it such an evil as the party that suffers or the publick cannot be accessory to let the case be never so small yet if there be illegality in the act it strikes at the very being of limited Monarchy which is to be legal unless our Author will say as in effect he doth That his limited Monarch must govern according to Law in great and publick matters only and that in smaller matters which concern private men or poor persons he may rule according to his own will Secondly our Author tells us If the Monarchs act of exorbitancy or transgression be mortal and such as suffered dissolves the frame of Government and publick liberty then the illegality is to be set open and redresment sought by petition which if failing prevention by resistance ought to be and if it be apparent and appeal be made to the consciences of mankind then the fundamental Laws of that Monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every mans conscience and every man so far as concerns him must follow the evidence of Truth in his own soul to oppose or not to oppose according as he can in conscience acquit or condemn the act of the Governour or Monarch Whereas my Author requires that the destructive nature of illegal commands shall be set open Surely his mind is That each private man in his particular case should make a publick remonstrance to the World of the illegal act of the Monarch and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved according to his desire he ought or it is his duty to make resistance Here I would know who can be the Judge whether the illegality be made apparent It is a main point since every man is prone to flatter himself in his own cause and to think it good and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent when other moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing and in this case the judgment of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible means or if it could it were like to be various and erroneous Yet our Author will have an Appeal made to the Conscience of all Mankind and that being made he concludes The Fundamental Laws must judge and pronounce Sentence in every mans Conscience Whereas he saith The Fundamental Laws must judge I would very gladly learn of him or of any other for him what a Fundamental Law is or else have but any one Law named me that any man can say is a Fundamental Law of the Monarchy I confess he tells us That the Common Laws are the foundation and the Statute Laws are superstructive yet I think he dares not say that there is any one branch or part of the Common Law but that it may be taken away by an Act of Parliament for many points of the Common Law de facto have and de jure any point may be taken away How can that be called Fundamental which hath and may be removed and yet the Statute-Laws stand firm and stable It is contrary to the nature of Fundamental for the building to stand when the foundation is taken away Besides the Common Law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common usage or custom which by length of time only obtains authority So that it follows in time after Government but cannot go before it and be the rule to Government by any original or radical Constitution Also the Common Law being unwritten doubtful and difficult cannot but be an uncertain rule to govern by which is against the nature of a Rule which is and ought to be certain Lastly by making the Common Law only to be the foundation Magna Charta is excluded from being a Fundamental Law and also all other Statutes from being limitations to Monarchy since the Fundamental Laws only are to be Judge Truly the Conscience of all mankind is a pretty large Tribunal for the Fundamental Laws to pronounce Sentence in It is very much that Laws which in their own nature are dumb and always need a Judge to pronounce Sentence should now be able to speak and pronounce Sentence themselves Such a Sentence surely must be upon the hearing of one party only for it is impossible for a Monarch to make his defence and answer and produce his Witnesses in every mans conscience in each mans Cause who will but question the legality of the Monarchs Government Certainly the sentence cannot but be unjust where but one mans tale is heard For all this the conclusion is Every man must oppose or not oppose the Monarch according to his own conscience Thus at the last every man is brought by this Doctrine of our Authors to be his own Judge And I also appeal to the consciences of all mankind whether the end of this be not utter confusion and Anarchy Yet after all this the Author saith This power of every mans judging the illegal acts of the Monarch argues not a Superiority of those who judge over him who is judged and he gives a profound reason for it his words are It is not authoritative and civil but moral residing in reasonable creatures and lawful for them to execute What our Author means by these words not authoritative and civil but moral perhaps I understand not though I think I do yet it serves my turn that he saith That resistance ought to be made and every man must oppose or not oppose according as in conscience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his Governour for if it enable a man to resist and oppose his Governour without question 't is authoritative and civil Whereas he adds That moral judgment is residing in reasonable creatures and lawful for them to execute he seems to imply that authoritative and civil Judgment doth not reside in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed Such a Conclusion fits well with Anarchy for he that takes away all Government and leaves every man to his own conscience and so makes him an independent in State may well teach that authority resides not in reasonable creatures nor can be lawfully executed I pass from his absolute and limited Monarchy to his division or partition for he allows no division of Monarchy into simple and mixed viz. of a Monarch the Nobility and Community Where first observe a doubt of our Authors Whether a firm union can be in a mixture of equality he rather thinks there must be a priority of order in one of the three or else there can be no unity He must know that priority of order doth not hinder but that there may be an equality of mixture if the shares be equal for he that hath the first share may have no more than the others so that if he will have an inequality of mixture a primity of share will not serve the turn the first share must be greater or better than the others or else they will be equal and then he cannot call it a mixed Monarchy where only
complectitur quaedam principia morum per se nota ad summum extenditur ad ea quae necessaria evidenti elatione ex illis principiis consequuntur praeter illa verò multa alia sunt necessaria in republica ad ejus rectam Gubernationem ideo necessarium fuit ut per humanam rationem aliqua magis in particulari determinarentur circa ea quae per solam rationem naturalem definiri non possunt Ludo. Molin de Just. Thus much may suffice to shew the Distractions in and between the Civil and Common Laws about the Law of Nature and Nations In the next place we are to consider how Grotius distinguisheth these Laws To maintain the Community of things to be Natural Grotius hath framed new Divisions of the Law of Nature First in his Preface to his Books De Jure Belli Pacis he produceth a Definition of the Law of Nature in such doubtful obscure and reserved Terms as if he were diffident of his Undertaking Next in his first Book and first Chapter he gives us another Distribution which differs from his Doctrine in his Preface In his Preface his Principle is that the Appetite of Society that is to say of Community is an Action proper to man Here he presently corrects himself with an Exception that some other Creatures are found to desire Society and withal he answers the Objections thus that this Desire of Society in brute Beasts comes from some external Principle What he means by Principium intelligens extrinsecum I understand not nor doth he explain nor is it material nor is the Argument he useth to any purpose for admitting all he saith to be true yet his Principle fails for the Question is not from what Principle this Desire of Society proceeds in Beasts but whether there be such a Desire or no. Besides here he takes the Appetite of Society and Community to be all one whereas many live in Society which live not in Community Next he teacheth that the keeping of Society custodia Societatis which in a rude manner saith he we have now expressed is the fountain of that Law which is properly so called I conceive by the Law properly so called he intends the Law of Nature though he express not so much And to this appetite of Sociable Community he refers Alieni Abstinentia but herein it may be he forgets himself for where there is Community there is neither meum nor tuum nor yet alienum and if there be no alienum there can be no alieni abstinentia To the same purpose he saith that by the Law of Nature men must stand to bargains Juris naturae sit stare pactis But if all things were common by Nature how could there be any bargain Again Grotius tells us that from this signification of the Law there hath flowed another larger which consists saith he in Discerning what delights us or hurts us and in judging how things should be wisely distributed to each one This latter he calls the looser Law of Nature the former Jus Sociale the Law of Nature strictly or properly taken And these two Laws of Nature should have place saith he though men should deny there were a a God But to them that believe there is a God there is another Original of Law beside the Natural coming from the free Will of God to the which our own Vnderstanding tells us we must be subject Thus have I gathered the Substance of what is most material concerning the Law of Nature in his Preface If we turn to the Book it self we have a division of the Law into Jus Naturale Voluntarium Divinum Humanum Civile Latiùs patens Seu Jus Gentium Arctiùs patens Seu Paternum Seu Herile In the Definition of Jus Naturale he omits those Subtleties of Jus Naturae propriè dictum and quod laxius ita dicitur which we find in his Preface and gives such a plain Definition as may fitly agree to the Moral Law By this it seems the Law of Nature and the Moral Law are one and the same Whereas he affirmeth That the Actions about which the Law of Nature is conversant are lawful or unlawful of themselves and therefore are necessarily commanded or forbidden by God by which mark this Law of Nature doth not only differ from humane Law but from the Divine voluntary Law which doth not command or forbid those things which of themselves and by their own nature are lawful or unlawful but makes them unlawful by forbidding them and due by commanding them In this he seems to make the Law of Nature to differ from Gods Voluntary Law whereas in God Necessary and Voluntary are all one Salmasius de Vsuris in the twentieth Chapter condemns this Opinion of Grotius though he name him not yet he means him if I mistake not In the next place I observe his saying That some things are by the Law of Nature not propriè but reductivè and that the Law of Nature deals not only with those things which are beside the Will of Man but also with many things which follow the act of Man's Will so Dominion such as is now in Vse mans Will brought in but now that it is brought in it is against the Law of Nature to take that from thee against thy will which is in thy Dominion Yet for all this Grotius maintains That the Law of Nature is so immutable that it cannot be changed by God himself He means to make it good with a Distinction Some things saith he are by the Law of Nature but not simply but according to the certain state of things so the common use of things was natural as long as Dominion was not brought in and Right for every man to take his own by Force before Laws were made Here if Grotius would have spoken plain instead of but not simply but according to the certain State of Things he would have said but not immutably but for a certain Time And then this Distinction would have run thus Some things are by the Law of Nature but not immutably but for a certain time This must needs be the naked Sense of his Distinction as appears by his Explication in the Words following where he saith That the common Vse of Things was natural so long as Dominion was not brought in Dominion he saith was brought in by the will of man whom by this Doctrine Grotius makes to be able to change that Law which God himself cannot change as he saith He gives a double ability to man first to make that no Law of Nature which God made to be the Law of Nature And next to make that a Law of Nature which God made not for now that Dominion is brought in he maintains it is against the Law of Nature to take that which is in another man's dominion Besides I find no Coherence in these Words By the Law of Nature it was right for every man to take his own by force before Laws
of his Posterity This Assertion is confuted point-blank by Bellarmine who expresly affirmeth That the first Parents ought to have been Princes of their Posterity And until Suarez bring some Reason for what he saith I shall trust more to Bellarmine's Proofs than to his Denials 5. But let us Condescend a while to the Opinion of Bellarmine and Suarez and all those who place Supreme power in the Whole People and ask them if their meaning be That there is but one and the same power in all the people of the World so that no power can be granted except all the Men upon the Earth meet and agree to choose a Governour An Answer is here given by Suarez That it is scarce possible nor yet expedient that All Men in the World should be gathered together into One Community It is likelier that either never or for a very short time that this power was in this manner in the whole Multitude of Men collected but a little after the Creation men began to be divided into several Commonwealths and this distinct power was in each of them This Answer of Scarce possible nor yet Expedient It is likelier begets a new doubt how this distinct power comes to each particular Community when God gave it to the whole Multitude only and not to any particular Assembly of Men. Can they shew or prove that ever the whole Multitude met and divided this power which God gave them in Gross by breaking into parcels and by appointing a distinct power to each several Common-wealth Without such a Compact I cannot see according to their own Principles how there can be any Election of a Magistrate by any Commonwealth but by a meer Usurpation upon the priviledge of the whole World If any think that particular Multitudes at their own Discretion had power to divide themselves into several Commonwealths those that think so have neither Reason nor Proof for so thinking and thereby a Gap is opened for every petty Factious Multitude to raise a New Commonwealth and to make more Commonweals than there be Families in the World But let this also be yielded them That in each particular Commonwealth there is a Distinct Power in the Multitude Was a General Meeting of a Whole Kingdom ever known for the Election of a Prince Is there any Example of it ever found in the Whole World To conceit such a thing is to imagine little less than an Impossibility And so by Consequence no one Form of Government or King was ever established according to this supposed Law of Nature 6. It may be answered by some That if either the Greatest part of a Kingdom or if a smaller part only by Themselves and all the Rest by Proxy or if the part not concurring in Election do after by a Tacit Assent ratifie the Act of Others That in all these Cases it may be said to be the Work of the whole Multitude As to the Acts of the Major part of a Multitude it is true that by Politick Humane Constitutions it is oft ordained that the Voices of the most shall over-rule the Rest and such Ordinances bind because where Men are Assembled by an humane Power that power that doth Assemble them can also Limit and Direct the manner of the Execution of that Power and by such Derivative Power made known by Law or Custom either the greater part or two Thirds or Three parts of Five or the like have power to oversway the Liberty of their Opposites But in Assemblies that take their Authority from the Law of Nature it cannot be so for what Freedom or Liberty is due to any Man by the Law of Nature no Inferiour Power can alter limit or diminish no One Man nor a Multitude can give away the Natural Right of another The Law of Nature is unchangeable and howsoever One Man may hinder Another in the Use or Exercise of his Natural Right yet thereby No Man loseth the Right of it self for the Right and the Use of the Right may be distinguished as Right and Possession are oft distinct Therefore unless it can be proved by the Law of Nature that the Major or some other part have Power to over rule the Rest of the Multitude It must follow that the Acts of Multitudes not Entire are not Binding to All but only to such as Consent unto them 7. As to the point of Proxy it cannot be shewed or proved That all those that have been Absent from Popular Elections did ever give their Voices to some of their Fellows I ask but one Example out of the History of the whole World Let the Commonweal be but named wherever the Multitude or so much as the Greatest part of it consented either by Voice or by Procuration to the Election of a Prince The Ambition sometimes of One Man sometimes of Many or the Faction of a City or Citizens or the Mutiny of an Army hath set up or put down Princes but they have never tarried for this pretended Order by proceeding of the whole Multitude Lastly if the silent Acceptation of a Governour by part of the People be an Argument of their Concurring in the Election of him by the same Reason the Tacit Assent of the whole Commonwealth may be maintained From whence it follows that every Prince that comes to a Crown either by Succession Conquest or Vsurpation may be said to be Elected by the People which Inference is too ridiculous for in such Cases the People are so far from the Liberty of Specification that they want even that of Contradiction 8. But it is in vain to argue against the Liberty of the People in the Election of Kings as long as men are perswaded that Examples of it are to be found in Scripture It is fit therefore to discover the Grounds of this Errour It is plain by an Evident Text that it is one thing to choose a King and another thing to set up a King over the People this latter power the Children of Israel had but not the former This distinction is found most evident in Deut. 17.15 where the Law of God saith Him shalt thou set King over thee whom the Lord shall choose so God must Eligere and the People only do Constituere Mr. Hooker in his Eight Book of Ecclesiastical Policy clearly expounds this Distinction the words are worthy the citing Heaps of Scripture saith he are alledged concerning the Solemn Coronation or Inauguration of Saul David Solomon and others by Nobles Ancients and the people of the Commonwealth of Israel as if these Solemnities were a kind of Deed whereby the Right of Dominion is given which strange untrue and unnatural conceits are set abroad by Seed-men of Rebellion only to animate unquiet Spirits and to feed them with possibilities of Aspiring unto the Thrones if they can win the Hearts of the People whatsoever Hereditary Title any other before them may have I say these unjust and insolent Positions I would not mention were it not thereby to
that he was a Gentleman and Bannaret and had served the late King He should be beheaded and for that our Lord the King was not informed of the manner of the Judgment the Execution thereof shall be respited until our Lord the King shall be informed It is commanded to the Constable of the Tower safely to keep the said John until he hath other commandment from our Lord the King In the case of Hen. Spencer Bishop of Norwich 7 Ric. 2. who was accused for complying with the French and other Failings the Bishop complained what was done against him did not pass by the Assent and Knowledge of the Peers whereupon it was said in Parliament that The Cognisance and Punishment of his Offence did of common Right and ancient Custom of the Realm of England solely and wholly belong to our Lord the King and no other Le Cognisance Punissement de commune droit auntienne custome de Royalme de Engleterre seul per tout apperteine au Roy nostre Seignieur a nul autre In the case of the Lord de la Ware the Judgment of the Lords was that he should have place next after the Lord Willoughby of Erisby by consent of all except the Lord Windsor and the Lord Keeper was required to acquaint her Majesty with the Determination of the Peers and to know her Pleasure concerning the same The Inference from these Precedents is that the Decisive or Judicial Power exercised in the Chamber of Peers is meerly derivative and subservient to the Supreme Power which resides in the King and is grounded solely upon his grace and favour for howsoever the House of Commons do alledge their Power to be founded on the Principles of Nature in that they are the Representative Body of the Kingdom as they say and so being the whole may take care and have power by Nature to preserve themselves yet the House of Peers do not nor cannot make any such the least Pretence since there is no reason in Nature why amongst a company of men who are all equal some few should be picked out to be exalted above their Fellows and have power to Govern those who by Nature are their Companions The difference between a Peer and a Commoner is not by Nature but by the grace of the Prince who creates Honours and makes those Honours to be hereditary whereas he might have given them for life only or during pleasure or good behaviour and also annexeth to those Honours the power of having Votes in Parliament as hereditary Counsellors furnished with ampler privileges than the Commons All these Graces conferred upon the Peers are so far from being derived from the Law of Nature that they are contradictory and destructive of that natural Equality and Freedom of Mankind which many conceive to be the Foundation of the privileges and Liberties of the House of Commons There is so strong an opposition between the Liberties of Grace and Nature that it had never been possible for the two Houses of Parliament to have stood together without mortal Enmity and eternal Jarring had they been raised upon such opposite Foundations But the Truth is the Liberties and Privileges of both Houses have but one and the self-same Foundation which is nothing else but the meer and sole Grace of Kings Thus much may serve to shew the Nature and Original of the deliberative and decisive Power of the Peers of the Kingdom The matter about which the deliberative power is conversant is generally the Consulting and Advising upon any urgent Business which concerns the King or Defence of the Kingdom and more especially sometimes in preparing new Laws and this Power is grounded upon the Writ The decisive Power is exercised in giving Judgment in some difficult Cases but for this Power of the Peers I find no Warrant in their Writ Whereas the Parliament is styled the Supreme Court it must be understood properly of the King sitting in the House of Peers in Person and but improperly of the Lords without him Every Supreme Court must have the Supreme Power and the Supreme Power is always Arbitrary for that is Arbitrary which hath no Superiour on Earth to controll it The last Appeal in all Government must still be to an Arbitrary Power or else Appeals will be in Infinitum never at an end The Legislative Power is an Arbitrary Power for they are termini convertibiles The main Question in these our days is Where this Power Legislative remains or is placed upon conference of the Writs of Summons for both Houses with the Bodies and Titles of our Ancient Acts of Parliament we shall find the Power of making Laws rests solely in the King Some affirm that a part of the Legislative Power is in either of the Houses but besides invincible reason from the Nature of Monarchy it self which must have the Supreme Power Alone the constant Antient Declaration of this Kingdom is against it For howsoever of later years in the Titles and Bodies of our Acts of Parliament it be not so particularly expressed who is the Author and Maker of our Laws yet in almost all our elder Statutes it is precisely expressed that they are made by the King Himself The general words used of later times that Laws are made by Authority of Parliament are particularly explained in former Statutes to mean That the King Ordains the Lords Advise the Commons Consent as by comparing the Writs with the Statutes that expound the Writs will evidently appear Magna Charta begins thus Henry by the Grace of God Know ye that WE of Our Meer and Free Will have given these Liberties In the self-same style runs Charta de Foresta and tells us the Author of it The Statute de Scaccario 41 H. 3. begins in these words The King Commandeth that all Bailiffs Sheriffs and other Officers c. And concerning the Justices of Chester the King Willeth c. and again He Commandeth the Treasurer and Barons of the Exchequer upon their Allegiance The Stat. of Marlborough 52 Hen. 3. goeth thus The King hath made these Acts Ordinances and Statutes which He Willeth to be observed of all his Subjects high and low 3 Edw. 1. The Title of this Statute is These are the ACTS of King EDWARD and after it follows The KING hath Ordained these ACTS and in the first Chapter The King Forbiddeth and Commandeth That none do Hurt Damage or Grievance to any Religious Man or Person of the Church and in the thirteenth Chapter The King prohibiteth that none do Ravish or take away by Force any Maid within Age. 6 Edw. 1. It is said Our Sovereign Lord the King hath established these Acts commanding they be observed within his Realm and in the fourteenth Chap. the words are The King of his special Grace granteth that the City of London shall recover in an Assise Damage with the Land The Stat. of West 2. saith Our Lord the King hath ordained that the Will of the Giver be observed
to Kings not only the Example of such Jurisdiction but the Prerogative also Of Privilege of Parliaments WHat need all this ado will some say to sift out what is comprised in the Writ for the Election of the Commons to Parliament since it is certain though the Writ doth not yet Privilege of Parliament gives sufficient Power for all Proceedings of the Two Houses It is answered that what slight Esteem soever be made of the Writ yet in all other cases the Original Writ is the Foundation of the whole business or action and to vary in Substance from the Writ makes a Nullity in the Cause and the Proceedings thereupon and where a Commissioner exerciseth more Power than is warranted by his Commission every such Act is void and in many Cases punishable yet we will lay aside the Writ and apply our selves to consider the Nature of Privilege of Parliament The Task is the more difficult for that we are not told what the number of Privileges are or which they be some do think that as there be dormant Articles of Faith in the Roman Church which are not yet declared so there be likewise Privileges dormant in the House of Commons not yet revealed we must therefore be content in a generality to discourse of the Quality or Condition of Privilege of Parliament and to confine our selves to these three points 1. That Privilege of Parliament gives no Power but only helps to the execution of the Power given by the Writ 2. That the Free-holders by their Elections give no Privilege 3. That Privilege of Parliament is the Gift of the King First The End or Scope of Privilege of Parliament is not to give any Power to do any Publick Act not warranted by the Writ but they are intended as Helps only to enable to the Performance of the Duty enjoyned and so are subservient to the Power comprised in the Writ For Instance the grand Privilege of Freedom from Arrests doth not give any Power at all to the House of Commons to do any Act but by taking away from the Free-holders and other Subjects the Power of Arrests the Commons are the better inabled to attend the Service to which they are called by the King In many other Cases the Servants or Ministers of the King are privileged and protected much in the same Nature The Servants in Houshold to the King may not be arrested without special Licence Also the Officers of the Kings Courts of Justice having a Privilege not to be sued in any other Court but where they serve and attend and to this Purpose they are allowed a Writ of Privilege Likewise all such as serve the King in his Wars as are imployed on Foreign Affairs for him are protected from Actions and Sutes Nay the King's Protection descends to the privileging even of Laundresses Nurses and Midwives if they attend upon the Camp as Sir Edward Coke saith quia Lotrix seu Nutrix seu obstetrix Besides the King protects his Debtors from Arrests of the Subject till his own Debts be paid These sorts of Protections are Privileges the Common Law takes Notice of and allows and hath several Distinctions of them and some are Protections quia profecturus and others are quia moraturus some are with a Clause of Volumus for Stay of Suits others with a Clause of Nolumus for the Safety of mens Persons Servants and Goods and the King's Writs do vary herein according to the Nature of the Business But none of these Privileges or Protections do give any Power they are not positive but privative they take away and deprive the Subject of the Power or Liberty to arrest or sue in some cases only no Protection or Privilege doth defend in point of Treason Felony or Breach of the Peace Privileges are directly contrary to the Law for otherwise they should not be Privileges and they are to be interpreted in the strictest manner as being odious and contrary to Law we see the Use of Privileges they do but serve as a Dispensation against Law intended originally and principally for the expediting of the Kings Business though secondarily and by accident there do sometimes redound a Benefit by them to the Parties themselves that are protected Strictly and properly every Privilege must be against a publick or common Law for there is no Use or Need of a private Law to protect where there is no publick Law to the contrary Favours and Graces which are only besides and not against the Law do not properly go under the name of Privileges though common Use do not distinguish them I know no other Privilege that can be truly so called and to belong to the House of Commons which is so vast and great as this Privilege of their Persons Servants and Goods this being indeed against the Common Law and doth concern the whole Kingdom to take notice of it if they must be bound by it Touching this grand Privilege of Freedom from Arrests I read that in the 33 Hen. 8. the Commons did not proceed to the Punishment of Offenders for the breach of it until the Lords referred the Punishment thereof to the Lower House The Case is thus reported George Ferrers Gentleman Servant to the King and Burgess for Plymouth going to the Parliament-House was arrested in London by Process out of the Kings Bench for Debt wherein he had before been condemned as Surety for one Welden at the Sute of one White which Arrest signified to Sir Thomas Moyl Speaker and to the rest the Serjeant called Saint-Johns was sent to the Counter in Breadstreet to demand Ferrers The Officer of the Counter refused to deliver him and gave the Serjeant such ill Language that they fall to an Affray the Sheriff coming taketh the Officers part the Serjeant returned without the Prisoner This being related to the Speaker and Burgesses they would sit no more without their Burgess and rising repaired to the Upper House where the Case was declared by the Speaker before Sir Thomas Audley Chancellor and the Lords and Judges there assembled who judging the Contempt to be very great referred the Punishment thereof to the House of Commons it self This Privilege of Freedom from Arrests is the only Privilege which Sir Edward Coke finds to belong to the House of Commons he cannot or at least he doth not so much as name any other in his Section of the Privileges of Parliament neither doth he bring so much as one Precedent for the Proof of this one Privilege for the House of Commons which may cause a Doubt that this sole Privilege is not so clear as many do imagine For in a Parliament in the 27 Eliz. Richard Coke a Member being served with a Subpoena of Chancery the Lord Chancellor thought the House had no such Privilege for Subpoena's as they pretended neither would he allow of any Precedents of the House committed unto them formerly used in that Behalf unless the House of Commons could also prove the same to have
his Subjects by the same or other like Restriction of such indifferent things and it is to be presumed if he had not been hindered would have commanded the same or the like Laws OBSERVATIONS Concerning the Original of Government Upon Mr. HOBS his Leviathan Mr. MILTON against Salmatius H. GROTIUS De Jure Belli Mr. HUNTON'S Treatise of Monarchy Arist Pol. Lib. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 THE PREFACE WITH no small Content I read Mr. Hobs's Book De Cive and his Leviathan about the Rights of Sovereignty which no man that I know hath so amply and judiciously handled I consent with him about the Rights of exercising Government but I cannot agree to his means of acquiring it It may seem strange I should praise his Building and yet mislike his Foundation but so it is his Jus Naturae and his Regnum Institutivum will not down with me they appear full of Contradiction and Impossibilities a few short Notes about them I here offer wishing he would consider whether his Building would not stand firmer upon the Principles of Regnum Patrimoniale as he calls it both according to Scripture and Reason Since he confesseth the Father being before the Institution of a Commonwealth was Originally an Absolute Sovereign with Power of Life and Death and that a great Family as to the Rights of Sovereignty is a little Monarchy If according to the order of Nature he had bandled Paternal Government before that by Institution there would have been little Liberty left in the Subjects of the Family to consent to Institution of Government In his pleading the Cause of the People he arms them with a very large Commission of Array which is a Right in Nature for every Man to war against every Man when he please and also a Right for all the People to govern This latter Point although he affirm in Words yet by Consequence he denies as to me it seemeth He saith a Representative may be of All or but of a Part of the People If it be of All he terms it a Democraty which is the Government of the People But how can such a Commonwealth be generated for if every man Covenant with every man who shall be left to be the Representative if All must be Representatives who will remain to Covenant for he that is Sovereign makes no Covenant by his Doctrine It is not All that will come together that makes the Democraty but All that have Power by Covenant thus his Democraty by Institution fails The same may be said of a Democraty by Acquisition for if all be Conquerours who shall Covenant for Life and Liberty and if all be not Conquerours how can it be a Democraty by Conquest A Paternal Democraty I am confident he will not affirm so that in conclusion the poor People are deprived of their Government if there can be no Democraty by his Principles Next If a Representative Aristocratical of a Part of the People be free from Covenanting then that whole Assembly call it what you will though it be never so great is in the state of Nature and every one of that Assembly hath a Right not only to kill any of the Subjects that they meet with in the Streets but also they all have a Natural Right to cut one anothers throats even while they sit together in Council by his Principles In this miserable condition of War is his Representative Aristocratical by Institution A Commonwealth by Conquest he teacheth is then acquired when the Vanquished to avoid present Death Covenanteth that so long as his Life and the liberty of his Body is allowed him the Victor shall have the Vse of it at his pleasure Here I would know how the Liberty of the Vanquished can be allowed if the Victor have the Vse of it at pleasure or how it is possible for the Victor to perform his Covenant except he could always stand by every particular man to protect his Life and Liberty In his Review and Conclusion he resolves that an ordinary Subject hath liberty to submit when the means of his Life is within the Guards and Garisons of the Enemy It seems hereby that the Rights of Sovereignty by Institution may be forfeited for the Subject cannot be at liberty to submit to a Conquerour except his former Subjection be forfeited for want of Protection If his Conquerour be in the State of Nature when he conquers he hath a Right without any Covenant made with the conquered If Conquest be defined to be the acquiring of Right of Sovereignty by Victory why is it said the Right is acquired in the Peoples Submission by which they contract with the Victor Promising Obedience for Life and Liberty hath not every one in the state of Nature a Right to Sovereignty before Conquest which only puts him in possession of his Right If his Conquerour be not in the state of Nature but a Subject by Covenant how can he get a Right of Sovereignty by Conquest when neither he himself hath Right to Conquer nor Subjects a liberty to Submit since a former Contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken by them I wish the Title of the Book had not been of a Commonwealth but of a Weal Publick or Commonweal which is the true word Carefully observed by our Translator of Bodin de Republica into English Many ignorant men are apt by the Name of Commonwealth to understand a Popular Government wherein Wealth and all things shall be Common tending to the Levelling Community in the state of pure Nature OBSERVATIONS ON Mr. HOBS's LEVIATHAN OR HIS ARTIFICIAL MAN A Commonwealth I. IF God created only Adam and of a Piece of him made the Woman and if by Generation from them two as Parts of them all Mankind be propagated If also God gave to Adam not only the Dominion over the Woman and the Children that should issue from them but also over the whole Earth to subdue it and over all the Creatures on it so that as long as Adam lived no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by Donation Assignation or Permission from him I wonder how the Right of Nature can be imagined by Mr. Hobs which he saith pag. 64. is a Liberty for each man to use his own Power as he will himself for Preservation of his own Life a Condition of War of every one against every one a Right of every man to every thing even to one anothers Body especially since himself affirms pag. 178. that originally the Father of every man was also his Sovereign Lord with Power over him of Life and Death II. Mr. Hobs confesseth and believes it was never generally so that there was such a jus naturae and if not generally then not at all for one Exception bars all if he mark it well whereas he imagines such a Right of Nature may be now practised in America he confesseth a Government there of Families which Government how small or brutish soever as he calls it is sufficient to destroy
which Natural Reason appoints all men to use is the Law of Nations saith Theophilus in the Text of the Civil Law and in the second Book of the Instit cap. 1. Jus Naturae is confounded with Jus Gentium As the Civilians sometimes confound and sometimes separate the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations so other-whiles they make them also contrary one to the other By the Law of Nature all men are born free Jure naturali omnes liberi nascuntur But Servitude is by the Law of Nations Jure Gentium Servitus invasit saith Vlpian And the Civil Law not only makes the Law of Nature and of Nations contrary but also will have the Law of Nations contrary to it self War saith the Law was brought in by the Law of Nations Ex jure gentium introducta bella and yet the Law of Nations saith Since Nature hath made us all of one Kindred it follows it is not lawful for one man to lye in wait for another Cùm inter nos cognitionem quandam natura constituit consequens est hominem homini insidiari nefas esse saith Florentinus Again the Civil Law teacheth that from the Law of Nature proceeds the Conjunction of man and woman the Procreation and Education of Children But as for Religion to God and Obedience to Parents it makes it to be by the Law of Nations To touch now the Canon Law we may find in one place that men are governed either by the Law of Nature or by Customs Homines reguntur Naturali jure aut moribus The Law of Nations they call a Divine Law the Customs a humane Law Leges aut divinae sunt aut humanae divinae naturâ humanae moribus constant But in the next place the Canon Law makes Jus to be either Naturale aut Civile aut Gentium Though this Division agree in Terms with that of Vlpian in the Civil Law yet in the Explication of the Terms there is Diversity for what one Law makes to belong to the Law of Nature the other refers to the Law of Nations as may easily appear to him that will take the Pains to compare the Civil and Canon Law in these Points A principal Ground of these Diversities and Contrarieties of Divisions was an Error which the Heathens taught that all things at first were common and that all men were equal This mistake was not so heinous in those Ethnick Authors of the Civil Laws who wanting the Guide of the History of Moses were fain to follow Poets and Fables for their Leaders But for Christians who have read the Scriptures to dream either of a Community of all things or an Equality of all Persons is a Fault scarce pardonable To salve these apparent Contrarieties of Community and Property or Equality and Subjection the Law of Jus Gentium was first invented when that could not satisfie to mend the matter this Jus Gentium was divided into a Natural Law of Nations and an Humane Law of Nations and the Law of Nature into a Primary and a Secondary Law of Nature Distinctions which make a great sound but edifie not at all if they come under Examination If there hath been a time when all things were common and all men equal and that it be otherwise now we must needs conclude that the Law by which all things were common and men equal was contrary to the Law by which now things are proper and men subject If we will allow Adam to have been Lord of the World and of his Children there will need no such Distinctions of the Law of Nature and of Nations For the Truth will be that whatsoever the Heathens comprehended under these two Laws is comprised in the Moral Law That the Law of Nature is one and the same with the Moral may appear by a Definition given by Grotius The Law of Nature saith he is the Dictate of Reason shewing that in every Action by the agreeing or disagreeing of it with natural Reason there is a moral Honesty or Dishonesty and consequently that such an Action is commanded or forbidden by God the Author of Nature I cannot tell how Grotius would otherwise have defined the Moral Law And the Canon Law grants as much teaching that the Law of Nature is contained in the Law and the Gospel Whatsoever ye will that men do c. Mat. 7. The Term of Jus Naturae is not originally to be found in Scripture for though T. Aquinas takes upon him to prove out of the 2. to the Romans that there is a Jus Naturae yet St. Paul doth not use those express Terms his words are The Gentiles which have not the Law do by Nature the things contained in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves He doth not say Nature is a Law unto them but they are a Law unto themselves As for that which they call the Law of Nations it is not a Law distinct much less opposite to the Law of Nature but it is a small Branch or Parcel of that great Law for it is nothing but the Law of Nature or the moral Law between Nations The same Commandment that forbids one Private man to rob another or one Corporation to hurt another Corporation obliges also one King not to rob another King and one Commonwealth not to spoil another the same Law that enjoyns Charity to all men even to Enemies binds Princes and States to shew Charity to one another as well as private Persons And as the Common or Civil Laws of each Kingdom which are made against Treason Theft Murder Adultery or the like are all and every one of them grounded upon some particular Commandment of the moral Law so all the Laws of Nations must be subordinate and reducible to the moral Law The Law of Nature or the moral Law is like the main Ocean which though it be one entire Body yet several Parts of it have distinct Names according to the diversity of the Coasts on which they border So it comes to pass that the Law of Nations which is but a part of the Law of Nature may be sub-divided almost in infinitum according to the Variety of the Persons or Matters about which it is conversant The Law of Nature or the divine Law is general and doth only comprehend some Principles of Morality notoriously known of themselves or at the most is extended to those things which by necessary and evident Inference are consequent to those Principles Besides these many other things are necessary to the well governing of a Common-wealth and therefore it was necessary that by Humane Reason something more in particular should be determined concerning those things which could not be defined by Natural Reason alone hence it is that Humane Laws be necessary as Comments upon the Text of the Moral Law and of this Judgment is Aquinas who teacheth that necessitas legis humanae manat ex eo quod Lex naturalis vel Divina generalis est solum
the whole people but to the supream Heads and Fathers of Families not as they are the people but quatenus they are Fathers of people over whom they have a supream power devolved unto them after the death of their soveraign Ancestor and if any can have a right to chuse a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct fatherly powers upon one man alone Chief Fathers in Scripture are accounted as all the people as all the Children of Israel as all the Congregation as the Text plainly expounds it self 2 Chr. 1.2 where Solomon speaks to All Israel that is to the Captains the Judges and to every Governour the CHIEF OF THE FATHERS and so the Elders of Israel are expounded to be the chief of the Fathers of the Children of Israel 1 King 8.1 and the 2 Chr. 5.2 If it be objected That Kings are not now as they were at the first planting or peopling of the world the Fathers of their People or Kingdoms and that the fatherhood hath lost the right of governing An answer is That all Kings that now are or ever were are or were either Fathers of their People or the Heirs of such Fathers or Usurpers of the right of such Fathers It is a truth undeniable that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever either great or small though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world but that in the same multitude considered by it self there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right to be the King of all the rest as being the next Heir to Adam and all the other subject unto him every man by nature is a King or a Subject the obedience which all Subjects yield to Kings is but the paying of that duty which is due to the supream fatherhood Many times by the act either of an Usurper himself or of those that set him up the true Heir of a Crown is dispossessed God using the ministry of the wickedest men for the removing and setting up of Kings in such cases the Subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon God's providence who only hath right to give and take away Kingdoms and thereby to adopt Subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power according to that of Arist 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Monarchy or Kingdom will be a fatherly government Ethic. l. 8. c. 12. However the natural freedom of the People be cried us as the sole means to determine the kind of Government and the Governours yet in the close all the favourers of this opinion are constrained to grant that the obedience which is due to the fatherly Power is the true only cause of the Subjection which we that are now living give to Kings since none of us gave consent to Government but only our Fore-fathers act and consent hath concluded us Whereas many confess that Government only in the abstract is the ordinance of God they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the Scripture but only in the fatherly power and therefore we find the Commandment that enjoyns obedience to Superiours given in the terms of Honour thy Father so that not only the Power or right of Government but the form of the power of governing and the person having that power are all the ordinance of God the first Father had not only simply power but power Monarchical as he was a Father immediately from God For by the appointment of God as soon as Adam was created he was Monarch of the World though he had no Subjects for though there could not be actual Government until there were Subjects yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be Governour of his posterity though not in Act yet at least in habit Adam was a King from his Creation And in the state of innocency he had been Governour of his Children for the integrity or excellency of the Subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the Governour Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned the Angels who are of a pure nature are subject to God which confutes their saying who in disgrace of civil Government or power say it was brought in by sin Government as to coactive power was after sin because coaction supposeth some disorder which was not in the state of innocency But as for directive power the condition of humane nature requires it since civil Society cannot be imagined without power of Government for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done yet things indifferent that depended meerly on their free will might be directed by the power of Adam's command If we consider the first plantations of the world which were after the building of Babel when the confusion of tongues was we may find the division of the Earth into distinct Kingdoms and Countries by several families whereof the Sons or Grand-children of Noah were the Kings or Governours by a fatherly right and for the preservation of this power and right in the Fathers God was pleased upon several Families to bestow a Language on each by it self the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdom as appears by the words of the Text Gen. 10. These are the Families of the Sons of Noah after their generations in their Nations and by these were the Nations divided in the Earth after the floud Every one after HIS TONGUE AFTER THEIR FAMILIES in their Nations The Kings of England have been graciously pleased to admit and accept the Commons in Parliament as the Representees of the Kingdom yet really and truly they are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom The Commons in Parliament are not the representative body of the whole Kingdom they do not represent the King who is the head and principal member of the Kingdom nor do they represent the Lords who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the Realm and are personally present in Parliament and therefore need no representation The Commons only represent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the People which are the Free-holders worth 40 s. by the year and the Commons or Free-men of Cities and Burroughs or the major part of them All which are not one quarter nay not a tenth part of the Commons of the Kingdom for in every Parish for one Free-holder there may be found ten that are no Freeholders and anciently before Rents were improved there were nothing near so many Free-holders of 40 s. by the year as now are to be found The scope and Conclusion of this discourse and Argument is that the people taken in what notion or sense soever either diffusively collectively or representatively have not nor cannot exercise any right or power of their own by nature either in chusing or in regulating Kings But whatsoever power any people
made since by the Law of Nature no man had any thing of his own and until Laws were made there was no Propriety according to his Doctrine Jus Humanum voluntarium latius patens he makes to be the Law of Nations which saith he by the Will of All or Many Nations hath received a power to bind he adds of Many because there is as he grants scarce any Law to be found common to all Nations besides the Law of Nature which also is wont to be called the Law of Nations being common to all Nations Nay as he confesseth often That is the Law in one part of the World which in another part of the World is not the Law of Nations By these Sentences it seems Grotius can scarce tell what to make to be the Law of Nations or where to find it Whereas he makes the Law of Nations to have a binding Power from the Will of men it must be remembred That it is not sufficient for men to have a Will to bind but it is necessary also to have a Power to bind Though several Nations have one and the same Law For instance Let it be granted that Theft is punished by Death in many Countries yet this doth not make it to be a Law of Nations because each Nation hath it but as a Natural or Civil Law of their own Country and though it have a binding Power from the Will of many Nations yet because each Nation hath but a Will and Power to bind themselves and may without prejudice consent or consulting of any Neighbour-Nation alter this Law if they find Cause it cannot properly be called the Law of Nations That which is the foundation of the Law of Nations is to have it concern such things as belong to the mutual Society of Nations among themselves as Grotius confesseth and not of such things as have no further relation than to the particular Benefit of each Kingdom For as private men must neglect their own Profit for the Good of their Country so particular Nations must sometimes remit part of their Benefit for the Good of many Nations True it is that in particular Kingdoms and Commonwealths there be Civil and National Laws and also Customs that obtain the Force of Laws But yet such Laws are ordained by some supreme Power and the Customs are examined judged and allowed by the same supreme Power Where there is no Supreme Power that extends over all or many Nations but only God himself there can be no Laws made to bind Nations but such as are made by God himself we cannot find that God made any Laws to bind Nations but only the Moral Law as for the Judicial Law though it were ordained by God yet it was not the Law of Nations but of one Nation only and fitted to that Commonwealth If any think that the Customs wherein many Nations do consent may be called the Law of Nations as well as the Customs of any one Nation may be esteemed for National Laws They are to consider That it is not the being of a Custom that makes it lawful for then all Customs even evil Customs would be lawful but it is the Approbation of the supreme Power that gives a legality to the Custom where there is no Supreme Power over many Nations their Customs cannot be made legal The Doctrine of Grotius is That God immediately after the Creation did bestow upon Mankind in general a Right over things of inferiour Nature From whence it came to pass that presently every man might snatch what he would for his own Vse and spend what he could and such an Vniversal Right was then instead of Property for what every one so snatched another could not take from him but by Injury How repugnant this Assertion of Grotius is to the Truth of Holy Scripture Mr. Selden teacheth us in his Mare Clausum saying That Adam by Donation from God Gen. 1.28 was made the general Lord of all things not without such a private Dominion to himself as without his Grant did exclude his Children and by Donation and Assignation or some kind of Cession before he was dead or left any Heir to succeed him his Children had their distinct Territories by Right of private Dominion Abel had his Flocks and Pastures for them Cain had his Fields for Corn and the Land of Nod where he built himself a City This Determination of Mr. Selden's being consonant to the History of the Bible and to natural Reason doth contradict the Doctrine of Grotius I cannot conceive why Mr. Selden should afterwards affirm That neither the Law of Nature nor the Divine Law do command or forbid either Communion of all things or private Dominion but permitteth both As for the general Community between Noah and his Sons which Mr. Selden will have to be granted to them Gen. 9.2 the Text doth not warrant it for although the Sons are there mentioned with Noah in the Blessing yet it may best be understood with a Subordination or a Benediction in Succession the Blessing might truly be fulfilled if the Sons either under or after their Father enjoyed a Private Dominion it is not probable that the private Dominion which God gave to Adam and by his Donation Assignation or Cession to his Children was abrogated and a Community of all things instituted between Noah and his Sons at the time of the Flood Noah was left the sole Heir of the World why should it be thought that God would dis-inherit him of his Birth-right and make him of all the men in the World the only Tenant in Common with his Children If the Blessing given to Adam Gen. 1.28 be compared to that given to Noah and his Sons Gen. 9.2 there will be found a considerable Difference between those two Texts In the Benediction of Adam we find expressed a subduing of the Earth and a Dominion over the Creatures neither of which are expressed in the Blessing of Noah nor the Earth there once named it is only said The fear of you shall be upon the creatures and into your hands are they delivered then immediately it follows Every moving thing shall be meat for you as the green herb The first Blessing gave Adam Dominion over the Earth and all Creatures the latter allows Noah liberty to use the living Creatures for food here is no alteration or diminishing of his Title to a Propriety of all things but an Enlargement only of his Commons But whether with Grotius Community came in at the Creation or with Mr. Selden at the Flood they both agree it did not long continue Sed veri non est simile hujusmodi communionem diu obtinuisse is the confession of Mr. Selden It seems strange that Grotius should maintain that Community of all things should be by the Law of Nature of which God is the Author and yet such Community should not be able to continue Doth it not derogate from the Providence of God Almighty to ordain a Community which
could not continue Or doth it make the Act of our Fore-fathers in abrogating the natural Law of Community by introducing that of Propriety to be a sin of a high presumption The prime Duties of the Second Table are conversant about the Right of Propriety but if Propriety be brought in by a Humane Law as Grotius teacheth then the Moral Law depends upon the Will of man There could be no Law against Adultery or Theft if Women and all things were common Mr. Selden saith That the Law of Nature or of God nec vetuit nec jubebat sed permisit utrumque tam nempe rerum communionem quà m privatum Dominium And yet for Propriety which he terms primaeva rerum Dominia he teacheth That Adam received it from God à Numine acceperat And for Community he saith We meet with evident footsteps of the Community of things in that donation of God by which Noah and his three Sons are made Domini pro indiviso rerum omnium Thus he makes the private Dominion of Adam as well as the common Dominion of Noah and his Sons to be both by the Will of God Nor doth he shew how Noah or his Sons or their Posterity had any Authority to alter the Law of Community which was given them by God In distributing Territories Mr. Selden saith the consent as it were of Mankind passing their promise which should also bind their Posterity did intervene so that men departed from their common Right of Communion of those things which were so distributed to particular Lords or Masters This Distribution by Consent of Mankind we must take upon Credit for there is not the least proof offered for it out of Antiquity How the Consent of Mankind could bind Posterity when all things were common is a Point not so evident where Children take nothing by Gift or by Descent from their Parents but have an equal and common Interest with them there is no reason in such cases that the Acts of the Fathers should bind the Sons I find no cause why Mr. Selden should call Community a pristine Right since he makes it but to begin in Noah and to end in Noah's Children or Grand children at the most for he confesseth the Earth à Noachidis seculis aliquot post diluvium esse divisam That ancient Tradition which by Mr. Selden's acknowledgment hath obtained Reputation every where seems most reasonable in that he tells us That Noah himself as Lord of all was Author of the Distribution of the World and of private Dominion and that by the appointment of an Oracle from God he did confirm this Distribution by his last Will and Testament which at his Death he left in the hands of his eldest Son Sem and also warned all his Sons that none of them should invade any of their Brothers Dominions or injure one another because from thence Discord and Civil War would necessarily follow Many Conclusions in Grotius his Book de Jure Belli Pacis are built upon the foundation of these two Principles 1. The first is That Communis rerum usus naturalis fuit 2. The second is That Dominium quale nunc in usu est voluntas humana introduxit Upon these two Propositions of natural Community and voluntary Propriety depend divers dangerous and seditious Conclusions which are dispersed in several places In the fourth Chapter of the first Book the Title of which Chapter is Of the War of Subjects against Superiours Grotius handleth the Question Whether the Law of not resisting Superiours do bind us in most grievous and most certain danger And his Determination is That this Law of not resisting Superiours seems to depend upon the Will of those men who at first joyned themselves in a Civil Society from whom the Right of Government doth come to them that govern if those had been at first asked if their Will were to impose this burthen upon all that they should chuse rather to dye than in any case by Arms to repel the Force of Superiours I know not whether they would answer That it was their Will unless perhaps with this addition if Resistance cannot be made but with the great disturbance of the Common-wealth and destruction of many Innocents Here we have his Resolution that in great and certain danger men may resist their Governours if it may be without disturbance of the Common-wealth if you would know who should be Judge of the greatness and certainty of the Danger or how we may know it Grotius hath not one word of it so that for ought appears to the contrary his mind may be that every private man may be Judge of the Danger for other Judge he appoints none it had been a foul Fault in so desperate a piece of Service as the resisting of Superiours to have concealed the lawful Means by which we may judge of the Greatness or Certainty of publick Danger before we lift up our hands against Authority considering how prone most of us are to censure and mistake those things for great and certain Dangers which in truth many times are no dangers at all or at the most but very small ones and so flatter our selves that by resisting our Superiours we may do our Country laudable Service without Disturbance of the Common-wealth since the Effects of Sedition cannot be certainly judged of but by the Events only Grotius proceeds to answer an Objection against this Doctrine of resisting Superiours If saith he any man shall say that this rigid Doctrine of dying rather than resisting any Injuries of Superiours is no humane but a Divine Law It is to be noted that men at first not by any Precept of God but of their own Accord led by Experience of the Infirmities of separated Families against Violence did meet together in Civil Society from whence Civil Power took beginning which therefore St. Peter calls an humane Ordinance although elsewhere it be called a divine Ordinance because God approveth the wholesom Institutions of men God in approving a humane Law is to be thought to approve it as humane and in a humane manner And again in another place he goeth further and teacheth us That if the Question happen to be concerning the primitive Will of the People it will not be amiss for the People that now are and which are accounted the same with them that were long ago to express their meaning in this matter which is to be followed unless it certainly appear that the People long ago willed otherwise lib. 2. cap. 2. For fuller Explication of his Judgment about resisting Superiors he concludes thus The greater the thing is which is to be preserved the greater is the Equity which reacheth forth an Exception against the words of the Law yet I dare not saith Grotius without Difference condemn either simple men or a lesser part of the People who in the last Refuge of Necessity do so use this Equity as that in the mean time they do not forsake the Respect of the