is is a fatality Why then should we be bound to believe the prognosticated things of Fate or Fortune before hand yea though they may have some naturall cause remotely necessary or of some indefinite probability yet is not all this sufficient for our faith in particular because as concerning many such naturall causes there is in us nevertheless besides the supreme a liberty and power to prevent 35. Suppose the Fates have destinated one man to be hangd or kill'd by another why should not that be prognosticated from another mans nativity as well as his own seeing he also comes necessarily into the series of second causes Indeed some of the old genethliacks have boasted to foresee or foretell a mans fate or fortune from the nativity of his parents Brethren children c. But have not others of them held it for a foolish fancy that the fate or fortune of one man should lye involved not only in his own but in the constellations of so many mens nativities 36. Whether they that suffer the same fate have the same starres coupling or compacting thereunto Et è contra Suppose them suffring and suffring to death the last line of Fate for Christ the Gospell religion and conscience Is this fatall destiny also from the starry order and connexion who ever heard that the starres made Martyrs or necessitated unto martyrdome How then hath it come to passe that young old men women of severall ages sexes nations and therefore not of the same constellations have all agreed to undergoe the same event 37. Whether that be true Fate which they would mingle together with providence and how can divine providence and Pagan Fate agree For Providence is the beginning and continuation of all things Fate is the end or utter confusion of them Providence is in the ordering of casuals as well as fatals Fate is opposing all things fortuitous and therefore not disposing them Providence is an act in God their Fate is no more but an event upon the creature Providence is a disposition impendent or out of the thing Fate is a disposition inherent or in the thing Providence comprehends all things past present and to come so does not Fate in her connexion of Causes Providence is in and over all things from the greatest to the least good evill celestialls terrestrialls spiritualls corporealls universalls singulars naturalls rationalls voluntaries necessaries contingents so is not Fate Providence is more speciall to one than to another but Fate is a necessity to all alike Providence can work immediately without and against means Fate can operate nothing but according to her series or connexion Providence can act with every creature reserving to it its own motion as with free agents freely with contingents contingently c. whereas Fate hath no way to work but fatally that is necessarily forcibly inexorably immutably inevitably The rules order successe of divine providence are either written in his own book or in his own breast and not in the Starres and Planets as Fate is The wisedome justice power goodnesse of his providence all this is written in his own book the particular successes issues events thereof all these are written in his own breast Even wise Providence it self is not herein to be discerned or determined before-hand what satuous thing is Fate then that is so obvious and triviall as for the Faticanes to foretell Is not this difference enough between them and never to be reconciled Providence is a prudent counsellor and will have the particular issues kept secret Fate is a silly babbler and will have them commonly foretold 38. Whether had it not been for the fictions of Fate and Fortune there had ever been hatcht opinions and heresies so projudiciall to divine providence and that even amongst Pagans themselves that had experience sufficient to convince them of the truth and power of it and of the justice yea and goodnesse of it in great part Had the divine providence ever been denyed if Fate and fortune had not been held for Gods Had God himself been implanted under Fate or made subject to the decrees of it or slandered for a sloathfull careless spectator of humane things and terrene if they had not confined and limited God to content himself with the reiglement of the heavens as if it had veen beneath his dignitie and majestie to vouchsafe to look down to sinall things or once to take notice of of what was done here below but to commit the care and rule of all sublunary and inferiour things to the starres and celestiall bodyes as his substitutes and their superiours Had prophane and wicked men ever accused providence and excused their impieties had they not heard of fatall starres necessitating and inforcing both their wills and actions 39. Was not the constitution of Fate and Fortune first invented in a derogation to God and his divine providence and that through a paganish and infidelious scandall at good things happening to bad men here and evill things to good men which had never been excogitated or had soon vanished had they been thus Christianly instructed viz. That the all provident Creator dispenses these middle things with an indifferent hand as unto creatures That the best men upon earth are not worthy of the least of goods things may deserve to be involved in the utmost of evill things that can here befall them That the wise Disposer knows how to turn these outward good things to the evill of evill men and these outward evill things to the good of good men That this present world is no time of full punishing or rewarding but these two precisely pertain to the world that is to come 40. Admit that either Fate or fortune was so indeed as they presage or much more than they can imagine yet how is the best of them both sufficient to moderate all fond hopes and fears Or what is able to doe that but a lively faith voyd of these heathenish superstitions and assuredly believing That there is an all-provident God that only foresees all things necessarie and to whom nothing is contingent or casuall That can will and doth work for the best of his both with second causes and exteriour means as also without them yea and against them That binds not the world much lesse tyes his Church unto them That hath written his childrens names in the book of life and much more then they may be assured hath numbred the hairs of their heads as concerning all earthly accidents That shines and moves in the Sun and Moon and starres and makes their generall influxes more or lesse effectuall as he is pleased to adde or abstract his speciall motion or oppose his immediate administration or interpose the office of his more excellent Ministers Angells and reasonable Souls CHAP. XIX 19. From the affinity to Witch-craft 1. WHat difference betwixt Astromancy Magomancy or Magastromancy as touching a sorcerous both superstition and operation and all these after-named viz. Stareomancy or divining
their own Now this prestigiousnesse or illusion whether freely from themselves or as it were forced by others is a signe of their impotency as well as their fallacy and either of them are a sufficient argument to exclude them utterly from a power of working Miracles And therefore if they will needs be contending for the devils power in and by Magicians Astrologers Necromancers Conjurers Witches c. We leave both them theirs to their lyingwonders 6. Whether there be any such secrets in Nature as whereby to work Miracles Although it be confest that there are sundry admirable secrets hidden in Natures bosome yet we must professe that her hand is here shortned Because it is the nature of a Miracle to exceed Natures power It must be above besides against Nature and not particular onely but universal or whole created Nature Though a Miracle be wrought in Nature yet it must be quite beyond Natures principles law order Nature of it self must not so much as incline or dispose to it Yea it must be in the very nature of the thing to be otherwise then the Miracle hath made it Alwayes the more alien the effect is to Nature and the more remore from Natures order the greater is the Miracle and the more to be admired Wherefore we conclude against those Mirions who would make themselves to be Natures Apes that not onely any particular nature is not able to worke a Miracle besides or against the order of whole Nature but the vertue even of whole Nature is not able to worke a Miracle upon any particular nature whatsoever 7. Whether Miracles may be wrought by Art The flat Negative is to be concluded upon these Arguments 1. Art cannot exceed Nature Now Nature in all her mirables is but Miracles Ape and Art is but Natures Ape what then are the Magical Mirabilaries at most but Apes of Art 2. The strength of Art is acquisite the vertue of Miracles is infused 3. An Art operates onely according to reason and knowledge but a Miracle altogether above them 4. Art effects nothing but according to ordinary rules observations experiments customs but a Miracle is so extraordinary that it were no Miracle except it were effected contrary to all these 5. Art for the most part is of necessaries a Miracle for the most part is of contingents 6. If Art served to worke Miracles then were the power of them acquisite arbitrary of mans will and industry yea one man might do Miracles as well as another 7. None of Gods servants ever wrought Miracles by Art 8. If it were in the Artists power it should be a Miracle to one man and not to another 9. Prophane men and the greatest tempters of God the Devil and Nature should so do most Miracles 10. Art rather serves to prevent many things for seeming Miraculous because it helps to finde out the suddain cause For either it lets to understand the cause or not if it doth not then it is no Art if it doth then it is no Miracle 8. Whether it be lawful necessary convenient not onely for the working of Miracles but for the finding out of Mirables to operate either by Art or violence against the order plac't in Nature Doubtlesse it is no further lawful then it may be either necessary or convenient That is probably and directly tending to some publike or private use or benefit Nature may have many pretty mirables which they title Admired Auditions Natural history Mirables of the world Occult Miracles of Nature Occult Philosophie subtilities and varieties of things secrets mysteries memorables unheard of curiosities c. Yet for all that are they not such as Magicians fain or fable in animals plants herbs stones c. Nor are they a many of them so mirable in themselves as either to mens fancies or ignorances Her actives and passives simpathies and antipathies are so occult and profound as who can tell where to finde them or how to apply them so as to urge Nature by the help of Art to worke wonders Who can do such a thing especially make it his trade profession ostentation so to do and not be subject to or guilty of tempting God provoking the Devil tormenting Nature abusing the creature losing time disparaging himself and deluding the world It is for none but God to worke absolutely against the order of whole created Nature because he could have instituted another order of Nature And all things are subject to him not so much from a necessity of Nature and second causes as according to the absolutenesse of his own power and liberty of his own will And it is for none to undertake to alter the order of particular Nature but in by under and for God yea I may say according to God and not otherwise As. 1. God acteth not against the order of nature in any particular of it save onely upon just and weighty causes how then dare prophane men offer to do such a thing joculatorily jugglingly to make sport and pastime or yet for no other end or use but vain and idle experiments sake or onely to feed or satisfie vain and presumptuous curiosity 2. God though he may act against that order which one creature hath to another yet acts he not against that order which the creature hath to himself For should he act against the order of nature as it depends upon himself he should so act against himself in like manner neither ought man to act against the order of nature or of the creature so far forth as it depends upon God nor yet so far forth as it is not intended by God to be serviceable and useful unto men 3. God acts not against the law and course of nature so as to violate his own great Law so that of his wisdome goodnesse justice in disposing the creature neither ought men so to do beyond the great Law of using the creature aright and to those very ends for which God ordained it For it can never be lawful or warrantable so to transgresse natures order as to abuse the creature in any kinde Now do they not know that the creature may as well be spiritually and speculatively abused by superstition and curiosity as practically and carnally by violence or sensuality 9. Why amongst all the Miracles that Christ wrought against the Devils among men and in the other creatures he did work none at all from or by the heavenly bodies the stars Besides the reason above mentioned why he refused to shew a signe from heaven this may now be added above all the rest It was because there now was a greater Miracle wrought upon the earth then ever was wrought in the Heavens Even the mysterious Miracle or miraculous Mystery of God and Man Doing such works upon earth as whereat the Angels and whole powers of heaven might well stand amazed with admiration Indeed there was a wonder in Heaven a star a new star at his birth and another wonder in Heaven an Eclipse of
geniture As of Janus Jupiter Saturn Genius Mercury Apollo Mars Vulcan Neptune Sol Orcus Liber Pater Tellus Ceres Juno Lucina Fluona Luna Diana Minerva Venus Vesta Moreover Vitumnus Sentinus Mens Mena Iterduca Domiduca Abaona Adeona and Dea Fatua too not of the least ordination and operation either in the birth or life or death And no marvell that they make so many Consent-Gods goe to the fate of a Man when they will have so many to be busie about the fate of an herb As Seia fatally president of the sowing Segetia or Segesta at the comming up of the Corn Nodotus or Nodinus at the knitting or knotting Volutina at the involving of the leaves Patellina or Patellea at the opening of the blade Proserpina at the budding Hostilina at the equall shaping of the eare Flora at the flourishing Lasturtia at the nourishing Tutilina in the keeping Matuta or Matura at the ripening Messia at the mowing and Runcina not only at the weeding but at the plucking up by the roots 8. Whether Fate be one or many If it be one simply then what needs any reduction if it be many why is it not redueed to one And then in vain is that done by many which may be done by one and it is prophane to ascribe that to many which ought to be ascribed to one If it be one truly then is it undivided in it self and divided from all others which how can that which is a series or connexion of so many things be especially having its inherence in movables or mutables If it be but one by accident why should it imply all under a necessity If it be but one by aggregation collection connexion so are things fortuitous as well as fatall Besides such an unity is in the meanest degree of entity Wherefore then should it order and subordinate things of a more perfect degree than it self If it be many or a multiplicity then is it unequall indeterminate uncertain and next to a nullity If it be one why then do they make it so diverse according to divers conjunctions and constellations If it be many how can they make any certain and particular pronouncing upon it 9. Whether that they call Fate be in the first or among the second Causes If in the first that is as much as to make it equall unto God If among the second then is it inferiour unto man For among second causes and especially in involuntary actions and all such as fall under humane counsell and deliberation the intellectuall mind and rationall will hath no superiour And what more contrary to the order of nature and creatures than that the lesse noble should be disposing and governing those more noble than themselves 10. Whether there be a fatall necessity upon all acts or events If upon all acts where 's Liberty if upon all events where 's contingency And whether upon these both good and evill and that whether naturall civill or spirituall If upon naturall acts and events good or evill then what use of means either to preserve or to prevent If upon acts civill and good what merit what praise if upon acts civill and evill what laws what punishments If upon events civill and good what thanks if upon events civill and evill what hopes If upon acts spirituall and good what free grace if upon acts spirituall and evill what free will If upon events spirituall and good what free bounty If upon events spirituall and evill what free mercy 11. How can there or why should there be such a thing as Fate imposing a necessity upon actions and events when as divine providence it self doth it not so as to exclude liberty contingency or casualty from things But works with second causes according to their own motion and manner Permitting sometimes their exuberancy sometimes their deficiency preserving to them their sundry orders offices and degrees of efficiency Suffering the remoter causes or agents to be impedited by the more proximate that all effects might not be taken for naturall and necessary but that his own free disposing might appear Although nature and every naturall agent be of it self and ordinarily determinated to one effect and to the producing of it after the same way yet he suffers it to be impedited by one debility and indisposition or another either to come to pass otherwise or else to be altogether prevented that so he might preserve a contingency in all naturall causes to the intent nothing might be thought absolutely necessitating but his own will and pleasure above Much more doth he confirm a freedom to the rationall will not only that good may the more chearfully be done and accepted but the evill also that is done or suffered may not unjustly be imputed to providence because of a necessity imposed 12. If fate be as they define it the Series order nexure ligation complication constitution disposition of second causes c. what feeble things are all those seconds put together without the first what can their own motion work to without his speciall concurrence what if he work not with them what if without them what if against them Leave them to themselves and what knot in a rope of Sand Can there be a perpetuall series or indissoluble connexion betwixt causes so disparate yea so adverse as naturall internall necessary and arbitrary adventitious accidentall yet after this order is fate oftentimes finished A languishing man not only consumes away within himself but the ayr meats drinks poyson act the fatall consummation To an ordinated destiny of an unfortunate end comes in inordinately fire water a fall a gun a sword an unlucky hand c. and hath not this necessitating fate now the complement by accident and is there not a casuall intervention of more force to the fatall effect than all the causall connexion How many accidents fall out fatally that can have no second cause ordinatly assigned to them much less prospected in them but must be referred meerly to divine will and pleasure unless you will have accidentall instruments that interven inordinately to be such 13. The Physicall fate they will have to be a series of pure naturall causes c. viz. betwixt the stars the elements the temperament the inclination the manners the action and the issue or event now where are all these causes knit together in the efficient the form the matter or the end How are they worthy to be called causes or so proved How are they pure naturall and necessary causes when some of them are voluntary and contingent what connexion of them is that which carrys on prime and second causes naturall and voluntary necessary and contingent with one fatall force or inevitable agitation what series is that which as hath been said is so often interrupted what copulation betwixt the first and the last when as by their own confession the stars are not the causes of all events neither doe all those effects fall out necessarily whereof they are the cause How are they fatall
then or their complement of fate 14. Whether in the series both of fate and of fortune although two contraries Astrologers have not delivered the same order and connexion of causes as the stars tempers manners actions events or else what difference doe they make between them Nay wherefore doe the same Authors speak of fate and fortune so promiscuously and indiscriminately especially in their prognosticating or predicting way Is it not because they are not able to distinguish them Or is it not because they are conscious of a fortuitousness of event even in their strictest fatality 15. Whether in the series of fatall causes the effect doth follow the universall indefinite equivocall and remote or else the univocall proximate specificall and particular cause And which of these is that which doth determine and distinguish the effect Does not a man generate a man and a Beast a Beast what ever the position of the stars be Those that have been borne in the same region at the same moment under the same position have they all been the same nay how divers have they been for all that in their ingenies their fortunes and fates And why so but because they have taken their severall affections and inclinations from their particular causes 16. As for second causes means agents instruments seeing God Almighty makes use of them to bring his own purposes to pass not out of any defect or necessity but to make his own efficiency the more perceptible Yee seeing he oft times renders the most noble and convenient means ineffectuall and uses the meanest and unaptest of them to the producing of very eminent effects Why then should we be bound to lurke at that order which God himself observes not why should our faith be taught to respect or rest upon the middle things in a prejudice to that providence which is the absolute beginning and end of all 17. Whether the second causes be not ordained as the remedies rather than as the means of fate or fortune providence it self that has determined such an accident or event has it not also ordained second means to help and relieve in such a case wherfore are the creatures and their offices created to such ends if they be not to be used to such ends for which they were created what ever the fate or fortune be is there not a naturall Law imprest in every creature to labour for the conservation of it self both in its being and well being To what end hath God given men a mind will reason affections counsell deliberation science art observation experiment means instruments c. but as well prudently and diligently to discern procure fortify prevent remedy as thankfully to accept or humbly to submit Hath not the Spirit of God secretly and sweetly suggested to his dearest children in their sudden and extraordinary perils and perplexities even present advices and succours besides the inward consolations and confirmations of his grace yea is not this one cause why men are kept so ignorant of future accidents and of their utmost issues after that they are already happened that men might not only prepare for them but make use of such means as God himself hath prepared against them Otherwise should they not tempt God in a neglect of them 18. Whether there be not in the whole course of nature in the universall world and especially throughout the whole Church of Christ farre more effectuall causes means orders connexions rules guides guards helpes of life of health peace libertie society c. for counsell actions passions accidents events than the coelestiall bodies can possibly be ought these then to be respected more than all they or yet in comparison to them 19. Who is able to bring into one series or can reconcile to truth the old Philosophicall opinions about the exercise or execution of Fate by second causes As whether by Angels Spirits Geniusses Demons Devills by the Soul of the world by the Souls of men by the totall subservience of Nature by the motions and influences of the Starres and caelestiall bodies by sensible agents by artificiall instruments yea and by very accidents and cafualties Christians know and acknowledge all these creatures to be the ministers or instruments of providence The Angells doing his will are the more eminent ministers both of his mercies and judgements administring not only in temporalls and in spiritualls but likewise to eternalls And if it be so as Philosophie sayes that they are the Intelligencies that move the caelestiall orbes then have they an ordination over the administration of the Starres The Devills are not only permitted but wisely and justly used in the execution of temptations tryalls judgements But how comes in Fate and Fortune who can tell unlesse they intrude among the Devills and be indeed of their foysting in As for the heavenly bodyes they are to be confest as of Gods ordination and employment in their order light motions and prodigious appearances But he makes speciall use of mens reason understanding wills affections memories counsells deliberations policies vocations societies arts artifices Lawes Customes actions and experiments in the government of the world and yet more especially their gifts graces duties offices fervices in the governing of his Church Last of all come in the whole hoste of creatures to act here as he hath ordained Now what fatation or fatall necessitation to man among all these Angels or Devills can but inject into the mind they cannot compell no nor yet incline the will That 's only for the infinite power of God himself to doo men as to naturall civill and morall acts are still actors in their own liberty As for bodyes Coelestiall or terrestriall they work directly but upon bodyes only and the terrestriall are held and found to be the more proximately particularly and sensibly disposing Besides the friendship and hatred the complyance and adversness of men is not the service or disservice of the brute creature the vertue or venome of an herb or minerall yea the defence or offence of a sword a knise a spear a gun a club c. are not all these more sensibly apprehended to be more neerly advantagious or prejudiciall to health or sicknesse riches or poverty honour or disgrace prosperity and adversity life or death than are all the joynt benevolences or malevolencies of the fatall Starres If therefore a fatidicall prognostication may be made from the Caelestiall why not rather from the terrestriall motions 20. Whether Fate be above the Starres as their governour or else under them as their minister If above them why make they the starres to be the causes of fate For so they must needs be superiour to it If under them how then are the starres themselves subject to fate for so they must needs be inferiour How then should the starres dispose of others fate that are not able to dispose of their own Is it for creatures terrestriall or caelestiall to perform that to others which they are not able to
preserve to themselves Ought not therefore such a disposition to be referred solely to him that hath the ordination and gubernation of all things both in heaven and earth simply freely eternally and immutably in himself 21. How can the fatall series of causes be from the starres when as the starres themselves are not causes as in humane and arbitrary actions Not causes where they may be signes as of things already done and past Yea God himself may signifie many things whereof he is not the cause as in evill and sinfull actions Nay have not the fatidicall Vaticinators themselves made many fatall signes which could never be causes nor yet once come into any series or necessary connexion As in their aruspicies and auguries from the entrailes of beasts flight and noise of birds c. as also from lots dreams prodigies casualties yea and physiognomies c. 22. How can the starres be the first in the fatall series of second causes When as of all creatures the spirituall intellectuall or rationall are the supreme and the corporeall animate or inanimate their inferiours Now the starres are both corporeall and inanimate Spirits and souls as they have more similitude to so they participate more vertue of divine providence than all other creatures For they are both the cognoscitive and the operative instruments of providence which the other are not For these being but the executive only may either be directed or diverted by the iutellectuall and ordinative As acting of themselves with liberty deliberation discretion observation of right rules application of fit means and intention to a due end And therefore are the more eminent ministers of providence than all things else in heaven or earth 23. Whether any such cut as fatation may be properly sayd to be in or from the starres For fatation imports a primordiall law or decree not an influence only or effect what sacrilege is it then to ascribe that to the instrument which is only peculiar to the principall agent Since it is for instruments especially the inanimate not to ordain but execute only Yea it is a question whether there be any fatation even in fate it self it being accepted and discerned not for a seminall disposition but for an ultimate execution and that inherent in the moveable or mutable subject Wherefore seeing fatation is neither in the starres nor in fate it self whether can any thing be sayd to be fatall with respect to the starres For the starres are but second causes And with respect to all such some things may be sayd to be naturall some things arbitrary some things indifferent some things contingent some things uncertain some things casuall but few or none fatall 24. Whether it be in the power and validity of the celestiall bodyes to impose a fatall necessity either upon humane actions or yet upon naturall things For if the starres be any such causes then must they cause principally of themselves intentionally directly immutably Now how can they be principall causes when providence is above them how of themselves when they work not upon humane actions but by accident how intentionally since they want a mind or soul how directly when they operate upon humane actions but indirectly how immutably when their ordination or disposition may be impedited Again were they thus acting then should there be no contingents or accidents no libertie or free actions nor prevention of any events or issues no particular causes should be defective nor distance of place nor indisposition of the mean no neglect of the means no endeavour to the contrary or opposition should be available nay not only the understanding but the will should be tyed to corporall organs and matter yea and the starres should not only be of sufficient but of infinite power 25. How doe the celestiall bodyes work so fatally upon these inferiours when as they here operate not upon a necessity as to the producing of the effect For albeit their impressions be naturall yet are they not received but according to the manner of the receivers which are fluxible and not having themselves still after the same way Because of the matter that is in a potentiality to many yea and to contrary formes The matter also is movable and corruptable and may easily defect of it self may be intrinsecally indisposed and extrinsecally impedited And the staries themselves are but indefinite and remote causes to which the effect can never follow determinatly and necessarily unless the middle causes be necessary and then they follow them and not the other But in the foresaid series the middle causes are most of them contingent and from many contingent causes can come no effect of necessity because any one of them and all of them together may be defective and not attain unto their end 26. Seeing the heavenly bodyes act not upon these inferiours but by their light and motion and so communicate nothing to the matter they work upon but light motion and heat Now why may not all these flow from all the starres in generall And why then should such and such fatall inclinations be attributed to such or such positions or conjunctions And if there be any particular vertues of the light and motion of some stars contrary to the vertues of the light and motion of other flarres how is that demonstrated And how comes it to passe that they should be operative and effectuall one way in their simple natures or qualities and yet another way in their relative aspects and positions Is an imaginary relation or respect of more validity than a reall substance or propriety 27. They seem to define fate more acurately that make it to be the series or connext order of naturall causes Now till they can directly and successively deduce those naturall causes down from the starres to those fatall events what reason is there to credit their proposition much lesse their prognostication They likewise will have fate in the best sense they can take it to digest and distribute all things according to certain motions successions orders forms places times Now if their fate cannot be well understood or discerned without these same astrictions why are they so consounded at the inexplicableness of the circumstances Otherwise why doe they not predict usually the very times and places together with the fates themselves Moreover the first definers of fate held it to be not in the superiors but in the inferiors themselves Namely a disposition inherent in the moveable thing and that urging to an immoveable event If indeed it be such ought not every mans fate to be collected from himself rather than from his Stars 28. How should the things of fate and fortune be foretold when it is not yet with one consent told what things they are themselves Some have gone so high as to say that they are Deities or Gods others are fallen so low as to make them vanities and nothing Some confound these two together some set them so opposite as that they make them
confound one another Some admit many things of both as they say at the fore-gate and exclude all again at the back door Some place them in the beginning in the middle in the end of a business Some make us to be in their power Some them in our power Some would have us believe both but inquire neither But if they would no inquiry after their nature and properties why make they such inquiry into their operations and effects 29. Whether fate be mutable or immutable If mutable how is it fate Is there not then a contingency of fate as well as a face of contingencies If immutable what hope what colour what means what remedy Nay if immoveable how moves it as they say according to the nature and order of all moveable things That is to say with naturall things naturally with necestary necessarily with voluntary voluntarily with contingent contingently with violent violently with remiss remissely And all this not as a prime and free but as a second and necessary cause Why may we not as well say with rationall things rationally with brute brutishly with sensuall sensually with vertuous vertuously with vitious vitiously with prosperous prosperously with adverse adversely with uncertain uncertainly c. And then what irrefragable law of fate is that which is fain to conform to and comply with every ones manners and manner of working 30. Whether fate be absolute in decree or conditionate If absolute then can it not be otherwise and what remedy Nay then is it infinite omnipotent eternall and with superiority If conditionate and that not from a liberall dispensation of its own but a naturall ordination from another what fatation is that then that comes upon condition that depends upon others actions not its own determination If it be absolute then is it cruell and unjust in many things if it be conditionate then is it variable and certain in nothing Set aside the first act which is the eternall decree and the last act which is death these indeed may be said to be both absolute and conditionate but Christians are not taught to call these fate But take it as they doe for the middle act then can they make it to be neither absolute nor conditionate 31. Whether fate and fatall events follow the body or the mind If the body what difference betwixt the fate of a man and of a beast In events good or evill who is worthy who is guilty And how follow they the mind seeing the stars necessarily and directly make no impression there Because it is superiour according to the order of nature and not subject to matter time or place but united to an intellectuall and spirituall substance and therefore cannot suffer from corporeall things although celestiall Nor can they so exceed their own sphear and species as to act directly upon it And if not upon the intellective faculty which acts necessarily much less upon the elective power which is free and never acts but freely nor is subject to fatality or fatall necessity For then should the election of the will be no more but a meer naturall instinct should be determined to one thing should act but one way should have the like motions in all upon the like representations should not have any thing in its own power to discern deliberate choose refuse c. but must be carryed on either naturally or violently as the Stars doe incline or enforce 32. Whether fate or fortune be either in good or evill actions If fate be in good actions are they not necessitated and inforced if fortune be there are they not fortuitous and accidentall And so what praise of them what reward The like may be affirmed of evill actions and if likewise thus inferred what shame what punishment In vitious actions either fate offers violence to a mans will or leaves to its own liberty If the first is not a mans will to be excused in evill and if the last is not every mans will the cause of his own fate yea and of the hardest and heaviest fates For they are such which follow sin and wickedness 33. Wherefore should man or his actions be made the subject yea the slave of sate when as indeed man as man is superiour thereto For fate being but a sydercall service of second causes must be reduced to the providence of the first cause and in that reduction man himself hath place or preferment before all the stars of heaven Because the divine providence receives to it self or extends it self in a more speciall way to intellectuall or rationall that it doth to all other creatures else In as much as they excell all others both in the perfection of nature and in the dignity of end In the perfection of nature Because the rationall creature hath the dominion over his own actions and operates voluntarily whereas the other act not so much as are acted In the dignity of the end because the intellectuall creature only by his operation reaches to the ultimate end of the universe sc to know and love God But the other creatures touch not that end by an inspired intention but only according to some participated similitude Furthermore God provides for the intellectuall nature principally and as it were for selfs sake and but for all other crtatures secondarily and in order to it The rationall creature is Gods agent the other are but his instrumens Now God cares more for his agents than he doth for his instruments Yea they are the instruments of this very agent and he makes use of them either in his practice or contemplation God hath more regard to the free and liberall than to the necessitated and servile acts of his creatures The rationall creatures are the more noble in themselves and of more neer accession to the divine similitude and therefore tendred by God before and above all others They are the more principall parts of the whole universe to which the less principall are but subserving as intended for their sakes and working for their ends Intellectuall natures have more assinity with the whole as apprehending all things else besides themselves whereas every other creature is but a part and capable of no more but a bare participation of its own particular entity Now it is not for the inapprehending part to have an ordaining power over the apprehensive whole By the course of nature the rationall creature uses all other things for it self as either for the perfection of its intellect the explication of its science the exercise of its vertue or else the sustentation of its body to which the intellectuall nature is united And therefore it is not for them to dispose tule govern impell necessitate him him but for him to observe rule govern dispence moderate and make use of them 34. Whether any thing can be sayd to be fatall with respect to us till it have taken effect For a fatality before it be is but a contingency to us and to us a contingency after it