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A42237 The most excellent Hugo Grotius, his three books treating of the rights of war & peace in the first is handled, whether any war be just : in the second is shewed, the causes of war, both just and unjust : in the third is declared, what in war is lawful, that is, unpunishable : with the annotations digested into the body of every chapter / translated into English by William Evats ...; De jure belli et pacis. English Grotius, Hugo, 1583-1645.; Evats, William. 1682 (1682) Wing G2126; ESTC R8527 890,585 490

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ground whose parts are the Soyl and the Superstructure and in which were it moveable the Lord of the Soyl could have no right at all Of which opinion was Scaevola XXIII The Possessor cannot claim the fruits but may his charges He that ignorantly sows another mans ground thinking it to be his own cannot by the Law of Nature appropriate all the fruits thereof to himself but he may charge the owner of the ground with his costs and with his profitable labour and pay himself out of the profits either already perceived or retain those that are extant if he cannot otherwise get satisfaction XXIV Yea though he possess it unjustly And the very same it seems may be said of him that is possest of another mans Estate unjustly where no penal Law interposeth For though he tha● possesseth mine Estate be an intruder or an Vsurper saith Paulus the Lawyer yet ought I to satisfie him for his just expences For he that seeks only to recover his own ought not to enrich himself by the loss of another XXV That naturally the delivery is not requisite to transfer dominion The last means of acquiring dominion by the Law of Nations is by Tradition But as I said before this is not required to the transferring of dominion by the Law of Nature which the Roman Lawyers themselves acknowledge in some cases As when the property of any thing is given away but the profits of it reserved or when it is bestowed on him that may hereafter possess it or when being but lent it may be kept and in such like cases Yea and even now a man may in some cases transfer Dominion to another before he hath gained possession himself As of an Inheritance expectant of Legacies to be received of things given to Churches and to pious places or to Cities c. whereof it may be said Then the delivery of possession seems to be good when the deeds of gift are in a mans own possession Godwin 's Rom. Ant. p. 240. And thus did the ancient Romans use to aliene things sold by striking the Scales with a piece of Brass and then giving it to him that made the sale XXVI What use may be made of what hath been said These things have I observed lest any man finding among the Roman Authors the Law of Nations often quoted should presently understand that Law to be such as could not be changed But rather that he should be able to distinguish between such Laws as are purely natural and those that are for some certain state natural and between such Laws as are in force amongst many Nations apart and such as knit together all humane societies And this likewise is to be observed That if either by the Law of Nations improperly so called or by the Law of any Nation or People any one way of acquiring a Right or Property be agreed on without making any distinction between Natives and Strangers there Foreigners also shall have and enjoy the same Right And in case they shall be hindred in the consecution thereof they have such wrong done them as may give occasion to a just War CHAP. IX How Empire and Dominion may Cease and Determine I. Dominion and Empire determine when he that had the Right dies and leaves no Successor in being II. So the Right of a Family dies when that Family is extinct III. The like of a People when they cease to be a free people .. IV. Which falls out when their necessary parts are taken away V. And when the whole Body of a People are swept away VI. And when their Form is lost whereby they become a People VII But not by the change of Place VIII Nor upon their change of Government where also is discust what place a new King or free People are to take in general Assemblies IX What if two People be united X. What if a People be divided XI In whom now are what once belonged to the Roman Empire since there appears no Alienation XII Of the Right of Heirs XIII Of the Right of Conquerors I. When the owner dying leaves no Successor HOw as well Propriety as Empire were at first introduced and how they may be transferred is sufficiently discust Now let us understand how they may end And first that they may determine by a voluntary dereliction hath been already demonstrated For Cessante voluntate non manet dominium Where the Will disclaims Propriety vanisheth Again they may cease when the Subject wherein they are is taken away before any Alienation be made of them either express or presumptive as in Successions from him that dyes intestate and leaves no Kindred behind him wherefore all the right that he had in any thing dyes also with him Wherefore his Servants unless the Laws do otherwise ordain are immediately free and the people that were in subjection to him are at their own liberty because these are not in their own nature occupyable but as they are willing to surrender themselves but all his other goods are naturally his that hath them II. So of a Family The very same holds true if a Family happen to be extinct whatsoever right it had ceaseth with it III. When the people that were free cease to be so So also if a People fail Isocrates first and from him the Emperour Julian tells us That Cities are immortal meaning that so they may be because the people are a Body consisting of Members remote one from another yet united under one name as having but one order or form of Government as Plutarch calls it or one Spirit as Paulus the Lawyer which animates and informs all the parts of it and is therefore as Aristotle terms it the life of it But this Spirit in the people is a full and perfect consociation tending to a civil life whereof the supreme power is the first product This is the bond that knits all the parts together the Vital Spirit as Seneca terms it Quem tot millia trahunt Lib. 1. declementia cap. 4. Ep. 58. which animates so many thousands at once for plainly the Artificial Bodies have some resemblance with the Natural The Natural Body though it every day wastes a little yet whilst that which wastes is every day repaired and the same form or figure continued ceaseth not to be the same body And therefore that of Seneca where he saith That no man is the same being old as he was when he was young may very fitly be interpreted as if understood of the matter only As also that of Heracleus in Plato verified That no man can descend twice into the same River Which Seneca thus expounds Manet idem fluminis nomen aqua transmissa est The Name only continues but the Waters glide away Pol. 13. c. 2. So Aristotle comparing a River to the people saith That the River is still called by the same Name though the Waters are not the same Neither doth it retain its name in vain for it hath the same
Injury offered to humane Nature Lib. 1. Romulus in Livy makes it his request to his Neighbours That they would not disdain by Interchangable Marriages to mix generations with them And Canuleius in the same Author pleads thus We saith he require but lawful Wedlock which to Neighbour Nations and Foreigners is usually granted What is unjustly denyed De Civit. Dei lib. 2. c. 17. may by the right of War be justly taken saith Aug. Now whereas the Civil Laws of some people do carefully provide against such Marriages they seem to be grounded upon this reason Because in the times when those Laws were made there was hardly any Nation or People but were sufficiently stored with Women or that those Laws were not intended to interdict all such Marriages but such only as were Legitimate or Just that is which should produce some special effects of a Civil Right XXII A Right to do such acts as were permitted to all strangers Among such acts whereunto a Right in Common is given by supposition we are to reckon those which a Prince or People do promiscuously permit to all strangers for that Nation is injured which is excluded Thus if it be permitted in any place for strangers to Hunt Fish Hawk gather Pearls If it be allowed them to receive Legacies to sell Commodities if even where there is no scarcity of Women to contract Marriages these cannot be denied to any one people unless they have some ways abused their Liberty for which cause it was Judg. 20. that the rest of the Hebrews denied to inter-marry with the Benjamites XXIII I mean such as are permitted by the Right of nature not out of grace and favour But this is to be understood of such Acts only as are permitted as it were by vertue of that liberty which nature gives being restrained or taken away by no Law but not of such as are indulged to any Nation as acts of Grace dispensing with the Laws For to deny a Courtesie is no Injury XXIV Whether to engross all the fruits of one kind be lawful Another Question is frequently started which is this Whether it be lawful for one Nation to contract with another for all their Fruits of such a kind which are no where else to be found so that they shall sell none to any other Nation This in mine opinion may be lawful If that people that shall so buy them be willing to communicate to others at a reasonable price For it concerns not other Nations much by whom they are supplied with their Natural wants so as they are supplied And it is lawful for any to anticipate others in matters of profit especially if there be any special cause for it as in case the people making this Contract shall undertake the protection of the other people and shall for that cause be at some expence or charge For such an Ingrossing made with such an Intent as I have said is no way repugnant to the Natural Right although it be sometimes prohibited by the Civil Law for the benefit of the Common-wealth CHAP. III. Of the Original Acquisition of things where also of the Sea and of Rivers I. That things were originally acquired either by division or occupancy II. Other ways refuted as the concession of Right Incorporeal III. As that also of Specification IV. Occupancy two-fold either of Empire or of Dominion This explained V. That the Right of Occupancy as to things movable may by Law be prevented VI. The Dominion of Infants and Mad-men by what Right held VII That Rivers may be acquired by Occupancy VIII Whether the Sea also may be so IX Anciently in some parts of the Roman Empire that was not lawful X. But as to such parts of the Sea as are Included by Land on each side the Law of Nature doth not Impugn it XI How such a Right of Occupancy may be made and how long it lasts XII That such an Occupancy gives no Right to Impede an Innocent passage of Ships upon them XIII That Empire over some part of the Sea may be gained by Occupancy and how XIV That Toll for certain causes may be Imposed on such as traffick by Sea XV. Of Agreements which forbid some people to sail beyond certain bounds XVI A River changing its course whether it change the bounds of the territory explained by a distinction XVII What is to be determined in case a River do manifestly change its course XVIII That the whole River doth sometimes pass with the Territory XIX That things clearly deserted become the next Occupants unless the Propriety be held in general by some Prince or People I. How things become ours originally THings may become ours by a particular Right either by an Originary or by a Derivative Acquisition Originary Acquisition when men began first to associate together might also arise by Division as we have said but now by Occupancy only II. Other means refuted But some man may haply say That somewhat of Originary Right may also be acquired by some service done or by reason of some Pledge c. But to him that throughly weighs the matter it will appear That this is no new Right unless it be in respect of the manner for it was first virtually in the dominion of the Lord. III. Paulus the Lawyer to the Causes of Acquisition adds this which indeed seems most natural if we our selves have given being to that which we claim as ours But since nothing can naturally be made without some pre-existing matter Now if that be ours the Species being introduced the dominion will be continued But if the matter pre-existing belong to none then shall the Right be acquired by a kind of Occupancy But if it it belong to another then that the Right of Propriety descends not naturally unto us alone will appear by what follows IV. Occupancy two-fold of Empire or Dominion Now let us examine Whether that Occupancy which after those first times is the only natural means of gaining Propriety be also the Originary Of things that properly belong to none two things are subject to be held in Propriety namely Empire and Dominion as it is distinguisht from Empire Which Seneca thus differenceth Ad Reges potestas omnium pertinet ad singulos Proprietas To Kings appertain the Soveraignty over all to private men the Propriety or Dominion of what is theirs Ch. 5. And a little after Rex omnia Imperio possidet singuli Dominio Kings hold all by their Soveraignty and private men what is theirs by Dominion And again Caesar omnia habet Fiscus autem privata tantum sua Caesar hath all yet is his Exchequer private only Lib. 10. Ep. 54. and his own So Symmachus concerning Kings Ye Rule all but preserve to every one his own Of the same mind was Dion Prusaensis Regio civitatis est at non eo minus in ea suum quisque possidet The whole Countrey is under the command of the City yet in it every
with the Land not so much by any Rig●● properly belonging to the Prince as by the quality of the Land for in such a case he that holds the Fee hath the benefit of what the Floods cast up XVI The Arguments whereby the Roman Lawyers would prove their Law to be as it were the Law of Nature answered The Roman Lawyers to prove the Laws by them used to be natural do often alledge this Maxim That it is most natural that his should be the profit of any thing whose is the disprofit whereupon they infer that since the River wasts a part of my Land it is but reasonable that of what it adds to mine mine should be the benefit But this rule holds not unless it be where the benefit ariseth from what is mine own but in this case it ariseth from the River which is anothers But that that which perisheth should perish to the owner of it is natural besides neither is that universally true that they alledge as may appear by the exception of grounds limited which themselves admit Not now to insist upon that which often comes to pass naturally that Rivers do sometimes impoverish and sometimes enrich their Neighbours Fields Whence Lucan thus Illos terra fugit dominos his rura colonis Accedunt Donante Pado Old Lords forsook the Earth doth gliding go New to enrich thanks to the River Po. Whereby it appears that some are enricht and impoverisht by one and the same River XVII Whether an High-way do stop the Increment of a River But whereas also they say that a publick way doth not put a stop to the increment of a River it hath nothing of natural reason in it unless it be where the Field is private through which such a way ought to pass XVIII That the Child should follow the condition of the Mother only is not natural Among other means whereby propriety by that which is called the Law of Nations is acquired one is Procreation wherein that which as well the Romans as some other Nations have determined namely That the Child should follow the condition of the Mother only is not as we have already said * See ch 5. §. 29. Vid. Gall. l. 2. de s●mine natural but only as the Father is unknown For if the Father by any probable means could be discovered why the Child should not as well be reputed his as hers no natural reason can be given since it cannot be denyed but that what is so begotten is a part of him that did beget it But whether of them do contribute most to the production of the Child Natural Philosophers do not accord Whereof notwithstanding Plutarch speaks thus Nature saith he doth mix the Seed of both Sexes and so confounds them that what is thereby born should be common to them both and that neither of them should be able to distinguish that which is theirs from that which was the others And hereupon are the Laws both of the French and Lumbards grounded XIX Community may arise by giving a new form to another matter If the matter belong to one and the form given by another the Sabinians give the property to him whose the matter was but Proculus to him that gave the form because he gave it such an existence as before it had not At length a middle opinion crept in namely that if the matter could be reduced to its pristine form then should the thing be his who gave the matter but if it could not then should it be his that gave the form But this opinion pleased not Connanus who would have no respect but to the value so that whether of them was of greater value should attract unto it that which was of lesser value by an Argument drawn from those things which are delivered unto us by the Roman Lawyers concerning Accession But if we look to the naked truth as by a commixture of several matters there ariseth a community to each according to proportion because it cannot otherwise be determined so when a thing is compounded of matter and form as of its parts if the matter or substance belong to one and the form to another which cannot be divided there must naturally follow a community to each according to their respective proportions for the form is a part of the substance but not the whole which was acknowledged by Vlpian in saying that the form being changed the substance was almost destroyed XX. Yea though the matter be abused But although it be not altogether unjust that he that abuseth the matter being another mans shall lose the form he gives it yet we must know that this is penal and therefore not natural For though it be natural that every delinquent should be punished yet doth not Nature determine how nor doth she of her self take away any mans property for his offence XXI That the lesser should yield to the greater by reason of its prevalence is not natural But that the greater part should swallow up the lesser whereupon Connanus grounds his opinion though it be natural in respect of the Fact yet is it not of Natural Right Wherefore he that hath but the twentieth part of a Field hath as much right in that as he that hath the other nineteen Therefore what the Roman Lawyers have decreed concerning an acquisition gained by way of prevalence or what they have or may decree in other the like cases is not justifyable by the Law of Nature but by the Civil Law for the better dispatch of business yet is it not repugnant unto Nature because the Laws have a power to create dominion There is scarce any one question in the Law Naturale est facti non juris more variously handled among Lawyers than this For who can grant that if Brass and Gold were mixed together they could not be separated as Vlpian writes or that if Metals were soldred together they must needs be confounded as Paulus Ferruminatione c. or that there is one rule for a Picture another for a Scripture that the Table should carry away this but not that XXII Of things planted or sowed on anothers ground the fruits are naturally to be communicated That things planted or sown should go with the soyl is a dictate likewise of the Civil Law grounded on this reason because they are nourished by it and therefore it is a material question concerning a Tree whether it have taken root But in case we look unto Nature only we must confess that the nourishment of a thing that had existence before gives but augmentation to the thing nourished which is but an additional part of it And therefore as there is a Right due to the Lord of the Soyl in respect of that nourishment so surely there remains a Right naturally to him that owned the Plant or the Seed without which the Soyl could not produce such fruits So that here also Nature admits of a Community no less than in an House built upon anothers