merely by his Dominion we must take away all rewards and punishments for then the actions of men would be the mere effects of irresistable power and so not capable of rewards and punishments for there could be neither of these where mens actions are capable of the differences of good and evil and that they cannot be if they be the acts of God's Dominion and not of their own But if God doth not exercise his full Dominion over rational creatures it is apparent that he doth govern them under another notion than as mere Lord and the reason of punishment is not to be taken from an absolute right which God doth not make use of but from the ends and designs of Government which are his own Honour the Authority of his Laws and the good of those whom he doth govern And Crellius is greatly mistaken when he makes punishment to succeed in the place of the right of obedience for it is only the desert of punishment which follows upon the violation of that right and as we assert that the right of obedience is derived from God's Sovereignty so we deny not but the desert of punishment is from the violation of it but withal we say that the obligation to punishment depends upon the Laws and God's right to inflict punishment Laws being supposed is immediately from that Government which he hath over mankind For otherwise if the whole right of punishment did still depend upon God's Dominion and the first right of Sovereignty then all sins must have equal punishments because they are all equal violations of the fundamental right of obedience then it were at liberty for God to punish a greater sin with a less punishment and a lesser sin with a greater And lastly this would make the punishment of sin a mere Arbitrary thing in God for there would be no reason of punishment but what depended upon God's mere will whereas the reason of punishment in Scripture is drawn from a repugnancy of sin to the divine purity and holiness and not merely from God's power or will to punish but if that were all the reason of it there would be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing for the most vitious person to be rewarded and the most pious to be made everlastingly miserable But who ever yet durst say or think so From whence it appears that the relation between sin and punishment is no result of God's arbitrary will but it is founded in the nature of the things so that as it is just for God to punish offenders so it would be unjust to punish the most innocent person without any respect to sin But if the right of punishment depends merely on God's Dominion I cannot understand why God may not punish when and whom and in what manner he pleaseth without any impeachment of his Justice and therefore it is to be wonder'd at that the same persons who assert the right of punishment to be merely in God's Dominion should yet cry out of the injustice of one person being punished for anothers faults for why may not God exercise his Dominion in this case yes say they he may his dominion but he cannot punish because punishment supposes guilt and cannot be just without it how far that reaches will be examined afterwards at present we take notice of the contradiction to themselves which our Adversaries are guilty of that they may serve their own hypothesis for when we dispute with them against absolute remission without satisfaction then they contend that the right of punishment is a mere act of Dominion and God may part with his right if he please but when they dispute with us against the translation of punishment from one to another then they no longer say that the right of punishment is an act of Dominion but that it is a necessary consequent of inherent guilt and cannot be removed from one to another And then they utterly deny that punishment is of the nature of debts for one man's money they say may become anothers but one man's punishment cannot become anothers Thus they give and take deny and grant as it serves for their present purposes VI. 2. The different ends of debts and punishments make it appear that there is a difference in the nature of them for the intention of the obligation to payment in case of debt is the compensation of the damage which the Creditor sustains but the intention of punishment is not bare compensation but it is designed for greater and further ends For which we are to consider the different nature of punishments as they are inflicted by way of reparation of some injury done to private persons and as they do respect the publick good I grant that private persons in case of injuries seek for compensation of the damage they sustain and so far they bear the nature of debts but if we consider them as inflicted by those who have a care of the publick though they are to see that no private person suffers injury by another yet the reason of that is not merely that he might enjoy his own but because the doing injuries to others tends to the subversion of the ends of Government Therefore I can by no means admit that Position of Crellius that a Magistrate only punishes as he assumes the person of the particular men who have received injuries from others for he aims at other ends than merely the compensation of those injured persons Their great end is according to the old Roman Formula nè quid Resp. detrimenti capiat the reason of exacting penalties upon private men is still with a regard to the publick safety Supposing men in a state of nature no punishment is due to the injured person but restitution of damage and compensation of the loss that accrues to him by the injury sustained and whatever goes beyond this is the effect of Government which constitutes penalties for perservation of the Society which is under Laws But herein Crellius is our adversary but with no advantage at all to his Cause for he offers to prove against Grotius That something more is due by an injury beyond bare compensation for what the other is supposed to lose by the right of nature for saith he in every injury there is not only the real damage which the person sustains but there is a contempt of the person implyed in it for which as well as the former he ought to have compensation To which I answer 1. That this doth not prove what he designs viz. that punishment doth belong to the injured person in a state of Nature beyond bare restitution but that it is necessary that men should not continue in such a state that so they may be vindicated from that contempt and others compelled to restitution Both which as they are punishments are not in the power of the offended party as such but shew that it is very reasonable there should be Laws and Governours that private persons may
be preserved in their just rights and offenders punished for the vindication not only of their honour but of the Laws too And Laws being established the injured person hath right to no more than the compensation of his loss for that being forced upon the offending party is a sufficient vindication of his honour 2. If the contempt of a private person makes a compensation necessary how much more will this hold in a publick Magistrate whose contempt by disobedience is of far worse consequence than that of a private person And by this argument Crellius overthrows his main hypothesis viz. that God may pardon sin without satisfaction for if it be not only necessary that the loss be compensated but the dishonour too then so much greater as the dishonour is so much higher as the person is so much more beneficial to the world as his Laws are so much more necessary is it that in order to pardon there must be a satisfaction made to him for the affronts he hath received from men And if the greatness of the injury be to be measured as Crellius asserts from the worth and value of the thing from the dignity and honour of the person from the displicency of the fact to him which he makes the measure of punishment this makes it still far more reasonable that God should have satisfaction for the sins of men than that men should have for the injuries done them by one another especially considering what the same Author doth assert afterwards that it is sometime repugnant to justice for one to part with his own right in case of injuries and that either from the nature and circumstances of the things themselves or a decree or determination to the contrary for the first he instanceth in case of notorious defamation in which he saith it is a dishonest and unlawful thing for a man not to make use of his own right for his vindication and for the other in case of great obstinacy and malice By both which it is most apparent that Crellius puts a mighty difference between the nature of debts and punishments since in all cases he allows it lawful for a person free to remit his debts but in some cases he makes it utterly unlawful for a person not to make use of his right for punishment And withal if a private person may not part with his own right in such cases how unreasonable is it not to assert the same of the great Governour of the World and that there may be a necessity for him upon supposition of the contempt of himself and his Laws to vindicate himself and his honour to the world by some remarkable testimony of his severity against sin VII But Crellius yet urgeth another end of punishment which though the most unreasonable of all others yet sufficiently proves from himself the difference of debts and punishments which is the delight which the injured person takes in seeing the offender punished This he so much insists upon as though he made it the most natural end of punishment for saith he among the Punishments which a Prince or any other free Person can inflict revenge is in the first place and the more there is of that in any thing the more properly it is called a punishment and he tells us what he means by this ultio viz. solatium ex alieno dolore the contentment taken in anothers pain But saith he no man must object that this is a thing evil in it self for although it be forbidden us under the New Testament yet in it self it is not unlawful for one that hath suffered pain from another to seek for the ease of his own pain by the miseries of him that injured him and for this purpose saith he we have the Passion of Anger in us which being a desire of returning injuries is then satisfied when it apprehends it done But how absurd and unreasonable this doctrine is will be easily discovered for this would make the primary intendment of punishment to be the evil of him that suffers it Where the right of punishment is derived from an injury received and therefore that which gives that right is some damage sustained the reparation of which is the first thing designed by the offended party Though it take not up the whole nature of punishment And on this account no man can justly propose any end to himself in anothers evil but what comes under the notion of restitution For the evil of another is only intended in punishment as it respects the good of him for whose sake that evil is undergone When that good may be obtained without anothers evil the desire of it is unjust and unreasonable and therefore all that contentment that any one takes in the evil another undergoes as it is evil to him is a thing repugnant to humane nature and which all persons condemn in others when they allow themselves in it It will be hard for Crellius to make any difference between this end of punishment which he assigns and the greatest cruelty for what can that be worse than taking delight in making others miserable and seeing them so when he hath made them Iâ— it be replyed that cruelty is without any cause but here a just cause is supposed I answer a just cause is only supposed for the punishment but there can be no just cause for any to delight in the miseries of others and to comfort themselves by inflicting or beholding them For the evil of another is never intended but when it is the only means left for compensation and he must be guilty of great inhumanity who desires anothers evil any further than that tends to his own good i. e. the reparation of the damage sustained which if it may be had without anothers evil then that comes not by the right of nature within the reason of punishment and consequently where it doth not serve for that end the comfort that men take in it is no part of justice but cruelty For there can be no reason at all assigned for it for that lenimentum doloris which Crellius insists on is meerly imaginary and no other than the Dog hath in gnawing the stone that is thrown at him and for all that I know that propension in nature to the retribution of evil for evil any further than it tends to our security and the preservation for the future is one of the most unreasonable Passions in humane Nature VIII And if we examine the nature of Anger either considered Naturally or Morally the intention of it is not the returning evil to another for the evil received but the security and perservation of our selves which we should not have so great a care of unless we had a quick sense of injuries and our blood were apt to be heated at the apprehension of them But when this passion vents it self in doing others injury to alleviate its own grief it is a violent and unreasonable perturbation but being
as a Sacrifice in our stead tanquam victima pro nobis Succedanea How can Socinus and the Racovian Catechism agree 2. That he suffer'd for our good But they deny any Commutation which they say was not in the Expiatory Sacrifice among the Jews What doth a Substitution differ from a Commutation in this Case But how do suffering in our stead and for our good come all to one at last Either it must be that Christ did truly suffer in our stead when he underwent the Punishment of our Sins in order to our Redemption and Expiation and that is a very good and true Sense which we readily embrace and are very well content that they should come all to one Or if the meaning be only that Christ may be said to suffer in our stead because we have Benefit by the Consequences of his Death then his dying is only consider'd as a bare Condition and not as a Sacrifice in our stead As to make it plain by an Instance we all agree that Joseph's Suffering in Egypt was designed by the Wise Providence of God for the good of his Brethren which they received after his Advancement to which his Suffering was an Antecedent Condition But can any Man say that he suffer'd in stead of his Brethren But now if Joseph's Brethren had been sold for Slaves in Egypt and Joseph had gone down thither and offer'd himself a Prisoner for their Deliverance this had been truly Suffering in their stead as well as for their Advantage And suppose the King of Egypt had agreed with Joseph that if he would become Prisoner for his Brethren he would advance him and he should himself deliver them by his own Power this doth not at all hinder his Suffering in their stead But if it had no Relation to their Deliverance by his being made Captive himself but was only a step to his Advancement then it cannot be said to be in their stead although it might turn to their Advantage And so much for the Sense of the Racovian Catechism But our Unitarians fly higher for they say 1. That God could not justly or wisely substitute an Innocent Person to undergo Punishment in place of the Guilty 2. That Christ could not freely offer himself as a Sacrifice in our stead nor could God accept of it or allow it So that here we have the true State of this Controversie between us viz. whether Christ were a Real Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind For if he could not be Substituted in our stead nor God accept of his offering up himself for us all the other Expressions are meer Words given out on purpose to Amuse and Deceive us And this is that which I have undertaken to make out in the following Discourse viz. 1. That the Scripture doth as plainly set forth that Christ suffer'd the Punishment of our Sins and in our stead as it could do and that no Expressions could be thought of to that purpose but might be answered in the same way that they do these And therefore it is in vain to contend with such Men who are resolved that Words and Phrases shall signify no otherwise than they would have them And yet at last they cannot deny but a kind of Substitution is implied as a Victima Succedanea but how That he suffer'd for our good and by the occasion of our Sins but not the Punishment of them Thus far then we have gained that the Words of Scripture are for us but say they what ever the Words are they cannot mean any real Punishment because he was an Innocent Person Therefore I have shewed 2. That there is no Repugnancy in Reason nor to the Iustice of God for an Innocent Person to suffer by his own Consent and for so great an End what the Scripture attributes to our Saviour And I have fully answered the Arguments brought by our Adversaries to prove that God could not justly or wisely substitute an Innocent Person to suffer for the Guilty 3. That Christ did offer up himself as an Expiatory Sacrifice to God in our stead and that God did accept and allow of it Which is the Design of the three last Chapters And till an Answer be given to what I have there discoursed at large I shall refer the Reader to what is already said and shall suppose those Answers to be sufficient till I see some better Reasons for their Opinion in this matter than I have yet met with although I have been no stranger to their late Writings as God willing they may see on another Occasion E. W. April 24. 1696. ADVERTISEMENT THere are already published Two Volumes of Sermons Preached upon Several Occasions by the Right Reverend Father in God Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester in Octavo Sold by Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-yard A Third Volume will speedily be prepared for the Press A DISCOURSE Concerning the Sufferings of Christ. CHAP. I. I. Of the Socinian way of interpreting Scripture and of the uncertainty it leaves us in as to the main Articles of Faith manifested by an Exposition of Gen. 1. suitable to that way II. The state of the Controversie in general concerning the Sufferings of Christ for us He did not suffer the same we should have done III. The grand mistake in making punishments of the nature of Debts IV. The difference between them at large discovered from the different reason and ends of them V. The right of punishment in God proved against Crellius not to arise from mere dominion VI. The end of punishment not bare Compensation as it is in Debts what punishment due to an injured person by the right of Nature proper punishment a result of Laws VII Crellius his great mistake about the end of punishments VIII Not designed for satisfaction of Anger as it is a desire of Revenge Seneca and Lactantius vindicated against Crellius IX The Magistrates interest in punishment distinct from that of private persons X. Of the nature of Anger in God and the satisfaction to be made to it Crellius his great arguments against satisfaction depend on a false Notion of God's anger XI Of the ends of divine punishments XII The different nature of them in this and the future state SIR ALthough the Letter I received from your hands contained in it so many mistakes of my meaning and design that it seemed to be the greatest civility to the Writer of it to give no answer at all to it because that could not be done without the discovery of far more weaknesses in him than he pretends to find in my discourse Yet the weight and importance of the matter may require a farther account from me concerning the true reason of the Sufferings of Christ. Wherein my design was so far from representing old Errors to the best advantage or to rack my wits to defend them as that person seems to suggest that I aimed at nothing more than to give a true account of what upon a serious
judge in the affairs of particular men he doth it only as assuming the person of those men whereas it appears from the reason of the thing and the Custom of Nations that the interest of the Magistrate is considered as distinct from that of private persons when he doth most appear in vindication of injuries But all this is managed with a respect to the grand hypothesis viz. that the right of punishing doth belong only to the offended party as such that the punishment is of the nature of debts and the satisfaction by compensation to the anger of him who is offended The falsity of which this discourse was designed to discover Having thus considered the nature of punishments among men we come more closely to our matter by examining how far this will hold in the punishments which God inflicts on the account of sin For which two things must be enquired into 1. In what sense we attribute anger to God 2. What are the great ends of those punishments God inflicts on men on the account of sin X. For the first though our Adversaries are very unwilling to allow the term of punitive justice yet they contend for a punitive anger in God and that in the worst sense as it is appetitus vindictae for after Crellius hath contended that this is the proper notion of anger in general neither ought any one to say he adds that anger as other passions is attributed improperly to God for setting aside the imperfections which those passions are subject to in us all the rest is to be attributed to him taking away then that perturbation and pain and grief we find in our selves in anger to which the abhorrency of sin answers in God all the rest doth agree to him I would he had a little more plainly told us what he means by all the rest but we are to guess at his meaning by what went before where he allows of Cicero and Aristotle's definition of Anger whereof the one is that it is libido or as Crellius would rather have it cupiditas puniendi the other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. and himself calls it poenae appetitio and in another place that it may be as properly defined cupiditas vindictae as cupiditas poenae or affectus vindicandi as well as puniendi in all which places he doth assert such an anger in God as supposes such a motion or desire or inclination to punish sin when it is committed as there is in us when an injury is done us only the perturbation and pain excluded But he hath not thought fit to explain how such new motions or inclinations in the divine nature every time sin is committed are consistent with the immutability and perfection of it nor what such a kind of desire to punish in God imports whether a meer inclination without the effect or an inclination with the effect following if without the effect then either because the sin was not great enough or God's honour was not concerned to do it and in this case the same reasons which make the effect not to follow make the desire of it inconsistent with the divine wisdom and perfection or else because the effect is hindred by the repentance of the person or some other way which may make it not necessary to do it then upon the same reason the effect is suspended the inclination to do it should be so too for that must be supposed to be governed by an eternal reason and counsel as well as his actions unless some natural passions in God be supposed antecedent to his own wisdom and counsel which is derogatory to the infinite perfection of God since those are judged imperfections in our selves if it be taken only with the effect following it then God can never be said to be angry but when he doth punish whereas his wrath is said to be kindled in Scripture where the effect hath not followed which if it implies any more than the high provocation of God to punish as I suppose it doth not then this inclination to punish is to be conceived distinct from the effect following it But that conception of anger in God seems most agreeable to the divine nature as well as to the Scriptures which makes it either the punishment it self as Crellius elsewhere acknowledges it is often taken so or God's declaration of his will to punish which is called the revelation of the wrath of God against all unrighteousness of men God thereby discovering the just displeasure he hath against sin or the great provocation of God to punish by the sins of men as when his wrath is said to be kindled c. By this sense we may easily reconcile all that the Scripture saith concerning the wrath of God we make it agreeable to infinite perfection we make no such alterations in God as the appeasing of his anger must imply if that imply any kind of commotion in him And thus the grand difficulty of Crellius appears to be none at all against all those passages of Scripture which speak of appeasing God of atonement and reconciliation viz. that if they prove satisfaction they must prove that God being actually angry with mankind before the sufferings of his Son he must be presently appeased upon his undergoing them For no more need to be said than that God being justly provoked to punish the sins of mankind was pleased to accept of the sufferings of his Son as a sufficient sacrifice of Atonement for the sins of the world on consideration of which he was pleased to offer those terms of pardon which upon mens performance of the conditions required on their part shall be sufficient to discharge them from that obligation to punishment which they were under by their sins And what absurdity or incongruity there is in this to any principle of reason I cannot imagine But our Adversaries first make opinions for us and then shew they are unreasonable They first suppose that anger in God is to be considered as a passion and that passion a desire of revenge for satisfaction of it and then tell us that if we do not prove that this desire of revenge can be satisfied by the sufferings of Christ then we can never prove the doctrine of satisfaction to be true whereas we do not mean by God's anger any such passion but the just declaration of God's will to punish upon our provocation of him by our sins we do not make the design of satisfaction to be that God may please himself in the revenging the sins of the guilty upon the most innocent person because we make the design of punishment not to be the satisfaction of anger as a desire of revenge but to be the vindication of the honour and rights of the injured person by such a way as himself shall judge most satisfactory to the ends of his Government XI 2. Which is the next thing we are to clear For which end we shall make
make atonement for him which is as much as is ever said of any Expiatory Sacrifices And in the Verse before where we render 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his own voluntary will it is by the vulgar Latin rendred Ad placandum sibi Dominum by the Syriack Version Ad placationem sibi obtinendam à Domino and to the same purpose by the Chaldee Paraphrast but no one Version considerable that so renders it as to make Burnt-offerings to be Free-will offerings here which are spoken of distinctly and by themselves afterwards And the Chaldee Paraphrast Ionathan thus explains This is the Law of the Burnt-offering i. e. Quod venit ad expiandum pro cogitationibus cordis but although the Iews be not fully agreed what the Burnt-offerings were designed to expiate yet they consent that they were of an Expiatory nature Which might make us the more wonder that Crellius and others should exclude them from it but the only reason given by him is because they are distinguished from Sacrifices for sin as though no Sacrifices were of an Expiatory nature but they and then the Trespass-offerings must be excluded too for they are distinguished from Sin-offerings as well as the other The ignorance of the Iews in the reason of their own customs hath been an occasion of great mistakes among Christians concerning the nature of them when they judge of them according to the blind or uncertain conjectures which they make concerning them So that the Text is oft-times far clearer than their Commentaries are Setting aside then the intricate and unsatisfactory niceties of the Iewish Writers about the several reasons of the Burnt-offerings and Sin and Trespass-offerings and the differences they make between them which are so various and incoherent I shall propose this conjecture concerning the different reasons of them viz. That some Sacrifices were assumed into the Jewish Religion which had been long in use in the world before and were common to them with the Patriarchs and all those who in that age of the world did fear and serve God and such were the Burnt-offerings for expiation of sin and the fruits of the earth by way of gratitude to God Other Sacrifices were instituted among them with a particular respect to themselves as a people governed by the Laws of God And these were of several sorts 1. Symbolical of God's presence among them such was the daily Sacrifice instituted as a testimony of God's presence Exod. 29. from v 38. to the end 2. Occasional for some great mercies vouchsaâ—ed to them as the Passover and the Solemn Festivals c. 3. Expiatory for the sins committed against their Law And these were of three sorts 1. Such as were wholly consumed to the honour of God which were the Burnt-offerings 2. Such of which some part was consumed upon the Altar and some part sell to the share of the Priests and these were either sins particularly enumerated by God himself under the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or else generally comprehended under the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as being allowed to be expiated because committed through inadvertency 3. Such whereof a less part was consumed as in the Peace-offerings of the Congregation mentioned Levit. 23.19 whereof the blood was sprinkled only the inwards burnt and the flesh not eaten by the persons that offered them as it was in the Peace-offerings of particular persons of which as being private Sacrifices I have here no occasion to speak but only by the Priests in the Court and these had something of expiation in them For thence saith Vatablus the Peace-offering was called by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. Expiatorium and the LXX commonly render it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and several of the Iews think the reason of the name was That it made peace between God and him that offered it But the great reason I insist on is Because all the things which were used in an Expiatory Sacrifice were in this too the slaying of the Beast the sprinkling of the bloâ—d and the consumption of some part of it upon the Altar as an Oblation to God which are the three ingredients of an Expiatory Sacrifice for the shedding of the blood noted the bearing the punishment of our iniquity and the sprinkling of it on the Altar and the consuming of the part of the Sacrifice or the whole there that it was designed for the expiation of sin From whence it follows that the phrase of a sweet-smelling savour being applied under the Law to Expiatory Sacrifices is very properly used by St. Paul concerning Christ's giving up himself for us so that from this phrase nothing can be inferred contrary to the Expiatory nature of the death of Christ but rather it is fully agreeable to it VIII But Crellius hath yet a farther Argument to prove that Christ's death cannot be here meant as the Expiatory Sacrifice viz. That the notion of a sacrifice doth consist in the oblation whereby the thing is consecrated to the honour and service of God to which the mactation is but a bare preparation which he proves Because the slaying the sacrifice might belong to others besides the Priests Ezek. 44.10 11. but the oblation only to the Priests To this I answer 1. The mactation may be considered two ways either with a respect to the bare instrument of taking away the life or to the design of the Offerer of that which was to be sacrificed As the mactation hath a respect only to the instruments so it is no otherways to be considered than as a punishment but as it hath a respect to him that designs it for a Sacrifice so the shedding of the blood hath an immediate influence on the expiation of sin And that by this clear Argument The blood is said to make an Atonement for the soul and the reason given is because the life of the flesh is in the blood So that which was the life is the great thing which makes the Atonement and when the blood was shed the life was then given from whence it follows that the great efficacy of the sacrifice for Atonement lay in the shedding of the blood for that end Thence the Apostle attributes remission of sins to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the shedding of the blood and not to the bare Oblation of it on the Altar or the carrying it into the Holy of Holies both which seem to be nothing else but a more solemn representation of that blood before God which was already shed for the expiation of sins which was therefore necessary to be performed that the concurrence of the Priest might be seen with the sacrifice in order to expiation For if no more had been necessary but the bare slaying of the Beasts which was the meanest part of the service the people would never have thought the institution of the Priesthood necessary and least of all that of the High-Priest unless some solemn action
to their Sins from which they could expect no Deliverance but by the Blood of Sacrifices as a Ransom or Price of Redemption for them 2. That as the Punishment became due by the Law and the Execution of it was by the Iustice of God so the Ransom or Price of Redemption must be by way of Satisfaction to the Law in such a manner as it had appointed 3. That they had no other Notion of an Expiatory Sacrifice but the Offering the Blood of the Sacrifice for an Atonement in order to the Averting the just Displeasure of God against them for their Sins and this was that which they understood by Expiation or Remission of Sins 4. That the Expiation did not depend upon the Sacrifice as an intervening Condition as to the Party who thereby performed an Act of Obedience but upon the Nature of the Sacrifice which was offer'd to God For whatever had been required the Obedience had been the same but here the great Force is laid on the Blood being offer'd for Expiation 5. That however the Mercy of God was seen both in the Appointing and Accepting the Ransom yet the Expiatory Sacrifice was never understood by them to Respect the Mercy of God but his Just Displeasure against their Sins What strange Language would it have been thought among the Jews to offer an Expiatory Sacrifice to the Mercy of God But Men that bring in New Doctrines must make a New Sense of Words and Phrases or else they can never reconcile them to each other And it is a mighty Advantage to our Cause that we understand the Expressions of the New Testament with Respect to these Matters no otherwise than the Jews understood them among whom they were spoken and who had their own Law to interpret them by Our present Unitarians do not deny that the Sacrifices under the Law had an immediate Respect to God but they say it Was not by way of Satisfaction to the Justice of God but by way of Application to the Mercy of God by way of humble Suit and Deprecation But if there were such a Sanction of the Law whereby an Obligation to Punishment did follow the Offences forbidden by it If the Iustice of God were concerned to see the Punishment executed if the Law were not satisfied If the Sacrifice of Atonement or Expiation were designed for satisfaction of the Law and God did accept it for that End then it follows that these Sacrifices were intended not meerly as Rites of Intercession and Deprecation to the Mercy of God but by way of Satisfaction to his Justice For was it not Iustice in God to punish Offenders against his Law Was it not Iustice in God to require a Satisfaction to his Law when it was broken Was it not Iustice in God when he had declared that he would accept a Sacrifice of Atonement to require that instead of the Punishment of the Offenders and to punish those who wilfully neglected or despised it How then can they pretend that these Sacrifices had no Respect to the Justice of God We never read in Scripture any Expressions as to the Methods of Supplication like this That the Blood of the Sacrifices was to expiate for their Sins and that it was given for an Atonement for the Soul Is it ever said that Prayer and Supplication was to make a Sacrifice of Atonement and that it was appointed for that End Prayer is a Natural and Necessary Duty and a Condition in order to Pardon but the Life and Force of that lies in a Man 's own Breast in the inward and fervent Desires of the Soul but a Sacrifice of Atonement was a thing of another Nature the Blood was to be shed and then offer'd up to God as a Sacrifice of Atonement which God himself had appointed for that End and without which no Remission of Sins was to be expected But was not this from the Mercy of God to appoint such a Sacrifice of Atonement No doubt of it and so it was that he would accept it for such an End But that is by no means the present Question for it is Whether the Sacrifice which God appointed for an Atonement was only a Rite of Supplication to the Mercy of God In one Sense a Sacrifice of Atonement is a way of Deprecation but then it relates to the Wrath and Displeasure of God for it is that which God hath appointed as the Means of Averting his Wrath and Preventing the Execution of his Iustice. But the main Question is Whether the Sacrifice of Atonement as to God's just Wrath and Displeasure be not a Real Satisfaction to his Justice For if he be justly displeased and might justly punish but doth accept a Sacrifice of Expiation in stead of it although there be a Concurrence of Mercy yet there is a Real Atonement to his Iustice unless they will say the Iustice of God is not concerned in preserving the Honour of his Laws But of this more afterwards If an Expiatory Sacrifice under the Law were nothing else but a Solemn Rite of Supplication to the Mercy of God it would take away the Typical Nature of those Sacrifices and especially those on the Day of Expiation For what doth a Rite of Supplication and Intercession represent as a Figure of something to come Why were the Goat and the Bullock for the Sin-Offering to be presented alive before the Lord then their Blood to be shed and to be sprinkled before the Mercy-seat and upon the Altar Why was the Scape-Goat to have the Sins of the People confessed over him and put upon his head Why was the Flesh of the Bullock and Goat that was Sacrificed burnt without the Camp Do these look like Applications to the Mercy of God by way of humble Suit and Deprecation But the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us these things were a Figure representing Christ offering himself up to God by his own Blood who having obtain'd eternal Redemption for us enter'd into the Holy Place in Heaven whose Blood was far more effectual for the Purging away of Sin than the Blood of Bulls and Goats could be and to answer to the burning of the Flesh of the Sacrifices without the Camp that he might Sanctify the People with his own Blood he suffer'd without the Gate Was all this nothing but an Oblation to the Mercy of God by way of Prayer and Intercession Why all this Ceremony about an Oblation of Prayer which depends on the hearty Devotion of him that makes it Why did not the High-Priest enter without Blood into the Holy of Holies if it were nothing but a Rite of Supplication Why was the Blood sprinkled upon the Altar for Atonement after he came out from the Mercy-Seat Why was the Flesh burnt without the Camp Was that for Intercession too But saith the Correct Racovian Catechism all this doth not prove that the whole Expiatory Sacrifice of Christ was performed on the Cross but only that it was begun there
Justice to belong to God Is it not because it is just in him to punish Offenders according to those measures And whence comes this but from that Universal Justice in God which is always joyned with his Wisdom and Holiness and implies an Universal Rectitude in all he doth And from thence it comes that all the Measures of Iustice are observed by him in the Punishment of the greatest Offenders Now this Universal Justice in God is that whereby he not only punishes Obstinate and Impenitent Sinners but he takes care of preserving the Honour of his Laws And therefore although Almighty God out of his great Mercy were willing that Penitent Sinners should be forgiven yet it was most agreeable thereto that it should be done in such a manner as to discourage Mankind from the practice of Sin by the same way by which he offers Forgiveness and for this end it pleased God in his Infinite Wisdom and Goodness to send his Son to become a Sacrifice of Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind which being freely undertaken by him there was no breach in the Measures of Punitive Justice with respect to him and so by his Death he offered up himself as a full perfect and sufficient Sacrifice Oblation and Satisfaction for the Sins of Mankind And this is that Doctrine of the Satisfaction of Christ which we own and defend But these bold Assertions That God as absolute Lord may forgive all Offences without Repentance and it is not contrary to his Justice so to do that it is not the Justice of God which prompts him to punish Sinners arise from too mean and narrow a Conception of Divine Justice as though it lay only in the manner of the Execution of it But that there is an Essential Attribute of Justice belonging to the Divine Nature appears from hence that there are some things which are so disagreeable to the Divine Nature that he cannot do them he cannot break his Promises nor deceive Mankind to their Destruction he cannot deny himself nor pervert that Order or due Respects of things to each other which he hath established in the World He cannot make it the Duty of Mankind to dishonour their Maker or to violate the Rules of Good and Evil so as to make Evil Good and Good Evil he cannot make Murder and Adultery to be Virtues nor Impiety and Wickedness not to deserve Punishment But whence comes all this Is it that God wants Almighty Power to do what he pleases No doubt he is supreme Lord over all and hath all things under his Will But there is an Essential Iustice in God which is a supreme Rule of Righteousness according to which he doth always exercise his Power and Will And so Moses saith of him All his ways are perfect a God of Truth and without Iniquity just and right is he and the Psalmist The Lord is righteous in all his ways and holy in all his works He not only is so but he can be no otherwise for this Vniversal Righteousness is as great a Perfection and Attribute of God as his Wisdom or Power It is not one Name which stands for all but it is a real and distinct Attribute of it self It is as a Rule and Measure to the Exercise of the rest And he particularly shews it in all the Acts of Punitive Iustice So Nehemiah Howbeit thou art just in all that is brought upon us for thou hast done right but we have done wickedly And Daniel Righteousness belongeth unto thee but unto us confusion of Face For the Lord our God is righteous in all his Works which he doth for we obey'd not his Voice And Zephaniah The just Lord is in the midst thereof he will not do Iniquity From whence it appears that the Exercise of Punitive Iustice is according to the Essential Iustice or Righteousness of the Divine Nature And so Abraham pleaded with God Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right i. e. Will he not punish according to the Righteousness of his Nature And so Abimelech argues from the natural Notion he had of Godâ—s righteous Nature Lord wilt thou slay also a righteous Nation But here the main Difficulty which deserves to be cleared is this How far Punitive Justice is founded on that Universal Justice which is an Essential Attribute of God For the want of understanding this hath been the great occasion of so much Confusion in the Discourses about this matter And for the clearing of it these things must be considered 1. That there is a difference between that Iustice in God whereby he hates Sin and that whereby he punishes the Sinner The hatred of Sin doth necessarily follow the Perfection of his Nature Therefore God is said To hate the Wicked and Evil to be an Abomination to him to love Righteousness and to hate Wickedness But if the Punishment of the Offender were as necessarily consequent as his Hatred of Sin all Mankind must suffer as they offend and there would be no place for Mercy in God nor for Repentance in Men. But Sin in it self is perfectly hatefull to God there being nothing like God in it but Man was God's Creature and made after his Image and Likeness and however God be displeased with Mankind on the account of Sin yet the Workmanship of God still remains and we continually see that God doth not exercise his Punitive Iustice according to the Measures of their Iniquities And they who plead most for the necessity of Punitive Iustice are themselves a Demonstration to the contrary for they cannot deny that they are not punished as their Iniquities have deserved And if Punitive Iustice be necessary in it self it must reach the Persons that have deserved to be punished if there be no Relaxation of the Severity of it 2. That it is very agreeable to the Divine Justice to exercise the Severity of Punitive Iustice on obstinate and incorrigible Offenders And this is that whereon the Iustice of the Punishments of Sinners in another World is founded because God hath been so mercifull to them here and used so many ways to reclaim them and it is the Not exercising his Punitive Iustice upon them in this World which makes it so much more reasonable in another For thereby they have shewed their Contempt of God and his Laws of his offers of Mercy and their wilfull obstinacy in offending him And the reasonableness of the Punishment of such Offenders is not denyed by any of our more Learned Adversaries as I have shewed in the following Discourse from Socinus and Crellius and might do from several others But I need not mention any more since in the late Correct Edition of the Racovian Catechism there is this Note That they have always asserted that the Wicked shall be raised up at the great Day to undergo the Punishment of their Sins and to be cast into the Fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels And for this
there would have followed a deliverance ipso facto for the release immediately follows the payment of the same and it had been injustice to have required any thing further in order to the discharge of the Offender when strict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation But we see that Faith and Repentance and the consequences of those two are made conditions on our parts in order to the enjoying the benefit of what Christ hath procured So that the release is not immediate upon the payment but depends on a new contract made in consideration of what Christ hath done and suffered for us If it be said That by Christ's payment we become his and he requires these conditions of us besides the contrariety of it to the Scriptures which make the conditions to be required by him to whom the payment was made we are to consider that these very persons assert that Christ paid all for us and in our name and stead so that the payment by Christ was by a substitution in our room and if he paid the same which the Law required the benefit must immediately accrue to those in whose name the debt was paid For what was done in the name of another is all one to the Creditor as if it had been done by the Debtor himself But above all things it is impossible to reconcile the freeness of remission with the full payment of the very same which was in the obligation Neither will it serve to say That though it was not free to Christ yet it was to us For the satisfaction and remission must respect the same person for Christ did not pay for himself but for us neither could the remission be to him Christ therefore is not consider'd in his own name but as acting in our stead so that what was free to him must be to us what was exactly paid by him it is all one as if it had been done by us so that it is impossible the same debt should be fully paid and freely forgiven Much less will it avoid the difficulty in this case to say That it was a refusable payment for it being supposed to be the very same it was not in justice refusable and however not in equity if it answer the intention of the Law as much as the suffering of the offenders had done and the more it doth that the less refusable it is And although God himself found out the way that doth not make the pardon free but the designation of the person who was to pay the debt Thus when our Adversaries dispute against this opinion no wonder if they do it successfully but this whole opinion is built upon a mistake that satisfaction must be the payment of the very same which while they contend for they give our Adversaries too great an advantage and make them think they triumph over the Faith of the Church when they do it only over the mistake of some particular persons But the foundation of this mistake lies in the consideration of punishment under the notion of debts and that satisfaction therefore must be by strict payment in rigor of Law but how great that mistake is will appear in the subsequent discourse But it cannot but be wondred at that the very same persons who consider sins as debts which must be strictly satisfied for do withal contend for the absolute necessity of this satisfaction whereas Socinus his Arguments would hold good if sins were only considered as debts and God as the mere Creditor of punishment he might as freely part with his own right without satisfaction as any Creditor may forgive what summ he pleases to a person indebted to him and no reason can be brought to the contrary from that notion of sins why he may not do it But if they be considered with a respect to God's Government of the world and the honour of his Laws then some further account may be given why it may not be consistent with that to pass by the sins of men without satisfaction made to them III. And because the mistake in this matter hath been the foundation of most of the subsequent mistakes on both sides and the discovery of the cause of errors doth far more to the cure of them than any Arguments brought against them and withal the true understanding of the whole Doctrine of satisfaction depends upon it I shall endeavour to make clear the notion under which our sins are considered for upon that depends the nature of the satisfaction which is to be made for them For while our Adversaries suppose that sins are to be looked on under the notion of debts in this debate they assert it to be wholly free for God to remit them without any satisfaction They make the right of punishment merely to depend on God's absolute Dominion and that all satisfaction must be considered under the notion of compensation for the injuries done to him to whom it is to be made But if we can clearly shew a considerable difference between the notion of debts and punishments if the right of punishment doth not depend upon mere Dominion and that satisfaction by way of punishment is not primarily intended for compensation but for other ends we shall make not only the state of the Controversie much clearer but offer something considerable towards the resolution of it The way I shall take for the proof of the difference between debts and punishments shall be using the other for the Arguments for it For besides that those things are just in matter of debts which are not so in the case of punishments as that it is lawfull for a man to forgive all the debts which are owing him by all persons though they never so contumaciously refuse payment but our Adversaries will not say so in the case of sins for although they assert That the justice of God doth never require punishment in case of repentance yet withal they assert That in case of impenitency it is not only agreeable but due to the nature and decrees and therefore to the rectitude and equity of God not to give pardon But if this be true then there is an apparent difference between the notion of debts and punishments for the Impenitency doth but add to the gâ—eatness of the debt And will they say it is only in God's power to remit small debts but he must punish the greatest what becomes then of God's absolute liberty to part with hâ—s own right will not this shew more of his kindness to pardon the greater rather than lesser offenders But if there be something in the nature of the thing which makes it not only just but necessary for impenitent sinners to be punished as Crellius after Socinus frequently acknowledges then it is plain that sins are not to be considered merely as debts for that obstinacy and impenitency is only punished as a greater degree of sin and therefore as a greater debt And withal those things
governed by reason it aims at no more than the great end of our beings viz. Self-Preservation But when that cannot be obtained without anothers evil so far the intendment of it is lawful but no further And I cannot therefore think those Philosophers who have defined Anger to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by whose Authority Crellius defends himself when he makes anger to be a desire of revenge did throughly consider what was just and reasonable in it but barely what was natural and would be the effect of that passion if not governed by reason For otherwise Iul. Scaliger's definition is much more true and justifiable that it is appetitus depulsionis viz. that whereby we are stirred up to drive away from us any thing that is injurious to us But because Crellius alledgeth a saying of Seneca that would make vindicta of the nature of punishment duabus de causis punire princeps solet si aut se vindicet aut alium We shall oppose to this the sense of the same Author in this matter which may sufficiently clear the other passage For saith he Inhumanum verbum est quidem pro justo receptum ultio à contumelia non differt nisi ordine qui dolorem regerit tantum excusatius peccat And no man speaks with greater vehemency against the delight in others punishments than he doth for he always asserts the only reason of punishment to be some advantage which is to come by it and not meerly to satisfie anger or to allay their own griefs by seeing anothers For saith he the punishment is inflicted Non quia delectetur ullius poena procul est enim à sapiente tam inhumana feritas sed ut documentum omnium sint So that it is only the usefulness of punishment according to him which makes it become any wise man and so far from a satisfaction of his grief by anothers punishment that he makes that a piece of inhumanity not incident to any who pretend to wisdom Nay he denies that a just punishment doth flow from Anger for he that inflicts that doth it non ipsius poenae avidus sed quia oportet not as desiring the punishment but because there are great reasons for it And elsewhere Exsequar quia oportet non quia dolet he is far enough then from approving that imaginary compensation of one mans grief by anothers And he shews at large that the weakest natures and the least guided by reason are the most subject to this anger and revenge And although other things be pretended the general cause of it is a great infirmity of humane nature and thence it is that children and old men and sick persons are the most subject to it and the better any are the more they are freed from it quippe minuti Semper infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas Vltio He makes Cruelty to be nothing else but the intemperance of the mind in exacting punishment and the difference between a Prince and a Tyrant to lie in this That one delights in punishing the other never does it but in case of necessity when the publick good requires it And this throughout his discourse he makes the measure of punishment Who then could imagine that he should speak so contradictory to himself as to allow punishment for meer revenge or the easing ones own griefs by the pains of another In the places cited by Crellius if taken in his sense he speaks what commonly is not what ought to be in the world for he disputes against it in that very place therefore that cannot be the meaning which he contends for The common design of punishments by a Prince saith he is either to vindicate himself or others I so render his words because vindicare when it is joyned with the person injured as here vindicare se aut alium doth properly relate to the end of punishment which is asserting the right of the injured person but when it is joyned with the persons who have done the injury or the crimes whereby they did it then it properly signifies to punish Thus Sallust useth Vindicatum in eos and Cicero In milites nostros vehementer vindicatum and for the fact very frequently in him maleficia vindicare but when it relates to the injured person as here it doth it cannot signifie meerly to punish for then se vindicare would be to punish ones self but to assert his own right in case of injury though it be with the punishment of another For Vindicatio as Cicero defines it est per quam vis injuria omnino quod obfuturum est defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur So that the security of our selves in case of force or injury is that which is called Vindication which sometimes may be done by defence and other times by punishment And that Seneca doth mean no more here is apparent by what follows for in case of private injuries he saith poenam si tutò poterit donet he would have the Prince forgive the punishment if it may be done with safety so that he would not have any one punished to satisfie anothers desire of revenge but to preserve his own safety And afterwards he saith It is much beneath a Princes condition to need that satisfaction which arises from anothers sufferings But for the punishments of others he saith The Law hath established three ends the amendment of the persons or making others better by their punishments or the publick security by taking away such evil members out of the body So that in publick punishments he never so much as supposes that contentment which revenge fansies in others punishments but makes them wholly designed for the publick advantage For the Laws in punishment do not look backward but forward for as Plato saith No wise man ever punished meerly because men had offended but lest they should For past things cannot be recalled but future are therefore forbidden that they may be prevented So to the same purpose is the saying of Lactantius produced by Grotius Surgimus ad vindictam non quia laesi sumus sed ut disciplina servetur mores corrigantur licentia comprimatur haec est Ira justa To which Crellius answers That this signifies nothing unless it can be proved that no man may justly punish another merely because he is wronged If he means of the right to punish we deny not that to be because the person is wronged but if he understands it of the design and end of punishment then we deny that it is an allowable end of punishments any further than it can come under the notion of restitution of which we have spoken already When a Master which is the instance he produceth punisheth his servants because they have disobeyed him The reason of that punishment is not the bare disobedience but the injury which comes to him by it the reparation of which he seeks by punishment
have something of Vindicta in it and therefore be a proper punishment The truth is our Adversaries allow themselves in speaking things most repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of punishments that they may justifie their own hypothesis For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the greatest blessings were ever promised them and instead of enjoying them to endure the miseries and hardships of forty years travels in a barren wilderness must not be thought a punishment and only because occasioned by their Parents sins But whatever is inflicted on the account of sin and with a design to shew God's severity against it and thereby to deter others from the practice of it hath the proper notion of punishment in it and all these things did concurr in this instance besides the general sense of mankind in the matter of their punishment which was such that supposing them preserved in their liberty could not have been imagined greater And therefore Vatablus whom Socinus and Crellius highly commend thus renders those words dabunt poenas pro fornicationibus vestris quibus defecistis à Deo vestro they shall suffer the punishment of your fornications And that bearing the sins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the punishment of them methinks they should not so earnestly deny who contend that to be the meaning of the words in Ezekiel The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father viz. that he shall not bear the punishment of his Fathers sins Where in bearing iniquity with a respect to their Parents sins by their own confession must be taken for the proper punishment for otherwise they do not deny but Children notwithstanding that sentence may undergo much affliction on the occasion of their Parents sins IV. But Socinus further objects that bearing sins doth not imply the punishment of them because the Scape-Goat under the Law is said to bear upon him the iniquities of the people and yet could not be said to be punished for them To which Grotius answers that Socinus takes it for granted without reason that the Scape-Goat could not be said to be punished for the sins of the people for punishment in general may fall upon beasts for the sins of men Gen. 9.5 Exod. 21.28 Lev. 20.15 Gen. 8.21 and Socinus hath no cause to say that the Scape-Goat was not slain for the Iewish Interpreters do all agree that he was and however the sending him into the Wilderness was intended as a punishment and most probably by an unnatural death To which Crellius replies That in the general he denies not but punishment may fall upon beasts as well as men but that he might shew himself true to his principle that one cannot be punished for anothers faults he falls into a very pleasant discourse That the Beasts are not said to be punished for mens sins but for their own and therefore when it is said before the flood that all flesh had corrupted his way he will by no means have it understood only of men but that the sins of the beasts at that time were greater than ordinary as well as mens But he hath not told us what they were whether by eating some forbidden herbs or entring into conspiracies against mankind their lawful Sovereigns or unlawful mixtures and therefore we have yet reason to believe that when God saith the ground was cursed for man's sake that the beasts were punished for mans sin And if all flesh must comprehend beasts in this place why shall not all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord take in the beasts there too for Vatablus parallels this place with the other But if saith Crellius any shall contend that some beasts at least were innocent then he saith that those though they were destroyed by the flood yet did not suffer punishment but only a calamity by occasion of the sins of men I wonder he did not rather say that the innocent beasts were taken into the Ark for the propagation of a better kind afterwards But by this solemn distinction of calamities and punishments there is nothing so miserable that either men or beasts can undergo but when it serves their turn it shall be only a calamity and no punishment though it be said to be on purpose to shew God's severity against the sins of the world And this excellent notion of the beasts being punished for their own sins is improved by him to the vindication of the Scape-Goat from being punished because then saith he the most wicked and corrupt Goat should have been made choice of As though all the design of that great day of expiation had been only to call the Children of Israel together with great solemnity to let them see how a poor Goat must be punished for breaking the Laws which we do not know were ever made for them I had thought our Adversaries had maintained that the Sacrifices on the day of expiation at least had represented and typified the Sacrifice which was to be offered up by Christ and so Socinus and Crellius elsewhere contend he needed not therefore have troubled himself concerning the sins of the Goat when it is expresly said That the sins of the people were put on the head of the Goat Whatever then the punishment were it was on the account of the sins of the people and not his own But Crellius urgeth against Grotius that if the Scape-Goat had been punished for the expiation of the sins of the people that should have been particularly expressed in Scripiure whereas nothing is said there at all of it and that the throwing down the Scape-Goat from the top of the rock was no part of the Primitive Institution but one of the superstitions taken up by the Iews in after-times because of the Ominousness of the return of it and although we should suppose which is not probable that it should die by famine in the Wilderness yet this was not the death for expiation which was to be by the shedding of blood To this therefore I answer 1. I do not insist on the customs of the later Jews to prove from thence any punishment designed by the primitive institution For I shall easily yield that many superstitions obtained among them aftewards about the Scape-Goat as the stories of the red list turning white upon the head of it the booths and the causey made on purpose and several other things mentioned in the Rabbinical Writers do manifest But yet it seems very probable from the Text it self that the Scape-Goat was not carried into the Wilderness at large but to a steep mountain there For although we have commonly render'd Azazel by the Scape-Goat yet according to the best of the Jewish writers as P. Fagius tells us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth not come from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Goat and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 abiit but is the name of a Mountain very steep and rocky near Mount Sinai and therefore
〈◊〉 that will not prove that his death was a proper punishment To which I answer That whatever answers to the ends of an exemplary punishment may properly be called so but supposing that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins those sufferings will answer to all the ends of an exemplary punishment For the ends of such a punishment assigned by Crellius himself are That others observing such a punishment may abstain from those sins which have brought it upon the person who suffers Now the question is whether supposing Christ did suffer on the account of our sins these sufferings of his may deterr us from the practice of sin or no And therefore in opposition to Crellius I shall prove these two things 1. That supposing Christ suffered for our sins there was a sufficient argument to deterr us from the practice of sin 2. Supposing that his sufferings had no respect to our sins they could not have that force to deterr men from the practice of it for he after asserts That Christ's sufferings might be a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to us though they were no punishment of sin 1. That the death of Christ considered as a punishment of sin is a proper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or hath a great force to deterr men from the practice of sin and that because the same reason of punishment is supposed in Christ and in our selves and because the example is much more considerable than if we had suffered our selves 1. The same reason of punishment is supposed For why are men deterred from sin by seeing others punished but because they look upon the sin as the reason of the punishment and therefore where the same reason holds the same ends may be as properly obtained If we said that Christ suffered death meerly as an innocent person out of God's dominion over his life what imaginable force could this have to deterr men from sin which is asserted to have no relation to it as the cause of it But when we say that God laid our iniquities upon him that he suffered not upon his own account but ours that the sins we commit against God were the cause of all those bitter Agonies which the Son of God underwent what argument can be more proper to deterr men from sin than this is For hereby they see the great abhorrency of sin which is in God that he will not pardon the sins of men without a compensation made to his Honour and a demonstration to the world of his hatred of it Hereby they see what a value God hath for his Laws which he will not relax as to the punishment of offenders without so valuable a consideration as the blood of his own Son Hereby they see that the punishment of sin is no meer arbitrary thing depending barely upon the will of God but that there is such a connexion between sin and punishment as to the ends of Government that unless the Honour and Majesty of God as to his Laws and Government maâ— be preserved the violation of his Laws must expect a just recompence of reward Hereby they see what those are to expect who neglect or despise these sufferings of the Son of God for them for nothing can then remain but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the Adversaries So that here all the weighty arguments concur which may be most apt to prevail upon men to deterr them from their sins For if God did thus by the green tree what will he do by the dry If he who was so innocent in himself so perfectly holy suffered so much on the account of our sins what then may those expect to suffer who have no innocency at all to plead and add wilfulness and impenitency to their sins But if it be replied by Crellius that it is otherwise among men I answer that we do not pretend in all things to parallel the sufferings of Christ for us with any sufferings of men for one another But yet we add that even among men the punishments inflicted on those who were themselves innocent as to the cause of them may be as exemplary as any other And the greater appearance of severity there is in them the greater terror they strike into all offenders As Children's losing their estates and honours or being banished for their Parents treasons in which they had no part themselves Which is a proper punishment on them of their Father's faults whether they be guilty or no and if this may be just in men why not in God If any say that the Parents are only punished in the Children he speaks that which is contradictory to the common sense of mankind for punishment doth suppose sense or feeling of it and in this case the Parents are said to be punished who are supposed to be dead and past feeling of it and the Children who undergo the smart of it must not be said to be punished though all things are so like it that no person can imagine himself in that condition but would think himself punished and severely too If it be said that these are calamities indeed but they are no proper punishments it may easily be shewed that distinction will not hold here Because these punishments were within the design of the Law and were intended for all the ends of punishments and therefore must have the nature of them For therefore the Children are involved in the Father's punishment on purpose to deterr others from the like actions There are some things indeed that Children may fall into by occasion of their Father's guilt which may be only calamities to them because they are neâ—essary consequents in the nature of the thing and not purposely design'd as a punishment to them Thus being deprived of the comfort and assistance of their Parents when the Law hath taken them off by the hand of justice this was designed by the Law as a punishment to the Parents and as to the Children it is only a necessary consequent of their punishment For otherwise the Parents would have been punished for the Childrens faults and not the Children only involved in that which unavoidably follows upon the Parents punishment So that Crellius is very much mistaken either in the present case of our Saviour's punishment or in the general reason of exemplary punishments as among men But the case of our Saviour is more exemplary when we consider the excellency of his person though appearing in our nature when no meaner sufferings would satisfie than of so transcendent a nature as he underwent though he were the Eternal Son of God this must make the punishment much more exemplary than if he were considered only as our Adversaries do as a mere man So that the dignity of his person under all his sufferings may justly add a greater consideration to deterr us from the practice of sin which was so severely punished in him when he was pleased to be a Sacrifice for our sins From whence
we see that the ends of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are very agreeable with the sufferings of Christ considered as a punishment of sin X. We now consider whether as Crellius asserts supposing Christ's death were no punishment it could have these effects upon mens minds or no Yes he saith it might because by his sufferings we might see how severely God would punish wicked and obstinate persons Which being a strange riddle at the first hearing it viz. that by the sufferings of an innocent person without any respect to sin as the cause of them we should discern God's severity against those who are obstinate in sin we ought the more diligently to attend to what is said for the clearing of it First saith he If God spared not his own most innocent and holy and only Son than whom nothing was more dear to him in Heaven or Earth but exposed him to so cruel and ignominious a death how great and severe sufferings may we think God will inflict on wicked men who are at open defiance with him I confess my self not subtle enough to apprehend the force of this argument viz. If God dealt so severely with him who had no sin either of his own or others to answer for therefore he will deal much more severely with those that have For God's severity considered without any respect to sin gives rather encouragement to sinners than any argument to deterr them from it For the natural consequence of it is that God doth act arbitrarily without any regard to the good or evil of mens actions and therefore it is to no purpose to be sollicitous about them For upon the same account that the most innocent person suffers most severely from him for all that we know the more we strive to be innocent the more severely we may be dealt with and let men sin they can be but dealt severely with all the difference then is one shall be called punishments and the other calamities but the severity may be the same in both And who would leave off his sins meerly to change the name of punishments into that of calamities And from hence it will follow that the differences of good and evil and the respects of them to punishment and reward are but airy and empty things but that God really in the dispensation of things to men hath no regard to what men are or do but acts therein according to his own Dominion whereby he may dispose of men how or which way he pleases If a Prince had many of his Subjects in open rebellion against him and he should at that time make his most obedient and beloved Son to be publickly exposed to all manner of indignities and be dishonoured and put to death by the hands of those rebels could any one imagine that this was designed as an exemplary punishment to all rebels to let them see the danger of rebellion No but would it not rather make them think him a cruel Prince one that would punish innocency as much as rebellion and that it was rather better to stand at defiance and become desperate for it was more dangerous to be beloved than hated by him to be his Son than his declared Enemy so that insisting on the death of Christ as it is considered as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for of that we speak now there is no comparison between our Adversaries hypothesis and ours but saith Crellius the consequence is not good on our side if Christ suffered the punishment of our sins therefore they shall suffer much more who continue in sin for Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world but they suffer only for their own and what they have deserved themselves To which I answer that the argument is of very good force upon our hypothesis though it would not be upon theirs For if we suppose him to be a meer man that suffered then there could be no argument drawn from his sufferings to ours but according to the exact proportion of sins and punishments but supposing that he had a divine as well as humane nature there may not be so great a proportion of the sins of the world to the sufferings of Christ as of the sins of a particular person to his own sufferings and therefore the argument from one to the other doth still hold For the measure of punishments must be taken with a proportion to the dignity of the person who suffers them And Crellius himself confesseth elsewhere that the dignity of the person is to be considered in exemplary punishment and that a lesser punishment of one that is very great may do much more to deterr men from sin than a greater punishment of one much less But he yet further urgeth that the severity of God against sinners may be discovered in the sufferings of Christ because God's hatred against sin is discovered therein But if we ask how God's hatred against sin is seen in the sufferings of one perfectly innocent and free from sin and not rather his hatred of innocency if no respect to sin were had therein he answers That God's hatred against sin was manifested in that he would not spare his only Son to draw men off from sin For answer to which we are to consider the sufferings of Christ as an innocent person designed as an exemplary cause to draw men off from sin and let any one tell me what hatred of sin can possibly be discovered in proposing the sufferings of a most innocent person to them without any consideration of sin as the cause of those sufferings If it be said That the Doctrine of Christ was designed to draw men off from sin and that God suffered his Son to die to confirm this Doctrine and thereby shewed his hatred to sin I answer 1. This is carrying the dispute off from the present business for we are not now arguing about the design of Christ's Doctrine nor the death of Christ as a means to confirm that but as a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and what power that hath without respect to our sins as the cause of them to draw us from sin by discovering God's hatred to it 2. The Doctrine of Christ according to their hypothesis discovers much less of God's hatred to sin than ours doth For if God may pardon sin without any compensation made to his Laws or Honour if repentance be in its own nature a sufficient satisfaction for all the sins past of our Lives if there be no such a Justice in God which requires punishment of sin commiâ—ted if the punishment of sin depend barely upon God's will and the most innocent person may suffer as much from God without respect to sin as the cause of suffering as the most guilty let any rational man judge whether this Doctrine discovers as much God's abhorrency of sin as asserting the necessity of vindicating God's honour to the World upon the breach of his Laws if not by the suffering of the offenders
therefore generally punisheth the whole Family or People 3. That which may be a meer exercise of dominion as to some may be a proper punishment to others as in the case of Infants being taken away for their Parents sins For God as to the Children he saith useth only an act of dominion but the punishment only redounds to the Parents who lose them and though this be done for the very end of punishment yet he denies that it hath the nature of Punishment in any but the Parents 4. That punishment may be intended for those who can have no sense at all of it as Crellius asserts in the case of Saul's sons 2 Sam. 21.8 14. that the punishment was mainly intended for Saul who was already dead From these concessions of Crellius in this case we may take notice 1. That a remote conjunction may be sufficient for a translation of penalty viz. from one Generation to another 2. That sins may be truly said to be punished in others when the offenders themselves may escape punishment thus the sins of Parents in their Children and Princes in their Subjects 3. That an act of dominion in some may be designed as a proper punishment to others 4. That the nature of punishment is not to be measured by the sense of it Now upon these concessions though our Adversaries will not grant that Christ was properly punished for our sins yet they cannot deny but that we may very properly be said to be punished for our sins in Christ and if they will yield us this the other may be a strife about words For surely there may be easily imagined as great a conjunction between Christ and us as between the several Generations of the Iews and that last which was punished in the destruction of Ierusalem and though we escape that punishment which Christ did undergo yet we might have our sins punished in him as well as Princes theirs in their Subjects when they escape themselves or rather as Subjects in an innocent Prince who may suffer for the faults of his people if it be said that these are acts of meer dominion as to such a one that nothing hinders but granting it yet our sins may be said to be punished in him as well as Parents sins are punished properly in meer acts of dominion upon their Children if it be said that can be no punishment where there is no sense at all of it that is fully taken off by Crellius for surely we have as great a sense of the sufferings of Christ as the first Generation of the Iews had of the sufferings of the last before the fatal destruction of the City or as Saul had of the punishment of his Sons after his death So that from Crellius his own concessions we have proved that our sins may very properly be said to be punished in Christ although he will not say that Christ could be properly punished for our sins nay he and the rest of our Adversaries not only deny it but earnestly contend that it is very unjust to suppose it and repugnant to the rectitude of God's nature to do it III. And so we come to consider the mighty arguments that are insisted on for the proof of this which may be reduced to these three viz. 1. That there can be no punishment but what is deserved but no man can deserve that another should be punished 2. That punishment flows from revenge but there can be no revenge where there hath been no fault 3. That the punishment of one cannot any ways be made the punishment of another and in case it be supposed possible then those in whose stead the other is punished must be actually delivered upon the payment of that Debt which was owing to God 1. That one man cannot deserve anothers punishment and therefore one cannot be punished for another for there is no just punishment but what is deserved This being the main Argument insisted on by Crellius must be more carefully considered but before an answer be made to it it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it which will be best done by laying down his principles as to the justice of punishments in a more distinct method than himself hath done which are these following 1. That no person can be justly punished either for his own or anothers faults but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin of his own For he still asserts That the justice of punishment ariseth from a mans own fault though the actual punishment may be from anothers But he that is punished without respect to his own guilt is punished undeservedly and he that is punished undeservedly is punished unjustly 2. That personal guilt being supposed one man's sin may be the impulsive cause of another's punishment but they cannot be the meritorious The difference between them he thus explains The cause is that which makes a thing to be the impulsive that which moves one to do a thing without any consideration of right that one hath to do it Merit is that which makes a man worthy of a thing either good or bad and so gives a right to it if it be good to himself if bad to him at whose hands he hath deserved it Now he tells us that it is impossible That one mans sins should make any other deserve punishment but the person who committed them but they may impell one to punish another and that justly if the person hath otherwise deserved to be punished unjustly if he hath not The reason he gives of it is That the vitiosity of the act which is the proper cause of punishment cannot go beyond the person of the offender and therefore can oblige none to punishment but him that hath committed the fault And therefore he asserts That no man can be justly punished beyond the desert of his own sins but there may sometimes be a double impulsive cause of that punishment viz. His own and other mens whereof one made that they might be justly punished the other that they should be actually but the latter he saith always supposeth the former as the foundation of just punishment so that no part of punishment could be executed upon him wherein his own sins were not supposed as the meritorious cause of it These are his two main principles which we must now throughly examine the main force of his Book lying in them But if we can prove that it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind that a person may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions if God hath justly punished some for the sins of others and there be no injustice in one mans suffering by his own consent for another then these principles of Crellius will be found not so firm as he imagines them IV. 1. That it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own
the others sufferings it would be by supposing their guilt more fully translated upon those who suffer and consequently a greater obligation to punishment following that guilt From whence it follows that if it be just to punish when the person is not deliver'd from whom the other suffers it is more just when he is for the translation of the penalty is much less in the former case than in the latter and what is just upon less grounds of punishment must be more just upon greater I look on this therefore but as a shift of Crellius hoping thereby to avoid the consent of mankind in one mans suffering for another without attending to the main argument he was upon viz. The justice of one person suffering for another 2. It is a very unreasonable thing to make an action unjust for that which of it self is acknowledged by our Adversaries to be very just viz. The pardoning the offenders themselves If it were just to suffer if the other were not pardoned and it were just to pardon whether the other were punished or no how comes this suffering to be unjust merely by the others being pardoned by it nay is it not rather an argument that those sufferings are the most just which do so fully answer all the ends of punishments that there is then no necessity that the offender should suffer but that the Supreme Governour having obtained the ends of Government by the suffering of one for the rest declares himself so well pleased with it that he is willing to pardon the offenders themselves 3. Many of those persons who have had their sins punished in others have themselves escaped the punishment due to the desert of their sins As is plain in the case of Ahab whose punishment was not so great as his sins deserved because the full punishment of them was reserved to his posterity If it be said as it is by Crellius That Ahab was not wholly freed his life being taken away for his own sins That gives no sufficient answer for if some part of the punishment was deferred that part he was delivered from and the same reason in this case will hold for the whole as the part As is plain in the case of Manasseh and several others the guilt of whose sins were punished on their posterity themselves escaping it 4 Our Adversaries confess that in some cases it is lawful and just for some to suffer with a design that others may be freed by their suffering for them Thus they assert That one Christian not only may but ought to lay down his life for another if there be any danger of his denying the truth or he judges him far more usefull and considerable than himself so likewise a Son for his Father one Brother for another or a Friend or any whose life he thinks more usefull than his own Now I ask whether a man can be bound to a thing that is in its one nature unjust if not as it is plain he cannot then such an obligation of one man to suffer for the delivery of another cannot be unjust and consequently the suffering it self cannot be so But Crellius saith The injustice in this case lies wholly upon the Magistrate who admits it but I ask wherefore is it unjust in the Magistrate to admit it it is because the thing is in it self unjust if so there can be no obligation to do it and it would be as great a sin to undergo it as in the Magistrate to permit it but if it be just in it self we have obtained what we contend for viz. that it may be just for a man to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions for he that lays down his life for his Brethren doth not deserve by his own actions that very punishment which he undergoes And if the thing be in it self just how comes it to be unjust in him that permits it 5. The reason why among men the offenders themselves are punished is because those were not the terms upon which the persons suffered For if they had suffered upon these terms that the other might be freed and their suffering was admitted of by the Magistrate on that consideration then in all reason and justice the offenders ought to be freed on the account of the others suffering for them But among men the chief reason of the obligation to punishment of one man for another is not that the other might be freed but that there may be security given by the publick that the offenders shall be punished and the reason of the Sureties suffering is not to deliver the offender but to satisfie the Law by declaring that all care is taken that the offender should be punished when in case of escape the Surety suffers for him But it is quite another thing when the person suffers purposely that others might be freed by his suffering for then in case the suffering be admitted the release of the other is not only not unjust but becomes due to him that suffered on his own terms Not as though it followed ipso facto as Crellius fansies but the manner of release doth depend upon the terms which he who suffered for them shall make in order to it For upon this suffering of one for another upon such terms the immediate consequent of the suffering is not the actual discharge but the right to it which he hath purchased and which he may dispense upon what terms he shall judge most for his honour 6. Although one persons sufferings cannot become anothers so as one mans Money may yet one mans sufferings may be a sufficient consideration on which a benefit may accrue to another For to that end a Donation or such a transferring right from one to another as is in Money is not necessary but the acceptation which it hath from him who hath the power to pardon If he declare that he is so well pleased with the sufferings of one for another that in consideration of them he will pardon those from whom he suffered where lies the impossibility or unreasonableness of the thing For Crellius gâ—ants that rewards may be given to others than the persons who did the actions in consideration of those actions and why may not the sufferings of one for others being purposely undertaken for this end be available for the pardon of those whom he suffered for For a man can no more transfer the right of his good actions than of his sufferings From all which it follows that one person may by his own consent and being admitted thereto by him to whom the right of punishing belongs suffer justly tho' it be beyond the desert of his own actions and the guilty may be pardoned on the account of his sufferings Which was the first thing we designed to prove from Crellius in order to the overthrowing his own hypothesis For it being confessed by him that such sufferings have all that belongs to the nature of punishments and since God
hath justly punished some for the sins which they have not committed since all Nations have allowed it just for one man by his own consent to suffer for another since it cannot be unjust for the offender to be released by anothers sufferings if he were admitted to suffer for that end it evidently follows contrary to Crellius his main Principle that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions And so that first argument of Crellius cannot hold that one man cannot by his own consent suffer for another because no man can deserve anothers punishment and no punishment is just but what is deserved His second argument from the nature of anger and revenge hath been already answered in the first Discourse about the nature and ends of punishments and his third argument that one mans punishment cannot become anothers immediately before And so we have finished our first consideration of the sufferings of Christ in general as a punishment of our sins which we have shewed to be agreeable both to Scripture and Reason CHAP. IV. I. The Death of Christ considered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin II. What the expiation of sin was by the Sacrifices under the Law twofold Civil and Ritual The Promises made to the Iews under the Law of Moses respected them as a People and therefore must be temporal The typical nature of Sacrifices asserted III. A substitution in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law proved from Lev. 17.11 and the Concession of Crellius about the signification of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 joyned with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lev. 10.17 explained The expiation of uncertain murther proves a substitution IV. A substitution of Christ in our room proved from Christ's being said to die for us the importance of that phrase considered V. In what sense a Surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us VI. Our Redemption by Christ proves a substitution VII Of the true notion of Redemption that explained and proved against Socinus and Crellius No necessity of paying the price to him that detains captive where the captivity is not by force but by sentence of Law Christ's death a proper 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and therefore the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 attributed to it cannot be taken for mere deliverance WE come now to consider the death of Christ as an Expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of mankind Which is as much denied by our Adversaries as that it was a punishment for our sins For though they do not deny That Christ as a Priest did offer up a Sacrifice of Expiation for the sins of men yet they utterly deny That this was performed on earth or that the Expiation of sins did respect God but only us or that the death of Christ had any proper efficacy towards the expiation of sin any further than as it comprehends in it all the consequences of his death by a strange Catachresis I shall now therefore prove that all things which do belong to a proper Expiatory Sacrifice do agree to the death of Christ. There are three things especially considerable in it 1. A Substitution in the place of the Offenders 2. An Oblation of it to God 3. An Expiation of sin consequent upon it Now these three I shall make appear to agree fully to the death of Christ for us 1. A Substitution in the place of the Offenders That we are to prove was designed in the expiatory Sacrifices under the Law and that Christ in his death for us was substituted in our place 1. That in the expiatory Sacrifices under the Law there was a Substitution of them in the place of the Offenders This our Adversaries are not willing to yield us because of the correspondency which is so plain in the Epistle to the Hebrews between those Sacrifices and that whâ—ch was offered up by Christ. We now speak only of those Sacrifices which we are sure were appointed of old for the expiation of sin by God himself As to which the great rule assigned by the Apostle was That without shedding of blood there was no remission If we yield Crellius what he so often urgeth viz. That these words are to be understood of what was done under the Law They will not be the less serviceable to our purpose for thereby it will appear that the means of Expiation lay in the shedding of blood Which shews that the very mactation of the beast to be sacrificed was designed in order to the Expiation of sin To an inquisitive person the reason of the slaying such multitudes of beasts in the Sacrifices appointed by God himself among the Iews would have appeared far less evident than now it doth since the Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews hath given us so full an account of them For it had been very unreasonable to have thought that they had been merely instituted out of compliance with the customs of other Nations since the whole design of their Religion was to separate them from them and on such a supposition the great design of the Epistle to the Hebrews signifies very little which doth far more explain to us the nature and tendency of all the Sacrifices in use among them that had any respect to the expiation of sins than all the customs of the Egyptians or the Commentaries of the later Iews But I intend not now to discourse at large upon this subject of Sacrifices either as to the nature and institution of them in general or with a particular respect to the Sacrifice of Christ since a learned person of our Church hath already undertaken Crellius upon this Argument and we hope e'er long will oblige the world with the benefit of his pains I shall therefore only insist on those things which are necessary for our purpose in order to the clearing the Substitution of Christ in our sleâ—d for the expiation of our sins by his death and this we say was represented in the expiatory Sacrifices which were instituted among the Iews If we yield Crellius what he after Socinus contends for viz. That the Sacrifice of Christ was only represented in the publick and solemn expiatory Sacrifices for the people and especially those on the day of Atonement We may have enough from them to vindicate all that we assert concerning the expiatory Sacrifice of the blood of Christ. II. For that those were designed by way of Substitution in the place of the offenders will appear from the circumstances and reason of their Institution But before we come to that it will be necessary to shew what that Expiation was which the Sacrifices under the Law were designed for the not understanding of which gives a greater force to our Adversaries Arguments than otherwise they would have For while men assert that the expiation was wholly typical and of the same nature with that expiation which is really obtained by the death of Christ they easily prove That all the expiation then was only
freely to pardon sin than it was ever presumed to be in all the Sacrifices of either Iews or Gentiles who all supposed Sacrifices necessary in order to Atonement and yet thought themselves obliged to the goodness of God in the Remission of their sins Nay we find that God himself in the case of Abimelech appointed Abraham to pray for him in order to his pardon And will any one say this was a derogation to the Grace of God in his pardon Or to the pardon of Iob's Friends because Iob was appointed to Sacrifice for them Or to the pardon of the Israelites because God out of kindness to them directed them by the Prophets and appointed the means in order to it But although God appointed our High-Priest for us and out of his great love sent him into the world yet his Sacrifice was not what was given him but what he freely underwent himself he gave us Christ but Christ offered up himself a full perfect and sufficient Sacrifice Oblation and Satisfaction for the sins of the world Thus Sir I have now given you a larger account of what I then more briefly discoursed of concerning the true Reason of the Sufferings of Christ and heartily wishing you a right understanding in all things and requesting from you an impartial consideration of what I have written I am SIR Your c. E. S. Ian. 6. 166â— THE MYSTERIES OF The Christian Faith ASSERTED and VINDICATED IN A SERMON Preached at S. Laurence-Jewry in London APRIL the 7th 1691. By the Right Reverend Father in GOD EDWARD Lord Bishop of Worcester LONDON Printed by I. H. for Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard 1697. A SERMON Preached at S. Laurence-Jury APRIL the 7th 1691. 1 TIM I. 15 This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation That Christ Iesus came into the World to save Sinners of whom I am chief IF these Words were to be understood without any Restriction or Limitation that Christ Iesus came into the World to save sinners they would overthrow the great Design of the Gospel and make its Excellent Precepts Useless and Ineffectual For to what purpose should men be put upon the severe Practice of Repentance Mortification and a continued Course of a Holy Life if the meer being Sinners did sufficiently qualifie them for Salvation This indeed would be thought a Doctrine worthy of all Acceptation by the greatest Sinners but it could not be a faithful saying being not agreeable either to the Nature of God or Revelation of his Will by Christ Iesus But S. Paul speaks of such Sinners as himself had been i. e. such as had been great Sianers but had truly and sincerely repented Of whom I am chief What then Must we look on him as the Standard and Measure of such Sinners whom Christ Iesus came to save What will then become of all those who have been Sinners of a higher Rank than ever he was It 's true in the Verses before the Text he sets out his Sins as a humble Penitent is wont to do with the worst Colours and deepest Aggravations Who was before a blasphemer and a persecutor and injurious but yet he adds that he obtained Mercy because he did it ignorantly in unbelief How then is S. Paul the Chief of Sinners Are Sins of Ignorance and Mistake the greatest of Sins for which Christ died Is there no Expiation for any other by Iesus Christ What will become then of all such who sin against Knowledge and Conscience and not in Ignorance and Vnbelief Can none of these hope for Mercy by Christ Iesus although they do truly Repent But the Blood of Christ is said elsewhere to cleanse us from all Sin not while we continue in them but if we repent and forsake them And Iesus Christ is said to be a Propitiation for our Sins and not for ours only but for the Sins of the whole World And therefore this Expression of S. Paul notes his great Humility and deep Sense of his own Sins but doth not exclude others from the hopes of Pardon whose Sins have other Aggravations than his had For if we leave out the last words as peculiar to his Case yet the other contain in them a true Proposition and of the greatest Importance to Mankind This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptation that Christ Iesus came into the world to save sinners This you may say is a matter out of all doubt among all such who hope for Salvation by Christ Iesus for all are agreed that one way or other we are to be saved by him But there is great Difficulty as to the Way of saving sinners by Christ Iesus whether by the Doctrine and Example of the Man Christ Iesus by the Power he attained through his Sufferings Or by the Eternal Son of God's assuming our Nature and suffering in our stead in order to the Reconciling God to us and making a Propitiation for our Sins These are two very different Hypotheses or Notions of Christ's coming to save Sinners and the former seems more easie to be understood and believed and the other seems to have Insuperable Difficulties in point of Reason and to run our Religion into Mysteries which expose our Faith and make Christianity appear Contemptible to Men of Sense and Understanding Is it not therefore much better to embrace such a Scheme of it as will have the least Objection against it that so Men of Reason may not be tempted to Infidelity and Men of Superstition may not under the Colour of Mysteries bring in the most Absurd and Unreasonable Doctrines These are plausible Insinuations and would be apt to prevail on considering Mens minds if they were to form and make a Religion that might be most accommodated to the Genius and Humour of the Age they live in And truly no Men by their own Authority can pretend to a Right to impose on others any Mysteries of Faith or any such things which are above their Capacity to understand But that is not our case for we all profess to believe and receive Christianity as a Divine Revelation and God we say may require from us the belief of what we may not be able to comprehend especially if it relates to Himself or such things which are Consequent upon the Union of the Divine and Human Nature Therefore our business is to consider whether any such things be contained in that Revelation which we all own and if they be we are bound to believe them although we are not able to comprehend them Now here are two Remarkable Characters in these Words by which we may examin these different Hypotheses concerning the way of Salvation by Iesus Christ. I. It is a faithfull saying and therefore must be contained in that Revelation which God hath made concerning our Salvation by Christ. II. It is worthy of all Acceptation i. e. most useful and beneficial to Mankind Now by these two I shall procceed in the
were the Christ the Son of God for he no doubt had heard of the Result of this Conference in Solomon's Porch Iesus said unto him Thou hast said S. Mark more expresly Iesus said I am And this was the Blasphemy for which they put him to death as appears by the Evangelists So that this ought to be a Dispute only between Iews and Christians since it was the very point for which they condemned him to death And in his last most divine Prayer just before his suffering he owns the Glory which he had with the Father before the World had a being And now O Father glorifie thou me with the glory which I had with thee before the World was Was this nothing but the Glory which God had designed to give him This is so far from being peculiar to Christ that it is common to all whom God designs to glorifie and takes away the distinction between the Decree and the Execution of it 2. As to the Apostles the Reason we believe their Testimony is that they were Men of great Sincerity and Plainness and of great Zeal for the Honour and Glory of God And according to this Character let us examine what they say concerning Christ Iesus He that was most conversant with him and beloved by him and lived to see his Divinity contested by some and denied by others is most ample in setting it forth in his Admirable Sublime and Divine Introduction to his Gospel Which all the Wit of Mankind can never make tolerable Sense of if they deny Christ's being the Eternal Son of God and it is he that hath preserved those Conferences with the Iews wherein he asserts his own Divinity S. Paul was a Stranger to him while he lived but at the same time when he was so zealous to perswade the Gentiles to the Worship of God and not of Creatures he calls him God over all blessed for evermore And when he saith that the Eternal Power and Godhead are known by the Creation of the World he attributes the Creation of all things to Christ applying to him those words of the Psalmist Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the Foundation of the Earth and the Heaven the Work of thy hands Which cannot be understood of any Metaphorical Creation And after the strictest Examination of Copies those will be found the best which have that Reading on which our Translation is grounded And without Controversie great is the Mystery of Godliness God wâ—s manifest in the Flesh. So that God's being manifest in the Flesh is made a great Part of the Mystery of Christianity But here arises a Difficulty which deserves to be considered i. e. If there were nothing in the Christian Doctrine but the Way of Saving sinners by the Doctrine and Example of Christ there would be little Objection to be made to it since the obtaining Eternal Life is certainly the best thing can be proposed to Mankind and the Precepts of Christ are Divine and Spiritual Plain and Easie to be Understood and Agreeable to the Reason of Mankind but many other things are imposed on Men as necessary to be believed concerning Christ Iesus as to his Divinity Incarnation and the Hypostatical Vnion of both Natures which perplex and confound our Understandings and yet these things are not only deliverâ—d as Mysteries of the Christian Faith but the Belief of them is required as necessary to the Salvation of Sinners whereas if they are Revealed they are no longer Mysteries and if they are not Revealed how come they to be made Articles of Faith The Scripture knows of no other Mysteries of Faith but such as were hidden before the Revelation of them but since they are Revealed they are plain and open to all mens Capacities and therefore it is a great Injury to the Plainness and Simplicity of the Gospel to impose such incomprehensible Mysteries as Necessary Articles of Faith and it is abusing the Credulity of Mankind to make such things necessary to be believed which are impossible to be understood But those who have ever loved to deceive and abuse the rest of the World have been always fond of the Name of Mysteries and therefore all such things are to be suspected which come under that Name For all such Points which will not bear Examination must be wrapt up and Reverenced under the Name of Mysteries that is of things to be swallow'd without being understood But the Scripture never calls that a Mystery which is Incomprehensible in it self though never so much revealed This is the main force of the Objection which I shall endeavour to remove by shewing 1. That God may justly require from us in general the Belief of what we cannot comprehend 2. That which way soever the Way of Salvation by Christ be explained there will be something of that Nature found in it and that those who reject the Mysteries of Faith run into greater Difficulties than those who assert them 3. That no more is required as a Necessary Article of Faith than what is plainly and clearly Revealed 1. That God may justly require from us in general the Belief of what we cannot comprehend It is to very little purpose to enquire whether the Word Mystery in Scripture be applied to such particular Doctrines whose Substance is revealed but the manner of them is incomprehensible by us for why may not we make use of such a Word whereby to express things truely revealed but above our Comprehension We are certain the Word Mystery is used for things far less difficult and abstruse and why may it not then be fitly applied to such matters which are founded on Divine Revelation but yet are too deep for us to go to the bottom of them Are there not Mysteries in Arts Mysteries in Nature Mysteries in Providence And what Absurdity is there to call those Mysteries which in some Measure are known but in much greater unknown to us Although therefore in the Language of Scripture it be granted that the word Mystery is most frequently applied to things before hidden but now revealed yet there is no Incongruity in calling that a Mystery which being revealed hath yet something in it which our understandings cannot reach to But it is meer Cavilling to insist on a Word if the Thing it self be granted The chief thing therefore to be done is to shew that God may require from us the belief of such things which are incomprehensible by us For God may require any thing from us which it is reasonable for us to do if it be then reasonable for us to give Assent where the manner of what God hath revealed is not comprehended then God may certainly require it from us Hath not God revealed to us that in six days he made Heaven and Earth and all that is therein But is it not reasonable for us to believe this unless we are able to comprehend the manner of God's production of things Here we
have something revealed and that plainly enough viz. that God created all things and yet here is a Mystery remaining as to the manner of doing it Hath not God plainly revealed that there shall be a Resurrection of the dead and must we think it unreasonable to believe it till we are able to comprehend all the changes of the Particles of Matter from the Creation to the General Resurrection But it is said that there is no Contradiction in this but there is in the Mystery of the Trinity and Incarnation It is strange Boldness in Men to talk thus of Monstrous Contradictions in things above their Reach The Atheists may as well say Infinite Power is a Monstrous Contradiction and Godâ—s Immensity and his other unsearchable Perfections are Monstrous Paradoxes and Contradictions Will Men never learn to distinguish between Numbers and the Nature of Things For three to be one is a Contradiction in Numbers but whether an Infinite Nature can communicate it self to three different Subsistences without such a Division as is among Created Beings must not be determined by bare Numbers but by the Absolute Perfections of the Divine Nature which must be owned to be above our Comprehension For let us examine some of those Perfections which are most clearly revealed and we shall find this true The Scripture plainly reveals that God is from everlasting to everlasting that he was and is and is to come but shall we not believe the Truth of this till we are able to fathom the Abyss of God's Eternity I am apt to think and I have some thoughtful Men concurring with me that there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the Trinity and Incarnation than there is of Eternity Not but that there is great Reason to believe it but from hence it appears that our Reason may oblige us to believe some things which it is not possible for us to comprehend We know that either God must have been for ever or it is impossible he ever should be for if he should come into Being when he was not he must have some Cause of his Being and that which was the first Cause would be God But if he was for ever he must be from himself and what Notion or Conception can we have in our Minds concerning it And yet Atheistical men can take no Advantage from hence because their own most absurd Hypothesis hath the very same Difficulty in it For something must have been for ever And it is far more reasonable to suppose it of an Infinite and Eternal Mind which hath Wisdom and Power and Goodness to give Being to other things than of dull stupid and sensless Matter which could never move it self nor give Being to any thing besides Here we have therefore a thing which must be owned by all and yet such a thing which can be conceived by none Which shews the narrowness and shortness of our Understandings and how unfit they are to be the Measures of the Possibilities of things Vain men would be wise they would fain go to the very bottom of things when alas they scarce understand the very Surface of them They will allow no Mysteries in Religion and yet every thing is a Mystery to them They cry out of Cheats and Impostures under the Notion of Mysteries and yet there is not a Spire of Grass but is a Mystery to them they will bear with nothing in Religion which they cannot comprehend and yet there is scarce any thing in the World which they can comprehend But above other things the Divine Perfections even those which are most Absolute and Necessary are above their Reach For let such Men try their Imaginations about God's Eternity not meerly how he should be from himself but how God should coexist with all the Differences of Times and yet there be no Succession in his own Being I do not say there is such Difficulty to conceive a Rock standing still when the Waves run by it or the Gnomon of a Dial when the Shadow passes from one Figure to another because these are gross unactive things but the Difficulty is far greater where the Being is Perfect and always Active For where there is Succession there is a passing out of not being in such a duration into being in it which is not consistent with the Absolute Perfection of the Divine Nature And therefore God must be all at once what he is without any Respect to the Difference of Time past present or to come From whence Eternity was defined by Boethius to be a perfect and complete Possession all at once of everlasting Life But how can we from any Conception in our Minds of that being all at once which hath such different Acts as must be measur'd by a long Succession of Time As the Creating and Dissolving the Frame of the World the promising and sending the Messias the Declaring and Executing a general Judgment how can these things be consistent with a Permanent Instant or a Continuance of being without Succession For it is impossible for us in this Case as to God's Eternity to form a clear and distinct Idea in our Mind of that which both Reason and Revelation convince us must be The most we can make of our Conception of it is that God hath neither Beginning of Being nor End of Days but that he always was and always must be And this is rather a necessary Conclusion from Reason and Scripture than any distinct Notion or Conception of Eternity in our Minds From whence it evidently follows that God may reveal something to us which we are bound to believe and yet after that Revelation the Manner of it may be incomprehensible by us and consequently a Mystery to us Hath not God Revealed to us in Scripture the Spirituality of his own Nature That he is a Spirit and therefore will be worshipped in Spirit and in Truth For that is a true Reason why Spiritual Worship should be most agreeable to him Now if we could have a clear distinct positive Notion in our minds of God's Spiritual Nature we might then pretend that there is nothing mysterious in this since it is revealed But let such men Examine their own thoughts about this matter and try whether the utmost they can attain to be not something Negative viz. because great Absurdities would follow if we attributed any thing Corporeal to God for then he must be compounded of Parts and so he may be dissolved then he must be confined to a certain place and not every-where present he cannot have the Power of Acting and Self-determining which a meer Body hath not For the clearest Notion we can have of Body is that it is made up of some things as parts of it which may be separated from each other and is confined to a certain place and hath no Power to move or act from it self But some of these men who cry down Mysteries and magnifie Reason to shew how slender
take our Nature upon him than that a man should be rapt up into Heaven that it might be said that he came down from thence For in the foâ—mer Supposition we have many other places of Scripture to support it which speak of his being with God and having Glory with him before the World was whereas there is nothing for the other but only that it is necessary to make some tolerable Sense of those words 4. It is more Reasonable to believe that God should become Man by taking our Nâ—ture upon him than that Man should become God For in the former there is nothing but the Difficulty of conceiving the Maâ—â—â—r of the Union which we all grant to be so between Soul and Body but in the other there is a Repugnancy in the very Conception of a Created God of an Eternal Son of Adam of Omnipotent Infirmity of an Infinite finite Being In the former Case an Infinite is united to a Finite but in the other a Finite becomes Infinite 5. It is more Reasonable to believe that Christ Iesus should suffer as he did for our sakes than for his own We are all agreed that the Sufferings of Christ were far beyond any thing he deserved at God's hands but what Account then is to be given of them We say that he made himself a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind and so there was a great and noble End designed and no Injury done to a willing Mind and the Scripture as plainly expresses this as it can do in Words But others deny this and make him to suffer as one wholly Innocent for what Cause To make the most Innocent Persons as apprehensive of Suffering as the most Guilty and the most righteous God to put no difference between them with Respect to Suffering 6. It is more Reasonable to suppose such a Condescension in the Son of God to take upon him the Form of a Servant for our Advantage than that a meer Man should be Exalted to the Honour and Worship which belongs only to God For on the one side there is nothing but what is agreeable to the Divine Nature viz. Infinite Love and Condescension and Pity to Mankind on the other there is the greatest Design of Self-Exaltation that ever was in Humane Nature viz. for a meer Man to have the most Essential Attributes and Incommunicable Honour which belongs to God And whether of these two is more agreeable to the Spirit and Design of the New Testament let any man of understanding judge For as it is evident that the great Intention of it is to magnifie the wonderful Love of God in the sending of his Son so it is as plain that one great End of the Christian Doctrine was to take Mankind off from giving Divine Worship to Creatures and can we then suppose that at the same time it should set up the Worship of a meer Man with all the Honour and Adoration which belongs to God This is to me an incomprehensible Mystery indeed and far beyond all that is implied in the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation For it subverts the very Foundation of the Design of Christianity as to the Reforming Idolatry then in being it lays the Foundation for introducing it into the Woâ—ld again for since the Distance between God and his Creatures is taken away in the matter of Worship there is nothing left but the Declaration of his Will which doth not exclude more Mediators of Intercession but upon this Ground that the Mediation of Redemption is the Foundation of that of Intercession And it is far more easie for us to suppose there may be some things too hard for us to understand in the Mystery of our Redemption by Iesus Christ than that at the same time it should be both a Duty and a Sin to worship any but the true God with proper Divine Worship For if it be Idolatry to give it to a Creature then it is a great Sin for so the Scripture still accounts it but if we are bound to give it to Christ who is but a Creature then that which in it self is a Sin is now become a Necessary Duty which overthrows the Natural Differences of Good and Evil and makes Idolatry to be a meer Arbitrary thing And I take it for granted that in Matters of Religion Moral Difficulties are more to be regarded than Intellectual because Religion was far more designed for a Rule of our Actions than for the Satisfaction of our Curiosity And upon due Examination we shall find that there is no such frightfull Appearances of Difficulties in the Mystery of the Incarnation as there is in giving Divine Worship to a Creature And it ought to be observed that those very Places which are supposed to exclude Christ from being the true God must if they have any force exclude him from Divine Worship For they are spoken of God as the Object of our Worship but if he be not excluded from Divine Worship then neither is he from being the true God which they grant he is by Office but not by Nature But a God by Office who is not so by Nature is a new and incomprehensible Mystery A Mystery hidden from Ages and Generations as to the Church of God but not made known by the Gospel of his Son This is such a kind of Mystery as the Heathen Priests had who had Gods many and Lords many as the Apostle saith i. e. many by Office although but one by Nature But if the Christian Religion had owned one God by Nature and only one by Office the Heathens had been to blame chiefly in the Number of their Gods by Office and not in the Divine Worship which they gave to them But S. Paul blames the Heathens for doing Service to them which by Nature are no Gods not for doing it without Divine Authority nor for mistaking the Person who was God by Office but in giving Divine Worship to them who by Nature were no Gods which he would never have said if by the Christian Doctrine Divine Worship were to be given to one who was not God by Nature But these are indeed incomprehensible Mysteries how a Man by Nature can be a God really and truly by Office how the Incommunicable Perfections of the Divine Nature can be communicated to a Creature how God should give his Glory to another and by his own Command require that to be given to a Creature which himself had absolutely forbidden to be given to any besides himself It is said by a famous Iesuit I will not say how agreeably to their own Doctrines and Practices about Divine Worship that the Command of God cannot make him worthy of Divine Worship who without such a Command is not worthy of it And it is very absurd to say that he that is unworthy of it without a Command can become worthy by it for it makes God to command Divine Honour to be given to one who
cannot deserve it For no meer Man can deserve to be made God But it is more agreeable to the Divine Nature and Will not to give his Honour to a Creature 3. But after all the Invectives of these Enemies to Mysteries we do not make that which we say is Incomprehensible to be a Necessary Article of Faith as it is Incomprehensible but we do assert that what is Incomprehensible as to the Manner may be a Necessary Article as far as it is plainly Revealed As in the Instances I have already mentioned of the Creation and Resurrection of the Dead would they in earnest have Men turn Infidels as to these things till they are able to comprehnd all the difficulties which relate to them If not why should this suggestion be allow'd as to the Mysteries which relate to our Redemption by Iesus Christ If it be said the Case is not alike for those are clearly Revealed and these are not this brings it to the true and proper Issue of this matter and if we do not prove a clear Revelation we do not assert their being Necessary Articles of Faith but my present business was only to take off this Objection That the Mysteries were Incomprehensible and therefore not to be received by us II. And so I come to the second Way by which we are to Examine the several Senses of Christ Iesus coming to save Sinners Which of them tends more to the Benefit and Advantage of Mankind or which is more worthy of all Acceptation And that will appear by considering these things 1. Which tends most to the raising our Esteem and Love of Christ Iesus 2. Which tends most to the begetting in us a greater Hatred of Sin 3. Which tends most to the strengthening our Hope of Salvation by Iesus Christ. 1. As to the raising in us a greater Esteem and Love of Christ. We are certain that the Infinite Love and Condescension of Christ Iesus in undertaking such a Work as the saving of Sinners makes it most worthy of all Acceptation Some Men may please themselves in thinking that by taking away all Mysteries they have made their Faith more easie but I am certain they have extremely lessen'd the Argument for our Love viz. the Apprehensions of the wonderfull Love and Condescension of Christ in coming into the World to save Sinners And yet this is the great Argument of the New Testament to perswade Mankind to the Love of God and of his Son God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son c. This is indeed a mighty Argument of Love if by the only begotten Son be meant the Eternal Son of God who came down from Heaven as S. Iohn speaks just before but if no more be meant but only that God made a meer Man to be his Son and after he had preached a while here on Earth and was ill used and crucified by his own People he Exalted him to be God and gave him Divine Attributes and Honours this were an Argument of great Love to the Person of Christ but not to the rest of Mankind But God's Love in Scripture is magnified with Respect to the World in the sending of his Son In this was manifested saith the Apostle the Love of God towards us because that God sent his only begotten Son into the World that we should live through him Herein is love not that we loved God but that he loved us and sent his Son to be a Propitiation for our Sins The great Love we still see is towards us i. e. towards Mankind but according to the other Sense it must have been Herein was the Love of God manifested to his Son that for his Sufferings he exalted him above all Creatures He that spared not his own Son saith S. Paul but delivered him up for us all If he were the Eternal Son of God who came to suffer for us there is a mighty force and Emphasis in this Expression and very apt to raise our Admiration and our Love But what not sparing his own Son is there if nothing were meant but that he designed by Sufferings to Exalt him For not Sparing him supposes an Antecedent Relation of the highest Kindness but the other is only designing extraordinary Kindness for the sake of his Sufferings Therefore the Argument for the Love of God is taken from what his Son was when he deliver'd him up for us all he was his own Son not by Adoption as others are S. Iohn calls him his only begotten Son and God himself his beloved Son in the Voice from Heaven and this before his Sufferings immediately after his Baptism when as yet there was nothing extraordinary done by him as to the great Design of his coming Which shews that there was an Antecedent Relation between him and the Father and that therein the Love of God and of Christ was manifested that being the only begotten Son of the Father he should take our Nature upon him and for our sakes do and 〈◊〉 what he did This is indeed an Argument great enough to raise our Adâ—â—ration to excite our Devotion to inâ—â—â—me our Aâ—â—ections but how flat and low doth it appear when it comes to no more 〈◊〉 this that there was a Man wâ—om after his Sufferings God raised from the Dead and made him a God by Office Doth this carry any such Argument in it for our Esteem and Love and Devotion to him as the other doth upon the moâ—â— serious Consideration of it 2. Which tends most to beget in 〈◊〉 a greater Hatred of Sin For that is so contrary to the Way of our Salvation by Iesus Christ that what tends most to ouâ— Hatred of it must conduce most to our happiness and therefore be most worthy of all Acceptation It is agreed on all handâ— that Christ did suffer very much both in his Mind and in his Body In his Mind when it is said that he was troubled in Spirit that he began to be sorrowfull and very heavy and soon after My Soul is exceeding sorrowfull even unto death S. Luke saith that he was in an Agony wherein he not only prayed more earnestly but his sweat was as it were great Drops of Blood falling to the Ground What made this Amazement and dreadfull Agony in the mind of the most innocent Person in the World Was it meerly the Fear of the Pains of Death which he was to undergo That is impossible considering the Assurance which he had of so glorious a Reward so soon following after when so many Martyrs endured such exquisite Torments for his sake without any such Disturbance or Consternation But the Apostles give us another Account of it S. Peter saith he was to bear our Sins in his own body on the tree that Christ suffered for Sins the just for the unjust S. Paul that God made him to be Sin for us who knew no Sin that he might be made the righteousness
reconciled before From whence he would at least have other senses of these words joyned together with the former viz. Either for purging away the filth of sin or for a declaration of a deliverance from guilt and punishment in imitation of the Idiom of the Hebrew in which many words are used in the New Testament From hence it follows that Crellius doth yield the main cause if it appear that Christ did offer up an expiatory Sacrifice to God in his death for then he grants that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being applied to the Sacâ—â—fice of Christ are to be taken for the purging away of guilt and the aversion of the wrath of God and the punishment of sin And it is to no purpose to say that it is not a proper Sacrifice for if the effects of a proper Sacrifice do belong to it that proves that it is so for these words being acknowledged to be applied to the Sacrifice of Christ by the Author to the Hebrews what could more evince that Christ's was a proper Sacrifice than that those things are attributed to it which by the consent of all Nations are said to belong to proper Sacrifices and that in the very same sense in which they are used by those who understood them in the most proper sense And what reason could Crellius have to say that it was only the superstition of the Heathens which made them attribute such effects to sacrifices when himself acknowledges that the very same sense doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ under that notion and as to the Iews we have already proved that the sense of expiation among them was by vertue of the Law to be taken in as proper a sense as among the Heathens for the purging of guilt and the aversion of the wrath of God And why should Crellius deny that effect of the Sacrifice of Christ as to the atonement of God because God's love was seen in giving him who was to offer the Sacrifice since that effect is attributed to those Sacrifices under the Law which God himself appointed to be offered and shewed his great kindness to the people in the Institution of such a way whereby their sins might be expiated and they delivered from the punishment of them But of the consistency of these two I shall speak more afterwards in the effect of the Sacrifices as relating to Persons VI. We now come to consider in what sense the expiation of sins is in Scripture attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ and therein I shall prove these two things 1. That the Expiation is attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ in the same sense that it is attributed to other Sacrifices and as the words in themselves do signifie 2. That what is so attributed doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ in his death antecedent to his entrance into Heaven 1. That the expiation is to be taken in a proper sense when it is attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ. Crellius tells us The controversie is not about the thing viz. whether expiation in the sense we take it in for purging away guilt and aversion of the wrath of God doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ for he acknowledges it doth but all the question is about the manner of it which in the next Section he thus explains There are three senses in which Christ may be said to expiate sins either by begetting Faith in us whereby we are drawn off from the practice of sin in which sense he saith it is a remoter antecedent to it or as it relates to the expiation by actual deliverance from punishment so he saith it is an immediate antecedent to it or as he declares that they are expiated but this he saith doth not so properly relate to Christ as a Sacrifice but as a Priest But never a one of these senses comes near to that which Crellius grants to be the proper importance of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as applied to a Sacrifice viz. the purging away guilt and the aversion of the wrath of God and punishment not any way but by the means of the Sacrifice offered For in the Legal Sacrifices nothing can be more plain than that the expiation was to be by the Sacrifice offered for Atonement supposing then that in some other way which could be by no means proper to those Sacrifices Christ may be said to expiate sins what doth this prove that there was an expiation belonging to his Sacrifice agreeable to the Sacrifices of old But as I urged before in the case of Christ's being High Priest that by their assertions the Iews might utterly deny the force of any argument used by the Author to the Hebrews to prove it so I say as to the expiation by Christ's Sacrifice that it hath no analogy or correspondency at all with any Sacrifice that was ever offered for the expiation of sins For by that they always understood something which was immediately offered to God for that end upon which they obtain'd remission of sins but here is nothing answerable to it in their sense of Christ's Sacrifice for here is no Oblation at all made unto God for this end all the efficacy of the Sacrifice of Christ in order to expiation doth wholly and immediately respect us so that if it be a proper Sacrifice to any it must be a Sacrifice to us and not to God for a Sacrifice is always said to be made to him whom it doth immediately respect but Christ in the planting Faith in actual deliverance in declaring to us this deliverance doth wholly respect us and therefore his Sacrifice must be made to men and not to God Which is in it self a gross absurdity and repugnant to the nature and design of Sacrifices from the first institution of them which were always esteemed such immediate parts of divine worship that they ought to respect none else but God as the object to which they were directed though for the benefit and advantage of mankind As well then might Christ be said to pray for us and by that no more be meant but that he doth teach us to understand our duty as be made an expiatory Sacrifice for us and all the effect of it only respect us and not God And this is so far from adding to the perfection of Christ's Sacrifice above the Legal which is the thing pleaded by Crellius that it destroys the very nature of a Sacrifice if such a way of expiation be attributed to it which though conceived to be more excellent in it self yet is wholly incongruous to the end and design of a Sacrifice for Expiation And the excellency of the manner of expiation ought to be in the same kind and not quite of another nature for will any one say that a General of an Army hath a more excellent conduct that all that went before him because he can make finer speeches or that the Assomanaean Family
discharg'd the Office of Priesthood best because they had a greater power over the people or that Nero was the most excellent Emperour of Rome because he excelled the rest in Musick and Poetry by which we see that to assert an excellency of one above another we must not go to another kind but shew its excellency in that wherein the comparison lies So that this doth not prove the excellency of the Sacrifice of Christ because he hath a greater power to perswade deliver and govern than any Sacrifice under the Law for these are things quite of another nature from the consideration of a Sacrifice But therein the excellency of a Sacrifice is to be demonstrated that it excells all other in the proper end and design of a Sacrifice i. e. if it be more effectual towards God for obtaining the expiation of sin which was always thought to be the proper end of all Sacrifices for expiation Although then Christ may be allowed to excel all other Sacrifices in all imaginable respects but that which is the proper intention of a Sacrifice it may prove far greater excellency in Christ but it doth withall prove a greater imperfection in his Sacrifice if it fail in that which is the proper end of it So that if we should grant that the expiation attributed to Christ's Sacrifice signified no more than reclaiming men from their sins or their deliverance by his power or a declaration of God's decree to pardon this may prove that there are better arguments to believe the remission of our sins now under the Gospel but they do not in the least prove that Christ is to be consider'd as a Sacrifice much less that he doth far excell in the notion of an Expiatory Sacrifice all those which were offered up to God for that end under the Law VII But we must now further consider whether this be all attributed to Christ in order to expiation in Scripture i. e. Whether those words which of themselves do imply the aversion of the wrath of God when used concerning other Sacrifices when applied to the Sacrifice of Christ do only imply the begetting faith in us or a declaration of pardon The words which are used to this purpose are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are all applied to the blood of Christ and the dispute is whether they signifie no more but a declaration of pardon or a means to beget faith in us The first words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Crellius acknowledgeth do frequently signifie deliverance from guilt and punishment but he saith they may likewise signifie a declaration of that deliverance as decreed by God or a purging from the sins themselves or from the custom of sinning So that by Crellius his own confession the sense we contend for is most proper and usual the other are more remote and only possible why then should we forsake the former sense which doth most perfectly agree to the nature of a Sacrifice which the other senses have no such relation to as that hath For these being the words made use of in the New Testament to imply the force and efficacy of a Sacrifice why should they not be understood in the same sense which the Hebrew words are taken in when they are applied to the Sacrifices under the Law We are not enquiring into all possible senses of words but into the most natural and agreeable to the scope of them that use them and that we shall make it appear to be the same we plead for in the places in dispute between us as 1 John 1.7 The blood of Iesus Christ his Son 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 purgeth us from all sin Heb. 9.13 14. If the blood of bulls and of goats and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your consciences from dead works 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 1.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when he had by himself purged our sins So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are used with a respect to the blood of Christ Heb. 10.22 Apocalyp 1.5 And because remission of sin was looked on as the consequent of expiation by Sacrifice under the Law therefore that is likewise attributed to the blood of Christ Matth. 26.28 This is the blood of the New Testament which was shed for many 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the remission of sins Eph. 1.7 In whom we have redemption through his blood the remission of sins and to the same purpose Coloss. 1.14 And from hence we are said to be justified by his blood Rom. 5.9 and Christ is said to be a propitiation through faith in his blood Rom. 3.25 The substance of all that Crellius replies to these places is That those words which do properly signifie the thing it self may very conveniently be taken only for the declaration of it when the performance of the thing doth follow by vertue of that declaration which then happens when the declaration is made of the thing decreed by another and that in the name and by the command of him who did decree it And in this sense Christ by his blood may be said to deliver us from the punishment of our sins by declaring or testifying to us the will and decree of God for that purpose But this answer is by no means sufficient upon these considerations 1. Because it doth not reach the proper and natural sense of the words as Crellius himself confesseth and yet he assigns no reason at all why we ought to depart from it unless the bare possibility of another meaning be sufficient But how had it been possible for the efficacy of the blood of Christ for purging away the guilt of our sins to have been expressed in clearer and plainer terms than these which are acknowledged of themselves to signifie as much as we assert If the most proper expressions for this purpose are not of force enough to perswade our Adversaries none else could ever do it so that it had been impossible for our Doctrine to have been delivered in such terms but they would have found out ways to evade the meaning of them It seems very strange that so great an efficacy should not only once or twice but so frequently be attributed to the blood of Christ for expiation of sin if nothing else were meant by it but that Christ by his death did only declare that God was willing to pardon sin If there were danger in understanding the words in their proper sense why are they so frequently used to this purpose why are there no other places of Scripture that might help to undeceive us and tell us plainly that Christ dyed only to declare his Father's will but what ever other words might signifie this was the only true meaning of them But what miserable shifts are these when men are forced to put off such