to the purpose partly as questionable as ever where it is to the purpose For that that which is infinite in essence must be one and not many I thinke is without question even amongst Atheists nowadayes that have any learning in them allthough a man may fayle in the demonstration of it as here you doe For to be infinite in essence is to comprehend all specificall entities not numericall For such as such differ not in essence And for it to be multiplied according to numericall differences only seemes nothing prejudiciall to the infinitie of the essence save only as infinity of essence is corruptly conceaved to imply quantitie Infinity of power dothe more evidently include opposition to numericall pluralitie then infinity of essence in my judgement But be it not only without question but allso supposed to have bene made evident by some demonstration of yours yet is it nothing to the present question For the question in present is not whether there may be two Gods but only whether in the one nature of God there be not thinges different to witt whether Gods wisdome be not different from his power and both these different from his goodnes that is in a word whether there be not any accident in God And yet unto this question you are arrived but in a very indecent and incongruous manner For wheras before you had undertaken to proove that all thinges were in God accordinge to ideall perfections by all thinges understandinge substances cheifly as of Angells and men and beasts of all sorts And in this chapter doe undertake to shewe that all things thus being in God are not in him by way of pluralitie but drawne to unitie and accordingly should herby proove that the essence of an Angell and the essence of a man yea and the essence of a beast and of every base thing is so in God as one with him and one with every thinge You shift of from this and in the place therof only mention how Gods life and wisedome and power and goodnes are all one in God And this you proove only from this that God is illimited which is as sory a consequence as that wherby you prooved his illimited condition to witt from this that he is independent and receaved not his being from any thinge Which consequence of yours is so farre from naturall evidence that it is repugnant to all Philosophers of olde who maynteyned eyther the World or the first matter not to speake of Intelligences to be independent of any efficient cause and without all makinge yet did never conceave that herehence it must followe that eyther of them should be infinite No lesse inconsequent is that which followeth allso as when you say Whersoever it can be truly sayde this is one and that another or this is and is not that each hath distinct limits I say this is untrue For suppose a body were infinite In this case bothe lengthe and bredthe and thicknes were infinite yet lengthe were only lengthe and not bredthe yet never a whit the lesse infinite Neyther is infinity in thicknes any hinderance to infinity in breadthe though breadthe be not thicknes nor infinity in breadthe any hinderance to infinity in lengthe thoughe lengthe be not breadthe In like sort the infinity of Gods power shoulde be no prejudice to the infinity of his wisedome though his wisedome be not his power Nor the infinitie of his goodnes any prejudice to the infinitie of his power and wisedome thoughe his power and wisedome and goodnes were different in themselves But to come nearer what thinke you of the Persons in the Trinitie The Father is the Father and neyther is he the Sonne nor the Holy Ghost will you herehence conclude that he is not infinite The Sonne is the Sonne but he is neyther the Father nor the Holy Ghost will you therfore say he is not infinite The Holy Ghost is the Holy Ghost but neyther the Father nor the Sonne will you hence inferre that he hathe limits and is not infinite And is it not confessed not only by great Schoolemen but even by our divines allso that the Sonne is produced of the Father per modum intellectus Is he not the wisedome of the Father and what difference betweene the wisedome of God and the understanding of himselfe And doe they not allso confesse that the H. Ghost proceedes from bothe per modum voluntatis And as we say Gods understanding is not his will though it be no different thing from his will and Gods will is not his understandinge thoughe it be no different thinge from his understandinge so we may adore the indivisible unitie of the Godhead notwithstanding the Trinity of the Persons thoughe we are not able to comprehended the mystery herof It is true our understanding is such as that oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari imaginatio non transcendit continuum Yet notwithstandinge we atteyne by discourse to the acknowledgment of thinges immateriall as of our soules yea and of Angells yea and of the God both of men Angells yet not by materiall thinges as by the pictures of them as you phrasify it but rather as in the effects wherein as it were in glasses doe shine the causes of them Thus Aristotle from the motions of the heavens hathe inferred the existence of immateriall and abstract substances as the moovers of them And we commonly say that the World is as a glasse wherein the glory of God is represented His eternall power and Godhead being made manifest by his workes as the Apostle speakethe Rom. 1. 20. Of Gods illimited beinge we make no question but well we may question the soundnes of your arguments wherby you proove it as allso the soundnes of those consequences which you make from it And farre better it is to content our selves with the simplicitie of our Christian faithe in believinge of God what Gods word teachethe us then to depend upon weake reason for the confirmation therof For weake reasons doe rather betray a cause then justify it We believe that God is one and that there is no pluralitie of natures in him but only of Persons And we must take heede that the Metaphysicall extract of vis unita fortior which you speake of doe not so farre possesse us with the contemplation of Gods unity as to deny the Trinity And touchinge the attributes of God as neyther distinct from the essence of God nor from themselves we doe not much affect curiosity of demonstration but if any man voluntarily undertake such a taske we looke for substance of sound proofes and are not content to have our mouthes filled with emty spoones You seeme to gratify God with your hyperboles but surely he dothe not put us to tell any untruthes for him as man dothe for man to gratify him You enterteyne a conceyte of Gods power above all conceyte of infinite power of Gods wisedome above all conceyte of infinite wisedome of Gods goodnes above all conceyte of infinite
It is true God is where any thing is but howe as conteyning it not as conteyned by it but it is untrue that God is where any thing may be For without the Heavens something may be but God is not without the Heavens For without the Heavens is Uacuum but God is not in Uacuo as before your selfe have disputed And indeede how should he be there seing he coulde neyther be there as conteyninge nor as conteyned For that which is nothing is neyther fitt to conteyne nor fitt to be conteyned In fine I observe how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads The one is his creation the other his preservation of them And so I confesse God is not distant from any of us for as much as we live and moove and have our beinge in him as the Apostle speakethe 4. The two wayes as you make them of Gods being every where as you construe the Prophet Ieremy are by Piscator conceaved to be but one the latter wordes Can any hide himselfe in secret places that I shoulde not see him being but an explanation of the former Am I a God at hande and not a God a farre off As much as to say that God seethe as well thinges done in earthe as thinges done in Heaven So that in Scripture phrase thinges done in earthe are called things done a farre of God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension Wheras God is sayde to fill Heaven and Earthe hence it is that God is sayd to be neyther circumscriptively in place as bodies are nor definitively as Angells are but repletively that is filling all thinges but howe that is saythe Durand with his effects God dothe more then fill Heaven and Earthe For he hathe made them and dothe maynteyne them not only fillethe them with all creatures fitt for them Water filles the bucket and the bucket conteynes the water But God forbid we should so conceave of the nature of God as by filling the Heavens and the Earth to be conteyned in them His infinite power and wisedome serves his turne first to make them afterwards to preserve them and unto proper congruous endes to order them and with his various effects to fill them but not with his essence least we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence and maynteyne that he was and is in Uacuo as before I have shewed Vndoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earthe as with the Angells and Saints in Heaven and no more distant or absent from us then from them But how is God present Not as praesensibus Corporis according to Austins exposition of the word praesent for God is no sensible thinge for then he were corporall and to be praesensibus animi is nothing to the purpose God dothe coexist with every thing that is For they doe exist and God doth exist But doth God coexist with them in time they doe exist in time that is their measure of duration but God in eternitie that is the measure of his duration to witt himselfe They doe exist in place that is the measure of corporall extension but doth God exist in place who hathe no extension dothe he not rather exist in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe like as is his eternitie In a word the severall beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses Insunt pars totum Species Genus calor igni Rex in Regno res in sine locoque locatum Now see whether any of these are competible unto God Your selfe have observed and approoved the Hebrewes conceyte in calling him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place Let this then passe for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures whether visible or invisible corporall or spirituall namely that as he hath made them so he conteynes them praeserves them ordereth them fillethe them all with his effects and workes the good pleasure of his owne will in them and by them And this his presence it is impossible he should withdrawe from them â—ave as he shall be pleased â—o destroy them and take all beinge from them and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worme as from the most glorious Angell But to talke of Gods piercing or penetrating all thinges not with his effects only but with his essence as the light piercâ—th the ayre I dare not enterteyne any such gâ—osse conceyte of the most simple and spirituall nature of God for feare attributinge extension unto his essence and such as should continue thoughe the World were destroyed and make roome for the essence of God to extende it selfe in Uacuo and the parts therof which are merely imaginary as well as in the World and in the parts therof like as before I have argued The power of God dothe exercise it selfe according to the pleasure of his will And therfore it seemes wonderous strange to me that you should ascribe power to God to dispose of his essence as touching the placinge of it in space locall Neyther doe I see cause why glorious Angells should be required to prepare a place of residence for God more then bodies inglorious God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worme as in the most glorious Angell And so farre foorthe as it beto Gods essence to be every where I presume no sober Divine will maynteyne that it is other then a naturall attribute unto God not in his power freely to dispose of his essence eyther otherwise or so And therfore when you aske whether upon the creatinge of a newe Heaven it is not possible that God should be therin I answere looke in what sense God is sayde to be any where in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here And yet without all change in them thoughe not without change in things without him one creature beinge annihilated and another created a newe And thoughe Angells be subject to change yet God is not But when you shall proove that change is no fruite of impotency I will renoâ—nce the Prophet that laythe The Lord is not changed and take you for my Apostle And surely if not to be changed were to be impotent how impotent must God needes be with whome is no variablenes nor shadowe of change 5. Gods immensitie is no more subject to his will and power to be streitned then his eternitie But as God is not in time that being a measure only fitt for creatures subject to mutation but in his owne eternitie which is all one with himselfe So neyther is he in place a measure fitt for creatures only subject to extension but in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe And as by his eternitie he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times so by his immensitie dothe he comprehend all places So that neyther doe we say that the first could not be neyther doe we say that this your second way can be Only we dare not say
the essence of God dothe pierce all things least we should give unto his simple and indivisible nature some kinde of extension And how can you avoyde it in making the essence or substance of God to pierce all thinges how I say can you avoyde the maynteyninge of Gods essence to be changeable from place to place upon supposition that the World may moove eyther Eastward or Westward farther then it is or that his essence is in Uacuo and that after a manner of extension as before hathe bene argued Now you tell us that mutabilitie is imcompetent with infinitie yet in the very next section foregoinge you reckoned it a point of impotency not to be able to change as Angells doe their mansions when they mislike them Of which course of Angells eyther as touchinge their mistake or change of mansion I am nothing conscious as neyther am I of any oracle tending that way By your leave there is no proportion betweene Gods immensitie in respect of all places filled by him and the infinity of his nature For seing place and created things can be but sinite his immensitie this way never extends farther then to the filling of a finite creature Neyther doe you well to confound distinction with limitation as if they were all one For when we distinguishe Gods power and wisedome and goodnes or the Persons in the Trinity herby we doe neyther limit the nature of God nor the Persons nor his attributes It is true that God is the supporter of all thinges and in this respect the Apostle acknowledgeth that He is not farre from any of us for as much as In him we live and moove and have our beinge 6. You say that God was when nothing was A most improvident speeche and as good as sacke and sugar unto Atheists For it is as much as to say that God was nothinge or that sometimes God was not But eftsoones you alter this dangerous forme of wordes and tell us that God was when nothing was besides himselfe Without all peradventure before the creation of the world there was neyther distinction of time nor of place Thoughe you doe not cloathe God with an imaginary space as without him yet may you doe as great wrong to imagine such a space in the nature of God as it seemes you doe and that you call immensitie For you say such an imaginary space should be a checke to his immensitie as being a parallel distance locall So that you seeme manifestly to acknowledge a distance in Gods nature but you woulde not have it checkt by any parallel distance as immense as himselfe This imagination is wonderous grosse Wheras on the contrary I finde none to conceyte of any immensitie in God otherwise then as he is sayde to fill all places and therfore before places or bodies are existent only a power and abilitie is in God to fill all places that filling Durand professethe to be in respect of the effects wrought by him wherwith he filles all places not with his essence piercinge all thinges as you discourse as if it were as bigge as the World or as an infinite World yet you thinke to charme this extravagant conceyte with calling it indivisible And so the light of the Sunne which filles the world with manifest extension is yet indivisible Gods essence you say conteynes the Heavens I would you would consider this phrase well what it imports If you were askt what the essence of man conteynes would you say that it conteynes any thing more then that which is of the essence of man as Animal rationale Yet without making any bones of scruple in the prosecution of your owne conceytes you say that the essence of God conteynes the Heavens May you not as well say that the essence of God made the Heavens I had thought it had bene a more congruous speeche to say that God by his power will made the Heavens so dothe preserve and conteyne them rather then by his essence For in respect of essence only such thinges are attributed unto God as doe necessarily belong unto him as for example that he is eternall unchangeable omnipotent most wise most good But no sober man woulde say I thinke that God is the creator preserver conteyner of all thinges by his essence But these attributes belong unto him by the freedome of his will I nothing doubt but that if the World were a thousand times bigger then it is God should be as intimately coexistent to every part of it as he now is to any part of this Heaven Earthe which we now see For all thinges that live or moove or have any beinge doe must live moove have their beinge in him But yet as it is by his will that he made them and not by his essence so it is by his will and not by his essence that he dothe preserve them You pursue the phrasifying of your owne conceytes according to your owne pleasure But where doe you finde in Tertullian or Philo the penetration of Gods essence thorough all thinges Yet I confesse Anselme saythe that Natura Dei penetrando cuncta continet and whether you tooke it hand over head from him I knowe not You seeme to make Gods essence a space of some spirituall extension to which kinde of conceyte our imagination I confesse is wonderous prone as if it did penetrate all thinges as light dothe penetrate the ayre and so fill all thinges with it selfe and not only with his multifarious effects as Durand interpreteth it Nowe this is a dangerous conceyte and obnoxious to a foule errour and opposite to the simplicitie of Gods nature which you perceave wel enoughe and therfore you thinke to checke this errour of conceyte by saying that he is indivisible as if wordes would serve the turne to salve Gods pure simplicitie Durand I am sure professethe against this penetration which you are so enamoured with Durand 1. dist 37. q. Quando dicimus Deum esse in rebus non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam vel intrinsecus penetrantem sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei non solum secundum durationem quia quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem cum non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus quia per situm se habet unum corpus ad aliud immediate quoad sui extremum sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quodlibet sui For thus he writes when we say that God is in thinges we doe not understand him to be an intrinsecate part or that he doth intrinsecatlie penetrate them but we understand him to be present to the thing not only according to the duration therof in being when the things are not by corporall touch seing he is not
thinges then hinders or excludes the conceyte of coextension with the things that are especially wheras you maynteyne that God is in all thinges not only as conteyning them with cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence as I have shewed but rather in respect of his power and wil but by way of penetration thoroughe all and that in respect of his essence and not in respect of his power only like as light is diffused thoroughe our Hemi spheare which similitude I am bolde to adde because you fayle in affoording us any resemblance to succour our capacitie of apprehension this way But I dare not adventure vpon such an apprehension because in my opinion it is too grosse to be attributed to the nature of God I content my selfe with this that as God before the world was in himselfe so he is in himselfe still according to that old verse Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse But then nothing being made he had nothing to conteyne governe and worke by or in as nowe he hathe As touchinge all other manner of being in all thinges I content my selfe with ignorance You magnify Trism gâ—sts definition of Gods immensitie and much good doe it you It is suitable with your dicourse But doe you remember what censure Aristotle passed vpon Empedocles for this figurative obscure manner of expressions in Philosophicall discourse And indeede when we take paynes in searching out the truthe why shoulde we encumber our selves with resolving figures into playne speeches that so we may have somethinge wheron to dispute Hertofore you tolde us that God was the center of all thinges and that of supportance now out of Trismegist you tell us that God hathe a Center and that every where but not of supportance passive I thinke as wherby he shoulde be supported but of supportance active wherby he supporteth all thinges Now herof we can easily finde bothe a center and a circumference For Gods supporting of the earth may well be accoumpted the Center and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accoumpted the Circumference of Gods supportinge the earthe In as much as there is no divine supporting without it at least of materiall creatures but all with it Thoughe it be true that God coulde can make the world much bigger then it is But Gods will hathe herein circumâ—scibed himselfe thus farre to proceede as he dothe in supporting all thinges no farther I doe not like your phrase of inlarging the actuall coexistence of Gods essence For dare any sober divine say that Gods actuall existence hathe boundes and that these boundes may be more or lesse enlarged And yet the face I confesse of your discourse lookes hitherwardes How then doe you say that the boundes of Gods coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged The only way to helpe it is to say that Gods existence is never enlarged but the existence of creatures by the encreasing of newe may be enlarged and consequently Gods coexistence with them may be sayde to be enlarged not that his existence is more then it was but that the existence of created substances is more then it was And more creatures coexisting with God then formerly there did he doth coexist with more then he did His existence is no greater then it was nor hathe no larger boundes then it had but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God more then formerly did exist And yet the omnipotency of God hathe pitcht a circumference to Gods coexistence with his creatures and that is the circumference of the world For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within And albeit God coulde make the world greater and greater yet still it shoulde be but finite as there should be a circumference of all creatures existing so likewise of Gods coexisting with them To say that God only truly is is one of the paradoxes That God alone is id quod est that is that whatsoever is attributed unto God is essentiall to him not accidentall I have often read But that God only truly is I never read but in your writings In him we live and moove and have our being saythe Saint Paul but this by your subtile commentary must be understood with a distinction In him we live but not truly in him we moove but not truly in him we have our being but not truly That God conteynes all things and is not conteyned in any thing we easily grant Spheares doe conteyne by way of place but I hope you will not say that God in such sort conteynes any thinge thoughe therfore called by the Hebrewes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because he conteynethe all thinges And yet certeinly there is no Spheare conteynes so much but that a square figure may conteyne as much thoughe not under the same limits And can any man make doubt but God coulde make a World of a square figure that shoulde conteyne as much as this World dothe thoughe in this case the Circumference of the World shoulde be greater then now it is But because that all thinges cannot comprehend God therfore you say He is rightly resembled to a spheare whose Circumference is no where A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible and fitt matter for Atheists to make themselfes sport withall I say impossible more then one way For first it is a thing impossible that a body should be infinite Secondly it is impossible that a body infinite should be Sphericall If you aske of what figure then shoulde it be my answeare is it should be of no figure For figures are the boundes of quantities it is contradiction to make a boundles quantitie consist of boundes or a bounded and figured quantitie without boundes And yet if all this were receaved as fitt and convenient what shall we gayne therby when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporall who indeede is merely spirituall For I doe not thinke you looke to finde spheares any other where then among bodies We reade and heare of the Spheares of Heaven but I never read or heard of the Spheares of Angells or Spirits as if they might be of a round or square figure as bodies are much lesse is any such figure fitt to resemble God Yet upon these conceytes as extraordinary atchievements of yours in the way of Metaphysicall discourse you proceede in the next place to the solution of certeyne difficulties that so Drismagist his definition of Gods immensitie may finde the more easy admittance into the Articles of our imagination if not into the Articles of our Creede Which yet truly I should not have excepted against but rather have admitted if to no other ende yet to this even to cutt of curious speculations about the immensitie of God had you not so farre magnified it as if it had bene some Oracle of natures light and made use of it not as a Rhetoricall flashe and
neyther universally true nor at all to any purpose you insist liberally in your followinge discourse You should proove that whatsoever hath limits of extension the same allso hath beginninge of duration which yet I deny not to be a truthe and demonstrable but of the demonstration herof your discourse hathe fayled hitherunto When you argue thus It is as possible to put a newe fashion upon nothing as for any thing that is to take limits or set forme of being from nothinge You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it For they that maynteyne the World had no beginninge doe allso maynteyne that it tooke no beginninge of the limits therof And as they doe not say the World tooke his beginninge from nothinge so neyther doe they say that the World tooke the beginninge of his limits or tooke his limits or forme from nothinge Nowe you by this forme of your dispute doe instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World thus If God made the World out of nothing then he put a newe fashion upon nothinge But it is impossible that any newe fashion shoulde be put upon nothinge therfore it is impossible that God shoulde make the World out of nothinge Nowe in this Syllogisme the minor is most true For not any thinge can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion as the forme therof But the consequence of the major is most untrue For when we say that God made the World out of nothinge our meaninge is not that nothing was the matter wherof the World was made but only that it was the terminus a quo not materia ex qua As much as to say God made the World wheras nothing went before neyther had God any matter wheron to woorke when he made the World And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginninge doe therwithall deny that the World tooke eyther being or limits from any thinge You turne their negative into an affirmative so to corrupt their opinion in steade of confutinge it They thought it needed not any thinge to give it beinge or bounds of beinge least they shoulde be driven to affirme that somethinge coulde be made out of nothinge wheras they had rather maynteyne that the world ever had existence by necessitie of nature Neyther did they maynteyne that the world tooke limits or beinge from it selfe any more then from any other which you devise and impute unto them in steade of convictinge their Tenet of errour by force of argument in the way of naturall reason which you undertake And therfore havinge so weakely disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited you doe therby betray the weakenes of your proofe of Gods illimited condition from the everlastingnes therof 6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived in the point of creation you proceede magnificently to suppose that the conceyte of beinge without limits is essentially included in the conceyte of beinge without cause precedent which if it were true then were it a truthe per se notae and consequently the creation of the world evident of it selfe even to common reason seinge it is supposed to have limits And agayne your discourse is so fashioned as if Philosophers maynteyned that the world tooke beginninge of it selfe which is untrue and indeede a thinge evidently impossible namely that any thinge shoulde take beginninge of it selfe And indeede if a thinge coulde give beinge to it selfe it might give what it lusted to it selfe if so be it had a lust which the Elements and Heavens have not Yet those Aristotle maynteyned to have bene from everlastinge not that they gave beginninge to themselves but that they tooke no beginninge from any thinge The reason wherof was because they coulde not conceave howe any thinge coulde be made out of nothinge a thing contrary to all naturall experience upon which kinde of ground your selfe but erst builded your discourse when you sayde thinges caused as induction manifestethe are allwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes Yet notwithstandinge upon this fiction of a thing able to give beinge to it selfe you dilate at large I grant that upon this fiction nothinge coulde restrayne it from takinge all bodily perfection possible to it selfe in case it had power to give beinge to it selfe But never any Philosopher maynteyned that it had power to give beinge to it selfe For they that maynteyned a Chaos precedinge the production of the world maynteyned that out of this Chaos God produced all thinges and not that the Chaos or ought els gave being to itselfe And Aristotle that denyed such an eternall Chaos maynteyned the world had no beginninge was farre from maynteyninge that the world gave beinge to it selfe Secondly I answeare that thoughe it shoulde thus receave all bodily perfection possible yet this shoulde not be infinite and without limits as you woulde have your Reader to suspect without proofe and indeede unles this be imagined t is nothing no the purpose The reason why in this case it shoulde not be infinite is this because all bodily perfection possible is but finite as they conceaved and therin conceaved nothing amisse So of quantitie or qualitie the impossibilitie of eyther to be without measure in bodies whose perfection is only finite is a sufficient hinderance from takinge eyther quantity or qualitie without measure In like sort let Vacuitie as you speake be left free to give it selfe full and perfect act let it take all possible perfection yet since all possible perfection of bodies is supposed to be only finite it will not followe that the perfection taken shall be without limits which yet you must proove otherwise your discourse is of no force to proove that whatsoever hathe nâ— cause of bringe distinct from itselfe is without limits Allthoughe the Philosophers that maynteyned the world or matter therof preexistent to be without beginninge driven herunto because they conceaved not how it was possible that any thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge yet did they never maynteyne that the one or the other gave being to it selfe Yet this fiction you pinne upon their sleeve to supply the weaknes of your discourse Much lesse coulde it enter into any sober mans conceyte that they gave power to a Vacuitie to give it selfe ful and perfect act seinge Vacuitie is starke nothinge which the Chaos was not but a materiall thinge thoughe merely passive and nothinge active But as for vacuitie that is neyther active nor passive as being starke nothinge And yet to this you adde a further solecisme in this your fiction as when you suppose this vacuitie to have power to assume eyther bodily substances or spirituall which the Chaos had not no not so much as in capacitie being wholy materiall wheras spirituall substances are immateriall And yet I confesse as you give unto that which is nothinge power to assume which it list eyther bodily or spirituall substances it may well be sayde that nothing hathe power indifferently
in God because he can produce them so strengthe by just proportion should be in our sinewes because our sinewes coulde produce it which is palpably untrue You shoulde rather say as the motion of our limbes is in our sinewes or in our motive facultie rather because our motive facultie can produce such motion Yet this were a very strange resemblance taken at the best For it is nothinge strange that our motive facultie shoulde moove our limbes but that God shoulde produce all thinges out of nothing is so wonderfull strange a thing that the most learned Philosophers could never digest it and the H. Ghost imputes it unto faithe that we believe it Here you confesse that sense cannot be without a corporall organ whence it followe the manifestly that if sense be in God then allso corporall organs must be found in God And agayne you confesse that what we feele by sense he knowes much better without sense how litle then did it become you to professe that he argued like himselfe that is sottishly belike who sayde we must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies or deny them sense I make no question but that the Divine essence represents the natures of all thinges For by knowing himselfe Divines say he knowes all thinges But is this representation only of natures extant as you speake If so how did he knowe all thinges before the World was howe shall he knowe all thinges after that the World shall cease to be some natures only reserved How varietie sets foorthe unitie as you speake I am to seeke yet the variety of Gods creatures by your leave is not infinite 3. Of the questions proposed by you let the Reader judge as they deserve as allso of your solution of them of your more accurate and exquisite distinction of universalitie and totalitie then the Platonicks ever atteyned too you distinguishinge it not only from that totality which arisethe from aggregation of parts but from that allso whose extent is not more then equall to all the parts which last member I confesse is very curious to witt that there shoulde be a totalitie more then equall to all his parts and I litle woonder that the Platonickes were not acquainted with this subtile curiositie Gods nature we acknowledge to have no parts but yet conteynes all entities not formally but vertually or eminently and examplarily which eminent comprehension is equivalent to a formall comprehension of all if possible thoughe the number of them were infinite but not greater because a number cannot be imagined greater then infinite Exhaustinge by particulars derived from them belongs to natures that conteyne the particulars formally as a bushell of wheate by substraction of graynes may be exhausted it belongs not to natures that conteyne particulars eminently To say that God is being it selfe or perfection dothe not exclude pluralitie in my judgement and that for this reason Humanitie is humanitie it selfe yet this hinderethe not but that many thousands may be partakers of humanitie In like sort thoughe divine perfection be perfection it selfe yet this hinderethe not but that many may be partakers of Divine perfection But you speake I confesse of pluralitie in the nature of God and that in respect of attributes reall not of denominations personall For pluralitie her of undoubtedly you doe not deny Now to say that God is all perfections eminently dothe no way hinder his formall unitie as likewise his formall unitie dothe nothing prejudice his perfectious eminent pluralitie 4. I see no cause for this distinction of yours concerning Ideall perfections internall perfections For if you understand ideall perfections of perfections externall and possible to be created by God but from everlasting represented unto God by his essence there is no cause why you should exclude the pluralitie of these from the essence of God For what Divine can doubt but that as the perfections of created thinges are many so they are all knowne by God and from everlasting were represented unto God and pluralitie of finite perfections represented unto God and knowne by him dothe no way hinder the unitie of Gods infinite essence no more then it hinders the unitie of our soules essence such as it is But if you meane it not of Idea representata but representans so I grant there is but one in God as there is but one essence which essence of God represents all entities and quiddities possible But the argument which you use to proove this unitie in God is neyther congruous nor sound Not congruous because it tends only to this namely to proove that God is illimited and infinite as much as to say that all kinde of entities are comprehended in the nature of God but whether they are so comprehended as with distinction of pluralitie or without that is another question to the cleering wherof you conferre nothinge for ought I yet perceave You demaund if Gods beinge be absolutely illimited what could limit or restrayne it from being power from being wisedome from being goodnes from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is I leave the congruity of your last phrase to be justified by your selfe I dare not say that God is whatsoever man or beast is But touching your interrogation I say it is nothing to the purpose For the question in present is not whether Gods being be bothe life and power and wisedome and goodnes and whatsoever any thinge is which is your phrase not mine But the question is whether all these are one in God or more that is whether his life be his power and both his wisedome and all these his goodnes and every thinge els that any creature is whose beinge allso as you say is infinitely in God Not whether all these thinges are in God but whether all these are drawne to an unitie in God without all pluralitie If you frame your argument in another fashion to helpe this as thus What hindereth Gods life from being his power and wisedome c. I answere that the formall notions of these is sufficient to hinder it except you can give some better reason to the contrary then hitherto you have done A second incongruitie I finde in your discourse and that is this That question the decision wherof you meditate in this chapter arose from that which formerly you maynteyned that all thinges were in God in a kinde of Ideall and transcendentall manner nowe your selfe have confessed that Ideaes were of substances if not only of them For your wordes are these If Plato meant that there were as many severall Ideaes eternally extant whether in the first cause of thinges or without him as there were substances specifically distinct c. But here you give instance only in such thinges as are of accidentall notion and denomination with us such as are life and power and wisedome and goodnes Lastly I have allready shewed that this argument of yours is not sounde wherby you proove Gods being to be illimited because forsoothe it is independant
rightly resembled to a point which every man knowes is much about the same proportion quantitie of just nothing For immensitie eternitie no Angell so like unto God as nothing agayne for his indivisibilitie you say he is rightly compared to a point which is as much as nothing Of the sobrietie of these your discourses let the Reader judge But you thinke to helpe the matter by saying that His presence agayne is like to magnitude actually infinite in that it can have no circumference Now consider I pray How will you make the Majestie of God amendes for these your injurious comparisons to witt in comparing him to magnitude actually infinite which indeede is just nothing For in the most generall opinion of Philosophers Divines magnitude actually infinite is a thinge utterly impossible to have any beinge And marke withall how you contradict your selfe For here you suppose that magnitude infinite can have no circumference but a litle before your discourse was of an infinite Spheare that had a circumference At length notwitstanding your former assertion of justifyinge the comparing of Gods indivisible essence vnto a center or point of magnitude Nowe you confesse that the indivisibilitie of the one and indivisibilitie of the other are heterogeneall and consequently asymetrall the best Philosophicall truthe I have hitherunto founde in your discourse But least all this while you should seeme utterly extravagant in your incongruous comparisons of the nature of God to vile thinges or rather to Nothings first you mince this Philosophicall maxime as when you say They are of times asymetrall and then you corrupt it by interpretation as if asymetrall signified not absolutely incommensurable but only not exactly commensurable Wheras in truthe you shall as soone proove the Diameter of a square commensurable to his side as to proove the indivisible nature of God commensurable to a point of quantitie Est quoddam indivisibile saith Durand quod est aliquid quantitatis ut punctus Aliud est indivisibile quod est totalitur extra naturam quantitatis ut Deus What an absurd thing were it to compare the soule of man to a point in a quantitie the soule being so indivisible as to be all in all all in every part how much more so to compare an Angell most of all the divine Essence And the soule of man is much fitter to represent God by man being made after the image of God and God is all in all and all in every part of the world but not as forma informans as the soule is and consequently neyther extended with the extension of the world nor mooved at the motion of the world nor any part therof Hence you say it is that the most subtile Schoolemen or Metaphysicall Divines as well ancient as moderne resolve it as a point irresoluble by humane witt whether a mathematicall point or center can be the complete and definitive place of an Angell albeit they holde the Angelicall natures to be as truly indivisible as points or centers are I doubt there is litle truthe sobrietie in all this If there be I must confessâ— I was never acquainted with any of these concealed Schoolemen or Divines eyther ancient or moderne at least in these particulars For you tell me that which I never heard or read of before yet I have bene acquainted with fopperyes more then enoughe amongst them might have bene with more if I had any minde thereunto But for the most part I have ever shunned those trifling subtilties But consider we the particulars which here you give us a part For to make your assertion good you are to shewe not only that these Schoolemen you intimate doe holde the point you speake of irresoluble but allso that Hence they doe holde it so that is because the indivisibilitie of centers or points of spirituall substances are heterogeneall and asymmetrall that is not exactly commensurable But let us consider the point it selfe concerning a Mathematicall point Now I pray consider this As Mathematicall quantitie is herein distinct from quantity Physicall because that is abstract from matter this is not so a Mathematicall point must herein be distinct from a point Physicall in as much as that is abstract from matter this is not Now quantity and poincts Mathematicall thus abstract from matter are but only in imagination And doe the Scholemen you speake of maynteyne it as a point irresoluble whether an Angell may be defined within a point of imagination only what were this but to have no being at all but in mans imagination Wherfore you may be advised to let the question runne rather of a point physicall then of a point Mathematicall unles you looke for some succour from that rule of course Mathematici abstrahunt nec mentiuntur Yet that woulde proove but a broken toothe and sliding foote to keepe you from errour in this But I thinke the Nominalls are those most subtile Schoolemen you speake of I envy not the glory which you give them be it as great as that which Scaliger passethe upon Scot Occam and Sincet The nominalls are much magnified by Hurtado di Mendosa And I finde in Gabriel Biel such a question as this Whether an Angell may determine unto himselfe a certeyne quantitie of place in such sort as be cannot coassist unto or be defined by eyther a greater or a lesser and the answeare is sayde to be according to Occam in his Quodlibets 1. quest 4. First that there may be given the greatest place of an Angell so that he cannot extende himselfe to a greater Secondly there cannot be given the least place of an Angell in such sort that he cannot define himselfe within a lesse For my part I utterly dislike all these conceytes of an Angells power to extend or confine his owne essence it seemes so opposite at first sight to a spirituall perfection and so obnoxius to the imputation of corporall extension unto them And I manifestly perceave how they puzle themselfes in labouring to scatter such mists of scruples as their owne fancyes rayse and are driven to professe Nihil in his materiis tam absconditis puto temere asserendum But let every man make his owne bed and lye as soft as he can I will not hinder any But we are not hitherunto come to the point you point at yet neyther Physicall nor Mathematicall but that which I meane is your point Philosophicall Pardon me if I picke up by the way some crumes of merryment to refreshe my Spirite in so unpleasing an argument The reason why the least place for an Angell to define unto himselfe cannot be given is because saythe he Posset coassistere loco punctuali pro eo quod ipse est indivisibilis Now you see we are upon the matter and withall quite off from your assertion For even these Nominalls doe not holde it to be a point irresoluble as you speake but resoluble and they actually resolve it for the affirmative to
such Ifs and And 's that the world is nothing like to profit either in wit or honestie by this information Onely in this clause alone I finde some coherence with the former to wit with the first sentence of this Section for that laid downe the thesis this delivers the selfe same in hypothesis The conclusion is that Gods ideall perfection in integrity and constancie hath no mixture of vice or humerous impotency And our conceit of this perfection in God you say is rectified thus to wit by experience of the strength of unconstant humerous desires of the faintnesse of our love and equity as well as by the contrary vertues Your wit hath plaid his part here when you strained to derive the rectification of our conceits touching Gods integrity and constancie from the contrary disposition in man Belike if Adam had never fallen our conceits could not have beene so rectified touching Gods integrity and perfection as now they are neither shall they bee so well rectified in the kingdome of heaven because there we shall be acquainted with no such humourous inconstancy or faintnesse of equity in man 2 In the former Section you complained of not extending the maxime mentioned so far as naturally it would reach and you discoursed unto us the dangerous consequence of such an humour and the cause of it The consequence was partly aptnesse to conceive difficulties in the points proposed by you and ignorance to assoile them The cause was the extending of our owne power too farre And in this Section you endeavour to rectifie our conceits hereabouts now whereas I was intent as it is fit every Reader should bee to observe what was your drift and scope in all this in the end of the former Section you fell upon the rectifying of our conceits touching Gods ideall perfection in the way of integrity and constancy as if that were the scope you aimed at but neither did your discourse in any handsome manner tend thereunto though finally it lighted thereupon neither doe I yet perceive whereunto this ideall perfection of God you speake of is directed as being nothing congruous for ought I discerne to the point in hand I rather thinke that was delivered as many other things in that Section on the by and that the immediate end you aime at is this here mentioned in the beginning of this Section namely the rectifying of our conceits touching the right extending of the aforesaid maxime which is the principall negative touching contradictories Both parts of contradiction cannot bee true no nor false neither you had rather expresse it thus To make both parts of contradiction true or false is no object of power omnipotent Now wee seeme to have found the hare againe at least the tract and sent of the hare and desire to pursue without making any fault as neare as wee can Now the rule you give us for the right extending of the maxime mentioned is this Many effects are very possible to power alone considered which imply contradiction to some other divine attributes This passage hath seemed wondrous harsh unto me and as it were Iuterpretationem commodam indignata such as could not admit a commodious interpretation and the issue of searching into the meaning thereof is not to justifie it but rather to discover sundry incongruities involved herein In the former Section you complained of men as extending their owne power too farre which you conceived to bee the reason why they did not extend the maxime there proposed so farre as naturally it would reach But here you admonish us of extending the power of God aright not considering it at large but rather as joyned with other attributes of God Secondly you complained that men did not extend the maxime you speake of so farre as naturally it would reach and therfore when here you come to give rules for the extending of it aright every man would imagine that you take a course to enlarge it at full whereas indeede you take a course to restraine it for you tell us here that a thing is not to be accounted possible in reference unto power but in reference unto other attributes of God also as love truth goodnesse and justice which manifestly doth restraine the possibility of any thing rather then enlarge it Thirdly whereas the effect of power which you treat of in this place is onely this To make both parts of contradiction true when you tell us that Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered do necessarily imply contradiction unto some divine attributes What doe you but hereby give us to understand that this effect to wit of making both parts of contradiction true though it bee possible to power alone considered yet it is not possible in respect of some other attributes divine Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobrietie whether this be a decent thing to say that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered whereas indeed it is no more possible in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true then to make both parts of contradiction false Neither indeed is it in the power of God as touching any one part of contradiction if it be not true to make it true or if it be true to make it false As for example I am alive it is not in the power of God to make it false Hee may take my life from me but that is not a course to make that proposition false For it was true onely for that time when it was pronounced not for the time to come when my life is taken from mee So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false Socrates is alive neither is it in the power of God to make it true for though hee can restore life to Socrates yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true For that proposition was true for that time only when it was pronounced not for the time to come least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates But you will say the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true not on the contrary And God is the cause of the being of things This I confesse is a truth in part God is the cause of the being of things yet not of all things but onely of things contingent God is not the cause of that which hath necessary being such as he is himselfe So that these like propositions God is eternall omnipotent omniscient most simple c. no way depend on the execution of God his power which proceeds alwayes according to the counsell of his owne will But hereupon depends not the nature of God nor many other principles containing necessary truth I grant many things are denominated possible to the humane nature which are not so in reference to the divine For the humane nature hath power to transgresse the divine nature hath not
judge there is no chang or alteration at all in God but only in men and in theire actions Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration your selfe proposed in the former chapter but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence that is the fruitfull Mother of all things and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe which usually falleth out whē men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation And yet that which you say here I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power But you have not discovered unto us if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children especially consideringe that will is found in the Father as well as in the Mother yea and love also if not in greater measure But I deny not but that God made the world out of love but out of love to whome to the creature Nothing lesse I should thinke as before I have shewed but rather out of love to himselfe as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe And greate reason God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things should be the supreame end of all things But let this passe Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous but very preposterous and unsound First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it and then a qualification or limitation thereof by way of exception unto a certayne time The proposition is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory but our temporall being also and the preservation therof For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any For they are merely gratuita dona and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne in bestowing it on whome he will and denyinge it to whome he will And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will and whome he will he hardneth But more then this as God was not bound to create any so neyther can any thing save his owne will binde him to preserve any thing in being But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men even take theire temporall being from them without any purpose ever to restore it and not only the being of theire bodyes but of theire soules also turning both into nothing Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent never so holy as Arminius confesseth But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this Now these are two the one because God hath created our natures Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this that God hath created other things as well as man Yet who will conclude herehence that God must needes preserve them and not exclude them from this fruite of his love Your other reason is because God cannot change and this is as weake as the former For like as God though at one time he gives us life another time takes life from us yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe like as in course of nature though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether in the heavens in the earth in the Sea in the states and Kingdoms of the World and in the bodyes of all creatures yet without any change at all in himselfe yea though he set an end to this visible World this can inferre no variablenesse in God so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells and so exclude them from all fruits of his love Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God Yet you have a third reason which is this Love is the nature of God as Creator You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good and what other sense you imply when you say Love is Gods nature as a Creator I discerne not You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love it is very incongruous to say that this love of God wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition and that is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill come to that hight as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour First touching your meaning in this then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning your meaning in briefe is this No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity Of this your opinion I have spoken often I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it And that is
goodnes To be essentiall to the nature of God is more noble I grant then to be accidentall but howe any power can be greater then power infinite or any wisedome greater then wisedome infinite or any goodnes greater then goodnes infinite I cannot comprehend yet I verily believe that whersoever infinite power infinite wisedome infinite goodnes is founde that nature is not accidentally but essentially both powerfull and wise good as namely the nature of God thoughe of the evident demonstration therof for ought you have brought to helpe us herein we may be still to seeke As for succession and extension we holde that each is impossible to be infinite And neyther of them any attribute of God as power and wisedome and goodnes is And therfore the comparison you make of the nature of God in this kinde must needes be wonderous wilde Yet I envy no man the delight that he takes in these and such like contemplations but rather wonder that succession and extension shoulde be reckoned up by you as excellencyes and perfections conteyned in God and that all these mentioned attributes layde out in severall should have infinities added unto them Much more should we have wondered if the issue of your discourse had bene answearable to the originall which is to shewe not how power and wisedome goodnes are all one in God which are with us of accidentall denomination but to shewe how every substance is in God of Angell of man of beasts of birds of fishes of woormes and every creeping thinge and that all these are to be accoumpted excellencyes and perfections And surely they had neede to be in God in a more excellent manner then they are in themselves otherwise their advancing so highe woulde be too great a degrading of the nature of God But to adde my mite of discourse touching the being of all thinges in God and the precise unitie of all thinges in God which under a forme of pluralitie according to our conceytes are attributed unto him As touching the first that all perfections are in God is to be acknowledged without all controversy because we understand by God such a nature as nothing can be imagined better and I approove of Aquinas his reason Like as heate if it did exist of it selfe it should comprehende all degrees of heate so the essence of God being all one with his existence that is he beinge essentially 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 all perfections of being must necessarily be comprehended in him But as for the perfections of beinge which are founde without God according to their severall rankes and kindes therein â—s namely of being without life of being and life without sense or reason of beinge life sense without reason of bothe beinge life and sense and reason as they are not like unto God according to any univocall notion of Species oâ—kind but only analogicall which as Aquinas shewethe is this that God is entitie by essence every other thinge is an entity only by participation So likewise their perfections cannot be sayde to be in God univocally but only analogically as the effect is sayde to be in the Agent in as much as he hathe power to produce it It is true some thinges are attributed unto creatures which cannot be attributed unto God and some thinges are attributed bothe to God and to the creatures As for example God is not a body man is a body God is a spirite an Angell is a spirite God hath beinge so have all thinges God hath life so have many thinges God is wise good powerfull these attributes are likewise conveniently given to men and Angells Yet these denominations in admitting wherof bothe God and creatures doe agree are as different in respect of God and the creatures as those denominations in the communion wherof they doe not agree As for example the Spirituall nature of God is as farre different from the spirituall nature of an Angell as from the bodily nature of maâ— or beast as being infinitely different from eache And therfore it is that some make the measure of perfections in the creatures not their approximation in nature unto God but rather their remotion a non esse One creature having more perfections of beinge then another consequently so much the more remooved from not beinge But the creatures of greatest perfection being but finite are still infinitely remooved from God who is infinite So that like as the bodily nature of man dothe not agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God so neyther dothe the spirituall nature of an Angell agree in any kinde with the spirituall nature of God But God is equally an equivocall Agent in respect of bothe And no merveyle for the denominations wherein God and the creature agree are commonly such as are of accidentall denomination unto the creatures as when we say God is wise and holy and powerfull a man or Angell is wise and holy and powerfull c. But is there any colour why the nature of God shoulde come nearer unto those thinges that are of accidentall denomination in us then unto those that are substantiall wheras every meane scholer knowes that substances are more noble then accidents and as for substantiall denominations wherein God and the creature doe agree if they be examined it will be founde that in the resolution of the truthe the agreement will appeare to be only in negation As when we say God is a spirite the negation of extension corporall and materiall is the only thinge wherein the nature of God agreeth with an Angell Like as our Saviour intimates the description of a spirite in distinction from a man to consist in this that a spirite hathe not fleshe and bones And as for the generall not on of entitie common to all marke what a vast difference there is herein betweene God and the creature and such as excludes all univocation God is an entity independant and wherof all other entities depend bothe for their production and for their preservation and that out of nothinge as touching the last resolution of them into their first principles Let it suffize then that all perfections are in God and that they all are his one most pure and most simple essence But as for created perfections the word created is a terme diminishing perfection but such as they are they are in God only as effects are in their causes and they not univocall but equivocall only or at the best but analogicall Let us come to the consideration of the unitie of Gods attributes especially with Gods essence whence it will followe that an unitie of them is to be acknowledged amongst themselves And the question wil come to this whether there be any accident in God Not that I have any edge to these Metaphysicall speculations or that I thinke our language to be fitt for them for want of termes of Art in common use to expresse such notions as here must necessarily occurre But only being provoked herunto by
a body nor any qualitie in a body but according to order which in Spirits is answerable to situation in bodies Which order in Spirits excells situation in bodies in this respect because by situation one body is with another only as touching the extreame parts therof immediately But by order a Spirit is immediate to a body in respect of every part therof Our imagination I confesse is apt to imagine God to be as it were of most subtile quantitie penetrating all But to conceave so of an Angell is too grosse how much more of God Durand 1. dist 37. part 2. qu. 1. num 17. Differentiae situs non extenduntur ad substantias incorporeas cujusmodi sunt Angeli Huic autem contradicit imaginatio quae non transcendit quantum continuum secundum quod formamus nobis de Angelis aliquod Quantum Subtilissimum Sed in hoc non est rectum credere imaginationi quia Angeli abstrahunt secundum rem a quanto sicut a quali ideo sicut non sunt albi aut nigri frigidi aut calidi sic de caeteris qualitaetibus corporalibus sic non sunt magni vel parvi quia non sunt quanti per consequens hic vel ibi ratione suae essentiae quia hae sunt proprietates quanti The proper differences of corporall thinges saythe Durand are not to be extended to incorporall things such as Angells are Imagination contradicteth this which dothe not transcend quantities according wherunto we fashion to our selves Angells as if they were of a most subtile quantitie But we doe not well to followe imagination in this For Angells are natures abstract as well from quantitie as from qualitie therfore like as they are not white and black cold and hott and so of the rest of corporall qualities and so they are not great or small because they have no quantity consequently are not here or there in respect of their essence seing these differences are proper unto quantitie But some may say If Gods essence be not here where is it then I answeare that God is as much here as any where and when I say God is here and every where I doe not exclude his essence For by God I understand his essence But I deny that he is here or any where els secundum essâ—ntiam as if his essence had any situation here which kind of being is proper only to bodies and not to Spirits and makes Gods nature subject to extension We may be bold to say that Gods essence is indistant from every thing For herein we goe along with the Apostle who sayth that God is not farre from every one of us For in him we live moove have our beinge But as for penetration of all things with Gods essence I leave that phrase to them that like it As for Gregories trimeÌ„bred sentence one part therof alone is to your purpose namely when he saythe that God is intra omnia non â—nclusus And indeede we all say that God is so in all thinges as that he rather conteynes them then is conteyned by them Now which I pray is the more sober speeche to say that Gods essence conteynes all thinges or to say that Gods power will conteynes all thinges let every learned and sober Reader judge 7. Thoughe I deeme it not much woorthe the while to searche after this distinction in Anselme the place wherof you conceale Yet I have taken that paynes to the ende I might the better consider in what sense and upon what grounde of reason he dothe deliver it And in his Monologion I finde he discoursethe of Gods beinge in time and place But no such distinction can I finde in him nor any such assertions as you impute vnto him In his 19. chap. he disputethe that God is in no place and time In the 21. How he is in all places and in no place In the 22. That It may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be allwayes then in all time In the 23. How it may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be every where then in all places But that it is fitter to be sayde of God that he is with place then in place I finde no where nor in any place in Anselme Yet you avouche it as the distinction of Anselme and as well approoved of good writers but who they are you keepe to your selfe Notwithstanding you tell us that the resolution of doctrine according to the former distinction is blameable in two respects 1. For that it conceales much matter of admiration which the description of immeÌ„sitie used by Barnard and others dothe promptly suggest 2. Because it dothe occasion an erroneous imagination of coextension in the divine essence As touching the first I see nothing to the contrary but that Gods being with every place dothe every way conteyne the very same matter of admiration which his being in every place dothe For the woonderful nature of his immensitie in playne termes is but this thoughe it may be phrasified diverse wayes as it pleasethe the writer that he conteynes all thinges and is conteyned in none Now this may as well be signified by sayinge God is with every place as by sayinge God is in every place For being with a place is indifferent to admitt such a manner of being with it as namely by way of conteyning it But being in a place dothe rather incline to signify a beinge conteyned by it Which is opposite to the active conteyning of it Place say the Durand may be considered two wayes eyther as a naturall thing or as conteyning the thing placed As it is naturall thinge so God is in every place but as it conteynes the thinge sayde to be in it so he is in no place For he conteynes all and is conteyned of none As for the imagination of coextension in the divine essence to my judgement your opinion in making the divine essence to penetrate all thinges hathe bene very prone therunto And howe to be with every thinge dothe more include a coextension of nature then to be in every thinge I cannot possibly conceave But I pray in what sense of truthe or truthe of sense can you averre that every body is with every place You may as well avouche that every worme here on earthe is with the Sunne or with the place of the Sunne And can the mathematicall dimensions of a bodily substance be accoumpted the place of that bodily substaÌ„ce that you should say Every bodily substance is with the mathematicall dimensions therof and that even there where you speake of a substance his being with a place And why you should terme them mathematicall dimensions rather then Physicall I knowe not You say that Gods being in every place and in every part of every body so as not to be conteyned in them dothe exclud all conceyte of coextension But I see no reason for this assertion it rather includes an extension of Gods being beyond all