their particular lodgings whether the way to the house were not so beset with clamarous multitudes that they must passe thorough the midst of them whilst they inform them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take The other two may be reduced to those It is no wonder many stay away since they must be absent even whilst they are there The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom publique affaires shall be transacted may be chosen by approbation or nomination of the great Councell could the King conceive this dishonourable for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to Royalty Is that the reason why each man preserves his own rights because he takes all the rest of mankind for deadly enemies Can he with honour confesse himselfe unfit to manage that trust which the law hath committed to him with equall reason they may challenge to themselves the nomination of all Bishops Ministers Sheriffs Justices c and dispose of all the Preferments in England The substance of the request seemes to be no more but this that it would please the King to be advised by Parliaments c What an affected mistake is this He is ashamed to call it by the true name and therefore styles that advice which is properly command if it be not in His power to reject their counsell seem it never so unreasonable If the King choose such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of His own good liking only or upon recommendation of such a Courtier here he is devested of no power but if it be upon the recommēdation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majesty and devesting himselfe of power If this will content them they shall have as much power as He grants to His Courtiers Counsellors are not names of authority they are the Princes eares His eyes this relation is neare enough He sees and heares by them yet they must not passe their bounds they must be like to the outward senses still and make a bare representation the office of reason is peculiar to him to passe judgement thereon Their information is not alwayes faithfull he may consult reason and by the benefit of that correct their errour misrepresenting an object as crooked which in it selfe is streight If not out of duty to their King and a just sense of His honour yet out of love to themselves and a naturall care of their own safety Subjects are bound in all legall wayes to expresse their dislike of this proposition For they must expect to suffer all those evills which Faction can produce and what happinesse can be hoped for in a Kingdome divided in it selfe This were the ready way to kindle a fire in our own bowells which would first break out in the Countyes electing and divide the familyes of the gentry by irreconcileable hatred For it cannot be imagined but that power will bandy against power and relations against relations to put Sons or Kinsmen into that roade which only leads unto preferment Nor would the flames be quenched but rather burn more fiercely even in the Houses as being pent in a narrow room to which the insolency of some attaining offices to which they are not equall the shame and discontents of others repulsed and the ambition of all would adde continuall fuell But the greatest misery of all is were their corruptions never so high we could have but slender hopes of redresse Since the prevayling party jealous of their own honour would easily maintain the reputation of their choice and perhaps it would be necessary for them to wink one at another He that cannot think it probable that out of private ends they should so farre neglect justice and honour let him only examine whether in some Parliaments most known offendours and active instruments in the peoples misery by striking in with the prevailing side have not been more safe then innocency could have made them There are severall degrees of Prerogatives Royall some whereof have greater power of protection and lesse of oppression and such J am most studious of Certainly it were to be desired we might enjoy the benefits of power and not be subject to the possible abuse thereof But since this cannot be fully provided for because the same hand which is enabled to protect may injure the aimes of wisest States have been not so much to take away the power because then they should be likely to suffer under a weak Protector as the will of oppression The most probable means to effect this is after a certain rule is agreed upon and Lawes are established to acquaint a governor what he ought to doe in performance of that trust committed to him so to order his interests that to advance the peoples good shall be for the Princes advantage Subjects will have great reason to promise to themselves a full happinesse from the faithfull discharge of his Regall office to which he is so strongly tyed by those bonds of justice and profit This the wisdom of our Ancestors hath provided for in a high degree and so temper'd this governement that both King and people will be joyntly happy or joyntly miserable The severall goods of each forme are here united we have great Democraticall advantages and yet may avoyd the evills of a popular State as long as Monarchy is kept up in its due height and tumultuous insolent multitudes are not protected from a legall tryall we have the good of Aristocracy counsell of the best experienced such as have studied nations and men nor yet are we acquainted with the disease of it faction amongst the Nobility The Counsell of many is profitable but the resolve of one is necessary Since they looking upon one another as equalls would be very apt to quarrell for when one contradicts what another hath advised the debate between them seems to be which is the wiser man Their discourses are like so many pleadings for honour and we know what issue such suites would come to when the thing in controversy is so highly valued if there were not a judge to determine And this is the benefit of Monarchy which is so restrained by some power proper to the Houses it cannot degenerate into a tyranny For how should this enter in The old lawes the security of our libertyes cannot be taken away till both Houses give consent but grant an illegall violent Government should break in upon us by what meanes could it be maintained The King can have no supply of money without the House of Commons and without these sinewes his arm would not be strong enough to hold the reines which should govern that provoked beast the multitude But He may take it by force He cannot doe it in person and it is not to be imagined any considerable number of His people will be active in their owne
are met We called them and without that call they could not have come together to be our Counsellors not Commanders for however they frequently confound them the offices are severall The writ runs super dictis negotijs tractaturi vestrumque consilium impensuri so that the cleare meaning is their advise is not Law except the Royall assent establish it into an act 'T is alleadged he calls them Counsellors not in all things but in quibusdam arduis c. and the case of Wentworth is cited who being a member of the House of Commons was committed by Q. Eliz. but for proposing they might advise the Queen in a matter Shee thought they had nothing to doe to meddle with He answers a meere example though of Q. Elizabeth is no law It is true a bare example shewes only what was not what ought to be but when grounded on authority and no way excepted against by those who have alwayes been earnest defenders of their Priviledges it may be reckoned amongst sound Presidents what he adds that some of Her actions were retracted is a confirmation of this for this being out of the number it seems it was accompted legall Exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis Yet neither did the King so quote this president as to build a right upon it He alleadges the King denyes the Assembly of the Lords and Commons when he withdrawes himselfe to be rightly named a Parliament or to have any power of any court and consequently to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men This is falsly imposed on His Majesty His Answers and Messages speak the contrary which are directed to both Houses of Parliament Besides He hath passed some bills since his withdrawing All that He affirms is that the sole power of making or repealing lawes and altering any thing established is not in them but if He upon mature deliberation shal preferr the present government to the proposed change then their order is not to have the force of law and oblige the Kingdom The King is said to assert that because the law hath trusted him with a prerogative to discontinue Parliaments therefore if He do discontinue Parliaments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this is no breach of that trust because in formality of law the people may not assemble in Parliament but by His writ This is grosse forgery if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdom He acknowledges He is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writs And to this end He gratiously signed the bill for a trienniall Parliament which like Physick well timed may preserve the body of this state in health and strength by not sufferring ill humors to grow to any head Another assertion of the Kings he saies is if the Parliament make any transition in other matters then what he pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure All this he collects from the citation of Wentworths case The sence of his inference is this because they cannot justify the medling with things which belong not to their cognisance therefore they may be punisht if they medle with those that do We may observe an affected mistake in this author of which he makes frequent use and this animadversion though once laid down may often be applyed Whatsoever the Houses do he calls that the Act of the people Whereas the truth is they represent them only to some purposes and ends So that if they exceed their commission and vote things not belonging to their cognisance the People by no meanes is engaged in it as having no legall way of expressing themselves in such cases His Majesty clearly to prove that the trust committed to both Houses cannot bind Him to assent to what ever they propose seem it of never so dangerous consequence to the Kingdom nor absolve Him in point of conscience if His reason tell Him His people will extreamly suffer vnder the grant argues thus It is impossible that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to Us and Our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend be committed to others did not the people that sent them look upon them as a body but temporary and dissoluble at Our pleasure and can it be beleived that they intended them for Our Guardians and comptrollers in the managing of that trust which God and the law hath granted to Us and Our posterity for ever Strange it is that affection should so blinde the understanding and worke mens beliefe not according to reason but desire I must needs think the let lies only in his will else he could never satisfy himselfe with such weak answers It is true faith he two supreames cannot be in the same sence and respect If he had not hoped to hide himselfe in generalls he would have descended to particulars and told us in what sence what respect and what matters the King was supream in what the two Houses But an application would have discovered the truth even to weak understandings Nothing is more knowne or assented to then this that the King is singulis major and yet universis minor I have already evidenced the contrary yet I will speak something to it here By universis he must mean the representative all which therefore he concludes to be above and have greater power then the King that is such a power as He is bound to obey So it seems the King hath taken the oath of allegiance as well as we and we may call Him our fellow subject Yet the oath of Supremacy he tells us is no waies endangered The sense of his reason is because he is a better man then any one of us take us single He tels us He is better then any one He does not tell us He is better then two if the Kings supreamacy be no more but this it is no more then possibly He might have and probably had before He was King It is not the Prince singulis major nay may not any Lord in the Land challenge the same supreamacy over all the Knights any Knight over all esquiers to be singulis major though universis minor But perhaps some othes limitation may be found out the meaning shortly shall be that he is above the Pope in these his dominions not but that He is under His subjects to take of these and all other corrupt glosses I shall refer him to cap. 12. vices 4o. Hen 8. In the preface of which statute the Kings supreamacy not over single persōs but the body Politique is clearly delivered The words are these Where by divers sundry old authentick histories chronicles it is manifestly declared expressed that this Realm of England is an Empire and so hath been accepted in the world governed by one Supream head and King having the dignity and Royall estate of the Imperiall Crown of the same unto whom a Body
Politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in tearmes and by names of spiritualty and temporalty been bounden and owen to beare next to God a naturall and humble obedience If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confesse that name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voice t is all one as if he had no voice if their power must over-rule his t is all one as if he were devested of all nay why is it thought fit to send to him and sollicite his consent when it is legally past in that the two houses have voted it why to all publique bills do they require this confirmation Le Roy Le voet is it only for the same reason that Bellarmine gives why the Pope being alone infallible calls generall councells ut res suavius transigatur suppose he should returne in answer that of SENECA Si vultis scire an velim efficite ut possim nolle Thus though he plead for a new government he is ashamed to own it by the right name For he tells us not without some indignation at the very thought of such an innovation This new Aristocraticall fabrique cannot seem to any impartiall man but as empty a shadow as airy a dream as ever mans fancy abused it selfe withall I dare say he cannot meet in all histories and records except of such Parliaments as have depos'd Kings which he confesseth no free one ever did with one example of this nature that the two Houses should pretend to a power which must of necessity over-rule the King Indeed a reasonable man cannot imagine any president possible because since the law hath given the King a power by dissolving the Parliament to take away that power as is pretended greater then his own if they had ever made claim to superiority over him he would quickly have put an end to that dispute Before this power be challenged it would befit to vote down that clause in a law made 2. Hen. â— cited by His Majesty that it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their Petitions as pleaseth himselfe Yet notwithstanding this he must be UNIVERSIS MINOR for this wee see in all conditionate Princes such as the Prince of Orange c. I never knew he had Regall power before This instance abundantly manifests his designe though he is pleased to say he speakes nothing in favour of any alteration but is as zealously addicted to Monarchy as any man can without dotage To the most absolute Empire in the world this condition is most naturall and necessary that the safety of the people is to be valued above any right of his It is against common sense to suppose a King that is in his wits me thinkes all good people should take to heart those desperate conclusions which are built upon most unreasonable and most unworthy suppositions of a King that is mad or a child since never subjects had greater obligation to be thankfull to Allmighty God for giving them a Prince as eminently able as vertuous who will not provide for the safety of His people nay who will not part with some of His right rather then they should perish because in their destruction He looses all Yet this does not prove a King should part with His rights as often as they will pretend to be in danger If this were once admitted what wild plots would be invented what strange intelligence would be received from invisible spyes and as often as crafty men were ambitious or covetous so often the filly people were to be frighted Since all naturall power is in those which obey they which contract to obey to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme such a contract before their owne preservation are felonious to themselves and rebellious to nature He cannot mean any people contracting to their own certain ruine there never was government guilty of this madnes therefore He must understand a contract to a possible ruine for example an agreement patiently to submit themselves to the ordinary tryall of Law and to suffer if it should so fall out though under an undeserved sentence In this case he that does not make resistance and prefer his preservation to his contract is pronounced felo dese and a rebell to nature Unhappy thiefe who for felony is condemned to be hang'd and will be guilty of another felony in being hanged what way is left unto innocency He must kill as many as he can in His own defence so shall He escape or dye in the quarrell either way He hath done right to nature Let us put another case an innocent man by the ordinary course of justice is adjudged to dye upon the testimony of two bearing false witnes he was free from fault before now he is in some danger except he refuse to be punisht he becomes guilty no lesse then a selfe murderer I wonder what opinion this man hath of Martyrs who valew not their owne preservation can he think by submitting themselves to one fire they deserve to be cast into another nay what of Christ himselfe who certainly suffered most injuriously though he had strength enough to preserve himselfe and could have been assisted by an Army of Angells yet he was obedient to death I cannot imagine from what principle he should draw such a conclusion unlesse it be from this whence indeed most of his book will naturally flow that there is no such thing as justice but suprema lex the paramount law is profit and the faults of men consist in the not violation of contracts in the not breaking promises if they be for their disadvantage for it were a sinne against native liberty to make our selves the slaves of justice If we examine the ground of this doctrine most destructive of all commerce all government we shall discover it to be no other but this that the law of nature doth allow a man to defend himselfe and provide for his owne preservation But the observer takes no notice that it is in our power to part with this right yet doe nothing contrary to nature if reason tell us we shall thereby obtaine a more excellent good the benefit of peace and society nay that this restraining Our selves by compact of that naturall liberty to defend our selves will conduce more to that end for which it was given us our preservation and safety Because in probability we shall be in lesse danger living amongst men who have agreed to be governed by certaine lawes then if every one followed his owne inclination Where one suffers hereby wrongfully thousands enjoy the benefit of being protected from wrong And therefore though it should happen to me in particular to be condemned by the magistrate without cause I am bound to suffer patiently because having made such a bargain which might have been profitable I have no right
not content with this Negagative affirmes Sempronius is bound to consent to what ever he thinks fit if so is not this money wholely at Titius his disposall Can any one be so stupid as to tell Sempronius notwithstanding this He hath a full power How did ship-money destroy our propriety but by this very consequence Law and Reason informe us that Ejus est velle qui potest nolle L. in bello §. medio D. de captiv postlim Hence Tryphonius determines that a Captive cannot consent to his sonnes Marriage Why Cum utique nec dissentire posset And Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is alledged in derogation of Parliaments that whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble or treate in all cases of a publicke nature yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the very name of Parliaments is not due to them If this Man had a mind to deale candidly he would deliver the Kings sense truly and let Him speak His own words The summe of which is onely this the two Houses have not power of making lawes and altering the established goverment without Him But this Allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under Very tragically expressed and with high confidence but not any colour of reason For are we not left in the same state in which we were His Majesties denying to bring in a new government doth not take away the old If He thinke it not convenient to alter that forme which the least deceitfull Argument long experience under so many of His glorious Ancestors hath proved happy can any who is not in love with error inferre hence this subjects us to a lawlesse and most unbounded regiment Vpon the same reason by the Kings desertion other Courts must needs be vertuelesse and void It were a strange consequence to conclude that because that may be done without the King to which His consent by law is not required therefore that may be done without him to which his consent is by law necessary Many Kings have dissented from Bills yet the people were never so mad as to feare a desertion of all Courts It is against common sense to fancy that He which enjoyes all by the benefit of Laws should hinder the due administration of Justice according to those Lawes so willfully endanger not onely his rights but safety by putting His Kingdome into tumults and combustion Every wise man may have as strong security he shall not suffer from the onely not impossible execution of such a power because it is so manifestly destructive of the Kings own interest and made evident to be so as well by experience as by reason as any man can have reason not to be afraid of himselfe because he hath a full power over himselfe and may destroy himselfe when he pleases The intent of the King is that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons doe not represent and appeare in the Right of the whole Kingdome or else that there is no honour nor power nor Iudicature residering in that great Majesticall Body then which scarce any thing can be more unnaturall A most impudent collection the meaning in breife is onely this when the particular consents of three are necessary it 's not in the power of any two to effect whatsoever they please A most prudent establishment in favour of present government that we may have no innovation without the mutuall agreement of King and people It is attempted to divide further between part and part in Parliament Who these attempters are I enquire not I suppose he meanes those who devided the Lords into good and bad the Members of the House of Commons into well and ill affected So making the major part not fully concluding They are not denyed to conclude as far as the power of that House extendeth but this cannot reach to an absolute and finall decision It is a wonderfull thing that the King's papers being fraited scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division 't is more wonderfull that in a well governed state such disrespectfull language of Princes from private pennes should passe unregarded unpunished tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamentall constitutions which support all our ancient liberties and to the erection of Arbitrary rule should find such applause in the world There is a vast difference between declaring what divisions are and causing them to be to shew is not to teach division But it is beyond admiration if the King's aimes are such as He would have the world beleeve that they should find such applause Especially if we consider the persons from whom men that have much more to loose then some who may ayme at getting greater fortunes by pretending they are in danger to loose what they have Men that are knowen not to value their lives equall to their liberties men of as great wisdome as honesty neither of which would permit them to be active to make themselves miserable and pull upon their posterity and Countrey perpetuall slavery What impudence of malice is it to accuse the King to intend that when the world sees how much He hath suffered meerly to prevent it Could our Ancestors ever have beleeved there should come a King who would plead for Magna Charta who would hazard His Crown in defence of the subjects Liberty and desire nothing more then the utter abolition of all Arbitrary rule If the King have parted from his Parliament meerely because they sought His oppression He had no other means to withstand their tyrany Let this proclaim them a voyd assembly His Majesty never layd such charge to the Parliament yet it is most evident there was too great reason elsewhere to justifie His feares when notwithstanding His deepest Protestations to maintaine the true established Religion they still imputed to Him inclining to Popery when notwithstanding His utmost endeavours to suppresse that unhappy Rebellion in Ireland and after the Houses had taken that worke into their care His frequent pressing them to send over sufficient supplyes and not to spend their time in businesses of little moment whilst their poore Brethren were dayly butcherd yet the people were made beleeve He was a favourer of their bloody designes when the baser sort of the people were permitted to come even to the Parliament in Clamarous and unwarrantable multitudes and there was a kind of discipline in disorder tumults being ready at command upon a watch-word given when seditious Pamphlets hourely came out and many Presses laboured day and night to abuse the King when factious Preachers were incouraged whilst they did cast publick obloquies on the Lawes which stood in full force and which if they had been duly executed would have justified themselves by restoring Us to our former Peace and happinesse which We so long injoyed as
in the fidelity of others If it could have been averred as it could not for the contrary was true that this would have bred disturbance and have been the occasion of greater danger Truly then he shall get the better if he can impose upon our sense and make the Kingdom beleeve contrary to what they see and suffer under What hath been the cause of these unhappy distractions but as the taking the Kings Towne from him by force and the illegall alteration of the Militia upon pretence of apparent danger Though for a time they were afraid where no feare was quis illis sic timere permisit yet after they have had so long a time to recover their understandings and to consider with themselves if the danger were apparent it might in so many months be made evident and they might know whence to expect the blow I dare now appeale to the weakest part of men their distrusts and aske them if they can now believe there was any just ground for jealousies It is not improbable since they have raised a house without a foundation it may fall upon the heads of the master builders Where the people by publique authority will seek any inconvenience to themselves and the King is not so much interessed in it as themselves 't is more inconvenience and injustice to deny then to grant it More injustice to deny then grant therefore it seemes that injustice too Into what streights must a King be brought by the mindes of the people If they seek any inconvenience injustice to deny it O unheard of Maxims out of these new Politiques that a King should be bound by Law to destroy his people and kill them out of duty that he doth not preserve their rights except he doe them wrong This affabile odium hath often had but never deserved thanks Can a man imagine those people of whom Juvenall speaks Evertêre domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles if they had understood their own prayers would have accused the Gods for denying them Charior est Regipopulus quà m sibi How great are His deserts towards His People that will not suffer them to be miserable though they intreat him though they provoke him to it and can content himselfe with the conscience of merit whilst his honour suffers under the envy of wrong doing Indeed this is the end of all government for the people finding they were not fit to govern themselves resolved to be ruled by those that were wiser and so committed their safety to the trust of others Now this were to reduce themselves to that first state which their sufferings made them weary of to place a Governour over them and to governe that Governour What blame is it then in Princes when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason No man justifies pretended conscience no man can condemne reall But what grounds can malice have to cast this aspersion of pretence of conscience and reason If we looke either on that unhappy misunderstanding of the people who would not be undeceaved by pretences his actions must appeare unto them as cleare as the day or on his owne necessities his owne extreame wants it cannot be For certainly he that hath granted so much in this Parliament and that in a short time as put all his Royall Ancestors Acts of grace together they fall much short of his would not have denyed any thing which was reasonable not any thing since his wants required supplyes from them but what should put him into farre worse condition then that of Poverty After a long and generall discourse of the originall of government the various formes and severall distempers whil'st policy was yet imperfect he returnes to the present matter The vertue of Representation hath been denyed to the Commons and a severance has been made betwixt the parties chosen and the parties choosing and so that great priviledge of all priviledges that unmoveable Basis of all honour and power whereby the House of Commons claimes the entire right of all the Gentry and commonalty of England has been attempted to be shaken and disturbed The sense of it is a trust is committed to them and they are to be guided according to conscience in the performance of it Let it be so but is not this cleerly the Kings case who is entrusted certainly as highly as they So that they will find the ready way to endanger their own rights is to entrench upon the Kings Yet there may be a mistake in the imputation of severance and denyall of representation to the Commons For put the case if a few men of a County present a Petition to the House against established lawes and the setled Discipline of the Church this is received and thanks returned if after another Petition modestly and discreetly expressing their desires and withall due respects to the House as to instance in that most excellent Petition of Kent be presented attested by men much more eminent then the former whether we respect number Gentry meanes or reputation and this in favour of present government which they have found happy by long experience and therefore have no reason to be so desirous of a change of which they are not able to judge so well without tryall this by no meanes is to be called a severance or denyall of representation though I confesse the Kingdome apt to mistake may easily be deceived and learn to miscall it because the Gentlemen were imprisoned who presented it Most of our late distempers and obstructions in Parliaments have proceeded from this that the people upon causelesse defamation and unproved accusations have been so prone to withdraw themselves from their representatives and yet there can be nothing under Heaven next to renouncing God which can be more perfidious and more pernitious in the people then this Here we may see the strength of passion above reason Certainly we never took the oath of Supremacy nor of Allegiance unto them Hence it will evidently follow that Treason against a Burgesse is higher then that against the King This he grants as unquestionable that the legislative power of this Kingdome is partly in the King and partly in the Kingdome so that neither the King can make a generall binding Ordinance or Law without the Parliament or the Parliament without the King This one truth if constantly stood to would have prevented our miseryes and if yet embraced might restore the Kingdome to happinesse But alas it is soon recalled as bolding only in ordinary cases but if the safety of the people be concerned if it may prove dangerous or inconvenient to them then an extraordinary course may justly be taken This is it which hath so miserably rent this Kingdome and caused these sad divisions First the people are made beleeve they are in danger and then a prevention of those dangers is promised This must needs be very gratefull to them so out of that naturall love they bear to themselves they favour that side
which pretends to take care of their safety His way of arguing is very plausible and seemeth to carry more strength because it worketh upon our understanding by our affection The summe is this in case of apparent and imminent danger the Peoples safety is not to be neglected they ought not to be exposed as a Prey to the enemy who if he take them unprovided will destroy them all therefore most fit they should be put into a posture of defence now none so fit Iudges of this apparent and imminent danger as the two Houses wherefore they to order this Militia So that it must be in their power to command Men raise Horses seize on all the Ammunition send for what supplies of mony they think necessary for repelling these dangers else they are not sufficiently enabled for that great work the peoples preservation Here we are falne back again into what we so much complained of Arbitrary power nor is the thing taken away but placed in another body all that we have gained is only this we shall not be beaten by the same hand Was not this the very case of Ship-mony upon supposall of a necessity and the Kingdom being in danger very fit to secure it and the people this cannot be done without money the danger will not allow the delay of asking the Subjects consent and going the ordinary way of Law therefore an extraordinary course them becomes legall and very reasonable it is the Subject should be content to part with some rather then loose all now who fitter to judge of this necessity then the King as being most fully informed by His advantage of intelligence from His Embassadors Agents c. of the designes of forraigne Princes and States To wind our selves out of this Labyrinth we will goe on those grounds on which they argued against Ship-mony for as the Argument runnes parallell so will the answer This therefore was laid downe as a sure ground of reason that it was better for the Kingdom though it were in reall danger in arenâ consilium capere to shift for it selfe as well as it was able by a suddain defence then that the Law should provide such a remedy which would be so easily so frequently abused upon every pretence of danger to prevent such an evill which could extreamly seldome or almost never happen for an Army and Navy could not be so secretly provided but that we must have some intelligence of it So in the case of the Militia it is much better that by being continued in the old legall way it should hazard it selfe to such a possible danger then that Law should provide such a remedy for what probably will never happen as being abused upon pretences may every three years put the Kingdom in combustion To repell danger any way but by Law is the greatest danger of all Let the world judge whether the pronouncing Sr Iohn Hotham's act Treason be not contrary to the clearest beams of humane reason and the strongest inclinations of nature for every private man may defend himselfe by force if assaulted though by the force of a Magistrate or his own father and though he be not without all confidence by flight He is strongly resolved upon the conclusion that will bring it in upon such premises Sr John Hotham his asseizing on the Kings Towne and Ammunition was it seemes in his own defence who assaulted him did His Majesty drive him into Hull what can he think of the Gunpowder-traitors was their resistance a just defence then certainly every Rebellion is a just warre Indeed what is that thing which we call obedience if a man may refuse to submit to Law in his own defence Here whole Nations being exposed to enmity and hazard being utterly uncapable of flight must yeeld their throats and submit to assassinates if their King will not allow them defence There is great difference betwixt a Subjects defending himselfe and offending his King His fears are over-witty if they will not permit him to think himselfe safe except he get into one of the Kings sorts for his better security See if we are not left as a prey to the same bloody hands as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ireland c. if we may not take up armes for our own safety or if it be possible for us to take up armes without some Votes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia Subjects upon in vasion would not have wanted Commission to take up armes till then they are safe enough by the benefit of the Law which could not possibly have better provided for their safety then by denying them a power to take armes as often as ambitious choletick men for their own ends shall perswaâ—e them they are it danger For by this meanes being easily deceived whilest they endeavoured to avoyd false they would run themselves headlong into true perills The King saies the Parliament denies c. to whether now in this uncertainty is the Subject bound to adhere It is possible circumstances may afford us some light for our direction We may consider whether the Houses doe not barely say and whether His Majesty doth not descend so farre as to give reasons for what He does and to shew the Kingdom the ground of His actions by particular citation of the Lawes which justify them We ought to agree whether swerving from Law be to be judged by the action or by the authors that is if the King should have done whatever they did and the Houses what ever He did whether all would not then have been legall because done by them The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to His authority but is willing to make all the world the judge of His actions neither is a blind obedience a part of any mans duty to the Houses The best way to discerne a right will be to consult the rule which is Law and not measure the legality of an act by the doer Some things are matters of fact here we may be guided by sense and judge as we see As whether the King has seized on any thing wherein the Subject hath a property or whether the Subject hath not seized upon something wherein the King hath a property whether the King hath raised warre against the Parliament that is whether His Guard was an Army and whether Hull is now London We had a maxime and it was grounded upon nature and never till this Parliament withstood that a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe True in a state where the collective body assembles and the reason of it is evident for though every man aime at his greatest particular interest yet except it be agreeable to the interest of the major part it will never passe into an Act and if it be advantageous for the most it is to be esteemed publique Now what service this can doe the two Houses I cannot see because they are a representative body If
he please to consult Livy or Tacitus he may find what most unworthy ends the Senate of Rome proposed to themselves and be quickly satisfied in the falsehood of this Maxime taken in his sense The truth is he raises probabilities into demonstrations and because it is not so likely it being a work of greater difficulty that four hundred should contrive things for their private interests as that four should the takes it for impossible Whereas experience clearly confutes him in other states we find nothing more common That we in England have so seldome suffered under such corruptions proceeds from causes which are peculiar to this government It was a court for the most part but of short continuance so that they had not time to mould and fashion their aimes and when called together againe the body was much altered But the chief reason and that to which the Subject especially owes his security is this that the finall determination is not in one nor two houses but the joynt consent of three Estates is necessary So that nothing is likely to passe but what is for the interest of the major part and what is so is publiquely advantagious It is more possible they may now prosequute private interests since they challenge a power to themselves sufficient to advance their designes which heretofore they never pretending to could not hope to compasse particular ends The King may safely leave His highest rights to Parliaments If this be all the motive he may as safely keep them Why did the Lawes entrust Him with them if it were fitting for Him to make no use of them None knows better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well ballanced a Monarchy I believe they affect Monarchy why then doth this Author endeavour to take it away by denying the King a power of dissent which our Ancestors inviolably preserved as a most happy restraint of Aristocracy or Democracy It hath been often in the power of former Parliaments to load that rule with greater fetters and cloggs but they would not A very good argument there is little reason now to doe it After a commendation of the exact temper and due proportion between the three Estates the many affecting Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility preferring it as much beyond Democracy He exhorts us not to seek to corrupt this purity of composition Very good counsell but which he overthrowes in the words immediatly following We must not conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King Therefore it will be fitting for the King to leave all to their disposall who certainly can doe nothing but what is fitting In how few words hath he destroyed that constitution which he told us was so perfect it could admit of no change but for worse But we could not stay here if the Kings negative were once taken away like decaying bodies our health would dayly impaire The next step must be the Lords sitting in a personall capacity no reason they should deny what the Kingdom hath voted to be necessary or convenient either let them not speak at all or let the greater part of Commons joyne with the lesser part of Peeres The right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of government can be advantage to them except they could each one attain an hereditary Crowne May they not attain as much as Malignant Counsellors are pretended to aime at Honours Offices Wealth Power Commands Their power is meerly derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and People will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done Then it is confest the King hath a right of dissenting Except both King and People here a power is given to the People collectively beyond the Lords Commons and King If the King be an affector of true Liberty He has in Parliament a Power as extensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike distresses The Dictator had absolute Authority nor was he circumscribed in power but in time only There lay no appeale from him neither was he questionable for any action after his government expired Though the humor of that people could not endure the name of King they had the same thing for in imminent dangers whether from forrain invasions or intestine seditions necessity of state forced them to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence we may make the truest judgement what forme of government the wisest Romans esteemed most convenient their actions which proceeded from feare were unfeigned interpreters of their thoughts That they fell back still into their old rule and were not as wise to prevent dangers by conserving that Authority as they were to encounter them by erecting it must be imputed to the inconstant temper of the people who in times of peace were as proud and insolent as when ruine threatned which their wantonnesse pulled upon themselves they were basely humble Since then the Romans preferred even the unbounded power of one to a popular sway wee have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this government wherein Monarchy is so wisely ballanced that as we are not exposed to the dangers which attend the rule of the many so we may avoyd the inconveniences which might probably flow from the Arbitrary power of one He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of His own Subjects and yet that Army which He went to destroy and advanced their colours against Him was more loyall then that which himselfe commanded Had he made a Conscience of unjust slander or had he any sense of the honour of his Nation these words had never fowled the paper That which the King here calls conscience and reason can be nothing else but meer private opinion What other possible notion can any man have of conscience is it not the light of reason informing us in our duty If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Counsell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Counsell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Counsell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there would be no such contestation It is a very unfaithfull way of judging to measure the goodnesse of Counsell by the person advising not by the thing advised His Majesty allwayes examined what not who and hath given His Subjects a most certain pledge of His Royall affection in passing so many good Acts and was resolved to grant as long as any thing could in reason be desired After He hath fully satisfied the publique interest even to the utmost extent of what most understanding and disingaged men wish for he is not bound to undoe again in part and so farre to comply with the interests of private men as to place a power in some by which they shall be
Respublica let the brand of Treason stick upon it No provisions are allowed but what are legall least the Remedy should prove the greatest disease Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed It is no just excuse to take away a mans money and say he did first desire him to deliver it Or if their grounds of jealousy were meerly vaine It is against all equity to doe wrong because there is a possibility of suffering it no man can have a full security and therefore we must arme our selves against uncertain feares not by injuries but a wary innocence Or if the jealousy of a whole Kingdom can be counted vaine Too large an expression much the greater part of the Kingdom apprehend no just grounds of jealousies Though the mindes of many were a long time unsetled being daily disturbed by suggestitons of plots at home and invasions from abroad yet if we duly weigh the businesse such fears ought not to be valued If forty severall men reporte the same thing yet if upon examination thirty nine of them say they had it from the other man this in Law makes but one witnesse so the fears of many thousands if grounded upon informations and those informations come from very few who can no way evidence the probability of such reports they ought not to be regarded they will vanish into nothing Or if they claime any such right of judging of dangers and preventing them without the King's consent as ordinary and perpetuall As often as they have a mind to make use of such a right 't is easy for them to call the case extraordinary and pretend a publike danger For my part I know not how they can ever be confuted if not now For certainly apparent dangers did never lesse appeare It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had been frighted with secret plots and conceald designes The King might have prevented the same repulse by sending a messenger before hand That is if He had not come to get in He had not been shut out if He would have stayed away he would not have denyed Him entrance Or by coming without any such considerable forces Let His forces be great he was not to give Law to his Prince but neither is it likely he would have admitted Him then for you confesse a little above He offered to enter Hull with twenty horse only unarmed The Scots in England took New-castle but by private authority yet there were other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The King and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an Act of oblivion He flourishes at large upon the example of Richard the second he means Edw. 2. misled by Spencer It doth not follow because one King hearkned to evill counsell therefore all must be denied the liberty to hearken to good Spencer's party was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the Scales and ballancing their reputations At length yet there is some little hopes he may prove a convert since he doth almost promise to suspend his judgement till he may have full satisfaction from His Majesties Narration which in due time will more fully informe him An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withoutsome means and what this means shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted then not to perceive what is so obvious Deny the King a negative and the thing is done The power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publique consent and how publique consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious Tyranny amongst us is not discernable It is not thought this was the intent of those that entrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs For though their power depend upon a publique consent in the election yet not so after they are met together The necessities of the time made His Majesty grant that this Parliament should not be dissolved without their consent but they may now challenge it as their right if the King be bound to confirme what they vote necessary or expedient But it cannot be and his reason is the Kingdom would not obey them In truth a very probable thing I beleeve they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdom His Majesty expresses His just indignation that they He imputes it not to the Houses though this Author still involve them but to the contrivers penners of the Declaration should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him He returnes answer this cannot be collected from those words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complain of want of modesty and duty because it may justly be denied that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the dethroning of any King of England What was there affirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of Free in it If the â— of Hen. 4. Were indeed not Free why were Statutes cited out of it The authors of those quotations must be presumed to accompt it so The King is offended at their franck expressions disguised under the charge of a malignant party The sense of his answer is this they have no other way to cleere themselves for there being faults somewhere not to lay them upon others were to take them upon themselves His Majesty hath proposed a very good way which will fully satisfy the world in their innocency and that is not alwaies to accuse but sometimes to prove The King demands justice for tumults and high indignities offered and complaines of a prohibition sent from the House of Commons into Southwarke to hinder the processe against a Riot according to Law His answer is equall justice could not be obtained against the Court-Cavaleeres His Majesty never protected them from legall tryall it was free for them to have proved what they could against them The Kingsaies it being granted by them that their priviledges doe not extend to Treason Felony or breach of the Peace so as to exempt the Members from all manner of tryall yet if they be so priviledged in the method of their tryall that the cause must first be brough before them and their consent asked before you can proceed then their Priviledges extend as farre in these as in the most unquestioned cases because no priviledge exempts them from all manner of tryall the House being acquainted and
committed so many outrages and such high injustice that Theramenes one of their own body one of the thirty professed his publique dislike of those proceedings Then was he accused as a Traitor to them and though it was a priviledge of the three thousand that none of them should suffer death by the sentence of the thirty but according to accustomed processe and tryall yet Critias wip't his name out of that number and so reduced him to their tryall Theramenes pleads for himselfe they ought to look upon his as a common case their names might as easily be blotted out he advises them to be very wary in making such a president which might ruine them and their posterity The issue was this Particular men being over-awed by their fears thought it their wisest way to hold their peace since if they should speak in his behalfe there was little hopes to redeeme him but great probability to ruine themselves So they chose rather to expose themselves to those future inconveniences which possibly might not come upon them then hazard a present danger By this advantage the Tyrants prevailed and condemned him to dye The things taken from the King at Hull were Armes which are of more danger then other kind of chattels By the same Law all that part of the Kingdom which is not confided in may be disarmed nay why may not their mony be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it The Subject is in a miserable condition that is lyable to be undone as often as they please to be fearfull It is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings Armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize what ever else belongs unto His Majesty The Law of this Kingdom hath only intrusted the Prince with Armes so that the Subject ought not to be arraied trained and mustered but by His Commission But some determination must be supream and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the discretion of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meer discretion No necessity of either For in cases of this nature which he confesses to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary Law The case of Ireland as it is laid down by His Majesty is unanswerable and therefore he is forced to extreme shifts being unable to say any thing materiall and yet unwilling to hold his peace England and Ireland are one and the same Dominion there is as true and intimate an union betwixt them as betwixt England and Wales If this were so Irish Barons would be English Peeres and English Peeres would have a right to vote in Irish Parliaments Besides all lawes here enacted would stand in full force in Ireland as they doe in the Kings dominion of Wales Though the major part should vote a thing yet if it be disliked here they would want authority to over-rule the thing so voted For the reason why the minor part in all suffrages subscribes to the major is that blood may not be shed for in probability the major part will prevaile This is a good reason for such a contract that the minor part should subscribe but after such agreement in States justice laies an obligation on them so to doe upon his grounds if the lesser part in Parliament though never so few can make it appeare the greater part of the Kingdom are of their opinion the major part ought to subscribe to the minor Nay if at any time the major part of Ireland joyning with the minor part of England make a major of the whole then the major part in our Parliament must sit downe He takes no notice of the other case suppose the malignant party should be a major part of both Houses which His Majesty shewes how very probably it might have been and were there a new election it is not impossible the Counties should send up the greater part of such men as he calls malignant would he think the King bound to consent to all such alterations as they should propose Some scattering reasons are laid down concerning the Militia which are but repetitions of what I have formerly answered A Faction is said to have prevailed upon a major part by cunning force absence or accident He argues thus against it if by cunning we must suppose the King's party in Parliament has lost all their Law policy and subtilty The reason why they are over-borne may be this not because they have lesse Law but more Honesty which will not permit them to maintain a good cause by ill meanes We all know in how great stead those piae fraudes holy falshoods and religious untruths stood the Church of Rome though there were such who laid down better reasons for the contrary opinions yet truth prevailed slowly and with a few only because the minds of most were craftily prepossest with prejudice against it begotten and nourished by fained stories The dispute proceeded upon very unequall termes for the Roman party gave themselves the liberty of taking all advantages whereas their adversaries were forced to betray a good cause out of meer ingenuity they had none of their side who could lye We ought to examine whether this policy work not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falshoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be reipublicae salutares which have so strong an influence on the understandings of many that they can submit to the votes of some who have insinuated themselves into their affections against the cleer reasons of others whom they have been taught causelesly to suspect How easy is it to deceive by giving in false informations of dangers from abroad If some more scrupulous then to be abused and led away by light reports inquire after the hand that they may judge of the probability of the intelligence according to the faith and credit of the relator they must be satisfied with this the informer desires his name should be concealed Pour l'eviterâ—le tiltre d'espion It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in Law to be done by force not only when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfy the passion and humor of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this works on the mind as strongly as the other on the body And therefore Seneca tells us stating this point of freedom vim majorem metum excipio quibus adhibitis electio perit and Cicero nec quicquam aequitati tam infestum est quà m convocati homines armati It remaines then we examine whether the names of many gentlemen were not openly read in tumults whether they were not posted with directions to
slavery Besides what can he propose to himselfe The people will give more then can be forced from them so he looses by it and then how much doth he hazard against lesse then nothing He hath least reason to break the lawes willfully because he injoyes most by them and experience having shew'd the benefit of observing them and the ill of the contrary He cannot but doubt the People would fail of their duty if he doe in performance of trust and cast of the bond of obedience if he doe that of Protection These things duly weighed render that malice inexcuseable which hath long time exercised the people with most unreasonable feares of lands and liberty and Religion being in danger and this notwithstanding the King 's many sacred Protestations to the contrary before God and all the world and the whole course of his proceedings which evidently tend to the securing all Now I think it doth fully appeare that the doctrine of that Remonstrance laid down by His Majesty by way of recapitulation in seven positions is most justly offensive being such as doth threaten ruine to both Church and State not permitting us either to obey the King or serve God as we ought 1. That the Parliament has an absolute indisputable power of declaring Law so that all the right of King and People depends upon their pleasure This power must rest in them or in the King or in some inferior Court or else all suits must be endlesse and it can no where rest more safely then in Parliament The two Houses are not the Parliament The subject of such power is the intire body which consists of three estates Some things are cleare and evident in Law and want no declarer if otherwise all the Subjects right would lye in the brest of the Iudge If the two Houses should Vote younger Brothers ought to inherite by the Law of England could this destroy the right of the first born 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents Statutes are not binding to them why then should Presidents yet there is no obligation stronger then the Justice and Honour of a Parliament This is an excellent ground to justifie their innocence against all the world For if they can make it appeare they are not bound to keepe any law no man can accuse them for the breach of any What obligation can justice lay on them who by astrange vertue of representation are not capable of doing wrong It will become justice because they did it when he hath declared what Honour is I shall be able to judge of that bond it may perchance not stand with their honour not to be able to prove men guilty after they have once accused and imprisoned them Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses as being not voyd till repealed by a joynt consent of all the Estates 3. That they are Parliaments and may judge of publique necessity without the King and dispose of any thing They may not desert the King but being deserted by the King when the Kingdome is in distresse they may judge of that distresse and relieve it and are to be accompted by the vertue of Representation as the whole body of the State To dissent after he hath granted what ever can in reason be desired is not to desert the Houses Upon pretence of distresse to take illegall courses is as if they should perswade us we are not in health and therefore they must breake our heads to forward our recovery They represent the people to some purposes not the King to any and therefore are but a part of the State 4. That no member of Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason c. without leave This is intended of suspicion only and when leave may seasonably be bad and when competent accusers appeare not in the impeachment If by suspicions be meant only a bare not considing in this in justice cannot be sufficient ground But upon Articles drawn and proofes in readinesse which it is not fit to produce while the accused partyes are at liberty they may be medled with for designes of this nature may brook no delay because it might prove dangerous to the King's safety or at least afford them liberty to escape If the Houses being adjourned were not able to give consent or upon too much confidence should not be willing hath not the Law provided in such a case for triall of Treason 5. That the soveraigne power resides in both Houses of Parliament the King having no negative voyce This power is not claimed as ordinary nor to any purpose but to save the Kingdom from ruine and in case where the King is so seduced as that be proferres dangerous men and prosequutes his loyall Subjects Not as ordinary that is they will only be King's as long as they please and when they are weary of Reigning the Kingdome shall be out of danger and then it shall be his turne to command againe To save it from ruine the Law hath better provided for the Peoples safety by prohibiting all illegall executions of power grounded upon what specious pretences soever And in case where the King is seduced that is when he is not so wise as he should be because he does not think as they doe and refuses to satisfy the humors and interests of some And prefers this seems to be the true cause of all preferments doe not goe the right way dangerous men i. e. such as desire he should govern according to the known Lawes of the Land And prosequutes his loyall Subjects i. e. is driven from London to Yorke where He long time patiently expected the undeceiving of His People 6. That leavying Forces against the personall commands of the King though accompanyed with his presence is not leavying warre against the King but warr against his Authority though not Person is warre against the King If this were not so the Parliament seeing a seduced King ruining himselfe and the Kingdom could not save both but must stand and look on It is against common sense to fancy a King ruining Himselfe and Kingdom He can neither be willing nor able Upon a mad supposall mad consequences will follow 7. That according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings 'T is denyed that any King was deposed by a free Parliament fairely elected This is most certain but takes not off those words upon which this Proposition is grounded These might well have been omitted as being more fully handled in the book But least he should complaine any thing was past over I chose by a short review to be his remembrancer The Propositions collected out of His Majesties Declarations are but the brief of his Observations to all which I have already spoken To conclude if the people hearken to reason they must needs think His Majesty will be more ready to prevent all reall danger then any Subject whatsoever because He is sure to beare the greatest share in the losse It alwaies was the master Policy amongst the wisest Legislators to grant to them the greatest power of government to whom the preservation of the present state would be most beneficiall because their private interests were the same with the publique from which if they swarv'd by error or misinformation their own disadvantage did soon appeare FINIS
French Pesant to his Prince There may be reasonable motives why a people should consent to slavery as if in danger of a potent enemy they could hire none on gentler conditions to undertake their defence or if reduced to extream want they had not wherewith to sustain themselves they may very probably like Esau passe away their birthright liberty We finde an example of each case in holy Scripture The Egyptians parted with all their mony and cattle and past away the right to their lands and became servants to Pharaoh Gen. 47. upon this condition that Joseph would afford them bread Jos 9. And the Gibeonites bought their lives of the children of Israel with the price of their liberty and thought they had a cheap purchase From the word trust used by his Majesty he gathers the King does admit his interest in the crown in part conditionate No ground for this collection for there may be a trust and that is so much the greater if free from condition But the thing is true de facto in some sense and his Majestie hath alwaies acknowledged He is bound to maintain the rights and liberty of the subject Yet we must not so understand it as if the right to His Kingdome were so conditionate that it were capable of forfeiture upon a not exact performance of covenant As for the word elegerit whether it be future or past it skills not much If he take notice of the conclusion deduced thence he may find as much difference between the Tenses as between Democracy Monarchy But the consuetudines which cannot refer to the future undeniably evinces it was meant of the time past and the oath in english is free from all ambiguity rendring consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit by rightfull customes which the commonalty of this your Kingdome have I may adde the different manner of the Kings answer as it is set down in their Remonstrance Where to other questions which respect the future the King answers in the future in this as referring to what is past He answers per verba de praesenti concedo permitto The King is bound to consent to new lawes if they be necessary as well as defend the old His Majestie never thought otherwise but He is not bound to an implicite faith to believe all necessary which is pretended to be so The word elegerit if it be in the preterperfecttense yet shewes that the peoples election had been the ground of ancient lawes and customes and why the peoples election in Parliament should not be now of as great moment as ever J cannot discover The election there spoken of is the election of the diffusive not of any representative body and that with the tacite consent of the Prince and so of much other authority and for the representative their ancient right is not denyed no law shall be abrogated none enacted without their assent But there is a mean between doing nothing and all The result of all is our Kings cannot be said to have so unconditionate and high a propriety in all the subjects lives liberties and possessions or in any thing else to the crown appertaining as subjects have in the Kings dignity The King pretends not to have any unconditionate proprietie in the subjects lives liberties and possessions he would onely be allowd it in his own And what he can mean by subjects having an unconditionate and high propriety in the Kings dignity surpasses my understanding It may seem to speak this wicked doctrine that subjects may dispose of the Soveraignty as they please for this right an absolute propriety gives If the King had such high right as subjects it were not lawfull or naturall for him to expose his life and fortune for his country How is it lawfull for subjects then to doe so The people have as great nay greater obligation of exposing their lives for the King This appeares by the Protestation as also by the ancient oath of fealty at the Coronation Je deviene vostre Liege de vie de biens c. Sir Hen Spelman gives us a form of sacramentum ligiantiae still in use Tu I. S. jurabis quòd ab ista die in antea eris sidelis legalis leaux domino nostro Regi suis haeredibus fidelitatem legalitatem Leaultie ei portabis de vita de membro de terreno honore quòd tu eorum malum aut damnum nec noveris nec audiveris quod non defendes i.e. prohibebis pro posse tuo ita Deus te adjuvet I cannot imagine any possible colour for such an inference I would sooner make a rope of sand hang together may not a tyrant expose his life in defence of his slave without breach of any law He doth but defend his owne goods â—xod 21.1 for the Scripture calls his slave his money His owne instance confutes him bonus pastor ponit vitam pro ovibus suis for it is evident this good pastor was our Saviour absolute Lord of his flock Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchyes if not higher What higher then the law of God and of the whole land yes for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence itselfe of Parliaments just as a Proctour is the essence of him for whom he appeares or an Ambassador is essentially the King But suppose it true this declares the materiall cause proves no greater dignity in the efficient But the reason is to come by the former rule he had no good fortune with that before 't is magis tale because we see ipsum quid quod efficit tale what magis tale in essences or can a thing be magis tale then it selfe This I conceave is beyond the sense of the house However this confession and the rule quod efficit tale est magis tale subjects the Parliament to the people as well as the same rule would doe the King and proves as well that the Parliament is vniversis minus though it be singulis majus Parliaments have also the same finall cause as Monarchyes if not greater what greater then salus populi nay then to promote the Subject to all kind of Politicall happines which he told us was the end and duty of a King His reason is publique safety and liberty could not be so effectually provided for by Monarchs till Parliaments were constituted This proves not the end higher but shewes they are good helpes in government which is readily granted Two things especially are aimed at in Parliaments not to be attained to by other meanes Not so easily attained indeed but certainly many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high degree of civill happines under arbitrary Monarchs who knew no Parliaments Such as have abundantly satisfied the inter est of the people in all weighty affaires advised with the ablest counsellors Two other ends might have been named as essentiall as those which are to supply his Majesties
wants by subsidies and assent to the abrogation of old lawes and enacting new as necessity shall require In the summons of Edw. 1. claus 7. m. 3. dors we see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writ that whatsoever affaire is of publique concernement ought to receive publique approbation Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet or tractari I have not the convenience of examining this record and therefore cannot be able to satisfie my selfe in circumstances which perhaps might afford some light to the cleerer understanding of this rule For the present therefore I will allow it to be certaine law though he would not be willing I should have the same liberty and argue the legality of a thing from a Princes bare affirmation and see what advantage he can make of it It seems to me to be deduced from an evident principle of reason and to flow hence it is against equity that the act of one should prejudice another without his consent There is much caution required to the managing this rule For if it be understood in its full latitude without all limitation it will dissolve the bonds of Government by reducing us to that primitive state wherein every one had absolute right to dispole of his owne as he pleased Therefore we must take into consideration that multitudes finding a necessity of Government did restraine this native right by positive Constitutions so that in the best governed States the greater part of men were presumed by a fiction of law to handle and approve such things as they never heard of The ground of which fiction is very reasonable for the people though they are not advised with may well be said to consent to what their rulers doe because they have entrusted them with their safety which without this power convaied into such or such hands could not be so effectually provided for Thus in absolute Monarchies what Princes doe is legally the act of all thus in our Kingdom two hundred thousand debate and approve things by the suffrages of two who many times vote quite contrary to their desires who have entrusted them and yet the people shall be said in law to affirme what really and in truth they doe deny The result of all is this those things which the law doth require shall be transacted only by Parliament the people doe handle approve of by their Knights or Burgesses in those things which the Law hath entrusted the King with many of which concerne the good of the whole what he does is their act Hence it may appear the Kings Writ by which he calls the Houses together to consult de quibusdam arduis urgentibus negotiis is no waies opposite to this supposed Law understood with due limitations The desire of the Commons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. seems to mee fully to justify the same which was that they might not advise in things de queux ils n'ont pas cognizance The matters in debate were of no small concernment being no lesse then the setling intestine commotions guarding the marches of Scotland and the Seas But the answer is herein they renounce not their right of consent they only excuse themselves in point of counsell referring it rather to the King and his Councell Here then we have the judgement of the House of Commons that in affaires of some nature and those too very much concerning the safety of the whole Kingdome there may be fitter Counsellors then they are I had conceived n' avoir pas cognizance had not signified to be ignorant or not to understand things so thoroughly since cognisance uses to be taken in a Law-notion and to signifie a right of handling matters judicially or power and jurisdiction as cognisance of Plea We meet with a very observable passage and which will give us great light in this buisines it is to be seen in a diary MS. of the Parliament held 1. Hen. 4. Et le lundy ensuivant S. lendemayn des almes les communes priont qu'eux ne soyiant pas entrez en les rolles de Parlement come parties as juggementez quex sount donez acest Parlement mes la ou ils sount in rei veritate partie et prive a cella quar lez juggementz appartient solement au Roy fosque la ou ascun juggement est renduz sur vn estatute feat par le comune prositz de Royalme Le quel fuist grante In English thus And the munday following scil the morrow after all Soules-day the Commons prayed that they might not be entred upon the Roles of the Parliament as parties to any judgements given this Parliament save only where in rei veritate they are part and privy thereto For that the judgements appertaine only to the King except where any judgement is given vpon a Statute made for the common profit of the Kingdome The which was granted How this shall derogate from Parliaments either in point of consent or counsell I doe not know for at last they did give both and the King would not be satisfied without them and the passage evinces no more but this that that King was very wise and warlike and had a very wise Counsell of Warr so that in those particulars the Commons thought them most fit to be consulted as perhaps the more knowing men The conclusion which more naturally followes is this when the King requires and will not otherwise be satisfied they may advise in matters not properly of their cognisance The conclusion by which he thinkes he hath gained so much may without any inconvenience be assented to These words ad tract andum or dinandum saciendum doe fully prove that the people in those dayes were sâ—mmoned ad consensum as well as ad consilium Be it so in those things which belong to their cognisance The formes which are used in passing a bill confesse so much les Communes ont assentés and les Seignevrs out assenás I have not yee done with his rule Quod omnes tangit ah omnibus approbari debet It is true the most popular state could never punctually observe it For some of the poorer some of the younger sort and women generally by reason of their sex are excluded yet all those having lives to loose are concerned in the publique safety But with what equity can he then thinke a considerable party of this Kingdome can be denyed the benefit of that which he conceives a most reasonable law I meane the Clergy who certainly cannot deserve to forfeit the priviledge of common men because they are more immediately the servants of God His next endeavour is to shew that Parliaments have been much lessened and injuried of late by some passages in his Majesties answers But he can never make it appeare that any part of their truly ancient power is denyed to them The Kings words are what the extent of their Commission and Trust is nothing can better teach them then the writ whereby they
to recall it when it appears disadvantageous I owe that I have been safe thus long to the benefit of this covenant therefore am bound in justice to share the inconveniences If reason will not satisfie perhaps Christianity may Qui resistunt potestati Rom. 13. ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt To resist the magistrate damnable The powers here spoken of were heathen yet Christ commanded his to be subject even to them That answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion This precept obliges private men but not magistrates Since inferiour magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as private men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to both Neither is this a hard law if duly considered If we suffer justly we have no reason to complain if undeservedly we are punished but not hurt The magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum because God will abundantly reward us for our patient suffering in obedience to his command But this is against nature He must mean nature guided by right reason and doth that dictate that rather then part with a temporall life we ought to forfeit an eternall It is objected that a temporary power ought not to be greater then that which is lasting and vnalterable He does not frame the Kings argument aright which concludes on this ground that it is not probable the lawes should place a power greater then his in such a body and yet leave it to his disposall when to call that body together when to dissolve it that is to determine when and how long he would be over-ruled when be King again His Majesty presses it farther which he dissembles This trust being irrevocably committed to Him and His heires for ever it cannot be conceived how it should sleep during the sitting of the Houses But if this were so the Romans had done unpolitiquely in creating Dictators when any great extremity assailed them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the form of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not an Aristocracy and much lesse to a democracy The Romans successe cannot be imputed meerely to their change but to this that they altered their form from worse to better as to their present ends but that will not justifie his desire of innovation from better to worse It is further objected He sayes if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more then counsellors we make them Comptrollers and this is not suitable to Royalty He answers we say here that to consent is more then to counsell and yet not alwayes so much as to command and comptroll True not alwayes but then it is when their consent shall impose a necessity upon the King of doing the like He hath not laid down his Majesties words faithfully The point He stands on is that their advise is not His law neither is He bound to captivate His reason or submit His conscience to their Votes Yes it must be so because in inferiour Courts the Judges are so counsellors for the King as that the King may not countermand their judgements and yet it were a harsh thing to say that they are therefore Guardians and Comptrollers of the King therefore it holds in Parliaments a fortiori The reason why the King cannot countermand their judgement is because they sustain His person and His consent is by law involv'd in what by law they do and there would be no end if He should undoe what He hath done Authoritas rei judicatae vim legis habet there can be no appeal from himselfe to himselfe He therefore makes the Judges take an oath they will deny to no man common right by His letters because He is not to passe sentence in private but in publique and in a Judiciall way That it is his owne act appears from this that He delegates his power to them and this is a known rule Quod Rex facit per officiarios per se facere videtur The truth is Kings have a right and heretofore they made use of it to sit in judicature personally Camden tells us that Bancus Regius ita dictus erat â—rit 112. quòd Rex ipse in eo praesidere solebat Sir Tho Smith too in his description of England Subsellia Regia vulgo Bancus Regius ex eo sortita sunt appellationem l. 2. c. 14. quia ibi ipsi Angliae Regessedere consueverunt This Court was called the Kings Bench because the King sate as judge in it in His proper person It removed with the King as is to be seen 9. Hen. 3. cap. 11. by which the Court of common Pleas is fixed Common pleas shall not follow our court but shall be holden in some certain place Moreover the Judges swear they will not assent to any thing which may turne the King in damage or disherison by any manner way or colour 18. Edw 3. when he can make these things agree to the two Houses he shall conclude from the Iudges sentence to their votes But since it will clearly appeare that they are not the mouth of the King the Lords sitting in a personall capacity and the House of Commons as representing the body of the Kingdom though not that to all intents and purposes the inference must by no means be granted I shall adde this to make the answer more clear and to avoid mistake in matters of Law there lyes an appeal to them a writ of errour being brought as to the highest Court not so in matters of state Because whilst they passe sentence according to known lawes the state is no way indangered thereby but if they challenge to themselves a liberty of passing sentence according to reason of state they may when they please overthrow our lawes The Counties which intrusted them looke upon them as Judges not Politicians But we ought not to conceive that they well either Councell or consent to any thing but what is publiquely advantagious When the King conceives they do not otherwise He will most willingly follow their advise This fallacy though extreamly weak hath influenced on all his book He takes the two Houses in such a Notion as not failing of their duty but doing every thing as they ought and supposeth the King to be wanting to that trust which is committed to him By such Councell and consent we cannot imagine the King limited or lessened Such a Consent in which his is necessarily involv'd renders his Power not so properly lesse as none at all it doth not limit but take it away Pray put the Case a thousand pounds is left to Titius and Sempronius to be bestowed upon joynt consent Sempronius being just and reasonable grants to Titius the right of a Negative so that without he will concurre he confesses he can doe nothing The King doth not pretend to have power of repealing old or constituting new Lawes without them Titius
We knew how to obey when such seditious fellowes out of their Pulpits did dare to strike even at the highest and with more boldnesse because with lesse danger as meaning to fight with other mens hands If the King could be more wisely or faithfully advised by any other Court or if His single judgment were to be preferd before all advice whatsoever it were not onely vaine but extreamly inconvenient that the whole Kingdome should be troubled to make elections and that the parties elected should attend the publike businesse There are other Ends besides this for which they are called together yet this is one main end as appears by the Kings writ and therefore He never refused to advise with them The usuall but not the onely forme of the Kings Answers to such Bills as they were not willing to passe which I beleeve was never objected to any Prince before to His Majesty le Roy s' avisera proves that after the advice of this His great Councell He is yet at liberty to advise further with persons or occasions as His owne wisdome shall think meet But this Author will by no meanes take notice that the use of Counsell is to perswade not to compell as if a man in a businesse of great concernment might not very prudently consult with many friends and yet at last follow the advice perhaps of one if it appeare more proportionable to the end he aymes at Not so because the many eyes of so many choise Gentlemen out of all parts see more then fewer This Argument I beleeve will conclude too much and therefore nothing at all For the same reason which denyes a liberty of dissenting to the King that is such a number who see more because they are more may deny it to the House of Pears in comparison of the House of Commons and to that House too in comparison of the People and so both King and Lords and Commons are voted out of Parliament Besides experience shews this rule is not generally true for I dare say if we ask almost any Parliament man he will tell us upon the reading of a Bill sometimes one man in the House hath found more faults and urged more just exceptions then three hundred would have been able to espy There have been Parliaments wherein Acts have been made to remedy former mistakes Nay whole Parliaments have been repeal'd and declared Null by succeeding Parliaments so 21. Rich. 2. cap. 12. does voyd and disanull all the Statutes made in a former Parliament held 11. Rich. 2. so 1. Hen. 4. cap. 3. repeales this whole Parliament of 21. Rich. 2. So 39. Hen. 6. In a Statute made at Westminster We find a totall repeal of a Parliament held at Coventry the yeare before as made against all good faith and conscience c the Acts and Statutes laboured by the conspiracy procurement and excitation of some ill disposed Persons for the introduction and accomplishment of their rancour and inordinate Covetise So 49. Hen. 6. A Parliament held at Westminster is made Null in regard diverse matters had there been treated and wrought by the laboured exhortation of Persons not fearing God nor willing to be under the rule of any earthly Prince but inclined of sensuall appetite to have the whole governance of the Realme under their owne power and domination These are the testimonies that one great Councell bestowes upon another I could urge the same Arguments in the very same words onely â—â—anging a Lay-councell into an Ecclesiasticall Councell and upon equall necessity require the King to assent to what ever they shall vote I make no doubt the Author will in this case give him leave to make his conscience his guide and if he doe he will think his Arguments deserve no further answer The few private ends they can have to deprave them must needs render their counsells more faithfull impartiall and religious then any other Certainly they may have as many as any other private Subject and that this Kingdome hath seldome heretofore suffered under the prosecution of private interest is to be imputed to the excellent policy which he endeavours to overthrow They are strangely transported with the love of a popular state who can so overrule their understandings as to force themselves to think the members of it may not be extreamly subject to ambition which would easily prompt them to alter the good old wayes of bestowing Offices and collating Honours to covetousnesse which would tempt them to draw the determination of causes out of the ordinary Courts of Iustice to hatred which would make them prosecute their enimies with bitter violence and upon the least suspition of a fault to punish them first by imprisonments and to prove them guilty at leasure to affection which would make them shield their friends from being questioned though their corruptions were notorious to all the world The Bishop of Durham his case speaks home to the businesse we are told in the 3. c. of the 2. Parliament held 1. Mar. how the Bishoprick of Durham was dissolved in a former Parliament 7. Edw. 6. which was compassed and brought to passe by the sinister labour great malice and corrupt means of certain ambitious persons then being in Authority rather for to enrich themselves and their friends with a great part of the possessions of the said Bishoprick then upon just occasion or Godly zeale Let the world judge whether this Age may not be subject to the same temptation and whether a desire to share the means of the Church may not have as strong operations as formerly Nothing more common in the Roman story then the bribing of the Senate This made Jugurtha cry out who by his guifts governed their Parliament O Vrbem venalem maturè perituram si emptorem invenerit Had it been our unhappinesse to have lived in a popular state except they are altered from what Histories deliver them we should have found injustice a trade and that the most compendious way to wealth was to buy no land but of the Judges Tacitus gives us a full character of what we might well feare When the government of Rome was changed into a Monarchy under Augustus the Provinces were very well contented Suspecto Senatûs populique imperio obcertamen Potentium avaritiam Magistratuum invalido legum auxilio quae vi ambitu postremò pecuniâ turbabantur They must evidently have more private ends then the King who may be mislead upon wantonnesse but they must struggle with solid temptations desire of riches desire of honours there being an emptinesse in them whereas He is full and satisfied Si violandum est Jus regni causâ violandum est the greatest motive that can be a hope to share in Soveraignty the Parliament to rule the King and they to rule the Parliament We have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the Country but never any till now betwixt the representatives and the body of the Kingdom represented How
able to hinder His good people from enjoying the full benefits of His Royall Grace if such a consent appear to Him to doe it The following discourse keeps all in generalls which easily deceive weaker apprehensions and hath its strength from this ground that it cannot reasonably be supposed the great publique Councell of the Kingdome should not give the most faithfull advice Therefore Princes if they may not be led by their owne opinions rather then by the sacred and awfull Councells of whole Nations unreasonably complain they are denyed liberty of Conscience and ravisht out of their own understandings I appeal to any mans judgment whether any thing can be urged for the authority of a Lay-Councell that it ought to enforce a submission of judgment a performance of dutyes arising from trust agreeable thereto which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in Councells Ecclesiasticall To instance in that of Trent if a Papist should as Campian doth bragg of that to him as the representative body of almost all the Western Church wherein was a concourse of so many choise able eminent Divines such as had addicted their whole times to the study of truth and therefore in all probability could not be deceived themselves such as had conversed so long with Heaven and Heavenly things they knew sufficiently how much it concerned them not to deceive others and conclude it therefore unlawfull for any to pretend conscience which is but private opinion against so publique and unanimous determination Notwithstanding these high probabilities and what will much more justify mens absolute obedience and captivating their reasons some plausible arguments for a divine assistance and immediate directions in all their decisions which the Houses will not pretend to yet it shall goe hard but he will find some answer as esily he might whereby to justifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which when he hath done he may with very little alteration apply to civill Councells and be satisfied Suppose it thus though amongst probable Arguments that drawn from authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight yet it must give place to a greater reason Now to every man belongs a judgment of discretion which must decide for what concernes his particular duty So in the Kings case the Votes which carry in them the authority of both Houses shall bear great sway and if it be in things extreamly dubious they may turn the scales of their side But if greater reason seem to contradict them his Majesty will not hoodwink His understanding and blindly follow whither they please to lead him He will walke by the greater Light For example his Majesty perceiving how much His people may suffer under arbitrary power is resolved never to make use of it thinks it lesse fitting any other should But it is told him now the use of it will be for their good by reason of apparent imminent dangers His Majesty understands the bottome of plausible pretences knows to how great mischiefes a way would be opened if it were sufficient upon such specious grounds to have a right to over-rule all known and certain Lawes Concerning the action at Hull he confesses to take possession of the Kings town and shut the gates against Him is Treason if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act as in this Case he pretends they doe For the first thing to be lookt on is that the King was meerly denyed entrance for that time His generall right was not denyed If then a Subject take up Armes against his Soveraign in a temporary warr it must not come within the compasse of Treason and he may legally possesse himselfe of the King's forts and maintaine them against Him so He confesse he hath no right in them No defying language was given If a man take away my purse shall he be acquitted from felony because he did not give me ill language too No act of violence was used This he may say who hath pickt anothers pocket but it is no sufficient plea against the Law But he used no violence though the King for diverse houres together did stand within Musket shot c It is no argument of innocence that he had opportunity to be more highly guilty and abstained The King used tearmes of defiance and this makes the act meerly defensive or rather passive If this were true there was never any warr but defensive for those who by some great injustice offered provoke a Nation to right it self fight as well to maintain their lives as what they unlawfully possesse How this should administer to the King any ground to leavy guards at York many men wonder or that it should seem the same thing to the King as if He had been pursued to the gates of York Certainly it was a sufficient ground not only to raise a guard for His safety but an Army to punish that high indignity and right His Honour but out of tender care of His Peoples safety least they should chance to suffer upon mistakes He afforded him so long time of repentance that the Kingdome might first be satisfyed and then his justice If the Parliament have hereupon turned any of the Townes-men out of their Estates His Majesty did not charge the two Houses Sir Iohn Hotham kept Him out without any publike order from them But if it had been done de facto the same law would have justified this act as well as the other But since not only the Country about but the Inhabitants within the Town have suffered in their Estates and libertyes Or if claimed any interest in it to themselves So much the lesse reason to seize on it if he cannot so much as pretend title to it or have disseized the King utterly denying the right for the future If any Law can be produced to justifie taking away the Kings goods for a time the case will be cleered Or have made any other use of their possession but meerly to prevent civill warr There is not any way more likely to create a Civill warr then endeavours to prevent it by illegall courses And to disfurnish the King's seducers of Armes Ammunition therefore the most essentiall property of Treason intention must needs here be absent in this act The Law hath judged otherwise in the case of the Earle of Essex whose plea was he intended the removall of evill Counsellors If the Parliament the shutting the King out of Hull was not their act be not vertually the whole Kingdome it selfe The King excluded it is not If it be not the Supream judicature as well in matters of State as matters of Law Till new lawes are enacted the Subject cannot justify any act but what is warrantable by the old If it be not the great Councell of the Kingdome as well as of the King to whom it belongeth by the consent of all Nations to provide in all extraordinary cases â—e quid detriment capiat