Soveraignty as â—…hey please T is strange that our Author will passe his judgement especially so severe an one upon any thing that he doth not understand because happily it may conclude thus much that his sacred person and his actions ought to be directed and ruled by his great councell the Parâ—… 〈◊〉 it therefore thence be deduced that they may dispose of his Soveraignty at pleasure this is the Authors meaning not ours If the King 〈◊〉 such high 〈◊〉 as subjects it were not lawfull or naturall for him to expoâ—…e his 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is it 〈◊〉 for subjects then to doe so What a strange 〈◊〉 is this is it not lawfull for a man by the hazzard of his person to defenâ—… his properâ—…y which cannot be maintained without the defense of his Countrey But this doth no way prove that if the Kings right were as absolute as the subjects that he might expose hâ—…s life and forâ—…une for their defence for no doubt hee that looseth his life when he might have saved it is a man slayer and if the people had beene made for the King not the King for the people what Law could have warranted the hazzarding of his person â—…or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But to disprove this conclusion he saith That the people have as great 〈◊〉 gâ—…eater 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…or the King and this he makes good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at the 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 that I become your Leâ—…ge of life 〈◊〉 gâ—…ds c. as 〈◊〉 by â—…he Proâ—…station and 〈◊〉 of Ligeance which are to the same effect He is no true subject that will not expose 〈◊〉 and all that he hath for the preservation of his King anâ—… Soveraâ—…e we shall ever acknowledge that strong tie and obligation that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 us to doe it But yet we must 〈◊〉 that the Kings oath and the Law of the Land which engage the King to protect and defend his Kingdome and people are equalâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Observator had shewen the efficâ—…ent cause of Parliament to wit the people anâ—… he finall cause safety and libertie he descends to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 are aimed at in Parliaments not to be attained to by oâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 est of the people might be satisfied â—…nd Kings better counselled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 certainly many Kingdomes have enjoyed a most high deâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 Monarchs who knew no Parliaments Thâ—…s possibly may be 〈◊〉 but I â—…ope it shall not 〈◊〉 into the hearts of English Subjects any whit the greater affection to that kind of 〈◊〉 I believe indeede that this is that the Author would faine perswade us to These are the maine grounds of the sad division our Religion and our Parliaments God enable us to maintaiâ—… both for if wee part with either we shake hands and bid adue to all happinesse The Author saith that two â—…her 〈◊〉 might have beene named as assentiall as the former which are to supply his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by Subsidies and assent to the abrogation of old Lawes and enacting new The latter I 〈◊〉 agree to be so but I never heard before that the supplying of his Majesties wants by Subsidies was one of the essentiall ends of the calling of Parliament It was accounted formerly the maiâ—… end of calling of a Parliament the ease or Releife of the subject and the granting of Subsidies was then esteemed but as a congratulation or thankfull acknowledgment of the Kings grace and favour towards them in that Parliament and is it now become one of the maine ends I suppose the Author speakes out of a late experience 'T was never happy with England since this Law was broached And wheresoever Kings advance their owne profit or but make it â—…quall with that of the publique the people will never enjoy true happinesse In the Summes of Edward 1. â—…laus 7. in 3. dors We see the first end of Parliaments expressed for he inserts in the writt that whatsoeveâ—… affaire is 〈◊〉 publique concernment ought to receive publique approbation Quod ownes tangit 〈◊〉 omnibus appâ—…obari debet tractari The Author tells us that this must be understood with due caution lest wee reduce our selves to our primirive estate by dissolving the bonds of Government and therefore saith he the policie of all estâ—…tes for the avoydiâ—…g of all confusion hath been to leave the transaction of publique affaires to some certaine number and their suffrages doe in Law binde the rest So saith he in absolute Monarchies what Princes doe is legally the act of all and hee makes the result of all to be this Those things which the Law doth require shall be transacted onely by Parliament the people doe handle and approve of by their Knights and â—…rgesses those things which the law hath intrusted the King with many of which concerne the good of the whoâ—… what bee doth is their act I shall not with our Author dare to confine Parliaments whose power is vaste and incognit as my Lord Cooke speakes And yet I shall not ascribe so unlimited a power unto them as to give them juâ—…isdiction in all cases They themselves who best know their power have in their late Declaration protested against it for they say they have power of jurisdiction of declaring the law in perticular cases before them then not in all cases But who shall bee Judge of those cafes by which they are intituled to jurisdiction can therâ—… be any one a Competent Judge of this but themselves and they having past their judgement who ought or dare to contradict it no reversing of their judgement but by the judgement of a subsequent Parliament why then since none can know their power or if they could they are not competent Judges of it how dare any one goe about to dispute their power or call in question their judgement The desire of the Commons in the Raigne of Edw. 3. was that they might not advise in things de queux ils nount pas cognizance the matter in debate then concerning the setling of intestine commotions guarding the Marches in Scotland and the Seas concludes no more than this that they thought themselves not competent Counsellours in thiâ—… case happily by reason of their unskilfulnesse in that way or for that the King had then more able Counsellors to advise with in that matter which under favour is no renouncing of jurisdiction But to give a more full and satisfactory answer at that time the King complyed with his Parliament and would not be advised by others and then there being no breach of trust there 〈◊〉 the lesse reason for the Parliament to advise or intermeddle with affaires of that nature But if the King had then deserted the Counsell of his Parliament and cleaved to the advise of his young men like Rehoboam certainely then they would not have deserted their power in danger of the Common-wâ—…alth which by their
writt and their oathes they are bound to preserve and defend and therefore clearely not out of their â—…gnizance for that passage in the Diary of 1. Hen. 4. I wonder the Author should so farre forget himselfe as to think that authorâ—…ty of any moment when he doth produce the Record I will then give him an answer So that I take this as an undeniable position that where the King doth duely execute the trust reposed in him there the 〈◊〉 are bound by his act and the Parliament in such caâ—…e have no 〈◊〉 or jurisdiction Bâ—…t if on the coâ—…trary the King infring his trust to the endangering of the Kingdom there the Parliament may are bound to 〈◊〉 for the securing oâ—… the King 〈◊〉 The 〈◊〉 will not passe over thâ—…s râ—…le thus for saith he if quod omnes tangit ab 〈◊〉 opprobâ—…ri debet with what equity then may the Clergie who are a considerable part of this Kingdome be excluded Why yes by the same eqâ—…ity that the Statute of 21. Hen. 8. doth exclâ—…de them from being Farmers that those who have devoted themselves soly to Gods service might not miscere se secularibus negotijs incumber themsâ—…lves with secular affaires for that this would be an impediment to the execution of their sacred function 'T was neâ—…er happy with this Nation since pride and covetousnesse so possessed the Clergie and temporall jurisdiction was dispensed by Ecclesiasticall persons And since they proved better Lawyers than Divines they â—…arved their flocke and made them more like wolves than Sheepe and Heathens than Christians I wish they would not desire temporall preâ—…erment but keepe themselves as they ought in their proper Spheare ponder on this that it is no small happines to be exempted from State 〈◊〉 molestations that it is the greatest honour to be the servant of God The Author saith that the King tells them their writt may direct them to know their power which is to counsell not to command I wish with all my heart that he and his associates could pleade as cleare a conscience from this as his Parliament can though certainely they may make a more colourable pretence to it than the Cavalliers if begging and intreating with all the submissivenesse that possibly can be be a commanding then are the Parliament highly guilty if it otherwise not Againe saith the Author the writt runnes super dubijs negotijs tractaturi vestrumque consilium impensuri So that the cleare meaning is their advise is not law except the Royall assent established it into an Act. If the Authour please but to advise with the learned he will finde that tractare is of a more large signication than to treat of or debate onely But was it ever said that their advise should be Law without the Regall assent They have power to declare what the law of the land is in case of publique concernement as now but it was never so much as thought on that they could make a new law or alter the old without his Majesty We must distinguish betweene the declaring or adjudging of a new case by the reason of the old law and the making of a new law the one they may doe without his Majesties consent the other they cannot 'T is alleadged that the King callâ—…th them Counsellors not in all things but in quibusdam arduis c. and the case of Wentworth is cited by his Majesty who being a member of the House of Commons was committed by Queene Elizabeth but for proposing they might advise the Qâ—…eene in a matter she thought they had nothing to doe to mâ—…ddle with To which the Observator answereth a meere example though of Queene Elizabeth is no Law 'T is true saith the Author but when grounded upon Authority I pray where is it and no way excepted against by those who have beene alwaies earnest defendors of their priviledges it may bee reckoned among sound presidents Happily there was never the like occasion to except against iâ—… as having never beene urged how then could it be answered I am confident that there was never any age before so guilty of the judging and questioning of the power of Parliaments But pray heare the Parliament and as you ought so rest satisfied who say that some Presidents ought not to be rules this you must agree to for that some are not lawfull But furthey they say that no presidents can bee bounds to the proceedings of a Parliament because some ought not to be followed and all may â—…all short and be different from the case in question The King denies the assembly of the Lords and Commons when be withdraweth himselfâ—… to bee rightly named a Parlâ—…ament or to have any power of any Court and consequenâ—…ly to be any thing but a meere convention of so many private men This is falsely imposed on his Majesty his answers and massages speakes the contrary which are directed to both Houses of Parliament Had it not beene doubted that other direction might have caused some mistake and miscarriage or at least have deniâ—…d them that acceptance that his Majestiâ—…s Messages do dâ—…serve I 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 oâ—…her name and style would have beene found out for doth he not in these very Mâ—…ssages call thâ—…m an inconsiderable number and a company of factious 〈◊〉 persons and the likâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not the stiles of a Parliament and for thâ—…ir powâ—…r if they can doe nothing wiâ—…hout his Mâ—…jesties consent and that not to be obtained neither what are they more thâ—…n a Cipher or a meere convâ—…ntion of private men And is this a falsity But our Authours language shâ—…ll not provoke to a retaliation The King doth assert that because the law hath trusted him with a Pâ—…erogative to discontinue Pâ—…aments to the danger or prejudice of the Kingdome this is no breach of that trust because in 〈◊〉 of Law the people may not assemble in Parliament but by his writt 〈◊〉 is grosse 〈◊〉 saith the Authour Howevâ—…r I am sure the language is grosâ—…e I had no time to 〈◊〉 for to disprove the Author but this I am certaine of that his Mâ—…jestie doth strongly urge that prerogative and his power and â—…lection thereby which gives a strong intimation of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 of freedome and power therein But why is it false because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Author if it appeare to him necessary or expedient for the Kingdome hee acâ—… he is obliged by that trust reposed in him to issue out his writts T is not to be 〈◊〉 â—…hat whâ—…n the people granted this Prerogative to his Majestie that they would give him so vast a power as to make him the sole Judge of the necessitie of a Parliâ—…ment for if so upon the 〈◊〉 of not necessary and that upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 counsellers be the Kingdome in never so imminent never so appaâ—…ent danger it must be destroyed for want of a Parliament certainly this was never the intention of this trust
good an innocents oppugning of the sword of Justice to rescue his owne life I dare confidently asfirme not the least title to this purpose No a man ought to discharge his Covenant though it be to his disadvantage And ruat Coelum fiat 〈◊〉 though heaven itselfe if it were possible should be destroyed yet let justice â—…ourish That were a way to open a gap for all disorder and breach of rule and society without which no common wealth can be of long subsistance If thou suffer unjustly God will abundantly remunerate thy sufferings and repay it upon the head of thine enemies wherefore much better it is for thee to submit to thy censure by patience than to incurr the breach of all society by dâ—…sobedience I but saith the Author If reason will not satisfie perhaps 〈◊〉 may Qâ—…i 〈◊〉 potestati ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt to resist the Magistrate 〈◊〉 And he saith that answer with which too many are deceived cannot excuse disobedience and Rebellion this 〈◊〉 obliges private men but not Magistrates Since inferiour Magistrates being opposed to the supreame power are but as pirvate men and in this respect the reason of obedience is common to 〈◊〉 T is not usuall with mee to intrenâ—…h upon another mans profession but seeing I am here inforced to it give me leave a little to sayle out of my way to answer the Author First for the taking up of Armes or the waging of a warre in generall I never heard any man oppose the legâ—…timation of that warre that had these three requisites or ingredients A lawfull authotity commanding 〈◊〉 as the â—…agistrate A just and lawfâ—…ll end or cause occasioning it as the defence of our Religion liberties and the like And a good affection in following of it as not with rashnesse or temeritie but after all other meanes sirst endeavoured And now I appeale to any indifferent man whom neither feare nor affection hath ingaged to the contrary whether all these are not exactly made good in this great â—…taking of the Parliament I but saith the Author how doth this anâ—…wer the taking up of armes against the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the King for 〈◊〉 all o her 〈◊〉 are but as private men compared with him To this I â—…nswer 〈◊〉 under he Aâ—…ors favour â—…he suprâ—…am power as I have made it good before is the people represented by a Parliaâ—…ent and then no doubt that precept of the Apostle comprehending the King aswell as other persons doâ—…h according to his owne Argument justifie he Parliament in their proceedâ—…s and make good â—…heir taking up of Armes in their owne just defence I but hen the Author 〈◊〉 hat of the Apostle that the Magistrate is Dei minister nobis in bonum Gods minister to thee 〈◊〉 thy good and though thou suffer by him unjusty yet there he is 〈◊〉 in bonum for that by thy patient suffering thou shalt thereby gaine an eternall reward Cerâ—…inly God never made Magistrates on purpose to aâ—…ict and 〈◊〉 over their pâ—…ople thâ—…t they by patient 〈◊〉 might enjoy the greâ—…ter happinâ—… hereafter No that they provâ—… corrupt issues from hemselves not from any divine determination and therefore if the Mâ—…gistrate doe prove to be Minister nobis in malum a Minister to thee â—…or thy ill he is not then 〈◊〉 minister Gods Minister for that he doth transgresse and goe beyond his commission and in such case under the favour of M. Doctor Ferne conscience doâ—…h not only deny obedience but command and justifie 〈◊〉 But in all this conceive me 〈◊〉 t is the magistrates not any 〈◊〉 opposition that I justifie and this being undertaken with the due circumstance is not a meanes to destroy order and societie but maintaine them But yet I hope our Auâ—…hor will be here informed that this is not our case For doe we take up armes against our Soveraign may he perish who in his thoughts intends him the least ill No t is as the Parliament have often declared against his Malignant Councellors such who endeavour whatever their 〈◊〉 may be to his Majesty the subversion of our Religion and the destruction of the publike And I hope there is nothing in the word of God that opposeth this O yes in opposing hâ—…s authority you fight against him Strange if it should be so when neither the law of God nor man do oblige obedience to commands unlawfull He that obeyes the magistrate upon such termes doth it at his owne perill and I hope t is lawfull for the Parliament to depresse any civill or private combustion I but what if that authority have the Kings person accompanying it may you in such case make resistance No question we may for t is not the person of the King that can legitimate an action that is in it selfe unlawfull nor adde any greater force or vigour to their Commission that obey Besides the personall presence of the King doth or doth not countermand his authority if it do countermand his authority then they have no power to warrant their actâ—…on if it do not yet the act is 〈◊〉 So then let them take their choise they see their termes Unhappy people who having committed themselves to the government of one King onely might not oppose the unlawfull and tyrannicall regiment of so many It being in effect objected as appeares befoâ—…e That a â—…emporall power meaning the Parliament cannot bee greater than that which is lasting and unalterable intending the King Is this were so saith the Observator the Romanes have done impolitickly in creating Dictators when any great extremity assayled them and yet we know it was very prosperous to them sometimes to change the â—…orme of government Hence we may conclude it good policy in imminent danger to trust to a Monarchy not 〈◊〉 Aristocâ—…y and much lesse to a Democracy What have we to do with Aristocracy or Democracy God be blessed we nor know nor desire any other government than that of Monarchy and we shall with all hâ—…mility cast our selvs upon his Majesties care and providence guided by his Parliament But if sedâ—…ced by malignant and destructive Counsell we are not bound to yeeld our selves as a prâ—…y to the ranâ—… and malice of his and our enemies The King objects if we allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors wee make them Comptrollers and this is not â—…ble to Royalty To which the Observator answers 〈◊〉 say saith he that to coâ—…t is more than to counsell 〈◊〉 yet not aâ—…es so much as to command and comptroll True saith the Author not alwayes but then it is when their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impose a necessity upon the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 the like Doth their consent impose a greater necessity or ingagement upon the King than the consent or declaration of law in cases of publike conâ—…nt by former Parliaments hath done or than the judgement of his Judges in inferiour Courts doâ—…h do who are so Counsellours for the King as that the King may
to dâ—…stroy his people no question law reason and pollicy will warrant their seising of â—…ny fort or publique place of defence for their owne better security See if we are not left as a Prey to the same bloody hands as have done such diabolicall exploits in Ireland c. If we may not take up armes for our owne safety or if it be possible for us to take up armes without sâ—…me â—…otes or Ordinances to regulate the Militia Subjects upon invasiâ—…n would not have wanted Commission to take up armes But upon a civill combustion they might Hee that will give me power to fight against his enemy will not give me authority to oppose himself but doubtlesse this is no rule in the Politiqâ—…es for a man first to receive one blow and then to stand upon his guard to keepe off the second better by a vigilant providence to prevent both or to expect an invasion and then be to â—…eke our Commission enemies are more easie kept out than thâ—…y can be repelled when they are once in I but he saith this would be of ill consequence to subjects if they might have power to take up armes as often as ambitious cholerick men for their own ends shall perswade thâ—…m they are in danger For by this meanes being easily deceived whilest they endeavour to avoyd false they would run them selves beadlong upon true perils Thâ—…se ambitious men which he himselfe knowes not and these pretended dangers because he himselfe feares not have a strong influence upon the Authors whole booke T is very much that the reason and senses of a whole Nation should be so easily captivated But t is his onely plea and therefore you must give him leave to make use of hiâ—… prâ—…tences or you bid him silence Well to tell our Author once for all as no man can or will justifie a pretended cause of feare so no man can condemne a reall And without he will say that there can be no cause of feare without he be privy to it this aspersion is by no meanes to be suffered for by this we shall never know how to beleeve that we are in danger for that true feares may be blasted with the ignominie of feined and pretended carry the visage of true The King sayes the Parliament denyes c. to whether now in this uncertainty 〈◊〉 the subjeâ—â— bounded to adhere Wee may consider whether the Houses doe not barely say and whether his Majesty doth not descend so farre as to give reasons for what â—…e doth and to shew the Kingdome the ground of his actions by perticular citation of the Lawes which justifie them What the two Houses of Parliament barely say then belike if his suffrage be of any account they prove or make good nothing Was ever age guilty of so great irreverence or of offering so greaâ—… an afforoâ—…t anâ—… in â—…ignity to this great Assembly Of whom as the law saith we ought not to imagine a dishonourable thing much lesse to speake it I am confident that all Historiâ—…s that ever were cannot give you one example of so high disdaine and presumption What the two Hoâ—…ses barely say He hath a great measure of confidence that dare say it for my part I dare not returne the contrary but I leave it to the whole woâ—…ld to judge whether that they do not exactly prove and maintaine their owne assertion and utterly disprove and destroy the contrary objections and conclusions I but saith the Author we ought to agree whether swerâ—…ing from law be to be judged by the actions or by the auâ—…hors that is if the King should â—…ave done what ever they did and the Houses what ever he did whether all would not thâ—…n have beâ—…n lâ—…gall because don by them Certainly t is no good way of iudging to conclude the legality or illegality of an action from the Author or Actor t is the applying of the rule to the action that denominates it eithergood or bad However we ought not totally to reject these circumstâ—…nces of place and persons for no doubt that in some cases may be lawfull for one that will not be lawfâ—…ll for another And it is more than probable that the Parliament may in many cases have a more extensive powâ—…r than the King However certaine I am that it is but charity in our Author to grant them his beleife that they will not approve or maintaine that in themselves which they condemne as illegall in his Majesty The King doth not desire to captivate any mans understanding to his authority but is willing to make all the world the judge of his actions And have the Parliament withheld any thing that might give satisfaction to the people Neither â—…s a blind ob diencâ—… a part of any mans duty to the Houses Hee who after so great lâ—…ght and evidence of the integrity and justice of the Parliaments proceedings shall say he obeyes he knowes not upon what grounds may justly be concludâ—…d to be Non compos mentis robbed of his senses Some things he saith are matter of fact here we may be guided by senseâ—… and judge as wee see With the Authors favour this to an ordinary capacity may be a dangerous way of determining for though wee must alwayes judge according to the outward sâ—…nse in matter of fact yet wee must have this caution that we gâ—…e no further as for instance If I see one enter and seisea Castle or fort of the Kings put the case Hull that he did enter that my sense directs mee to discerne but whether he keepe the possession for or against the King that is examinable upon other circumstances and is matter of law depending upon reason and judgement and this every ordinary capacity cannot judge of But saith he this every one may â—…udge of whether the King hath seised on any thing wherein the subject hath a property That 〈◊〉 thupon the â—…ower and priviledges of Parliament the best evidence to maintaine the title that we have to â—…ll that ever we enjoy Or whether that the Subject hath not seized on something wherein the King hath a property That we must yeeld affirmative to that the Subject hath not seized on the Kings property but it is to his use and behoofe for the securing of him and his people So that the King looseth nothing but both gaine protection and safety thereby Whether the King hath raised warre against the Parliament that is whether his guard was an Army A very strang and unusuall guard of 15000. or 20000. And whether Hull is now London Very manifect it is not but the forces that â—…ound no bâ—…tter successe approaching London may for ought I know make a speedy retreat to Yorke againe Wee had a Maxime and it was grounded upon nature and never till this Parliament withstood tâ—…at a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe True in a staâ—…e where a collective bodâ—… 〈◊〉 and
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended
Besides who can be so competent a Judge of any approaching danger or of any malignities or pressures in the Common wealth as they who speake out of the common sense and 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 However this is certaine the Kingdome cannoâ—… suffâ—…r by a Parliament iâ—… may withouâ—… If the Parliament make any transition in other matters than what be pleases to propose they are lyable to imprisonment at his pleasure The sense of his inference is this that because they cannot justifie the medling with things which belong not to their cognizance therefore they may bee punished if they meddle with those that doe This is the Authors inference not the Observators He doth not say that for executing their due power they may be imprisoned no such inconsequent concluâ—…ious we leave to the Author But this he seemeth to speake that it should be very hard and unreasonable that the power of judging of the jurisdiction and authority of a Parliament should reside only in the Kings breast when that none can determine aright of them but themselves for if so if the King at any time shall say they exceed their power they may be imprisoned at pleaâ—…ure The Author telling the people how farre their ingagement goes with the Parliament saith That if they exceed their 〈◊〉 and Vote things not belonging to their cognizance the people by no meanes is ingaged in it as having no legall way of expressing of themselves in such cases This is in plain termes to tell the people in what cases they are to submit to and maintain and desend the Parliament in what not certainly people cannot be so 〈◊〉 as to thinâ—… that the illegall acts of a Parliament sâ—…ould bind them but on the other side I hope they will not be so foolish as to believe every thing to be illegall which the Author is pleased to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but rather cast themselves upon their care as in duty they are bound whom they have entrusted with the publike securitie But I hope the Author will now be advised that on the contrary the people are no more ingaged in the illegall proceedings of the Prince in those things that he is intrusted with for the publike than of the Parliament It is impossible saith the King that the same trust should be irrevocably committed to us and our heires for ever and the same trust and a power above that trust for such is the power they pretend to be committed to others It is true saith the Observator Two supreames cannot be in the same sense and respect This is a weake answer saith the Author So weake that the Author cannot reply to it for nothing is more knowne or assented to than this that the King is singulis major yet universis minor It seemes sayes the Author the King hath taken the Oath of Alligeance as well as we and we may call him 〈◊〉 fellow subject Did we ever speake of two Kings or can there be so in one common wealth But much lesse can there be any alligeance due from the Soveraigne to the subject certainly the Author was not himselfe But to prove his reasoning yet more absurd we doe not say that the King is singulis minor but that he is universis minor and I hope â—…he universe or body politike never swore alligeance or supremacy to the King neither is it possible that it should for that it is a body only in consideration of Law that hath neither life nor motion like other individuals and therefore not capable of doing of any act in that capacity so that notwithstanding this shallow reaâ—… the King is universis minor I but saith the Author You tell us that he is greater than one you doe not tell us that he is better than two this is no greater supremacy than probably he had before he was a King The Prince is singulis major as well as â—…ee nay may not any Lord in the Land chal 〈◊〉 the same supremacy over all the Knights any Knight over all Esquiâ—…es What a poore and senslesse cavill is this doe not we say that he is universis minor and doth it not then consequently follow that we allow him major to all that is lesse than the universe When you can reduce the universe to so small a number as two then will his Majesty be lesse than those two untill then he is greater for those slender instances to prove as great a supremacy in the Prince nay in every nobleman over all Knights and in Knights over all Esquires I must tell him had not his senses bâ—…ene ravished by and swallowâ—…d up in Monâ—…rchy he would never have so much forgot himselfe can there be any one singulis major but the King he that accounts himself so high 〈◊〉 to be made lower by the head the Prince himselfe is not singâ—…lis major till he survive his Father To be short all others are but comparatively great the King only is great in the superlative I but to take us off these corrupt glosses I would there were no more 〈◊〉 in himâ—… the Author 〈◊〉 us to 24. H. 8. ca. 12. which as he saith 〈◊〉 the King to be universis major the preface of which statute 〈◊〉 thus that this Kingdome hath beene alwayes acknowledged to be an Empire governed by one supreame head and King having the dignity and regall estate of the same unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people c. been bounden and owen next to God a naturall and humble obedience Doth this prove the King universis major under favour nothing lesse for wee must not understand this that the body politike doth owe obedience but that the severall sorts and degrees of people of which this body is compacted and made that they doe owe obedience for to take it otherwise were to make an absurd and impossible construction For as I have said before how is it possible that a body politike which is a body only in judgement of law or contemplation that hath neither life sense nor motion that that should owe homage or obedience to any one much lesse a naturall obedience as the Statute speaketh so that cleerly this doth not aâ—… all disprove the former position If there were no King at all in England you would call this government an Aristocracy and why I beseech you do you not confâ—…sse the name now seeing the thing is altogether the same for if they give his voyce t is all one as if he had no voyce if their pâ—…wer must over-rule his t is all one as if he were 〈◊〉 of all Certainly Monarchy hath committed a Rape upon the Authors reason and understanding or els he could not bee thus overseene Doth the Parliament go about to take away the Kings voyce or to disrobe him of his power more than the knowne law of the land doth approve of Did they even declare or publish such a power to be in them that they
what are they I but he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 This is but your bare assertion which is nâ—…t to be credited before the Paâ—…liament But if it had beene so that they had beene turned 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be sayes the same law would have justified this act as well as the 〈◊〉 So it would had the primer seisin of their estates beene of the like conâ—…equence and concernmeâ—…t â—…o the publike But he sayes since not only the Countrey about but the inhabitants within the towne have suffered in their estates and liberties If any have suffered without they may thank the unlawfâ—…ll assaults of others if within their unfaithfulnesse to the Common wealth Or if they clâ—…ymed any interest in it to themselves So much the lesse reason to 〈◊〉 on it if he cannot so much as pretend title to it T is sufficient if the common Wealth clayme an interest in it though he doth not Or have 〈◊〉 the king utterly denying his right for the future If any law can be produced to justifie the taking away the kings goods 〈◊〉 a time the 〈◊〉 will be cleared If any law or evidence can be produced to justifie the towne of Hull to be the Kings goods otherwise than with reference to the common wealth for the good of which he is intrusted with it then happily the case may not be so evident Or have made any other â—…se of their possession but meerely to prevent civill warre There is not any way more likely to create a civill 〈◊〉 than indeavours to prevent it by illegall courses Uery just if you could demonstrate any illegall courses that have beene taken If the Parliament the shutting of the King out of Hull was not their act if the Act of the substitute be not the Act of him that doth authorize him then I understaud no law be not vertually the whole kingdome it selfe The King exclâ—…ded it is not T is certaine but if he exclude himselfe then it is If it be not like supreame judicature as well in matters of State as matters of law Till new lawes be enacted the subject cannot justifie any act but what is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the old This is an unquestionable truth if the Author doe not corrupt it by this false glosse and interpretation he must know t is one thing to declare the common law another to â—…act a new law the subject may justifie an act by the authority of Parliament without his Majesties consent in the former not so in the latter If it be not the great Counsell of the kingdome as well as of the king to whom it belongeth by the consent of all nations to provide in all extraordinary cases ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica 〈◊〉 the brand of treason stick upon it No provisions are allowed but what are legall least the remedies prove worse than the disease Very right but circumstances may vary a case And that may and ought to be legall at one time that neiâ—…her will nor can be so at another And in extraordinary cases extraordinary provisions may bee made and ought not to beâ—… brâ—…nded with injustice or breach of Law Nay if the Parliament would have used this forcible meanes unlesse petitioning would not have prevailed It is no just cause to take away a 〈◊〉 money and said he did first desire him to deliver it Cleare law and the cases will no way vary if the Author can prove that the King hath as absolute a property in the towne of Hull as any man hath in his money Or if their grounds of 〈◊〉 were 〈◊〉 vaine It is against all equitie to dâ—…e a wrong because there is a 〈◊〉 of suffering it Right but I hope you will prove now that there is a wrong done and not argue this by way of admission Besides it is against all reason that a whole Kingdome should be put to suffer a wrong out of a meere possibilitie of doing one Or if the 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 kingdome can be coâ—…ted vaine Too large an expression much the greater paâ—…t of the kingdome apprehend unjust grounds of jealousies Very good is not this the Doctrine of division that I impeach our Auâ—…hor to be guilty of before The Parliament have formerly beene esteemed the representative body of the whoâ—… Kingdome But belike now â—…is otherwise they have I know not how lost this honour and priviledge or it is unjustly taken from them In the easing us of these many preâ—…ures which lay so heavin upon he Kingdome 〈◊〉 which we and our whole posterity are eternally ingaged unto them there they did represent us and their actions for our benefiâ—… had an influence upon the whole Kingdome But if they tell us through their vigilancy and great care of us that we are like to be reduced to a worse condition through the malicious counsâ—…ll of those men that wrought our former miseries if not timely prevenâ—…ed there they sit in a parsonall capacity only and we are not bound to believe that we 〈◊〉 in danger because they say so No alaâ—… they are a seditious factious and inconsidâ—…rable number who intend to raise tâ—…ir own fortunes upon vâ—…ine 〈◊〉 of danger out of the publike d stractionâ—… O the wit and power of 〈◊〉 that should thus work upon men to renounce their unde standing neglect their duty and incurre the publike ruine upon a meere possibility tha they may be seduced by the Parliament But t is very mâ—…ch â—…at the Author should dare to affirme â—…ha much the greater part of the Kingdome apprehâ—…nd no ground of jealousie bâ—…like he hath travailed the wâ—…ole Kingdom over and examined men by the Poles and takâ—…n every ones suffrage and so upon the to â—…l cast up on every side is able to render you this account or otherwise hee could never make good his assertion Oâ—… if they clâ—…yme any such right of judging of dangers and preventing of them without the Kings Consent as ordinary and perpetuall As ofâ—…en as they have a mind to make use of such a right t is easie â—…or them to call the case extraordinary and pretend publike dangâ—…rs If it shall be suffered that their soleâ—…ne judgements and determinations which are of so great waight and credit that they ought to awe us to a beliefe of them shall be blasted with the scandall of vaine and pretendâ—…d how can it possibly be â—…hat there should fall out any case 〈◊〉 I but the event ought to be Judge and he sayes they will never be câ—…nfuted by that if not now for certainly apparent dangâ—…s did never lesse appâ—…e Admirably ingenious were it not a pure contradiction for doubâ—…lesse if apparent dangers they must be seene But let me tell you that the issue or event is no certaine de ermiâ—… of an imminent danger a provident care
future thus abuse his judgement and discretion Lâ—…t me give him this caution when his heart shall suggest any ill of so great and reverend a counsell whose actions ought to awe him to a good conceipt of them to consider well the grounds and reasons of his mistrust and when he hath done this ponder on the great disproportion and inequality that there is betwixt so great a power and himself and this will either ingage him to a better beleife or force him to silence And let thâ—… people take this Caveat that the subtile prâ—…ssing and urging of the ill examples of other men ought not though it be most maliciously indeavoured to perswade us to a beleife of the like corruptions in the Parliament The things taken from the King at Hull were armes which are of more danger than other kind of Chattells By the same law all that part of the Kingdome which is not confided in may be disarmed Good reason too if in a publique 〈◊〉 they shall appeare in opposition to them who indeavour nothing but the publique fafety and preservation Nay why may not their money be taken too upon probable feare they may buy armes with it If that probability can be evidenced by a sufficient proofe I see no reason any man should be permitted to buy a sword to helpe to cut his owne throat nay more to hasten the ruine of the Common-Wealth The Subjâ—…ct is in a miserable condition that is liable to be undone as often as they please to be fearefull Wee should be in a farre worse condition if we should not feare when we have just cause and prevent the losing of the whole by a wise parting with some small and inconsiderate portion Let Brainford evidence this truth I but he saith it is so farre from excusing it aggravates the fact to take away the Kings armes that is the meanes whereby he may seize whatever else belongs unto his Majesty It doth much extenuate the fact to seize those things which would be more immediate Agents or instruments in his Majesties and the publique ruine I but then againe hee sayes that the law of the land hath onely intrusted the Prince with armes so that the Subject ought not to he arrayed trayned and mustered but by his Commission He sayes very much and of great consequence had it beene at another time But as circumstances may vary a case so I hope the Author will learne to distinguish betwixt a case in neceâ—…ity and one out of necessity Betweene the Kings adhering to the advise of his great Counsell the Parliament and his deserting of them and betweene the due execution of his trust and the breach of it These layed together will much vary the case and justifie the Parliament in their arraying trayning and mustering without his Majesties Commission But some determination must be supreame and therefore either the Kings power and trust must be guided by the directions of the Parliament or else the Parliament and all other Courts must be overruled by the Kings meere direction No necessity of either for in cases of this nature which is confessed to be extraordinary if the King and Parliament dissent things must be at a stand and the Subject must be obedient to the ordinary law Our Author doubâ—…lesse hath a strong Minerva that could make so subtile a decision of a matter of so great controveâ—…sie But I beleive this concept was as soone penned as it was thought on For what is this but in plaine termes to tell the Parliament hat they might aswell have saved their labour And that if a King seduced by evill counsell shall indeavour the destruction of the publique yet it lyes not in the power of the Parliament any way to oppose or prevent it A sad conclusion if it would hold But then his Majesty maintaining of his negative power puts this case whether if the Papists in Ireland in truth were or by act or accident had made themselves the Major part of both Houses of Parliament there and had pretended the trust which the Parliament here doth from the Kingdome of Ireland thereupon had voted their Religion and liberty to â—…e in danger of extirpation from a Malignant party of Protestants and Puritanes and therefore that they should put themselves into a possure of defence that the 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of that Kingdome were to be put into the hands of such persons as they could confide in c. Wheâ—…her he were bound to consent to all such alterations as these men should propose to him and resolve to be for the publique good I shall not need to prove the unlikely hood of their accomplishing their desired ends nor go about maintaine with the Observator that there is as true and intimate an union betwixt England and Ireland as betwixt England and Wales Neither do I thinke if it were so that the two Parliaments would joynâ—… for transacting and concluding upon matters for both states But to the question I shall give this short answere that I do not conceive the King in such case bound to consent to their proposalls For I never did nor shall allow where their conclusions and requâ—…sts are evidently against lâ—…w reason or Religion if that may bâ—… presumed of a Parliament that in such case the Kiâ—…g is bound to yeâ—…ld to their Votes No farre be it from any one thus to judge for that were to make him a â—…yrant though against his will and to be ingaged in his peoples ruine against his conscience But now what use or advantage can be made of this against the casâ—… in question â—…he Parliaments proposalls being not apparently either against law reason or Religion doâ—…h nonplus my understanding to imagine A faction is said to have prevailed upon a Major part by cunning â—…orce absence or accident The Observator argues thus aginst it If by cunning we must suppose the Kings party in Parliament hath lost all their law policy and 〈◊〉 The reason why they are overborne may be this not because they have lesse law but more hoâ—…sty which will not permit them to maintaine a good cause by ill meanes No the reason is evidently this that they have liâ—…le law and 〈◊〉 Honesty which wiâ—…hholds them from promoting the publique safâ—…ty I but how falls it out that after so many reiterated scandalls of pretences and deceivings of the people the Author should now confesse that the cause is good only he adds that there is an ill prosecuting of it which he ought to prove if he expects we should beleive him Certainely he did not read what he had writâ—…en or not understand it or there is some hope now at the last after the venting of his spleâ—…ne that he will prove a convert But I dispaire of convincing him by better reason for he is here in his very next words fallen into a contradiction where he saâ—…es that wee all know in how great stead these Piae