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A90680 Autokatakrisis, or, Self-condemnation, exemplified in Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hickman. With occasional reflexions on Mr Calvin, Mr Beza, Mr Zuinglius, Mr Piscator, Mr Rivet, and Mr Rollock: but more especially on Doctor Twisse, and Master Hobbs; against whom, God's purity and his præscience ... with the sincere intention and the general extent of the death of Christ, are finally cleared and made good; and the adversaries absurdities ... are proved against them undeniably, out of their own hand-writings. With an additional advertisement of Mr Baxter's late book entituled The Groatian religion discovered, &c. By Thomas Pierce rector of Brington in Northampon-shire. Pierce, Thomas, 1622-1691. 1658 (1658) Wing P2164; Thomason E950_2; ESTC R210640 233,287 279

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was next before that building before that will it now follow as Dr. T. his Logick would have it that he lets it out before he furnisheth it and that he does furnish it before he builds it Once more A man determines to take a servant after he hath taken him he findes him a knave and so resolves to put him away must he therefore put him away before he takes him because his intention to take him was before his intention to put him away yet such is the arguing of Doctor Twisse who * Si peccati permissio prius intenderetur quàm damnatio sequeretur in executione ut damnatio priùs sieret quàm peccati permisso Twiss in Praesat ad Vin. Gr. p. 3. saith that if God did decree to permit sin before he decreed to damn men for sin it would follow they must be damned before they can so much as be permitted to sin 4. T●e first cause of the whole mistake 4. As the cause of this Error was his taking that Maxime by the left handle Quod primum in intentione est ultimum in executione so the cause of that also was his over-hasty imagination that * Neque enim ullus intentionis ordo est nisi ratione mediorum Finis Id. ibid. there is no order of intention unless in respect of the end and the means which he dictates tanquam ex Tripode as an unquestionable truth though there is nothing more visibly and even palpably false For there being many means to one end to wit God's glory one of these means may be subordinate to another and so in mente Dei before the other God did not decree to create man to the end that he should sin nor did he decree that man should sin to the end he might be damned but he decreed to create man and to permit him to sin and to damn him for sinning to the end his glory might be advanced And this is Neque enim damnotio potest esse finis à Deo intentus quandoquidem D●us fac●● omnia propter se Necesse est ergo ut gloria Dei ejusque patefactio sit finis actionum Divinarum Idem ibid. acknowledged by the Doctor even in that very page 5. That first cause removed and the fallacy les● naked 5. To remove the Origin of the whole evil I shall not need to say more then this God foreseeing that man would voluntarily sin if he were not forcibly hindered and decreeing not to use any forcible hinderance which would not suit with the nature of a free and voluntary Agent he also saw that Adam would make a wrong choice and thereby fall from his state of Innocence This state of Adam is to be looked on as a Disease which stands in need of a Soveraign Remedy The death of Christ is that Remedy which God decreed And it cannot be imagined that the Remedy should be first in intention before the Disease was foreseen or the very permission of it decreed though still the Remedy is to be last in execution as it was also in the intention Therefore the Axiom must be so limited as to be onely appliable to those things whereof the later is the absolute end and the former decreed as a means to attain it by But thus it is not in mente Dei for the permission of sin is not designed by God as a means of bringing in any former decree of giving Christ but as that which is suitable to Adam's nature created with a free elective faculty commonly known by the name of Will Now God foreseeing that man will do what will be permitted to be done doth also foresee an opportunity of magnifying his mercy in giving Christ and accordingly decrees to give him And that before Adam falls though not before he decrees to permit his fall and actually foresees that fall of Adam From whence 't is clear that * Quod primum in intentione est ultimum in executione that Maxime is very absurdly applyed unto the business of Gods decrees as by numberless instances might be evinced For what man will say that the Creation of the world which was the first thing in execution was therefore the last in Gods intention It was certainly praecedaneous in mente Dei to the fall of Adam For how could Adam be considered as an actual sinner without being considered as something capable of sin Indeed Mr. Perkins was so unhappy as to teach it for Divinity † Etiam ipso Decreto creandi prius esse judicavi decretum praedestinandi tum ad salutem tum ad damnationem Id. Ib. p. 2. col 1. That Gods decree of damning was before his decree of creating man And Doctor Twisse * Ibid. confesseth that he was once of that mind But Arminius clearly confuted Perkins and Doctor Twisse doth seem to confess as much calling Perkins his opinion * Ibid. rigidiorem sententiam Let it now be remembred that there is a priority of order amongst those things whereof neither can be said to be the end of the other and the original cause of the errour is quite removed 6. Mr. W's indirect course to excuse Doctor Twisse in contradiction to him 6. But Mr. W. alledgeth that Doctor Twisse understands the old maxime de finibus ultimis non intermediis p. 18. If he did not look into the Doctors words why would he speak thus without any knowledge of the Fact And if he did why would he speak against his knowledge The Doctor applyes the maxime only to sin and damnation and things on this side damnation but not to any thing beyond it And that damnation is not finis ultimus the Doctor stifly maintains in the place before cited If Mr. W. think● it is he contradicts the Doctor whilest he asserts him It is agreed on all sides that the Glory of God is finis ultimus to which the damnation of the impenitent is but a means And therefore Mr. W. might have omitted his ill language which there he gives me unless he had found some colour for it If he did not fear his undertaking why did he not cite the page or chapter where I had spoken of the subject that I and others might easily have found it out I leave his best friends to judge of such dealings 7. Doctor Twisse his error of co-ordination c. 7. But Doctor Twisse saith farther that the decrees of permitting sin and of giving Christ are co-ordinate Ibid. p. 3. In saying that he did well to oppose Mr. Perkins although not well to miss the truth It doth not follow that they are not subordinate because not so as Mr. Perkins feigned them they are one after another in order of nature though not of time as the Disease is before the Cure as well in nature as time and though both are means to Gods glory yet still the Remedy must suppose the Disease and one is naturally conceivable before the other And so for the
are absolutely eternal therefore they can have no condition or consideration of any thing without himself going before them p. 2. and 3. Num. 1. Now his absurdities grow numerous 1. He is as unfortunate in his best as in his worst meaning as well as grosse for either he here bewrayeth his former meaning to have been of a priority of time in eternity it self and so he is enwrapped in all the miseries so lately mentioned or else he must say in his defence that he onely here means a priority of order as I and others are wont to do I am content to allow him the utmost favour that he can wish I will suppose he means sense and the very best that can be meant yet as things go with him I cannot chuse but make him appear to be as unhappy in his best as in his worst meaning And when I have done he shall take his choice For let him stick to what he will and say he means what he can or can be prompted by his Abettors to say he means yet he hath so ordered the matter that the measure of his calamities will be on every side equal For admitting he here means a priority of order from the impossibility of which in that which is absolutely eternal he argues the impossibility of Conditional Decrees we find him fallen without redresse into these following absurdities 2. His way of arguing in his best sense against Conditional Decrees is as much against the Trinity of persons in the Godhead 2. First his arguing is against the Trinity of the Godhead for the Father is the first Person the Son the second the Holy Ghost the third and by a priority of order though not of time the first is before the second as the second before the third So that according to Mr. Whitfield the second and third persons cannot be absolutely eternal for whatsoever is so is absolutè primum saith Mr. W. but the second and third persons are not both the first person therefore according to Mr. W. they are not absolutely eternal But by his favour the three persons are coaeternal yet they differ in order as the first from the second and the second from the third nay they differ also in their proprieties and in their manner of working The Father existing and working from himself the Son from the Father the Holy Ghost from both as the Adversaries agree But that which is of it self onely is before that which is of another in some respect therefore that which is eternal may have something going before it by a priority of order Again God's Essence is in order of nature before his attributes and his attributes before his actions yet God did act and had attributes from all eternity There must be Ens before Tale and a subject before a praedicate especially in Conjugates where the praedicate is by way of adjunct as when we say God is just we imply his Being in the first word and his attribute in the third And as there must be men before they can be happy so God's decree that there shall be men is by one kind of priority before his decree that they shall be happy We intend the end before the means God both at once yet so as that the one is in order of nature before the other And this is confessed by Mr. W. p. 42. Arg. 3. viz. That Divines do usually place an order in God's decrees wherein one thing goes before another 3. He argues against his own M●st rs and Brethren 3. Next his way of arguing is against his own Masters as well as brethren * Calv. Lost l. 3 c. 23. sect 7. fol. 325. for Mr. Calvin placeth God's Decree before his praescience and so doth † Beza ad Rom. 11 4. Beza and Mr. Barlee saith Gods praescience praesupposeth his praedestination c. 3. p. 13. Doctor Reynolds more truly thus * D. Reyn. of the Passions c. 42. p. 545. The actions of our will were foreknown because our will would certainly execute them though not without freedom and election † Wolleb in Theol. compen l. 1. c. 3. p. 29. Wollebius more plainly then any other affirms God's will to be considered as the efficient cause and his Decree as the effect and again he saith * Id. ib. c. 4. p. 35. that God's praedestination doth praesuppose his decree So that according to Mr. W. all these are enemies to the absolute aeternity of God's praescience or of his praedestination some placing his praedestination before his praescience and some his decree before his praedestination and some his will before his decree even as the cause before the effect 4. He argues directly against S. Paul as well as against the eternity of God's foreknowledge 4. Again his way of arguing is not onely directly bent against the eternity of God's foreknowledge as alwayes supposed by himself to be after his decree but more unhappily against the words of S. Paul who in the very same period doth imply God's purpose and counsel and so his knowledge to be in order of nature before his praedestination Eph. 1.11 In whom that is in Christ we also have obtained an inheritance being praedestinated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the purpose of him who worketh all things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the counsel of his will Where his counsel is as the Rule by which he acts which is in order of nature before his action his action being according to the Rule of his counsel from whence it is evident that God did not first Decree and then consult or consider but both together because both from eternity yet so as that his counsel or consultation was in order of nature before his Decree he having wisely decreed for this reason onely because he decreed according to his counsel not by hap hazzard but according to his knowledge and consideration that it would tend to his glory without which it is evident he would never have decreed it And therefore saith the same Apostle 2 Thess 2.13 God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation he doth not say absolutely but through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the Truth which God foreknew when he chose them And according to foreknowledge they were chosen or elected as S. Peter saith expressely 1 Pet. 1.2 as 't were defining or explaining a conditional election And S. Paul doth put foreknowledge before Praedestination Rom. 8.29 which may fitly be compared with Rom. 11.2 and Act. 2.23 5. He argues in a fl●t contradiction to himself and against Doctor Twisse 5. His way of arguing is contradictory to himself and to Doctor Twisse with whom he joyns in a confession That there is in God's Decrees prioritas Rationis p. 6. Arg. 4. and because saith he in order of nature the end goes before the means and we can apprehend no other way therefore that order is usually attributed unto God in his Decrees that
Sect. 19. Mr. B's first chip hewen out of Mr. H's block He foists into the Creed the word Real and makes it supply the place of good Provides a Creed for the Libertines viz. that God is the maker of all sins if sins are things real and things not real implies a contradiction The different methods of our reasonings and what comes of it They ascribe the filthiest of positive Entities unto God A●c convinced by the Assemblies confession of Faith Are farther uncovered by being supposed to be catechized Sect. 20. His second chip of the same block Inconsistency with himself and making all sinful actions to be wrought by God His unsuccesful Relyance on the Jesuits Sect. 21. His third chip more pitiful then the former Sect. 22. His fourth chip the most lamentable of all His arguing concludes him Pelagian or Libertine He is impertinent on purpose to make God the Author of sin Sect. 23. By his fifth chip he denies Gods Praescience of all wickedness unless he also praedetermined it Sect. 24. His impositions upon the Scripture The Schoolmen Aust●n His new degree of Arminianism Sect. 25. Mr. Hick's Heathenish expression of sins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sect. 26. Of Calvins Doctrine that God commands yea compels the Devil and all that are wicked to Conceive execure their evil dving Sect. 27. Mr. B's affected Tergiversation in his chiefest concernments Of Zuinglius his Doctrine that God is in plain terms the Author of sin How Mr. B. holds the same even in that which he confesseth to be the proper notion of the word Author He accuseth Calvin in excusing him for saying that God doth will sin And Piscator as well as Calvin for saying that God doth thrust men into wickedness He confesseth his Masters do some times teach a coaction from God to sin He forgeth new Texts upon the Scripture Sect. 28. He turns his back to the prime charge and tacitly yields the whole cause Sect. 29. Of Adams inclination to sin before he sinned The birth and growth of the very first sin with the very wide difference betwixt the inclinations of the sensitive appetite and the will Sect. 30. The whole importance of the word Author How the Adversaries say worse then if they had only said verbatim God is the Author of sin Mr. Roll●cks strange Salvo Chap. IV. Sect. 1. OF the signal fallacy swallowed first by Dr. Twisse then by his followers Mr W's essay to cover it The Fallacy shewed in its deformity The first cause of the whole mistake about the order of intentions and execution That cause removed and the fallacy left naked Mr. W's indirect course to excuse Dr. Twisse in contradiction to him Dr. Twisse his error of Co●rdination in things subordinate Sect. 2. Mr. W's forgery of objections in other mens names Sect. 3. Mr. W's second part displayed and Universal Redemption vindicated as to the true intent and extent of Christs death from the feeble utmost of his attempts in a subdivision of eight Paragraphs Sect. 4. How the Presbyterians do nourish Socinianism in contracting Christs death and perverting Scripture Daille Camero Am●rald why they forsook their party abridging the benefit of Christs death Received rules for the interpreting of words and ending controversies The extream absurdity of dutiful misbelief exploded hy the Lord Primate Mr. W's reproch cast upon Christendom and the Gospel of Christ Europe Asia Africa and America inferred by Mr. W. to be the least part of the world Sect. 5. Universal Redemption proved from 2 Cor. 5.14 by S. Austin and Prosper to the stopping of Mr. W's and Mr. B's mouths Sect. 6. The conclusion giving reasons why no more time is to be lost in this employment AN INTRODUCTION To the three first Chapters Concerning the impious and unexcusable because blasphemous and unavoidable both Contradictions and other Absurdities which issue out from the Denial of Gods eternal respective or conditional Decrees SECT 1. The neerest way to end a controversie is to strike altogether at the root of error When once an Error is grown fruitful and hath run it self out into several Branches it is commonly found by sad experience to grow the thicker for being lopp't There is not an Error in all Theologie which doth seem to have taken so deep a Root or to have spread so sturdy Branches or to have born so lewd a fruit as that many-headed Error whose extirpation out of the Church ought so much the rather to be desir'd because it hath shed such a fatal and deadly influence upon a multitude of Professors who have lately sate under its shade Of those that have exercised themselves in so good a work I may call it my Lot and my Necessity to have been one of the meanest Faithfulness and Affection have been my chiefest qualifications and I esteem it a priviledge as well as duty to have done God service in any measure But in every good Labourer there is a skill and prudence as well as industry and faithfulnesse to be required It is not enough to be doing and working in a meer opposition to sloth and idlenesse but by contrivance and forecast to do a great deal of work in a little time Sect. 2. I am not quite so sensible of that unquestionable Aphorism set down by Solomon * Eccles 12.12 much study is a wearinesse to the flesh as of the words going before it in making many books there is no end This I knew a long time since but it is now that I consider it and lay it seriously to heart And therefore now I determine to make an end of the Task imposed on me not contenting my self with a bare Resistance but proceeding to a Dispatch of that Hydra-like Error of which I spake I will no longer amuse my self with striking off now and then a Head which besides that they are many are very apt to be succeeded by many others growing up out of the very same Trunk but rather compendiously endeavour to strike the Monster into the heart which besides that it is but one is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first part that lives and the last that dies in every creature Sect. 3. The grand Error about God's Decrees and its numerous off-spring is rooted in the mistake of two things The false conceit of God's prescience and predetermination makes up the error of irrespective and unconditional Decrees I do not say of the most natural but of the most voluntary actions and effects neither reward nor punishment nor sin it self being excepted This I take to be the heart imparting life and activity to every member and limb of that body of error whose most affectionate friends and abettors have conspired to find me my late imployment With this grand error all the rest which grow from it must live and die In this Mr. Whitfield hath put his chief trust Upon this he hath been poreing as his admirers have ●oasted these thirty years In his Apologie for ●his he hath
question Durst he have writ against my Doctrine of Conditional Decrees as it seems he dares against his own he durst have cited my words wherein my meaning might have appear'd Which why durst he not do but because he found that my words were not liable to exception He knew he was destitute of Arguments against Conditional Decrees as I have alwayes understood them but as he understands them he can order them at his pleasure A goodly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and much good do 't him with all his conquests in that war which he wageth against himself He is equally unfortunate whether he intended sense or non-sense 2. But what are Mr. W's conditional Decrees against which Mr. W. prepares to argue he tells us They are such as wherein the condition doth go before the Decree it self Did he intend this for non-sense or did he not If he did how mean and abject an opinion must he have had of his enterprise who thought it not safe to speak sense for fear the people should understand him if he did not it seems he thought it good sense to say that the condition in the Decree was before the Decree it self wherein it was Had he not imbarqued himself in a most desperate Adventure as very shortly he will find he would have told us that a Decree is therefore said to be conditional because it is made with a condition annexed to it or concomitant with it or in a foresight of something in respect of which it is decreed For thence it is that the word conditional is commonly explained by the word respective as absolute is on the contrary by irrespective For example God foreseeing or foreknowing that Adam and Cain would determine their wills to sin the one in eating as the other in killing what was forbidden decreed to permit and to punish both In which case his Decree is called respective or conditional because it was made in a praescience and praeconsideration that they would both determine their wills to sin which praescience was concomitant because coaeternal with his decree Whereas according to Mr. W. God did absolutely decree that Adam should eat against praecept and that Cain should kill his brother Which if he shall venture to deny and say he holds as I do that God did onely decree to permit them to sin in a foreknowledge that they would freely and voluntarily do it if not forcibly hindred from using the freedom of their wills he will then be exactly of my opinion and overthrow his whole fabrick by subverting and even nulling his whole foundation For to decree one thing in intuition of another and both from eternity respecting their objects which shall be in time is to make a respective or conditional decree Now because when God is said to decree and foreknow he is implied eo ipso to decree something and foreknow something 't is plain the things now in time which were decreed and foreknown from all eternity were some way present to the Almighty when he foreknew and decreed them because the act implies the object about which it is conversant And how can that which is meerly temporal have been eternally present with the Almighty but by its Idea or Exemplar in mente Dei as the work of every rational and advised Agent is conceived by the Agent before effected the intelligible platform or conception is present with the workman whil'st the work it self or thing executed is yet but future And here it is duly to be considered that as the temporal thing which God eternally decreed was every whit as future when God decreed it as any temporal thing which God foreknew when he eternally foreknew it so his eternal foreknowledge was as eternal as his eternal decree Again it is duly to be considered that as now in time the sin doth go before the punishment so from all eternity God foreknew this priority of the sin and posteriority of the punishment Nor could he possibly decree the second until he had foreknown the first Nay he must needs have decreed to punish sinners according to his foreknowledge that they would sin because whatsoever he did decree he did knowingly and wisely and righteously decree neither cruelly nor by chance or at a venture So that God's foreknowledge was simultaneous with his decree as having been coaeternal neither was before the other in order of time for that would imply a contradiction although in order of nature his foreknowledge of sin did praecede his Decree to punish sinners and his foreknowledge that man would determine his will to sin did praecede his decree to permit that man's determination Now I proceed to shew more of Mr. W's unhappinesse into which he hath freely cast himself either by not comprehending or by dissembling his comprehension of these so plain and obvious things 3. He is equally unhappy whatever he means by the word Condition 3. Forsooth he means such Decrees by Conditional Decrees whose condition goes before the Decree it self as well as before the execution of the Decree Very well But what does he mean by the condition As being in act a temporal thing or onely in Idea as being eternally in God's foreknowledge If the first then his meaning is wonderful and never enough to be celebrated with admiration For his project is but to prove that temporal is not before eternal and that that which comes after God's Decree at an infinite distance could not possibly go before it A very visible truth but a most inexcusable Ignoratio Elenchi If he shall say he means the second he must also tell us his meaning of the word before Does he mean a condition before in time or before onely in order If the former he implies a contradiction by implying in eternity a priority of time and when he saith that the condition is understood by him to be before the Decree it self he implies another contradiction by implying an eternal conditional Decree to have been a Decree before conditional for such it was if the condition was in time before the Decree But if he shall say he means the later then he first of all infers that God is the Author of all the wickednesse in the World by his denying the possibility of such Decrees as in part hath been shewed and shall be shewed in great plenty and secondly he ruines the utmost force of his first Argument which therefore now shall be compar'd For his next words are these Sect. 11. Mr. W's first Argument to be compared with his exposition of conditional Decrees is he understands them That such a Decree as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of God if we consider him in regard either of his eternity immutability omnipotency simplicity or other perfections belonging to his nature may thus appear That which is absolutely eternal had nothing going before it for it is absolutè primum but all God's Decrees being acts within himself and therefore not really differing from himself