THE COURT OF THE GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination WHEREIN The Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully Explicated and Demonstrated both in the General as also more Particularly as to the Substrate Mater or Entitative Act of Sin WITH A Vindication of Calvinists and others from that Blasphemous Imputation of Making God the Author of Sin By Theophilus Gale Si Pelagio tantillum dederis danda sunt omnia Cornel. Jansen Praefat. in Pelag. LONDON Printed for John Hill at the Black Lyon in Fleet-street and Samuel Tidmarsh at the Kings-Head in Cornhill 1678. PREFACE THE strong and almost invincible Inclination I have to Solitude and Retirement with a natural aversion from the Controversies of this Age wherein there is so little of Christian Candor Fidelitie Ingenuitie and Moderation to be found hath given me no small satisfaction in my being exemted hitherto from those vexatious Conflicts which I see many learned and pious men involved in and it seems to me a thing no lesse than prodigious to consider with what warm zele and self-complacence some learned men contend in the mists and clouds of ambiguous termes as if they had no other designe but that of some Mercenary Soldiers who do what they can to protract the War These and such like considerations have kept me for some Moneths from the publication of this Discourse with hopes there might be found out some Expedients for the putting a period to those unhappy Controversies it refers to which I now have little hopes of But enough of that The Discourse it self both as to its first conception and present publication has not been without various agitations in mine own thoughts and how little my natural Inclinations have induced me hereto is wel known to some But I must confesse the crime charged on us being no lesse than Blasphemie against the God of Heaven it may be deservedly judged too great a violation to the Laws of Christianitie not to purge our selves from so black an Imputation and yet in as much as some reverend Divines of repute among us both for their Learning and Pietie have entertained Sentiments opposite to our Hypothesis we have been very studious yea emulous to deliver our own thoughts in such a mode or forme as may be least obnoxious to passionate emotions personal reflexions or whatever may unbeseem one that lies under essential obligation to love and honor the Persons of some that differ in Judgement about these points Wherefore to render our Discourse the lesse offensive we have cast it into a thetic and dogmatic Method rather than agonistic and polemic And because it is altogether impossible distinctly and demonstratively to discusse such an Hypothesis without some opposition against such as defend the Antithesis we have pitcht on Strangius as our principal Antagonist who indeed to give him his merited character has ventilated this Controversie with candor perspicuitie and force of Argument beyond his Sectators Yet we must also do the Cause we undertake this justice as to declare that we have not omitted to examine the Reasons and Arguments of other Reverend Divines who oppose our Hypothesis albeit we have as in dutie we conceived our selves obliged conceled their Names For indeed of what use are such personal Nominations and Reflexions but to render us a grief to Friends and reproche to Enemies As for my Stile if any judge my pen too much drenched in Scholastic Theologie I shal not denie but that I have spent some time in those Studies neither do I as yet see any reason to repent thereof for I have found those Controversies about Divine Concurse and Efficacious Grace no where more accurately examined and demonstratively determined than among the Scholemen specially Bradwardine and Alvarez neither can I conceive how any one can distinctly and perfectly discusse these Controversies specially as now miserably perplexed with ambiguous obscure termes without some inspection into and knowledge of Scholastic Theologie For doth not a principal part of the Controversie depend on that scholastic Notion of Free-will Yea is there any thing New started by the Arminians or New Methodists but what has been fully examined and answered by some among the more sober Scholemen specially Aquinas Ariminensis Bradwardine and Alvarez Whatever others may judge of them yet Reverend Mr. Baxter Cathol Theol. Part 1. p. 124. prefers the Scholemen before Arminians And albeit I have a particular kindnesse for some of the more sober Scholemen as to such points wherein they serve not the Papal Interest and their own vain Imaginations yet what a low and cheap estime I have of the Scholemen in the general is sufficiently apparent by the Character I have given them Court of the Gentiles Part III. B. 2. c. 2. S. 1. § 2. And indeed I would read them with the same indifference and suspension of mind as I read Plato and Aristotle But to conclude if any private Christian desires not to charge his thoughts with the Scholastic part of this Controversie but only to satisfie his Douts and confirme his Faith in the Scriptural part he may confine himself to Chap. III. of this Discourse which contains almost a third Part of the Book where we have under seven general Heads largely given the Scriptural Demonstrations of our Hypothesis Touching Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin with Solutions to such false Glosses and Comments as our Adversaries give thereto which are suited to Vulgar Capacities BREVIARIE of CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie BOOK III. Of Divine Predetermination CHAP. I. The Explication of the Termes THE Controversie about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin p. 2 Seven heads to be discussed by us 3 The Explication of the Termes 4 1. Of Sin 1 Its origine ibid. 2 It s substrate mater 5 3 It s formal Constitution 6 1 Al acts in their generic nature indifferent ib. 2 Al moral Constitution from the Divine Law ibid. 3 Sin formally considered privative 7 4 The Kinds of sinful actions 8 1 Actions modally sinful 9 2 Actions intrinsecally sinful ib. 2. The natural libertie of the Wil what 10 The New Methodists distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken examined and refelled 11 The true Idea of Libertie 12 3. Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good 13 Of Necessitie Impossibilitie Possibilitie 15 4. The Wil of God its Distribution into significative and decretive 17 5. Divine Concurse 1 Its Immediation consisting not in a mere Habilitie to act but in exciting to act 19 2 Its Efficacitie and Predetermination 21 1 Efficacious Concurse what 22 2 Determinative Concurse what 23 3 Predeterminative Concurse what 24 Predeterminative Concurse active and passive also Physic and Moral 25 Gods Predetermination to wicked acts 27 CHAP. II. The state of the Controversie THE agreament of the Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants in ten Propositions 28 c. The Antipredeterminants differences among themselves in 5 particulars 34 c. The
sin it is suggested by some and believed by others that we make the holy God the Author of sin which is the dregs of blasphemie and that which every serious spirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout but that with divine assistance we may firmly assert and demonstrate the efficacitie of Divine concurse to the material entitative act of that which is sinful and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majestie from that blasphemous Imputation of being the Author of sin And for our more distinct and demonstrative procedure herein we propose this method or form as most apt for the subject mater before us 1 To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in or virtually relating to the subject in controversie 2 To shew wherein the opposite parties agree and wherein they differ both among themselves and each from other together with the original and principal motives grounds and causes of such Differences 3 To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonstration of our own Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful with an answer to those false glosses and comments which our Adversaries the Jesuites Arminians and some new Methodists give to those Scriptures for the evading the force of them 4 To draw up a brief Historie or Narrative of this controversie and its state in al periods of the Christian Churches to this day 5 To give the Demonstration of our Hypothesis from Reasons grounded on Scripture with the Vindication of those Reasons from the ungrounded invalid answers given to them by our opponents Strangius and others 6 To solve and answer the Objections urged by those that oppose our Hypothesis particularly Strangius Baranius Le Blanc with others 7 And finally to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheses of the Orthodoxe about this subject in opposition to those false Opinions which their Adversaries charge upon them as also to produce the proper opinions of the adverse party and the dangerous consequences that naturally and necessarily flow from them § 2. Our first and indeed principal task in order to a clear and demonstrative procedure in this controversie wil be to explicate the termes and disabuse them from those ambiguities confusions and false impositions in which at present they are involved And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding state of the Churches of Christ by reason of those vexatious controversies which rend and tear out their very bowels and al from the sophistic abuse or Ambiguitie of termes And I no way dout but to make it most manifest when opportunitie is offered that most of the controversies of this Age are somented and maintained from the obscuritie and abuse of termes misapplyed by subtile wits for the establishment of their own Hypotheses This is most evident in our present case which makes it a duty absolutely necessary before we enter on our province to clear up the way by a distinct and particular explication of those termes that relate thereunto The first Terme we are to consider is Sin wherein we are to examine its Origne Causes Constitution both material and formal and Kinds particularly the nature of Acts substantially or intrinsecally sinful al which we shal discusse with that Brevitie and Perspicuitie the mater wil admit 1. As for the Origine of Sin it came first into the world from the Defectibilitie of our first Parents their Free-wil and has been ever since maintained and fomented by the Vitiositie of human nature depraved by Adams sin as we have copiosely demonstrated Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 2. and Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 3. 2. Sin as to its material constitution has for its substrate mater or subject some natural good For al sin being as to its formal nature but a moral privation or relation it necessarily requires some natural good as its substrate mater or subject The wise Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law so constituted al moral Beings both Virtues and Vices as that they cannot subsist but in something natural albeit sin be according to its formal reason a mere privation yet it requires some positive real natural Being for its subject according to the nature of al other privations Thus Augustin That which is evil by reason of vice is good by nature Again he saith That sin is not nature but the vice of nature And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients That al evil is founded in some good i. e. natural sufficiently demonstrates this our assertion Thus Augustin Enchirid. 97. Although therefore things sinful as sinful are not good yet not only that good things but also that sinful be is good i. e. things sinful are good not morally but naturally as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie for albeit they oppose the bonitie of the creature yet materially considered they oppose not the bonitie of the Creator who can extract the greatest good out of the greatest evils Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God to permit sins to be Yea doth not the ingresse of sin into the world belong to the perfection thereof is not then the substrate mater thereof some natural good This is wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaph. Disput 11. sect 3. p. 252. Sin as sin has a material cause which is always some good So Augustin saith That there can be no evil but in good because if there were pure evil it would destroy itself and the reason is because sin as to its formal cause is not purely positive or a pure negation but a privation of debite perfection therefore it requires a subject unto which such a perfection is due which subject must be some good c. Yea Strangius himself our principal Adversary in this Controversie grants in this particular as much as we demand pag. 629. That it is absurd to say any sin or defect can exist of itself sithat there can be no separate evil but al evil is seated in good Yea he ingenuously confesseth pag. 245. That hatred of God which is an action intrinsecally evil as it is an Act and Being so it is from God namely as it is hatred For adds he So hatred truly as it is abstracted from this or that object is a physic action to which the metaphysic bonitie of Ens or Being agrees and it is morally indifferent but as it is determined to God hence is its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquitie This concession of Strangius if wel considered would not only overthrow his own Antithesis against our Hypothesis but also put a period to this Controversie as in what follows we shal demonstrate Chap. 6. § 1. 3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of sin is its formal Constitution or Reason which we shal endeavour to manifest in the following Propositions 1 Al human
acts considered in their generic physic Entitie or natural Being abstracted from their moral constitution are neither good nor evil but morally indifferent Al moral Beings or Acts are scated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in proper nature as Cyril neither can they existe without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent There is no virtue or vice which has not something of nature for its subject and seat it 's true there may be nature where there is no moralitie yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not some nature to sustain the same Now al human nature as also al natural Acts considered in their generic natural Idea albeit capable of virtue or vice yet are in themselves morally indifferent Al thoughts words and actions considered physically and abstractly without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God are neither good nor evil For Moralitie is a mode not physically or intrinsecally inherent in human acts but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law The very acts of loving and hating God considered in their generic physic and entitative nature as abstracted from the moral relation they have to their object are morally neither good nor evil because moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal as Suarez and other Scholemen generally grant Thus much Strangius frequently grants as pag. 158. he saith That moral Bonitie and Vitiositie are accidents of natural Actions So pag. 875. The action considered apart and physically is morally indifferent neither may it be lesse subject to virtue than to vice Hence 2 Al Moralitie and moral Acts whether good or evil receive their Constitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law This Hypothesis is defended by Scotus and other Scholemen and that on the highest reasons For the Divine Wil is the supreme measure and rule of al Justice and Sanctitie Things are therefore just and good because God wils them and whatever God wils is for that very reason because God wils it good and just Therefore that Platonic notion defended by some learned men That the reasons of good and evil are eternal is of dangerous consequence albeit it hath somewhat of Truth as other errors have mixed with it we grant that in things morally good there is a natural condecence or congruitie to human nature even antecedent to the Divine wil and constitution As on supposition of mans being created he immediately falls under a necessary and essential obligation of loving God hating sin c. These are duties naturally congruous yea morally necessary to human nature Whence it is that Divines usually determine That Original Righteousness was natural to Adam i. e. most condecent congruous and morally necessary to his Nature Yet all this hinders not but that the formal Determination of al Morals arise from the free constitution of the Divine wil and Law The Law of God is the great Expansum or firmament which God has spread over the rational world whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts and by which they shall be at last day judged whence it necessarily follows that al moral constitution must procede hence as we have more amply demonstrated Court Gentiles P. 4. B. 1. c. 2. § 1 2. Thus also Voetius Disput Theolog. Par. 1. de jure justit Probl. 10. p. 351. proves That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodness So much also Strangius grants us p. 89. namely That as whatever is true is therefore true because conform to the first Truth so whatever is good is therefore good because conform to the first Goodness and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect so Goodness to his Wil. The like Mr. Baxter Catholick Theolog. Part 1. p. 100. Al created Justice and Holiness is such i. e. good for goodness is their essence because Gods efficient wil made them so Hence 3 The formal reason or nature of Sin consists in its being a Deordination or Transgression of the Divine Law This Proposition is fully stated and demonstrated in Sacred Philosophie as we have copiosely proved Court Gent. P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. § 1. and Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 1. so that it requires not further Explication or Demonstration Hence 4 Sin as to its formal constitution and nature is not a positive real Being but privative This Hypothesis has found general assent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philosophers and Christians excepting some few Marcion and Manes with others It 's true the Manichees held Sin to be a positive Being and they took up principes suited thereto namely That there were two first Beings or Causes one of good the other of evil But the sober Philosophers and Christians abhorred such sentiments Simplicius on Epictetus c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Discourse to prove that sin is not in the nature of Beings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a privation of Good which we have largely explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3 § 4. § 2. And this was generally asserted by the Greek and Latin Fathers Thus the spurious Dionysius assures us that Sin must necessarily be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without nature without subsistence So Greg. Nyssen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is an insubsistent Being or privation And it was a general conclusion in the Greek Scholes that sin resulted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from the absence of good as darkness from the absence of light Thus also among the Latins Augustin asserted that Sin was not Nature but the evil of Nature Again the Amission of Good has taken up the name of Sin And Strangius who is our principal adversary in this controversie yet l. 1. c. 13. p. 97 c. he strongly demonstrates this Hypothesis That the formal reason of sin consists in Privation This I conceive deserves a particular remarque because some late Authors and those not of inferior note make great use of this Antithesis namely That Sin is as to its formal nature positive as their chief engine to oppose our general Hypothesis touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of that which is sinful They tel us that Sin as to its forme is not a mere privation but a moral Relation which has so much Realitie as a relation But to obviate al mistakes and verbal contests we grant 1 That Sin may be termed a moral privative relation or rather relative privation as it is a transgression of and so must have relation to the Moral Law 2 That Sin is not a mere nothing but has some kind of logic positivitie or notional entitie so far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Proposition as we have more fully shewen Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. § 2. But 3 We may not yield that Sin is a moral positive Relation much less a positive act or real Being such as
ours 2 How doth God judicially punish one sin by another but to use his own words by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error And if so then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God Of this hereafter § 6. But 2 I passe on to his second answer whereon he seems to lay the most weight though indeed most feeble But saith he because those words Rev. 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to vers 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which points out the reason of that which next follows namely that those ten Kings having changed their opinion should destroy the Whore and Antichrist it seems to me more commodious if in that vers 17. there be a reason given of this famose change that they who were before the friends and vassals of Antichrist should be afterwards enemies and adversaries to him namely because God hath put this into their heart And the first words of vers 17. sufficiently accord to this Exposition But what is subjoined That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste until the word of God should be consummate I should think ought to be expounded negatively c. Thus Strangius A strange comment indeed let us a little inquire into it 1 How infirm is his argument from the rational particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to make what follows the fulfilling of Gods wil to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist whereas the particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seems rather to refer to the whole verse and more particularly to the last clause until the Word of God shal be fulfilled and so it notes that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil 1 In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste and 2 When the words of God were fulfilled i. e. Antichrists reign expired then to hate the Whore c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident So that v. 17. is not only a reason of the change mentioned v. 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to and enemies against Antichrist 2 As for what is subjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste I cannot but admire with what shadow of reason Strangius can understand this negatively as if they should not give their Kingdom to the Beste certainly if such glosses should be admitted we might easily find in Scripture subterfuges for the worst Heresies and Immoralities Why may not the most profane debauched wretch when he is pressed with those Commands Thou shalt not commit adulterie Thou shalt not kill c. replie that these Scriptures must not be taken negatively but affirmatively Thou shalt commit adulterie c But Strangius saw ful wel that the affirmative sense of those words That they might give their Kingdome to the Beste would quite subvert his forced sense of the foregoing words and therefore he saw no way left but to secure himself by reducing this later affirmative clause to a negative though contrary to the expresse letter and mind of the words But 3 being after al his glosses sensible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this response he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge telling us That if any shal think this exposition of the last member not sufficient but that beyond it there must be also signified that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beste I have no mind to contend about this mater sithat the sense is sufficiently sane which ever way the words be understood In evil works God is not the cause of the moral evil but of the substrate act and punishment or Judgement which is annected to the sin but in good works not only of the substrate act but also of the moral Bonitie c. Who of us denies this would our Adversaries but stick here how soon would our Controversie be ended But here lies the sting even in this plausible concession Strangius with the rest would fain perswade us that there are some acts of sin so intrinsecally evil as that you cannot separate the physic natural act from its moral Vitiositie § 5. We descend now to such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious Permission of sin The former Heads regard only the substrate mater or entitative act of sin but this sin in its formal nature Our Adversaries the Pelagians Jesuites Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodists al grant Gods permission of Sin but only such as is otiose speculative negative and naked without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act or direction of it to its proper ends But the sacred Scriptures ascribe to God a positive efficacious directive and ordinative permission of sin arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it So it 's said of Eli's Sons 1 Sam. 2. 25. They hearkened not to the voice of their father because the Lord would slay them The conjunction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is Causal and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God The Soverain Lord had by an absolute peremtorie decree predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine and thence it 's said they hearkened not because the Lord would slay them the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be I am not ignorant that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a more soft as they phrase it Version and among these some make it conclusive and so render it ideo idcirco quapropter others render it quamvis as Turnovius others otherwise But certainly our English Version which renders it causally because seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions So the LXX who render the words thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them In willing willed i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome peremtorily efficaciously immutablely and absolutely willed Thus also the ancient Syriac and Arabic Versions with some later Munster Pagnine Arias Montanus Junius and Tremelius Osiander Piscator Malvenda with the Tigurine and Belgic Versions yea Castalio not excepted render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 causally because according to our sense and interpretament Let us examine now what Strangius returns in answer to this Text lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809 c. He answers 1 That the sons of Eli were for their flagitiose impieties destined and devoted by God to ruine 2 That the punishment of death here mentioned seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal not eternal 3 That however it be as it is manifest that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting
futurition made from Eternitie but what is eternal To which he answers with a scoffe thus A pretty argumentation indeed why may we not by the same reason prove that the futurition of sin is God The same is urged by Le Blanc de Concord Libert par 1. thes 55 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove against Twisse That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God it is God which makes God manifestly the Author of sin The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us But in answer hereto I must confesse I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned and in other points judicious on such infirme and rotten grounds For when we speak of the futurition of sin which is a complexe aggregate thing we must distinguish its material from its formal part 1 If we speak of the material entitative part of sin which is in itself a natural good so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme that its futurition is the same or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof and why not is not the futurition of al natural Beings good And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good Yea was not al good from Eternitie loged in the bosome of God and sonot really distinct from him So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc against the futurition of the material entitative act of sin from the wil of God strikes at the futurition of althings even the most gratiose acts from the same wil for if the futurition of any one natural act may be resolved into the wil of man as its first cause why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel resolved into the same human wil specially in Adams innocent state who had then perfect free-wil But yet 2 if we speak of the futurition of sin in regard of its formal nature consisting in its vitiositie and obliquitie so we utterly denie that its futurition is the same with God for the futurition of sin as to its vitiositie is not from the effective wil of God but permissive God decrees to effect the entitative act but only to permit the vitiositie appendent thereto which follows on the act as other privations do on the absence of their habit To make this evident by a parallel instance God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun and that at night it shal retire into the other Hemisphere whence darknesse necessarily follows may we thence argue that the futurition of darknesse or darknesse itself is the same with God Would not any Fresh-man in Logic hisse such a consequence out of the Scholes And yet who dares denie but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemisphere into the other is from God as also its futurition The like may be instanced in al other privations which have no real being and therefore no real efficient of their existence or futurition for nothing can admit a real efficient cause of its futurition but what has a real efficient cause of its existence what is the first efficient of the existence of things Is it not the wil of God and is it not also the same Divine wil that gives futurition to things Yea doth not the very same act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition give them also in their appointed periods of time their existence So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is most true That the same cause that gives things their existence gives them also their futurition this I say holds true of the first cause but not of second causes as they would needs persuade us So that to conclude this argument in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al sin the effective wil of God to the entitative act or substrate mater of sin and the permissive wil of God to the formal reason or vitiositie of sin hence it necessarily follows that the predeterminative Concurse of God whereby I understand nothing else but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative gives existence to the substrate mater of Sin § 2. Our second Argument shal be taken from the certitude of Gods Prescience and we may forme it thus God can certainly foreknow nothing but what he certainly decrees predefines and predetermines to be But God certainly foreknows al sin Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adversaries and denied by none that I know except Atheists and Socinians Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he seeth al his goings Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propositions 1 Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God but what has some certain Reasons Principes and Causes of such a foreknowledge Now there are three causes that give certitude to al Science and Prescience 1 A certitude of the Object for if the object be uncertain the Science can never be certain can the Structure or Edifice be firme if the foundation be infirme 2 A certain Medium which is the principal fundamen of al Science 3 A certitude of the Subject for be the Object and Medium never so certain yet there can be no certain Science unless the Subject apprehend the same And doth not the Prescience of God include al these degrees of Certitude Must there not be a certitude of the Object Medium and Subject 2 Prop. The Divine Prescience as to future sins admits not any of these degrees of certitude but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree 1 How can Sin as the Object of Divine Prescience be certainly future but by the efficacious Wil of God making it so 2 What certain Medium can there be of Divine Prescience but the divine Wil and Decree 3 And thence how can God have a subjective Certitude of sin but in and by his own Wil Hence 3 Prop. Gods certain Prescience of Sin infers also a certain predefinition and predetermination of the substrate mater of Sin That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future has been the persuasion not only of Calvinists but also of the most sober Scholemen in al Ages Scotus Ricardus Hervaeus Bradwardine Johannes Major and others not a few as Le Blanc de Concord Libert Par. 3. Thes 33. p. 443. confesseth Yea Strangius himself grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Prescience as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea Le Blanc De Concord Libert Hum. Par. 1. Thes 59. c. p. 455. proves strongly That according to Strangius's opinion there can no contingent i. e. sinful act be foreknown by God as absolutely future but what God first decreed to be absolutely future His words are these But some also of those who hold some free acts of God to be absolutely future and as such to be foreknown by God without any Decree
is from the Creature 3 Between the wil of God decreeing and the wil of God commanding Whence he concludes Thes 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth by the Creature as the first Cause by the second the Act as an Act of it self indifferent to moral Bonitie and Vitiositie and wils and effectes the same albeit depraved by the Creature as invested with his moral rectitude because he produceth it by his own power from his immaculate Sanctitie and Justice which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any second Cause Whence he addes Thes 101. And this act essentially good even as defiled by the Creature God justly and holily useth either as an Instrument of punishment or of exploration or exercice and as an ordinate convenient Medium according to his Justice for the best ends Thes 102. In this sense God is said To create evil to produce it out of his mouth to send Joseph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren to rob Job of his goods to command Shimei to curse David to use Absolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines to deliver Christ into the hands of Jews and Gentiles Thes 103. For God decreed to produce those acts as acts and to permit the depravation of them by the Sinners and to use them albeit depraved wisely and justly to ends holily ordained by him 2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the formal nature of Sin which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions as Ch. 1. § 2. we have more fully explicated Whence we thus argue If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins and if of some why not of al even such as are intrinsecally evil That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident and that from the concessions of our Adversaries who grant That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good which also according to their own confessions are modally sinful Whence we thus argue The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same wherefore if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful When we say That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinfil As here may not be taken reduplicatively but only specificatively i. e. as it specifies and distributes the same action into good and sinful which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act so that our Opponents granting that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good how can they possibly denie that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful When I can see a rational solution given to this argument which I despair of I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause But they replie If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions it doth not thence follow that he concurs to actions intrinsecally and in the substance of them evil But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor if we consider wel 1 That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it any more than the greatest the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here dare our Adversaries say that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God or the like Whence 2 The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason If God doth concur yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally sinful without falling under the imputation of being the Author of sin why may he not also predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the like imputation Albeit there be a disparitie in the sins yet is not the paritie of reason for the one and the other the same Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majestie of God from having any hand in the least sin as in the greatest And if we allow our selves the libertie of making him the author of the least sin wil not that open a wide gate for atheistic blasphemous wits to impute to him the greatest sins Whence if we can prove what our Adversaries wil never be able to disprove yea what they approve of namely that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater or entitative act which is imperfectly good but modally sinful it thence follows by necessary consequence and inevitable paritie of reason that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of that which is intrinsecally evil without the least imputation of being the Author of sin annexed thereto I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument § 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin shal be drawen from his Permission of Sin And to make way to this demonstration we must distinguish of Permission which is either legal or natural Natural Permission is either divine or human and both either negative or positive 1 God gives no legal Permission or Indulgence to sin but on the contrary severely prohibites it and that on pain of death 2 Gods natural Permission as Rector of the World is not of sin simply as sin but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation It 's true Divine Permission regardes not only the substrate mater of sin but also sin formally considered and so sin under that reduplication as sin yet not simply considered but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie and so much is confessed by Strangius l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme sin it 's true that sin as sin is permitted by God physically not morally Yet I adde not simply but respectively as conducible to Gods supreme ends of Government And Lud. Crocius Duodec Dissert 8. Thes 74. pag. 415. assertes That God albeit he wils and decrees only the material of sin yet unbelieving and disobedient both Iews and Cananites c. 2. Whereas he tels us that the Mythologists say Mars was the first that invented militarie weapons and affairs c. This may as well refer to Joshua as to Nimrod For albeit Nimrod began wars in Asia the greater or Babylon yet we find no considerable wars amongst the Cananites or Phenicians till Ioshua's time who by reason of his great militarie Exploits and victories might well be reputed the God of War Mars or Hercules 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioshua is that the Mythologists whom Diodorus
God a velleitie or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect 7. There is something in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature 8. God hath a general antecedent conditional love and desire of the Salvation of al men 9. Some Decrees of God may be frustrated and never come to passe 10. The reason why God hated Esau and loved Jacob must not be resolved into the 〈◊〉 or good pleasure of God but into his prescience of Esau's actual and final disobedience and Jacobs obedience 11. There is Scientia media or middle Science in God dependent on mans ambulatory wil and so only conjectural and uncertain 12. God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world but doth not neither can omnipotently rule dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie 13. When it 's said that God wils the permission of sin it must be understood only of the effect 14. Al Divine Concurse is not particular total immediate and efficacious 15. The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts or the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause 16. God can make a creature which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse Baron 131. 17. Supernatural good is from God but not al natural good 18. Efficacious grace in Conversion destroyeth human libertie 19. Gods efficacious Concurse is in the power of mens natural free wil either to use or refuse the same 20. God vouchsafeth to al men sufficient grace which if wel improved he wil reward with efficacious grace Strang. 229. 21. Al Predetermination impels the wil and acts it as a mere Machine 22. There is a twofold libertie one essential to the wil but lesse proper the other accidental consisting in indifference which is most proper 23. Alhuman acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie 24. The vitiositie of sin is essential to some human natural acts as natural We do not produce the consequents here drawen from the Antitheses of Antipredeterminants as their proper sentiments at least not of al that espouse those Antitheses but only as such as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheses albeit they do not formally assent to al of them FINIS ERRATES BOOK II. PAge 489. l. 31. for God read us BOOK III. Page 10. l. 33. for drive r. denie p. 22. l. 26. after elswhere put a period Item l. 36. dele by p. 23. l. 32. r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 24. l. 39. dele and. p. 28. l. 1. dele and stating p. 42. l. 36. r. that God only p. 76. l. 19. r. same p. 79. l. 38. r. to Gods p. 80. l. 31. for like r. agreable p. 86. l. 7. r. Tarnovius p. 89. l. 3. for is he r. he is p. 111. l. 18. for Baronius r. Bellarmine p. 119. l. 16. r. c. 34. p. 129. l. 23. r. This he p. 142. l. 5. dele who p. 145. l. 2. r. so not p. 166. l. 26. r. Compton p. 170. l. 9. r. it workes The Origine of the Controversie The method of our procedure The explication of the Termes Of Sin 1. It s Origine 2. It s substrate mater Quod malum est per vitium bonum est per naturam Aug. contra Advers Leg. Prophet cap. 5. Absurdum esset si diceretur ullum defectum aut peccatum aut ullum peccatum aut defectum posse per se existere cùm nullum detur separatum malum sed omne malum sit in bono Strang. de Volunt l. 3. c. 19. p. 629. Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent Actio seorsim per se physicè considerata indifferens est moraliter nec minùs virtuti quà m vitio substerni potest Al moral constitution from the Divine Law Sin as to its formal nature a privation Actions modally sinful Actions intrinsecally evil The Libertie of the Wil. The new coined distinction of Libertie largely and strictly taken The True Idea of Libertie f Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur quà m 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spontaneum intellectuale Strang. l. 3. c. 14. p. 686. Moral Libertie or free-wil to good Necessitie impossibilitie and possibilite what In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiae ad opposita sed non potentia simultatis Alvarez The wil of God its distributions c. Of Divine Concurse Immediate Concurse what Efficacious and predeterminant concurse Efficacions concurse what Eph. 1. 19. Ephes 3. 7. Phil. 3. 21. 1 Cor. 12. 6 11. Rom. 7. 5. 2 Cor. 4. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 11. Eph. 1. 11. Determinative Concurse what Act. 17. 26. Heb. 4. ◠Luke 22. 22. Acts 2. 23. Predeterminative concurse what in Scripture 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 8. 29 30. Eph. 1. 5 11. Acts 4. 28. Predeterminative Concurse active and passive Predetermination physic and moral Praedeterminare voluntatem est applicare voluntatem ad agendum facere ut faciat Strang. Wherein we and our Opponents agree Volitiones pure conditionales sunt alienae à sapientia prudentia Dei Ruiz de Volunt Dei Disp 20. §. 1. Wherein our Opponents differ among themselves Their differences 1. about Gods Prescience 2. The futurition of sin 3. Divine Concurse 4. Gods permission of sin 5. The nature of sin difnew 1. As to Gods Decrees 2. The Futurition of sin 3. Gods permissive Decree 4. Gods prescience of sin 5. Divine Predetermination 6. Human Libertie 7. God not the Author of Sin Scriptural Demonstrations 1. God the first Cause of al natural Actions and Things Esa 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. * Nam vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus sed tamen ordinator est Eph. 1. 11. Psal 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Hab. 3. 4. Act. 11. 21. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. Si Dii volunt volentibus Diis Cic. in Offic. Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19. God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed 1 Arg. from Josephs Vendition Gen. 45. 5 7 8. Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum sed transitum suum in Aegyptum Erasm Act. 7 9 The Objections against Josephs Vendition answered 2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Christ Mat. 26. 24. Luk. 22. 22. Act. 4. 28. Joh. 19. 10 11 Act. 2. 23. Act. 4. 28. Our Adversarie evasions examined 1. Evasion touching active and passive Crucifixion 2. Evasion Strangius ' s Evasions Answer Quum Pater tradiderit Filium Christus Corpus suum Judas Dominum cur in hac traditione Deus est justus homo reus nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt causa non est una ob quam fecerunt August Epist 48. ad Vinc. 1. Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments Esa 10. 5 6 7. Jerem. 16. 16. 2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Instruments Job 1. 21. Psal 105. 25. 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin 2 Sam.
2 There is also a libertie strictly so termed which consists in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object also to act or not to act and this Libertie is most proper to this our imperfect state as Strangius p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewise Le Blanc p. 435. and others There were some first lines of this distinction drawn by Camero who makes libertie strictly so termed to be about the means not the end yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable in that he makes Divine Predetermination consistent with human Libertie But the first creator of this distinction touching a two-fold Libertie among those who owned the Synod of Dort was Strangius who asserts a two-fold Libertie one considered in its own Nature which is essential to the wil and the other as limited to lapsed man which includes Indifference c. as in places above cited What these new Methodists mean by this new-coined distinction of Libertie unless it be a gratification to the Pelagians I cannot conjecture Certain I am that I never could find it among the ancient Philosophers Primitive Fathers Scholastic Theologues or any other but these new Methodists or their Sectators Do any of the Greek Philosophers make mention of any libertie but what is essential to the wil and al human acts Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie Yea do not the very Jesuites herein concur with us that Liberty is essential to al moral acts both in the future as wel as the present state of the Soul Is not Libertie constituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie Doth not Amyraldus de Libero Arbitrio as wel as we make Libertie properly taken essential to the wil and al its Acts Of what use then can this distinction of a two-fold Libertie be Wil it satisfie the Pelagians Jesuites or Arminians No because they al make Libertie strictly taken essential to al Moral Acts. Or wil it any way relieve the Calvinists in their conflicts both with Jesuites and Arminians to say the wil is sometimes free and sometimes not If it be supposed that Indifference be essential to libertie in this imperfect state wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians that the wil is not according to these new Methodists free in Conversion because not indifferent It were not difficult to demonstrate how invalid this new-coined distinction of Libertie is and unapt to reach those ends for which it was designed by the authors thereof As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie we have with what studie and diligence we could inquired into and discussed the same Court of the Gentiles P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 11 12. B. 4. c. 1. § 29 32. also Philosoph General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. P. 2. L. 1. c. 1. S. 4. § 2. the sum whereof may be drawn forth in these following Propositions 1 Natural Libertie as it denotes a power has one and the same Idea or Nature with the Wil. This is copiosely demonstrated in the forementioned places Hence 2 Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the strictest notion essentially appendent to them 3 The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not absolute but limited and conditionate 4 The necessitie which ariseth from the concurse of God the first cause no way diminisheth but establisheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil. For nothing offers violence to the Wil or is injuriose to its Libertie so long as the act it puts forth is voluntary so long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto the act is in its own power and free for as Aristotle Eth. l. 5. c. 12. wel observes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nothing happens to such an one but what he wils 5 Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts is no way essential to natural Libertie but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection 6 The formal native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie both as to state and exercice includes no more than a rational spontaneitie This last proposition which is the principal Strangius owns and Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit Thes 19. p. 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines even of Amyraldus Placeus and other new Methodists That this also is asserted by our Judicious Davenant see his Determinations Quaest 22. That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie These Propositions about natural Libertie we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie and particularly this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin depends thereon and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Question without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie doth nothing to purpose § 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil we are to consider Moral Libertie or Free-wil as also what is possible or impossible to corrupt Nature By Moral Libertie or Free-wil is generally understood the moral potence or spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good This moral and spiritual Libertie our Adversaries the Pelagians Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature they falsely charge us with denying the former therefore to remove this confusion of the termes and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurse the following Propositions wil be of use unto us 1. Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts whatever act is voluntary is for that very reason free Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation as also by the determination of the best Philosophers termes synonymous and equipollent as we have demonstrated Philos General P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. § 1. But now as for Moral Libertie and free-wil to good that is only accidental to the human Soul it may come and go be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul or violation to natural Libertie It 's true that Moral Libertie consisting in virtuose Habits Inclinations and Exercices is the Perfection of Man yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof 2. Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good This is granted on both sides and therefore needs not further demonstration 3. Since the fal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good I cal this Impotence total and universal as it overspreads the whole soul and has stript it of al seeds of or inclinations to any