utter Exclusion of other Bodies out of the space it possesses But Hardness in a firm Cohesion of the parts of Matter making up masses of a sensible bulk so that the whole does not easily change its Figure And indeed Hard and Soft are as apprehended by us only relative Terms to the Constitutions of our Bodies that being generally call'd hard by us which will put us to Pain sooner than change Figure by the pressure of any part of our Bodies and that on the contrary soft which changes the Situation of its parts upon an easie and unpainful touch But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves or of the Figure of the whole gives no more Solidity to the hardest Body in the World than to the softest nor is an Adamant one jot more solid than Water For though the two flat sides of two pieces of Marble will more easily approach each other between which there is nothing but Water or Air than if there be an Adamant between them yet it is not that the parts of the Adamant are more solid than those of Water or resist more but because the parts of Water being more easily separable from each other they will by a side motion be more easily removed and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble But if they could be kept from making Place by that side-motion they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of Marble as much as the Diamond and 't would be as impossible by any force to surmount their Resistance as to surmount the Resistance of the parts of a Diamond The softest Body in the World will as invinâ—ibly resist the coming together of any two other Bodies if it be not put out of the way but remain between them as the hardest that can be found or imagined He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well with Air or Water will quickly find its Resistance And he that thinks that nothing but Bodies that are hard can keep his Hands from approaching one another may be pleased to make an Experiment with the Air inclosed in a Football § 5. By this Idea of Solidity is the Extension of Body distinguished from the Extension of Space The Extension of Body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid separable moveable Parts and the Extension of Space the continuity of unsolid inseparable and immoveable Parts Vpon the Solidity of Bodies also depends their mutual impulse Resistance and Protrusion Of pure Space then and Solidity there are several amongst which I confess my self one who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct Ideas and that they can think on Space without any thing in it that resists or is protruded by Body whereof they think they have as clear an Idea as of the Extension of Body the Idea of the distance between the opposite Parts of a concave Superficies being equally as clear without as with the Idea of any solid Parts between and on the other side That they have the Idea of something that fills space that can be protruded by the impulse of other Bodies or resist their Motion If there be others that have not these two Ideas distinct but confound them and make but one of them I know not how Men who have the same Idea under different Names or different Ideas under the same Name can in that case talk with one another any more than a Man who not being blind or deaf has distinct Ideas of the Colour of Scarlet and the sound of a Trumpet could discourse concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man I mention in another Place who phansied that the Idea of Scarlet was like the sound of a Trumpet § 6. If any one ask me What this Solidity is I send him to his Senses to inform him Let him put a Flint or a Foot-ball between his Hands and then endeavour to join them and he will know If he thinks this not a sufficient Explication of Solidity what it is and wherein it consists I promise to tell him what it is and wherein it consists when he tells me what thinking is or wherein it consists or explain to me what Extension or Motion is which perhaps seems much easier The simple Ideas we have such as experience teaches them us but if beyond that we endeavour by Words to make them clearer in the Mind we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's mind by talking and to discourse into him the Ideas of Light and Colours The Reason of this I shall shew in another Place CHAP. V. Of simple Ideas of divers Senses THe Ideas we get by more than one Sense are of Space or Extension Figure Rest and Motion For these make perceivable impressions both on the Eyes and Touch and we can receive and convey into our Minds the Ideas of the Extension Figure Motion and Rest of Bodies both by seeing and feeling But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place I here only enumerate them CHAP. VI. Of simple Ideas of Reflection § 1. THe Mind receiving the Ideas mentioned in the foregoing Chapter from without when it turns its view inward upon its self and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has takes from thence other Ideas which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation as of any of those it received from foreign things § 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind which are most frequently considered and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of in himself are these two Perception or Thinking and Volition or Willing The power in the Mind of producing these Actions we denominate Faculties and are called the Vnderstanding and the Will Of some of the modes of these simple Ideas of Reflection such as are Remembrance Discerning Reasoning Iudging Knowledge Faith c. I shall have occasion to speak hereafter CHAP. VII Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection § 1. THere be other simple Ideas which convey themselves into the Mind by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection viz. Pleasure or Delight and its opposite Pain or Vneasiness Power Existence Vnity § 2. Delight or Vneasiness one or other of them join themselves to almost all our Ideas both of Sensation and Reflection And there is scarce any affection of our Senses from without any retired thought of our Mind within which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain By Pleasure and Pain I would be understood to signifie whatsoever delights or molests us whether it arises from the thoughts of our Minds or any thing operating on our Bodies For whether we call it Satisfaction Delight Pleasure Happiness c. on the one side or Uneasiness Trouble Pain Torment Anguish Misery c. on the other they are still but different degrees of the same thing and belong to the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain
since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its Ideas and the flames of a Fever in a few days calcines all those Images to dust and confusion which seem'd to be as lasting as if carved in Marble § 6. But concerning the Ideas themselves it is easie to remark That those that are oftenest refreshed amongst which are those that are conveyed into the Mind by more ways than one by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them fix themselves best in the Memory and remain clearest and longest there and therefore those which are of the original Qualities of Bodies viz. Solidity Extension Figure Motion and Rest and those that almost constantly affect our Bodies as Heat and Cold and those which are the Affections of all kind of Beings as Existence Duration and Number which almost every Object that affects our Senses every Thought which imploys our Minds bring along with them These I say and the like Ideas are seldom quite lost whilst the Mind retains any Ideas at all § 7. In this secundary Perception as I may so call it or viewing again the Ideas that are lodg'd in the Memory the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive the appearance of those dormant Pictures depending sometimes on the Will The Mind very often sets it self on work in search of some hidden Idea and turns as it were the Eye of the Soul upon it though sometimes too they start up in our Minds of their own accord and offer themselves to the Understanding and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark Cells into open Day-light by some turbulent and tempestuous Passion our Affections bringing Ideas to our Memory which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded § 8. Memory in an intellectual Creature is necessary in the next degree to Perception It is of so great moment that where it is wanting all the rest of our Faculties are in a great measure useless And we in our Thoughts Reasonings and Knowledge could not proceed beyond present Objects were it not for the assistance of our Memories wherein there may be two defects First That it loses the Idea quite and so far it produces perfect Ignorance For since we can know nothing farther than we have the Ideas of it when they are gone we are in perfect ignorance Secondly That it moves slowly and retrieves not the Ideas that it has and are laid up in store quick enough to serve the Mind upon occasions This if it be to a great degree is Stupidity and he who through this default in his Memory has not the Ideas that are really preserved there ready at hand when need and occasion calls for them were almost as good be without them quite since they serve him to little purpose The dull Man who loses the opportunity whilst he is seeking in his Mind for those Ideas that should serve his turn is not much more happy in his Knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant 'T is the business therefore of the Memory to furnish to the Mind those dormant Ideas which it has present occasion for and in the having them ready at hand on all occasions consists that which we call Invention Fancy and quickness of Parts § 9. This faculty of laying up and retaining the Ideas that are brought into the Mind several other Animals seem to have to a great degree as well as Man For to pass by other instances Birds learning of Tunes and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the Notes right put it past doubt with me that they have Perception and retain Ideas in their Memories and use them for Patterns For it seems to me impossible that they should endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes as 't is plain they do of which they had no Ideas For tho' I should grant Sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal Spirits in the Brains of those Birds whilst the Tune is actually playing and that motion may be continued on to the Muscles of the Wings and so the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises because this may tend to the Birds preservation yet that can never be supposed a Reason why it should cause mechanically either whilst the Tune was playing much less after it has ceased such a motion in the Organs of the Bird's voice as should conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound which imitation can be of no use to the Birds preservation But which is more it cannot with any appearance of Reason be suppos'd much less proved that Birds without Sense and Memory can approach their Notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a Tune play'd yesterday which if they have no Idea of in their Memory is now no-where nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate or which any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to Snce there is no reason why the sound of a Pipe should leave traces in their Brains which not at first but by their after-endeavours should produce the like Sounds and why the Sounds they make themselves should not make traces which they should follow as well as those of the Pipe is impossible to conceive CHAP. XI Of Discerning and other Operations of the Mind § 1. ANother Faculty we may take notice of in our Minds is that of Discerning and distinguishing between the several Ideas it has It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general Unless the Mind had a distinct perception of different Objects and their Qualities it would be capable of very little Knowledge though the Bodies that affect us were as busie about us as they are now and the Mind were continually employ'd in thinking On this faculty of Distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several even very general Propositions which have passed for innate Truths because Men over-looking the true cause why those Propositions find universal assent impute it wholly to native uniform Impressions whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning Faculty of the Mind whereby it perceives two Ideas to be the same or different But of this more hereafter § 2. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating Ideas one from another lies either in the dulness or faults of the Organs of Sense or want of accuteness exercise or attention in the Understanding or hastiness and precipitancy natural to some Tempers I will not here examine It suffices to take notice that this is one of the Operations that the Mind may reflect on and observe in it self It is of that consequence to its other Knowledge that so far as this faculty is in it self dull or not rightly made use of for the distinguishing one thing from another so far our Notions are confused and our Reason and Judgment disturbed or misled If in having our Ideas in the Memory ready at hand consists quickness of parts in this of having them unconfused and being able nicely to distinguish one thing
simple Ideas which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge yet having treated of them there rather in the way that they come into the Mind than as distinguished from others more compounded it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this Consideration and examine those different Modifications of the same Idea which the Mind either finds in things existing or is able to make within it self without the help of any extrinsical Object or any foreign Suggestion Those Modifications of any one simple Idea which as has been said I call simple Modes are as perfectly different and distinct Ideas in the Mind as those of the greatest distance or contrariety For the Idea of Two is as distinct from Three as Blueness from Heat or either of them from any Number and yet they are made up only of that simple Idea of an Unite repeated and these Repetitions joined together make those distinct simple Modes of a Dozen a Gross a Million § 2. I shall begin with the simple Idea of Space I have shewed above c. 4. that we get the Idea of Space both by our Sight and Touch which I think is so evident that it would be as needless to go to prove that Men perceive by their Sight a distance between Bodies of different Colours or between the parts of the same Body as that they see Colours themselves Nor is it less obvious that they can do so in the Dark by Feeling and Touch. § 3. This Space considered barely in length between any two Beings without considering any thing else between them is called distance If considered in Length Breadth and Thickness I think it may be called Capacity When considered between the extremities of Matter which fills the Capacity of Space with something solid tangible and movable it is properly called Extension And so Extension is an Idea belonging to Body only but Space may as is evident be considered without it At least I think it most intelligible and the best way to avoid Confusion if we use the Word Extension for an Affection of Matter or the distance of the Extremities of particular solid Bodies and Space in the more general Signification for distance with or without solid Matter possessing it § 4. Each different distance is a different Modification of Space and each Idea of any different distance or Space is a simple Mode of this Idea Men having by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of Space which they use for measuring of other distances as a Foot a Yard or a Fathom a League or Diametre of the Earth made those Ideas familiar to their Thoughts can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will without mixing or joining to them the Idea of Body or any thing else and frame to themselves the Ideas of long square or cubick Feet Yards or Fathoms here amongst the Bodies of the Universe or else beyond the utmost Bounds of all Bodies and by adding these still one to another enlarge their Idea of Space as much as they please This Power of repeating or doubling any Idea we have of any distance and adding it to the former as often as we will without being ever able to come to any stop or stint let us enlarge it as much as we will is that which gives us the Idea of Immensity § 5. There is another Modification of this Idea of Space which is nothing but the Relation of the Parts of the Termination of Capacity or Extension amongst themselves This the Touch discovers in sensible Bodies whose Extremities come within our reach and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours whose Boundaries are within its view Where observing how the Extremities terminate either in streight Lines which meet at discernible Angles or in crooked Lines wherein no Angles can be perceived by considering these as they relate to one another in all Parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space it has that Idea we call Figure which affords to the Mind infinite Vatiety For besides the vast Number of different Figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of Matter the Stock that the Mind has in its Power by varying the Idea of Space and thereby making still new Compositions by repeating its own Ideas and joining them as it pleases is perfectly inexhaustible And so it can multiply Figures in infinitum § 6. For the Mind having a Power to repeat the Idea of any length directly stretched out and join it to another in the same Direction which is to double the length of that streight Line or else join it to another with what Inclination it thinks fit and so make what sort of Angle it pleases And being able also to shorten any Line it imagines by taking from it ½ or ¼ or what part it pleases without being able to come to an end of any such Divisions it can make an Angle of any bigness So also the Lines that are its sides of what length it pleases which joining again to other Lines of different lengths and at different Angles till it has wholly inclosed any Space it is evident that it can multiply Figures both in their Shape and Capacity in infinitum all which are but so many different simple Modes of Space The same that it can do with streight Lines it can do also with crooked or crooked and streight together and the same it can do in Lines it can also in Superficies by which we may be led into farther Thoughts of the endless Variety of Figures that the Mind has a Power to make and thereby to multiply the simple Modes of Space § 7. Another Idea coming under this Head and belonging to this Tribe is that we call Place As in simple Space we consider the relation of Distance between any two Bodies or Points so in our Idea of Place we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any thing and any two or more Points which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another and so considered as at rest for when we find any thing at the same distance now which it was Yesterday from any two or more Points which have not since changed their distance one with another and with which we then compared it we say it hath kept the same Place But if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those Points we say it hath changed its Place Though vulgarly speaking in the common Notion of Place we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise Points but larger Portions of sensible Objects to which we consider the thing placed to bear Relation and its distance from which we have some Reason to observe § 8. Thus a Company of Chess-men standing on the same squares of the Chess-board where we left them we say they are all in the same Place or unmoved though perhaps the Chess-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one Room into another because we compared them only to
Ideas that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other and to apply them right is I suppose that which is called Sagacity § 4. This Knowledge by intervening Proofs though it be certain yet the Evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright nor the assent so ready as in intuitive Knowledge For though in Demonstration the Mind does at last perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas it considers yet 't is not without Pains and Attention There must be more than one transient view to find it A steddy application and pursuit is required to this Discovery And there must be a Progression by steps and degrees before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need Proofs and the Use of Reason to shew it § 5. Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative Knowledge is that though in the latter all doubt be removed when by the Intervention of the intermediate Ideas the Agreement or Disagreement is perceived yet before the Demonstration there was a doubt which in intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind that has its Faculty of Perception left to a degree capable of distinct Ideas no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye that can distinctly see White and Black Whether this Ink and this Paper be all of a Colour If there be Sight in the Eyes it will at first glimpse without Hesitation perceive the Words printed on this Paper different from the Colour of the Paper And so if the Mind have the Faculty of distinct Perception it will perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas that produce intuitive Knowledge If the Eyes have lost the Faculty of seeing or the Mind of perceiving we in vain enquire after the quickness of Sight in one or clearness of Perception in the other § 6. 'T is true the Perception produced by demonstration is also very clear but yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the Object it produces a Knowledge but 't is still every reflection with a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinctness which is in the first till in many removes it has a great mixture of Dimness and is not at first Sight so knowable especially to weak Eyes Thus it is with Knowledge made out by a long train of Proofs § 7. Now in every step Reason makes in demonstrative Knowledge there is an intuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate Idea which it uses as a Proof For if it were not so that yet would need a Proof Since without the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement there is no Knowledge produced If it be perceived by it self it is intuitive Knowledge If it cannot be perceived by it self there is need of some intervening Idea as a common measure to shew their Agreement or Disagreement by which it is plain that every step in Reasoning that produces Knowledge has intuitive Certainty which when the Mind perceives there is no more required but to remember it to make the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas concerning which we enquire visible and certain So that to make any thing a Demonstration it is necessary to perceive the immediate Agreement of the intervening Ideas whereby the Agreement or Disagreement of the two Ideas under Examination where the one is always the first and the other the last in the Account is found This intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate Ideas in each Step and Progression of the Demonstration must also be carried exactly in the Mind and a Man must be sure that no part is left out which because in long Deductions and the use of many Proofs the Memory does not always so readily and exactly retain therefore it comes to pass that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledge and Men embrace often Falshoods for Demonstrations § 8. The necessity of this intuitive Knowledge in each step of scientifical or demonstrative Reasoning gave occasion I imagine to that mistaken Axiom that all Reasoning was ex praecognitis praeconcessis which how far it is a mistake I shall have occasion to shew more at large where I come to consider Propositions and particularly those Propositions which are called Maxims and to shew that 't is by a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our Knowledge and Reasonings § 9. It is not only Mathematicks or the Ideas alone of Number Extension and Figure that are capable of Demonstration no more than it is these Ideas alone and their Modes that are capable of Intuition For whatever Ideas we have wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement or Disagreement that is between them there the Mind is capable of intuitive Knowledge and where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas by an intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any intermediate Ideas there the Mind is capable of Demonstration which is not limited to Ideas of Extension or Figure or Number or their Modes § 10. The Reason why it has been generally sought for and supposed to be only in those I imagine has been not only the general usefulness of those Sciences But because in comparing their Equality or Excess the Modes of Numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable And though in Extension every the least Excess is not so perceptible yet the Mind has found out ways to examine and discover demonstratively the just Equality of two Angles or Extensions or Figures and both these i. e. Numbers and Figures can be set down by visible and lasting marks § 11. But in other simple Ideas whose Modes and differences are made and counted by degrees and not quantity we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences as to perceive or find ways to measure their just Equality or the least Differences For those other simple Ideas being Appearances or Sensations produced in us by the Size Figure Number and Motion of minute Corpuscles singly insensible their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some or all of those Causes which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived it is impossible for us to have any exact Measures of the different degrees of these simple Ideas For supposing the Sensation or Idea we name Whiteness be produced in us by a certain number of Globules which having a verticity about their own Centres strike upon the Retina of the Eye with a certain degree of Rotation as well as progressive Swiftness it will hence easily follow that the more the superficial parts of any Body are so
I be in one which I leave to be consider'd by those who with me dispose themselves to embrace Truth where-ever they find it § 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain Principles both Speculative and Practical for they speak of both universally agreed upon by all Mankind which therefore they argue must needs be the constant Impressions which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings and which they bring into the World with them as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties § 3. This Argument drawn from Vniversal Consent has this Misfortune in it That if it were true in matter of Fact that there were certain Truths wherein all Mankind agreed it would not prove them innate if there can be any other way shewn how Men may come to that Universal Agreement in the things they do consent in which I presume may be done § 4. But which is worse this Argument of universal Consent which is made use of to prove innate Principles seems to me a Demonstration that there are none such because there are none to which all Mankind give an universal Assent I shall begin with the Speculative and instance in those magnified Principles of Demonstration Whatsoever it is and 'T is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be which of all others I think have the most allow'd Title to innate These have so setled a Reputation of Maxims universally received that 't will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it But yet I take liberty to say That these Propositions are so far from having an universal Assent that there are a great Part of Mankind to whom they are not so much as known § 5. For first 't is evident that all Children and Ideots have not the least Apprehension or Thought of them and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal Assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate Truths it seeming to me near a Contradiction to say that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul which it perceives or understands not imprinting if it signifie any thing being nothing else but the making certain Truths to be perceived For to imprint any thing on the Mind without the Mind 's perceiving it seems to me hardly intelligible If therefore Children and Ideots have Souls have Minds with those Impressions upon them they must unavoidably perceive them and necessarily know and assent to these Truths which since they do not it is evident that there are no such Impressions For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted How can they be innate And if they are Notions imprinted How can they be unknown To say a Notion is imprinted on the Mind and yet at the same time to say that the Mind is ignorant of it and never yet took notice of it is to make this Impression nothing No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind which it never yet knew which it was never yet conscious of For if any one may then by the same Reason all Propositions that are true and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to may be said to be in the Mind and to be imprinted Since if any one can be said to be in the Mind which it never yet knew it must be only because it is capable of knowing it and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know Nay thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind which it never did nor ever shall know for a man may live long and die at last in Ignorance of many Truths which his mind was capable of knowing and that with Certainty So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for all the Truths a Man ever comes to know will by this Account be every one of them innate and this great Point will amount to no more but only to a very improper way of speaking which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary says nothing different from those who deny innate Principles For no Body I think ever denied that the Mind was capable of knowing several Truths The Capacity they say is innate the Knowledge acquired But then to what end such contest for certain innate Maxims If Truths can be imprinted on the Understanding without being perceived I can see no difference there can be between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing in respect of their Original They must all be innate or all adventitious In vain shall a Man go about to distinguish them He therefore that talks of innate Notions in the Understanding cannot if he intend thereby any distinct sort of Truths mean such Truths to be in the Understanding as it never perceived and is yet fully ignorant of For if these Words to be in the Vnderstanding have any Propriety they signifie to be understood So that to be in the Understanding and not to be understood to be in the Mind and never to be perceived is all one as to say any thing is and is not in the Mind or Understanding If therefore these two Propositions Whatsoever is is and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be are by Nature imprinted Children cannot be ignorant of them Infants and all that have Souls must necessarily have them in their Understandings know the Truth of them and assent to it § 6. To avoid this 't is usually answer'd that all Men know and assent to them when they come to the use of Reason and this is enough to prove them innate I answer § 7. Doubtful Expressions that have scarce any signification go for clear Reasons to those who being prepossessed take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say For to apply this Answer with any tolerable Sence to our present Purpose it must signifie one of these two things either That as soon as Men come to the use of Reason these supposed native Inscriptions come to be known and observed by them Or else that the Use and Exercise of Men's Reasons assist them in the Discovery of these Principles and certainly make them known to them § 8. If they mean that by the Vse of Reason Men may discover these Principles and that this is sufficient to prove them innate their way of arguing will stand thus viz. That whatever Truths Reason can certainly discover to us and make us firmly assent to those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind since that universal Assent which is made the Mark of them amounts to no more but this That by the use of Reason we are capable to come to a certain Knowledge of and assent to them and by this Means there will be no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians and Theorems they deduce from them All must be equally allow'd innate they being all Discoveries made by the use of Reason and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know if he
a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary Tenets which are firmly believed confidently asserted and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their Blood And indeed if it be the privilege of innate Principles to be received upon their own Authority without examination I know not what may not be believed or how any ones Principles can be questioned If they may and ought to be examined and tried I desire to know how first and innate Principles can be tried or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters whereby the genuine innate Principles may be distinguished from others that so amidst the great variety of Pretenders I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this When this is done I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful Propositions and till then I may with modesty doubt since I fear universal Consent which is the only one produced will scare prove a sufficient mark to direct my Choice and assure me of any innate Principles From what has been said I think it is past doubt that there are no practical Principles wherein all Men agree and therefore none innate CHAP. IV. Other Considerations concerning innate Principles both speculative and practical § 1. HAD those who would perswade us that there are innate Principles not taken them together in gross but considered separately the parts out of which those Propositions are made they would not perhaps have been so forward to believe they were innate Since if the Idea's which made up those Truths were not it was impossible that the Propositions made up of them should be innate or our Knowledge of them be born with us For if the Idea's be not innate there was a time when the Mind was without those Principles and then they will not be innate but be derived from some other Original For where the Idea's themselves are not there can be no Knowledge no Assent no Mental or Verbal Propositions about them § 2. If we will attently consider new born Children we shall have little Reason to think that they bring many Idea's into the World with them For bating perhaps some faint Idea's of Hunger and Thirst and Warmth and some Pains which they may have felt in the Womb there is not the least appearance of any setled Idea's at all in them especially of Idea's answering the Terms which make up those universal Propositions that are esteemed innate Principles One may perceive how by degrees afterwards Idea's come into their Minds and that they get no more nor no other than what Experience and the Observation of things that come in their way furnish them with which might be enough to satisfie us that they are not Original Characters stamped on the Mind § 3. It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be is certainly if there be any such an innate Principle But can any one think or will any one say that Impossibility and Identity are two innate Idea's Are they such as all Mankind have and bring into the World with them And are they those that are the first in Children and antecedent to all acquired ones If they are innate they must needs be so Hath a Child an Idea of Impossibility and Identity before it has of White or Black Sweet or Bitter And is it from the Knowledge of this Principle that it concludes that Wormwood rubb'd on the Nipple is not the same Taste that it used to receive from thence Is it the actual Knowledge of impossibile est idem esse non esse that makes a Child distinguish between its Mother and a Stranger or that makes it fond of the one and fly the other Or does the Mind regulate it self and its assent by Idea's that it never yet had Or the Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles which it never yet knew or understood The Names impossibility and Identity stand for two Idea's so far from being innate or born with us that I think it requires great Care and Attention to form them right in our Understandings They are so far from being brought into the World with us so remote from the thoughts of Infancy and Childhood that I believe upon Examination it will be found that many grown Men want them § 4. If Identity to instance in that alone be a native Impression and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our Cradles I would gladly be resolved by one of Seven or Seventy Years old Whether a Man being a Creature consisting of Soul and Body be the same Man when his Body is changed Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras having had the same Soul were the same Man tho' they lived several Ages asunder Nay Whether the Cock too which had the same Soul were not the same with both of them Whereby perhaps it will appear that our Idea of sameness is not so setled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us For if those innate Idea's are not clear and distinct so as to be universally known and naturally agreed on they cannot be the Subjects of universal and undoubted Truths but will be the unavoidable Occasion of perpetual Uncertainty For I suppose every ones Idea of Identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and Thousands others of his Followers have And which then shall be the true Which innate Or are there two different Idea's of Identity both innate § 5. Nor let any one think that the Questions I have here proposed about the Identity of Man are bare empty Speculations which if they were would be enough to shew That there was in the Understandings of Men no innate Idea of Identity He that shall with a little Attention reflect on the Resurrection and consider that Divine Justice shall bring to Judgment at the last Day the very same Persons to be happy or miserable in the other who did well or ill in this Life will find it perhaps not easie to resolve with himself what makes the same Man or wherein Identity consists And will not be forward to think he and every one even Children themselves have naturally a clear Idea of it § 6. Let us examine that Principle of Mathematicks viz. That the whole is bigger than a part This I take it is reckon'd amongst innate Principles I am sure it has as good a Title as any to be thought so which yet no Body can think it to be when he considers the Idea's it comprehends in it Whole and Part are perfectly Relative but the Positive Idea's to which they properly and immediately belong are Extension and Number of which alone Whole and Part are Relations So that if Whole and Part are innate Idea's Extension and Number must be so too it being impossible to have an Idea of a Relation without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs and in which it is founded Now Whether the Minds of Men have
naturally imprinted on them the Idea's of Extension and Number I leave to be considered by those who are the Patrons of innate Principles § 7. That God is to be worshipped is without doubt as great a Truth as any can enter into the mind of Man and deserves the first place amongst all practical Principles But yet it can by no means be thought innate unless the Idea's of God and Worship are innate That the Idea the Term Worship stands for is not in the Understanding of Children and a Character stamped on the Mind in its first Original I think will be easily granted by any one that considers how few there be amongst grown Men who have a clear and distinct Notion of it And I suppose there cannot be any thing more ridiculous than to say that Children have this practical Principle innate That God is to be worshipped and yet that they know not what that Worship of God is which is their Duty But to pass by this § 8. If any Idea can be imagin'd innate the Idea of God may of all others for many Reasons be thought so since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate Moral Principles without an innate Idea of a Deity Without a Notion of a Law-maker it is impossible to have a Notion of a Law and an Obligation to observe it Besides the Atheists taken notice of amongst the Ancients and left branded upon the Records of History hath not Navigation discovered in these latter Ages whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania in Brasil and the Caribee Islands c. amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God Nicolaus del Techo in literis ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conversione haec habet Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum Hominis animam significet nulla sacra habet nulla Idola Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum â—â— 70. And perhaps if we should with attention mind the Lives and Discourses of People not so far of we should have too much Reason to â—ear that many in more civilized Countries have no very strong and clear Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds and that the Complaints of Atheism made from the Pulpits are not without Reason And though only some profligate Wretches own it too barefacedly now yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others did not the fear of the Magistrate's Sword or their Neighbour's Censure tie up Peoples Tongues which were the Apprehensions of Punishment or Shame taken away would as openly proclaim their Atheism as their Lives do § 9. But had all Mankind every where a Notion of a God whereof yet History tells us the contrary it would not from thence follow that the Idea of him was innate For though no Nation were to be found without a Name and some few dark Notions of him yet that would not prove them to be natural Impressions on the Mind no more than the Names of Fire or the Sun Heat or Number do prove the Idea's they stand for to be innate because the Names of those things and the Idea's of them are so universally received and known amongst Mankind Nor on the contrary is the want of such a Name or the absence of such a Notion out of Men's Minds any Argument against the Being of a God any more than it would be a Proof that there was no Load-stone in the World because a great part of Mankind had neither a Notion of any such thing nor a Name for it or be any shew of Argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of Angels or intelligent Beings above us because we have no Idea's of such distinct species For Men being furnished with Words by the common Language of their own Countries can scarce avoid having some kind of Idea's of those things whose Names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them and if it carry with it the Notion of Excellency Greatness or something extraordinary if Apprehension and Concernment accompany it if the Fear of absolute and irresistible Power set it on upon the Mind the Idea is likely to sink deeper and spread the farther especially if it be such an Idea as is agreeable to the common light of Reason and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledge as that of a God is For the visible marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power appear so plainly in all the Works of the Creation that a rational Creature who will but seriously reflect on them cannot miss the discovery of a Deity And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the Minds of all that have but once heard of it is so great and carries such a weight of Thought and Communication with it that it seems stranger to me that a whole Nation of Men should be any where found so brutish as to want the Notion of a God than that they should be without any Notion of Numbers or Fire § 10. The Name of God being once mentioned in any part of the World to express a superior powerful wise invisible Being the suitableness of such a Notion to the Principles of common Reason and the Interest Men will always have to mention it often must necessarily spread it far and wide and continue it down to all Generations though yet the general reception of this Name and some imperfect and unsteady Notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of Mankind prove not the Idea to be innate but only that they who made the Discovery had made a right use of their Reason thought maturely of the Causes of things and traced them to their Original from whom other less considering People having once received so important a Notion it could not easily be lost again § 11. This is all could be inferr'd from the Notion of a God were it to be found universally in all the Tribes of Mankind and generally acknowledged by Men grown to maturity in all Countries For the generality of the acknowledging of a God as I imagine is extended no farther than that which if it be sufficient to prove the Idea of God innate will as well prove the Idea of Fire innate since I think it may truly be said That there is not a Person in the World who has a Notion of a God who has not also the Idea of Fire I doubt not but if a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island where no Fire was they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a thing nor Name for it how generally soever it were received and known in all the World besides and perhaps too their Apprehensions would be as far removed from any Name or Notion of a God till some one amongst them had imployed his Thoughts to enquire into the Constitution and Causes of things which would easily lead him to the Notion of a God which having once taught to others
the Parts of the Chess-board which keep the same distance one with another The Chess-board we also say is in the same Place it was if it remain in the same part of the Cabin though perhaps the Ship it is in sails all the while and the Ship is said to be in the same Place supposing it kept the same distance with the Parts of the neighbouring Land though perhaps the Earth hath turned round and so both Chess-men and Board and Ship have every one changed Place in respect of remoter Bodies which have kept the same distance one with another But yet the distance from certain Parts of the Board being that which determines the place of the Chess-men and the distance from the fixed parts of the Cabin with which we made the Comparison being that which determined the Place of the Chess-board and the fixed parts of the Earth that by which we determined the Place of the Ship these things may be said properly to be in the same Place in those respects Though their distance from some other things which in this matter we did not consider being varied they have undoubtedly changed Place in that respect and we our selves shall think so when we have occasion to compare them with those other § 9. But this Modification of Distance we call Place being made by Men for their common use that by it they might be able to design the particular Position of Things where they had occasion for such Designation Men consider and determine of this Place by reference to those adjacent things which best served to their present Purpose without considering other things which to another Purpose would better determine the Place of the same thing Thus in the Chess-board the use of the Designation of the Place of each Chess-men being determined only within that chequer'd piece of Wood 't would cross that Purpose to measure it by any thing else But when these very Chess-men are put up in a Bag if any one should ask where the black King is it would be proper to determine the Place by the parts of the Room it was in and not by the Chess-board there being another use of designing the Place it is now in than when in Play it was on the Chess-board and so must be determined by other Bodies So if any one should ask in what Place are the Verses which report the Story of Nisus and Eurialus 't would be very improper to determine this Place by saying they were in such a part of the Earth or in Bodley's Library But the right Designation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil's Works and the proper Answer would be That these Verses were about the middle of the Ninth Book of his AEneides And that they have been always constantly in the same Place ever since Virgil was printed Which is true though the Book it self hath moved a Thousand times the use of the Idea of Place here being to know only in what part of the Book that Story is that so upon occasion we may know where to find it and have recourse to it for our use § 10. That our Idea of Place is nothing else but such a relative Position of any thing as I have before mentioned I think is plain and will be easily admitted when we consider that we can have no Idea of the place of the Universe though we can of all the parts of it because beyond that we have not the Idea of any fixed distinct particular Beings in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance but all beyond it is one uniform Space or Expansion wherein the Mind finds no variety no marks For to say that the World is somewhere means no more but that it does exist this though a Phrase borrowed from Place signifying only its Existence not Location and when one can find out and frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the Place of the Universe he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable Inane of infinite Space tho' it be true that the Word Place has sometimes a more confused Sense and stands for that Space which any Body takes up and so the Universe is in a Place § 11. The Idea therefore of Place we have by the same means that we get the Idea of Space whereof this is but a particular limited Consideration viz. by our Sight and Touch by either of which we receive into our Minds the Ideas of Extension or Distance § 12. There are some that would persuade us that Body and Extension are the same thing who either change the Signification of Words which I would not suspect them of they having so severely condemned the Philosophy of others because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant Terms It therefore they mean by Body and Extension the same that other People do viz. by Body something that is solid and extended whose parts are separable and movable different ways and by Extension only the Space that lies between the Extremities of those solid coherent Parts and which is possessed by them they confound very different Ideas one with another For I appeal to every Man 's own Thoughts whether the Idea of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity as it is from th◠Idea of Scarlet-Colour 'T is true Solidity cannot exist without Extension neither can Scarlet Colour exist without Extension but this hinders not but that they are distinct Ideas Many Ideas require others as necessary to their Existence or Conception which yet are very distinct Ideas Motion can neither be nor be conceived without Space and yet Motion is not Space nor Space Motion Space can exist without it and they are very distinct Ideas and so I think are those of Space and Solidity Solidity is so inseparable an Idea from Body that upon that depends its filling of Space its Contact Impulse and Communication of Motion upon Impulse And if it be a Reason to prove that Spirit is different from Body because Thinking includes not the Idea of Extension in it the same Reason will be as valid I suppose to prove that Space is not Body because it includes not the Idea of Solidity in it Space and Solidity being as distinct Ideas as Thinking and Extension and as wholly separable in the Mind one from another Body then and Extension 't is evident are two distinct Ideas for First Extension includes no Solidity nor resistence to the Motion of Body as Body does Secondly The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from the other so that the Continuity cannot be separated neither really nor mentally For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another with which it is continued even so much as in Thought To divide and separate actually is as I think by removing the parts one from another to make two Superficies where before there was
true the Idea of Extension joins it self so inseparably with all visible and most tangible Qualities that it suffers us to see no one or feel very few external Objects without taking in impressions of Extension too This readiness of Extension to make it self be taken notice of so constantly with other Ideas has been the occasion I guess that some have made the whole essence of Body to consist in Extension which is not much to be wondred at since some have had their Minds by their Eyes and Touch the busiest of all our Senses so filled with the Idea of Extension and as it were wholly possessed with it that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not Extension I shall not now argue with those Men who take the measure and possibility of all Being only from their narrow and gross Imaginations but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of Body to be Extension because they say they cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any Body without Extension I shall desire them to consider That had they reflected on their Ideas of Tastes and Smells as much as on those of Sight and Touch nay had they examined their Ideas of Hunger and Thirst and several other Pains they would have found that they included in them no Idea of Extension at all which is but an affection of Body as well as the rest discoverable by our Senses which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure Essence of Things § 25. If those Ideas which are constantly joined to all others must therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those Things which have constantly those Ideas joined to them and are inseparable from them then Unity is without doubt the essence of every thing For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection which does not carry with it the Idea of one But the weakness of this kind of Argument we have already shewn sufficiently § 26. To conclude whatever Men shall think concerning the existence of a Vacuum this is plain to me That we have as clear an Idea of Space distinct from Solidity as we have of Solidity distinct from Motion or Motion from Space We have not any two more distinct Ideas and we can as easily conceive Space without Solidity as we can conceive Body without Motion though it be never so certain that neither Body nor Motion can exist without Space But whether any one will take Space to be only a relation resulting from the Existence of other Beings at a distance or whether they will think the Words of the most knowing King Solomon The Heaven and the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain Thee or those more emphatical ones of the inspired Philosopher St. Paul In Him we live move and have our Being are to be understood in a literal sense I leave every one to consider only our Idea of Space is I think such as I have mentioned and distinct from that of Body For whether we consider in matter it self the distance of its coherent solid parts and call it in respect of those solid parts Extension or whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any Body in its several dimensions we call it Length Breadth and Thickness or else considering it as lying between any two Bodies or positive Beings without any consideration whether there be any Matter or no between we call it Distance However named or considered it is always the same uniform simple Idea of Space taken from Objects about which our Senses have been conversant whereof having setled Ideas in our Minds we can revive repeat and add them one to another as often as we will and consider the Space or Distance so imagined either as filled with solid parts so that another Body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the Body that was there before or else as void of Solidity so that a Body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure Space may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there § 27. The knowing precisely what our Words stand for would I imagine in this as well as a great many other cases quickly end the dispute For I am apt to think that Men when they come to examine them find their simple Ideas all generally to agree though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different Names Imagine that Men who abstract their Thoughts and do well examine the Ideas of their own Minds cannot much differ in thinking however they may perplex themselves with words according to the way of speaking of the several Schools or Sects they have been bred up in Though amongst unthinking Men who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own Ideas and strip them not from the marks Men use for them but confound them with words there must be endless dispute wrangling and jargon especially if they be learned bookish Men devoted to some Sect and accustomed to the Language of it and have learned to talk after others But if it should happen that any two thinking Men should really have different Ideas different Notions I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another Here I must not be mistaken to think that every floating Imagination in Mens Brains is presently of that sort of Ideas I speak of 'T is not easie for the Mind to put off those confused Notions and Prejudices it has imbibed from Custom Inadvertency and common Conversation it requires pains and assiduity to examine its Ideas till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones out of which they are compounded and to see which amongst its simple ones have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of Things he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles and will often find himself at a loss CHAP. XIV Of Duration and its simple Modes § 1. THere is another sort of Distance or Length the Idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of Space but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession This we call Duration the simple Modes whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have distinct Ideas as Hours Days Years c. Time and Eternity § 2. The Answer of a great Man to one who asked what Time was Si non rogas intelligo which amounts to this the more I set my self to think of it the less I understood it might perhaps perswade one That Time which reveals all other things is it self not to be discovered Duration Time and Eternity are not without reason thought to have something very obstruse in their nature But however remote this may seem from our Comprehension yet if we trace them right to their Originals I doubt not but one of those Sources of all our Knowledge viz. Sensation and Reflection will be able to furnish us with those Ideas as clear
measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact Since then no two Portions of Succession can be brought together it is impossible ever certainly to know their Equality All that we can do for a measure of Time is to take such as have continual successive Appearances at seemingly equidistant Periods of which seeming Equality we have no other measure but such as the train of our own Ideas have lodged in our Memories with the concurrence of other probable Reasons to perswade us of their Equality § 22. One thing seems strange to me that whilst all Men manifestly measured Time by the motion of the great and visible Bodies of the World Time yet should be defined to be the measure of Motion whereas 't is obvious to every one that reflects ever so little on it that to measure Motion Space is as necessary to be considered as Time and those who look a little farther will find also the bulk of the thing moved necessary to be taken into the Computation by any one who will estimate or measure Motion so as to judge right of it Nor indeed does Motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of Duration than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible Ideas in seeming equidistant Periods For if the Motion of the Sun were as unequal as of a Ship driven by unsteady Winds sometimes very slow and at others irregularly very swift or if being constantly equally swift it yet was not circular and produced not the same Appearances it would not at all help us to measure time any more than the seeming unequal motion of a Comet does § 23. Minutes Hours Days and Years are then no more necessary to Time or Duration than Inches Feet Yards and Miles marked out in any Matter are to Extension For though we in this part of the Universe by the constant use of them as Periods set out by the Revolutions of the Sun or known parts of them have fixed the Ideas of such Lengths of Duration in our Minds which we apply to all parts of Time whose Lengths we would consider yet there may be other parts of the Universe where they no more use those measures of ours than in Iapan they do our Inches Feet or Miles but yet something Analagous to them there must be For without some regular periodical returns we could not measure our selves or signifie to others the length of any Duration though at the same time the World were as full of Motion as it is now but no part of it disposed into regular and apparent equidistant Revolutions But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of Time do not at all alter the notion of Duration which is the thing to be measured no more than the different standards of a Foot and a Cubit alter the notion of Extension to those who make use of those different Measures § 25. The Mind having once got such a measure of Time as the annual Revolution of the Sun can apply that measure to Duration wherein that measure it self did not exist and with which in the reality of its being it had nothing to do For should one say That Abraham was born in the 2712 year of the Iulian period it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the World though there were so far back no motion of the Sun nor any other motion at all For though the Iulian Period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either Days Nights or Years marked out by any Revolutions of the Sun yet we reckon as right and thereby measure Durations as well as if really at that time the Sun had existed and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now The Idea of Duration equal to an annual Revolution of the Sun is as easily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration where no Sun nor Motion was as the Idea of a Foot or Yard taken from Bodies here can be applied in our Thoughts to Distances beyond the Confines of the World where are no Bodies at all § 26. For supposing it were 5639 miles or millions of Miles from this place to the remotest Body of the Universe for being finite it must be at a certain distance as we suppose it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any Body in the beginning of the World we can in our Thoughts apply this measure of a Year to Duration before the Creation or beyond the Duration of Bodies or Motion as we can this measure of a Mile to Space beyond the utmost Bodies and by the one measure Duration where there was no Motion as well as by the other measure Space in our Thoughts where there is no Body § 27. If it be objected to me here That in this way of explaining of Time I have beg'd what I should not viz. That the World is neither eternal nor infinite I answer That to my present purpose it is not needful in this place to make use of Arguments to evince the World to be finite both in Duration and Extension But it being at least as conceivable as the contrary I have certainly the liberty to suppose it as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it◠may easily conceive in his Mind the beginning of Motion though not of all Duration and so may come to a stop and non ultra in his Consideration of Motion so also in his Thoughts he may set limits to Body and the Extension belonging to it but not to Space where no Body is the utmost bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the reach of Thoughts as well as the utmost bounds of Number are beyond the largest comprehension of the Mind and all for the same reason as we shall see in another place § 28. By the same means therefore and from the same Original that we come to have the Idea of Time we have also that Idea which we call Eternity viz. having got the Idea of Succession and Duration by reflecting on the Train of our own Ideas caused in us either by the natural appearances of those Ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking Thoughts or else caused by external Objects successively affecting our Senses and having from the Revolutions of the Sun got the Ideas of certain lengths of Duration we can in our Thoughts add such lengths of Duration to one another as often as we please and apply them so added to Durations past or to come And this we can continue to do on without bounds or limits and proceed in infinitum and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the Sun to Duration supposed before the Sun 's or any other Motion had its being which is no more difficult or absurd than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow one Hour to day upon the Sun-dial to the duration of something
solid parts of Matter and so includes or at least intimates the Idea of Body Whereas the Idea of pure Distance includes no such thing I preferr also the Word Expansion to Space because Space is often applied to Distance of fleeting successive parts which never exist together as well as to those which are permanent In both these viz. Expansion and Duration the Mind has this common Idea of continued Lengths capable of greater or less quantities For a Man has as clear an Idea of the difference of the length of an Hour and a Day as of an Inch and a Foot § 2. The Mind having got the Idea of the length of any part of Expansion let it be a Span or a Pace or what length you will can as has been said repeat that Idea and so adding it to the former enlarge its Idea of Length and make it equal to two Spans or two Paces and so as often as it will till it equals the distance of any parts of the Earth one from another and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the Sun or remotest Star By such a progression as this setting out from the place where it is or any other place it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths and find nothing to stop its going on either in or without Body 'T is true we can easily in our Thoughts come to the end of solid Extension the extremity and bounds of all Body we have no difficulty to arrive at But when the Mind is there it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless Expansion of that it can neither find nor conceive any end Nor let any one say That beyond the bounds of Body there is nothing at all unless he will confine GOD within the limits of Matter Solomon whose Understanding was filled and enlarged with Wisdom seems to have other Thoughts when he says Heaven and the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain Thee And he I think very much magnifies to himself the Capacity of his own Understanding who persuades himself that he can extend his Thoughts farther than GOD exists or imagine any Expansion where he is not § 3. Just so is it in Duration The Mind having got the Idea of any length of Duration can double multiply and enlarge it not only beyond its own but beyond the existence of all corporeal Beings and all the measures of Time taken from the great Bodies of the World and their Motions But yet every one easily admits That though we make Duration boundless as certainly it is we cannot yet extend it beyond all being GOD every one easily allows fills Eternity and 't is hard to find a Reason why any one should doubt that he likewise fills Immensity His infinite Being is certainly as boundless one way as another and methinks it ascribes a little too much to Matter to say Where there is no Body there is nothing § 4. Hence I think we may learn the Reason why every one familiarly and without the least hesitation speaks of and supposes Eternity and sticks not to ascribe Infinity to Duration but 't is with more doubting and reserve that many admit or suppose the Infinity of Space The reason whereof seems to me to be this That Duration and Extension being used as names of affections belonging to other Beings we easily conceive in GOD infinite Duration and we cannot avoid doing so but not attributing to him Extension but only to Matter which is finite we are apter to doubt of the existence of Expansion without Matter of which alone we commonly suppose it an Attribute And therefore when Men pursue their Thoughts of Space they are apt to stop at the confines of Body as if Space were there at an end too and reached no farther Or if their Ideas upon consideration carry them farther yet they term what is beyond the limits of the Universe imaginary Space as if it were nothing because there is no Body existing in it Whereas Duration antecedent to all Body and the motions it is measured by they never term imaginary because it is never supposed void of some other real existence And if the names of things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of Mens Ideas as I am apt to think they may very much one may have occasion to think by the name Duration that the continuation of Existence with a kind of Resistence to any destructive force and the continuation of Solidity which is apt to be confounded with and if we will look into the minute atomical parts of Matter is little different from Hardness were thought to have some Analogy and gave occasion to Words so near of kin as Durare and Durum esse But be that as it will this is certain That whoever pursues his own Thoughts will find them sometimes lanch out beyond the extent of Body into the Infinity of Space or Expansion the Idea whereof is distinct and separate from Body and all other things which may to those who please be a subject of farther meditation § 5. Time in general is to Duration as Place to Expansion They are so much of those boundless Oceans of Eternity and Immensity as is set out and distinguished from the rest as it were by Land-marks and so are made use of to denote the Position of â—inite real Beings in respect one to another in those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space These rightly considered are nothing but Ideas of determinate Distances from certain known points fixed in distinguishable sensible things and supposed to keep the same distance one from another From such points fixed in sensible Beings we reckon and from them we measure out Portions of those infinite Quantities which so considered are that which we call Time and Place For Duration and Space being in themselves uniform and boundless the Order and Position of things without such known setled Points would be lost in them and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable Confâ—â—sion § 6. Time and Place taken thus for determinate distinguishable Portions of those infinite Abysses of Space and Duration set out or supposed to be distinguished from the rest by marks and known Boundaries have each of them a two-fold Acceptation First Time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite Duration as it measured out by and co-exhistent with the Existence and Motions of the great Bodies of the Universe as far as we know any thing of them and in this Sense Time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible World as in these Phrases before mentioned before all time or when time shall be no more Place likewise is taken sometimes for that Portion of infinite Space which is possessed by and comprehended within the Material World and is thereby distinguished from the rest of Expansion though this may more properly be called Extension than Place Within these two are confined and by the observable Parts of them are measured and determined the
particular Time or Duration and the particular Extension and Place of all corporeal Beings § 7. Secondly Sometimes the word Time is used in a larger sense and is applied to Parts of that infinite Duration not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real Existence and periodical Motions of Bodies that were appointed from the Beginning to be for Signs and for Seasons and for Days and Years and are accordingly our measures of time but such other portions too of that infinite uniform Duration which we upon any occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured Time and so consider them as bounded and determined For if we should suppose the Creation or Fall of the Angels was at the Beginning of the Iulian Period we should speak properly enough and should be understood if we said 't is a longer time since the Creation of Angels than the Creation of the World by 764 years Whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished Duration as we suppose equal to and would have admitted 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun moving at the rate it now does And thus likewise we sometimes speak of Place Distance or Bulk in the great Inane beyond the Confines the World when we consider so much of that Space as is equal to or capable to receive a Body of any assigned Dimensions as a Cubickâ—foot or do suppose a Point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the Universe § 8. Where and when are Questions belonging to all finite Existences and are by us always reckoned from some known Parts of this sensible World and from some certain Epochs marked out to us by the Motions observable in it Without some such fixed Parts or Periods the Order of things would be lost to our finite Understandings in the boundless invariable Oceans of Duration and Expansion which comprehend in them all finite Beings and in their full Extent belong only to the Deity And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not and do so often find our Thoughts at a loss when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible Being But when applied to any particular finite Beings the Extension of any Body is so much of that infinite Space as the bulk of that Body takes up And Place is the Position of any Body when considered at a certain distance from some other As the Idea of the particular Duration of any thing is an Idea of that Portion of infinite Duration which passes during the Existence of that thing so the time when the thing existed is the Idea of that Space of Duration which passed between some known and fixed Period of Duration and the Being of that thing One shews the distance of the Extremities of the Bulk or Existence of the same thing as that it is a Foot Square or lasted two Years the other shews the distance of it in Place or Existence from other fixed points of Duration or Space as that it was in the middle of Lincolns-Inn-Fields or the first degree of Taurus and in the year of our Lord 1671. or the 1000 year of the Iulian Period All which distances we measure by preconceived Ideas of certain lengths of Space and Duration as Inches Feet Miles and Degrees and in the other Minutes days and years c. § 9. There is one thing more wherein Space and Duration have a great Conformity and that is though they are justly reckoned amongst our simple Ideas Yet none of the distinct Ideas we have of either is without all manner of Composition it is the very Nature of both of them to consist of Parts But their Parts being all of the same kind and without the mixture of any other Idea hinder them not from having a Place amongst simple Ideas Could the Mind as in Number come to so small a part of Extension or Duration as excluded Divisibility that would be as it were the indivisible Unite or Idea by repetition of which it would make its more inlarged Ideas of Extension and Duration But since the Mind is not able to frame an Idea of any Space without Parts instead thereof it makes use of the common Measures which by familiar use in each Country have imprinted themselves on the Memory as Inches and Feet or Cubits and Parasangs and so Seconds Minutes Hours Days and Years in Duration The Mind makes use I say of such Ideas as these as simple ones and these are the component Parts of larger Ideas which the Mind upon Occasion makes by the addition of such known Lengths which it is acquainted with On the other side the ordinary smallest measure we have of either look'd on as an Unite in Number when the Mind by division would reduce them into less Fractions Though on both sides both in addition and division either of Space or Duration when the Idea under Consideration becomes very big or very small the Idea of its precise Bulk becomes very obscure and confused and it is the Number of its repeated additions or divisions that alone remains clear and distinct as will easily appear to any one who will let his Thoughts loose in the vast Expansion of Space or Divisibility of Matter Every part of Duration is Duration too and every part of Extension is Extension both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum But the least Portions of either of them whereof we have clear and distinct Ideas may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us as the simple Ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of Space Extension and Duration are made up and into which they can again be distinctly resolved Such a small part in Duration may be called a Moment and is the time of one Idea in our Minds in the train of their ordinary Succession there The other wanting a proper Name I know not whether I may be allowed to call a sensible Point meaning thereby the least Particle of Matter or Space we can discern which is ordinarily about a Second of a Circle whereof the Eye is the Centre § 10. Expansion and Duration have this farther Agreement that though they are both considered by us as having Parts yet their Parts are not separable one from another no not even in Thought Though the parts of Bodies from whence we take our measure of the one and the parts of Motion or rather the succession of Ideas in our Minds from whence we take the measure of the other may be interrupted and seperated as the one is often by Rest and the other is by Sleep which we call rest too § 11. But yet there is this manifest difference between them That the Ideas of Length we have of Expansion are turned every way and so make Figure and Breadth and Thickness but Duration is but as it were the length of one streight Line extended in infinitum not capable of Multiplicity Variation or Figure
subtraction of any the least part and such are the Ideas of Space Duration and Number which we have considered in the foregoing Chapters 'T is true that we cannot but be assured That the Great GOD of whom and from whom are all things is incomprehensibly Infinite but yet when we apply to that first and supream Being our Idea of Infinite in our weak and narrow Thoughts we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity and I think more figuratively to his Power Wisdom and Goodness and other Attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible c. For when we call them Infinite we have no other Idea of this Infinity but what carries with it some reflection on and imitation of that Number or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power Wisdom and Goodness which can never be supposed so great or so many which these Attributes will not always surmount and exceed let us multiply them in our Thoughts with all the infinity of endless number I do not pretend to say how these Attributes are in GOD who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities They do without doubt contain in them all possible perfection but this I say is our way of conceiving them and these our Ideas of their Infinity § 2. Finite then and Infinite being by the Mind looked on as modifications of Expansion and Duration the next thing to be considered is How the Mind comes by them As for the Idea of Finite there is no great difficulty the obvious portions of Extension that affect our Senses carry with them into the Mind the Idea of Finite and the ordinary periods of Succession whereby we measure Time and Duration as Hours Days and Years are bounded Lengths the difficulty is how we come by those boundless Ideas of Eternity and Immensity since the Objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that Largeness § 3. Every one that has any Idea of any stated lengths of Space as a Foot finds that he can repeat that Idea and joining it to the former make the Idea of two Foot and by the addition of a third three Foot and so on without ever coming to an end of his additions whether of the same Idea of a Foot or if he please of doubling it or any other Idea he has of any length as a Mile or Diametre of the Earth or of the Orbis Magnus for which-ever of these he takes and how often soever he doubles or any otherwise multiplies it he finds that after he has continued this doubling in his Thoughts and enlarged his Idea as much as he pleases he has no more reason to stop nor is one jot nearer the end of such Addition than he was at first setting out the power of enlarging his Idea of Space by farther Additions remaining still the same he hence takes the Idea of infinite Space § 4. This I think is the way whereby the Mind gets the Idea of infinite Space 'T is a quite different Consideration to examine whether the Mind has the Idea of such a boundless Space actually existing since our Ideas are not always Proofs of the Existence of Things but yet since this comes here in our way I suppose I may say that we are apt to think that Space in it self is actually boundless to which Imagination the Idea of Space or Expansion of its self naturally leads us For it being considered by us either as the Extension of Body or as existing by it self without any solid Matter taking it up for of such a void Space we have not only the Idea but I have proved as I think from the Motion of Body its necessary existence it is impossible the Mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it or be stopp'd any where in its progress in this Space how far soever it extends its Thoughts Any Bounds made with Body even Adamantine Walls are so far from putting a stop to the Mind in its farther progress in Space and Extension that it rather facilitates and enlarges it For so far as that Body reaches so far no one can doubt of Extension and when we are come to the utmost extremity of Body what is there that can there put a stop and satisfie the Mind that it is at the end of Space when it perceive it is not nay when it is satisfied that Body it self can move into it For if it be necessary for the motion of Body that there should be an empty Space though never so little here amongst Bodies and it be possible for Body to move in or through that empty Space nay it is impossible for any particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space the same possibility of a Bodies moving into a void Space beyond the utmost Bounds of Body as well as into a void Space interspersed amongst Bodies will always remain clear and evident the Idea of empty pure Space whether within or beyond the confines of all Bodies being exactly the same differing not in Nature though in Bulk and there being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it So that wherever the Mind places it self by any thought either amongst or remote from all Bodies it can in this uniform Idea of Space no-where find any bounds any end and so must necessarily conclude it by the very Nature and Idea of each part of it to be actually infinite § 5. As by the power we find in our selves of repeating as often as we will any Idea of Space we get the Idea of Immensity so by being able to repeat the Idea of any length of Duration we have in our Minds with all the endless addition of Number we come by the Idea of Eternity For we find in our selves we can no more come to an end of such repeated Ideas than we can come to the end of Number which every one perceives he cannot But here again 't is another question quite different from our having an Idea of Eternity to know whether there were any real Being whose Duration has been eternal He that considers something now existing must necessarily come to something eternal but having spoke of this in another place I shall say here no more of it but proceed on to some other Considerations of our Idea of Infinity § 6. If it be so that our Idea of Infinity be got from the Power we observe in our selves of repeating without end our own Ideas It may be demanded Why we do not attribute Infinity to other Ideas as well as those of Space and Duration since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our Minds as the other and yet no body ever thinks of infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness though he can repeat the Idea of Sweet or White as frequently as those of a Yard or a Day To which I answer All the Ideas that are considered as having parts and are capable of increase by the addition of
the Idea of a Power to prefer the doing to the not doing any particular Action vice versa which it has thought on which preference is truly a Mode of Thinking and so the Idea which the word Will stands for is a complex and mixed one made up of the simple Ideas of Power and a certain Mode of Thinking and the Idea of Liberty is yet more complex being made up of the Idea of a Power to act or not to act in conformity to Volition But I hoped this transgression against the method I have proposed to my self will be forgiven me if I have quitted it a little to explain some Ideas of great importance such as are those of the Will Liberty and Necessity in this place where they as it were offered themselves and sprang up from their proper roots Besides having before largely enough instanced in several simple Modes to shew what I meant by them and how the Mind got them for I intend not to enumerate all the particular Ideas of each sort those of Will Liberty and Necessity may serve as instances of mixed Modes which are that sort of Ideas I purpose next to treat of § 47. And thus I have in a short draught given a view of our original Ideas from whence all the rest are derived and of which they are made up which if I would consider as a Philosopher and examine on what Causes they depend and of what they are made I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones viz. Extension Solidity Mobility which by our Senses we receive from Body Thinking and the Power of Moving which by reflection we receive from our Minds to which if we add Existence Duration Number which belong both to the one and the other we have perhaps all the original Ideas on which the rest depend For by these I imagine might be explained the nature of Colours Sounds Tastes Smells and all other Ideas we have if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified Extensions and Motions of these minute Bodies which produce those several Sensations in us But my present purpose being to enquire only into the Knowledge the Mind has of Things by those Ideas and Appearances God has fitted it to receive from them and how the Mind comes by that Knowledge rather than into their Causes or manner of Production I shall not contrary to the Design of this Essay set my self to enquire philosophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies and the Configuration of Parts whereby they have the power to produce in us the Ideas of their sensible Qualities I shall not enter any farther into that Disquisition it sufficing to my purpose to observe That Gold or Saffron has a power to produce in us the Idea of Yellow and Snow or Milk the Idea of White which we can have only by our Sight without examining the Texture of the Parts of those Bodies or the particular Figures or Motion of the Particles which rebound from them to cause in us that particular Sensation Though when we go beyond the bare Ideas in our Minds and would enquire into their Causes we cannot conceive any thing else to be in any sensible Object whereby it produces different Ideas in us but the different Bulk Figure Number Texture and Motion of its insensible Parts CHAP. XXII Of Mixed Modes § 1. HAving treated of Simple Modes in the foregoing Chapters and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them to shew what they are and how we come by them we are now in the next place to consider those we call Mixed Modes such are the Complex Ideas we make by the names Obligation Drunkenness a Lie c. which consisting of several Combinations of simple Ideas of different kinds I have called Mixed Modes to distinguish them from the more simple Modes which consists only of simple Ideas of the same kind These mixed Modes being also such Combinations of simple Ideas as are not looked upon to be the characteristical Marks of any real Beings that have a steady existence but scattered and independent Ideas put together by the Mind are thereby distinguished from the complex Ideas of Substances § 2. That the Mind in respect of its simple Ideas is wholly passive and receives them all from the Existence and Operations of Things such as Sensation or Reflection offers them without being able to make any one Idea Experience shews us But if we attentively consider these Ideas I call mixed Modes we are now speaking of we shall find their Original quite different The Mind here often exercises an active Power in the making these several Combinations for it being once furnished with simple Ideas it can put them together in several Compositions and so make variety of complex Ideas without examining whether they exist so together in Nature And hence I think it is that these sort of Ideas are called Notions as if they had their Original and constant Existence more in the Thoughts of Men than in the reality of things and to form such Ideas it sufficed that the Mind put the parts of them together and that they were consistent in the Understanding without considering whether they had any real Being Though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from Observation and the Existence of several simple Ideas so combined as they are put together in the Understanding For the Man who first framed the Idea of Hypocrisie might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made shew of good Qualities which he had not or else have framed that Idea in his Mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by For it is evident that in the beginning of Languages and Societies of Men several of those complex Ideas which were consequent to the Constitutions established amongst them must needs have been in the Minds of Men before they existed any where else and that many names that stood for such complex Ideas were in use and so those Ideas framed before the Combinations they stood for ever existed § 3. Indeed now that Languages are made and abound with words standing for them an usual way of getting these complex Ideas is by the explication of those terms that stand for them For consisting of a company of simple Ideas combined they may by words standing for those simple Ideas be represented to the Mind of one who understands those words though that complex Combination of simple Ideas were never offered to his Mind by the real existence of things Thus a Man may come to have the Idea of Sacrilege or Murther by enumerating to him the simple Ideas these words stand for without ever seeing either of them committed § 4. Every mixed Mode consisting of many distinct simple Ideas it may be well enquired whence it has its Vnity and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one Idea since that Combination does not
may account for the cohesion of several parts of Matter that are grosser than the Particles of Air and have Pores less than the Corpuscles of Air yet the weight or pressure of the Air will not explain nor can be a cause of the coherence of the Particles of Air themselves And if the pressure of the AEther or any subtiler Matter than the Air may unite and hold fast together the parts of a Particle of Air as well as other Bodies yet it cannot make Bonds for it self and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis So that that Hypothesis how ingeniously soever explained by shewing that the parts of sensible Bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible Bodies reaches not the parts of the AEther it self and by how much the more evident it proves that the parts of other Bodies are held together by the external pressure of the AEther and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the Corpuscles of the AEther it self which we can neither conceive without parts they being Bodies and divisible nor yet how their parts cohere they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other Bodies § 24. But in truth the pressure of any ambient Fluid how great soever can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of Matter For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished Superficies one from another in a Line perpendicular to them as in the Experiment of two polished Marbles Yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a Motion in a Line parallel to these Superficies Because the ambient fluid having a full liberty to succeed in each point of Space diserted by a lateral motion resists such a motion of Bodies so joined no more than it would resist the motion of that Body were it on all sides environed by that Fluid and touched no other Body And therefore if there were no other cause of cohesion all parts of Bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion For if the pressure of the AEther be the adequate cause of cohesion where-ever that cause operates not there can be no cohesion And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation as has been shewed therefore in every imaginary plain intersecting any mass of Matter there could be no more cohesion than of two polished Superficies which will always notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a Fluid easily slide one from another so that perhaps how clear an Idea soever we think we have of the Extension of Body which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts he that shall well consider it in his Mind may have reason to conclude That 't is as easie for him to have a clear Idea how the Soul thinks as how Body is extended For since Body is no farther nor otherwise extended than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts we shall very ill comprehend the extension of Body without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of Thinking and how it is performed § 25. I allow it is usual for most People to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe Do we not see will they be ready to say the parts of Bodies stick firmly together Is there any thing more common And what doubt can there be made of it And the like I say concerning Thinking and voluntary Motion Do we not every moment experiment it in our selves and therefore can it be doubted The matter of fact is clear I confess but when we would a little nearer look into it and consider how it is done there I think we are at a loss both in the one and the other and can as little understand how the parts of Body cohere as how we our selves perceive or move I would have any one intelligibly explain to me how the parts of Gold or Brass that but now in fusion were as loose from one another as the Particles of Water or the Sands of an Hour-glass come in a few moments to be so united and adhere so strongly one to another that the utmost force of Mens arms cannot separate them A considering Man will I suppose be here at a loss to satisfie his own or another Man's Understanding § 26. The little Bodies that compose that Fluid we call Water are so extreamly small that I have never heard of any one who by a Microscope and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to 10000 nay to much above 100,000 times pretended to perceive their distinct Bulk Figure or Motion And the Particles of Water are also so perfectly loose one from another that the least force sensibly separates them Nay if we consider their perpetual motion we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another and yâ—t let but a sharp cold come and they unite they consolidate these little Atoms cohere and are not without great force separable He that could find the Bonds that tie these heaps of loose little Bodies together so firmly he that could make known the Cement that makes them stick so fast one to another would discover a great and yet unknown Secret And yet when that was done would he be far enough from making the extension of Body which is the cohesion of its solid parts intelligible till he could shew wherein consisted the union or consolidation of the parts of those Bonds or of that Cement or of the least Particle of Matter that exists Whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious Quality of Body will be found when examined to be as incomprehensible as any thing belonging to our Minds and a solid extended Substance as hard to be conceived as a thining one whatever difficulties some would raise against it § 27. For to extend our Thoughts a little farther that pressure which is brought to explain the cohesion of Bodies is as unintelligible as the cohesion it self For if Matter be considered as no doubt it is finite let any one send his Contemplation to the Extremities of Universe and there see what conceivable Hoops what Bond he can imagine to hold this mass of Matter in so close a pressure together from whence Steel has its firmness and the parts of a Diamond their hardness and indissolubility If Matter be finite it must have its Extreams and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder If to avoid this difficulty any one will throw himself into the Supposition and Abyss of infinite Matter let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of Body and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible by resolving it into a
Supposition the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other So far is our Extension of Body which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts from being clearer or more distinct when we would enquire into the Nature Cause or Manner of it than the Idea of Thinking § 28. Another Idea we have of Body is the power of communication of Motion by impulse and of our Souls the power of exciting of Motion by Thought These Ideas the one of Body the other of our Minds every days experience clearly furnishes us with But if here again we enquire how this is done we are equally in the dark For in the communication of Motion by impulse wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body as is got to the other which is the ordinariest case we can have no other conception but of the passing of Motion out of one Body into another which I think is as obscure and unconceivable as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Thought which we every moment find they do The increase of Motion by impulse which is observed or believed sometimes to happen is yet harder to be understood We have by daily experience clear evience of Motion produced both by impulse and by thought but the manner how hardly comes within our comprehension we are qually at a loss in both So that however we consider Motion and its communication either in Body or Spirit the Idea which belongs to Spirit is at least as clear as that that belongs to Body And if we consider the active power of Moving or as I may call it Motivity it is much clearer in Spirit than Body since two Bodies placed by one another at rest will never afford us the Idea of a power in the one to move the other but by a borrowed motion whereas the Mind every day affords us Ideas of an active power of moving of Bodies and therefore it is worth our consideration whether active power be not the proper attribute of Spirits and passive power of Matter But be that as it will I think we have as many and as clear Ideas belonging to Spirit as we have belonging to Body the Substance of each being equally unknown to us and the Idea of Thinking in Spirit as clear as of Extension in Body and the communication of Motion by Thought which we attribute to Spirit is as evident as that by impulse which we ascribe to Body Constant Experience makes us sensible of both of these though our narrow Understandings can comprehend neither For when the Mind would look beyond these original Ideas we have from Sensation or Reflection and penetrate into their Causes and manner of production we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness § 29. To conclude Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended Substances and Reflection that there are thinking ones Experience assures us of the Existence of such Beings and that the one hath a power to move Body by impulse the other by thought this we cannot doubt of Experience I say every moment furnishes us with the clear Ideas both of the one and the other But beyond these Ideas as received from their proper Sources our Faculties will not reach If we would enquire farther into their Nature Causes and Manner we perceive not the Nature of Extension clearer than we do of Thinking If we would explain them any farther one is as easie as the other and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a Substance we know not should by thought set Body into motion than how a Substance we know not should by impulse set Body into motion So that we are no more able to discover wherein the Ideas belonging to Body consist than those belonging to Spirit From whence it seems probable to me that the simple Ideas we receive from Sensation and Reflection are the Boundaries of our Thoughts beyond which the Mind whatever efforts it would make is not able to advance one jot nor can it make any discoveries when it would prie into the Nature and hidden Causes of those Ideas § 30. So that in short the Idea we have of Spirit compared with the Idea we have of Body stands thus The substance of Spirit is unknown to us and so is the substance of Body equally unknown to us Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body viz. solid coherent parts and impulse we have distinct clear Ideas of So likewise we know and have distinct clear Ideas of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit viz. Thinking and a power◠Action i. e. a power of beginning or stopping several Thoughts or Motions We have also the Ideas of several Qualities inherent in Bodies and have the clear distinct Ideas of them which Qualities are but the various modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts and their motion We have likewise the Ideas of the several modes of Thinking viz. Believing Doubting Intending Fearing Hoping all which are but the several modes of Thinking We have also the Ideas of Willing and Moving the Body consequent to it and with the Body it self too for as has been shewed Spirit is capable of Motion § 31. Lastly if this Notion of Spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it not easie to be explained we have thereby no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of Spirits than we have to deny or doubt the existence of Body because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of Spirit more perplexed or nearer a Contradiction than the very notion of Body includes in it the divisibility in infinitum of any finite Extension involving us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent Consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing substance § 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at since we having but some few superficial Ideas of things discovered to us only by the Senses from without or by the Mind reflecting on what it experiments in it self within have no Knowledge beyond that much less of the internal Constitution and true Nature of things being destitute of Faculties to attain it And therefore experimenting and discovering in our selves Knowledge and the power of voluntary Motion as certainly as we experiment or discover in things without us the cohesion and separation of solid Parts which is the Extension and Motion of Bodies we have as much Reason to be satisfied with our Notion of Spirit as with our Notion of Body and the Existence of the one as well as the other For it being no more a contradiction that Thinking should exist separate and independent from Solidity than it is a contradiction that Solidity should exist separate and independent from Thinking they being both but simple Ideas independent one
we compare their Age to different Ideas of Duration which are setled in our Minds as belonging to these several sorts of Animals in the ordinary course of Nature But the Sun and Stars though they have outlasted several Generations of Men we call not old because we do not know what period GOD hath set to that â—ort of Beings This Term belonging properly to those Things which we can observe in the ordinary course of Things by a natural decay to come to an end in a certain period of time and so have in our Minds as it were a Standard to which we can compare the several parts of their Duration and by the relation they bear thereunto call them young or old which we cannot therefore do to a Ruby or a Diamond things whose usual periods we know not § 5. The Relation also that things have to one another in their Places and Distances is very obvious to observe as Above Below a Mile distant from Charing-Cross in England and in London But as in Duration so in Extension and Bulk there are some Ideas that are relative which we signifie by Names that are thought positive as Great and Little are truly Relations For here also having by observation setled in our Minds the Ideas of the Bigness of several Species of Things from those we have been most accustomed to we make them as it were the Standards whereby to denominate the Bulk of others Thus we call a great Apple such an one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to and a little Horse such an one as comes not up to the size of that Idea which we have in our Minds to belong ordinarily to Horses And that will be a great Horse to a Welsh-man which is but a little one to a Fleming they two having from the different Breed of their Countries taken several siz'd Ideas to which they compare and in relation to which they denominate their Great and their Little § 6. So likewise Weak and Strong are but relative Denominations of Power compared to some Idea we have at that time of greater or less Power Thus when we say a Weak Man we mean one that has not so much Strength or Power to move as usually Men have or usually those of his size have which is a comparing his Strength to the Idea we have of the usual Strength of Men or Men of such a size The like when we say the Creatures are all weak Things Weak there is but a relative term signifying the disproportion there is in the Power of GOD and the Creatures And so abundance of Words in ordinary Speech stand only for Relations and perhaps the greatest part which at first sight seem to have no such signification v. g. The Ship has necessary Stores Necessary and Stores are both relative Words one having a relation to the accomplishing the thing intended and the other to future use All which Relations how they are confined to and terminate in Ideas derived from Sensation or Reflection is too obvious to need any Explication CHAP. XXVII Of other Relations § 1. BEsides the before-mentioned occasions of Time Place and Causality of comparing or referring Things one to another there are as I have said infinite others some whereof I shall mention First The first I shall name is some one simple Idea which being capable of Parts or Degrees affords an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another in respect of that simple Idea v. g. Whiter Sweeter Bigger Equal More c. These Relations depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple Idea in several Subjects may be called if one will Proportional and that these are only conversant about those simple Ideas received from Sensation or Reflection is so evident that nothing need be said to evince it § 2. Secondly Another occasion of comparing Things together or considering one thing so as to include in that Consideration some other thing is the circumstances of their origine or beginning which being not afterwards to be altered make the Relations depending thereon as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong v. g. Father and Son Brothers Cousin-Germanes c. which have their Relations by one Community of Bloud wherein they partake in several degrees Country-men i. e. those who were born in the same Country or Tract of Ground and these I call natural Relations Wherein me may observe that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life and not to the truth and extent of Things For 't is certain that in reality the Relation is the same betwixt the Begetter and the Begotten in the several Races of other Animals as well as Men But yet 't is seldom said This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf or that two Pigeons are Counsin-Germanes It is very convenient that by distinct Names these Relations should be observed and marked out in Mankind there being occasion both in Laws and other Communications one with another to mention and take notice of Men under these Relations From whence also arise the Obligations of several Duties amongst Men Whereas in Brutes Men having very little or no cause to mind those Relations they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar Names This by the way may give us some light into the different state and growth of Languages which being suited only to the convenience of Communication are proportioned to the Notions Men have and the commerce of Thoughts familiar amongst them and not to the reality or extent of Things nor to the various Respects might be found among them or the different abstract Considerations might be framed about them Where they had no philosophical Notions there they had no Terms to express them And 't is no wonder Men should have framed no Names for those Things they found no occasion to discourse of From whence it is easie to imagine why as in some Countries they may not have so much as the Name for an Horse and in others where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their Horses than of their own that there they may have not only Names for particular Horses but also of their several Relations of Kindred one to another § 3. Thirdly Sometimes the foundation of considering Things with reference to one another is some act whereby any one comes by a Moral Right Power or Obligation to do something Thus a General is one that hath power to command an Army and an Army under a General is a Collection of armed Men obliged to obey one Man A Citizen or a Burgher is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that place All this sort depending upon Mens Wills or Agreement in Society I call Instituted or Voluntary and may be distinguished from the natural in that they are most if not all of them some way or other alterable and separable from the Persons to whom they have sometimes
Men certain Ideas so constantly and readily that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them But that they signifie only Men's peculiar Ideas and that by a perfectly arbitrary Imposition is evident in that they often fail to excite in others even that use the same Language the same Ideas we take them to be the Signs of And every Man has so inviolable a Liberty to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases that no one hath the Power to make others have the same Ideas in their Minds that he has when they use the same Words that he does And therefore the great Augustus himself in the Possession of that Power which ruled the World acknowledged he could not make a new Latin Word which was as much as to say that he could not arbitrarily appoint what Idea any Sound should be a Sign of in the Mouths and common Language of his Subjects 'T is true common use by a tacit Consent appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages which so far limits the signification of that Sound that unless a Man applies it to the same Idea he cannot speak properly And it is also true that unless a Man's Words excite the same Ideas in the Hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking he cannot speak intelligibly But whatever be the consequences of his use of any Words different either from the Publick or that Person to whom he addresses them This is certain their signification in his use of them is limited to his Ideas and they can be Signs of nothing else CHAP. III. Of General Terms § 1. ALL Things that exist being Particulars it may perhaps be thought reasonable that Words which ought to be conformed to Things should be so too I mean in their Signification but yet we find the quite contrary The far greatest part of Words that make all Lauguages are general Terms which has not been the Effect of Neglect or Chance but of Reason and Necessity § 2. First It is impossible that every particular Thing should have a distinct peculiar Name For the signification and use of Words depending on that connection which the Mind makes between its Ideas and the Sounds it uses as Signs of them it is necessary in the Application of Names to Things that the Mind should have distinct Ideas of the Things and retain also the particular Name that belongs to every one with its peculiar appropriation to that Idea But it is beyond the Power of humane Capacity to frame and retain distinct Ideas of all the particular Things we meet with every Bird and Beast Men saw every Tree and Plant that affected the Senses could not find a Place in the most capacious Understanding If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious Memory That some Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army by his proper Name We may easily find a Reason why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock or Crow that flies over their Heads much less to call every Leaf of Plants or Grain of Sand that came in their way by a peculiar Name § 3. Secondly If it were possible it would yet be useless because it would not serve to the chief end of Language Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things that would not serve them to communicate their Thoughts Men learn Names and use them in Talk with others only that they may be understood which is then only done when by Use or Consent the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech excites in another Man's Mind who hears it the Idea I apply it to in mine when I speak it This cannot be done by Names apply'd to particular Things whereof I alone having the Ideas in my Mind the Names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very particular Things which had fallen under my notice § 4. Thirdly But yet granting this also fecible which I think is not yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of Knowledge which though founded in particular Things enlarges it self by general Views to which Things reduced into sorts under general Names are properly subservient These with the Names belonging to them come within some Compass and do not multiply every Moment beyond what either the Mind can contain or Use requires And therefore in these Men have for the most part stopp'd but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things by appropriated Names where Convenience demands it And therefore in their own Species which they have most to do with and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons there they make use of proper Names and distinct Individuals have distinct Denominations § 5. Besides Persons Countries also Cities Rivers Mountains and other the like Distinctions of Place have usually found peculiar Names and that for the same Reason they being such as Men have often an Occasion to mark particularly and as it were set before others in their Discourses with them And I doubt not but if we had Reason to mention particular Horses as often as we have to mention particular Men we should have proper Names for the one as familiar as for the other and Bucephalus would be a Word as much in use as Alexander And therefore we see that amongst Jockeys Horses have their proper Names to be known and distinguished by as commonly as their Servants Because amongst them there is often Occasion to mention this or that particular Horse when he is out of Sight § 6. The next thing to be considered is how general Words come to be made For since all Things that exist are only particulars how come we by general Terms or where find we those general Natures they are supposed to stand for Words become general by being made the signs of general Ideas and Ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of Time or Place or any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular Existence By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more Individuals than one each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract Idea is as we call it of that sort § 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our Notions and Names from their beginning and observe by what degrees we proceed and by what steps we enlarge our Ideas from our first infancy There is nothing more evident than that the Ideas of the Persons Children converse with to instance in them alone are like the Persons themselves only particular The Ideas of the Nurse and the Mother are well framed in their Minds and like Pictures of them there represent only those Individuals The Names they first give to them are confined to these Individuals and the names of Nurse and Mamma the
Hands laid upon it was told That now he touched the Head and then the Forehead Eyes Nose c. as his Hand moved over the Parts of the Picture on the Cloth without finding any the least distinction Whereupon he cried out that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of Workmanship which could represent to them all those Parts where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing § 13. He that should use the word Rainbow to one who knew all those Colours but yet had never seen that Phaenomenon would by enumerating the Figure Largeness Position and Order of the Colours so well define that word that it might be perfectly understood But yet that Definition how exact and perfect soever would never make a blind Man understand it because several of the simple Ideas that make that complex one being such as he never received by Sensation and Experience no Words are able to excite them in his Mind § 14. Simple Ideas as has been shewed can only be got by Experience from those Objects which are proper to produce in us those Perceptions When by this means we have our Minds stored with them and know the Names for them then we are in a condition to define and by Definition to understand the Names of complex Ideas that are made up of them But when any term stands for a simple Idea that a Man has never yet had in his Mind it is impossible by any Words to make known its meaning to him When any term stands for an Idea a Man is acquainted with but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it there another name of the the same Idea which he has been accustomed to may make him understand its meaning But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple Idea capable of a Definition Fourthly But though the Names of simple Ideas have not the help of Definition to determine their signification yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed Modes and Substances Because they standing only for one simple Perception Men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in their signification And there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning He that knows once that Whiteness is the name of that Colour he has observed in Snow or Milk will not be apt to misapply that Word as long as he retains that Idea which when he has quite lost he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it but perceives he understands it not There is neither a multiplicity of simple Ideas to be put together which makes the doubtfulness in the Names of mixed Modes nor a supposed but an unknown real Essence with Properties depending thereon the precise number whereof are also unknown which makes the difficulty in the Names of Substances But on the contrary in simple Ideas the whole signification of the Name is known at once and consists not of parts whereof more or less being put in the Idea may be varied and so the signification of its Name be obscure or uncertain § 16. Fifthly This farther may be observed concerning simple Ideas and their Names that they have but few Ascents in linea praedicamentali as they call it from the lowest Species to the summum Genus The reason whereof is that the lowest Species being but one simple Idea nothing can be left out of it that so the difference being taken away it may agree with some other thing in one common to them both which having one Name is the Genus of the other two v. g. There is nothing can be leâ—t out of the Idea of White and Red to make them agree in one common appearance and so have one general name as Rationality being left out of the complex Idea of Man makes it agree with Brute in the more general Idea and name of Animal And therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations Men would comprehend both White and Red and several other such simple Ideas under one general name they have been fain to do it by a Word which denotes only the way they get into the Mind For when White Red and Yellow are all comprehended under the Genus or name Colour it signifies no more but such Ideas as are produced in the Mind only by the Sight and have entrance only through the Eyes And when they would frame yet a more general term to comprehend both Colours and Sounds and the like simple Ideas they do it by a Word that signifies all such as come into the Mind only by one Sense And so the general term Quality in its ordinary acception comprehends Colours Sounds Tastes Smells and tangible Qualities with distinction from Extension Number Motion Pleasure and Pain which make impressions on the Mind and introduce their Ideas by more Senses than one § 17. Sixthly The Names of simple Ideas Substances and mixed Modes have also this difference That those of mixed Modes stand for Ideas perfectly arbitrary Those of Substances are not perfectly so but refer to a pattern though with some latitude and those of simple Ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of Things and are not arbitrary at all Which what difference it makes in the significations of their Names we shall see in the following Chapters The Names of simple Modes differ little from those of simple Ideas CHAP. V. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations § 1. THe Names of mixed Modes being general they stand as has been shewn for Sorts or Species of Things each of which has its peculiar Essence The Essences of these Species also as has been shewed are nothing but the abstract Ideas in the Mind to which the Name is annexed Thus far the Names and Essences of mixed Modes have nothing but what is common to them with other Ideas But if we take a little nearer survey of them we shall find that they have something peculiar which perhaps may deserve our attention § 2. The first Particularity I shall observe in them is that the abstract Ideas or if you please the Essences of the several Species of mixed Modes are made by the Vnderstanding wherein they differ from those of simple Ideas in which sort the Mind has no power to make any one but only receives such as are presented to it by the real Existence of Things operating upon it § 3. In the next place these Essences of the Species of mixed Modes are not only made by the Mind but made very arbitrarily made without Patterns or reference to any real Existence Wherein they differ from those of Substances which carry with them the supposition of some real Being from which they are taken and to which they are conformable But in its complex Ideas of mixed Modes the Mind takes a liberty not to follow the Existence of Things exactly It unites and retains certain Collections as so many distinct specifick Ideas whilst others that as often occur in
same Figures and Motions of any other and I challenge any one in his Thoughts to add any Thing else to one above another § 16. Thirdly If then neither one peculiar Atom alone can be this eternal thinking Being nor all Matter as Matter i. e. every particle of Matter can be it it only remains that it is some certain System of Matter duly put together that is this thinking eternal Being This is that which I imagine is that Notion which Men are aptest to have of GOD who would have him a material Being as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other Men which they take to be material thinking Beings But this Imagination however more natural is no less absurd than the other For to suppose the eternal thinking Being to be nothing else but a composition of Particles of Matter each whereof is incogitative is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being only to the juxta-position of parts than which nothing can be more absurd For unthinking Particles of Matter however put together can have nothing thereby added to them but a new relation of Position which 't is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them § 17. But farther this corporeal System either has all its parts at rest or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its Thinking consists If it be perfectly at rest it is but one lump and so can have no privileges above one Atom If it be the motion of its parts on which its Thinking depends all the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limitted since all the Particles that by Motion cause Thought being each of them in it self without any Thought cannot regulate its own Motions much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole since that Thought is not the cause of Motion for then it must be antecedent to it and so without it but the consequence of it whereby Freedom Power Choice and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite taken away So that such a thinking Being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind Matter since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind Matter or into Thought depending on unguided motions of blind Matter is the same thing not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis however full of them it be than that before-mentioned since let this thinking System be all or a part of the Matter of the Universe it is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own or the motion of any other Particle or the Whole know the motion of every Particular and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion § 18. Others would have Matter to be eternal notwithstanding that they allow an eternal cogitative immaterial Being This tho' it take not away the Being of a God yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his Workmanship the Creation let us consider it a little Matter must be allow'd eternal Why Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing why do you not also think your self eternal You will answer perhaps Because about twenty or forty years since you began to be But if I ask you what that You is which began to be you can scarce tell me The Matter whereof you are made began not then to be for if it did then it is not eternal But it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your Body but yet that frame of Particles is not You it makes not that thinking Thing You are for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal immaterial thinking Being but would have unthinking Matter eternal too therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be If it did never begin to be then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity the absurdity whereof I need not confute till I meet with one who is so void of Understanding as to own it If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing to be made out of nothing as all Things that are not eternal must be why also can you not allow it possible for a material Being to be made out of nothing by an equal Power but that you have the experience of the one in view and not of the other Though when well considered Creation of one as well as t'other requires an equal Power And we have no more reason to boggle at the effect of that Power in one than in the other because the manner of it in both is equally beyond our comprehension For the Creation or beginning of any one thing out of nothing being once admitted the Creation of every thing else but the CREATOR Himself may with the same ease be supposed § 19. But you will say Is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing since we cannot possibly conceive it I answer No 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite Being because we cannot comprehend its Operations We do not deny other effects upon this ground because we cannot possibly conceive their Production we cannot conceive how Thought or any thing but motion in Body can move Body and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible against the constant Experience we have of it in our selves in all our voluntary Motions which are produced in us only by the free Thoughts of our own Minds and are not nor cannot be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind Matter in or upon our Bodies for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it For example My right Hand writes whilst my left Hand is still What causes rest in one and motion in the other Nothing but my Will a Thought of my Mind my Thought only changing the right Hand rests and the left Hand moves This is matter of fact which cannot be denied Explain this and make it intelligible and then the next step will be to understand Creation In the mean time 't is an overvaluing our selves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacities and to conclude all things impossible to be done whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension This is to make our Comprehension infinite or GOD finite when what he can do is limitted to what we can conceive of it If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite Mind that thinking Thing within you do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind who made and governs all Things and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain CHAP. XI Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things § 1. THe Knowledge of our own Being