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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A41639	The court of the gentiles. Part IV, Of reformed philosophie. Book III, Of divine predetermination, wherein the nature of divine predetermination is fully explicated and demonstrated, both in the general, as also more particularly, as to the substrate mater [sic] or entitative act of sin.; Court of the gentiles. Part IV. Book III	Gale, Theophilus, 1628-1678.	1678 (1678)	Wing G143; ESTC R16919	203,898	236

1. 13. Eph. 1. 9. to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to prepare Rom. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 2. 9. By al which we evidently see what footsteps predetermination and as to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin has in the sacred Scriptures We now procede to examine this notion as used by scholastic Theologues and how far their sentiments thereof are applicable to our present Controversie 1 Some distinguish between Gods predefinition and his predetermination his predefinition they restrain to his Decrees and his predetermination to his Concurse Others distinguish the predetermination of God into extrinsec and intrinsec by extrinsec predetermination they understand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree whereby the creature is predetermined to act by intrinsec predetermination they mean the previous motion of God upon the creature which continually moves and applies it to act But I should rather distinguish predetermination as Creation and al other Acts of God ad extrà into active and passive 1 By active predetermination I mean nothing else but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil whereby al second causes persons acts effects and things receive their termes order and limitation as to power and activitie This is the same with predefinition predestination and extrinsec predetermination That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil without any impression or actual influxe on the second cause has been defended by Scotus and others of great name in the Scholes and that on invict reasons for if God wil that the second cause suppose it be the human wil act immediately on the volition of God the action of the second cause wil follow not from any previous impression on the second cause but from its natural subordination and as it were sympathie with the first cause as at the beck of the human wil every inferior facultie of man moves See Suarez de Auxil l. 1. c. 5. n. 3. and Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. § 3. 2 By passive predetermination I understand the concurse of God as applying the second cause to its act and not really but mentally or modally only distinct therefrom For as active predetermination is the same with the Divine wil so passive predetermination is the same with the second cause its act and effect as we have demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 8. § 1. 2 Predetermination is usually distinguished into physic or natural and ethic or moral This distinction dependes on that of causes into physic and moral a physic or natural cause is that which is truly efficient and so doth really influence the act and effect in a way of proper efficience or causalitie whence an Ethic or moral cause is that which doth not immediately directly or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect but only morally by proposing objects motives precepts promisses or the like moral means and influences with excitements and persuasions Thus proportionably we may distinguish predetermination into physic and moral 1 By physic predetermination we must understand not corporal or natural in a strict notion which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes but such a predetermination as really applies the Agent or second cause to its act and really yea immediately influenceth both act and effect Thus Suarez Metaphys Disput 17. sect 2. num 2. A physic cause and so predetermination in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cause acting by corporeous and material motion but it 's taken more universally for a cause that truly and really influenceth the effect for as nature sometimes signifies any essence so physic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper causalitie worketh the effect to which when a moral cause is opposed it is to be understood of such a cause which doth not of itself and truly act yet it doth so carrie itself as that the effect may be imputed to it such a cause is he that comforts beseecheth or hinders not when he may and ought Hence 2 by moral predetermination as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world we must understand his moral influence on man as his last end his stating mans dutie by moral precepts inviting thereto by Evangelic promisses dehorting from sin by penal comminations and al other moral influences Here we are to note that albeit physic and moral predetermination be comprehended under physic and moral causalitie yet the later is more comprehensive than the former for physic predetermination properly belongs to a superior cause as acting on an inferior but physic causalitie to any efficient as Strangius doth wel observe But to sum up the whole both the Dominicans and Calvinists agree with the Jesuites and Arminians in this That the holy God doth not morally predetermine any to sin for he neither counsels encourageth commandes or invites any one to the least sin The Question therefore must be understood of physic predetermination which I shal describe according to the explication of Strangius l. 2. c. 4. p. 159. thus By the physic predetermination of God in this place is understood the action of God whereby he moves and applies the second cause to act and so antecedently to al operation of the creature or in order of nature and reason before the creature workes God really and efficaciously moves it to act in al its actions i. e. he actes and causeth that the creature actes and causeth whatever it actes and causeth so that without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing and this premotion being given it is impossible in a composite sense that the creature should not act and do that unto which it is premoved by the first cause And more particularly though concisely as for Gods predetermination of the human wil Strangius l. 2. c. 11. p. 244. gives it us thus To predetermine the wil as they teach is to applie the wil to act and to make it act Which description of predetermination I do readily close with and so the Question before us wil be summarily this Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions even those that have sin annexed or appendent to them Affirm I am not ignorant that a reverend and learned Divine who opposeth our Hypothesis states the question otherwise as if we held That God doth by an efficacious influence universaelly move and determine men to al their actions even those that are most wicked But this Hypothesis as proposed and intended I know no sober mind but abhors whoever said that God determines men to the most wicked actions as such were not this to make him the Author of sin which every pious soul detestes For to determine to wicked actions as such implies also a determination to the wickednesse of those actions and this determination cannot be physic because sin as sin has no physic cause or determination therefore

and the Scotists placing the whole of it in the volition of God without any force impressed on the second cause as our Country-man Compt. Carleton in his Philosophie Disp 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel stated it But 3 Scotus in 4. Sentent Distinct 49. Quaest 6. § 14. pag. 522. edit 1620. has these very words Est contra naturam ejus scil voluntatis determinari à causa inferiori quia tunc ipsa non esset superior non est autem contra naturam ejus determinari à causa superiori quia cum hoc stat quòd sit causa in suo ordine It 's against its nature namely the wils to be determined by an inferior cause because then it should not be superior but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause because it is consistent herewith that it be a cause in its own order Wherein Scotus doth most acutely though briefly state the Controversie about Predetermination both negatively and positively 1 Negatively That the wil cannot be determined or predetermined by any inferior cause because then it were not superior for whatever cause predetermines another to act is so far superior to it it being impossible yea a contradiction that the inferior should predetermine the superior 2 Positively That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a superior cause i. e. by God the first cause who gave it being and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation and Scotus's reason is invincible because to be predetermined by a superior cause is very wel consistent with the wils being a cause in its own order Yea we may raise this reason to a greater height therefore the wil is a cause in its own order i. e. a particular proper principal or lesse principal cause according to the nature of its causalitie and effect because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil even such as have sin appendent to them is according to Scotus's sentiments so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting as that it corroborates and confirmes the same 4 Lastly Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. q. 2. saith expressely That albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is sinful yet the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to God but to the create wil because the create wil is under an essential obligation to give rectitude to the action but God is not bound by any such obligation c. Which is the same with the sentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines albeit opposed by the new Methodists as wel as Arminians and Molinists Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes Thomas and Scotus we now passe on to their sectators whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious To begin with Gregorius Ariminensis who was by profession a Dominican and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine whom Bishop Vsher valued as the soundest of the Schole-men and Dr. Barlow as the acutest His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find in Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. where he demonstrates Gods immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of sin thus 1 Every evil act when produced is conserved by God Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus because otherwise every evil act should not in its existence immediately depend on God but be independent and so by stronger reason the wil itself which is more perfect than its act should be independent Again if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conserve the evil act neither is it repugnant to it to produce the same 2 The wil is of itself indifferent to any act therefore it must be determined to every act by God 3 If God be not the immediate cause of the act which is evil he is not the Maker of al Beings 4 Al good that is not God is from God as the Efficient thereof but the act morally evil is yet naturally good Ergo. Hence he procedes to answer the Objections of his and our Adversaries thus 1 If God produce the same evil act which man produceth then he sins as man sins Whereto he answers by denying the consequence and that on this reason because man doth not therefore precisely sin because he doth an evil act as it is Ens or act but therefore he sins because he doth it evilly i. e. against right reason or the Law of God but now God produceth the same act according to right reason and therefore wel So the same man borne in fornication is produced by God wel but by the fornicator evilly But 2 it is farther objected by his Adversaries then as by ours now thus Thou wilt say that those things that are per se in themselves or intrinsecally evil as the hatred of God or the like can never be wel done therefore neither by God I responde saith he as we that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done albeit not by every Agent e. g. man envieth but God although he produce the same act of envie with man yet he doth not envie For al such acts beyond the simple production or motion of such or such a thing do connote something on the part of the Author who is so denominated which agrees not to God So to steal besides the simple translation of the thing from place to place connotes the thing stolne not to belong to him that translated it but God translating the same thing doth not translate what is not his own and therefore is not said to be the thief c. But here we are to note that whereas Gregorius Ariminensis makes God to be a partial cause of sin it is not to be understood as if God were the partial cause of the entitative act for so he makes God to be a total cause but he cals God a partial cause of sin as he produceth only the entitative act not the vitiositie whereof man only is the moral cause Thus also Holcot our Country-man super Sentent lib. 2. Dist 1. q. 1. makes God to be a partial cause of sin yet not the Author of it whereby he plainly means as he explicates himself that God is the physical cause of the substrate mater or entitative act only but man the moral cause of the vitiositie also This I mention because a reverend Divine of name among us from these expressions of Ariminensis and Holcot would persuade us that they make God the partial cause of the entitative act We might adde to these the testimonies of Altissiodorensis in Sent. 2. where he proves by strong arguments namely from the Passion of Christ c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil of which more in

That infallible prescience granted by the Arminians infers as much a necessitie on the wil as absolute Reprobation asserted by the Calvinists So p 418 419 442 462. Davenant was succeeded by Samuel Ward Doctor of Divinitie and Margaret Professor of Cambridge a person of great natural acumen and deep insight into the main points in Controversie between us and the Papists as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections published by Dr. Seth Ward With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypothesis is fully manifest by his 24. Determination pag. 115. where he stoutly demonstrates this Thesis That the concurse of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation according to that great saying though in an apocryphous Book Wisd 8. 1. Wisdome i. e. the wise Providence of God reacheth from one end to the other mightily and yet orders althings sweetly He first states the Controversie shewing how the Remonstrants fal in with the Jesuites Bellarmine Molina Lessius c. in asserting only a simultaneous immediate concurse of God with the second cause upon its action and effect yet so that al the modification and determination of the act specially in free actions be from the second cause as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he assertes 1 That the concurse of God with second causes even such as are free is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very second causes themselves moving and applying them to their work This he demonstrates both by Scripture and Reason The Scriptures he cites are Esa 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reasons are cogent namely from Gods prime causalitie the instrumental concurse of al second causes the dependence of the human wil c. 2 He assertes pag. 117. That this previous concurse of God the first cause doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of the second causes This which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis he invictly demonstrates 1 because the Divine wil determines itself for the production of every the most special and singular effect therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cause as the influence of the Sun is 2 Because as mans free wil determines althings subject to it so much more efficaciously doth the Divine wil determine al create things subject to it 3 He demonstrates the same from the supreme Perfection of Divine Providence whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and singular things which are done in time and to destine the same to those ends intended by itself as also to move and applie al second causes to their determinate effects 4 Because otherwise the concurse and determination of free-wil should be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence and so God should not have a Providence over althings in particular but only in commun for as Thomas pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth The Divine providence extendes only to those things unto which the Divine causalitie extendes wherefore if God doth not determine the concurse of free-wil he wil not have a providence but only a prescience thereof in particular as pag. 118. Thence 3 he assertes and demonstrates That this antecedaneous concurse of God on second causes modifying their actions takes not away from them their proper mode of operating This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurse with human libertie and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and sagacitie withal shewing that the Molinists and Remonstrants with Cicero make man sacrilegious whiles they endeavor to make him free And Determinat 26. pag. 132. touching absolute Reprobation he saith that it is the antecedent but not the cause of mens sin Lastly what his sentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurse is to be seen in his most acute Clerum de Gratia discriminante From Cambridge we might passe on to Oxford and without much difficultie demonstrate that al the principal Professors of Theologie ever since the Reformation have chearfully espoused and strongly defended our Hypothesis against the Jesuites and Remonstrants Our learned and famose George Abbot in his Quaestiones sex Praelect c. cap. 6. discusseth this very Question An Deus sit Author peccati Whether God be the Author of sin And pag. 207. he gives us this distinct decision of the whole 4. In the very actions which on mans part are vitiose the divine finger plainly shines forth but so that God be the motor and impulsor marque that terme which notes the highest Predetermination of the action and worke but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting For God excites i. e. predetermines the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Augustin de Praedest Sanctor Quòd mali peccant ipsorum est quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt ex virtute Dei tenebras prout visum est dividentis c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland Regius Professor of Divinitie and Dr. Prideaux his Successor were is sufficiently evident by their warm zele against the Arminians As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Professor he has sufficiently declared his assent and consent to our Hypothesis in his Exercitatio 2 ● de Malo Conclus 7. Rat. 3. where he proves That it is impossible there should be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie And to conclude this Head it is very evident that not only the Professors of Theologie but also the Bishops and Convocation together with King James were greatly opposite to Arminianisme and so friends to our Hypothesis Yea in Bishop Laud's time when Arminianisme began to flourish there were but five Arminian Bishops Laud Neale Buckeridge Corbet Howson and Montague who espoused that Interest as Dr. Heylin in the Life of Bishop Laud assures us By al which it appears most evident that not only Rutherford Twisse and Dominicans but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful assent and consent to our Hypothesis for God's predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin § 4. Having examined the Testimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antithesis and who they are by whom it has been defended The Antithesis to our Thesis namely That God concurs not to the substrate mater of Sin is generally ascribed to Durandus as the principal founder thereof who denied Gods immediate concurse to actions under this pretext that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins But to speak the truth this Antithesis is much more ancient than Durandus Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. asserts That this was the Opinion of the Manichees and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. saith That it it is next to the error of the Manichees who held two Principes one of Good and the