in a threefold consideration And first of all the worship of God properly so called and the chiefest is that inward wordship of the mind which consisteth in the exercise of inward Vertues as of Faith Hope Love Invocation Confidence c. Secondly those outward Acts by which that inward worship of the mind is partly expressed and partly helped and fostered such as are publick Prayers Singing of Psalms the Hearing of the word and the participation of the Sacraments c. may reducibly and lesse properly be called and oftentimes are called the worship of God as they are the outward Testimonies and Helps of that worship which so properly is called Thirdly Seeing it is impossible that any outward action especially if it be a solemn one should be performed without some Circumstances either more or lesse of Time Place and Gesture from whence it comes to passe that the very same Circumstances which if established by Laws or Customes are called also Rites do sometimes receive the appellation of worship although very improperly and only for that Concomitancy which they have to that outward worship which it self also is improperly called a worship It is therefore to be affirmed That the inward primary worship properly so called doth only so acknowledge God to be the only Author of it that it is not lawful for any man either to institute a new worship or being instituted by God to exhibit it to any other besides God himself We are to affirm also That the outward worship according to its substantials is instituted only by God but there is a far different account to be made of the circumstances which are accessary to this outward worship and those which do accompany it If there be any who will Honor them also with the Name of worship For seeing that the outward worship of God cannot be performed without Circumstances and God in the Gospel hath not given any certain particular Circumstances perpetually to be observed in sacred Assemblyes but only hath lay'd down some Generals as may conduce to Order Honesty and Edification it must necessarily follow that the Determination of the said Circumstances which are but Accidental to the worship it self and mutable according to the respect of Times Places and Occasions must pertain unto those who under Christ have a Right and Power of Governing the Churches which that they may be imposed by those who in the several Churches are invested with publick Authority and being imposed may Religiously be observed by all the Members of the said Churches the nature of Holy worship doth not forbid but Solemnity rather Decency doth require We observe also that even those Men themselves who so Lordly bitterly do inveigh against the Canons and Ecclesiastical Constitutions yet as often as they please do use those Rites in the outward worship of God no where prescribed by Christ or his Apostles as the lifting up of their hands in the taking of an Oath the uncovering of the Head in the Holy Conventions and many other things which because we dayly observe to be done it is unnecessary to rehearse them XXX In the fourth place they object that Moses the pattern of the old that is of the Jewish Church who was given by God to the people of the Jews to be their Lawgiver did not only by his Law define the Substantials of the Jewish worship but according to that fidelity which was in him he omitted not the least Circumstances and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a Type of the Christian Church he most compleatly and perfectly finished all things according to the Idaea of the Example which was propounded to him in the Mount And now if Christ the-Lawgiver of the new Testament should not have prescribed all things and every thing even to the least Circumstances which are to be performed in the Ecclesiastical worship it may justly be believed to suspect which is near to Blasphemy that he was lesse faithful in the House of God than Moses and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and contumely done unto Christ if any new Rites never instituted by him should by humane Authority be brought into the Church or be received by the Christian common people But they who do object these things ought in the first place to have considered that by this Argument all humane political Laws are no lesse everted than Eclesiastical for Moses by the commandement of God did give unto the people of Israel a certain and a defined Law not only of those Rites which belonged to the worship of God but also of those Decrees and Judgments which belonged to the Administration of Civil Government XXXI In the second place it is a wonder moreover that they observed not that by this comparison of that fidelity which was in both Law-givers Moses and Christ that they could not more importunately have alleged any thing that could bring a greater dammage to their own Cause or more strongly have confirmed ours For as from that that Moses both in rituals and judicials did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews we do truly collect it was the will of God that the people of the Jews should be so restrained in their duties under that paedagogy and Mosaick Discipline as under a Yoak of servitude so that very few things should be free unto them so from that also that Christ the most faithful Interpreter of his Fathers Will did give unto the Christian Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies we do truly collect that it is the will of God that the Magistrates and Christian people should be permitted in those things to their own Liberty so that it is now free for any private Man of his own accord no command or prohibition of a superior intervening to do as shall seem in his own Judgement to be most expedient and to the several Churches and their Governors to prescribe those things which according to the condition of the time and place shall seem to them to be most subservient to Order Honesty Edification and Peace XXXII Moreover Those who do make use of this Argument ought in the third place to have considered that under that Paedagogy of Moses the Jews themselves had not all the Liberty of Rites in things pertaining to the worship of God so take away that it was not lawful for them by their own Authority to observe and to institute those things which it is manifest were never commanded either by God himself or by Moses his Servant Of many take these few instances First the solemn feast of the Passover which by the Law of Moses was commanded should be observed but seaven dayes was by a special Law of Hezekias who received a singular testimony of his piety from God himself and by the consent of the people continued seaven dayes longer The History is extant 2. Chron. 30. Secondly Esther and Mordecay did institute that the seast of Purim should be yearly celebrated in memory of
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
go with him twayn A man therefore may and if occasion so requires he ought to depart from his own right for his own peace but much more for the publick tranquillity and obey him who hath no lawful power to command But above all he must have this Reserve so to depart from his own right that by so doing he taketh not any thing away from the right of another And Abraham in this did justly and wisely Gen. 14. who though he made the King of Sodom partaker of the spoils which by the right of war was his portion from the five Kings that were overthrown yet he cautelously provided that both the Priest should have his Tenths and his three Associates in the War should not want of their full proportions In the like manner obedience is so to be payed to an Usurper that the fidelity due unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated and that his right suffers no prejudice by it XXI But it may be objected How can this be done That which is grateful to an Usurper cannot but be most ungrateful to the lawful Prince No man can serve two Masters that look so contrary all whose Votes Mat. â— Studies and Counsels are violently carryed on to the ruine and destruction of one another I answer the account being well computed there is no reason that we should think that this obsequiousness of the Citizen so ordered and bounded as we before have delivered should be unpleasing to the lawful Prince but altogether to the Uâ—urper nay we may presume that with the consent of the true Prince himself it ought to be so For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be accounted to have assisted so much the unjust Possessor as the whole Commonalty or Republick the safety whereof doth no lesse concen the true Heir than the unjust Possessor Nay peradventure much more because being the true Father of his Country he is to be believed to love it sincerely to wish it more happinesse than the other who having excluded him hath thrust himself into his house and hath excercised a command over his Family and by how much the affections of a Mother to her Children are more pure vehement than a Step-mothers as may appear by that remarkable contestation of the two Harlots before Solomon the true Mother who knew the Child to be her own desiring the safety of it and that it should be given rather to another nay unto her Adversary than that it should perish by the Sword so it is most likely and it is to be presumed that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the safety of his people whom although for the present under the yoak of a Stranger yet he doth acknowledge them to be his own hopeth well that in time they will prove profitable to him than he who having newly usurped the supreme Magistracy will be more careful it is likely to establish his newly acquired Greatness than to procure the safety of the publick and therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as modestly as they could they should accommodate themselves to the present affairs for their own safety than to run into a certain destruction by making an unseasonable and an unsuccessful opposition against one that overpowers them And thus I have given you my opinion concerning this most difficult and high question determining possitively of nothing but being ready if any man shall render more certain reasons to correct what hath been spoken and to jump in to the same Judgment with him XXII The fourth Conclusion followeth Humane Laws concerning things not unlawful do by themselves and directly in the general oblige the Conscience Which is as much as to say This general precept that Subjects should obey humane Laws being duly made is obligatory directly and by its self And this Calvin himself who doth not use to attribute too much to humane constitutions doth acknowledge who in the 4 Institute 10. § 5. doth advise that such a distinction be made inter Genus et Speciem betwixt the General and the Special that although it be denied that Laws in the Special do oblige the Conscience yet it must be granted that they have an obliging power in the General The reason is perspicuous for this general precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine Law every part whereof doth directly and by it self and not only by consequence oblige our Consciences It pertains to the Law of God in a double respect First Because natural Reason dictates that Peace and Order which is the Soul of Common-wealths and of all humane Societies cannot be preserved but by an Obedience to the Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them Secondly Because that God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be subject unto those who are over us in that Order as God hath appointed and to obey 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he Higher Powers as may appear in the first and second verses of this Chapter and not to draw back our necks from their yoaks upon a bare pretext that they are meet men 2 Pet. 2. 13. and Creatures such as we are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sons of Adam of the same â—ace of mankind and subject to the same Affections Sufferings Inâ—irmities and Casualties as our selvs but rather being mindful that Almighty God by a delegated Power did set them over us as his Vicegerents on Earth and hath been pleased to vouchsafe them so much honour as to communicate his own Name unto them as to so many visible and mortal Gods Psal 82. 6. I have said you are Gods we should reverence honour and obey them with the greatest Reverence and though not for their own sakes who are but men as we are nor composed of better Clay yet in respect to the Divine Oâ—dination who making them to bâ— Prâ—nces hath preferred them into a higher place abovâ— other men and in some measure made them Partakers of his own Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Lord as the Apostle Sâ— Peter â—n another place and by consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording unto Conscience as the Apostle Sâ— Paul hath it in this place XXIII The fifth Conclusion Humane Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them doe oblige theâ—â—â—science even in particular and although not directly and by themselves yet by Consequent and by 〈◊〉 of the general Divine Commandment I say in the first place Lawes solemnly and rightly constituted that is both by reason of the efficient Cause being made by him who is indued with lawful Power and by reason of the matter commanding nothing unlawful dishonest or filthy or any wayes unworthy the Duty of a Christian For we already have asserted that the Lawes which do offend in either of those two senses are not obligatory I say in the second place In the particular that is to a particular Determination in things of a middle Nature and in others As what and how
much tribute is to be paid What merchandise is lawful and what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in such and such a Country What habits are suitable to such and such degrees in an University What Statutes are dispensable and what not c. I say in the third place that such Lawes doe not oblige by themselves and directly I prove first because that God alone is that Law-maker who hath a most peculiar and direct Command over the Consciences of men There is but one Law-giver who is able to save and destroy James 4. 12. In things of a middle nature which are indifferent which for the most part are the subjects of humane Laws we do suppose that God made no Law in particular but left them all to the arbitration of those who are his Vice-gerents on Earth It is proved thus in the second place because that those things only do oblige directly and by themselves which oblige by reason of the matter as of an internal Cause without any respect to the external Causes the Efficient and the Final which would have obliged of themselves if they had not been commanded by Men But things indifferent and of a middle Nature determined by a particular and positive humane Law when they are so qualified in themselves that before the Determination of them they may freely be made or nor be made by any they doe not oblige in respect of the matter therefore not of themselves I say in the third place that the same Lawes notwithstanding doe oblige in particular by the Consequent and by Vertue of the general Divine Commandement And because in this last position the hindge of the whole controversy is turned I will more plainly propound the Conclusion which by and by I will more fully confirm The Conclusion is this Positive humane Laws being rightly and lawfully constituted which contain particular determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themselves indifferent and which before they are determined are free to be made or to be unmade do by the vertue of of the Divine Commandement by which we are bound to obey those who are set over us by God so oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them that they are bound under the penaâ—ty of moâ—tal Sin and the fear of Gods displeasure to give obedience to the said Laws and if they shall fail in the performance thereof they shall endure the checks and sâ—ings of their accusing CoÌ„sciences XXIV This Conclusion is confirmed by divers Reasons the first whereof is taken from this present Text we must therefore be subjected not only for wrath but for Conscience sake The words in themselves are perspicuous enough In the former verses the Apostle had largely insisted upon the necessity of Christian Subjection which he urged chiefly by two Arguments the one from the Institution and the Ordination of God in the two first verses and the other from the fear of the Punishment of man in the two verses following In the way of recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argument and repeateth them in this fifth verse and as it is very usual in the Scripture in an order inverted beginning the repetition from the latter and the next member As if he should have said A great necessity of Obedience doth lye upon you in both respects whether the fear of punishment may deterr you or the Conscience of the Duty may incite you If you despise the Power and Authority of the Lawes and do evil consider with your selves that the Magistrate who is set over you is the Minister of God the Revenger of your neglected Duty and ready to draw the Sword with which God hath intrusted him to inflict a corporal punishment due to the despisers of his Lawes But if these things move you not being deluded by a vain hope to find out one subterfuge or another to escape the force of his Arm yet think on God the just Remembrancer of aâ—l Acts committed whether they be good or evil stand in awe of him as of a just Judge Fear your own Consciences those severe accusers those faithful witnesses and importunate Tormentors you cannot avoid them by any Artifices not elude them by any Inventions From the scope of this place the Argument is thus framed Those things which being violated do leave a Remorse upon the Conscience do oblige the Conscience for so it must necessarily be that all remorse or reproof of Conscience must proceed from the sense of some obligation as all other effects do follow their causes but humane Laws being violated do leave a remorse upon the Conscience for that is the expreâ—â—e sense of those words in the Text Necesse est subjici propter Conscientiam You must of necessity be subject for Conscience sake you cannot keep your Consciences upright and safe unlesse you be subjected Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Conscience XXV But some there are who to un-nerve the force of this Argument do in this place give another Interpretation unto Conscience and chiefly herein they defend themselves by the Authority of Chrysostome as if no other Conscience was to be understood in this place but a Conscience only of benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the Political Government I have made mention of this heretofore and praysed it for the sense I confesse is pious though not so genuine And I have thus much against it For in the first place amongst the Ancients Chysostome is singular in this Interpretation whom hardly one or two amongst so many Interpreters have followed Theophyâ—act only and Oecumenius excepted Who are not to be reputed in the number of witnesses for they so tread in the footsteps of Chrysostome that all three of them do make only but one witnesse Secondly No place can be aleged in the Scripture in which either St. Paul or any other of the Apostles have made use of the word Conscience in that sense as Chrysostome here doth feign unto himself Thirdly the Apostle in this place as it is very manifest would induce something which should be of more moment and more effectual to stir up the minds of men than temporal punishment for which end it was better to affright them with the fear of the Divine anger than to admonish them of any benefits received from men Fourthly and lastly the Apostle here in a short repetition of those reasons before alleged would conclude his discourse of Christian Subjection now in the two first Verses of this Chapter he did bring the reason not from the Conscience of the benefit but of the duty XXVI The second reason followeth from the use and the end of the Laws It being most necessary that they should be made and observed for the preservation of humane societies in peace and publick tranquillity for otherwise there would be no certain rule of Contracts no measure of Faith and Civil Justice which are the firmest bands of Cities and societies for the natural and the
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
according to his good pleasure he may either delegate a dispensation of either power to another or he may reserve it to himself Therefore it would not be absurd if any man should grant that God in some measure hath delegated a Legislative power to the Magistrate of obliging Consciences but hath reserved the Judicial power over them entire unto himself But there is no necessity that compelleth us to grant 〈◊〉 or to use any expressions that may be helped although by never so gentle an interpretation For we do not say this that God hath given to the Magistrate a power to oblige by his Laws the Consciences of those that be under him but this rather which is a more wary and a more commodiouâ— kind of speaking that God hath given to the Magistrate a power of making Laws which but by the only Authority of God himself do oblige the Consciences of his Subjects For to speak properly the Magistrate doth not oblige the Conscience to obey the Law but God obligeth the Conscience to obey the Magistrate XL. And by this a way is made for an 〈◊〉 to the last objection I do grant indeed 〈…〉 effects of Actions ought not to be extended 〈…〉 the intention of the Agents nevertheless where there are more Agents subordinate there is 〈◊〉 hindreth but that the effect may be extended beyond the intention of the inferiour Agent provided it doth not exceed the Intention of the principâ—â— Agent As in the generation of a Monster which being but boyes we have learned from Aristotle the effect which is the production of the Monster is besides the intention of the second cause or as they speak it of Nature natured that is to say of the person that begets or brings it forth but it is not besides the intention of the first Cause or of Nature naturing that is Almighty God Therefore although the Magistrate in the making of a Law hath no explicit intention of obliging the Consciences yet by instituting the Law he doth institute that which by the intention ordination of God hath an implicit force of obliging them which necessarily is conjoyned to him And this may suffice to be spoken of the obligation of Humane Laws in general I will shortly proceed to the Questions or particular doubtful Cases if God shall permit and my health be more constant to me THE SIXTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in reference to their material Cause PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree Justice I Have reduced to two general Questions or to two heads what I have propounded to be spoken concerning the obligation of humane Laws The first is whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences of Subjects Concerning which in the former Lecture I have expounded to you what was my Judgment of it The other Question is How they oblige To which question I have told you there belongeth the deâ—â—ding of some Cases and Doubts which meeâ— in this â—ubject And because they are 〈◊〉 few noâ— of one kind therefore to avoid Confusion and that we may proceed in some Order and Method to that which is to be spoken I have thought is not impertinent to give you a rough Representative of the whole Treatise now in hand And that Method which most of you do remember I observed in those my former exercitations concerning the obligation of an oath I here conceive it very necessary for me to use again that those things may all of them be reduced to the four kind of Causes which I conceive may commodiously be referred to them But because I do find many things to remain which cannot easily be included in those bounds we will assigne them their several â—lasses And they are chiefly two the first of Persons who are under the obligation of those Laws and the other in the comparing of the obligatory Vertue which is in Humane Laws with that which ariseth from the Judgement of the Conscience by Vowes Oaths Promises Contracts and from the Law of Scandal or if there be any thing else which elsewhere obligatory for these two obligations do seem to be in a contestation and justling for precedency to strive which of them should give place unto 〈…〉 To add the third Classis for some certain species of Laws which seem to contain in themselvs somthing singular to themselvs such as are Ecclesiastical Laws Penal Laws the local statuâ—es of Colleges and lesse societies will not peradventure be very necessary seeing in some manner they may be reduced to somthing in the four kinds of Causes and though not so aptly as to satisfy the curious yet so fully as to serve our present purpose for whilst our hearers understand what it is we speak of we have never taken any great care in what method we have gone We will in the first place therefore if God shall grant life health and opportunity to accomplish what we have propounded speak of the obligation of the Laws as to the four kinds of Causes In the second place of the persons who are obliged to the observation of those Laws And lastly of the comparison of the obligations which quarrel amongst themselves giving you before-hand one or two distinctions which will be of great concernment in the whole management of this discourse II. We must understand therefore in the first place Seeing that to the end of Political Government and order there is a two-fold power in those who are invested with Soveraign Authority A directive power by which the Subjects may understand what they have to do and a Power Coactive or Coercitive for by reason of the Analogy it is better so to call it than Coercive by which the Subjects may be compelled to the performance of those things that are commanded if of their own accords they shall refuse to give obedience to them both which are so contained in the Laws that the one consisteth most in precepts and the other is most to be seen in punishments there ariseth from this double power of the Magistrate a double duty of the Subject which answereth to that double power The duty of Obedience in reference to the Directive power and the duty of Subjection in reference to the power Coercitive I here understand subjection as it is properly so called by an appellation Generical which as elsewhere it often comes to passe is restrained to one certain Species For obedience also is a Species of Subjection largely taken The Apostle comprehends both those duties Heb. 13. 17. and signifies them in those two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obey them that have the oversight of you and submit your selves The first whereof pertaineth to the Duty of obedience or of performing that which is commanded by a lawful Superior the other to the Duty of Subjection or of induring what by him shall be inflicted Furthermore As from a double Power there ariseth a double
vitious by reason of the defect of a due rectitude in that circumstance From whence ariseth another difference betwixt an affirmative and a negative Humane Law or a Law commanding or forbidding For a Law affirmative doth not give any goodness to the Act which it commandeth if it be otherwise evil in any part of it But a Law negative doth contribute evilnesse to the Act which it forbiddeth although it be otherwise good in every part of it Or which is the same again a Humane Precept affirmative doth make that necessary which it finds to be good a humane precept negative doth make that unlawful which it found to be good both of them what they found evil do leave it to be evil as they found it Notwithstanding both do oblige in their manner and as to us this to the doing of that which by commanding is now made necessary and that to the not doing of that which by forbidding is now made unlawfull XXVI The seventh Doubt remaineth of Ecclesiastical Lawes in Special By Lawes Ecclesiastical I do not understand those Lawes which are constituted by Ecclesiastical Persons without the Authority of the Civil Magistrate which consideration pertains not to this case but to a Cause of an other kind to wit the Cause efficient but those which being made by any lawful Power doe treat of Ecclesiastical things for at this present we dispute only of the material Cause I have never heard of any besides those two above named who denyed all Indifferency or who would not grant to the political Magistrate some Power in things indifferent meerly political But we meet every where with a great number of Innovators who would take from men all Power of making Rites and Ceremonies in the publick worship of God besides those which are prescribed by Christ and his Disciples in the Gospel But sincerely I professe that to give satisfaction to my self and to others in this particular Having perused many Books written by many Authors but especially of our own Nation concerning this Subject I find not any one that can produce any just or any likely Reason of Difference why there may not be a Power of ordaining and determinating concerning things indifferent as well in Cases Ecclesiastical as Political For the Arguments which are urged from Scandal and Christian Liberty and other common Places of the same Nature doe equally fight against the Lawes and Constitutions of both Kinds and do overthrow them both or neither of them Those which are thought to carry a peculiar force against Ecclesiastical Laws and Rites are four which as the time will permit I will briefly and orderly examine they are derived 1. From Christ the Lawgiver 2. From the perfection of the Scripture 3. From the nature of holy Worship 4. From the example of the antient Church XXVII In the first place they object that of the Apostle James 4. 12. There is one Lawgiver who can save and destroy In the reign of Elizabeth many who were the Coriphaei of that Disciplinary Faction did make very much of this argument as the foundation of their whole Cause They alleged that Christ was the only Prince and Legislator of his Church And the Laws which he made did oblige the Church to a perpetual observation of them and that no other Laws ought to be admitted nor any other Legislator acknowledged whosoever shall presume to make any other Lawes besides those which Christ made shall act the part of Anti-Christ and declare himself a rash Invader into the Office of Christ We have discoursed on this place and expounded it already as occasion did require especialy where it was to be proved that God only and his Christ did exercise an absolute and a direct Command on the Consciences of Men But that this hath no greater a place in Lawes politick than in Ecclesiastick he must needs be blind that doth not observe it For why can the obligation of humane Laws in civil things consist with the legislative Power of Christ alone and why cannot there be the same consistence in Lawes Ecclesiastical Who can discover or produce the least shadow of any difference from that Text. Be Christ the Law-giver of the Christian Church Is he not as well the Law-giver of the Christian Common-wealth But the Apostle in that place made not the least mention of the Church nor instituted the least disputation concerning things Ecclesiastical neither doth he treat there at all of Political Lawes or Rites but of the Censures of Private Men. He would have the faithful admonishâ—d to be mindfâ—â—l of Christian Charity and that they should forbear from passing a rash Judgment on their Brothers for God was only the Judge of Consciences who alone made that Law by which every man in the last Day shall be judged This is the true scope of that place This is the mind of the Apostle What is here I pray you that tendeth to the condemning of Humane Lawes or if to the condemning of them why of Ecclesiastical Lawes more than Civil Neither of which either the one or the other are asserted by us by themselves and of their own Vertue to oblige the Conscience XXVIII In the second place they object the Perfection of the Holy Scripture This they say is the Rule both of Life and Manners and which can make a man of God wise to every good work to which if any man shall adde any thing of his own he shall commit a most remarkable trespasse against God and pull most heavy punishments on himself All this is most certain But if the Scripture in all considerations be the absolute rule of our lives of all things whatsoever to be done and if we may believe these Stoicks it extends to the slightest things insomuch that it is not lawful to take up a straw unlesse it be by the prescribed word of God will it not suffice as well for the regulating of things Civil as Ecclesiastical or how can the Laws of â—he Church derogate more from the perfection of the Scripture than the Laws of the Commonwealth or who is he who rightly can say that he hath added something to the word of God who for Honesty and Orders sake did make the Ecclesiastical Laws seeing he propounded not his Laws unto the people as the word of God and God in his word hath commanded that all things in the Church shall be done honestly and in order XXIX In the third place they object the Nature of worship to wit that the worship of God is a thing sacred in which worship all things are to be done by the Command of God and all Humane inventions are to be driven far away as superstitious nay plainly Idolatrous and traditionary Rites Indeed the worship of God is a sacred thing neither is it lawful for man to institute any other worship besides that which God hath ordained But because there is an Ambiguity in the word we are to distinguish of the worship of God which is taken
not on another For by the force of Free will a man is master only of his own will and of his own Acts and not of anothers Now on the contrary he who layes a precept upon or who doth command another if he hath right to command he obligeth by commanding that man whom he commandeth but he doth not oblige himself Because a command is an Act of power and Authority and of right upon another and is fit and proper unless peradventure there be something that hinders it to induce an obligation so the Father with Authority commands the Son the Master the Servant the General the Souldier the King the people and God as a Superior commandeth man to such and such duties and by commanding doth oblige him to the performance of them IV. In the second place I suppose that the Legislative power is a power of publick Jurisdiction for it sufficeth not to the power of making Laws that a man hath a Right and power over others to prescribe unto them what is to be done unless he be invested with an external power to compel them to the performance of it and to afflict punishments on the Refusers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Ethick 10. The Law hath a necessitating power The Schoolmen therefore do distinguish that power which a Superior hath over an Inferior into that power which they call Dominative or the power of Masterdome and the power of Jurisdiction The first whereof is less and more private and not admitting an external Jurisdiction the other greater and of a more inforcing Authority These two powers do not a little differ between themselves and that in a three-fold consideration First in respect of the matter or object for the Power Dominative or of mastery is properly exercised on the more imperfect and private Commonalty as a House a School or a Family but the power of Jurisdiction on the more perfect and publick Commonalty as a City an Army a Common-wealth Secondly in respect of the End for the power Dominative by it self and Primarily is ordinated to the profit of the person indued with that power that is the master and but Secondarily and by Consequence to the good of the Commonalty as it is profitable for a Family that the master of it should grow rich Now the power of publick Jurisdiction is Primarily ordinated to the publick good of the Commonalty it self and but Secondarily and Consequently to the good of the person indued with that power which is the Magistrate himself it being profitable for a Prince that the Common-wealth should flourish Thirdly in the respect of the more effectual Administration which is greater in the power of jurisdiction than in the Power Dominative by reason of a greater coactive Power for examples sake The Master of a Family cannot so efficaciously prevail that his Commands may be put in Execution by his Sons or Servants whom he cannot correct but with a rod or Cudgel as may the civil Magistrate who by his Power may enforce his Subjects to Obedience by imprisonment or banishment by confiscating their Goods or by Death it self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The fatherly Authority hath nothing in it that is enforcing nothing that is necessating saith Aristotle in the place newly quoted Therefore to the making of Laws every superiority is not sufficient but besides that Dominative there is required the power of Jurisdiction so properly called for the Laws cannot be made or established unless by a Person that hath a publick coactive power by this time you understand I believe that I may need no more to admonish you of it that what here hath been spoken by me concerning Laws doth absolutely pertain to the chief Laws of a Nation and not to any others unless analogically after their way the proportion that is due unto them as they come near or are more remote from their perfection V. To these two suppositions which to what sense they tend you shall easily understand from those things which presently I shall represent unto you I in the third place do now adde a responsive position viz. That the power Legislative is a power autocraâ—ical That is the power of making Laws which may oblige the Commonalty doth consist in him alone whether he be a single person as in the state of Monarchical Government or whether they be more as in other Governments who exerciseth the chief power over the whole Commonalty I will in the first place explane this position and afterwards I will confirm it And for the explication of it we are in the first place to understand that for the happiness of humane societies and the more commodious Adminstration of Commonwealths it hath pleased Almighty God the Author of Order not only to constitute a political Government that there may be Magistrates to be set over the people but also in that very Government to constitute a political Order that amongst the Magistrates themselves there might be divers degrees as well of Dignity as of Power And it is likely that the military word of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Apostle useth in the Romans hath a relation to this sence to show that there is not only an ordination of Magistrates from God but a subordination also such as is seen in a military Army VI. In the second place we are to know that in all things in which there is order to avoid a proceeding to an infinitenesse which Nature doth abhor we must at the last come necessarily to something which is the first and chiefest in that Order where we are to make a stand Therefore seeing that Magistrates of the same Commonalty are some of them superiour unto another in Dignity and power it must of necessity so come to passe that some one of them must be transcendent above the rest that the others may depend on him and he on none In the same construction the head is the highest in the body the Admiral in a Fleet and the Emperour in an Army The supreme Magistrate is only less than God himself and in governing the people committed to his charge hath neither a Superiour nor an Equal St. Peter calls him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Superiour St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the higher power 1 〈…〉 13. and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 1. the man in Authority And the Schoolmen 1 Tim. 〈◊〉 2. caput communitatis the head of the Commonalty in whom solely the chief command and the Majesty of the Empire doth consist and to whom all inferiour Magistrates do owe all that power which they do exercise over the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being sent from him 1 Pet. 2. 14. VII In the third place we are to know that this supreme power which we call Majesty or Autocratical that is governing all by it self according to the diverse form of Commonwealths is placed either in some one person or in more In a popular state which is called
Democraty the chief and Soveraign power consisteth in many Magistraâ—es yearly chosen by popular Suffrages or by certain other Intervalls of time and this heretofore was the state of the people of Rome when they were governed by Consulls Praetors Tribunes of the people Aedils and other yearly Magistrates and from hence proceed those Expressions which oftentimes we find in Tully Populi Romani Majestas laesa populi Majestas Visum est Senatui populoque Romano The Majesty of the Romane people The injured Majesty of the people it seemed good to the Senate and the people of Rome c. In a state Aristocratical the same Majesty resideth amongst some of the Lords and Nobles whom in some places they call Illustrissimoes in others the Peers of the Land and in other places again they receive other titles and appellations according to the custom of the Nation Amongst whom although peradventure but one as in the Common-wealth of Venice or more of them may have a preheminence of place and dignity above the rest being as it were a certain Primacy of Order which heretofore was the Honour of the Bishops of Rome and some Patriarchs in their Councils yet no man was so superiour above the rest in power that by his own authority he could judge any one of them neither could he himself be judged unlesse it were by all of them altogether Some form of this Government is still retained by our Mayors and Aldermen in our Cities and by the Heads and Fellows of Colleges in our Universities and although as it were but in a shadow yet in some manner they do represent it to us But in a Monarchial Government as the Name it self implies the chief Power is resident in the Person of the King alone whereupon St. Peter a most excellent Interpreter of St. Paul doth admonish the Christian People to obey the King as their superior that no man might any more doubt of whom St. Paul speaketh when he maketh mention of the higher Powers Ro. 1. 3. 1. Samuel also the Prophet of God doth so propound unto the people the fulness of the Kingly Power to be considered of by them 1 Sam. 8. That if a King the supreme in his Kingdom should act all those things which in that Chapter it is manifest that it is lawful for him to do upon no just Cause but upon the meer desire of Domination and to show himself a Tyrant and not a King although he wanted not Sin before God yet he ought not to have any force to be put upon him by the People nevertheless he may justly be said to have abused his Power but his own Power Amongst us English what more certainly or more cleerly can appear unless at noon we choose rather to be blind than open our eyes than that the supreme Power of the three Kingdoms doth intirely appertain to the Kings most excellent Majesty whom we are accustomed to render more remarkable by the title of Majesty not only according to the common use of speaking but in our solemn Ordinances and in all our forms actions of Law in the taking of an oath laying our hands upon the Gospel of the eternal God we acknowledg him the supreme yea the only supreme Governour of all persons and Causes in his Kingdoms VIII In the fourth place we are to understand That when we say the Power of making Lawes is in the King alone It is not so to be understood as if we meant that whatsoever the King is pleased to command shall immediatly obtain the force of a Law for by and by I will show unto you that some Consent of the People themselves and many other things are required to the Constitution of Law but this is that which I would hold forth unto you that the Counsels of the People Senate and other Demands of the Peers People or any whomsoever doe not oblige the Subjects nor do carry with them the Power of a Law unlesse they are strengthened and established by the Authority of the King to which being maturely and duely prepared as soon as the Consent of the King accedeth they immediatly receive the Name the Form and Authority of a Law and forthwith begin as soon as they are published to oblige the Subjects Therefore seeing that only is to be esteemed to be the Principal and the efficient Cause of any thing which by it self and immediatly produceth and into a prepared matter introduceth that Form which giveth to that Thing both the Name and the Being although other things ought to concurre to the production of that Effect or to go before it as so many praevious dispositions that so the matter may be rendred more apt to receive the Form intended by the Agent It is most manifest whatsoever those things are which antecedently are required to the Constitution of a Law yet the will of the Prince from whose Arbitration and Command alone all Rogations of Lawes are either established or made void is the only adaequate and efficient Cause of Publick Laws IX These things being premised The Position is confirmed by many Arguments And first by the Testimony of Holy Scripture First Gen. 49. 10. in that remarkable Testament of the Patriarch Jacob being about to dye The Scepter shall not be taken away from Judah nor a Law-giver from his Thigh is a Prophecy of the future Royal Dignity of that Tribe which the holy old man doth periphrastically describe and to the Confirmation of it he mentioned the Scepter the most remarkable witnesse of Kingly Authority and the Legislative Power the chiefest Perogative of it Secondly Deut. 33. 4 5. Moses was said to be a King in Israel because having gathered together all the Tribes of the People he gave them a Law to observe Thirdly Psal 60. 7. Judah is my Law-giver that is King And the vulgar Interpretation reads it Judah is my King In the Text now in hand Prov. 8. 15. By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things where which is usual with Solomon in the whole Book of the Proverbs that the latter part of the verse doth contain an Amplification or Antithesis the very same Persons who in the beginning of the verse are called Kings in the latter part by way of Amplification are called Makers of Lawes Fiftly In the new Testament St. James also maketh mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Royal Law X. Secondly It is confirmed by the Testimonies of Philosophers and Historians and by the Authority of the Civil Laws and the municipal Laws of our Nation The thing being so manifest we shall be content to give you but few Examples Aristotle Plutarch and almost an infinit Number of other Authors of great Estimation do all affirm that we must have a Law and the Law of the Prince But that of Ulpian is very remarkable which he hath in his Book of the Roman Laws Quod principi placuit Legis vigorem habet What pleaseth the Prince hath the
of the Laws is the good of the Commonalty or the publick peace and tranquillity This is proved first from those very words of the Apostle that we may live a quiet a peaceable life The Apostle doth here exhort that both privately but especially in publick Congregations for so I conceive this place to be understood and the best Interpreters are of the same opinion with me Requests Prayers and Supplications with thanksgivings may be made as first for all men in general out of Charity and in order to a Spiritual end viz. Eternal happiness in the life to come as they are men and either in Act or in Power Members of the mystical Body of Christ so more especially for Kings and others invested with supreme Authority and this out of Prudence and in order to a Temporal end to wit external felicity in this present life as they are the chief Members of the body politicks from whose legislative and executive power accordingly as they have administred it whether rightly or unjustly either the chief happiness or unhappiness of the rest of the Members and by consequence of the whole Body doth depend Therefore the making of Laws being the chief Act of the supreme political Jurisdiction that which is the supreme End of that supreme Jurisdiction is also the supreme End of the making of Laws to wit the good of the Commonalty It is proved secondly from the Nature of the End as by a Demonstration a priori That in its order is the ultimate End of everything to which all the Acts of that thing are reduced 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 8. Ethic. 11. as to their first regulative principle and to which they are referred as to that for whose sake they are ultimately ordained Therefore the Final Cause is commonly called by Aristotle That for which But all the Acts of Laws are regulated by the Common good as by their first Rule and Principle and are referred to the Common good as to that for whose sake they are made as may appear by running over the several Acts Therefore c. For wherefore are good things commanded or evil ones forbidden and things indifferent and of a middle Nature permitted Or wherefore are Rewards decreed to men that have deserved well of the Common-wealth or wherefore are punishments appointed to the Violators of Laws or wherefore are the Laws in the Courts indifferently pleaded unto both of which those are the first Acts of Laws and by the way of Form and the other more remote and by the way of Effect Is it not for that end that the Common-wealth may flourish in peace and safety and that private men according to their measure and degrees may partake rejoyce in the publick happinesse in a word that they may be all inservient to the Common good Thirdly it is proved a posteriori from the posterior by the sence and consent of all men For the Law-makers who do decree just judgements do indeed appear and those who meditate on Evil as a Law do notwithstanding desire to seem to have an Eye to the Common good and profit in the making of their Laws and to preferr the publick interest above their own Whether they sincerely intend or craftily pretend they all professe that in the making of their Laws their chiefest Intention was the publick Good II. This foundation of the present discourse being laid to wit That the End of Laws is the good of the Common-wealth I proceed to the Doubts whereof let this be the first Whether there be any necessary use at least of Humane Laws And indeed we should not have needed to have made any Doubt of it did not the mad errors of the Anabaptists and some others of their faction make this businesse for us from whose Principles seeing they affirm it is not lawful for a man that is a Christian to be a Magistrate or to contend by war or by sutes in Law to swear or to administer an oath to any one it seems to follow that there is no need at all of Humane Laws For take away but Jurisdiction there will be no man to make Laws and take away the Seats and Courts of Justice there will be no man that will fear them What need sad complaints if the offence be not redressed by punishment what will vain Laws profit without the execution of them The Directive power of the Law must of necessity fall unto the ground if the Coactive power doth not assist it The reason of this Doubt is for the Law of Nature may suffice to leave the Gentiles inexcusable which dictates to them to eschew all Sins and trespasses to injure no man and the like But if that be defective the Christian hath at hand a more sublime and a more perfect Law to wit the Law of Faith Justice and Charity made by our Saviour Jesus Christ whom St. James acknowledgeth to be the only Judge and Law-giver James 4. 12. This place in my Judgement doth neerly touch our Innovatours who have derived and drawn most of their opinion from the unclean wells of the Anabaptists whilst they collect from that place of the Apostle that it is lawful for no man besides Christ alone to make Ecclesiastical Laws for it no wayes appeareth either by the force of the words or by the scope and order of the whole perioch that the Apostle hath spoke more there of Ecclesiastical Laws then of Civil And unless they had rather deal unfaithfuly and deceitfuly with us than be ruled by reason they must do one of these two things which they please either turn absolute Anabaptists and take away altogether from mankind all the power of making Laws or grant unto supreme Magistrates as it is fit they should the power of making Ecclesiastical Laws III. But how these our Brethren can disintangle themselves from the snares of the Anabaptists it doth not much concern us let them look unto it themselves We easily do answer that the Law of Nature is written in our hearts and the Law of Christ is revealed in the Gospel and that both of them in their kind are most perfect but so that for all that it is most manifest that the profit of humane Lawes is very great and their use as necessary Because those divine Laws do contain only general Principles of things to be done From which as Conclusions from their Principles more special Rules are to be deduced accommodated to the right Institution of publick Societies of the manners of single persons Neither is it any way to be feared that it may derogate at all from the perfection of the Law of God For the makers of humane Laws do not go about to add any new stock to the most rich Treasure of the divine Law but they rather take from thence what they judge most profitable to themselves and to their people and the good of the Common-wealth Humane Laws therfore if they are just are nothing else but the Relicts of