Before we enter into the Examen of our opinions we must both of us agree in one Truth which cannot be contradicted to wit That when a beast eats any thing which he knows is sweet its certain he will eat it and that he would not eat it did he not finde it good to eat forasmuch as nothing moves the appetite but what is good and therefore he knows the connexion which sweetness hath with goodness since he findes not the thing good but because its sweet and that if it were not sweet he would not judge it good The question then is to know whether it be necessary for him to know the universal annexion of sweetness with goodness or whether it be sufficient for him onely to know that which is to be found betwixt these two particular qualities And of necessity M. C. must take the one side or the other unless he hath a design to commence a suit against Nature as well as against me if he therefore beleeves that a beast knows the universal connexion of sweetness with goodness there is nothing hinders but that a beast my deduce the proposed consequence and conclude after having known That a thing is sweet That the thing is good to eat because he knows that all what is sweet is good to eat After this manner would M. C. fall into the opinion which we maintain that Beasts reason although by another way For we beleeve it sufficient for them to know the particular connexion of sweetness with goodness to conclude that such a thing is good to eat In effect if it be true that they know the connexion which those two qualities have with one another as we have shewed and that they can conceive nothing that 's universal that being above the material faculty it 's necessary they should know the particular connexion which these two things have together So that since they judge a thing good to eat because they find it sweet it follows that the knowledge of that particular connexion is sufficient to make them conclude that such a thing is good to eat since that in effect they do so neither are they deceived in their judgment I must confess indeed that there is an universal connexion of sweetness with goodness which serves for the foundation of that truth which beasts know but it s in Nature and not in the Imagination which is not obliged to know it that it may certainly infer that such a thing in particular is good to eat it s like those who do things by rote For what they do is conformable to the rules of Art although they know it not neither doth their ignorance hinder them from doing it as perfect as it could be done So the Imagination knows not that all what is sweet is good to eat but onely that the sweet is good to eat and with this particular knowledge it as certainly knows it ought to eat it as if it had a general knowledge thereof Last of all since what it thus knows is found true what need it seek it any other way And since Syllogisms may be made of particular propositions which make a good conclusion Why then may not that which it makes be good M.C. hereupon says That from that any sweet thing is good to eat it follows not that that is it It s true and I confess that beasts sometimes deceive themselves neither did I say their Syllogisms were demonstrative It is sufficient if they be probable and that commonly they make them to know the particular connexion which Nature hath placed betwixt those two qualities for by her they know that such a thing is good to eat with as much certainty as all other sensible things may be known It is certain they do not know that they know it for to know a thing and to know that one knows it are two different things although M. C. it seems hath confounded them To know that we know we must consider the general Reasons and the form of reasoning which we use in a word we must make a reflection on that knowledge which Beasts are not capable of But to know and to know a thing simply this is not necessary and its sufficient that the notion we have of it be like the nature of the thing which presents it self without examining the principles or the means whereby we know it That sweetness cannot move the Appetite untill the Imagination hath judged it good After this M. C. makes me three great questions and askes me Who could have told me That Beasts did not eat before they made all these fair Discourses That sweetness was not sufficient to move the Appetite if the Imagination knew not that it were good to eat and that it makes three different judgements from the two first of which it infers a third But I shall answer in a word It is reason told me so And I wonder that having made him see it so clear and evident it hath not preswaded him the same thing I have much more reason to ask who told him That sweetness is sufficient to move the Appetite without its being necessary for the imagination to judge that the sweet thing is good to eat For no Philosopher could have taught him this Maxim nor could any Reason have engaged him in a Proposition which destroys the first elements of Philosophy All the world is agreed that the Appetite cannot be moved but by what is good and that therefore sweetness as sweetness cannot move it it must be known as good but also as good to eat if the Appetite will eat it Now the sence knows not this goodness as M. C. confesseth presently after and therefore it must be the Imagination since the Appetite affords no kind of Knowledge Certanly it will endanger those which will perceive how M. C. hath abused himself with such gross errors to be scandalized with the reproach he makes me That I onely brought fair words to maintain my opinion without having troubled my self to uphold them with solid Reasons And perhaps some will say that he hath used neither to destroy them and as there is more trouble to build then to ruine he hath done wisely to have established nothing since he hath succeeded so ill in that which was most easie For my part all that I can say in this encounter is That he ought not to have contented himself to have learnt from all the men he had converst with That Beasts did not reason He ought also to have informed himself of the reasons which they had to beleeve in and boldly to have produced them for the defence of the Truth for the reputation of those with whom he had spoken and perhaps for the instruction of those to whom he hath not spoken But what Could he have brought a better reason to prove that Beasts reason not then the experience which he hath made thereof in himself he hath as he saith examined the actions of his sensitive Appetite and after
A DISCOURSE OF THE KNOWLEDG OF BEASTS WHEREIN All that hath been said for and against their RATIOCINATION is Examined By Monsieur de la CHAMBRE Counsellor to the King of France in his Counsels and his Physitian in ordinary Translated into English by a Person of Quality LONDON â—rinted by Tho. Newcomb for Humphrey Mosele at the Princes Arms in St. Pauls Church-Yard 1657. To the READER THis Discourse is it self an Apology and needs no other It witnesseth the Author sufficiently learned to vindicate himself from the extravagancy of those who may think him guilty neither do I doubt but those who read him with judgement will rather submit then contest those Truths which he advanceth and cannot but yeeld even to the probability of his Paradoxes for he treats of all like the Counsellor and Doctor of a King whereto his great deserts have raised him or rather like a King amongst Philosophers in a word like himself He divides the orders of Nature he counsels and instructs men and makes even Beasts Reason Look but upon his grand Design and he appears more eminent then any of our modern Philosophers I mean that Art of his To know Men which he hath long since promised the world In the first Part whereof he hath designed the characters of the Passions of which two excellent Books are extant of Vertues and of Vices And in the second Part he intends a discovery of the nature of Animals and from the resemblance betwixt Men and Beasts to teach us that those whose parts are like theirs have the same inclinations Amongst his Preliminaries he hath brought to light a Discourse of the Knowledge of Beasts which although it had the general approbation of the most learned yet having met with the opposition of a bold Adversary our Author thought himself obliged to vindicate by this discourse of his which contains the sum of that and by which he refutes all the cavils and objections of his Antagonist So that if any man after the perusal thereof be startled or offended that he hath granted Reason to Beasts give me leave to beleeve it must be either out of ignorance or pride That it destroys the immortality of the soul and the essential difference of man is what they object I know how dangerous it is to speak physically of the nature of Souls neither am I ignorant of the opinion of the Galenists nor of the heresie of the Manichees yet I know also that many great men have endeavored by the light of Nature to prove the Soul of man immortal Neither hath any of them a more peculiar Argument then our Author who from the immateriality of the not simply but intellectually reasonable soul concludes that naturally having no principles of corruption it must necessarily be immortal So far is he from shaking that he strongly confirms that immortal principle As for those who apprehend the loss of that essential difference which they pretend betwixt themselves and Beasts let them examine the matter and the difference will appear but still the more manifest The reason he allows them is limited to corporeal objects to the necessities of life food and shelter it s only direct It s capable only of singulars it s restrained to an opinative faculty it s a meer shadow of ours much like that of our phantasie when we sleep So that they will have all the reason in the world to believe that this opinion raiseth the Reason of Man to make the difference really essential to an Intellectual Faculty which tends to the nature of divine things and declares the soul potentially to be a Spirit so that what we call Intelligence in Angels we may justly call Intellectual Reason in men which as it is inferior to that so it is superior to that of Beasts which is sensual and corporeal whilst his is altogether spiritual These two main objections being answered it remains onely that we should by authority vindicate it from novelty Tiresias Melampus and Apollonius are said to have understood their very language Plato tells us that in the golden age men reaped all their knowledge from communication with them And although the Scripture tell us of some Beasts that have no understanding yet it sends us for instruction to others And Philosophy acknowledgeth to have learned from them many of her Arts and Sciences they have instructed us in Physick even in morality nay they have taught us piety Porphyrius Plutarch Raymondus Sebondus for whom also Montaign in his Essays hath written an Apology were all of the same opinion with our Author and if you will have the reasons of these and other learned men why they have allowed Reason to Beasts take these in brief That most Animals have organs fit and faculties like ours In Anatomy the very cells of their brain nothing different that their industry not onely equals but often surpasseth that of man Essences and Properties are known but by effects It is not more reasonable to conclude that Beasts doing reasonable things have a reasonable Faculty then to affirm that the effects are not reasonable because Beasts have not a reasonable Faculty the Effects appear the Power is occult That they seek necessaries without being instructed and of themselves invent the means to acquire them that they are capable of discipline even contrary to their own Nature that most of them can discern things and can accommodate themselves to time place and other circumstances and accordingly operate diversly so that no man can deny but that they act formally for some end and know both that as the end and the means to attain it as means nay more that they tend to a felicity proportionable to their Nature Pleasure being their highest good and Grief their extremity of ill To conclude the greatest difficulty seems to be in the terms those who call it Instinct cannot deny but it acts with Reason and those that allow them Reason deny it to be Intellectual Now if you require examples out of History to confirm this opinion If Plinies Elephant repeating his Lesson in the Moon-shine is not to be credited nor Ptolomies Stag who understood Greek nor Plutarchs Dog who could counterfeit rhe very convulsions of death nor that Goose which was Disciple to a Philosopher what shall we say to an Ape that could play at Chess or of another that had learnt some touches upon the Gittar But let who will judge of Francis the First 's Dog that King having lost his Gloves as he was hunting and having sent him in search of it and he after a tedious inquiry returning without it being remanded by his Master runs directly to Paris and leaps up at a Stall where he had formerly observed Gloves hang out and tears down a pair and carries them three leagues back again to the King Let them I say judge whether this action were not from Discourse sure I am it could not be from his scent If you desire more fitting Examples more pregnanâ— Reasons
known This is practised also when in the destinction of the parts of the Soul the Imagination is oppos'd to the Appetite even as we oppose the Understanding to the Will For its certaine that in this case the Imagination the Understanding comprehend all the knowing faculties as the Appetite and the Will expresse all the motive faculties of the Soul Howsoever it be by the word Imagination I here understand the Sensitive faculty which knows the things without specifying any of its differences the examen whereof conduceth nothing to my designe I am also to add to this advertisment that the division of the Chapters and Articles was made after the work was ended for it interrupts not the sequel of my discourse and requires not those great pawses which in other matters were requisite The Critick also who is oblig'd in a continuall combate cannot regulare his quarters as an Army would do which hath no enemy before them Without stopping it pursues its adversary and gives him no release till it hath vanquished him It s thus that I have behav'd my self in the heat of my disputation not minding the division of my work into so many Sections but because a long Discourse without any disturbs the mind and eyes of a Reader I afterwards advis'd with my self to make some and to place those things in the Title which I esteemed most remarkable that at first sight the Reader may chuse those Subjects which might be most pleasing to him without ingageing himself in others which were not according to his gust But as this manner of reading will be more advantagious to him then to me and may leave him some doubts which may make him have a ill opinion of my reasons I shall begg thus far from him that he will not condemne them untill he hath read the whole work and without having examined the principâ—es foundations which I have therin established And then if he cannot approve them I shall condemn them my self and employ their excuses which the weakness of humane minds and the difficulty there is to penetrate into secrets of nature furnish them withall who have recourse thereunto For the rest what is printed in a great Italian Letter at the head of every Part is the Abridgment of my first Discourse of the Knowledge of Beasts The figures in the Margent designe the pages of M. C's book out of which I have drawn those propositions which I examine That the Imagination forms the Images of things And that its there wherein the first Knowledge consists THE FIRST PART IN considering the order which God hath established through the whole Universe where the lesse noble thing serve for the degrees whereby we rise to the most excellent and all of them have some beginings of that perfection which is more full and perfect in these A man might easily perswade himself that since the Sensitive Soul is subordinate to the Reasonable such a progresse ought to be made in their knowledge that the first may be addresses to the latter and that the actions of the understanding may have their beginning to be as it were roughcast in those of the Imagination And to speak it in one word since the understanding knows thing that it judgeth of them and draweth consequences from them there must needs be somthing done in the Sensitive Soul which serves for the first draught of those actions and in which some image and some vestiges may be observed In effect it conceives things it judgeth whether they are good or ill and concludes either to follow or to fly them And to perform these actions it useth the same way as the Understanding doth For as it judgeth and reasoneth by uniting things which are divided and by dividing those which are united it doth nothing but unite and separate the images of objects to judge of what is good or ill for the Animal It is true that she doth it very imperfectly both because her power is of no great extent and because her knowledges are as the first sights wherewith the Soul views things and the first Essays she makes to discern them But to understand this it 's necessary to see how the Imagination knows That Knowledge is an Action and how far its knowledge may arrive Having therefore presupposed that Knowledge is the onely function of the Reasonable and Sensitive Soul forasmuch as to be sensible to conceive to judge and to reason is nothing else but to know I have from thence inferred That since all things which are below them have the vertue of operating they also must needs have it and consequently that Knowledge which is their onely function is an Action So that those who say that the Senses know not their objects but by receiving their images and that sensation is a pure passion place the sensitive Soul below all corporal things and destroy ever the Nature of Knowledge which was even placed in the rank of vital actions This action is a production of the Image Now because Knowledg cannot be otherwise conceived but as a representation of the objects which are made in the mind If the Sensitive Soul knows and if to know is to operate it of necessity must present it self with the objects And because it cannot otherwise represent a thing but by forming its picture it follows that in knowing things it forms pictures and images of them and that there is no other action which may be attributed unto it proportionable to the perfection and excellency of its Nature To confirm this truth we have in pursuit shewed Their images are different from the action that these images ought to be different from those which come from without 1. Reason Because these are not capable to make the representation wherein the Knowledge consists since they subsist onely in the presence of the objects and that the Soul forbears not to represent them although they be absent 2 Reas Because those which the Understanding useth are different from those which the Imagination and the Senses may furnish and since it forms them to its self the Imagination ought to do in the same manner 3 Reas Forasmuch as sensible images represent onely the accidents and that the Imagination must not onely know the sensible Accidents but the sensible Body and so the Images it forms represent both the Accidents and Subject once together Their Images represent the Accidents and their Subject This latter proposition which ought to serve as a principle to shew the impotency which the Imagination hath to make abstracts and universal Notions was maintained by four Reasons The First That the Imagination being a power buried in the matter ought to have an object of the same Gender and an action which terminates in a thing which in some manner may be as that is composed The Second That being destined to represent sensible things and having no other vertue but to make pictures and images thereof it ought to represent them all
For the Proposition which he would ruine was placed at the entry of my Discourse but as a pleasant Avenue or as a piece of Architecture which makes no part of the Edifice which I would build In a word it is the Preface of my work which ought not to decide the question I was to discourse but onely to prepare the Readers minde and to give him some suspition and some conjecture of that Truth which I would shew him Neither is it to be found in the rank of those proofs which I have imployed to establish it although I ought not to have forgotten it had I made a fundamental reason of it as M. C imagineth For although it be most certain yet is not fit to perswade all kindes of mindes and I very evidently foresaw that the Application I must have made thereof might have been contested After all if I should have used it as a necessary principle to my design I would not have proposed it naked and simple as I did I would have maintained it with Reasons and with an Induction which might have convinced those who would have doubted of it This had been nothing difficult for me to have done since Philosophy teacheth us that in all the order of things there is ever one first which possesseth in perfection that Nature whereon the order is established and that all those which are inferiour to it have onely portions of it which are greater or lesser as they draw neerer or are estranged farther from it So fire is the first amongst hot bodies Heaven amongst the Diaphanous the Sun amongst the Luminous and so of all the rest And every of them hath in the sovereign degree that quality which serves for the foundation of that order wherein they are All that are under have it more or less weakned It is not in the qualities onely wherein this disposition is to be found it 's remarkable even in the essence and in the very substance of things For there is a first being which possesseth all the extent and all the perfection of the essence of which the rest are but little portions which are still diminishing to the very matter which is almost a nothing and a Non ens The Platonick Philosophy is full of these considerations it acknowledgeth a first One a first Good and a first Fair of which all the rest are but participations Aristotle even wills that in the order of Substances there are some more substances then the rest that Form is more then Matter That the first is more then that which is called the second And to draw nearer to our Subject There is no faculty in living and animated things which enter into order wherein the same participation is not observable There are plants which nourish which encrease and multiply some more then others and those who know their Nature well may see that the most perfect in every kind hath that vertue which is fit for it in a soveraign degree What inequality will not be found in the distribution of the Senses if we would measure the difference which there is amongst Animals for the sight from the Mole to the Eagle for smel from Insects to the Dogs for touch from Spunges or if you will from the sensitive Plant to Man and so of all other Animal Vertues In fine he who would consider all the genders of things he will finde some species which are as bonds which unite them together and as steps which insensibly lead from the one to the other for amongst Stones and Plants there are Stone-plants found amongst Plants and Animals there are the Zoophytes amongst fish and Terrestrial Creatures we finde the Amphibious so far that even to preserve this order there must often have been species in some sort monstrous to place amongst those things which are most opposite such is the Bat amongst Birds and four-footed Beasts for it 's a monstrous Bird which hath neither feathers nor bill which hath teeth and breasts and which goes on four feet although it have but two Such is the Triton amongst Aquatick Creatures and Man such also betwixt him and terrestrial Animals is the Guinny Monkey called Banis and a thousand such like which may be observed running over all the species which are in the Universe All which evidently make it appear that it 's a Law which Nature hath imposed to make an essay of her works in the meanest things that she might compleat them in the highest and that in those she might put the beginning of that vertue which she intended perfect in these Which being so had not I reason to leave this suspition in the Readers mind That the same might be in that of Reasoning And since the Sensitive Soul was subordinate to the Reasonable and even therein there must be some vestiges and some rough-casts of reason which were perfect in this At all adventures it was a proposition which was to be made good by the proof I was to make of the reasoning of Beasts And I should have been guilty to have supprest it since it may serve for a new example to confirm that fair disposition which the wisdom and providence of God hath established in the World So that M. C. hath not onely grosly abused himself when he did beleeve that I made it the foundation of my proof but even also when he would accuse it of falseness since he knew not the use I had destined it unto and that he produceth no reason which might convince it of error He says well p 41. That there are a thousand most excellent Faculties in Minerals the least tract of which appears not in the Elements That nourishment and the other parts of Vegetation are compleat in Plants and are not began in those things which are inferior to them That Sight Memory and Imagination are onely to be found in Animals But all this makes nothing against the truth of this Proposition when it assures that the lowest things have the beginnings of that perfection which is to be found in the highest this ought to be understood of those which are in one and the same order and which consequently have a Vertue or a Nature common amongst themselves For all things are not in one and the same order and as many different Vertues as there are and several Natures which may be common so many several orders of things there are such as that is of Bodies Diaphanous Luminous c There are without doubt in the Minerals qualities which are common with the Elements and which consequently make an order amongst themselves as is hardness weight and such like But there are those also which are particular unto them and the order which is found in them is shut up in the gender of Minerals but it 's always according to the proportion we have observed For Gold for example possesseth the Metallick Nature in perfection and all other Metals have but their portions greater or lesser as they are nearer or farther
when she was to make the picture of a man it must paint his Soul and his most hidden Faculties I grant him not onely that the Picture represents the thing all entire for that unless it were entire it were not the thing it ought to represent But it follows not from thence that the picture ought to represent the Soul and the Faculties of man forasmuch as that makes no part of what it ought to represent If he had shewed that the picture ought truly to have represented man certainly it were obliged to paint his soul and his body since man is composed of them both And if we say that it represents man it is but by accident and because the understanding supplies the deficiencie the Nature of Man representing to him that which Art furnisheth him withall only in figure It is not so with the knowing Faculties which are as the Natural pictures of all things and which by an Art if we may so say more excellent then all those which Men have invented have the power to represent the very substance of their objects The defect then which is in M. C. his Consequence comes from that he takes the word of Things in the general signification although I have restrained it to a certain gender and as the Logicians speak he changeth the Supposition and from a Term which is distributed he makes a Distributive But not to weigh too exactly what he spoke but in raillery let us observe his other Answers which explicate his true sentiments The Nature of the Imagination is altogether Representative He says That the Imagination moves the Appetite and therefore that its Nature is not altogether Representative And I deny this Consequence although I agree with him in the Antecedent For the Imagination moves not the Appetite but by representing unto it those things to which it ought to bear it self And to speak properly it is not moved it is rather that which moves it self in pursuit of the Judgment it makes As for the vertues which M.C. gives it by which he pretends That in Nature is not at all representative we have already answered this objection pag. 22. As well as to what he adds That the Nature of the external Senses is as much or more representative as the Imagination For if by the external Senses he understand the Sensitive faculty which is in the Organs it is not more nor less representative then the Imagination since its the same thing He might remember that I had expressly marked That by the word Imagination I comprehended all the powers of the Sensitive soul which form Knowledge For although the sense of that word have not in common discourse so large an extent as I have given it yet after I had explicated it clearly enough there remained nothing of an Equivoke And since the question is of things and not of words which serve only but as they are valued M. C. ought rather to have comprehended the thing of which I spake then to have poposed his gainsayings The Imagination is more representative then the sensible Species 182. At last he objects against us That the visible Species are more representative then the Imagination and that she represents the Objects more perfectly then the Phantasm which is in the Memory It is what he should have proved For if he supposeth that the Imagination represents not the Subject of the Accidents he supposeth what is in question And if he will confess that she doth represent them he must also confess that the Phantasm represents the things more imperfectly then the visible Species since they represent only the Accidents and that represents the Accidents and the Subject together On the other side the word To represent is taken actively when we imploy it about the Imagination and signifies the same with Making the picture Now if this be so the Species represent it not in that sense since they make not the pictures and that themselves are the pictures of things And therefore M. C. deceives himself when he would compare them with the Imagination which makes the pictures and images of things That if he will compare them only with the Phantasm he must abandon the one half of his Proposition and for the rest he must save himself from the Dilemma we have now made him The third Reason we made use of to shew that the Imagination represents somewhat besides the Accidents is Reas 3. Because the Vnderstanding cannot form the Idea of a Substance That if in some manner it do not represent the substance of the objects the Understanding would finde no ground for those Knowledges in the Phantasm it represents For after having separated all Accidents from it there would remain nothing whereupon it could form the Idea of its Substance Whereupon M. C. says That I should have added That the Vnderstanding could not know universal things did not the Phantasm represent the Vniversality neither would it know Man did not the Imagination form a spiritual Image of his soul I am much obliged to him for the advice he gives me But the Laws of Logick defend me the use thereof and teach me That when a man changeth the Terms of a Proposition which he would bring to an Absurdity he labours in vain and can conclude nothing at all Seeing I had said that the Understanding would have nothing whereupon to form the Idea of its substance did not the phantasm in some fort represent the substance All what M. C. could legitimately infer was That the Understanding could have nothing on which it could form the Idea of universal things did not the phantasme in some sort represent unto it universal things And then although the Consequences which are drawn from the first intentions to the second are commonly captious yet I should freely have consented herein without fearing any inconvenience because that I can maintain That universal Natures are all in every of their Individuals not formally and precisely as they say but nevertheless really So that in this sense it being true that the phantasm may represent such an Animal it may also in some manner represent the universal Nature of that Animal But I will not engage my self in the Combats which the Schools make on this subject And that I may no longer contest with M. C. I shall grant That the Understanding knowes things which are not represented in the phantasms The Vnderstanding hath Knowledges direct and oblique and that by means of the Discourse he makes and the Consequences he deduceth he discovers in the objects of Natures and Vertues whereof the Imagination gives him no notice But it follows not from thence that it knows all things after the same manner Besides these Knowledges which are oblique there are those which are direct and intuitive whereby it sees and knows things as they are represented by the Senses And did not the phantasms express it it could never attain to the knowledge of them by the way of Knowledge
If this be thus as no man need doubt M. C. can draw no advantage from what he hath opposed For were it true that the Understanding knew Universal and Spiritual things without the help of the Imagination it will not from thence follow That he did know the Substance of which we have spoken in the same manner since there is anoâ—her kind of Knowledge whereby it may know it In effect the Imagination conceiveth what is hot what is animated And there is no likelihood when a Beast sees another Animal that it conceives only the colour the figure and the motion which it perceiveth therein but it conceiveth somewhat which hath all those Accidents And this cannot but be the Substance which in Man serves for the Object to the direct knowledge of the Understanding For in separating all the Accidents which the Imagination confounded he at last discovers that thing which is void of those Accidents So that a man cannot say he doth it afresh no more then he who finds a Treasure makes the Treasure by digging the earth and putting by what hid it In pursuit of this discovery the Understanding imploys its oblique knowledges and by several relations and divers inductions which it makes he adds to this Substance other Notions which were not truly represented in the phantasme as Universality Spirituality and the like But this is not the place where we are to examine this Subject And without troubling our selves to establish our Reasons it will be sufficient to shew that those which M. C. hath made use of to destroy them hath been nothing to their prejudice For as for what he adds That he knows not why I will not have the Vnderstanding know those things which are not represented in the Phantasm since I will have the Imagination should know the Substance without the help of external Senses and sensible Species He makes me speak there as he pleaseth him self Had he taken notice of my words he would have found them quite contrary to what he said And that I will have That the Understanding knows the things which are not represented in the Phantasm And that I will not have the Imagination know the Substance without the help of the Senses and of the Sensible species For although I assured That the Imagination forms it self its Phantasm yet I have always said that it form'd it on the Model of those sensible Species which are receiv'd through the organs of the Senses And therefore it is not without their aid as he would have that I had said Yet I know that this is not the meaning which he gives to my words neither will I stick at it And I would only observe this Equivoque to make it be remembred That those who undertake the Censure of other mens Works ought to keep themselves on their guard and not to expose themselves to the danger to be reprehended by those they would correct I see then well enough the Reason which he would imploy against me is That if the Imagination may represent the Substance the picture of which the sensible Species are not to make the Vnderstanding which is incomparably more knowing and more perfect may also represent it without the Phantasms giving it any image thereof But this objection is easily resolved because we do not consider here the Understanding in it self and in its pure nature which may have such a power and perhaps Souls separated may thus know corporal things But we respect it in the state it is in us and in its ordinary manner of acting which requires the help of the inferior Faculties Otherwise we might prove That we had no need of eyes to see things since a man might see them without as Spirits do 'T is the Law which Nature imposeth to this sublime faculty That at often as it is link'd to the Body it ought to serve the Senses and the Imagination and not anticipate that knowledge which they are to give it And since they are destined to representation in corporal things it ought to expect the report they are to make and take in for the ground of their first knowledges Now it is certain they give in an accompt of the very substance of things for that they cannot do otherwise for those reasons which we have before recited And certainly Nature should have been deceitful to have reduced all the Knowledge of Animals to exterior Accidents and to have denied them that which was the most important for their preservation These are the greatest endeavours M. C. hath made against our First Part. For what he afterwards adds is so weak that there is nothing which can excuse it but that he was at an end of his work and that in all likelihood his mind was tired with the long labor he had undertaken In effect On what we have said That the Imagination confounded the Accidents with their Subject The only Reason he objects is That it is not true For if he pretends to have sufficiently proved it Because the Imagination knows not the Subject and that the Qualities serve not for marks to know them It 's what is in question and consequently cannot pass for a proof Reas 4. Drawn from Experience As for the Experience I proposed which at the first sight we have of visible Accidents We do not only believe we see the Accidents but the Bodies themselves wherein they are He answers That this experience is false because says he the first sights or single conceptions can precede the affirmations and the reasonings without which one cannot conclude nor know a Substance by means of an Accident But to what purpose doth he speak here of Affirmations and Reasonings in this encounter we will not have the Imagination reason or affirm any thing neither is it by means of the Accident that it knows the Substance at one sight it sees both as it sees the colour and the figure And when I say That it beleeves it sees the subject of accidents it is not by the reflection it makes on its first knowledge but it is in its common way of speaking of such things as they think they certainly know For when any object presents it self to sight it is true we beleeve we see it and we think we are not deceived in that knowledge which our eye affords us and yet for all that we cannot say we make any Affirmation Conclusion or Reasoning How ever it be it imports me or the truth but very little that M. C. denys the experience which shall be confessed by all other men so as they be not blind And if we would consult with the most ignorant who commonly are the most certain and most sincere Judges we can chuse for what concern the senses they will all say that when they see a stone they do not onely see the colour and the figure but the thing it self which hath those qualities it is not that at this first sight they destinguish it from its accidents because
to say Besides that he confounds Propositions which are distinct and separate those which are onely particular he renders universal and thus imposeth things on me which I never thought of The Reader may therefore observe that when I say that the knowledge of the Imagination is bounded to corporal things which are necessary to life and that commonly she is restrained to those things which are proper to every Species He suppresseth the word commonly which renders my Proposition particular and makes me speak universally as if I had said that its equally restrained to those which are proper to the nature of every species and to those which are necessary to life which nevertheless is not true 2. He will have it that I make Beasts reason on all what presents it self to their sences and that I make them assemble all the images which they have in the Memory to draw from thence consequences But there is a great deal of difference to say what I have said That when Beasts reason they reason on what presenâ—s its self to their Senses or that they reason of sensible things which are necessary to life and to speak as M C. doth That they reason on all what presents it self to their senses For I confess that there are some which present themselves to their senses which are not necessary to life whereon they do not reason and even on those which are necessary to life they do not always reason being elsewhere diverted To conclude they assemble the Images of the Memory not all as M.C. makes me speak but onely those which agree together and on which they ought to reason After this its easie to make it appear That what he brings to shew that the Knowledge of the Imagination is not bounded to things necessary to life proveth quite the contrary For when Beasts reason on what presents it self to their senses and on the things they are taught when they assemble the images of the Memory and thence draw consequences In fine when they know the time to come all these knowledges are followed with pleasure or grief with hope or fear and they must therefore be necessary to life since these passions respect their preservation and are never raised in the mind unless to possess good or she from ill For the rest I stop not at the induction which he would draw from the knowledge of the time to come which in his opinion is altogether spiritual For I have made it fully appear before that it is sensible and that therefore is within the extent of the object which I have assigned to the Imagination The second Difference which is betwixt the Vnderstanding and the Imagination The second difference which we have found betwixt the Understanding and the Imagination is That this forms no universal Notion so that consequently I can none but particular Ratiocinations Instead that the Understanding hath the liberty to form general notions of all things and when it pleaseth to draw from thence universal or particular consequences I had here given a fair field to M.C. td have exercised his spirit and I did beleeve in the humour he was in to contradict whatever he incountred he would not have let pass so important a Proposition without disputing it Yet I perceive that notwithstanding it hath great Philosophers for its enemies and several presumptions repugnant unto it yet it hath escaped his hands and hath received no touch of his Criticks Certainly instead of amusing himself to mince upon words as he doth in this Chapter and to puzzle the truth by petty School tricks as he hath done every where else he should have examined whether it is a necessity That because a power is material it cannot make universal notions principally not going out of the resort or precinct of material things In effect when the sense hath known an objâ—ct doth there not remain in the soul a general notion which makes it know all the rest which are of the same nature And â—s the great Scaliger saith The Chick hath it not a universal image of the Kite whereby it knows every Kite which comes to sight And what If the Imagination hath the faculty to judge as we beleeve can it not judge through all the extent of its object and since it can know all the parts of the whole may it not form a proposition which may comprehend all the objects it hath the knowledge of For example can it not judge that all what is sweet is good or at least That all the sweet things it knows are good And when a Sheep shall see divers Wolves together will it not judge that all the Beasts it sees are Wolves and enemies to attempt its life Now these are universal propositions and yet the Imagination how material soever she be is capable to form general Notions But all these Reasons are weak in comparison of those which establish the contrary opinion and which shew that a material Faculty can never form any universal Notion for its certain That we cannot conceive an universal thing but by taking from it the singularity it hath otherwise it would not be universal now its singularity cannot be taken away but by separating it from those things which render it singular as from the particular subject its in and from the other conditions which determine it Now there is no material faculty which can separate the forms from the matter nor from their subject because the Act and the Power must be of the same gender and that the Power which is material and composed must have an Action which terminates in somewhat which is material and composed as we have shewed in the first Part And consequently the Imagination which is of that order can form no universal Notion since it cannot separate the forms from their subjects Besides an universal notion supposeth an universal power and an universal power is nor determined at least in respect of particular things over which its universality extends Now so it is that all what is material is absolutely determined because it s of the Maliciousness of the matter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Aristotle says to restrain all things which participate of it to its nature And therefore the matter being absolutely singular and determined there is no material power which can raise it self above singularity or produce any notions which are not absolutely singular and determined What shall we then say of those Images which represent so many several objects Certainly they are not properly universal for of three kind of things which are called so to wit the causes which produce several effects the signs which represent divers things and the Natures which are in several particulars there are onely these latter which are essentially universal because they are in no way singular and that the unity which they have hinders them not from being in effect in many particulars Instead that the others are effectually singular and altogether exterior to the things in respect
how evident soever they are of themselves which need no other knowledge but that of terms and which natural light make us presently comprehend yet ought to be known and proved by the Induction Now it is not that the Induction gives in the evidence but it is that it fortifies and confirms it as hath been said The second Objection is That the Conclusion draws its evidence and its proof from the antecedent propositions and consequently it ought of it self to be obscure and doubtful But we should say that the proof of the conclusion is ever in power in the antecedents and not always in effect that is to say that were it necessary to prove the conclusion it might be done by the Antecedents But when the conclusion is certain or evident of it self it needs none of this proof unless for the reason before mentioned to wit to confirm the truth which she makes known So that in this case the conclusion doth not effectively draw its evidence from the propositions which precede it and this maxim is not true as to the effect but for the conclusions which are obscure and doubtful Whereto may be added what we have said in the Chapter of the Third Part that things are known or unknown by the Senses or by Nature and that a conclusion may be known by one and unknown by another And then the Antecedent will serve as a proof not for sensible evidence but for natural evidence So this Proposition Peter is risible is evident of it self by sense and experience and were it to be proved by a universal proposition it is but to give in the natural evidence which it hath not After all this being evident by the senses the proof added thereunto whatever it were serves but to confirm the truth which is already known from elsewhere We may therefore reason on things which are not obscure nor doubtful and consequently the evidence of means were it as great as that of the end cannot hinder the soul from reasoning not onely to apply them to that end but also to the operation which ought to follow this knowledge as we have before said That we cannot apply the Means to the End without Ratiocination M. C. hath then much deceived himself when he assures page 114. That all the error of his adversaries comes but from that they imagine that its impossible to use means to attain an end without reasoning For all what I have said makes it appear that there was no error therein and all what he says afterwards to shew that there is proves nothing what he pretends First The example he brings of insensible things which use means to attain to their end without having any knowledge of it is altogether impertinent For the question here is not to know whether the imployment of means in general to attain an end require Ratiocination the question is restrained to things which operate with knowledge Now it 's certain that Animals know the end to which they tend as we shall shew hereafter and consequently they also know the means to attain it And by the reason before alledged they ought to reason to apply the meanes to the end and to the practical judgment which they make before they make use of it It 's true if there were a knowledge to be found by which we could imploy those means without making this judgment which devanceth all the motions of the appetite and which is the principle of all animal operation perhaps I might confess that Ratiocination would be nothing necessary But where were this knowledge to be found since of all the things which are in nature the Animals onely are knowing and that to operate they must judge that the things are good and possible and that from the goodness and possibility they find in them they conclude that they must do them which cannot be without reasoning as we have demonstrated In the second place the example he adds pag. 114 115. of Children of Fools as those benummed of timerous persons c. who without reasoning as he says employ means to do a thing All these examples I say are useless to our question for they do exclude but the Ratiocination of the superior part which is not here in question and presuppose the Ratiocination of the Imagination which is as much as to say that they do not employ means without reasoning Yes I grant That a Child which reasons not yet brings its hands to its face to take away what troubles it that falling he opposeth them to save himself that he casts himself on his Nurses breasts that he useth more strength in sucking her as he hath more need and hides it self from one who hath frighted it and useth a hundred several means for several ends But although it be true that this Childe reasons not yet it cannot yet be understood but of Intellectual Ratiocination and not of that of the Imagination which goes before all these actions as we have shewed in several places of this Work It 's the same with those benummed who how little sense soever they have remaining shrink back those parts where they are grieved for so long as they still feel their Imagination must work and move the appetite to these motions and consequently make that Ratiocination which we have so often spoken of We may say as much of a Man whose appetite prevents all the conclusions which his reason can make at the unexpected encounter of some spark of fire which burns him Of timerous persons who without reasoning flie from those things which appear frightful and of those to whom the sight of a Serpent of a Mouse or of such like makes them out of countenance by the antipathy they have together For all this may well be without the intervention of the Superior Reason but not without the reasoning of the Imagination In the mean time M. C. confounds these two things as well as the design and intention which are to be found in these two faculties since he says That all the actions of the Appetite are performed without design that we often laugh without any intention and that the apprehension of tickling causeth us often to make involuntary shrugs Now it 's certain that by this kind of speaking we can say nothing but that these actions are done without the Design and Intention of the Superior part And it cannot fall into the thought of any reasonable person that from thence one might infer that they were done without the design and intention of the sensitive soul presupposing that it is capable of design and intention as we have shewed So that I pitty M.C. for having taken so much pains to accumulate reasons upon reasons and heaping examples on examples to prove a thing which is besides the question and to have forgotten the decisive point of our dispute Truly had he fallen into the defect he reproacheth me to have done in some place to have made principles according to my fancy to draw from
it suffers So that in general there are two inflexions or different articulations of the voyce the one when it 's hindered to enlarge it self and the other when it cannot run in an even thread The first is when coming out of the throat where its principal organ is it comes to encounter the mouths cavity which obligeth it to restrain it self and in some manner to assume the figure it findes in that part for according as the opening is great or smal round square or otherwise the voyce conforms it self to all these figures and takes these different sounds which are observable in the five Vowels A E I O V. Now we need not doubt but that there is therein a true articulation since there is a right inflexion the voyce which seeks to extend it self being in that streight which it is to pass forced to lessen it self Otherwise we must say that words composed of pure vowels are not articulate because they are not formed by any other kinde of articulation but that which we have here observed The second is when the parts of the mouth oppose themselves to the voice and strike on it as they pass interrupting the equality of its course and forcing it to turn it self out of its right way as it happens to waters which run through pebbles and other such like obstacles and this interruption forms all the consonants the voyce rendring it self soft or dry sweet or sharp clear or obscure quick or slow according as the stroke is made and according to the nature of the organs which in some manner imprint on it the qualities it hath But as there are parts which cause a greater hinderance to the voyce some then others there are also Consonants wherein articulation is more or less sensible which for this reason are divided into Mutes Demy-Mutes and Demy-Vowels The greatest obstacle is to be found in the Mutes because the Voyce finds the passage quite stopt and that endeavouring to get out it s opprest and as it were stiffled it beating against the organs through which it passeth Now there is nothing but the Tongue and the Lips which may cause this hinderance because there are only those two parts of the Mouth which truly move and whose motion serves to form Speech and as they strike the other parts more strongly or more softly they produce two sorts of Mutes if it be by the Lips the passage is stopt the voyce issuing out forms P or B. If by the Tongue either it is by its Basis which strikes the Palat and bring forth C and G. or 't is by its point which strikes against the Teeth and makes T and D. Amongst the Demmutes the passage is truly stopt as in the Mutes but the voice is not stifled as it is here because it engageth not it self altogether betwixt the organs which resist it so that it returns back and seeks turns to flye out Wherefore they are called liquids because they make a reflux and have a waveing recourse like the water which returns back to its source when it s stopt When the voice is therefore hindered from going out of the lips which shut themselves and that it returns towards the Nostrils it changeth it self into a kind of bellowing which makes M. If the hinderance happens on the Tongue which with its end strikes on the roof then either the voice takes the same tune back and produceth N or else escapes by the sides of the Tongue in the to cavity of the Cheeks and forms L. To conclude in the Demi-vowels the passage is not absolutely shut as in the rest of the Consonants but it 's very much streightened so that the voice is constrained to fortifie it self by a greater breath the more easily to issue out of so streight a passage Now the breath at its going out is pressed either by the teeth whence comes S or by the Tongue whereby it makes R or by the Lips which produce the consonant V or by the Lips and Teeth together which make F or by the Tongue and fore-teeth which form the Z or by it and the Teeth which we call dog or eie teeth whence is the consonant J. Or again by it and the great teeth whence comes the Shin of the Hebrews and our Ch in French to which we hitherto have given no simple Character All this would require a longer Examen then we can here afford it but it is sufficient for our design to know that the voice is therein articulate because it suffers inflexion and that it sensibly turns and binds it self Yet we must confess that these two kinds of articulation which are in the vowels and consonants are simple and that in comparison of those which are composed of them they are neither so evident nor so perfect and as commonly the most accomplished things carry away and reserve the name of all the gender although in effect it appertain to all the rest it also happens that the most composed voices and where there is most articulations are for their excellency called articulate the simple and the less composed being not placed in that rank although truly they ought to be so as well as the rest And thence it comes that in comparison of humane speech which is without doubt the most diversified in all kinds of inflexions and motions there are none but that to whom the common use of Tongues would give the name of articulate all the rest being so little to its proportion that unto it they alwayes seem as if they were not so at all But Philosophy and Truth which do not subject themselves to so extravagant and unequitable a Judge and which preserve the name to all things which belongs to their nature acknowledge that all voices which have an inflexion are articulate and that they ought to be called so So that on this ground to take away those doubts which are proposed at the beginning of this Discourse for the vowels and consonants are not called elements but in respect of the composed word and not of speech in general every one of them being a word which hath no elements and is indivisible even as when we exclude out of the rank of articulate voices Groanings Exclamations Whistlings and the like it 's by comparison with speech which is diversified by divers syllables and is used in the common commerce of men for those are true articulate voices which are composed of several vowels or redoubled or continued demi vowels but which are not so much so as the words which enter into our language wherein the consonants and vowels are diversly mixt together and make a many different articulations From hence it 's easie to judge that all the essence of articulation consists in the onely inflexion of the voice and that all the rest is exterior and strange to it for although it be destined to express the motions of the mind it s its end and not its essence the end nor the efficient cause never entring