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A61552 The doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome truly represented in answer to a book intituled, A papist misrepresented, and represented, &c. Stillingfleet, Edward, 1635-1699. 1686 (1686) Wing S5590; ESTC R21928 99,480 174

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fixed Principles of Reason in Mankind concerning the Nature and Properties of Bodies For 1. We must still suppose the Body of Christ to be the very same individual Body which suffered upon the Cross but if it have no extension of Parts and be reckoned independent upon Place it ceaseth to be a Body It is granted that after a natural way of Existence a Body cannot be in more Places than one but let the way of Existence be what it will if it be a Body it must be finite if finite it must be limited and circumscribed if it be circumscribed within one place it cannot be in more places for that is to make it circumscribed and not circumscribed undivided from it self and divided from it self at the same time Which is a manifest Contradiction which doth not depend only on Quantity or Extension but upon the essential Unity of a Body 2. If it be possible for a Body to be in several Places by a Supernatural Existence why may not the same Body be in several Places by a Natural Existence Is it not because Extension and Circumscription are so necessary to it that in a natural Way it can be but in one Place Then it follows that these are essential Properties of Bodies so that no true Body can be conceived without them 3. This Supernatural Existence doth not hinder the Body's being individually present in on Place My meaning is this A Priest Consecrates an Host at London and another at York is the Body of Christ at London so present there by virtue of Consecration as to be present at York too by this Supernatural Existence What then doth the Consecration at York produce If it be not then its Presence is limited to the Host where the Consecration is made and if it be so limited then this supernatural Existence cannot take off its Relation to Place 4. The same Body would be liable to the greatest Contradictions imaginable For the same Body after this supernatural way of Existence may not only be above and below within and without near and far off from it self but it may be hot and cold dead and alive yea in Heaven and Hell at once 5. What is it that makes it still a Body after this supernatural way of Existence c. if it lose extension and dependency on Place If it be only an aptitude to extension when that supernatural Existence is taken off then it must either be without Quantity or with it If it be without quantity how can it be a Body If with quantity how is it possible to be without Extension 6. This confounds all the differencs of Greater and Less as well as of Distance and Nearness For upon this Supposition a thing really greater may be contained within a less for the whole Original Body of Christ with all its Parts may be brought within the compass of a Waser and the whole be in every part without any distance between Head and Feet 7. This makes Christ to have but one Body and yet to have as many Bodies as there are consecrated Hosts No saith our Author This supernatural manner of Existence is without danger of multiplying his Body or making as many Christs as Altars P. 11. But how this can be is past all human Understanding For every Consecration hath its Effect which is supposed to be the Conversion of the Substance of the Bread into the Body of Christ. Now when a Priest at London converts the Bread into the Body of Christ there he doth it not into the Body of Christ at York but the Priest there doth it therefore the Body of Christ at London is different from that at York or else the Conversion at London would be into the Body as at York But if not what is the substantial Term of this substantial Change where nothing but an accidental Mode doth follow If there be any such Term whether that must not be a Production of something which was not before and if it be so Christ must have as many new Bodies as there are Consecrations 8. This makes that which hath no particular Subsistence of its own to be the Subject of a substantial Change for this is the condition of Christ's Body whatever its manner of Existence be after the Hypostatical Union to the Divine Nature For when Bellarmin Petavius and others of their greatest Divines undertake against Nestorius to explain the Hypostatical Union they tell us it consists in this that the Human Nature loseth its proper Subsistence and is assumed into the Subsistence of the Divine Nature From whence I infer That the Body of Christ having no proper Subsistence of its own there can be no substantial Change into that which hath no proper Subsistence but into that which hath and consequently the Change must be into the Divine Nature principally from whence it will follow the Elements losing their Subsistence upon Consecration the Divinity must be united hypostatically to them as to the Human Nature and so there will be as many Hypostatical Unions as there are Consecrations And so this Doctrine not only confounds Sense and Reason but the Mysteries of Christ's Incarnation too Which I think is sufficient for this Head VI. Of Merits and Good Works FOR the true stating this Controversy we are to observe 1. That we do not charge those of the Church of Rome That they believe Christ's Death and Passion to be ineffectual and insignificant and that they have no dependence on the Merits of his Sufferings or the Mercy of God for attaining Salvation but that they are to be saved only by their own Merits and Good Works as the Misrepresenter saith Pag. 12. 2. We do not charge them with denying the necessity of Divine Grace in order to Merit or with asserting that they can merit independently thereupon 3. We do by no means dispute about the Necessity of Good Works in order to the Reward of another Life or assert that Christ's Merits will save Men without working out their own Salvation but do firmly believe that God will judg Men according to their Works The Question then is Whether the Good Works of a just Man as our Author expresses it are truly meritorious of Eternal Life Which he affirms but qualifies with saying That they proceed from Grace and that through God's Goodness and Promise they are truly meritorious But the Council of Trent denounces an Anathema against those who deny the Good Works of justified Persons to be truly meritorious of the increase of Grace and of Eternal Life Here then lies the Point in difference 1. Whether such Good Works can be said to be truly meritorious 2. Whether those who deny it deserve an Anathema for so doing As to what relates to God's Acceptance and Allowance and his Goodness and Promise we freely own all that he saith about it and if no more be meant what need an Anathema about this matter There must therefore be something beyond this when Good Works are