absolute Prince or the sole Landlord of a large Territory require for the first story of the Building that what Demeans he shall think fit to reserve being set apart the rest be divided into Horse quarters or Military Farms for life or at will and not otherwise And that every Timariots Tenant for every hundred pounds a year so held be by condition of his Tenure oblig'd to attend his Soverain Lord in Person in Arms and at his proper cost and charges with one Horse so often and so long as he shall be commanded upon service These among the Turks are call'd Timariots Beglerbegs THE second Story requires that these Horse quarters or Military Farms be divided by convenient Precincts or Proportions into distinct Provinces and that each Province have one Governor or Commander in chief of the same at the will and pleasure of his Grand Signior or for three years and no longer Such among the Turks unless by additional honors they be call'd Bashaws or Viziers are the Beglerbegs Janizarys and Spahys FOR the third Story there must of necessity be a Mercenary Army consisting both of Horse and Foot for the Guard of the Prince's Person and for the Guard of his Empire by keeping the Governors of Provinces so divided that they be not suffer'd to lay their arms or heads together or to hold correspondence or intelligence with one another Which Mercenary Army ought not to be constituted of such as have already contracted som other interest but to consist of Men so educated from their very childhood as not to know that they have any other Parent or native Country than the Prince and his Empire Such among the Turks are the Foot call'd Janizarys and the Horse call'd Spahys The Divan and the Grand Signior THE Prince accommodated with a Privy Council consisting of such as have bin Governors of Provinces is the Topstone This Council among the Turks is call'd the Divan and this Prince the Grand Signior THE Superstructures proper to a regulated Monarchy or to the Chap. 4 Government of a Prince three or four hundred of whose Nobility The Superstructures of Regulated Monarchy or of whose Nobility and Clergy hold three parts in four of the Territory must either be by his personal influence upon the Balance or by virtue of Orders IF a Prince by easing his Nobility of Taxes and feeding them with such as are extorted from the People can so accommodat their Ambition and Avarice with great Offices and Commands that a Party rebelling he can overbalance and reduce them
to support Monarchy tell us not what kind of Monarchy it is and consequently gain nothing tho we should grant them the former Proposition to be true For what dos it avail to tell me of the Title of such a Prince if I know not by what Title he holds Grant it were visible to me that such a Man was mark'd out by Providence to be my Governor yet if I cannot tell what kind of one whether absolute mixt limited merely executive or only first in order how shall I know to direct my Obedience If he be absolute my very natural Liberty is taken away from me nor do I know any Power that can make any Man such the Scripture setting just limitations and restrictions to all Governors If mixt and limited I must know the due Temper and Bounds wherby he is to rule or else he may usurp or be mistaken and I opprest or injur'd If executive the Power fundamentally resides not in him but in the Great Council or them intrusted by the People then I adore only a Shadow Now if any Prince of Europe can really clear up these Mists and shew the Lines of his Government drawn fairly and his Charter whole and authentic like that of Venice and antient Rome for my part I 'll be the first man shall swear him Allegiance and the last that will preserve him But you will find that they will tell you in general about their Office and in particular of their Claims of Succession Inheritance and Ancestors when look but three or four Storys back and you will meet either som savage unnatural Intrusion disguiz'd under som forc'd Title or chimerical Cognation or else som violent Alteration or possibly som slender Oath or Articles hardly extorted and imperfectly kept Now if any man that will but run over these Rules and apply them to any History whatever as we shall exemplify in that of Scotland upon which for the present we have pitcht and not find most Titles ambiguous the Effects of former Monarchys for where in a Catalogue of forty Kings can you almost shew me three good ones but things merely strugling to maintain their Titles and domestic Interest ruinous to the People who for the most part consider them no otherwise than as to be rescu'd from violent Confusion not as they conduce to the positive Happiness of a civil Life I say all this will be found to be true or my small Conversation in Books is extremely false And truly I conceive reading of History to be the most rational Course to set any Judgment right because it instructs by Experience and Effects and grounds the Judgment upon material Observations and not blindly gropes after Notions and Causes which to him are tantum non inscrutabile but of that anon A main Mistake under this Topic has bin an erroneous comparison and application of matters Civil and Military for Men observing that mixt Councils about Generals Plurality Equality of Commands frequent and sudden Military Alterations have brought no small Distempers and Dangers to several Governments and Attemts therefore they presently conclude that in Civils also it is the safest to continue a Command in one hand for preventing the like Disturbances But here they are deceiv'd Civil matters consist in long debate great consideration patient expectation and wary foresight which is better to be found in a number of choice experienc'd Heads than in one single Person whose Youth and Vigor of Spirit inables him rather to Action and fills him with that noble Temerity which is commonly so happy in Martial Affairs that must be guided always to improve Occasions which are seldom to be found again and which mistaken are to be scarcely amended Besides the Ferocity of daring Spirits can hardly be bounded while they stand level so that it is no wonder if they extinguish all Emulations by putting the Power into the hands of one wheras in a Commonwealth it is quite otherwise and Factions unless they be cruelly exorbitant do but poise and balance one another and many times like the discord of Humors upon the natural Body produce real good to the Government That slender conceit that Nature seems to dress out a Principality in most of her works as among Birds Bees c. is so slender indeed in regard they are no more Chiefs than what they fancy them but all their Prepotency is merely predatory or oppressive and even Lions Elephants Crocodils and Eagles have small inconsiderable Enemys of which they stand in fear and by which they are often ruin'd that the Recital confutes it and if it were so yet unless they could prove their One Man to be as much more excellent than the rest as those are and that solely too I see not what it would advantage them since to comply with the design of Nature in one they would contradict it in others where she is equally concern'd But these Philological and Rhetorical Arguments have not a little hinder'd the severer Disquisition of Reason and prepossess'd the more easy Minds with Notions so much harder to be laid aside as they are more erroneous and pleasing THESE are the fundamental Errors that have misled the Judgment now those which have misguided the Conscience have principally proceded from the Misinterpretation of Scripture and therfore seeming Sacred have bin less examin'd and doubted as carrying the most Authority Thus in the Old Testament there being such frequent mention of Kings which notwithstanding were given in Wrath they superstitiously maintain not only the necessity but even the impunity of Kings wheras we know not their Powers and Limitations and it is inconsequent to argue That because Judea was so govern'd we should follow the same Pattern when we find neither Precept Consequence nor Necessity convincing us And it is madness to think that while the Divine Spirit so freely and vehemently exclaims against the Iniquity of men God would authorize it so far as to leave it in them only unpunishable who should exterminat and reform it As for the Antiquity from ADAM it is true before his Fall his Dominion was large and wide but it was over the Beasts that after his Fall learn'd to rebel against him and oeconomically not despotically over his Wife and Children But what is this to Civil Government In the New Testament for I the briesâ—ier pass over this head in regard it has bin so copiously treated upon by those under whose Profession it falls and that it dos not immediatly conduce to my Design the principal Argument has bin the meekness of CHRIST and his compliance with Civil Powers which certainly if he had bin dispos'd to have resisted say they he could as easily have overthrown as with a few Cords whip the Buyers and Sellers out of the Temple But he that was the Wisdom of his Father rather thought fit to build up his Kingdom which is not earthly nor known of earthly men in Meekness and Obedience to Civil Powers which are perpetually chang'd and hurry'd
Persons endeavour to gain ground one upon another there is an Enmity whatever is pretended Besides if these men would be Fathers it were then their duty to do like Fathers which is to provide for defend and cherish wheras on the contrary it is they themselves that eat the bread out of the mouths of their Children and thro the groans of the Poor And wheras Flattery has said that what they draw up in Vapors they send down in Showers yet are we sure that such rains are for the most part unfruitful if not ominous and infectious If they pretend the Law of Nations it were well they would declare to us first what this Law is and whether generally agreed on or no by Nations If they say yes they must resolve whether explicitly or implicitly if they say the former let them produce them if the latter they must demonstrat that all Nations are agreed in such and such Notions and all men of these Nations since every one must be of equal capacity When on the contrary tho the Understandings of most men whom we know or have convers'd with seem to agree in som general maxims but unpolish'd unnumbred and unmethodiz'd yet we see many Nations differing from us in many things which we think clearly fundamentally and naturally true neither do Climats and Education only so diversify the Minds of men but even their Understandings and the different ways of thinking so distinguish even those of one Country that tho we may please our selves in thinking that all mens thoughts follow the fantastical method of ours yet we might find if we were perfectly conversant with all men of the World and well read in their Authors as we are not with half of them no nor any one man with the twentieth part that there are scarce four or five Axioms excepting as they make a part of the Law of nature would be universally receiv'd Now for I have bin the longer by reason that this imaginary Law has bin so held up by the Civilians and made the subterfuge of so many considerable Disputes if it be so weak as that we can scarce tell whether it has a being or no for even that which we account the most sacred piece of it the violation of public Messengers the Tartar and Muscovite unless restrain'd by fear break it every day What then are the Arguments deduc'd from it or if there were such a Law what would it avail such a particular man for why should other Nations impose a Governor where they are not concern'd And if they pretend this Law as to the preservation and impunity of their Persons the same Answer will serve again with this addition That they make an Offender incapable of punishment which is but to give them a Commission to offend Now if they run upon that distinction of suspending only and not punishing as if forsooth this kind of People must be preserv'd tho by the ruin of Mankind to immediat Vengeance then I say That Suspension is really a Punishment and if his Demerits can deserve that I see not but that upon a proportionable Increase they may deserve Dethronization or Death as clearly as two and two make four and four more make eight If they allege positive or municipal Laws and number Homages they are not much the nearer since that all such Laws are but Rivulets and Branches of them we before examin'd and since we found that those speak so little in their favor that which these do cannot signify much especially since Princes who are ever watchful to improve all occasions of this nature can either by terror or artifice draw Assemblys or the major part of them to their own Lure nay even the worst of them have not forgot to be solicitous in this case But it must be remark'd That whatever positive Laws are repugnant to those general ones they are injurious and ought to be repeal'd And truly it is a sad Observation that as Monarchs grow either out of the weakness of Government and as I may say its Pupilage as ROMULUS and THESEUS did at Rome and Athens or else out of the disease or depravation of it as CAESAR again invaded Rome so have the People bin never more fond of them than when Manners were at the highest corruption which ever gave access of strength to them nor have they more distasted them than when their Spirits and Disciplin were the most brave and healthful so fatally disagreeing are true Liberty which is the very source of Virtue and Generosity and the impotent Domination of a single Tyrant who commonly reigns by no other means than the Discords of braver Citizens who can neither indure Equality or Superiority among themselves and rather admit a general Vassalage than just Equality or by the Vices of the baser sort which naturally reconcile them and Kings and concern them both in a bad Example But suppose Succession a thing sacred and inviolable yet once break and interrupt it it is little worth either the Usurper being to be acknowleg'd regular or the whole Series dash'd out of order Nay we see Aspirers themselves either so blinded with their Pretences or with Animosity and so crying up their own Titles that it is almost impossible for any privat Judgment to do right in this case themselves thwarting one another and it cannot be in the power of Nature that both should be right But who can instance one Monarch whose Crown is come to him by untainted Succession and what History will not confirm the Example I shall anon bring Certainly tho Succession were a thing that had not so little reason or reality yet I see not why men should with such a strange pertinacy defend it Matters of Government ought to be manag'd by Prudence but Succession puts them into the hands of Fortune when a Child incapable or infirm under the regiment of a Nurse must possibly be Supreme Governor and those whom either their Abilitys or Virtues fit for it subordinat or laid aside But what if the Person whom necessity has set at the stern be incapable lunatic weak or vitious is not this a good way to prevent Controversys yet this plainly enervats all good Counsil when a King should have need of Tutors and that a multitude of People should be commanded by one who commands not himself and when we scarce obey even excellent Princes to adore Shadows and weak ones AS for BOXHORNIUS'S distinction of Succession wherin the next Heir must necessarily succede by the original Right of the former I would ask him whether the Predecessor were a Possessor or Usufructuary If the first all our former Arguments fall on him if the latter it makes not for his Successor the People being Owners and besides the distinction is one of his own coining never pretended before upon the first controversy it is invalid altho the first Founder had a Right as we have prov'd the contrary HAVING with what brevity I could brought to an end
intimated than shewn Nevertheless because I cannot otherwise understand the passage concerning ELDAD and MEDAD of whom it is said that they were of them that were written but went not up to the Tabernacle then with the Talmudists I conceive that ELDAD and MEDAD had the suffrage of the Tribes and so were written as Competitors for Magistracy but coming afterwards to the lot fail'd of it and therfore went not up to the Tabernacle or place of Confirmation by God or to the Sessionhouse of the Senat with the Seventy upon whom the lot fell to be Senators for the Sessionhouse of the Sanhedrim was first in the Court of the Tabernacle and afterwards in that of the Temple where it came to be call'd the stone Chamber John or Pavement If this were the Ballot of Israel that of Venice is the same transpos'd for in Venice the Competitor is chosen as it were by the lot in regard that the Electors are so made and the Magistrat is chosen by the Suffrage of the great Council or Assembly of the People But the Sanhedrim of Israel being thus constituted MOSES for his time and after him his Successor sat in the midst of it as Prince or Archon and at his left hand the Orator or Father of the Senat the rest of the bench coming round with either horn like a Crescent had a Scribe attending upon the tip of it THIS Senat in regard the Legislator of Israel vvas infallible and the Laws given by God such as were not fit to be alter'd by men is much different in the exercise of their Power from all other Senats except that of the Areopagits in Athens which also was little more than a Supreme Judicatory for it will hardly as I conceive be found that the Sanhedrim propos'd to the People till the return of the Children of Israel out of Captivity under Esdras at which time there was a new Law made namely for a kind of Excommunication or rather Banishment which had never bin before in Israel Nevertheless it is not to be thought that the Sanhedrim had not always that right which from the time of Esdras it more frequently exercis'd of proposing to the People but that they forbore it in regard of the fulness and infallibility of the Law already made wherby it was needless Wherfore the function of this Council which is very rare in a Senat was executive The Magistracy and consisted in the administration of the Law made and wheras the Council it self is often understood in Scripture by the Priest Deut. 17. 9 10 11. and the Levit there is no more in that save only that the Priests and the Levits who otherwise had no Power at all being in the younger years of this Commonwealth those that were best study'd in the Laws were the most frequently elected into the Sanhedrim For the Courts consisting of three and twenty Elders sitting in the Gates of every City and the Triumvirats of Judges constituted almost in every Village which were parts of the executive Magistracy subordinat to the Sanhedrim I shall take them at better leisure and in the larger Discourse but these being that part of this Commonwealth which was instituted by MOSES upon the advice of JETHRO the Priest Exod. 18. of Midian as I conceive a Heathen are to me a sufficient warrant even from God himself who confirm'd them to make farther use of human Prudence wherever I find it bearing a Testimony to it self whether in Heathen Commonwealths or others And the rather because so it is that we who have the holy Scriptures and in them the Original of a Commonwealth made by the same hand that made the World are either altogether blind or negligent of it while the Heathens have all written theirs as if they had had no other Copy As to be more brief in the present account of that which you shall have more at large hereafter Of Athens ATHENS consisted of the Senat of the Bean proposing of the Church or Assembly of the People resolving and too often debating which was the ruin of it as also of the Senat of the Aropagits the nine Archons with divers other Magistrats executing Of Lacedemon LACEDEMON consisted of the Senat proposing of the Church or Congregation of the People resolving only and never debating which was the long life of it and of the two Kings the Court of the Ephors with divers other Magistrats executing Of Carthage CARTHAGE consisted of the Senat proposing and somtimes resolving too of the People resolving and somtimes debating too for which fault she was reprehended by ARISTOTLE and she had her Suffetes and her hundred Men with other Magistrats executing Of Rome ROME consisted of the Senat proposing the Concio or People resolving and too often debating which caus'd her storms as also of the Consuls Censors Aedils Tribuns Pretors Questors and other Magistrats executing Of Venice VENICE consists of the Senat or Pregati proposing and somtimes resolving too of the great Council or Assembly of the People in whom the result is constitutively as also of the Doge the Signory the Censors the Dieci the Quazancies and other Magistrats executing Of Switzerland and Holland THE proceding of the Commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland is of a like nature tho after a more obscure manner for the Soveraintys whether Cantons Provinces or Citys which are the People send their Deputys commission'd and instructed by themselves wherin they reserve the Result in their own power to the Provincial or general Convention or Senat where the Deputies debate but have no other power of Result than what was confer'd upon them by the People or is farther confer'd by the same upon farther occasion And for the executive part they have Magistrats or Judges in every Canton Province or City besides those which are more public and relate to the League as for adjusting Controversies between one Canton Province or City and another or the like between such persons as are not of the same Canton Province or City BUT that we may observe a little farther how the Heathen Politicians have written not only out of Nature but as it were out of Scripture As in the Commonwealth of Israel God is said to have bin King so the Commonwealth where the Law is King is said by ARISTOTLE to be the Kingdom of God And where by the Lusts or Passions of Men a Power is set above that of the Law deriving from Reason which is the dictat of God God in that sense is rejected or depos'd that he should not reign over them as he was in Israel Pag. 170. And yet LEVIATHAN will have it that by reading of these Greec and Latin he might as well in this sense have said Hebrew Authors young Men and all others that are unprovided of the antidot of solid Reason receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great Exploits of War atchiev'd by the Conductors of their
this kind of Government which is also noted by MACCHIAVEL namely that a Throne supported by a Nobility is not so hard to be ascended as kept warm Wherfore his secret Jealousy lest the dissension of the Nobility as it brought him in might throw him out made him travel in ways undiscover'd by them to ends as little foreseen by himself while to establish his own safety he by mixing Water with their Wine first began to open those Sluces that have since overwhelm'd not the King only but the Throne For wheras a Nobility strikes not at the Throne without which they cannot subsist but at som King that they do not like popular Power strikes thro the King at the Throne as that which is incompatible with it Now that PANURGUS in abating the Power of the Nobility was the cause whence it came to fall into the hands of the People appears by those several Statutes that were made in his Reign as that for Population those against Retainers and that for Alienations BY the Statute of Population all houses of Husbandry that were us'd with twenty Acres of Ground and upwards were to be maintain'd and kept up for ever with a competent proportion of Land laid to them and in no wise as appears by a subsequent Statute to be sever'd By which means the houses being kept up did of necessity inforce Dwellers and the proportion of Land to be till'd being kept up did of necessity inforce the Dweller not to be a Begger or Cottager but a Man of som substance that might keep Hinds and Servants and set the Plow a going This did mightily concern says the Historian of that Prince the might and manhood of the Kingdom and in effect amortize a great part of the Lands to the hold and possession of the Yeomanry or middle People who living not in a servil or indigent fashion were much unlink'd from dependence upon their Lords and living in a free and plentiful manner became a more excellent Infantry but such a one upon which the Lords had so little Power that from henceforth they may be computed to have bin disarm'd AND as they lost their Infantry after this manner so their Cavalry and Commanders were cut off by the Statute of Retainers for wheras it was the custom of the Nobility to have younger Brothers of good houses metal'd fellows and such as were knowing in the feats of Arms about them they who were longer follow'd with so dangerous a train escap'd not such Punishments as made them take up HENCEFORTH the Country-lives and great Tables of the Nobility which no longer nourish'd veins that would bleed for them were fruitless and loathsom till they chang'd the Air and of Princes became Courtiers where their Revenues never to have bin exhausted by Beef and Mutton were found narrow whence follow'd racking of Rents and at length sale of Lands the riddance thro the Statute of Alienations being render'd far more quick and facil than formerly it had bin thro the new invention of Intails TO this it happen'd that CORAUNUS the Successor of that King dissolving the Abbys brought with the declining state of the Nobility so vast a prey to the Industry of the People that the Balance of the Commonwealth was too apparently in the popular Party to be unseen by the wise Council of Queen PARTHENIA who converting her reign thro the perpetual Lovetricks that past between her and her People into a kind of Romance wholly neglected the Nobility And by these degrees came the House of Commons to raise that head which since has bin so high and formidable to their Princes that they have look'd pale upon those Assemblys Nor was there any thing now wanting to the destruction of the Throne but that the People not apt to see their own strength should be put to feel it when a Prince as stiff in disputes as the nerve of Monarchy was grown slack receiv'd that unhappy incouragement from his Clergy which became his utter ruin while trusting more to their Logic than the rough Philosophy of his Parlament it came to an irreparable breach for the House of Peers which alone had stood in this gap now sinking down between the King and the Commons shew'd that CRASSUS was dead and the Isthmus broken But a Monarchy devested of its Nobility has no refuge under Heaven but an Army Wherfore the dissolution of this Government caus'd the War not the War the dissolution of this Government OF the King's success with his Arms it is not necessary to give any further account than that they prov'd as ineffectual as his Nobility but without a Nobility or an Army as has bin shew'd there can be no Monarchy Wherfore what is there in nature that can arise out of these Ashes but a popular Government or a new Monarchy to be erected by the victorious Army TO erect a Monarchy be it never so new unless like LEVIATHAN you can hang it as the Country-fellow speaks by Geometry for what else is it to say that every other Man must give up his will to the will of this one Man without any other foundation it must stand upon old Principles that is upon a Nobility or an Army planted on a due balance of Dominion Aut viam inveniam aut faciam was an Adage of CAESAR and there is no standing for a Monarchy unless it finds this Balance or makes it If it finds it the work 's don to its hand for where there is inequality of Estates there must be inequality of Power and where there is inequality of Power there can be no Commonwealth To make it the Sword must extirpat out of Dominion all other roots of Power and plant an Army upon that ground An Army may be planted Nationally or Provincially To plant it Nationally it must be in one of the four ways mention'd that is either Monarchically in part as the Roman Benesiciarii or Monarchically in the whole as the Turkish Timariots Aristocratically that is by Earls and Barons as the Neustrians were planted by TURBO or Democratically that is by equal lots as the Israelitish Army in the Land of Canaan by JOSHUA In every one of these ways there must not only be Confiscations but Confiscations to such a proportion as may answer to the work intended CONFISCATION of a People that never sought against you but whose Arms you have born and in which you have bin victorious and this upon premeditation and in cold blood I should have thought to be against any example in human Nature but for those alleg'd by MACCHIAVEL of AGATHOCLES and OLIVERETTO di Fermo the former wherof being Captain General of the Syracusans upon a day assembl'd the Senat and the People as if he had somthing to communicat with them when at a sign given he cut the Senators in pieces to a man and all the richest of the People by which means he came to be King The procedings of OLIVERETTO in making himself Prince of Fermo were somwhat
a standing General First Because it could not have bin more to their own safety And Secondly Because so long as they should have need of a standing Army his work was not done That he would not dispute against the Judgment of the Senat and the People nor ought that to be Nevertheless he made little doubt but experience would shew every Party their own Interest in this Government and that better improv'd than they could expect from any other that Mens animositys should overbalance their Interest for any time was impossible that humor could never be lasting nor thro the Constitution of the Government of any effect at the first charge For supposing the worst and that the People had chosen no other into the Senat and the Prerogative than Royalists a matter of fourteen hundred men must have taken their Oaths at their Election with an intention to go quite contrary not only to their Oaths so taken but to their own Interest for being estated in the Soverain Power they must have decreed it from themselves such an example for which there was never any experience nor can there be any reason or holding it it must have don in their hands as well every whit as in any other Furthermore they must have remov'd the Government from a Foundation that apparently would hold to set it upon another which apparently would not hold vvhich things if they could not com to pass the Senat and the People consisting vvholly of Royalists much less by a parcel of them elected But if the fear of the Senat and of the People deriv'd from a Party without such a one as vvould not be elected nor ingage themselves to the Commonwealth by an Oath this again must be so large as would go quite contrary to their own Interest they being as free and as fully estated in their Liberty as any other or so narrow that they could do no hurt vvhile the People being in Arms and at the beck of the Strategus every Tribe vvould at any time make a better Army than such a Party and there being no Partys at home fears from abroad vvould vanish But seeing it vvas otherwise determin'd by the Senat and the People the best course vvas to take that which they held the safest in vvhich vvith his humble thanks for their great bounty he was resolv'd to serve them vvith all Duty and Obedience A VERY short time after the Royalists now equal Citizens made good the ARCHON'S Judgment there being no other that found any thing near so great a sweet in the Government For he who has not bin acquainted with Affliction says SENECA knows but half the things of this world MOREOVER they saw plainly that to restore the antient Government they must cast up their Estates into the hands of three hundred men wherfore in case the Senat and the Prerogative consisting of thirteen hundred men had bin all Royalists there must of necessity have bin and be for ever one thousand against this or any such Vote But the Senat being inform'd by the Signory that the ARCHON had accepted of his Dignity and Office caus'd a third Chair to be set for his Highness between those of the Strategus and the Orator in the House the like at every Council to which he repair'd not of necessity but at his pleasure being the best and as ARGUS not vainly said the greatest Prince in the World for in the Pomp of his Court he was not inferior to any and in the Field he was follow'd with a Force that was formidable to all Nor was there a cause in the nature of this Constitution to put him to the charge of Guards to spoil his stomach or his sleep Insomuch as being handsomly disputed by the Wits of the Academy whether my Lord ARCHON if he had bin ambitious could have made himself so great it was carry'd clear in the Negative not only for the Reasons drawn from the present balance which was Popular but putting the case the balance had bin Monarchical For there be som Nations wherof this is one that will bear a Prince in a Commonwealth far higher than it is possible for them to bear a Monarch Spain look'd upon the Prince of Orange as her most formidable Enemy but if ever there be a Monarch in Holland he will be the Spaniards best friend For wheras a Prince in a Commonwealth derives his Greatness from the root of the People a Monarch derives his from one of those balances which nip them in the root by which means the Low Countrys under a Monarch were poor and inconsiderable but in bearing a Prince could grow to a miraculous height and give the Glory of his Actions by far the upper hand of the greatest King in Christendom There are Kings in Europe to whom a King of Oceana would be but a petit Companion But the Prince of this Commonwealth is the Terror and the Judg of them all THAT which my Lord ARCHON now minded most was the Agrarian upon which Debate he incessantly thrust the Senat and the Council of State to the end it might be planted upon som firm root as the main point and basis of perpetuity to the Commonwealth AND these are som of the most remarkable Passages that happen'd in the first year of this Government About the latter end of the second the Army was disbanded but the Taxes continu'd at thirty thousand Pounds a month for three years and a half By which means a piece of Artillery was planted and a portion of Land to the value of 50 l. a year purchas'd for the maintenance of the Games and of the Prize arms for ever in each Hundred WITH the eleventh year of the Commonwealth the term of the Excise allotted for the maintenance of the Senat and the People and for the raising of a public Revenue expir'd By which time the Exchequer over and above the annual Salarys amounting to three hundred thousand Pounds accumulating every year out of one Million incom seven hundred thousand Pounds in Banco brought it with a product of the Sum rising to about eight Millions in the whole wherby at several times they had purchas'd to the Senat and the People four hundred thousand Pounds per annum solid Revenue which besides the Lands held in Panopea together with the Perquisits of either Province was held sufficient for a public Revenue Nevertheless Taxes being now wholly taken off the Excise of no great burden and many specious advantages not vainly propos'd in the heightning of the public Revenue was very chearfully establish'd by the Senat and the People for the term of ten years longer and the same course being taken the public Revenue was found in the one and twentieth of the Commonwealth to be worth one Million in good Land Wherupon the Excise was so abolish'd for the present as withal resolv'd to be the best the most fruitful and easy way of raising Taxes according to future Exigencys But the Revenue being now such as was
reasonable most ready to serve him To the Question then how such Councils as I have propos'd would do with a Prince I answer truly the best of them I doubt but untowardly One that is the popular Assembly has no mean but is either the wisest in Nature or has no brains at all * When affairs go upon no other than the public Interest this having no other Interest to follow nor eys to see withal is the wisest Council but such ways are destructive to a Prince and they will have no Nay The Congregation of Israel when REHOBOAM would not hearken to their advice depos'd him and we know what popular Councils so soon as they came to sufficient Power did in England If a Prince put a popular Council from this Ward he dos a great matter and to little purpose for they understand nothing else but themselves Wherfore the Kings of France and of Spain have dissolv'd all such Assemblys It is true where a Prince is not strong enough to get Mony out of them but by their consent they are necessary yet then they are not purely of Advice and Dispatch but share in the Government and he cannot be medling with their Purses but they will be medling with his Laws The Senat is of sitter use for a Prince and yet except he has the way of TIBERIUS but a ticklish piece as appears by MAXIMINUS who was destroy'd by PUPIENUS and BALBINUS Captains set up against him by this Order To go to the root These things are not otherwise in Prudence or Choice than by direction of the Balance where this is popular no Remedy but the Prince must be advis'd by the People which if the late King would have indur'd the Monarchy might have subsisted somwhat longer but while the Balance was Aristocratical as during the great Estates of the Nobility and the Clergy we find not the People to have bin great or wise Counsillors In sum if a King governs by a popular Council or a House of Commons the Throne will not stand long If he governs by a Senat or a House of Lords let him never fear the Throne but have a care of himself there is no third as I have said often enough but the Divan Book I CHAP. X. Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by her self was ever conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch I COM in this Chapter to resume the Discourse where I broke off in the former making good my assertion That a Commonwealth is the Government which from the beginning of the world to this day was never conquer'd by any Monarch for if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon they were first broken by themselves WHEN I speak of a Commonwealth in relation to this point I am no more to be argu'd against out of the little Citys in Asia or those of Ragusa and San Marino which cannot be shewn to have had the command of any considerable Army than I argue against the Prevaricator where he asserts Monarchy to consist of a mixture of Arms and of a Nobility from the King of Yuetot who had neither THIS Assertion in the judgment of any rational man ought not to be incounter'd but where there was a natural possibility of defence in regard that a City which has no Army at all as Geneva which yet being invaded by the Duke of Savoy found means to defend her self or such a one as is not considerable should be subdu'd by som potent Monarch if we could find the example concerns the Government no more than if it had bin overwhelm'd by som Inundation or swallow'd up by som Earthquake And yet all that is oppos'd by the Considerer amounts not to thus much The Testimony he brings out of PAUSANIAS coms far short for it is Consid p. 53. Paus Messen recorded says the Author speaking of the Lacedemonians that being corrupted by the Bounty of CRAESUS they were the first that contracted Amity with the Barbarians at the time when that King added the Territorys inhabited by the Dorians upon the border of Caria with other Commonwealths in Asia to his Empire So that CRAESUS corrupted the Lacedemonians with Gifts PAUSANIAS is express but whether he obtain'd the Asiatic Citys likely in this case to have bin easilier corrupted than the Lacedemonians by Arms or by Purchase he is not express and the presumtion of the latter as in other regards so in this is the stronger that CRAESUS by the testimony of SOLON was more potent in Gold than in Iron Now if it were so and if otherwise let the Considerer shew that these Commonwealths inveigl'd by the Treasure of CRAESUS came first under the Lydian and fell with that under the Persian Empire when CRAESUS was subdu'd by CYRUS all I can learn by this example is no more than that CRAESUS for ought that is perceivable might have bought those Commonwealths as COSIMO of MEDICIS did Florence from whom it is affirm'd by MACCHIAVEL that there was not a considerable Man in the whole City that had not receiv'd som considerable Sum. So this example presumes but in the next which is of Sicily there is not so much as a Presumtion in favor of the Assertor the State of Sicily before that which the Romans call the first Carthaginian War being clear in Story against his design For that Africa for the generation of Monsters is not more famous than Sicily for that of Tyrants Chap. 10 they who have pass'd their Novitiat in Story are not ignorant nor how Fazello Hist de Sicil Polyb. l. 1. when TIMOLEON had freed her of this Vermin and with Liberty she had recover'd som strength and virtue she relaps'd under AGATHOCLES and his horrid violation of Faith while he was trusted with the Arms of her Citizens how after him PYRRHUS was call'd in from Epirus after PYRRHUS HIERO usurp'd all by the same Arts getting first into trust or charge and then recoiling upon them that would take no warning by which it is apparent that the Commonwealths of Sicily like those of Greece were ruin'd by themselves and their own Disorders and no more subdu'd upon these changes by foren Arms than was Israel by the Canaanites or Rome by the Gauls or Decemvirs ISRAEL having broken her Orders was indeed somtimes opprest by the Canaanites Rome was sack'd by the Gauls and usurp'd by the Decemvirs But as the man that having got a fall in a Duel throws off his Adversary recovers himself and his Sword is not conquer'd Decree of the States of Holland apud Grot. Hist 4. so neither the Commonwealth wherfore neither Holland nor Genoa tho they have bin under being yet standing can be said to be conquer'd by the Arms of Spain or France but rather the contrary seeing the Liberty of Holland in many Citys more antient than any Records or other Monuments there can witness and in it self than that of Tacitus wherby CIVILIS born of Princely Blood
month of October that these being all chosen by that time then receive their Magistracy it consists also of sixty more call'd the Junta which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senat that is by the Senat proposing and the Great Council resolving the rest of their Creation is after the same manner with the former In the Sixty of the Senat there cannot be above three of any one Kindred or Family nor in the Junta so many unless there be fewer in the former These Magistracys are all annual but without interval so that it is at the pleasure of the Great Council whether a Senator having finish'd his year they will elect him again The College THE College is a Council consisting more especially of three Orders of Magistrats call'd in their Language Savi as the Savi grandi to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affairs of Sea and Land the Savi di Terra ferma to whose care and cognizance belong the affairs of the Land and the Savi di Mare to whose cognizance appertain Book I the affairs of the Sea and of the Ilands These are elected by the Senat not all at once but for the Savi grandi who are six by three at a time with the interposition of three months and for the Savi di Terra ferma and the Savi di Mare who are each five after the same manner save only that the first Election consists of three and the second of two Each Order of the Savi elects weekly one Provost each of which Provosts has Right in any affair belonging to the cognizance of his Order to propose to the College Audience of Embassadors and matters of foren Negotiation belong properly to this Council The Signory THE Signory consists of the Duke and of his Counsillors The Duke is a Magistrat created by the Great Council for life to whom the Commonwealth acknowleges the Reverence due to a Prince and all her Acts run in his name tho without the Counsillors he has no Power at all while they can perform any Function of the Signory without him The Counsillors whose Magistracy is annual are elected by the Scrutiny of the Senat naming one out of each Tribe for the City is locally divided into six Tribes and the Great Council approving so the Counsillors are six whose Function in part is of the nature of Masters of Requests having withal power to grant certain Privileges but their greatest preeminence is that all or any one of them may propose to any Council in the Commonwealth Certain Rights of the Councils THE Signory has Session and Suffrage in the College the College has Session and Suffrage in the Senat and the Senat has Session and Suffrage in the Great Council The Signory or the Provosts of the Savi have power to assemble the College the College has power to assemble the Senat and the Senat has power to assemble the Great Council the Signiori but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Savi in their own Offices and Functions have power to propose to the College the College has power to propose to the Senat and the Senat has power to propose to the Great Council Whatever is thus propos'd and resolv'd either by the Senat for somtimes thro the security of this Order a Proposition gos no further or by the Great Council is ratify'd or becoms the Law of the Commonwealth Over and above these Orders they have three Judicatorys two Civil and one Criminal in each of which forty Gentlemen elected by the Great Council are Judges for the term of eight months to these Judicatorys belong the Avogadori and the Auditori who are Magistrats having power to hear Causes apart and as they judg fitting to introduce them into the Courts IF a man tells me that I omit many things he may perceive I write an Epitome in which no more should be comprehended than that which understood may make a man understand the rest But of these principal parts consists the whole body of admirable Venice THE Consiglio de' Dieci or Council of Ten being that which partakes of Dictatorian Power is not a limb of her but as it were a Sword in her hand This Council in which the Signory has also Session and Suffrage consists more peculiarly of ten annual Magistrats created by the Great Council who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lot which so elected are call'd Capi de' Dieci their Magistracy being monthly Again out of the three Capi one is taken by Lot whose Magistracy is weekly this is he who over against the Tribunal in the Great Council sits like another Duke and is call'd the Provost of the Dieci It belongs to these three Magistrats to assemble Chap. 12 the Council of Ten which they are oblig'd to do weekly of course and oftner as they see occasion The Council being assembl'd any one of the Signory or two of the Capi may propose to it the power which they now exercise and wherin for their assistance they create three Magistrats call'd the Grand Inquisitors consists in the punishment of certain heinous Crimes especially that of Treason in relation wherto they are as it were Sentinels standing upon the guard of the Commonwealth But constitutively with the addition of a Junta consisting of other fifteen together with som of the chief Magistráts having Right in cases of important speed or secrecy to this Council they have the full and absolute Power of the whole Commonwealth as Dictator THAT Venice either transcrib'd the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedemon or happens to be fram'd as if she had so don is most apparent The Result of this Common-wealth is in the Great Council and the Debate in the Senat so was it in Lacedemon A Decree made by the Senat of Athens had the power of a Law for one year without the People at the end wherof the People might revoke it A Decree of the Senat of Venice stands good without the Great Council unless these see reason to revoke it The Pryians were a Council preparing business for the Senat so is the Collegio in Venice the Presidents of the Prytans were the ten Proedri those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Savi The Archons or Princes of Athens being nine had a kind of Soverain Inspection upon all the Orders of the Commonwealth so has the Signory of Venice consisting of nine besides the Duke The Quarancys in Venice are Judicatorys of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduc'd the causes into that Judicatory so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these The Consiglio de' Dieci in Venice is not of the Body but an Appendix of the Commonwealth so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon and as these had power to put a King a Magistrat or any Delinquent of what degree soever to death so has the Consiglio de' Dieci This again is
So that this being the Militia of the Nation a few Noblemen discontented could at any time levy a great Army the effect wherof both in the Barons Wars and those of York and Lancaster had bin well known to divers Kings This state of Affairs was that which inabl'd HENRY the Seventh to make his advantage of troublesom times and the frequent unruliness of Retainers while under the pretence of curbing Riots he obtain'd the passing of such Laws as did cut off these Retainers wherby the Nobility wholly lost their Officers Then wheras the dependence of the People upon their Lords was of a strict ty or nature he found means to loosen this also by Laws which he obtain'd upon as fair a pretence even that of Population Thus Farms were so brought to a Verulam H. 7. standard that the Houses being kept up each of them did of necessity inforce a Dweller and the proportion of Land laid to each House did of necessity inforce that Dweller not to be a Begger or Cottager but a man able to keep Servants and set the Plow on going By which means a great part of the Lands of this Nation came in effect to be amortiz'd to the hold of the Yeomanry or middle People wherof consisted the main body of the Militia hereby incredibly advanc'd and which henceforth like cleaner underwood less choak'd by their staddles began to grow excedingly But the Nobility who by the former Laws had lost their Offices by this lost their Soldiery Yet remain'd to them their Estates till the same Prince introducing the Statutes for Alienations these also became loose and the Lords less taken for the reasons shewn with their Country lives where their Trains were clip'd by degrees became more resident at Court where greater pomp and expence by the Statutes of Alienations began to plume them of their Estates The Court was yet at Bridewel nor reach'd London any farther than Temple-Bar The latter growth of this City and in that the declining of the Balance to Popularity derives from the decay of the Nobility and of the Clergy In the Reign of the succeding King were Abbys than which nothing more dwarfs a People demolish'd I did not I do not attribute the effects of these things thus far to my own particular observation but always did and do attribute a sense therof to the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH and the Wisdom of her Council There is yet living Testimony that the ruin of the English Monarchy thro the causes mention'd was frequently attributed to HENRY the Seventh by Sir HENRY WOTTON which Tradition is not unlike to have descended to him from the Queen's Council But there is a difference between having the sense of a thing and making a right use of that sense Let a man read PLUTARCH in the Lives of AGIS and of the GRACCHI there can be no plainer demonstration of the Lacedemonian or Roman Balance yet read his Discourse of Government in his Morals and he has forgot it he makes no use no mention at all of any such thing Who could have bin plainer upon this point than Sir WALTER RALEIGH where to prove that the Kings of Egypt were not elective but hereditary he alleges that if the Book I Kings of Egypt had bin elective the Children of PHARAOH must have Hist of the World part 1. p. 200. bin more mighty than the King as Landlords of all Egypt and the King himself their Tenant Yet when he coms to speak of Government he has no regard to no remembrance of any such Principle In Mr. SELDEN'S Titles of Honor he has demonstrated the English Balance of the Peerage without making any application of it or indeed perceiving it there or in times when the defect of the same came to give so full a sense of it The like might be made apparent in ARISTOTLE in MACCHIAVEL in my Lord VERULAM in all in any Politician there is not one of them in whom may not be found as right a sense of this Principle as in this present Narrative or in whom may be found a righter use of it than was made by any of the Partys thus far concern'd in this story or by Queen ELIZABETH M. D. l. 1. b. 10. and her Council If a Prince says a great Author to reform a Government were oblig'd to depose himself he might in neglecting of it be capable of som excuse but reformation of Government being that with which a Principality may stand he deserves no excuse at all It is not indeed observ'd by this Author that where by reason of the declination of the Balance to Popularity the State requires Reformation in the Superstructures there the Prince cannot rightly reform unless from Soverain Power he descends to a Principality in a Commonwealth nevertheless upon the like occasions this fails not to be found so in Nature and Experience The growth of the People of England since the ruins mention'd of the Nobility and the Clergy came in the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH to more than stood with the interest or indeed the nature or possibility of a well founded or durable Monarchy as was prudently perceiv'd but withal temporiz'd by her Council who if the truth of her Government be rightly weigh'd seem rather to have put her upon the exercise of Principality in a Commonwealth than of Soverain Power in a Monarchy Certain it is that she courted not her Nobility nor gave her mind as do Monarchs seated upon the like foundation to balance her great Men or reflect upon their Power now inconsiderable but rul'd wholly with an art she had to high perfection by humoring and blessing her People For this mere shadow of a Commonwealth is she yet famous and shall ever be so tho had she introduc'd the full perfection of the Orders requisit to Popular Government her fame had bin greater First She had establish'd such a Principality to her Successors as they might have retain'd Secondly This Principality the Common-wealth The great Council of Venice has the Soverain Power and the Duke the Soverain Dignity as Rome of ROMULUS being born of such a Parent might have retain'd the Royal Dignity and Revenue to the full both improv'd and discharg'd of all Envy Thirdly It had sav'd all the Blood and Confusion which thro this neglect in her and her Successors has since insu'd Fourthly It had bequeath'd to the People a Light not so naturally by them to be discover'd which is a great pity For M. D. l. 1. c. 9. even as the Many thro the difference of opinions that must needs abound among them are not apt to introduce a Government as not understanding the good of it so the Many having by trial or experience once attain'd to this understanding agree not to quit such a Government And lastly It had plac'd this Nation in that perfect felicity which so far as concerns mere Prudence is in the power of human nature to injoy To this Queen succeded King JAMES who
had which was HEZEKIAH but to him succeded his Son MANASSEH a shedder of innocent Blood To MANASSEH succeded his Son AMMON slain by his Servants JOSIAH the next being a good Prince is succeded by JEHOAHAZ who being carry'd into Egypt there dys a Prisoner while JEHOIAKIM his Brother becoms PHARAOH'S Tributary The last of these Princes was ZEDEKIAH in whose Reign was Judah led away captive by NEBUCHADNEZZAR Thus came the whole Enumeration of those dreadful Curses denounc'd by Deut. 28. MOSES in this case to be fulfil'd in this People of whom it is also said I gave them a King in my anger and took him away in my wrath Hos 13. 11. TO conclude this Story with the Resemblances or Differences that are between Monarchical and Popular Government What Parallel can there be beyond the Storys wherby each of them are so largely describ'd in Scripture True it is that AHIMELEC usurp'd the Magistracy of Judg in Israel or made himself King by the men of Sichem that the men of Ephraim fought against JEPTHA and that there was a Civil War caus'd by Benjamin yet in a Popular Government the very womb as they will have it of tumult tho never so well founded that it could be steddy or take any sufficient root can I find no more of this kind A Parallel of the Tribunitian Storms with those in the Hebrew Monarchys BUT the Tribuns of the People in Rome or the Romans under Sect. 6 the Magistracy of their Tribuns throout the whole Administration of that Government were never quiet but at perpetual strife and enmity with the Senat. It is very true but first this happen'd not from a Cause natural to a Popular Government but from a Cause unnatural to Popular Government yea so unnatural to Popular Government that the like has not bin found in any other Commonwealth Secondly the Cause is undeniably discover'd to have consisted in a Faction introduc'd by the Kings and foster'd by the Nobility excluding the Suffrage of the main body of the People thro an Optimacy or certain rank or number admitted not by the People or their Election but by the value of their Estates to the Legislative Power as the Commons of that Nation So the State of this People was as if they had two Houses of Lords and no House of Commons Thirdly this danger must have bin in any other Nation at least in ours much harder to be incur'd than Authors hitherto have made it to be seen in this And last of all this Enmity or these Factions were without Blood which in Monarchys they are not as you saw well in those mention'd and this Nation in the Barons Wars and in those of York and Lancaster besides others has felt Or if at length they came indeed to Blood this was not till the Foundations were destroy'd that is till the Balance of Popular Government in Rome was totally ruin'd which is equally in cases of the like nature inavoidable be the Government of what kind soever as of late years we have bin sufficiently inform'd by our own sad Experience Book II CHAP. V. Shewing the State of the Jews in the Captivity and after their return out of it with the Frame of the Jewish Commonwealth Sect. 1 The State of the Israelits in Captivity WE left the Children of Israel upon a sad march even into Captivity What Orders had bin antiently observ'd by them during the time they were in Egypt one of which as has bin already shewn was their seventy Elders the same so far as would be permitted by the Princes whose Servants they were continu'd in practice with them during the time of their Captivity out of which the ten Jer. 25. 12. 2 Chr. 36. 22. Ezra 1. Tribes never more return'd The two Tribes when seventy years were accomplish'd from the time that they were carry'd away by NEBUCHADNEZZAR and in the first year of CYRUS King of Persia â—eturn'd the best part of them not only with the King's leave and liking but with restitution of the Plate and Vessels belonging to the Temple Sect. 2 The Balance of the Common-wealth restor'd by Zorobabel Ezra 2. Ezra 8. THE first Colony as I may say of the two Tribes or those that return'd under the Conduct of ZOROBABEL Prince of Judah amounted to forty two thousand three hundred and threescore among which there were about one hundred Patriarchs or Princes of Familys To these in the reign of ARTAXERXES came sixteen or twenty Princes more with their Familys among whom the Prophets HAGGAI ZACHARIAS and MALACHI were eminent Som of Ezra 2. 59. them could not shew their Fathers House and their Seed whether they were of Israel But these were few for it is said of them in general That they went every one to his own City or to the Inheritance of his Fathers In which you may note the restitution of the Balance of the Mosaical Commonwealth tho to what this might com without fixation the Jubile being not after the Captivity in use I cannot say However for the present plain it is that the antient Superstructures did also insue as in order to the putting away of the strange Wives which the People in Captivity had taken is apparent Sect. 3 The Superstructures of this Commonwealth in the time of Ezra and Nehemia THEIR whole progress hitherto is according to the Law of MOSES they return every man to his Inheritance by direction of his Pedegree or according to the House of his Fathers they are led by Princes of their Familys and are about to put away strange Wives for what reason then should a man believe that what follows should not be according to the Orders of the same Lawgiver Now that which follows in order to the putting away of these foren Wives is Ezra 10. 8 9. Proclamation was made throout Judah and Jerusalem to all the Children of the Captivity that they should gather themselves to Jerusalem and that whosoever would not com within three days according to the counsil of the Princes and Elders all his Substance should be forfeited and himself separated from the Congregation of those that had bin carry'd away This plainly by the penalty annex'd is a Law for Banishment of which kind there was none made by MOSES and a Law made by the Princes and the Elders What doubt then can remain but these Elders were the Sanhedrim or seventy Elders But wheras neither the Sanhedrim nor any other Senat of it self has bin found to make Laws what others can these Princes be that are join'd with the Elders than those spoken of before that is the Princes of Familys or the chief Chap 5 Fathers in the Congregation of them that had bin carry'd away So the Princes and the Elders in this place may be understood of the Sanhedrim and the People for thus DAVID proposes to the Congregation of the People of Israel or the chief Fathers and must be understood 1 Chr. 27. 1.
of them because there is no such thing throout the Scripture to be found as a Law made by the Sanhedrim without the People and if so then that the Sanhedrim with the People had power to make a Law is by this place of Scripture undeniably evinc'd But besides the chief Fathers which here are call'd Rulers of the Congregation Ezra 10. 14 and in the time of DAVID were call'd Captains of thousands and Captains of hundreds mention is also made of the Elders of every City and the Judges therof in which words you have the Judges in the Gates throout the Tribes of Israel as they were instituted by MOSES All which particulars being rightly sum'd up com to this total Tâ—at the Commonwealth restor'd by EZRA was the very same that 〈…〉 was instituted by MOSES A Transition to the Cabalistical or Jewish Commonwealth SUCH was the Government restor'd by ZOROBABEL EZRA Sect. 4 and NEHEMIA Now whether the Jewish or Cabalistical Common-wealth father'd by the Presbyterian Jews of latter ages upon MOSES or EZRA be the same shall be shewn by reducing the invention of these Men to three heads as first their Cabala secondly their Ordination and last of all their great Synagog The Cabala THE Cabala call'd also by the Jews the Oral Law consists of Sect. 5 certain Traditions by them pretended at the institution of the Sanhedrim to have bin verbally deliver'd to the seventy Elders by MOSES for the Government of the Commonwealth These were never written till after the dispersion of the Jews by the Emperor ADRIAN when to save them from being lost they were digested into those Volums call'd the Talmud which they hold to be and indeed are as to matter of Fact the authentic Records of their Government Of the Traditions thus recorded says one of the Rabbins or Jewish Doctors Think not Rabbi Corbulensis that the written Law or the Law of MOSES is fundamental but that the Oral or Traditional Law is fundamental it being upon this that God enter'd into a League with the Israelits as it is written After the tenor of Exod. 34. 27. In codice juris Chagiga these words I have made a Covenant with thee and with Israel A man says another who returns from the study of the Talmud to the study of the Bible can have no quiet conscience neither was there any peace to him that Zach. 8. 10. went out or came in The like wherof is the Talmudical way of applying Scripture throout And it was the common Blessing the Pharises gave their Children My Son hearken to the words of a Scribe or Doctor rather than to the Law of MOSES To whom says CHRIST hereupon You have made the Commandment of God of no Mat. 15. 6. effect by your tradition Ordination by Imposition of Hands NOW as true as the Talmud or as this word of a Scribe or that Sect. 6 MOSES deliver'd the Oral Law to the seventy Elders and to JOSHUA so true it is that MOSES ordain'd both the seventy Elders and JOSHUA by the imposition of Hands and that this Ordination by the imposition of Hands together with the Oral Law came successively and hand in hand from the seventy Elders and from JOSHUA downright to these Doctors This indeed is so generally affirm'd by their Talmudists that there is no denying of it but that as to the seventy Elders it is quite contrary to Scripture has already bin Book II made sufficiently apparent for JOSHUA is acknowleg'd to have bin ordain'd by MOSES with imposition of hands But this Argument besides that the Act of MOSES was accompany'd with a miracle and that it is absurd to think that a thing plainly miraculous should or can be receiv'd as an Order in a Commonwealth will go no farther than that JOSHUA upon this authority might have elected his Successor by imposition of hands Let them shew us then that he did so or indeed that he left any Successor at all for certainly if JOSHUA left no Successor so ordain'd or no Successor at all which is the truth of the case then descended there upon them no such Ordination from JOSHUA and so by consequence none from MOSES Whence it follows that the Authority and Vogue of Ordination by the imposition of hands among the Jews procedes not from the Law of MOSES but from the Oral Law which how bad an Authority soever iâ—â—e to us of right is of fact or of what the exercise of Ordina 〈…〉 s among the Jews a good and sufficient testimony Now therby the condition of this Ordination tho in som times of the Commonwealth it was less restrain'd was such that no man not having receiv'd the same from the great Sanhedrim or som one of the inferior Courts by laying on of hands by word of mouth or by writing could be a Presbyter or capable of any Judicature or Magistracy in the Commonwealth or to give Counsil in the Law or any part of the Law or to be of the Assembly of the great Synagog Sect. 7 The great Synagog WHAT the Assembly of the Princes and Fathers was in the time of EZRA has bin shewn and is left to the judgment of others But this is that which the Talmudists and their Ancestors the Cabalistical Jews among which the Pharises were of the highest rank unanimously affirm to have consisted of the seventy Elders and of a Juncta of fifty Presbyters not elected by the People but by the laying on of hands by the Sanhedrim or by som other Judicatory This they say was the institution of their great Synagog where I leave them but that according to the sense wherin they cite their Authoritys the like with them was a constant practice appears not only by their own Testimony and Records but is plain in Scripture as where CHRIST speaks of the Jews to his Apostles in this manner They Grot. ad Mat. 10. 17. will scourge you in their Synagogs that is the Jews having as yet no Law made wherby they can invade the liberty of Conscience or bring you for the practice therof to punishment will call their great Synagog wherin the Priests and the Pharises or the Sanhedrim have at least seven to five the overbalancing Vote over the rest Which also are their Creatures and by these will easily carry or make such Laws wherby they may inflict upon you corporal Punishment which Interpretation of Christ's words was fulfil'd even to a tittle or rather with over measure For upon this occasion the High Priest and as Acts 4. 6. many as were of the kindred of the High Priest were gather'd together at Jerusalem That this same Juncta to be in this case added to the Sanhedrim was to consist but of fifty those fifty not elected by the People but chosen by the Elders of the Sanhedrim and not out of the body of the People but out of such only as had receiv'd Ordination by the Sanhedrim or by som other
Court or indeed were actually Judges in som other Court was not enough unless they might consist also of Acts 5. 21. as many as were of the kindred of the High Priest Which Rights and Privileges being all observ'd The High Priest came and they that were Chap. 5 with him and call'd the Sanhedrim and all the Presbytery of the Children of Israel that is so many of them as being assembl'd in the great Synagog represented all the Presbytery of the Children of Israel or all the Children of Israel themselves In this Assembly you have the full description of the great Synagog and when in this Synagog they had beaten the Apostles PETER and JOHN they commanded them that Act. 5. 40. they should not speak in the Name of JESUS and let them go Upon these procedings there are Considerations of good importance as first That the Cabalistical Doctors themselves did never so much as imagin that MOSES had indu'd the Sanhedrim alone or separatly consider'd from the People with any Legislative Power nevertheless that the Sanhedrim came into the place and succeded to the whole Power of MOSES they unanimously held whence even upon their Principles it must follow that in MOSES distinctly and separatly taken from the People there could be no Power of making any Law The second thing remarkable in this proceding is That the most corrupt Commonwealth and in her most corrupt Age had not yet the face without som blind of pretending to Legislative Power in a single Council The last I shall observe is That no possible security is to be given to liberty of Conscience but in the security of Civil Liberty and in that only not by Laws which are otherwise as perishing as flowers or fruits but in the roots or fundamental orders of the Government What even in these times must have follow'd as to the liberty of Conscience had there bin an equal Representative of the People is apparent in that the Captain and the Officers imploy'd by this Synagog to apprehend Acts 5. 26. the Apostles brought them without violence for they fear'd the People lest they should have bin ston'd It is true there is nothing with us more customary even in the solemnest places and upon the solemnest occasions than to upbraid the People with giddiness from the Hosanna and the Crucifige of the Jews What may be charg'd upon a multitude not under orders the fouler Crime it be is the fairer Argument for such Orders as where they have bin once establish'd the People have not bin guilty of such Crimes at least it should seem that in this case there is great scarcity of Witnesses against them seeing the Death of SOCRATES is more laid to one People than that of all the Martyrs to Kings yet were the false Witnesses by whom SOCRATES suffer'd and by the like wherto a man in the best Government may chance to suffer no sooner discover'd than they were destroy'd by the People who also erected a Statue to SOCRATES And the People who at the Arraignment of CHRIST cry'd Crucify him Mark 15. 11. crucify him were such as the chief Priests mov'd or promted and such also as fear'd the multitude Now that the People which could be Mat. 21. promted by the chief Priests or the People which could fear the People could be no other than this pretended Representative of the People but indeed a Juncta of Cousins and Retainers is that which for ought I know may be possible and the rather for what happen'd before upon the Law call'd among the Jews The Law of the Zealot which was instituted by MOSES in these words If thy Brother the Deut. 13. 6. Son of thy Mother intice thee saying Let us go and serve other Gods thy hand shall be first upon him to put him to death and afterwards the hand of all the People By this Law it is plain that as to the true intent therof it relates to no other case than that only of Idolatry The Book II execution of the same according to the Talmud might be perform'd by any number of the People being not under ten either apprehending the Party in the Fact or upon the Testimony of such Witnesses as had so apprehended him yet will it not be found to have bin executed by the People but upon instigation of the Priest as where they interpreting the Law as they list STEPHEN is ston'd Now if the Priests could have made the People do as much against CHRIST what needed they have gon to PILAT for help and if they could not why should we think that the Multitude which cry'd out Crucify him crucify him should be any other than the great Synagog HOWEVER that it was an Oligarchy consisting of a Senat and a Presbytery which not only scourg'd the Apostles but caus'd CHRIST to be crucify'd is certain And so much for the great Synagog Sect. 8 The Model of the Jewish Commonwealth THESE parts being historically laid down and prov'd it follows that the Cabalistical or Jewish Commonwealth was much after this Model BE the capacity of bearing Magistracy or giving Counsil upon the Law or any part of the Law of this Commonwealth in no other than such only as are Presbyters BE Presbyters of two sorts the one general the other particular BE Presbyters general ordain'd by the laying on of hands of the Prince of the Sanhedrim with the rest of the Elders or Presbytery of the same and by no other Court without a Licence from the Prince of the Sanhedrim and be those ordain'd in this manner eligible by the major vote of the seventy Elders into the Sanhedrim or into any other Court by the major vote of the Elders or Presbytery of that Court. BE Presbyters particular ordain'd by any Court of Justice and be these capable of giving Counsil in the Law or in som particular part of the Law according to the gift that is in them by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery BE all Presbyters capable of nomination to the great Synagog BE the Sanhedrim in Law made the supreme Magistracy or Judicatory and with a Juncta of fifty Presbyters of their Nomination the great Synagog BE the great Synagog the Legislative Power in this Commonwealth SUCH was the Government where the word of a Scribe or Doctor was avowedly held to be of more validity than the Scripture and where the usual appellation of the People by the Doctors and Pharises was populus terrae the Rascally Rabble Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis Sect. 9 Ordination in the lesser Synagog THERE were other Synagogs for other uses as those wherin the Law was read every Sabbathday each of which also had her Ruler and her Presbytery with power to ordain others to this Capacity CHAP. VI. Chap. 6 Shewing how Ordination was brought into the Christian Church and the divers ways of the same that were at divers times in use with the Apostles The form
upon the day and at the hour appointed except the meeting thro any inconvenience of the weather or the like be prorogu'd by the joint consent of the Signory and the Tribuns That the Prerogative Tribe being assembl'd accordingly the Senat propose to them by two or more of the Senatorian Magistrats therto appointed at the first promulgation of the Law That the Proposers for the Senat open to the People the Occasion Motives and Reasons of the Law to be propos'd and the same being don put it by distinct Clauses to the Ballot of the People That if any material Clause or Clauses be rejected by the People they be review'd by the Senat alter'd and propos'd if they think fit to the third time but no oftner Act of Parlament THAT what is thus propos'd by the Senat and resolv'd by the People be the Law of the Land and no other except as in the case reserv'd to the Dictatorian Council The seventh Parallel THE Congregation of Israel being monthly and the Representative propos'd being annual and triennial they are each upon Courses or Rotation the Congregation of Israel consisting of twenty four thousand in which the whole number of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Princes of the Familys amounted not I might say to one hundred but will say to one thousand it follows that the lower sort in the Congregation of Israel held proportion to the better sort above twenty to one Wheras in the Representative propos'd the lower sort hold proportion to the better sort but six to four and that popular Congregation where the lower sort hold but six to four is by far the most Aristocratical that is or ever was in any well order'd Common-wealth except Venice but if you will have that Gentry to be all of one sort or if you allow them to be of a better and of a meaner sort Venice is not excepted The Sanhedrim made no Law without Book III the People nor may the Senat in this Model but the Sanhedrim with Ezra 10. 8. the Congregation might make Laws so may the Senat in our Model with the Representative of the People Lastly as the Congregation in Israel was held either by the Princes in person with their Staves and Standards of the Camp or by the four and twenty thousand in Military Disciplin so the Representative propos'd is in the nature of a Regiment EXCEPTING Venice where there is a shadow and but a shadow of Law made by the Senat for the Soverain Power is undeniably in the great Council and Athens where a Law made by the Senat was current as a Probationer for one year before it was propos'd to the People there neither is nor has bin any such thing in a Commonwealth as a Law made by the Senat. That the Senat should have power to make Laws reduces the Government to a single Council and Government by a single Council if the Council be of the Many is Anarchy as in the Assembly of the Roman People by Tribes which always shook and at length ruin'd that Commonwealth Or if the Council be of the Few it is Oligarchy as that of Athens consisting of the four hundred who nevertheless pretended to propose to Thucyd. lib. 8. five thousand tho they did not Of which says THUCYDIDES This was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred but the most of them thro privat ambition fell upon that by which an Oligarchy made out of a Democracy is chiefly overthrown for at once they claim'd every one not to be equal but to be far the chief Anarchy or a single Council consisting of the Many is ever tumultuous and dos ill even while it means well But Oligarchy seldom meaning well is a Faction wherin every one striving to make himself or som other from whom he hopes for advantage spoils all There is in a Commonwealth no other cure of these than that the Anarchy may have a Council of som few well chosen and elected by themselves to advise them which Council so instituted is the Senat Or that the Oligarchy have a popular Representative to balance it which both curing Tumult in the rash and heady People and all those Corruptions which cause Factiousness in the sly and subtil Few amount to the proper Superstructures of a well order'd Commonwealth As to return to the example of the Oligarchy in Athens where the four hundred whose Reign being very short had bin as seditious were depos'd and the Soverainty was decreed to a popular Council of five thousand with a Senat of four hundred annually elective upon Courses or by Lib. 8. Rotation Of this says THUCYDIDES Now first at least in my time the Athenians seem to have order'd their State aright it consisting of a moderat temper both of the Few and the Many And this was the first thing that after so many misfortunes made the City again to raise her Head But we in England are not apt to believe that to decree the Soverainty to thousands were the way to make a City or a Nation recover of its Wounds or to raise its Head We have an aversion to such thoughts and are sick of them An Assembly of the People Soverain Nay and an Assembly of the People consisting in the major vote of the lower sort Why sure it must be a dull an unskilful thing But so is the Touchstone in a Goldsmiths Shop a dull thing and altogether unskil'd in the Trade yet without this would even the Master be deceiv'd And certain it is that a well order'd Assembly of he People is as true an Index of what in Government is good or great as tany Touchstone is of Gold A COUNCIL especially if of a loose Election having not Chap. 1 only the Debate but the Result also is capable of being influenc'd from without and of being sway'd by Interest within There may be a form'd a prejudic'd Party that will hasten or outbaul you from the Debate to the Question and then precipitat you upon the Result Wheras if it had no power of Result there could remain to the same no more than Debate only without any Biass or cause of diverting such Debate from Maturity in which Maturity of unbiass'd Debate lys the final cause of the Senat and the whole Light that can be given to a People But when this is don if your resolving Assembly be not such as can imbibe or contract no other Interest than that only of the whole People all again is lost for the Result of all Assemblys gos principally upon that which they conceive to be their own Interest But how an Assembly upon Rotation consisting of one thousand where the Vote is six to four in the lower sort should be capable of any other Interest than that only of the whole People by which they are orderly elected has never yet bin nor I believe ever will be shewn In a like distribution therfore of Debate and Result consists the