Naturalia that is some Least Size of Bodies which are generally no farther Divisible because there want Natural Causes little enough to pass between their parts and divide them but they say moreover that there is not only Local or Situal which are Extrinsecal but also Intrinsecal or Formal Composition and Division and consequently Formal Mutation in them either in Whole or in Part that is a Change in them according to the Form and not according to the Matter or Subject and they deny that any Solid Discourse or Explication either of Nature or Transnaturals which we call Metaphysicks can possibly be made unless this be admitted 2. The Parts of which they affirm all the Essences or Natures of all those Entities we converse with are Compounded they call Act and Power or Form and Matter whether those be Essential or Accidental And they put the Matter and Essential Form to be necessarily found in every Body and in each of the most minute and insensible Atomes and Particles that can be imagin'd The reason they give for this Assertion is because each of them is a Distinct Ens from the Others in regard it can subsist alone and so is Capable of a Distinct Being whence they conceive there must be Somewhat in every Body and every Atome by which it is Distinguisht from all Others and somewhat in which it Agrees with them That which Distinguishes them they call the Form and that in which they Agree the Matter And they think that however their Adversaries may quarrel the Words yet they must allow the Sense Nature and daily Experience teaching us that One Thing is made of Another which cannot be unless Somewhat of it remains and Somewhat be lost For otherwise one Thing could not truly be said to be made of another but the Former Ens of which Nothing remains would be Annihilated and the Ens or Body newly produced would be made of Nothing that is Created 3. Now when the Peripateticks speak of Matter and Form and that each thing is Compounded of these and consequently that there is some kind of Divisibility or Difference between them the Corpuscularians who fancy nothing but Particles commodiously laid together are presently apt to conceit that those Parts as it were that Compound a Body are meant to be two certain kinds of Things joyn'd together into One and if this be deny'd they are ready to conclude that they are either two Nothings or at least that they leave us in the dark and at a loss how to distinguish Things from Nothings and thence object that this doctrin of Matter and Form cannot explicate any thing or make a man one Jot the wiser And indeed in case the Asserters of them did stay in these Common Expressions and not draw many Clear Consequences from them giving a farther account of them the bare Saying there are such Partâ— so named would be as Insignificant as to talk of Occult Qualities 4. To rectify this Misconceit of theirs sprung from a just Prejudice against meer School-terms the Aristotelians defend themselves by declaring their Meaning to be that One and the same Thing does ground those diverse Notionâ— of it self in us That the Faecundity as it were of the Thing not being Comprehensible at one view by our short Sighted Understanding which knows nothing here but by Impressions on our Senses which are Distinct and of many sorts forces us to frame Inadequate or Partial Conceptions of it And because we cannot Speak of a thing otherwise than as we Conceive it hence we can truly say One of those Notions or Conceptions of the Thing is not the other which yet means no more but that that Thing as thus Conceiv'd is not the same Thing as otherwise Conceiv'd or that the Thing as working by my Sense upon my Understanding thus is not the Thing as working by the same or another Sense upon my Understanding otherwise Whence because what corresponds to both these Conceptions or Notions is found in the same Thing hence they affirm that there is a certain kind of Composition of them both in the Thing it self which is no more in reality but that there is found in that Thing what corresponds to and grounds both these Conceptions 5. Farther they declare that since Nature shows us that the Thing may be Changed according to somewhat in it that answers to One of these Conceptions Notions or Natures and not Chang'd according to what answers to the Other hence we must be forced to grant that there is a kind of Divisibility between them in the Thing answering to the foresaid Composition and consequently a Capacity of Formal Mutation by which the Thing may be Chang'd accordâ—ng to one of them viz. the Form and not Chang'd according to the Matter Whether that Form remains or no after such a Change is Another Point and Extrinsical to our present business 6. For Instance We experience that that Thing we call Wood is Chang'd into Another Thing call'd Fire and therefore unless we will say that Wood is Annihilated and Fire Created in its room which we are forbid to do by the very Notion of its being Chang'd into another there must have been Somewhat in Wood by which it was Actually Such a Thing before the Change was made and which is Lost by its being Chang'd into Fire and also Somewhat in it which remains in the Fire into which 't is Chang'd The Former they call the Form the Later the Matter and thence conclude there must have been a Composition of Matter and Form in the Wood. And since all Mankind agrees that Wood is One Thing and Fire Another Thing hence Essence being the Form that constitutes an Ens or makes it Formally a Thing they do farther affirm that that which was in Fire and made us denominate it such a Thing or Ens is an Essential Form And because the Matter of the Wood had or rather was a Power to have such a Form as made it now to be Wood and also a Power to be afterwards Fire hence they say that that Thing Ens or Substance we call'd Wood did consist of Matter and Form or was Compounded of them that is Wood had truly in it what corresponded to both these Natures or Notions Lastly because Wood was Chang'd according to One of them only viz. the Form hence they conclude there was Formal Mutation made in the Wood which therefore was a Change according to somewhat that was most Intrinsecal to it because it chang'd it's Essence by making it become Another Thing and consequently that Change was an Essential one Thus much of the Doctrin of the Peripateticks concerning Formal Composition and Mutation which is Essential 7. But besides this Formal Composition and the Divisibility of that Essential part call'd the Form from the Matter which we have now spoken of there is moreover say the Peripateticks another sort of Formal Composition and Mutation which is Accidental For even
that here is most manifestly a Divisibility between the Natures of Essences of those Things and these Intrinsecal Accidents or Accidental Forms and the Subjects are evidently Chang'd by Natural Causes according to These and not according to its Essence or Nature that is the Subject undergoes so many Formal Mutations that are Accidental And let them explicate these Terms as they please after their own odd manner they shall never avoid the Conclusion if they do put the Subject or Body to be truly an Ens and that it may be otherwise than it was and yet not Immediately cease to be that Ens either of which to deny were to bid defiance to Mankind and to Common Sense 28. I know it will be repli'd that all Natural Bodies are Compound Entities or made up of many little Particles which put together Mov'd and Plac'd Commodiously do enable them to perform those several Operations peculiar to each and that these do occasion our saying in our common Speech it is such an Ens. And that therefore all our Discourse concerning Formal Mutation falls to the Ground since all may be Explicated by the Taking away Adding Ordering and Moving those Particles after such or such a manner But this comes not up to the Point nor can serve them to escape our Argument but rather plunges them into a more manifest and Direct Contradiction For admit that each Compound Ens as they are pleas'd to call those Many Entities or at least a great part of it be made up of those little Particles I am still to ask them whether those Particles do really conspire to make it One Thing or no after the Composition that is whether after the Composition there remains only One Actual Thing or Many Actual Things or Entities If the First then our Discourse proceeds with the same Force for then since this One Ens or Body is Dissolvable or Corruptible it must as was prov'd above have somewhat in it that remains in the Compound w ch is to be made out of it which we call Matter and Somewhat which Formally Constituted the Former Body to be what it was and consequently which does not remain in the New One which is what we call the Form And because it did not cease to be or was Corrupted in an Instant the Former Subject or Body admitted of Alterations first and consequently there was Mutation in it both according to those Substantial and those Accidental Forms But if they say as I fear they will because they must that after Composition there is no Ens which is truly One but Many or if they say that after Composition there is One and Many which are properly and Formally Entities then they must say that the same Thing is both One according to the Notion of Ens and yet not One according to the Notion of Ens which is a plain Contradiction for it Affirms and Denies Contradictories of the Thing acording to the same respect Whereas in the Aristotelian Doctrin there is but One Ens Actually tho' made up of Potential Parts which have a Formal Divisibility between them or which is the same One Thing apt to verify different Conceptions and Notions which as was said above partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once partly because Natural Causes do change it according to One Respect and not according to Another we are naturally forced to make of it Now to make the Subject consist of Potential parts Destroys not the Vnity of the Compounded Ens but Establishes it for to say it is Potentially Many is the same as to say it is Actually One and to Compound an Ens of Potential Parts proper to the Notion of Ens neither of which were One Actual Part before is to make that Ens truly One tho' it had no other Titlâ— to be One of its own nature For to compound an Ens of Entitatine parts neither of which is of its Self an Ens is as plainly to make One Ens as words can express 29. But to put them past this Evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our Discourse by alledging that Natural Bodies are Compounds I have purposely drawn my Chief Arguments from the Atomes or Molicellae as Gassendus calls them of Epicurus and from that Original Mass of Matter of which the Cartesians affirm their Elements were made which the Antiperipateticks must be forced to confess are perfectly Vncompounded And I farther alledge that as Many Quantums cannot compound One Quantum unless they be Vnited Quantitatively so neither can Many Entities such those Distinct Atomes and Particles must be compound One Ens unless they be United Entitavely Wherefore those parts can be only Potentially in the Compound as our Matter and its Essential and Accidental Forms are for were they Actually there they would be Entitatively Many Whence the Ens made up of those Many Actual Entities could not be Entitatively Vnum or one Ens but it would be an Vnum which is Divisum in se and which is worst to compleat the Nonsence and make it a perfect Contradiction it would be in the same respect Divisum in se in which it is Vnum or Indivisum in se viz. in ratione Entis which is to be perfectly Chimerical 30. Thus they come off and so must every one who guides himself by the sound of Words without looking attentively into their Sense For the Word Compounded is in reality a kind of Transcendent and therefore in the highest manner Equivocal whence while out of slightness of Reasoning and not heeding where the Question pinches they take the word in an Vnivocal signification they come to apprehend that the compounding many Entities together according to some Extrinsecal respects such as are Situation Motion joynt-Action and such like is the same as to compound them according to that most Intrinsecal respect call'd Substance and is sufficient to make them One Entitatively or One Ens. 31. And let it be noted that this Discourse equally confutes their Position of the Soul 's being a Distinct Thing from the Body which leads them into Innumerable Errours And the absurdity in making These Two to be One Compound Thing is far greater than to make One Body compounded of those Particles in regard the Ranging of Particles may at least make One Artificial Compound v. g. a House tho' not a Natural one whereas a Spirit and a Body are forbid by their natures to have any such Artificial or Mechanical Contexture but must unavoidably when the Asserters of this Tenet have shifted and explicated all they can remain Two Actual Things and moreover such Two as are toto genere Distinct nor consequently can they either by the Natural or Artificial Names us'd by Mankind be signify'd by One Word or be called A Man as the former Compounds could be called a House or a Clock And I defy all the wit of Man to invent any way how Two such Actual Things can have any Coalition into One Natural thing or
THE METHOD TO Science By I. S. LONDON Printed by W. Redmayne for the Author and are to be Sold by Thomas Metcalf Bookseller over against Earl's-Court in Drury-lane 1696. Book I. Of the First Operation of our Understanding Less 1. OF NOTIONS or the very First Ground on which all Science is built Less 2. Of the Distinction of Natural Notions and of the Reducing them under Ten Common Heads p. 10 Less 3. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided and of the Common Head of SUBSTANCE p. 25 â—ess 4. Some Considerations belonging to those Heads of Notions or to the Ten Predicaments in Common p. 36 â—ess 5. Of the Common Head call'd QUANTITY p. 50 â—ess 6. Of the Common Head of QUALITY p. 60 â—ess 7. Of the Common Head of RELATION p. 71 Less 8. Of the Common Heads of ACTION and PASSION p. 81 Less 9. Of the Common Head of UBI or WHERE p. 89 Less 10. Of the Common Head oâ— QUANDO or WHEN p. 9â— Less 11. Of the Expressions of ouâ— NOTIONS by WORDS p. 100 Book II. Of the Second Operation oâ— our Understanding or JUDGâ—MENTS Less 1. OF the Nature of Judgâ—ments or Propositions Common Of their Parts Of 〈◊〉 Ground of their Verification 〈◊〉 of the several Manners of Predicâ—ting p. 11â— Less 2. Of Self-evident Propositions First Principles p. 1â—â— Less 3. That First Principles are Ideâ—â—tical Propositions prov'd by Instaâ—â—ces The Use that is to be made of them Also of some Other Propositions either in whole or in part Formally Identical and of the Reducing of Inferiour Truths to Self-evident Propositions p. 15â— Less 4. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd p. 163 Book III. Of the Third Operation of our Understanding DISCOURSE and of the Effects and Defects of it Less 1. OF Artificial Discourse the Force of Consequence and of the Only Right Figure of a Syllogism p. 225 Less 2. Of the several Manners or Moods of a Syllogism and of the Laws of Concluding p. 235 Less 3. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism or what Middle Term is Proper for Demonstration p. 248 Less 4. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition and consequently every Errour to a Contradiction What Consequences follow thence of one Truth being in another and of the Science of Pure Spirits p. 261 Less 5. Of other Mediums for Demonstration from the Four Causes p. 272 Less 6. Several Instances of Demonstration p. 288 Less 7. Other Instances of Demonstration p. 302 Advertisement p. 316 Less 8. Of Opinion and Faith p. 322 Less 9. Of Assent Suspense Certainty and Uncertainty p. 344 Less 10. Of Disputation and Paralogisms p. 356 Appendix p. 374 The Errata's in the Preface PRef P. 26. l. 15. out of P. 28. l. 19. cast about P. 46. l. 19. the Cartesian Corrections of the Errata PAge 5. Line 8. onely which P. 18. l. 10. as is P. 21. l. 18. that Motion P. 62. l. 6. most nearly P. 69. l. 23. but their P. 75. l. 1. become P. 77. l. 6. has besides P. 106. l. 2. False P. 107. l. 17. Proposition P. 122. l. 31. A whole P. 128. l. 12. Sophroniscus P. 147. l. 18. make P. 236. l. 16. Proposition is Identical P. 245. l. 27. nunc P. 250. l. 5. that can P. 255. l. 7. Sensitivum P. 257. l. 30. 't is Evidently P. 258. l. ult Basis. P. 270. l. 31. at one P. 273. l. 33. est of P. 281. l. 27. be a kind P. 301. l. 1. Cause of P. 308. l. 20. exercise it 's P. 311. l. 25. there P. 318. l. 18. Frailty which P. 321. l. 23. all own P. 322. l. 3. main P. 326. l. 1. what is is P. 354. l. 20. Erroneous P. 362. l. 13. he is not P. 364. l. 30. Grammatical P. 369. l. 13. The Sixth P. 370. l. 34. a proud P. 381. l. 17. with no. P. 388. l. 3. to be P. 393. l. 19. gives P. 414. l. 26. very small P. 417. l. 22. Slender Flexible and. l. 24. contiguous P. 419. l. 25. Art P. 424. l. 18. Is it P. 425. l. 13. so they l. 16. do P. 427. l. 7. Lock P. 273. l. 17. and seeing P. 396. l. 21. that is ' t is PREFACE DEDICATORY TO THE LEARNED STUDENTS OF Both Our Universities REason being Man's Nature and the Proper Act of Reason the Deducing Evidently New Knowledges out of Antecedent ones it may seem Wonderful that Mankind after the using their Reason and Disputing so long time should still Disagree in their Sentiments and contradict one another in inferring their Conclusions so that those who are sam'd for the Greatest Philosophers do still remain in Perpetual and as far as it can be discern'd Endless and Irreconcileable Variance and Dissension about their Tenets It seems to shock the very Definition of Man and to lay in some sort a scandal upon Creative Wisdom it self that whereas all other Creatures do arrive at the Natural End for which they were made Mankind alone nay the Noblest Portion of that Kind who cultivate their Thoughts with the most exact care that may be should still miss of Reasoning rightly and so fall short of True Knowledge which is their Natural Perfection What Tree but bears the Fruit Proper to its Kind Or what Cause in the World but produces such Effects as are sutable to its Nature And tho' by the Interfering of Cross-Agents there happens now and then a Deficiency in some very Few Particulars yet that Defect is never found in a Considerable part of the Species for Chance would not be Chance if it did come near the reaching an Universality whereas Mankind in its whole Latitude seems to fall short of improving it self in Truth at least in gaining Certainty of it or if some have attain'd it yet the Number of those Right Reasoners is so very Inconsiderable that they are lost amongst the Croud of those who stray into Errour Nor can those Happy Few who have light on it obtain Quiet Possession of what they have Acquir'd but their Title to it is perpetually Disputed by Great Multitudes of Pretenders who put in their Claim and set up their Pleas for their Opposit Tenets Whence our First Enquiry ought to be how Man's Nature comes to be so Disabled from performing its Primary Operation or from Reasoning rightly that so we may bethink our selves by what Means it may if possible recover the true use of its Natural Faculty how it may be cur'd of the Impotency it labours under and be freed from those Impediments which hinder it from Acting as it ought 2. Divines will tell us that this mischief happens thro' Original Sin Nor can it be doubted but there is some Truth in what they alledge For questionless Passion distorts the Understanding by the Ascendent which the Depraved Will has over it in such Concerns as the Will is addicted to and has espous'd an Interest in But this
purpose are his many Distinctions of his Propositions especially those he calls Exponibiles Let but the Learner know certainly and liquidly what are the Subject and Predicate in any Proposition which is easie to be discover'd by the Copula that is to come between them and unite them and have a care that the words that express them are Univocal he will be furnish'd with means to see the Form of Connexion which is Essential to a Proposition and is onely Conducive to Science which wholly consists in the Connexion of Terms His chief Misfortune is that he does not seem either at the beginning or in the Process of his Book to know at least to build upon this Truth and stand to it that our Notions or as the Moderns have taken a Toy to call them Ideas are the very Natures of the Things in our Understanding imprinted by Outward Objects without which no Stability of those Notions or Ideas can be with Evidence asserted nor any Solid knowledge possibly be had of our Predications nor the true Ground of Truth or Falshood be understood nor consequently ean there be any Firmness in our Judgments or Discourses Whence I could wish that every Beginner were at first well instructed and settled in this point for without this all will be but Loose and Ungrounded Talk in the Air. And tho' I lose Credit with our late Wits I must avow that Aristotle's dry Assertion that Anima intelligendo fit omnia tho' it may seem to some a wild Paradox has more Solid Sense in it were it rightly understood and is more Useful to true Philosophy than all the other Maxims that do not proceed upon it and suppose it which yet I see the Goodness of Nature intimates to many and forces them to ground their Discourses on it Practically even tho' while they speculate they deny it or at least seem to doubt of it or disregard it Observing therefore this great want under which Philosophy which is the Study of Truth labours I have out of my true Zeal of improving Science and beating down Scepticism the profest Patron of Ignorance and covert Parent of all Irreligion hazarded the Opinion of Singularity in endeavouring to write and publish a Demonstrative Logick at least I have given such Reasons quite thorough it as I judg'd to be Clear and Conclusive in every piece of it that has any Influence upon Scientifical Knowledge What my Reader may expect from me is this I begin with our Natural Notions the Bottom-Ground of all our Knowledge I show them to be the very Natures of the Things whose Metaphysical Verity being Establish'd by Creative Wisdom does consequently give Stability and Solidity to all our Discourses that are built on them I distribute those Natural Notions under those several Common Heads and manifest why there must be so many and no 〈◊〉 show how their Definitions are to be fram'd which make our Conceptions of the◠〈◊〉 and Distinct. I lay Rules to escape 〈◊〉 Snares which Equivocal Words lay 〈…〉 way while we are Discoursing I show â—he Reason of all Truth and Falshood in Connected Notions or Propositions Which if Self-evident and Identical have Title to be First Principles as from many Heads I demonstrate I trace Nature in all those nice and Immediate steps she takes to generate Knowledge in us at First Coming to those Propositions that need Proof and the Way of Proving them I lay open the Fundamental Ground of the Force of Consequence which gives the Nerves to every Act of True Reasoning and of the Certainty and Evidence of every Conclusion which we rightly inferr To perform which I manifest that there can be but One Necessary or Natural Figure of a Syllogism and but Four Moods of that Figure I lay down and fix the Fundamental Laws of Concluding I evidence the Nature of that Third Notion or Middle Term by the Connexion of which with the Two Terms of the Thesis to be Proved they must inevitably be joyn'd with one another and so the Thesis it self must be rightly Concluded and therefore Infallibly True I show how to find out a Middle Term fit for our purpose and thence prepare the way for Demonstration I lay open how every Truth must have at the Bottom an Identical Proposition and every Errour a Contradiction as their First Principles and how they may be reduced to those Principles of theirs To do which tho' more laborious is the best Way of Demonstrating I manifest thence how one Truth is in another and what strange Consequences follow thence Also how Middle Terms Proper for Demonstration may be taken from all the Four Causes To clear better the Notion of Science I treat of the Natures of Opinion and Human Faith their Grounds and how the Former of these two last Deviates from Right Reason and when the Later does or does not Then I consider the Effects issuing from all sorts of Proof viz. Assent Suspense Certainty and Uncertainty And to put in Practise my self what I do persuade and recommend to others I add Seven Demonstrations of the most Considerable Theses in divers Sciences And lastly I lay open the Ways and Methods of Disputation and detect the weak Stratagems and inefficacious Attacques of Fallacies or Paralogisms This is the Summ of my Endeavours in common But besides these many particular Knowledges light in on the by and as I hope very Useful ones which it would be tedious to enumerate The Manner I use to carry on the Scheme of my Doctrin is not to propose my Conceptions Magisterially or to expect any one should assent to the least Tittle of what I say upon my Word But I offer my Reasons for every Paragraph I advance if it can be conceiv'd to need any by doing which I speak to the Reason of my Readers and withall I expose my self to the Severe Examination of the most Acute and Iudicious Wits of which I doubt not there are Multitudes in those Seminaries of Learning our two Famous Universities to whom I humbly dedicate this small Present I neither strive to ingratiate my self by my Style nor to surprize any by Plausible Discourses much less to Impose upon their Understandings by Voluntary Suppositions I draw now and then divers Useful Corollaries and some that will seem I doubt not Paradoxical that so I may carry on my Doctrine to farther Consequences and show withall to what Unthought-of Conclusions Reason will lead us if we follow her close and home Nor am I asham'd to declare openly that I hold that the Chief End of Science is to beget Virtue and not onely to raise us to Higher Contemplation but also to comfort and strengthen Divine Faith in us and to make it more Lively and Operative Whence I have taken occasion to excite my Reader 's Devotion out of the Reflexions on divers Points that seem'd of themselves to be but Dry Speculations making account that Good Thoughts arising upon the Spot but of Truths newly Clear'd to our
the Mind which is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God who onely can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance I am heartily glad to know that Euclid and Archimedes were converted to God and that they were so infinitely Happy as to see God's Substance which is his Essence so manifestly He proceeds Men must look within themselves and draw near unto the Light that shines there continually that their Reason may be the more Illuminated The Mind ought to examin all Human Sciences by the Pure Light of Truth which guides it without hearkening to the False and confused Testimonies of the Senses Those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears unless he that discover'd them to us he means GOD the Giver of Ideas do reveal them at the same time to the Mind So that all Science it seems comes by Divine Revelation To what end then are Teachers Professours Schools and Universities if when we have done what we can by all our Teaching and Learning nothing but Divine Revelation must do the business or gain us any Science But now he advances to a higher point The Mind says he is immediately and after a very strict manner United to God nay after a stricter and more Essential manner than with the Body Now if this be true I dare affirm that the Mind is more United to God Naturally than our Saviour's Humanity was Supernaturally and Miraculously For This was but United Hypostatically or according to the Suppositum or Person of the Eternal Word whereas by this new Philosophy every Human Mind is United Essentially to God that is to the Godhead it self For to be united Essentially is for one Essence to be united to another Essence that is to be one or the same Essence with the Divine Essence Was ever such Quakerism heard of among Philosophers Or plain honest Human Reason so subtiliz'd and exhal'd into Mystick Theology by Spiritual Alchymy Yet to say True this is very Consonant to the Doctrine of Ideas They slight the Instruction of Nature they scorn to be beholding to their Senses and Outwards Objects which forces them upon Introversion and to observe as the same Authour says what Eternal Truth tells us in the Recesses of our Reason that is in their Darling Ideas Now common Reason ever taught me and every Man who did but reflect upon what passes within his Understanding that the Proper and Effectual way to gain a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of our Simple Notions is to make DEFINITIONS of them and there are most Certain Rules of Art how those Definitions may be fram'd But this was too Ordinary a way to please Minds so Extraordinarily Elevated as these Gentlemen pretend to be bless'd with The highest Flights of Nature do flag it seems too low for their Supernatural pitch nor can reach the Degrees of their Elevation above our dull Horizon They are Inspir'd with Heaven implanted Ideas and so they have no more to do but retire their Thoughts into the Inward Recesses of their Mind embellish'd and guilded with these Shining Innate Ideas and their work is done without any need of Definitions made by sublunary Art Sometimes I am apt to think that they had recourse to those Spiritual Pourtraitures out of despair of explicating any other way the Essences of Things or in what they consisted and I fear two of our Learned men lately mention'd apprehend them to be Inscrutable and In-explicable Whereas speaking of Essences in Common I do assure them that nothing can be plainer and that every Clown were he interrogated orderly could give us the true Essences or which is the same the true Natures of the things he is conversant with For whatever makes Mankind call and esteem any Bodies such or such Things in Distinction from all others is truly their Essence or to speak in the Language of a Philosopher let but Matter be determin'd by such a Complexion of Accidents with that Harmony or Proportion of parts connected with that Constancy that it is fit to act a Distinct part upon Nature's stage or perform its Primary Operation that Complexion of Accidents I say is truly the Essence of that Body or the Form that constitutes it such an Ens or such a Part of or in Nature Perhaps the Cartesians will say they allow Definitions to make their Ideas Clear and Distinct. But how can this cohere Definitions are the Effects of Art whereas these Ideas are imprinted by God's Hand who gave them their Nature and Cartesius says expresly they are Ingenitae This being so and GOD's immediate Works being Perfect and those Ideas being intended to give them Knowledge they can need nothing to make them more Clear and Distinct nor consequently can the Users of them have any occasion for Definitions unless perhaps to explain their Ideas to us who think we have a firmer Basis to build them on than those Ideas of theirs Nature gives the Ground and Art the Rules to make them And they are such necessary Instruments to true and solid Science that I could wish for the Improvement of Knowledge that our Universities would appoint a Committee of Learned Men to compile a Dictionary of Definitions for the Notions we use in all parts of Philosophy whatever Monsieur de Furetiere has attempted to perform this for all words whatever in Three Volumes Out of which may be Collected those that make for our purpose which being by the Ioynt-labour and Concurrence of the Persons deputed Examined if faulty Amended and propos'd to the World it could not fail of advancing Science highly In carrying forward such a Noble Work and so Beneficial to Mandkind I should willingly contribute my Quota of Endeavours nor think my pains better bestow'd in any thing I know of For Definitions explicating or unfolding the Nature of the Thing and all Proper Causes and Effects being so nearly ally'd to the Nature of the Thing it follows that there lies involv'd in the Definitions all Essential and Proper Middle Terms to demonstrate whatever belongs to the Notion Defin'd if Right Logick and studious Industry be not wanting He blames St. Austin and wishes he had not attributed to External Bodies all the sensible Qualities we perceive by their means And why Because says he they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea he had of Matter What Idea St. Austin had of Matter is little to purpose but if he proceeded consequently to his Thoughts he could not conceive the First Matter to be such as they put theirs to be For what Man of Common Sense can frame any Idea of a Thing that has onely Extension in it but is not to any degree either Dense or Rare Easie or Hard to be Divided Fluid nor Solid Soft nor Hard c. And if their Quaint Ideas and Clear and Distinct Conceptions which seem to be the Ground of all their Witty Discourses or Divine Revelations as Malbranche calls them of Science be no Wiser or Solider
procedure will bear me out and justifie me For the same inducement I have very frequently drawn my Arguments from Metaphysicks being well assured that such Mediums do make the Dicourses built on them approach nearest to Self-evidence Nor do I fear it should be objected that in a Logical Treatise I bring such Instances and Corollaries as entrench upon and make an In-road into divers other Sciences Rather I must profess that I held it a precise Duty in my Circumstances because Logick or the Art of Reasoning being a Common Instrument to attain all Science I was to show how it was upon occasion to be Apply'd to as many of them as I could so I do not make unreasonable Excursions to hunt for them in Foreign Subjects but that they light Naturally in my way Lastly I thought it became a Lover of Peace and Union among Christians to endeavour they should not wrangle about Equivocal Words so their Meanings be justifiable In a word 't is Connexion of Terms which I onely esteem as Proper to advance Science Where I find not such Connexion and the Discourse grounded on Self-evident Principles or which is the same on the Metaphysical Verity of the Subject which engages the Nature of the Thing I neither expect Science can be gain'd nor the Method to Science Establish'd But this done I make account both the one and the other may be hoped for How well I have behav'd my self in attempting this is left to the Iudgment of those who are the Proper Umpires in such Matters I mean your selves Your True Honourer and Humble Servant I. S. THE METHOD TO SCIENCE BOOK I. LESSON I. Of Notions or the very First Ground on which all Science is built 1. WE experience that Impressions are made upon our Senses and that those Impressions are Different according to the different Nature of the Objects that imprint them 2. We experience also that those Impressions do not stay in the Outward Senses but reach the Soul and affect it 3. Every thing being received according to the nature of the Subject that receives it and the nature of the Soul being a Capacity of Knowledge hence those Impressions must so affect the Soul as to cause some kind of Knowledge in her how rude and Imperfect soever it may yet be 4. The Impressions from Objects that affect the Senses and by them the Soul do carry the very Nature of those Objects along with them and imprint them in the Soul which Prints or as it were Stamps as received in the Understanding we call Notions 5. Wherefore Notions are the First and Rudest Draughts of Knowledge being most Simple and Naturally wrought in the Soul by the strokes of occurring Objects without any Industry or Active Concurrence on our part 6. That these Notions are the very Natures of the Thing or the Thing it self existing in us intellectually and not a bare Idea or Similitude of it appears hence evidently that when we say interiourly or judge A Stone is hard we do not intend to affirm That the Likeness or Idea of a Stone is hard but the very Stone it self And were it not so the Proposition would be false for the Similitude of a Stone in our Mind is not Hard whereas yet we are well assur'd that Proposition is True 7. Again we experience that we consider judge and disâ—ourse of the very Thing it self and of its very Nature which these being Interiour or Immanent Acts bred and perfected within our Soul we could not do unless the Objects of those Acts or the very Things themselves were there 8. Lastly It cannot be deny'd but that we have in our Soul the full and compleat Sense of this Proposition and Notions of every distinct part of it viz. There is in me the Idea or Likeness of a Stone Therefore there is in me something signified by the word Stone not only distinct from Idea and Likeness but moreover Relatively Opposite to it as the thing Represented is to that which represents it which can be nothing but the very Stone it self 9. Nor need it cause any Wonder that the same Ens or Thing may have diverse Manners of Existing one Corporeal the other Intellectual or Spiritual since the Thing v. g. Peter abstracts even from Existence it self for 't is not found in the Notion or Meaning of that word that the Thing signified by it Exists or not Exists much more then does the Notion of Thing abstract from that is is Indifferent to all Manners of Existing 10. The words Notion Simple Apprehension Conception and Meaning are all synonymous terms They are called Notions because they are the Parts or Elements of Knowledge which put and consider'd together make Cognition wâ—ich is Proper and Compleat Knowledge They are call'd Simple Apprehensiâ—ns to distinguish them â—rom Judgments which are compounded of more Notions and belong to the second Operation of our Understanding Or rather because by them we simply or barely Apprehend that is say hold of or take into us the thing about which we aâ—terwards Judge or Discourse They are call'd Meanings because they affect the Mind which only can mean or intend or else in relation to the Words whose Meanings they are They are called Conceptions in order to the Power which impregnated by the Object conceives or as it were breeds them as the Embryo's of Knowledge Lastly they are said to be the Natures of the Things because as was shewn they are such essentially and formally in nothing differing from them but only that they connotate a new Manner of Existing which is Extrinsecal to the Thing and to the Nature or Essence of it The word Idea is the least proper because it seems to signifie a bare Similitude unless the Users of it would express themselves to take it in that sence in which we take the word Notion here or as we use to understand it when we say that the Idea's of all things were in the Divine Intellect before they were created that is their very Essences 11. Notions are called Simple Apprehensions not from the Fewness of the words that express them nor from their not having any Grammatical Composition or Syntax in them but from the nature or manner of this Operation of our Understanding For since as was said they are called Simple Apprehensions because by them we simply or barely apprehend or lay hold of the Nature of the Thing intellectually it matters not how many or how few the words are so we do no more than meerly Apprehend or Take the Meaning of the Words or the Notions into our Minds without Judging or Discoursing of them Whence we may have a simple Apprehension of a long Sentence nay of a whole Sermon or a great Book as long as we do not set our selves to Judge or Discourse of the Truth or Falshood of what 's said or writ but purely to Apprehend the Sence or Meaning of the Speaker or Writer 12. Notions being the Natures of the Things in
cannot be if any Two of them be confounded or taken together at once it is manifest that 't is one necessary and main part of the Method to Science to distinguish our Notions Clearly and to keep them distinct carefully 13. The best way to do this is to rank all our Notions under distinct common Heads For this done it will be easie to know to which of those common Heads they belong and those common Heads being easily distinguish't from one another because they differ most vastly or as the Schools phrase it toto genere it will follow that the several Notions comprized under each of those Heads must likewise to a fair degree be clearly known to be Distinct also 14. There is but one onely Notion that is perfectly Absolute viz. that of Existence and all the rest are in some manner or other Respective For since all Notions that are must be either of the Thing it self or of what relates or belongs to it and the Thing it self relates to Existence of which since only a Thing can be it is a Capacity and Existence as being the last Actuality conceivable in the Line of Being relates to no other or farther Notion it follows that only the Notion of Existence is perfectly Absolute and all the rest are some way or other Respective 15. Whence it follows that the Notion of Existence is imprinted in the Soul before any other in priority of Nature For since all other Notions are Respective and so consist in some at least confused or rude Comparisons as it were of that Notion to what it respects to have which is much harder than to have that which is perfectly Absolute more Simple and not Comparative at all hence the Notion of Existence is the most Easie and therefore the first in priority of nature Again since as will be shewn hereafter the substance of all Operation is nothing but the Existence of the Object imprinted on the Patient and the Soul must have a Notion of the Operation made upon her that is a Notion of the Existence of the thing imprinting it it follows necessarily that the Notion of the Existence of that thing is first in her 16. From this last Reason it is evinced that the Notion of the Man 's own Existence is wrought in the Soul before the Notion of things without him and this by the Man himself as his own Object and is not imprinted by Outward ones For since the Soul has Notions of Objects not by Emission of its Virtue to them but by their being Receiv'd in it and Existing in it Intellectually nor could it have a Notion of them that is they could not exist in the Soul without its having a Notion first in priority of Nature of its own or the Man's Existence it follows that the Notion of the Man's Existence comes into the Soul before the Notion of other things and consequently that it is imprinted by the Man himself as his own Object and is not caused by Outward ones Again since the Existence of the Man is Naturally in him and consequently in the Soul when she has a Notion of him after its manner that is intellectually it follows that it has as it were Naturally a Notion of the Man's Existence and consequently before it has the Notion of any other thing Note 1. To explicate how this is done and why it must be so Anatomists tell us that the Embryo lies in a manner round in the Womb whence some parts of it do continually and necessarily touch some others Wherefore as soon as the Soul is infus'd and it is now from a meer Animal become a Man and has got an Understanding Power capable to receive Notions of Objects those Touches or Impressions of some parts of himself upon others do naturally affect the Sense and by it the Soul and beget a blind Notion there of the Man and by a natural kind of Consciousness or Experience that he Operates thus upon himself of his own Existence Note 2 d. Hence follows against the Cartesians that there is no kind of Necessity of Innate Idea's For having once got by this means the Notion of Existence and all other Notions being Respective or Comparative to it and the Soul being of its own nature a Comparative Power since as will be seen hereafter both our Acts of Judging and of Discoursing are Comparative Acts hence the Soul becomes provided with Means to have all other Natural Notions whatever by what it has from the Object and by it self But of this Point more towards the end of this Lesson Only it is to be remark'd that it is not here intended that the Soul has only the Notion of Existence alone and afterwards others for at the same time it has the Notion of the Man existing and existing thus by his operating thus We only discourse which of those Notions is first in priority of Nature that is of its own Nature most Knowable or Perceptible 17. All other Notions of the Thing besides Existence being Respective are either of something Intrinsecally belonging to it or else of something Extrinsecally refer'd to it by our Understanding This is evident for we can have no Notion of Non-Ens or Nothing nor consequently of what belongs to it 18. Intrinsecal Notions are but Four For since Existence is the only Absolute Notion and can be refer'd to no other all other Notions must either Immediately or Mediately refer to it Wherefore all Intrinsecal Notions must either refer the Thing it self immediately to its Existence by considering the Ens to be of such an Essence as it is capable to recieve it and then Essence being the Immediate Power to Existence they are Essential Notions and belong to that Common Head we call Ens or Substance Or else they refer the Thing to some Common Manner or Modification that is Consideration of it in which all things we converse with do agree that is to its Bigness or Quantity Or else they refer the thing to some Modification or Consideration belonging to its own peculiar Nature denoting how it is well or ill dispos'd in that respect which Common Head is called Quality Or lastly they refer some one Individuum according to something Intrinsecal to it to another Individuum which constitutes the Common Head of Relation And more Common Heads of Intrinsecal Respects cannot be invented therefore there are only Four Common Heads of Intrinsecal Notions 19. Those Notions that refer not something that is Intrinsecal to the thing but what 's Extrinsecal to it are conceiv'd to apply that Extrinsecal to it either by way of Motion or in Rest. If by way of Motion then since Motion has two terms it may be consider'd either as coming from the Mover and 't is the Notion of Action or as affecting the thing Moved and then 't is called Passion And because the most Regular and most Equable Motion to our apprehension is that of the Sun call'd Time and therefore all
less Divisible or rather 't is not so properly Quantity as is the other because it has no Vnity to distinguish it from a mere Confused Multitude of Ones but by means of the Understanding conceiving it to be so many Units terminated by the last yet because Plurality and Paucity are More and Less of any one Determinate Number and that there is a Ground in Nature for our Understanding to consider many Scatter'd Ones and comprehend or bind them together into one Notion and that such Notions are useful or necessary to Mankind therefore this Order'd Multitude of discrete or shatter'd Ones call'd Number is rightly placed in the Predicament of Quantity For t is to be noted that when 't is said Quantity is Divisibilis in semper Divisibilia it was not meant of Quantity in Common or all Quantity but only of that Species of Quantity call'd Continued 4. The Unity proper to Extended Quantity is Continuity of its parts For if the parts of this sort of Quantity be Discontinu'd either Nothing or vacuum comes between them and then they are still Continu'd against the Supposition for Nothing can do nothing and therefore cannot discontinue the Parts of Quantity Or else some Body comes between them and Discontinues them and then since all Bodies bring their own Quantities along with them however the Bodies A. and B. are distanced by C's coming between them because every Body has its determinate bounds and Limits yet the Quantity of those three Bodies precisely consider'd has none but goes on Smoothly in the self same tenour thro' the whole Mass of Body whether those Bodies be Different or the Same without Notches or Nicks butting and bounding it here and there or in the least diversifying it what ever Variety is found in the Figure Colour Hardness Softness or in any other consideration belonging to those Bodies Again since this Species of Quantity has its peculiar Notion Nature or Essence it must have some kind of Vnity too peculiar to it self But none is imaginable except Continuity nor does any so directly subsume under the notion of Quantity which is Divisibility or Vnity of its potential parts or sute so exactly with it Nay were the parts of Quantity discontinu'd quantitatively they would be divided quantitatively that is not Divisible or One that is none or Not-Quantity against the Supposition Therefore the Vnity proper to this Species of Quantity is Continuity of its parts Cor. I. Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Vninterrupted Continuity and the World it self speaking of Quantitative Unity One Great Continuum 5. Quantity according to its precise Notion cannot be Essential to Body because it can neither be the Genus of it nor the Intrinsecal Difference that constitutes it as is prov'd above 6. Yet Quantity Materially consider'd and not according to its precise and formal notion of Divisibility may as it were per accidens contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies For since nothing is truly and perfectly Ens or Capable of Existence but Individuals nor since Thing in common cannot exist can any thing be Capable of Existing but by being ultimately Determinated and thence compleatly fitted to be This or That and this Determination distinguishing one Individuum from all others is perform'd by means of such a particular Complexion of Accidents as fits them for their Primary Operation for which Nature ordain'd them and this Complexion of Accidents is either of Quantity or else as is shewn in Physicks of different modifications of Quantity it follows that Quantity materially consider'd and not according to its Formal notion of Divisibility may as it were by Accident contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies 7. The Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity are more and less of the Notion of Quantity This is prov'd formerly when we treated of the Division of Substance and the reason given there holds equally here 8. The Proper Species of Quantity mathematically consider'd or as it abstracts from Motion are Longitude Latitude and Profundity otherwise call'd Linea Superficies and Corpus For it is evident that Latitude is another sort of Quantity and has more of that Notion in it than Longitude has and that Profundity is a different sort of Quantity and has in it more of Quantity thus consider'd than either of the other as containing in it self all the three Dimensions 9. Therefore the Intrinsecal Differences of each of these continued Quantities consider'd Mathematically as abstracted from all Order to Motion are Divisibility into greater or into lesser determinate parts For since the Notion of Quantity is Divisibility and Divisibility respects the Parts into which it may be divided and this respect cannot be to Indeterminate parts into which it may be divided they being as Euclid has demonstrated Infinit as well in the greatest as the least Quantities so that they cannot have any differences thus considered wherefore Divisibility into Greater and Lesser parts being the Intrinsecal Differences of all such Quantities in regard that the Greater have more of the Immediate Generical Notion or of that kind of Quantity in them the smaller less of it and Divisibility into parts which are Determinate may bear the Notion of Greater or lesser Divisibility which Divisibility into Potential parts as was said cannot it follows that Divisibility into Greater and Lesser Determinate parts are the Intrinsecal Differences of this kind of Quantity Mathematically consider'd Besides Greater and Lesser bear in their Notions some Proportion between those parts which cannot be conceiv'd unless those Parts be Determinate 10. The Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of Continued Quantity consider'd Physically or in Order to Motion that is Affecting it's subject as apt to be wrought upon by Natural Causes are more or less Divisible or capable to be wrought upon and divided by those Causes This is evident from the very same Reason supposing Intrinsecal Differences to be onely more or less of the immediate common Notion or of the Genus they are to divide 11. The More and Less Divisibility of Continu'd Quantity thus consider'd is to be more easily or less easily wrought upon or divided by Natural Agents For since Quantity thus consider'd does not respect the Parts it contains or may be divided into but the Causes in Nature and their Operation upon its Subject Body it follows that the Notion of its being more or less Divisible as thus consider'd can only mean more or less susceptive of the Efficiency of Natural Causes that is more easily or less easily Divisible by the said Causes which is to be Rare and Dense 12. The Division of Continu'd Quantity into Permanent and Successive is made by Accidental Differences and not by Essential ones as were the former Divisions of it For since to move and to stand still are Accidental to Quantity and have no respect to that Generical Notion as more and less of it as had the other Differences above mentioned it follows that these Differences are Accidental to their Generical
more nor can more sorts of Answers to the Question How a Thing is be invented or imagin'd Examples of the Questions proper to Quality are such as these How do you To which is Answer'd Sick or in Health well or ill dispos'd How is he as to his Understanding Learned or Ignorant which Answers we call Habits or Dispositions How is he as to his Walking or using his Natural Faculties To which we answer well able to walk or Lame c. which signifie his Power or Impotency How is the Milk that 's over the Fire or the Bread in the Oven To which is answer'd Hot or Cold Dough-bak'd or Enough which are Passible Qualities How is he affected to me To which is answer'd Angry which is Passion Lastly it may be ask'd How he is as to his outward shape To which is answer'd well or ill shap'd Handsome or Vgly which Quality is call'd Figure 4. The Intrinsecal Differences of more or less in this Common Head of Quality are more properly to be call'd Better and Worse qualified since they fall into the same as more and less only the latter Expressions sute better having a qualifying sense 5. Wherefore Power and Impotency are the First Species of Quality because they spring immediately out of the Essence as it's Properties and most meerly concern it as to making it Better or Worse as also because they most dispose or indispose the Subject to the substance as it were of it's Natural Operations Habit and Disposition are the Second because they Supervene to the Power and only give it a better or worse Facility or Difficulty to Operate Passible Quality and Passion taken as such are the Third because taken as such they meerly qualify the Subject to be Passive or Alterable by another I say taken as such that is as Passible for if they be consider'd as Active as Heat in Fire is conceiv'd to be apt to effect Heat in another thing then 't is a calefactive Virtue and has the Notion of Power Lastly Figure has the least share of the Notion of Quality because it onely regards the Outward Lineaments and Appearance which are the sleightest of all other Qualities Though it may sometimes especially in Organical Bodies and their several parts contribute to their Power or Impotency as an Acute Figure in Dense Bodies makes them better divide the Ayre and other Bodies adding thus an Accidental perfection to their Power of Dividing and Splay-footedness hinders the Power of Walking whereas Straightness helps it Accidental I say for the Essential Notion of Figure is onely to terminate thus or thus the Quantity of Bodies as will be shewn hereafter 6. Wherefore the Intrinsecal Differences of Quality being to make the Subject of them better or worse hence most Qualities may admit of several Degrees in each of it's Species or as the Schools phrase it may be Intended or Remitted whereas neither Substance nor Quantity can Not Substance because as we no sooner step out of the Notion of Ens in common but we plunge into Non-Ens so we cannot depart from the Essential Notion of Hoc Ens but we must fall into Non-hoc-Ens or Another Ens. Not Quantity for let us design any particular or determinate Species of Quantity a Yard for example and but in the least Increase or Diminish it quantitatively and immediately it becomes no yard but of an other Species really tho' perhaps so little may be added or detracted that we may want a Name for it 7. Power differs from Habit also in this that Powers are Natural and spring out of the Essences of things as their Properties as the Power of Walking Seeing Hearing Fancying Understanding Willing Heating Dividing c. Whereas Habits are generally Acquir'd by frequent Acts. In things Inanimate and Vegetables and in some sort of Animals they are properly call'd Virtues thus we say such a Mineral or Herb has the Virtue of Drying Cooling Healing Cauterizing Poisoning In Animals they are call'd Natural Faculties as those of Seeing Walking Flying c. Where the word Faculty is not taken in the same Sense in which we use it when we tell one he has got a Faculty of doing this or that meaning thereby a Facility or Habit of doing it but for the Power it self which is to be facilitated by that Habit. The Privations or want of those Powers due to Nature we call Impotences as Deafness Blindness Doltishness c. Which signify Inabilities to perform such Operations as we ought were the Subjects Qualify'd as they should be 8. Habits are generally Acquir'd by Acts yet some may seem to be had by Nature as Healthfulness and Sickliness Of the former we use to say such a one has got a Habit of Dancing Drinking Brawling Swearing Praying c. Of which sort are all kind of Skill's in moving the Body and all Arts and Sciences qualifying the Mind and their Opposites All which we shall find to be Perfections or Imperfections belonging either to the particular Nature of the Body as Dancing Pronouncing c. or else suitable or disagreeable to the peculiar Temper of the Mind which is Reason such as are Sciences Virtues Vices Ignorance c. But those that are Innate and have withal some constant Ground of Stability by the steady or fixt course of Causes are rather call'd States or Conditions than Habits such as are Original Justice Original Sin Impeccableness in the Saints in Heaven Obdurateness in Sin in the Divels and Healthfulness or Sickliness if it comes out of a Man's Natural Constitution All which tho' less properly Habits than those that are Acquir'd yet Habit having in it's Notion a kind of Constancy we do therefore from their Steady manner of working denominate Habitual Propensions Dispositions Affections or Determinations of the Subjects and reduce them to the Species of Habit 9. Those Natural Affections of Body consider'd as apt to render the Subject not to be determinately This or That in the Line of Ens nor Bigger or Lesser but only Alterable thus or thus without changing the Entity are for the most part Passible Qualities This is manifest For considering them thus there is no Predicament but that of Quality nor any Species of Quality but This under which they can be rank't Under the Genus of Passible Quality are particularly The Four First Qualities Heat Coldness Moisture Dryness and the Second and perhaps Third Qualities compounded of these with a variety almost Infinit of which more in Physicks 10 All Passible Qualities are Objects of the Senses Otherwise they would not be Natural Notions nor belong to any Common Head and consequently we could not discourse or think of them which yet we experience we do 11. Yet 't is not the Consideration of them as the Objects of our Senses which Constitutes them nor Essentially Distinguishes them This is evident for their Essence as Qualities must be taken from their manner of affecting their own Subject and thence giving us ground of denominating it diversly
Manners of Working have and consequently those Relations are far more Real than those which are grounded on Corporeal Powers and their Operations 15. The Substance as it were of Relation consists in that Immediate Ground which is the Reason of our referring one thing to another For 't is Evident that 't is the Thing it self in my Mind which is Referr'd and not the Act of the Mind Referring it For example Two White things have Vnity of Form or the same Notion in them which makes them Really Alike of themselves were they in a Comparing Power that could actually Referr them and denominate them Relatively as their Nature requires so that it is not the Act of my Understanding which made the white Walls really Alike but their own Natures which are the Object of my Act by means notwithstanding of the Comparative Act of my Understanding which they inform'd as a necessary Condition to relate them actually and without which they had each of them had but the Absolute Notion of White and not the Relative one of being Alike Corol. II. Hence we have some light given us how there may be True and Real Relations in God Knowing and Loving himself and how they depend and not depend on our Understanding 16. The Intrinsecal Differences of Relation being more and less and our Act adding nothing to the Substance of the Relation they must be taken from the Greater or Lesser Ground or Reason why the thing is referr'd to another Hence our greatest Relation is to God because all the good we have or can have does entirely Referr us to him Upon which therefore is founded all our Religious Respects and our Duties of Serving Obeying and Adoring him Next follows the Relation of a Husband to a Wife who is in some manner the same Individual with himself After them comes our Relation to our Parents who concurr'd to our Being gave us Education and provided for our Subsistence Then to Mankind to whom we are Related by Identity of Nature to our Country our King and other Superiours according to their several Ranks to our Kinsfolks Neighbours c. from which Relations arise several Duties in proportion to the more or less important Reason or Ground that makes them more or less nearer or remotely Related to us LESSON VIII Of the Common Heads of Action and Passion 1. THERE are Two and but Two Common Heads of Extrinsecals conceiv'd to be apply'd to one another by way of Motion For since Motion has two Terms viz. that thing from whence it comes and that to which it reaches and these are distinct Considerations hence we have Two Common Heads of one Extrinsecal thing conceiv'd to be apply'd to another by way of Motion Nor can there be more for Motion consider'd as it were in the Midway between those Terms has no Notion but that of meer Motion whence it is the very Notion of Successive Quantity and belongs clearly to that Common Head and therefore cannot belong to another or constitute a new one 2. The Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions and most approaching to Non-Entity For since Motion as it superadds to the Extensive Quantity of its Subject is wholly made up of not being in this place or that or of not being still here and not being yet there nor has any thing of Permanency which is in a manner the same Notion with Actual Being it follows that besides the Common disadvantage other Accidents are liable to of having no Entity of their own but what 's borrow'd of their Subjects it has moreover this that neither it self nor any part of it self exists so much as for one Moment Wherefore Ens being a Capacity of Existence Motion seems to be in a manner incapable of Existence or a Non-Entity and this out of its own peculiar Nature or Notion Again since in every part of Motion the thing moved is in a space bigger than it self and Place as will be shewn hereafter properly such is but Equal to the thing it contains and not bigger than it hence Motion hinders its Subject to be properly speaking in any place that is any where which amongst Bodies seems next akin to not being at all Lastly Motion is destructive of Actual Being in those things that are arriv'd to their full state of perfection which shews its nature to be in some sense directly opposit to the Notion of Being which has some kind of Constancy and Stability in it Nor can it be said that it gives Actual Being or Existence to the new Entities it helps to produce for Existence is the proper Effect of Self-Existence or the First Cause Wherefore the Notion of Motion is the most Imperfect of all our Notions and most approaching to Non-Entity Corol. I. Hence is demonstrated that since every Agent produces an Effect suitable to its own Nature and therefore an Agent infinitely perfect cannot be the Immediate Cause of what 's most Imperfect therefore Motion being both most imperfect and withal most disagreeable nay directly contrary to God's Nature which is pure Self-Existence and Essentially Immovable and Vnchangable was not immediately caus'd by God but by some imperfect Agent or some Creature that is by such a Cause as of it self is a Non-Entity 3. The Notion of Action as it superadds to meer Motion is the Exercise of a Power which is Effective of something For since to Act is to Do and to do Nothing is not to do it follows that to Act is to Do something but to do something presupposes a Power to do it and this so as not to stay in the Notion of meer Power for if it stays there it only denominates the Thing Able to do which again is not to do wherefore Action is not the Notion of a sluggish Power but of a Power Exerted and Exercis'd that is Effecting something whence the Power is call'd Effective the Action Efficiency and the Something it does is term'd an Effect All which superadd to the notion of meer Motion 4. The Primary and Chief Natural Action is Division For since Substance is the Subject of all Accidents and which being changed all the Accidents do suffer a change with it hence that Action that works upon a Body according to the Substantial Notion of it has more of Action in it as working a Greater Effect But Division makes Two Things of One and so destroys the former Vnum or Ens and makes Two new ones therefore Division is the Primary and Chief of all other Natural Actions Note That this is to be understood of Perfect Division which makes the thing Divided and is therefore only properly to be call'd Division for Imperfect Division only alters the Figure It may be objected That Rarefaction and Condensation if they be in a great degree change the Substance as well as Division does Answ. This arises out of the nature of some particular sort of Bodies and not out of the precise Notion of those Actions For
the same Ens where they are Entitatively Connected or the same Materially before they are Seen or Judg'd to be so by our understanding 11. It is sufficient that the two Terms be Materially the same or Identify'd with the same Ens when the Subject is a Concrete whether it be Substantially a Concrete that is consisting of the Nature and the Suppositum as when we say Petrus or Homo is Animal Or Accidentally as when we say Album est Dulce But in Abstract Notions they must besides this be moreover the same Essentially or Formally that is they must not onely be found in the same Material Ens or thing but those very Notions themselves must have the same Formality either in part or in whole in our Understanding In Whole as when we say Petreitas est Petreitas Quantitas est Divisibilitas In part as when we say Petreitas est Humanitas or Animalitas for then Humanitas and Animalitas are as Essential to Petreitas and Petreitas as much includes and is the Subject of their Notions and of its own Differnces besides as Petrus does or is of the Notions of Homo or Animal 12. An Abstract and a Concrete Term can never be Subject and Predicate in the same Proposition tho' never so Essential to one another For an Abstract Notion out of the very Nature of its Abstraction is formally a Part and a Concrete Notion in respect to it a Whole and a Part tho' taken materially it may belong to the same Ens which is a Whole and be the same Thing with it yet taken formally it cannot for then a Whole would be Formally a Part and a Part Formally a Whole Hence we cannot say Petreitas est Petrus or Petrus est Petreitas c. Hence also this Proposition Quantitas est Quanta and such like is False for Quanta being a Concrete signifies the Subject which has Quantity in it and it is False to say that Quantity alone is Quantity and its Subject too 13. From what 's said above we may gather that there may be diverse manners of Predicating or referring one Notion to another and they are reckon'd by Porphyrius to be Five called by the Schools Predicables that is several Manners how one Notion may be predicated of another Whose Pardon we must beg if following the Dictates of Reason which we Judge Evident and not the Track beaten by others we dissent from them and assign Six The first is when the whole Notion is Predicated of the whole as when we say Quantity is Divisibility A. Whole consists of all its parts or when we Predicate the Definition of â—he Notion Defiâ—'d as Man is a Rational Animal or all the Dividing Members of the Notion Divided And this Manner we call Entirely Identical that is the predicating of the same Whole Notion wholly of it self In the rest â— Part only is Predicated of the whole and then â—he Predicate is either Essential to the Subject or â—ot If Essential then it either predicates that part of his Nature which in the common acceâ—tation of Mankind not reaching to inferiour Differences is immediately Superiour to it and is thought to denote the whole Essence of the thing and then 't is call'd a Species as Petrus est Homo Or but some lesser part of its Essence as Petrus â—st Animal Vivens or Substantia which are call'd the Genus or Generical Notion And both these as also the first are said to be predicated in Quid because they are Essential Predicates and answer differently tho' imperfectly and but in part to the Question made by Quid. As ask Quid est Petrus we answer appositely Homo Animal Vivens c. Or else the Predicate is that Compart which distinguishes the Genus Essentially from others of the same Common kind and constitutes it in an inferiour Class under the Common Notion and is therefore Referr'd to what it thus constituted as its Essential Difference as Homo est Rationalis And this supposes the Question made by Quid or what Thing and answers to a further Question What kind of Thing And therefore 't is said to be predicated not meerly in quale for then it might have been a meer Quality and not Essential but in Quale quid as both giving account of the particular Nature of the Thing as also of its belonging to the Essence of it If the Predicate be not Essential then either one notion is Referr'd to another and Predicated of it not as any Part of its Essence but yet as more or less Connected with it as an Effect or Sign of it as Capable of Admiring or the being affected with Musick Proportion or Beauty are Connected with Rational Nature or Man and referr'd to him accordingly that is Predicated of him as a Property Thus Combustive or Rarefactive are Connected with Fire Opacous with Earth and referr'd to those Subjects or predicated of them as Properties Or lastly the Predicate is Comâ—par'd or Referr'd to the Subject as having no kind of at least known Connexion with the Essence but meerly casually belonging to it or as Indifferent to the Essence whether it belong to it or no. As Armed Placed Situated c. belongs to Maâ— or Body and then 't is said to be predicated as an Accident that is as affecting him only Casually and Accidentally Note 1. That in this last Predicable only the Manner how it is Predicated or Compar'd to the Subject is consider'd and not the Nature of that which is Predicated nor whether it be a substantial Notion or whether it does belong to some one of the other 〈◊〉 Accidents so it be but Casually or Accidentally belonging to the Subject or Referr'd to it for Wooden Golden and Earthen are all Predicated as Accidents or Accidentally of Cup for 't is still equally a Cup whether it be made of any of those or of any other matter tho' Wood Gold and Earth be substantial Notions Whence the word Accident does not here signifie what Inheres in the Substance as it does in those Predicamental Accidents which are Intrinsecal ones but that which belongs to a Subject by Chance or Casuality so that the Notion of the Subject is preserved entire whether it has it or has it not Note 2. That since it was clearly the Intention of him who invented these Predicables and of those who follow'd him and us'd them to comprehend all the Different Manners how Notions could be Predicated of their Subjects and the being Predicated as a whole of the whole is most evidently one Manner of Predicating and Distinct from the Five they assign'd it is manifest that their Account of the Predicables was Defective and our Supplying it Rational and Necessary Add that they omitted that Predicable or Manner of Predicating which if it were not the most Vseful at least it was the Chief and First in Dignity all the First Principles having as will be shewn hereafter this Manner of Predication and consequently having Title to belong to
come to shew the Vse of First Principles 3. The First principle that grounds all Ethicks or Morality is A Will is a Will For since all Morality at least in its practice consists in Acting for an End and no man acts for an End but because it appears to him a Good and therefore an appearing Good is the proper Object of that Active Power call'd the Will and Powers are specified by their proper Objects and have their Essences from them it is as certain the Will cannot act when there appears to the Man no Good and that it will act for what appears to him taking him as thus Dispos'd hic nunc a Good as it is that A Will is a Will Object This takes away the Freedom of the Will to tye it up to First Principles or pretend that its Actions can be reduc'd to Rules of Science or Demonstration for this seems to hamper it and lay a Necessity upon it which destroys its Free Nature I answer that the Will has a Nature of its own which it can no more forgo than Homo can not be Homo Whenever then there is but one Appearing Good the Will is not free in that circumstance because in such a Case its Essence is engag'd and 't is not in the power of the Will to chuse whether it will be its self or no. In all other Cases where its Essence is not engag'd the Will is free provided there be on the Object 's side Variety enough for Choice Yet in the former Case those Acts of the Will tho' not free are Voluntary because they are more according to what 's Essential to it or to its very Nature and would if the Will did not bear it self accordingly make the Will to be no Will. Corol. I. Hence is seen that the only solid way to perfect our Souls in Christian Morality or True Virtue is by Wise Judgments or Frequentation of Devout Thoughts and Actions to gain a Lively and Hearty Conceit of the Transcendent Excellency of Heavenly Goods and of the Vileness of all Temporary Goods in comparison since 't is the very Nature of our Will to pursue that with her Interiour Acts which appears lively to be the Greater Good that is to be hic nunc a Good to him that wills 4. Lastly to omit others the First Principles in Mathematicks are Identical For example At our first entrance into Euclid we are met with those Famous and Useful Principles Those things that are Equal to the same are Equal to one another If Equals be added to Equals the Wholes are Equal If Equals be taken away from Equals the Remainders are Equal Those which are twice as big as the same are Equals Those which are Halfs of the same are Equals All which are in effect but this Identical Proposition Aequale est aequale sibi or else diverse Inferiour Identicals subsuming under that Common one as Homo est homo does under Ens est ens For example this Proposition If Equals be added to Equals the Wholes are Equal is that common Identical Proposition thrice as it were Repeated and is plainly as much as to say the two supposed Equals are Equal to one another the two Equals added are Equal to one another and so the two Equal Wholes made up of both those Equal parts are Equal to one another There are many other such Identical Propositions on which that great Mathematician builds as on his Principles and among the rest A Whole is greater than a part of it self which I have shewn above to be in sence Formally Identical 5. As for the Vse that may be made of First Principles First they cannot be the Conclusion for that is the thing to be proved and First Principles are above Proof as not being to be made Evident because they are Self-evident Nor can they be either of the Premisses for as will be more clearly shewn hereafter the Middle Term must be Connected with one of the Terms of the Conclusion in one of the Premisses and with the other Term in the other which could not be if the self same Notion were us'd twice in one of those Premisses for then the Syllogism must either be fram'd thus Omnis Homo est Homo Aliquod Animal est rationale ergo aliquod Rationale est Homo or thus Nullus Homo est Irrationalis Ted aliquis Homo est Homo ergo Aliquod irrationale non est Homo where we see to omit other faults that the Notion of Homo is taken thrice whereas in a Legitimate Syllogism no Term ought to be taken more than twice and so the whole Discourse is Preternatural and Absurd 6. Hence follows that since the Vse of First Principles cannot be the bringing down or deducing Truths which are yet unknown from them therefore the Use of them must consist in the bringing up or Reducing Truths to them which is done by Resolving less-clear Truths into others still Clearer till we arise to those which are the Clearest of all that is to Self-evident Principles to shew which by Instances or lay open the way how this is done is not proper for this place but belongs to the next Book where we shall treat of Rigorous Discourse or Demonstration 7. To make this use of First Principles is no more in effect but to attend heedfully to the Nature of the Thing and not to deviate from it This is Evident for to Deviate in a Discourse about Homo or Corpus from their Natures is by consequence to make Homo not to be Homo and Corpus not to be Corpus which Propositions are Contradictory to Homo est Homo and Corpus est Corpus which are the First Principles in those Discourses 8. Quaere It may be ask'd if there be no more in the business but to attend to the Metaphysical Verity or Nature of the Thing why we keep such a pother about putting it into such nice and dry and seemingly Insignificant Identical Propositions since we may attend to our Notion or the Nature of the Thing without framing Formal Propositions about it or saying It is what it is 'T is answer'd Because all our Discourses are made up of Propositions without which we cannot say or affirm any thing and therefore those Sayings into which we do finally resolve their Evidence and Truth as into what 's most true and evident must be Propositions also Besides Self-evident Propositions which advance the Metaphysical Verity of the thing into Formal Verity do reflect and redouble as it were the Notion of it upon it self by expressing its being what it is and thence gives an advantage to our bare Single Notion by not only having had as had the Single Notion its Metaphysical Verity in it but by expressing that Metaphysical Verity so as to make it more fit to be discours'd of 9. Tho' First Principles cannot be any Proposition in a Legitimate or Regular Syllogism yet this hinders not but that those particular Identical Propositions which subsume
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
expresly or by consequence Included in some part of the Definition the Formality of one is in some part the Formality of the others as the Notions of Ens Corpus Mixtum Vivens Sensituum are found in part to be Formally in the Entire Notion of Homo The Art of Dividing right is requisit to make exact Definitions Because the Genus and one of the Proper Differences that divide that Common Notion do constitute and integrate the Definition Note that the Genus must be Immediate because otherwise it confounds the Intermemediate Notions with the Species and so gives a less-distinct Conception of the Notion to be defin'd Hence Ens or Vivens Rationale is not a good Definition of Homo because Ens and Vivens do but Confusedly or in part speak the Notion or Nature of Animal Nor is Rationale the Proper and Immediate Difference of Ens and Vivens 12. Hence Dichotomy or a Division made by two Members is the best For in such a Division the Parts if rightly exprest may be most easily seen to be Equivalent to the Whole That Dichotomy in which the Members are Contradictory is the very best Division that can be imagin'd As that of Ens into Divisible and Indivisible that is not-Divisible of Animal into Rational and Irrational that is not-Rational of Number into Odd and Even or not-Odd For since there can be no Middle between Contradictories it is Evident there can be no more Members than Two and consequently that those Two parts are Equivalent to the Whole 13. The Whole Definition and All the Members of a Division that is rightly made if taken together may be a proper Medium for a Demonstration For both of these taken together are Equivalent to the Whole Notion Defin'd and Divided and may as well be a Middle Term as that Whole Notion exprest by one word as by Man Animal c. v. g. Every Rational Animal is capable of Science Every Clown is a Rational Animal therefore Every Clown is Capable of Science What-ever is either Even or Odd is capable of Proportion All Number is either Even or Odd therefore All Number is capable of Proportion 14. Out of what has been proved 't is seen that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain Science For since all Knowledg is taken from the Nature of the Thing and therefore all Distinct and Clear Knowledg such as Science ought to be from the nature of the Thing distinctly and clearly represented and this as has been shown is done by Definitions it follows that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain to Science 15. Another use to be made of Definitions in order to Demonstration is this when two Notions by being Remote seem in a manner Disparate and so the Proposition is Obscure we are to pursue home the Definitions of each of the Terms till something that is Formally Identical appears in both of them Which done all farther disquisition ceases and the Point is demonstrated For example If we would prove that Virtue is Laudable we shall find that the word Laudable signifies deserving to be spoke well of and Practical Self-Evidence as well as Reason telling us that our Speech being nothing but Signes agreed on by Mankind to express their thoughts that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of and that what 's according to the true Nature of him that speaks or thinks or to true Reason deserves to be judg'd by him Right and Good that is thought well of To which add that Virtue is nothing but a Disposition to Act according to True Reason it comes to appear that Virtuo and Laudable have something couch't in their notions that is Formally Identical and that this Proposition Virtue is Laudable is full as Certain as that What 's according to right Reason is according to right Reason or what 's Laudable is Laudable which seen perfect Knowledg is had of the Truth of Virtue is Laudable that is 't is the Proposition Evidently Concluded or Demonstrated Note hence that in Resolving Truths thus into first Principles Rigorous Definitions do not alwayes need but Explications of the two Notions or of the Meaning of the Words that express the two Terms may serve so they be True and Solid since no more is necessary in this case but to resolve the Inferiour Truths and the Notions that compound them into Superiour ones For which reason also Practical Self-evidence or a Knowledg agreed on by all Mankind in their Natural Thoughts through Converse with those Natural Objects is sufficient For this is a Solid Knowledg tho' it be not lick't into Artificial shape Whence it may Suffice oftentimes without Framing the Demonstration coucht in these Discourses into a Syllogistick Method unless the Form of the Discourse be Deny'd 16. Hence follows that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them For since all Truths are therefore such because they are Conformable to the Nature of the Thing or to its being what it is which is express'd by an Identical Proposition it follows that all Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them 17. Hence every Errour has at the bottom a fect Contradiction and is grounded on it For since all Truths as being Conformable to the Nature of the Thing are grounded on the things being what it is and so have an Identical Proposition for their Bases therefore for the same reason every Error being a Dis-conformity to the Thing or a Deviation from its being what it is must be Grounded on this as its first Principle that the Thing is not what it is which is a perfect Contradiction 18. Hence follows necessarily that if Art and Industry be not wanting Every Truth is Reducible to a Self evidâ—nt or an Identical Proposition and every Errour to a Contradiction For since these as has been prov'd are the Basâ—s or bottom-Principles of all Truths and Falshoods and all Inferiour Propositions derìve all their Truth or Falshood from the First Truths or Falshoods that is from Identical Propositions or Contradictions it follows that either no Truth or Falshood can be finally known or be Knowable or Provable to be such or else they must be Reducible either to Identical Propositions or to Contradictions as the Tests of their Truth or Falsity Corol. I. Hence follows that all Learning being Knowledge those Men only ought to be accounted Absolutely speaking True Schollars or perfectly Learned who can thus settle Truth and confute Errour that is thus Demonstrate the Conformity of the Position he maintains to the Nature of the Thing or the Disconformity of his Adversaries Thesis to the Essence of the Subject under Dispute By which it will appear how Unjustly many Men are esteem'd Learned by the Generality meerly for their having read a Multitude of Authors Since the Former know the Truth of the Things or of the Subjects discours'd of
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
casually upon something in the dark or run against it tho' we neither see or know what that thing is or when we see a thing a far off we know that that thing is tho' as yet we know not what it is The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cauâ—es and Effects For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise he Administâ—rs his workmanship the World after the wisest and best manner which is that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack but perfectly Coherent nor can this be done among an infinit variety of Bodies by any other means so as to make up the Course of Nature but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes since if that were not the Course of Nature would be at a stand and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self it follows that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects 4. The Course of Nature must be câ—â—ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 â—roper to one another For were â—ot â—â—ese â—auses and Effects Proper to one anotheâ— any 〈◊〉 might do any thing or suffâ—r from any thing v. g. Fire might both heat and cool and mâ—iâ—ten and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood and so of all the rest In whiâ—h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions or what Efficient Cause or what Matter rather than another he is to make use of to produce any Effect nor consequentlâ— sinâ—e â—uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect For since to Causâ— is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or proâ—uce some Effect Anâ— this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd § 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing For since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self as being nothing but it's Existence and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative that is of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause hence it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient and that it is prâ—st upon it But there being no vacuum immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature and the Course of Nature consisting in Moâ—ion one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes which we call Demonstrating â priori and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori For since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this that the word Cause speaks the thing as it is in Nature and Reason the same thing as 't is in our understanding and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another and consequently do Infer one another naturally it follows that those Causes and for the same reason Effects as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding Whence follows that thoâ—e Causes and Effects can be uâ—'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another And that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise as 't is shown these are § § 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd because Two Bodies that are Immediate do Act and Re-act or are in some respect mutually Causes and Effects to one another For since their Existences which is their Power of Acting are immediately Apply'd and by the Course of Nature consisting in Motion prest upon one another and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant it follows that till one of them be by degrees totally subdu'd the Resisting Body must necessarily for the reason given re-Re-act upon it whence they will be to some degree or in some respect Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence and as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones Interiour and Exteriour perfecting and streâ—gthening the Will all along to the very end and ripening Souls for Bliss which we call Grace is that which is truly meant by Predestinatioâ— which sounds so terribly and is such â—â—ugbeaâ— to those that mis-understand it Corâ—â— â—I Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something Corol. â—â—I Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of â—â—e First Cause to cause or lay any 〈◊〉 for Sin For Sin formally as such has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it either â—etaphysical Physical or Moral but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature whence it comes that by falling-short here in using the Means that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End which is only attainable by such Means To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words but by Reason and Good Sense Corol. IV. Hence follows also that were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect known to us we could have no Accidental Predications nor consequently any Opinions but the Effect would still be equally Demonstâ—able from the Complexion of those Causes as it is now from some one single Efficient as was hinted formerly Corol. V. Hence to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes there could be no Chance nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion For Chance as the common use of the word tells us signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes and that they cannot but follow from such Causes Corol. VI. Hence tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World or the Course of Nature because we Comprehend not all Causes nor know what Cause or Causes did
all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity but la All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of or is One Indivisible added to Another Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity 10. The Minor is Evident for all Number tho' Infinit consists of Ones that is of One added to another Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct All the parts must be Actually distinct also Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two must be equally found wherever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity 11. The Minor is proved for all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar that is in our case out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity Again this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance for this has no Distinction of parts but that of Matter and Form Nor out of any other Line for all those do presuppose Quantity and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body therefore if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self 12. Now that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct destroys the Nature of Quantity and is Contradictory is thus proved Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity actually Distinct contradicts the nature of Quantity 13. The Minor is Evident For those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively or rather are already so as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line Wherefore since the Nature of such a Subject as they put Quantity to be does bear it let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into that is into All they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles They must be Indivisible because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into and they must be Infinit for Divisibility that is but Finite would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration Besides it would follow hence that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity Wherefore they being also Infinit in Number for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension for the least Determinate Quantity Infinit times repeated makes an Infinit Extension 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration that since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles nor of Actual parts it is made up of Potential parts that is there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity and this Whole is Divisible without end Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity or which is the same the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole Divisible still into its Potential parts or parts still farther Divisible Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion and consequently the Course of Nature could not have been ab Aeterno but must have had a Beginning Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible The Minor is Self-evident The Major is thus prov'd Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time v. g. Infinit Hours but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible 16. The Major is clearly Evident for were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite then all the Parts which are equivalent to the Whole being Finite the Whole must likewise be Finite The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis that Time Motion or the Course of Nature had a beginning Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists Note that 't is the same as to our Argument whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd or no 't is sufficient the Subject Infinit Motion or Infinit Time bears the having such a Determination made by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings which we call Angels Demonstration V. Axiom 1. What acts is 2. Every thing acts as it is and à fortiori cannot act directly contrary to what it is especially as an Immediate Agent 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings but either Divisible or Indivisible ones that is Body or Spirit 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts and consequently is but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect viz. of the First Motion in Nature therefore i-An Angel acts and consequently is The Minor is thus prov'd Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediatâ—ly by the First Cause noâ— by a Body must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel and consequently an Angel acts is The former part of thâ— Minor viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause is thus demonstrated 19. Fe-No being that is Essentially Vnchangeable and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change can be the Immediate Cause o Change or Motion nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature but ri-The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable and his Nature is directly
money to morrow will be Where Omitting the Former at present the Medium what 's Promis'd is a Common Notion in respect of Paying whence we use to say All Promises are either Broken or Kept Besides 't is far from being Proper or Immediate to the Effect of Paying in regard that multitudes of Cross-causes may intervene hindering that Effect from following tho' never so really intended whereas taking a Proper Effect viz. my Chambers being Enlightn'd prov'd by it's Proper Cause the Suns darting it's Rayes in through my Window at which rate all the Course of Nature and all the Demonstrations that might be fram'd of it all along do hang together nothing can intervene to hinder it the Efficiency of the Cause being still the Putting the Effect 3. Common Mediums not being immediate but Remote are not in true Speech Mediums apt to Connect the Extremes For since what Connects two others must it self be Connected with them both and what is Connected to two things must be Immediate to them both it follows that a Common Notion not being Immediate to the Two Extremes cannot Connect them and so cannot be in proper Speech or Univocally a Middle Term with that which is Immediate 4. Wherefore all Assent to a Conclusion from a Common Medium is a Deviation from Humane Nature and consequently Opprobrious Whence comes the Proverb Turpe est opinari 't is Shameful to Assent upon Uncertain and Inconclusive Mediums such as are Common ones To which agrees that saying of Holy Writ Qui credit citò levis est corde He that assents hastily is light of heart that is Inconstant or Unsteady in his Thoughts and Actions Whence also he that adheres stiffly upon Opinionative Grounds incurrs the Note of being an Opiniatre The reason is becauâ—e Reason being Man's Nature so that as Brutes are led by Sense so he is led by some Reason good or bad in all his Actions and True Reason being a Power to draw True Conclusions out of True Premisses hence every Assent Involves as it were practically that the thing is True for such a Reason which Proposition is False if that Reason for which he assents does not Conclude it True as Common Mediums do not Wherefore Reason being the true Nature given us by GOD and Truth the Perfection of that Nature all Assents upon Incompetent or Inconclusive Grounds do doubly injure our Nature First as to its Essence by Concluding unduely next as to it's Perfection in making it embrace a Falshoâ—d and such a Falshood as makes it liable to fall into many others by imbuing the understanding with a wrong Method of Reasoning whence he lies expos'd by leaving the paths of Right Reason to the Disrepute of being either Passionate or Ignorant 5. They who do Assent upon such an Inconclusive Medium notwithstanding that they see it is Inconclusive are convinc'd to be Deserters of Humane Nature and led blindly by Passion For since all Reasoning is built upon First Principles they who come nearest the Denyâ—ng First Principles do radically as it were put off and abdicate their Whole Nature But such Assenters come as near as is possible to the Denying First Principles for they Assent that is they Judge or say interiourly the Conclusion is True or that the thing is and yet they see at the same time that the Reason on which only they relie for that Assent does not Conâ—lude it to be that is they see it may not be notwithstanding that Reason which is to Assent or Judge that to be which yet at the same time they Judge may not be which is in Substance though not in Direct Terms Nature not permitting such a palpable Contradiction to settle in a Subject made to see Truth as 't is to Deny the First Principle what it is or It is Impossible a Thing should be and not be at once Corol. I. Hence such Men are convinc'd to bely their own knowledge to be False to themselves Self-condemn'd highly Passionate Prejudic'd and Govern'd by meer Will that is to be blindly Willful which is the Greatest and most Unnatural Depravation that a Spiritual or Knowing Nature is capable of Wherefore they are Justly held to be disposed for any Ill that a Depraved Soul can desire Which ought to make every prudent Man wary in his Conversing or Negotiating with them if he cannot well avoid them totally since having renounced the Conduct of Evident Reason no Reason can manage them nor the wisest Man give any guess at what they will do or whether the blind Impulse of Ungovernable Passion will hurry them 6. Whatever Allowance may be made for Weak or Ignorant People there can be no Excuse for a Learned Man if he Assents upon a Common or Inconclusive Medium Because there can be no Necessity Imaginable that can compel him to Interiour Assent as perhaps there may be to force him to Outward Actions in regard God has given us a Faculty of Suspending our Assent till we see Evidence lest our Weakness or Carelessness should at every turn precipitate us into Error 7. From what has been said 't is seen that Common Mediums can at most but prove a thing Probable or likely to be which may consist with it's not-being or being False The Former part is prov'd because Proper Mediums only make the Conclusion Certain and therefore such as these can only render it Probable or Likely The Second part is prov'd by every days Experience which shows us how often we are Deceiv'd in Likelihoods or Probabilities even though Great ones and that the Contrary frequently happens to what such slight Grounds made us expect 8. When those who are Invincibly Ignorant do assent upon such Common Mediums it leaves no Note upon them more than that of Weakness and Ignorance For since such Men do as is suppos'd use the best of their Understanding their Erring does not spring from the Obliquity or Byass of their Wills perverting their Light of Reason which secures their Morality Untainted 9. Tho' we ought not to Act thus Interiourly or Assent upon Inconclusive Mediums yet Probability is very often enough to make us act Exteriourly when those Actions are Necessary to be done even though they be subject to great hazard Thus Merchants venture their Effects to Sea even in the time of War because their State of life requires it yet even then they must have Evidence that 't is best to venture otherwise their Reason is some way Defective So that Humane Nature still Obliges all Men to Act upon some Evidence 10. In Cases of Conscience and Law-suits which are only Probable and in which Interest is concern'd the safest way is first to purge our Affections from Coveting that which is perhaps our Neighbours next not to trust to Casuists whom we apprehend to have Large Cases favourable to our Interest nor to make choice of a Lawyer who is a Crafty Knave but rather one who is reputed Honest so he be Intelligent For while we proceed thus the
Will and Conscience is kept Clear however the Decision of the matter may hap to be Vnjust 11. Thus far of Opinion FAITH or Belief speaking of Human Faith to which our Circumstances determin our Discourse is built on Human Testimony or Witnessing Authority To which ere we ought to yield Assent two things are Prerequisit viz. That we be Certain it could certainly know the things it Attests and that it speaks truly when it does Attest them that is there are requisit Knowlèdg and Veracity in the Attesters 12. If we certainly know that the Attesters knew the thing and did not only fancy they knew it it is most Certain the thing is so as they knew it to be For since to know a thing is to have the thing in our Understanding as it is in it self and none can know what is not Knowable or is not it follows that all Knowledg of the Thing 's Being or of it's being thus or thus does most certainly Infer that thing to be as the Asserters knew it to be 13. Care is to be had that the Attesters did truly Know the Thing and not only fancy they knew it when they knew it not For since Mankind is often deceiv'd in thinking they know and only True Knowledg in the Attesters can ground our Second-hand Knowledg that it is grounded on their Knowing it to be it follows that we must be sure those Attesters could not err in knowing that thing ere we can Rationally beleive them 14. Wherefore no Testimony built on their Knowing Speculative Points can have any force upon our Understanding or Oblige it to Belief For since we experience that even Learned Men do often err in their Speculations either thro' Inadvertency the Obscurity or Perplexedness of the Object Ambiguity of Words Dread of some Authority which over-aws their Reason or lastly thro' want of Logick or a Right Method how to manage their Thoughts It follows that we cannot be Sure that they do not err or that they do truly know Speculative Points nor consequently can we be Certain that the thing is truly so as they pretend to know it is All the power they have over us is to make us prudently wary not to oppose such Speculaters but upon Evident Reason especially if they be many and of Repute but much more if they pretend to go upon Intrinsical Mediums in which the Mistake is both seldom and quickly discover'd if brought to the Test. Corol. II. Hence no Credit at all is to be given to such Reasoners who do not so much as pretend to Demonstrate tho never so many For such men do not so much as affirm themselves to be Knowers or that the thing is Certainly so as they deem it to be and so they can have no kind of Authority even tho' their Speculative thoughts were a thing Attestable Whence we may establish this Maxim viz. That No Reasoner precisely as such has any kind of Authority but by virtue of the Reason he produces that is the Reason which he alledges and not his Saying or Word ought to have any force at all upon our Understanding 15. Wherefore Testimony has for it's Object either Particular things or Matters of Fact necessarily knowable by Mankind using their Common and Frequent Sensations or relying on Vnerrable Experience For since Vniversal Notions are the Object of Speculation and men may err in their Speculations Vniversals cannot be the Objects of Witnessing Authority or Testimony but Particulars only Again since every Particular is not obvious to Sense but many of them are so Circumstanc'd Insensible or Remote that we can have no Certain Experience of them it follows that only suâ—h Particular Objects or Matters of Fact as make a lively and Certain Impression on the Senses are those which can be Attested or be the Object of Testimony 16. Experience may be so Circumstanced that it is Impossible the thing Experienced should be otherwise For since the Senses of Mankind in due circumstances are as apt to convey sincere Impressions of Sensible Objects into our Minds as other Natural Causes to produce their Effects they being design'd and fitted by God and Nature for that end it follows that if other Circumstances be agreeaable it is Impossible but they should give us such Experiential Knowledg of Sensible Matters of Fact or Particulars as may assure us of the things being as we Experience it The Circumstances requir'd to this Absolute Assurance is that the Object propos'd be of a thing Subject to Sense that it be within a Convenient Distance and that the Iâ—pression be not hindred or perverted by an Inconvenient Medium Hence we can be absolutely Certain what House or Street we live in of our Acquaintance or Employment who reigns in such a year and of Notable Actions Universally Knowable that happen'd in such or such a time lastly of Multitudes of Private Actions familiarly known to our selves only 17. Besides Knowledg in the Attester there is also requisit Veracity in him to ground Human Faith For let the Attester know the Object never so well if we cannot be Certain he tells us True when he sayes he knows it his Original Knowledg cannot have any Effect on us or beget a Second-hand Knowledg in us derivable from his Pretended Knowledg of that Object 18. No Authority deserves Assent farther then Reason gives it to deserve For let us take two Authorities one that of a whole Town the other of a Knight of the Post and since our Nature allows us that Privilege let it be ask'd why the Latter is not to be credited as much as the Former and the answer will be For such a Reason So that Reason in Common is the Ground of our Believing at all as well as of our believing one Authority rather than Another And this because Reason is our Nature given us by GOD and therefore every Act of our Soul that is not for some Reason and according to Reason is totally without Reason that is Unnatural that is Irrational that is Brutal or Unbecoming a Man 19. Wherefore no Man can be oblig'd to believe beyond the Motive he has to believe For that degree of Belief that is beyond the Motive or the Reason as far as it is beyond the Reason is Evidently without Reason or Irrational Whence follows that our Reason is to give us our Grounds of Belief both as to the Knowledg and the Veracity of the Attesters For otherwise our Belief would have no Reason at all for the Grounds it is to rely upon and so would be perfectly Irrational Corol. III. Wherefore since God governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has given them he does not Command us to Assent absolutely upon any Authority which may either be Deceiv'd or Deceive us For otherwise men may be led into Errour by obeying GOD's Command that is since GOD laid that Command by GOD Himself 20. Wherefore both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters must be Knowable by Intrinsical
Gramarical Quibbles and it would do too much honour to them to spend labour to name them being too open of themselves to need Exposing Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this He that says you are an Animal says true but He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal Therefore He that says you are an Ass says true Where as has been particularly shown above the word Animal is taken in diverse Senses for in this Proposition Peter is an Animal it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind viz. Rational But in the Proposition An Ass is an Animal it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind viz. Irrational whence 't is no Syllogism because it has Four Terms 10. Of these Fallacies which are not grounded on the Ambiguity of the Words but are built on the Thing or the Sense the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Accidente which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes and not per se or out of its own Nature As Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad but ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth therefore ra-All Religion is bad The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both and to say that what breeds Stirs out of its own Nature is Bad but not that which breeds them Accidentally for otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad because the one sometimes helps to commit Murther and the other causes Drunkenness But the more Solid way and which bears up best to Logical Grounds is to deny it to be a Syllogism because though the Form of it be Legitimate yet the Matter or the Middle Term is not so For a Syllogism being a Speech contriv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises so as by Connexion of the Medium with the Extremes we may know it to be Certainly True for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant it follows that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Extremes or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it neither of which it can be if it be but Accidentally belonging to them We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Remote ones or such as beget Opinion For between Religion and Commotions intervene Perversity of will Disregard of Virtue Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground Pride and Faction against Church Governours who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties Interest c. All which or some if not most of them are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention at least nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self the Principles of which do Oblige men to the preservation of Peace and Unity 11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi which in easier Language is the attempting to prove what 's not in question or putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds when they object to others what they neither held nor thought that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right and by Agreeing before-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd as was recommended in the second and third Rule Or if this be not done before the Dispute begins it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum and forcing the Adversary weary with aiming his blows amiss to recur to the true point and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet which was his only Duty and ought to have been done at first 12. The Third is Begging the Question or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd Which is manifestly faulty For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion which they cannot be if the Proof in whole or in part is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusion it self as it must be if it is barely Suppos'd and begg'd gratis Of which Fallacy therefore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philosophy is Guilty as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts as follows here 13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division which happens wâ—en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated or that it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd when perhaps there is Another way how that thing may be done which was never assign'd but either Unthought of or Neglected As if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum or by the Impression of so much Motion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD and his Continuing it ever since when as a third way may be assign'd viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes and all along Continues the Motion of the first-moved Bodies which move the rest This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action and by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate 14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa That is in plain terms the bringing a Medium that does not Conclude or the pretending the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it This Fallacy if it must be call'd so happens chiefly to Experimental Philosophers who going by meer Induction and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature a priori to guide their Thoughts by but Hypothetical ones only do hence refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes whence every man who sets up a new Scheme does still assign new Reasons or Causes according to which he strives to Explicate Nature and into which he endeavours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it But why this should be call'd a Fallacy I cannot comprehend At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy For since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion whoever argues ill argues Fallaciously and assigns a wrong Cause by producing an Incompetent Medium But in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant it is then enough to deny it and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground as was pretended 15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what 's taken in a Divided sense as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense Example of the Former is this He that is actually sitting may Walk Peter is actually sitting therefore Peter actually sitting or while he sits may walk Where the Major is False unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively and mean that he who sits
to the Wall And if the words Extrinsically Chang'd have not this meaning they can have no Sense but are altogether Inexplicable To be Cloath'd is an Extrinsical Denomination to the man on whom Cloaths are put But then the Cloaths suffer an Intrinsical Change of their Figure and perhaps their Quantity by being fitted and acomodated to the Body of that man and the Air suffers the same while the Action or Motion of Cloathing is perform'd To be Mov'd Locally is an Extrinsical Denomination to the Body that is Moved but then Local Motion being a Division of the Medium through which that Motion is made there is an Intrinsical Change in the Medium Divided and a New Continuity of the parts of the thing Moved to New parts of the Medium is acquir'd which is a Quantitative and therefore an Intrinsical Mutation whence the Extrinsical Denomination of Moved accrues to the Moved Body Besides it is scarce possible in Nature where there can be no Action without some Degree of Reaction but the Body it self that is Moved must undergo some small Change But now in the Scheme of Epicurus his Philosophy all things are quite otherwise since neither the Vacuum nor the Atoms and he puts nothing else even according to his own Doctrin are in the least degree Capable of Change Wherefore he is convinced to Deny this Self-evident Maxim Idem manens idem semper facit idem while he must affirm that there can be a New Effect viz. that New Notion and Denomination without any Novelty or Change in the Cause or the Thing that is he must put a New Effect without any New Cause or which is the same an Effect without a Cause 18. But leaving him and turning our Discourse to our Modern Corpuscularians the Cartesians These Philosophers tell us the Particles of their Maâ—ter are Crumbled or Shattered by Rubbing against one another Wherefore their Matter and each Part of it was One Thing before it was Moved and now is by Motion become Many Things Nor can it be deny'd but that All of them were Entities before their Motion since both that Whole Mass of Matter and each of the first Divided Parts were antecedently to the Division Capable of Existing apart and pre-suppos'd to the Division as the Subject of it Wherefore both that Whole Bulk of Matter and each of those Parts by losing their Vnity did eo ipso lose their Entity too and consequently the respective Forms that constituted them such Entities which is the Greatest Formal and Intrinsical Mutation that can be and far Greater even by their own Doctrin than could be made afterwards according to any Accident or Modification of those foresaid Entities 19. Again since Motion cannot be made in an Instant that Mass of Matter must be granted to have been Created that is to have had Being antecedently in Priority of Nature to Motion Wherefore it had in that Instant some kind of Intrinsecal Nature and somewhat in it which made it to be of that Nature Hence I argue thus that Nature and the Form that constituted it is either Lost when it came to be Divided and then it was Intrinsecally and Formally Chang'd Or else it retain'd that Nature after it was Divided and then 't is Manifest that that Mass was Diminisht that is Chang'd according to its Extension in regard the Greater Extension of that Original Mass was now made Less and yet was Vnchang'd according to its Nature Let them take which of these they please they must unavoidably yield there was Formal Mutation in the former case of its Essence in the Later of its Extension and a Formal Divisibilâ—ty in it either of its Form from its Matter or of its Extension from its Nature or Essence in regard it was by Motion Chang'd according to the One and not according to the Other But now in case they make as they do Extension to be the Essential Form of that Matter Formal Mutation is made more Unavoidable and must be granted even by themselves 20. To understand the force of this Demonstration more Clearly it is to be noted that the Cartesians do not make their First Matter to be only an Abstracted Conception of an Ens or Body as it has in it a Power to have a Form and so to be a Thing as the Aristotelians do for which reason they rightly and acutely Define or rather Describe it as thus Abstracted by our consideration to be Neque Quid neque Quantum neque Quale neque aliquod aliud eorum quibus Ens determinatur in regard that as thus consider'd 't is a meer Power to be any of them or all of them that is none of them Actually But they put their first Matter to be Inform'd otherwise they could not put it to have Extension in it which must necessarily be granted to be a Form either Essentially Constituting it or some Accident or Modification of some Thing that has a Substantial Form Whence they must hold that their First Matter is an Ens or Compleat Thing that is Compleatly Capable of Existing which appears farther by its Terminating the Action of Creation the peculiar Effect of which is to give Actual Being which concludes it to have been Compleat under the Notion of Ens since it is Self-evident that that cannot Actually be which is not Capable to be that is which is not an Ens. This Note reflected on it is manifest it must have a Nature of its own and Somewhat in it to constitute that Nature or some Essential Form and so is Formally Mutable whether Extension be that Form or no as is deduced by our Argument § 19. 21. To come up closer to them and enforce the Evidence of our Argument to a Nonplusage of their Cause we ask Of what kind of Consistency was that Original Matter into which GOD according to them did infuse the first Motion and so Divided it The very Terms tells us that it must have been of it's own Nature either Easie or Hard to be Divided nor do we ask the precise Degree Let them say 't is either One or the Other or a Middle Degree between both we are so reasonable it shall serve the turn It being then indifferent to our Question in this perfect silence of theirs we will gâ—ess as well as we can at what they should say as most congruous to their Doctrin and so we will suppose it to be Dense We enquire next in what consists this Modification or Affection of it call'd Density or how they will explicate it Motion had not yet begun in that Instant in which it first was by the Means of which they put all Qualities and this amongst the rest to be Produced If they should say which yet I do not read they do nor so much as speak of it as 't is found in their First Matter that it consists in the Rest of it's Parts 'T is reply'd first that that Matter has as yet no Parts for these are made by
have an Entitative Union but by being join'd together as Act and Power that is as Matter and Form which are the Potential Parts of an Ens and therefore are apt to compound One Ens in regard neither of them is a Thing Actually 32. And indeed if we look more narrowly into the Doctrin of the Deniers of Formal Mutation the Antiperipateticks we shall find that they have Perplex't and render'd Obscure the most Common Easie Obvious Useful and Necessary Notion which Mankind has or can have viz. the Notion of a Thing For I cannot discern that they make their First Mass of Matter to be One Natural Thing unless they fancy it to be a kind of Idea Platonica of Body existing Indeterminately or in Common For they put the Form of it to be Extension and they make this Extension to be Indeterminate that is not-Particular that is to be Extension in Common Nor can we learn of them what kind of Thing it is more than that it is barely thus Extended Which tells us indeed that it has Quantity but gives us no light of it's Intrinsecal Nature or Entity that is they never explicate to us of what nature that thing is which is Extended And what man living can conceive a Body which has neither Figure or Colour Density or Rarity Heat or Cold Hardness or Softness in it but meerly Extension Again I cannot see that they put those little Particles made by Motion out of that Matter to be Natural Things tho' they do Actually and Distinctly exist in Nature because they make them Principia or Elementa Rerum Naturalium and the Elements of which Things are made can no more with good Sense be called Things than Letters which are the Elements of Words can be said to be Words The Compound made up of those Particles they do indeed expresly own to be a Thing but by making it consist of Many Things I mean those Particles each of which has a peculiar Actual Existence of its own and which are not United or made One according to the Notion of Ens but only according to the Notion of some Accident which is Extrinsecal to the Notion of Ens and differs from it toto genere they cannot with any show of Reason call such a Compound A Thing or One Thing Whence according to their Hypothesis we can have no Clear Light what is to be called a Thing or what the word Thing means As for our Four Elements which perhaps they will object they either are found Pure and out of the Compound and then having an Actual Existence of their own they are truly Things Or they do not and then they are Potential parts of the Compound in which they are which and only which Exists by One Actual Existence which shows it to be One Thing and not by Many as their Compound does which makes it Many Things at least such Things as they will allow those Elements or Particles to be 33. But to give them what Satisfaction we may without Injury to Truth and withal to Clear the true Aristotelian doctrin from the prejudices taken from the bad speculations of those School-men who make Accidents so many little Entities distinct from Substances we will confess that many of those Forms we call Qualities are Effluiums or Particles sent out from other Bodies which while they transiently affect that Body on which they light they retain their own Distinct Entities and are call'd the Particles or Vertue of the Emittent Body affecting another Body that is Passive from them But when they gain a Permanency there and by Continuity of Quantity or Similitude of Nature or any other Cause they come to be naturally Vnited to it and assist it in its Proper Operation they lose their Actual Entity and Unity which they had formerly and become a Potential Part of the Subject that was Passive from them and Exist and Subsist in it And because the Notion of Form is to be Receiv'd in the Subject or Matter and those Particles advene to it already Existing they are hence call'd Accidental Forms of it and either give it such an Alterableness as is agreeable to their nature as is seen in Passible Qualities or sometimes if they suit with the Primogenial Constitution of that Body they strengthen and belong to some Habit Disposition Power or Property of it and piece out as it were those Qualities and in some degree or other denominate the Subject thus or thus Qualify'd 34. But to make it yet more manifest how industriously the Cartesians do wave the giving any account of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they hold all their three Elements and consequently all Nature was made we will take notice of one prevarication of theirs more which does evidently bewray at what a plunge they are about it by omitting that Consideration which even by their own Doctrin was the Chiefest and most Necessary They affirm that Matter of theirs to have been Divided first by God into greater parts which again being moved or jumbled one against another did shave or wear off every small particles of several sorts of which their First Element was made Division then was the first and Principal Physical Action and that which most conduced to frame all Nature Nay in case there be no Vacuum as they grant there is not it is manifest that the First Motion and which was exercis'd Immediately upon their Matter as also all the following Motions exercis'd upon the said Matter was Division Now Divisibility of the Matter being the Proper Power that answers to the Act of Division or which is the same to Motion and withal directly speaking the nature of their Matter as apt to be wrought upon by those Causes how was it possible they should slip over that and regard only the Extension of it Divisibility is a Natural Notion and imports an Order to Natural Action whereas Extension is a dull sluggish Notion and meerly Mathematical that is it does Abstract from Action and Motion both For an Extended thing is never the more or less Extended whether it Moves or stands still but its whole Nature and Notion is taken up in affecting its own Subject or Extending it equally and all one whether it Acts or not acts But the reason of this willful neglect is this that tho' they grant it to have been Divided yet should they tell us it was thus Divisible Common Reason would lead us to pose them with asking whether it were Easily or Hardly Divisible that is Rare or Dense of which Qualities in their Matter antecedently to Motion and the Contexture of the particles made by that Motion their Principles can give no kind of account nor possibly explicate them 35. I am apt to think that they foresaw this Rub in their way which hindred the Currency of all their Doctrin of Physicks and seeing they could not remove it they very fairly let it alone Yet for a show they take notice of the Word but they