him that willeth nor him that runneth but of God that sheweth mercy Wherefore man cannot will or do a theological good act of himself although he may from himself but of God XIX Before I leave this controversie it is requisite to examine that Scripture of the ninth to the Romans which seemeth to evert most of what hath been posed in this Chapter vers 13 14 15 16. As it is written Jacob have I loved but Esau have I hated What shall we say then is there unrighteousnesse with God God forbid For he saith to Moses I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that sheweth mercy 1. Hence they may argue If God hated Esau then he hated also all his actions and consequently hated his prayers Wherefore there was no means left in Esau whereby to procure God's extraordinary concurss Ergo All men have not the means in them whereby c. This also proveth that Esau had no spark of good in him and therefore God did totally hate him for had he had any good in him God could not have hated that good 2. Jacob have I loved Ergo Jacob had never any evil in him for had he had evil in him God could not have loved him 3. The Scripture makes enquiry Whether it is unrighteousnesse with God to hate Esau and love Jacob. Ergo It is not severe that God should hate one and love another to damn one justly and to save another Gratis velex gratia 4. Moses saith that God will have mercy on whom he will have mercy and whom he will he hardneth Ergo Man hath no free-will to do good In answer to the first inference I deny the sequel For it doth not follow that God because Esau had no good in him or means to procure God's favour hated Esau but God hated Esau for not using the means which was in him Rom. 2. 15. Here may be urged that God hated Esau from all eternity Ergo Esau could never have had the means to salvation I deny the consequence God hated Esau from all eternity because he fore-knew his actions and intents from all eternity Here may be demanded How God can fore-know mans actions since they are contingent were they necessary he might Let the Scripture answer you in this Rom. 9. 20. We are not to dive into God's manner of working farther than he hath revealed to us and nevertheless we must believe that all things are possible to God and that he is Elohim Heb. 1. 3. Luc. 1. 37. Phil. 3. 21. 2 Chron. 20. 5. Matth. 19 26. Esay 9. 6. Jer. 32. 18. Gen. 17. 1. 35. 11. Ruth 1. 20 21. 2 Cor. 6. 18. Revel 1. 8. 4. 8. 1 Tim. 6. 9. Neither is it a legal inference that because God hated Esau therefore Esau had no remnant of good in him he might have had good in him and yet God have hated him not for having that good but for not exercising it God might also have hated Esau from all eternity for his sins and evil actions which God foresaw from all eternity and yet he might have had a principle of Good in him As for the second Argumentation I deny the consequence for it doth not follow that Jacob had never no evil in him because God did love him for God loved David and yet it is apparent enough that David had evil in him Rom. 7. 24. Paul calleth himself wretched yet it is certain that God loved him God pardoneth their sins because they are committed by them not with an entire will but with a reluctancy Romans 7. 20 23. To the third I answer It is no severity in God to love one and hate the other supposing that God can fore-know all man's evil actions and therefore hateth him He may also fore-know his good actions and come to love him from all eternity yet not because his actions are absolutely good in themselves Luc. 17. 10. Rom. 11. 35 36. 1 John 1. 8. Esay 64. 6. Psal. 130. 3. but because God out of his grace and mercy doth impute his actions to him for righteousnesse Rom. 4. 21 22 23 24. Ephes. 2. 8 9. Phil. 3. 9. Col. 3. 24. 2 Tim. 1. 16. But it would be severe should God hate us from all eternity if we should falsly suppose that God did not fore-know our actions so that herein you conclude nothing against me If in the fourth place God sheweth mercy to those onely to whom he will and hardneth their hearts whose he pleaseth to harden it will prove in vain to man to work good works or to will good neither can he will or do good without God's grace and mercy All this I grant to be a certain truth that we can do no good work without God's grace and mercy and no doubt but God hath also a free-will to conferre grace and mercy on whom he pleaseth and harden those whom he pleaseth to harden working all things according to the counsel of his own will Ephes. 1. 5 6 11. Revel 4. 11. Psal. 135. 6. Psal. 33. 9. Matth. 8. 2 3. Neverthelesse this is no ground why we should argue that man hath no free-will because God hath a free-will we rather ought to surmise the contrary That man hath a free-will because God hath a free-will Gen. 1. 26. God doth work in us to will and to do of his good pleasure or will Phil. 2. 13. Ergo God's will doth not abolish our wils but his will is that we should have a will But possibly you do farther urge this argument by subducting Predestination from thence thus If man is predestinated Ergo He hath no free will of doing good for a free-will in him would be in vain This Text doth apparently teach God's eternal Decree Predestination or Ordination to save some and damn others But for what for to manifest his Glory Mercy and Justice Acts 13. 48. And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed Isa. 46. 10. Mal 3. 6. Hereunto I answer that God's Predestination is in no wise coactive for were it so then Predestination and Fate of the Stoicks would not differ What is fate but an irresistable and forced impulse upon man through which he doth necessarily and unavoidably perform all his actions and especially such which concern his life and death his ruine or advancement in politick affairs his marriage or any other extraordinary change of life for in all these fate was most taken notice of and therefore more particularly attributed to them cases Although fate in general denoted an unchangeable and necessary ordination upon all beings Whether this ordination was imposed by Jupiter as the Poets feigned or caused from a necessary bending and disposing of the Heavens and its constellations as the Chaldeans thought doth not much concern us in this Treatise Cicero was not a little puzzeld in expounding how
Whether a man hath a free-will or a remnant of theologick good in him whereby he may procure God's extraordinary assistance through himself or whether God doth stirre up that spark of Good being moved through his own mercy and not by what can proceed from man for many hold that man hath no spark of Good remaining in him and consequently cannot be thence supposed to have a free-will to beg God's extraordinary assistance but it is God who doth out of his singular goodnesse free-will and pleasure towards singular men cast and infuse a measure of theologick good in them through which they are made capable of having accesse to God and of praying to him and this they say Scripture implies by a new creation regeneration conversion or the becoming of a new man No doubt but this latter tenent is erroneous and absurd First They affirm That man hath no spark of theologick good remaining in him This is false as hath been proved already and shall be demonstrated more at large elsewhere Secondly Hereby they imply that man doth alwayes act evil and consequently acteth evil necessarily without a free-will And wherein doth he then differ from a Beast Thirdly Should God cast his mercy or goodnesse upon that which is altogether evil it followeth that God should love that which is altogether evil but that is repugnant to God's nature that being most good doth necessarily reject that from it which is most evil Fourthly Should God stirre up that spark of Good in man it proveth that that Good is of no efficacy and for no purpose which is repugnant to common reason concluding that all things which are are for to operate and for an end and are not in vain Therefore this spark of Good doth and can operate for an end to save it self and glorifie God especially being accompanied with God's ordinary concurrence it is directly as by a guide led to God's extraordinary concurrence and assistance So then if there be a spark of theologick Good remaining in man as without doubt there is it is of the same Nature with that which was in the first man before his fall who having a free-will to good and evil infers that this spark must necessarily retain the same free-will to good and evil but in an improportionable manner since that man's will is much more habituated to evil which doth much dead that weak remnant of good in him It is certain God doth equally impart his mercy and goodnesse to natural men because they are of an equal state Then again I object If so then all men would become theologically Good which is erroneous Wherefore I say God is no more good or mercifull to one natural man than to another and consequently there must be somewhat in men whereby one doth move God to mercy before another and what is that but that spark of Good Notwithstanding this inference holds good only ordinarily and doth not infer but that God extraordinarily may be pleased out of his free-will and pleasure to conferre bounties and mercies upon those to whom he will be bountifull and mercifull XVI 5. It is a simple Question to demand Whether the will is free at that instant when it acteth which is as much as if you enquired Whether the act of the will were free Certainly there can be no freedom allotted to the act or effect of an efficient for that followeth necessarily Posita causa ponitur effectus The cause being stated the effect is also stated By the act of the will I mean the consent of the will or the last execution of it which is named Actus imperatus But if the Question be understood De actu eliciendo then no doubt but the will is free at the same instant when it acteth for when would it be free else were it not when it acteth This Query may be apprehended thus Whether the will is free that is Whether it doth not act necessarily è suppositione Necessitas è suppositione is through which the will cannot act otherwise than it acteth when it doth act According to this supposition it doth act necessarily Nam impossibile est idem simul esse non esse For it is impossible that a thing should be and not be at the same instant Neverthelesse this doth not clip any whit from the freedom of man's will for freedom of the will is properly in actum eliciendo and in actum imperando but not in actu elicito vel imperato that is before the act is consented unto for the will before she consenteth to any act can determinate it freely to either opposite In short the will is free in its faculty but its acts are necessary CHAP. X. Of Free-will from Scripture 1. Objections from Scripture against man's free-will 2. An Answer to the said Objections 3. Objections proving that moral good is evil 4. The first Objection answered 5. The second Objection removed 6. Some other Texts produced against free-will in man 7. The first Text reconciled 8. The second Objection removed 9. Arguments deduced from faith An answer to the said Arguments 10. The first Argument drawn from Scripture to prove man's free-will to good and evil 11. A second Argument proving the same 12. A third Argument 13. Many other Texts inferring the same 14. Texts proving a remnant of good in man 15. Texts proving that a natural man cannot do a theologick good act through himself and being only assisted with the ordinary concurss of God 16. Scriptures inferring that a supernatural man hath no free-will to direct contraries that is to do theologick good and evil An answer to some Texts produced by Bellarmin 17. Scripture proofs concluding that the means whereby God's extraordinary concurrence is procured is in man and adheres to his free-will 18. Whether man's actions performed with God's extraordinary assistance are to be taken for the actions of God or of man 19. A reconciliation of the ninth to the Romans The unfolding of Predestination or of God's eternal Decree I. THe precedent Dispute touching Free-will is not so much held among natural men as between them who conceive themselves to be gifted As for the first I have already endeavoured to satisfie them And as for these last they alledging sacred Texts for their opinions plead with more force than the former Wherefore it will not be amisse to examine their Arguments and afterwards to produce such others as most orthodox Divines do urge for the proof of their tenents The first Scripture which they seem to produce against us is that in the Prov. 16. 9. A mans heart deviseth his way but the Lord directeth his steps And in Chap. 21. 1. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the Rivers of water he turneth it whither soever he will And in the next fore-going Chapter vers 24. Mans goings are of the Lord how can a man then understand his own way Jer. 10. 23. O Lord I know that the way of man is not in himself it
is not in man that walketh to direct his steps Phil. 2. 13. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure II. In answer to these I confesse they are most undoubted truths but they are so farre from making against us that they prove part of what I stated in the fore-going Chapter Without God we cannot act will or live that is through our selves alone and without God's ordinary concurrence with us so that Solomon saith well That man may devise his way that is God hath given man a power of Acting But the Lord directeth his steps that is he hath not given man so absolute a power but that he needs God's ordinary concurrence So St Paul God worketh in you both to will and to do that is hath given us a will and an essence through which we do act and God doth conservate us in that will and essence for without his continual influence we cannot abide in our being or actions But that which they ought to prove is that God's concurrence with man in his actions taketh away his free-will III. They may also oppose against the 1. subconclus of the 1. conclus in the ninth Chapter to wit that moral good is absolutely evil Rom. 8. 7. Because the carnal mind is enmity against God c. But moral good is effected by them who are carnally minded Therefore it is enmity against God that is absolutely evil Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of faith is sin But moral good is not of faith Ergo It is a sin or evil Matth. 15. 9. But in vain do they worship me teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men But moral good acts are onely such as the Doctrine of man teacheth Therefore they are in vain and evil IV. I answer to the first and except against the Major which is What ever proceeds from a carnal mind is absolutely evil I distinguish that evil is two-fold 1. Evil in particular Malum in particulari which is effected from an evil individual or particular man 2. Evil in common Malum in communi or absolute evil which is evil in it self and is evil if performed by any man whether good or evil Take my Solution thus What ever proceeds from a carnal minded man is evil in particular relatively as it proceeds from him because it is from an evil man in particular But this evil in particular doth not make that evil in common that is evil to all For example eating and drinking in an evil man or what ever an evil man doth is evil but because eating and drinking is evil in an evil man it doth not follow that eating and drinking is evil to all so as to extend also to good men now eating and drinking and what ever an evil man doth is evil because he eats and drinks unworthily and ungratefully in not acknowledging God to be the Creator of the food which is set before him and in not returning thanks for it 1 Thes. 5. 18. So that I say whatever an evil man doth is evil because he doth it unworthily Hence I may deny the Minor and say That a moral good act which is effected by an evil man is evil in particular neverthelesse it abides moral good that is good in common Tit. 1. 15. Wherefore this concludes nothing against my assertion viz. That a natural man can do a moral good act that is if he be a good natural or moral man for it is possible to a natural man to be good and evil and yet be natural V. As to the second I deny the Minor Because moral good in a good natural man is of faith yet not of entire faith for he believeth that God gave him his being and power of acting He believeth in God that he will supply him in all defects Of this more elswhere So that the Major is most true for whatever is not of faith is sin All our actions must be good that is such as God doth require from us But if we do not believe God or believe in him we cannot perform such actions as are pleasing to him for in not believing him is to rob God of all his Attributes of his Mercy Goodnesse Power c. therein they make God a liar and no wonder then if men's actions are evil in God's sight when they perform them without faith The last Objection doth require little else for answer than what was made to the first VI. Further there are other Texts offer'd arguing that man hath no free-will to do good or evil That he hath no free-will to do good is proved by the 6th Chapter of Gen. 5. vers And God saw that the wickednesse of man was great in the earth and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was onely evil continually Gen. 8. 21. For the imagination of mans heart is evil from his youth Rom. 7. 18. For I know that in me dwelleth no good thing Job 15. 16. How much more abominable and filthy is man which drinketh iniquity like water 1 Cor. 6. 19. Eccles. 7. 20. Hence they conclude that man doth alwayes act evil and consequently hath no free-will to good VII I answer that these Texts do not imply man in general that is all men but only wicked men or the most part of men I prove it Were all men implyed by these Texts then there never were any good men but there were many good men then as Moses Abraham c. Therefore all men are not implyed by the said Texts 2. And particularly to the first Text I say that there were many men but they were not natural for had they been natural they could not have been so perverse as quite to have forgotten God and to have denied him who were preternaturally evil that is confirmd Atheists who plainly deni'd God's Essence or Existence No doubt these cannot doe a good act or think a good thought because they act and think with an entire and absolute unbelief Wherefore it is a certain moral saying that none can do good without faith Again That man hath no free-will to evil is inferred by that Scripture of the 7th to the Romans For the good that I would do I do not but the evil which I would not that I do Jer. 13. 23. Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the Leopard his spots then may ye also do good that are accustomed to do evil Hence they infer that a man acteth evil necessarily In the first place the Question is not of an evil action but of a free-will to will good and evil Wherefore the first quotation makes for us That a man doth will good although he doth not alwayes act it for saith he The good which I would do I do not Here the Apostle speaks of himself as he is a natural man for as otherwise no question he could will good and do good If as a natural man then a natural man can will good although he doth not act
moral or voluntary actions We need not augment the number of internal principles by adding Habits to them these being supposed to alter the forestated principles accidentally only and not essentially How Habits ' are acquired and how intended remitted and corrupted we have set down elswhere Neither are God or Angels properly said to be external principles since all principles strictly are required to be internal But God may be justly termed the coefficient of the actions of man since God worketh in us to will and to do Angels whether good or evil Wizards and Witches cannot concur efficiently to the effecting of humane actions to which an infinite power is onely sufficient whereas they consisting of a limited power are therefore render'd uncapable They may concurre to the specification of an act as persuasive causes in bending man's will to this or that act by changing the phansie in stirring up the humours and spirits of the brain whereby it may represent objects otherwise than they are or by presenting objects through a false image or representation or by changing the external sensories Whence we may observe that it is not in the Devils power to make or force us to doe a thing against our wils but that we may discover resist and refuse his deceitfull motions or otherwise we might be justly thought excusable wherefore if we do at any time commit evil through the perswasion of an evil spirit we must not onely accuse the wicked spirit but our selves also After our discourse upon the will there remains alone to appose a word or two touching humane actions II. Humane actions otherwise called moral and voluntary are such as are effected by man as farre as he is a man or are produced by his will or practick understanding Wherefore whatever man acteth with the fore-knowledge and fore-command of his practick understanding is humane and voluntary A voluntary action may be purely voluntary and free or mixt out of a Voluntas and Noluntas that is willed with a reluctancy The first acception of Voluntary Aristotle terms voluntary strictly so called the latter he denominates involuntary but improperly III. It is absurd to assert man to do a thing ignorantly since it is impossible for a man to do any thing which he doth not fore-know Wherefore it must be an errour in the Peripateticks to affirm that man can act an involuntarium quiddam ex ignorantia because he acteth nothing but what is consented unto partially or totally by his will which cannot will any thing as the Peripatetick definition holds forth without the foreknowledge of the understanding Hence I conclude that nothing is to be termed involuntary or mixtly voluntary unlesse a man is forced to it violently or by a cause acting from without IV. Here may be demanded Whether evils of omission of duties required by a Law committed by man when he is ignorant of the said Law are to be termed involuntary No certainly for they are voluntary in that the omission of an act is as much an act of the will as the effection of it But whether such omissions or commissions which a man doth will are to be termed evil in regard he willed them through ignorance which had he not been ignorant of he would not have willed is to be decided from the circumstances of such actions and not from the imputing such actions not to be the actions of man or not to be voluntary Moreover I answer That no kind of ignorance doth make an action neutral that is neither good or evil and excusable but an invincible ignorance What invincible ignorance and other kinds of ignorances are I do wittingly omit the inserting since they are vulgarly enough known As for such circumstances which are required to render humane actions good or evil I have set down in the latter end of this Book V. The action of the will is accidentally divided in fruition and intention Fruition is the continuated coveting and willing of an object already before coveted and now enjoyed Intention is a mediate coveting of means whereby to covet an object immediately or to arrive to the fruition of it Intention contains in it three inferiour actions 1. Election whereby the practick understanding doth by a preceding deliberation covet one or more objects for a means out of many 2. Consent which is a further coveting of that or them objects which it hath elected so as to be confirmed and pleased in that election 3. Usus or Usance otherwise called execution which is the application of the means now elected and consented unto to a further action CHAP. XIII Of Natural Faith 1. That Faith is the sole means through which we are to attain to our greatest good What Faith is The Definition confirmed by Arguments deduced from reason 2. The two-fold object of Faith A proof from reason that God is the Creator of man That God and Nature are one 3. An enquiry into the end of man's creation 4. That man doth know the summe of God's Law through the light of Nature A summary enumeration of the Law of God as it is imprinted upon every man's heart 5. Moral virtues compared with the moral Law A comprehension of all moral virtues I Have just now finisht my Discourse upon the subject of this Tract that which fals next under our consideration is the means through which we are to attain to our greatest Good and happinesse The sole means is Faith Faith is a certain knowledge of God and the Law and an assurance in and of God's mercy and goodnesse The genus proximum and differentia proxima are signals that their Definitum or thing defined is not an historical or temporary faith or saith of miracles onely but a justifying and glorifying faith necessarily comprehending in it self the three other kinds as degrees by which the soul doth gradually ascend to an exalting faith Among other School-Divines it goeth under the name of an explicite Faith Fides the same with the Definitum deriveth its denomination from fidere a word not in use among the later Latinists whose signification the verb confidere hath since supplied which is to rest contented and fully satisfied Wherefore assurance implying a certain practical knowledge freed from all doubts and causing this rest and satisfaction doth justly and properly deserve the place of the Genus in this Definition The certainty which Faith doth bring with it depends upon the certainty and necessity of its premises which being necessary and certain infers a certain and necessary conclusion If God is mercifull he will save them that beg mercy But God is mercifull and I do beg mercy Therefore God will save me This Conclusion as depending upon unchangeable and certain premises holds forth that Faith is an undoubted assurance of God's mercy and that he will save a zealous believer No wonder then if Faith doth create this quietnesse rest and satisfaction Austin de Civit. Dei lib. 19. cap. 18. tels us no lesse To the Acadamicks all things are
to the owner which is only possible in unfixt and untied matters V. I have briefly enumerated the contents of the Moral Law according as it is engraffed upon all mens hearts This Law is perfect and compleat because there is no moral precept belonging to any moral virtue but is contained herein neither is there any vice but is hereby checked and condemned Wherefore I shall compare them together to wit moral Virtues with the moral Law A virtue is a habit of acting good on the other side vice is a habit of acting evil Virtue or vice may be termed moral or theologick according to the act which it produceth which is either moral good or evil or theologick good or evil So holinesse is a habit of acting according to the Law of God Sin is a habit of acting contrary to the Law of God according it is written in all mens hearts That this Law is known to all men it appears hence because all men are checked by their conscience at one time or another for their sins There are four cardinal or principal Virtues Prudence Justice Temperance and Fortitude Prudence is a habit through which a man is directed in exercising particular virtues It s integrant parts are three 1. The remembrance of things past 2. The knowledge of things present 3. The fore-sight of things to come Thomas Aquinas counteth eight 1. Memory 2. Knowledge 3. Aptnesse to learn 4. Cunningnesse 5. Reason 6. Fore-sight 7. Circumspection 8. Caution The subjected parts of Prudence are four 1. Kingly prudence in governing his Subjects 2. Politick prudence of the People in obeying the Magistrate 3. Oeconomical prudence in governing a family 4. Military prudence in ruling an Army The potential parts of prudence are three 1. Inquiry for means 2. Judgement concerning the means invented 3. Command that them things be effected upon which judgement is past Justice is a virtue of giving every one what is his It s integral parts are three 1. To live honestly 2. To give every one what is his 3. To wrong no man The subjected parts of Justice are two 1. General Justice through which a man deals justly with the Commonwealth 2. Special or particular Justice through which a man deals justly with every particular person Special Justice is two-fold 1. Commutative Justice through which a man is just in his trading with others 2. Distributive Justice which is either recompencing every one for his good deserts or punishing every one for his crimes in which there is observed a Geometrical proportion and in commutative Justice an Arithmetical proportion Right is that which agreeth with the Law or Justice It is either natural or positive humane or divine Ecclesiastick or civil written or not written A Law is a rule command or precept of Justice containing in it what is just and what ought to be done There are three conditions required to the constitution of a Law 1. Equity 2. Authority 3. Promulgation or the publishing of it A Law is either external or participated The participated Law is divided in Natural Humane and Divine The Humane Law is either Civil or Canonical The Divine Law is divided into the old and new Law Temperance is a habit of moderating the senses particularly the senses of feeling and tasting The integral parts are two 1. Bashfulnesse 2. Honesty The potential parts are four Continence Clemency Humility and Modesty The subjected parts are Abstinence Sobriety Chastity and Shamefac'dnesse Fortitude is a virtue in attempting terrible matters Its acts are two 1. To uphold 2. To go on The integral parts of Fortitude are Magnanimity Magnificence Patience and Perseverance A man must not only have a bare knowledge of God's Law or of the moral Virtues but also a practick knowledge that is to know them in himself so as to practise them CHAP. XIV Of Man's Fall and of Atheism 1. A rational enquiry into man's primitive estate The maenner of man's fall 2. Grounds whence a man may rationally collect hopes for his restoration 3. That Atheism is the worst of sins and that an Atheist is unable of performing the least good act Wherein the goodnesse of an action doth consist 4. A Character of an Atheist That confirmed Atheism is the onely sinne against the holy Ghost A full Discovery of an Atheist THe other part of the object of Faith is Gods mercy and goodnesse how a natural man comes to find out God's mercy I shall instantly demonstrate Man having compared the difficulty of the Law with his unablenesse of performing obedience to it cannot rest satisfied or assured unlesse relieved and assisted by these two Attributes of God for he being conscious of his pravity and corrupt state of nature must imagine that he was not so created but good and blessed because the Creator is good and blessed and being left to his free-will knowing what was good and what might be evil he through a wanton curiosity and alurement of an evil spirit which spirits were created before man and whose nature it hath alwayes been to tempt man and draw him into evil as shall be proved by reason elsewhere was overswayed to try evil one act of which had not God through his grace prevented it might have been valid enough to corrupt his nature in such a manner that he would have been rendred uncapable of ever recovering his former state or of acting a good act By reason that the commission of one evil act must needs have effected a privation of that habit which he once had of working good for they being acts proceeding from two contrary habits the latter must have expelled the former which would have remained unrecoverable because à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus After a privation a habit cannot return Put out your sight once and you will never recover it Wherefore it must have followed that man being arrived to this depraved state of nature must have become a meer alien from God in whose former resemblance his happinesse did consist Furthermore the immortal spirit expiring out of the body in that condition abideth eternally in absence and dissemblance from God which two cases makes its state most wofull and dismal Thus you may remark that it is possible to a natural man by way of a Sorites to collect his first beatitude deficience guilt and punishment II. Is it not then a man's greatest concernment to bestir himself in this need and defect for a means of restoration Here may be demanded How can a man hope for restoration if the habit of acting good is quite extirpated and that from a privation to a habit there is no returning 2. Why may not a man have the same hopes of restoration here in this world as well as out of it as the Papists hold To the first I answer That extirpation may be understood in a two-fold representation 1. As it represents a total extinction and annihilation Nihil remanente sui 2. As it doth represent not a total yet almost
must also expect her preservation from a spirit hence concludes that the same spirit to whom he acknowledgeth his Creation and existence must be the onely means of his preservation and restitution The soul having now discovered a means she directs her next aim to a further search How and whereby to procure the said means she argues with her self God through his goodnesse hath given me a being Summum Bonum est sui maximè diffusivum And the same attribute which moved him to confer an essence upon me will certainly move him to preserve it from perishing and restore it to its primitive state This produces a hope in the soul which is a middle passion between a certain knowledge and an utter despair partaking somewhat of an assurance and as much of a Despair During this anguish the soul further disputes with her self God is good and therefore will save her on the other side her conscience accuseth her in that she hath put her happinesse at a stake by offending against the goodnesse of God and deflecting from her primitive perfection which no doubt but God's justice will be satisfied for God's justice is an attribute whereby he separateth all those from his presence that are unlike to him The soul now in a tempest surrounded with innumerable waves of doubts and commotions of spirit laboureth with all her strength to come to an anchor or to make for a harbour here she beats against the rock of God's justice ready to founder then beats off again to Gods goodnesse and saves her self from danger of the first stroak yet the same perill being imminent upon her she agreeth with her self to steer another course whereby to consult her safety at last lighteth upon an infallible Pilot God's mercy which brings her clear off to a harbour of assurance and quietness which is a natural faith III. God's mercy is an attribute through which he is moved to succour a perishing soul labouring for its own recovery This attribute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the capacity of humane reason is called compassion and pity Compassion in us is an endeavouring to help a man grappling with his misery The same compassion hath a resemblance to that which is in God although infinitely inferiour to it for we spying the misery wherein a man is involved bearing down and overcoming his happinesse do endeavour from a principle of love through which we incline to what ever is like to us and reject what ever is unlike to support and aid him by adjoyning a force of the same nature to that which is suppressed But when a man is render'd altogether miserable and unsupportable then we reject him and our compassion towards him ceaseth because his misery hath overcome his happinesse or his evil hath totally expelled his good and so he remains in a desperate state for instance A man who is a going to be hanged for sacriledge and he persisting in his crime untill the last is desperate and quite lost as having no good in him now our compassion cannot be moved towards such an one because he is totally evil whom to pitty proveth in vain IV. But to return to the exposition of the definition of mercy First I say it is an Attribute God's Attributes are principles and perfections whereby we conceive him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to effect acts really distinct one from the other They are called Attributes because we attribute them to him thereby to make a distinction in our understandings of the several acts proceeding as it were from distinct powers which really do not for in God there is no distinction to be imagined that supposing a composition and a composition an imperfection so that what ever we attribute to any of God's Attributes is to attribute it to God himself Nihil est in Deo quin sit ipse Deus There is nothing in God but what is God himself V. The Act which floweth from God's mercy doth succour and strengthen the soul in this contention by expelling the cloudinesse which the material species and depravate appetite of the body have cast about it whereby they draw the soul from God and inchant her to sottish pleasures God's mercy is distinguisht from his goodnesse because through his goodnesse he acteth that which is good totâ suâ Naturâ in it self or acteth upon good having no part of evil opposing it as to create man or the world or to preserve man in his innocence His mercy hath a respect to good as it is opposed by evil as to redeem man is an act of God's mercy CHAP. XVI Of the Light and Darknesse of Man's practick understanding 1. That Light and Darknesse are analogal to principles of good and evil 2. Queries concerning Light and Darknesse 3. The two kinds of Light What the first Light is and how it produceth the second Light 4. What the Habit of Light is That the first man acted without habits How a habit is acquired 5. That the first man acted through a natural disposition and not through any habits I. WE have sometimes made mention of Good and Evil Light and Darknesse which being in this Treadse stated the two principles of mans actions whether good or evil it will not be impertinent to unfold the nature of each By the way you are to take notice that Light is analogal to the principle of good and darknesse to the principle of evil which analogy containing a clear and expresse emblem of good and evil we shall therefore the rather retaine its Analogata for to explain II. Concerning Light and Darknesse may be inquired 1. What Light is or what the habit of Light is 2. What Darknesse is and how it is to be taken in this place 4. How it is otherwise called 5. How it got its first footing in man 6. What proportion there is between the remaining Light and this habit of Darknesse 7. How two contrary habits can both inhere in the same subject at the same time 8. Whether the habit of Light is a habitus per se and the habit of Darknesse a habitus per accidens 9 How one contrary habit doth act against the other 10. How the one at last happens to extirpate the other III. Light as you may know further in the second Book part 2. is either primitive or derivative The first is called Lux and through its emanative power is by some said to cause the second otherwise named Lumen or in English the former may be rendred a Light the latter an Enlightning The soul her self is the primitive Light which irradiates or enlighteneth the whole body This illumination is more splendid and of greater lustre in the brain and animal spirits than in any other part because the Lumen is reflexed through a repercussion against the arterial and membranous parts of the brain IV. The habit of Light is nothing else but the facility or easinesse of the first Light in actuating the second which hapneth through a lesse opposition